ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: (sworn states)
FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RICHARD: Thank you Chair. Thank you, Mr Ismail. We've heard that there were a number of discussions between you and Mr McBride during 1986. Do you have any memory of how many discussions there were?
MR ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, I have no specific recall of the number of discussions we had. Whenever it was possible and when I was in Botswana, I would meet with operatives and in this case, I would have met with Mr McBride whenever I was there and whenever he would have been there.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ismail, during 1986 these discussions, were they all face to face discussions? You didn't have telephonic communication or anything like that?
MR ISMAIL: I did not deal telephonically with Mr McBride.
MR RICHARD: Thank you. Now when was the first discussion concerning a car bomb?
MR ISMAIL: The first discussion concerning a car bomb was actually held with Gordon Webster and this would have been earlier in the year, it could have been as early as March, April and I had, at that time, said to Gordon Webster to reconnoitre the Natal Command with a view to using a car bomb at the Natal Command, where there would be high concentrations of Security personnel.
MR RICHARD: Thank you. Now, when was your first discussion with Mr McBride concerning a car bomb?
MR ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, the discussions were always held with Gordon Webster regarding this and when he had reported back about this, there may have been some time when Mr McBride was present. I don't recall exact dates and times when I was there etc and at that time I had said to them to do further reconnaissance but specifically I was directing myself at Gordon Webster as the Commander of the unit at the time, to say to him to do further reconnaissance on the possibility of using a car bomb against Security Force personnel.
MR RICHARD: So, what was the first report you got back from either Mr Webster or Mr McBride as to the viability of your idea of a car bomb attack on Natal Command?
MR ISMAIL: The report that they gave to me was or rather, that Gordon gave to me was that they could not carry out such an attack against Natal Command where there would be a high concentration, because all of that area had been marked as places where no cars could be parked and here we're talking specifically around the front, where the soldiers would enter and exit from the base, or where they may hang around in large numbers.
MR RICHARD: Now was it then that an alternative target was discussed?
MR ISMAIL: No. At that time we did not discuss any alternative targets, I had said to Gordon and Robert who may have been present, that they should do further reconnaissance and look for other suitable targets.
MR RICHARD: When you said other suitable targets, did you mean targets of the same nature and description as Natal Commands? In other words, a military police establishment?
MR ISMAIL: No, I'm talking about large concentrations of Security Force personnel, I did not specify where they had to be. I basically had instructed, wherever they occurred.
MR RICHARD: Thank you. Now when did the idea of placing a car bomb in a hotel first become a topic for conversation? Was it weeks or months before June 1986?
MR ISMAIL: There was no specific discussion about any hotel, because my instruction was, find Security Force concentrations. It was not reported to me that there is a concentration at a hotel.
MR RICHARD: So if I understand your answer correctly and correct me if I'm wrong, you never had a discussion with either Mr McBride or Mr Webster, concerning the placing of a car bomb outside a hotel?
MR ISMAIL: No.
MR RICHARD: Then, in your mind, what did you mean by a high concentration of Security personnel?
MR ISMAIL: Security Force personnel congregate at various points. In the case of the Church Street, they were concentrated outside of the Air Force Headquarters, there was a bus rank there, they were there in their hundreds. I'm talking of that kind of a concentration, where they would occur, wherever they would occur, but to my mind, wherever they would occur, if they were off duty and they were sitting in a pub or whatever, that would still be a concentration of Security Force personnel.
MR RICHARD: Thank you. From what I understand your answer to imply is, as in the Church Street situation where there was transport to take Security personnel home, where people would be standing in a bus, there might also be other people in that area, but there would be a bus line of Security personnel, or a concentrated number of them, am I understanding you correctly?
MR ISMAIL: Yes, and I also added that if they were there sitting in a pub drinking, then that would also form a concentration of Security Force personnel.
MR RICHARD: How many would constitute a concentration?
MR ISMAIL: Well it depends, it could be 20, it could be 100, it could be 200.
MR RICHARD: Less than 20?
MR ISMAIL: Well, that could also be a concentration, yes.
MR RICHARD: Now, Mr McBride has given evidence that he raised the question of what now has become termed collateral civilian casualties. Do you recall him raising that issue?
MR ISMAIL: Yes and I did testify to that and I said he had raised it and I had said to him about Kabwe.
MR RICHARD: On how many occasions did he raise that topic?
MR ISMAIL: That would have occurred more than once, however, the last time when I met him, it was just before the incident we are dealing with, it was raised again and it was reiterated.
MR RICHARD: Now, on that occasion, other than outlining the nature and import of the Kabwe Conference's decisions, was there any contextual discussion about how they would apply in a practical planned operation that they were about to go on?
MR ISMAIL: Well, we did not discuss contextual discussions because that would depend on specifics.
MR RICHARD: Did you ever discuss the Kabwe principles in relation to a specific planned attack?
MR ISMAIL: No.
MR RICHARD: Did you discuss those principles in the context of a car bomb attack?
MR ISMAIL: Yes.
MR RICHARD: What was the content of that discussion?
MR ISMAIL: Well, basically it was what happens if there are civilians around, the possibility of civilian casualties and the discussion was, there's a high concentration of Security Force personnel, the movement's decision was that we were no longer to be that concerned about the possibility of civilian casualties, that that could or would be allowed and therefore we could go ahead with that.
JUDGE PILLAY: What was meant, or how would the words "high concentration" be defined?
MR ISMAIL: Judge, a high concentration can be, it's a relative term. You could see it as a small unit, it could be a very large unit and it depended on that. It's a question of inside of an entire context. If there are large numbers, the overwhelming number has to be Security Force personnel relative to other people around there. That is the issue.
JUDGE PILLAY: You see, why I raise that issue with you now, your last answer says, or said that the Kabwe decision was that where there was a high concentration of Security Forces, there would be a reduction of the duty of care in respect of civilians and the trend of cross-examination was how at one stage it dealt with percentages, I don't know what the relevance thereof is at the moment, but I think it then necessary, if you use the words "high concentration" in respect of the reduction of the duty of care, then we should define it somewhat, as far as we can.
MR ISMAIL: Basically Conference never spoke percentages. Basically Conference said we would accept civilian casualties in order to strike at Security Force personnel. Now that was left to Commanders or operatives to then deal with. To my mind, it had to be an overwhelming number of Security Force personnel.
MR RICHARD: Thank you, Chair. You've used the word overwhelming. In the sense that it does have a connotation of proportion, give me an idea of whether 50% would be overwhelming, or 80% would be overwhelming.
MR ISMAIL: I would say firstly, if those people are gathered in one place, then you already have them within a confined area and if there are civilians on the further perimeters of it, you find that those people are concentrated in a particular spot and then I would say 60/70%.
MR RICHARD: So to relate it to this specific event that we're debating at the moment, what it would mean is that, to use the hypothetical examples I've been on about before, if there was a table of 5 policemen, firemen, traffic police, soldiers at one table in a restaurant capable of seating a couple of hundred people or a place of entertainment, would that constitute a high concentration or not?
MR ISMAIL: No, it would not.
MR RICHARD: Now it goes further. You've heard the evidence of Mr McBride regarding what information gathering was conducted. If you had heard the following; Mr Webster says that he has information that a place is infested, factor 1, but that is hearsay, you've heard discussion from various people or a person at the Allan Taylor residence at the University that there are Security personnel concentrated at a particular place, the third factor was on a particular night and only one night, two trips were made when a group leaving the police barracks was followed to see where they went and one of the two groups went to a particular venue and on that same night, the information gatherer heard somebody make a statement "may the Force be with you." Would you believe that in the context of an attack on a hotel situated on the Durban beach front in one of the busiest entertainment areas of the town, that was sufficient intelligence gathering?
MR ISMAIL: No, I would have attempted and here I'm talking of myself, to get further intelligence information. I would have tried to verify that more Security Force personnel frequented that place.
MR RICHARD: Now, taking into account that each one of those four factors can be isolated in time and certainly would not tell anyone as to who would be in that complex of entertainment venues on any particular night, do you think it was sufficient?
MR ISMAIL: Perhaps it was not sufficient, but again here I must state that they in their minds and here in this case in Mr McBride's mind, he thought he had verified it and he's also testified and has said he also relied on the previous information that had been gleaned by Gordon Webster, he didn't then test that further information. He was told it was infested by Security Force personnel. I, in my turn, did not test the information that they had because the specific target, the Why Not Bar, was not discussed with me and perhaps that is the mistake that I made, but they, or Mr McBride had thought that that place had a concentration of Security Force personnel and he acted on the basis of that.
MR RICHARD: Now, I'm going to give a more contextual proposition and again it relates to an objective opinion of the contextual situation, rather than a subjective belief that Mr McBride might have had at the time. If it is established that the following might have been the case, that firstly once in two years about 20 people from the Dunottar Air Force training base in Pretoria would come and hold a weekend holiday get-together at that specific hotel, the second point, that if one took a very imprecise survey, but the reliance of the bar staff's memory and said, of all the patrons who might come in and out of that establishment over an extended period, more than 6 months, there might have been a group of about 15 to 20 firemen, traffic police, policemen, soldiers that individually would come on odd occasions.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I didn't quite understand that. A group that would individually come - do you mean a group of 20 coming at a time, or there being 20 but not as a group, but just - if you could just explain? I couldn't understand it.
MR RICHARD: It's the second proposition that I'm making. There were approximately 15 to 20 people who would not ever congregate there all at one time, but out of that group, individuals within that group, would periodically visit the venue, not as a group though. The next leg extends to that, that on no particular evening or afternoon, or day for that matter, would there ever be more than and then I'm using the words more than very deliberately, four or five individual members of that classification of people that fall within the broad definition of Security personnel, that's inclusive of traffic cops, firemen, police, soldiers etc. Now my question on that proposition is quite simple. If you had at the time been given those facts and were asked the question and the question that you're being asked is: We do not know who will be in the Why Not pub or in its neighbouring Magoo's bar on the night we intend effecting the attack and will have no idea as to who will be inside, should we or should we not go ahead with the attack? At that time in 1986, do you think you would have said, "Yes, carry on with the mission" or "No, stop"?
MR BERGER: Chairperson, before Mr Ismail gives an answer to that question and if he wants to he can, but after such a convoluted question, first of all, I don't know if one can be expected to answer that question clearly, but more as a matter of principle, Chairperson, my learned friend Mr Richard says, don't have regard to what Mr McBride had in his mind and the information he had and don't have regard to what you had in your mind and the information you had and then poses a specific question. The provisions of Section 20(ii) of the Act are very clear and that it is the person's state of mind that is the crucial inquiry at any particular stage of these Hearings. It's not some facts which, I don't know where Mr Richard gets the facts from in the first place because it's not evidence before this Committee, but it's the person's state of mind that is the relevant inquiry and so what Mr McBride had in his mind and what Mr Ismail had in his mind is the pertinent inquiry, not some hypothetical situation that Mr Richard might want to ask about.
MR ISMAIL: However, Chairperson, if I may just deal with it. Mr Richard, you started out by formulating a hypothetical proposition. You then go on to relate to a specific proposition and can I finish? We get to a position now, in the first proposition you do not contextualise any civilians and I don't know where that suddenly flew away to in your questioning. However you then come and make a supposition about the kind of information or intelligence that existed with regard to the Why Not bar. Now Mr McBride and previously Mr Gordon Webster have said they spoke to people and they had information from those people that Security Force personnel frequented that bar. My experience of Security Force personnel is that they usually go back to the same bars night after night. That becomes their watering hole. That's the first thing. To simply try to create some kind of theoretical perspective when we are dealing with specifics here, now we've got to decide, we can test a whole series of them from 0 to 100, we can talk in every percentage and we can go on for days like this. The issues before us are that Gordon Webster had obtained certain information, he had then said to Mr McBride it was infested with Security Force personnel. They then tried to check that out, perhaps inadequately, but in their minds, they understood that Security Force personnel frequented that place. They struck it, in the furtherance of a political motive. The African National Congress was asked this question and Mr Chairperson, if you'll bear with me, I'm now going to read this into the record with regards to this, because they say, the African National Congress said quite clearly, tactical intelligence was the responsibility of the units on the ground. Even if they did that reconnaissance badly, it is the way they did it. Unfortunately I, as Commander, may have failed in my duty to check out that information, to push them on it, but on the basis of all the operations that they'd carried out in the past where they operated meticulously, struck at all their targets etc, I accepted that when I was told there is a concentration of Security Force personnel, I accepted that and authorised the operation to go ahead and that is what is important to us, but I would like to read this into the record, Chairperson and this occurs on page 57 of the MK Hearing in Cape Town on day 1, that is the bundle that, I hope that now these bundles have been put before you, Chairperson. The question is then raised by Mr Valley and I quote
"I just want to follow this thought through because I want to refer to the first submission of the ANC on page 60, the second last paragraph, left-hand column 60. "The much publicised case of the car bomb explosion at the Magoo Bar and the Why not Bar on June 14th 1986, provides another example of an operation in which civilians were victims in the context of the intensification of the armed struggle. Three civilians were killed, 69 injured" and it talks about McBride (that's Mr Valley that says that). I want to go on to the next column, the second paragraph. "This attack was in line with the ANC's attempts to take the struggle out of the black ghettos and into the white areas."
Then he talks about the Why Not Bar.
"How does this accord with what you were saying? And I also defer to Dr Boraine now.
We then have a response from Mr Mac Maharaj and I'm quoting
him:
"I thought I had indicated that the enemy forces were often located in the commercial or civilian areas. In this particular case, whatever was the actual outcome, the fact of the matter was that the comrades who acted on this target, had intelligence, tactical intelligence, suggesting that the Security Forces, when off duty, congregated at this venue. So that was the basis on which they had acted and if they had acted on that basis, then they were in line with the practical problems that I had outlined that we were facing in the country."
And he goes on:
"The same problem, Chairperson, is highlighted in Church Street because it was the Air Force target. Had the bomb gone off at 16h30, it would have caught the majority of the people, the overwhelming majority would have been from that place, but it went off prematurely and it had been carefully reconnoitred, so there was our problem and the target was selected, not directed at the civilian population but at the Security Force members."
MR RICHARD: Thank you. Now what I did was outline evidence that I will lead in due course. Chairperson it's not usual for me to argue with a witness, because what I think the witness has largely read into the record is argument, not evidence. My reason for ascertaining and locating this evidence, is that we have this undercurrent going on that the figure of 69, 74 and 68 is some sort of propaganda figure which was created at the time to achieve some other purpose.
CHAIRPERSON: I wouldn't say that, that's not the impression that I got, the impression I got was that the figure, the exact figure is not known because various figures have been given at different times. I don't recall having heard any suggestions in the evidence that the figure was bloated for propaganda purposes. It was suggested that it has been fluctuating so therefore it's not certain.
ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, my impression from what Mr Ismail has now read out, that in the evidence tendered at the Security Force Hearings in October 97, the ANC's position was, civilian casualties were 3 dead and 69, that was the position they accepted.
CHAIRPERSON: But I'm just saying what Mr McBride said. He wasn't sure of the numbers, because he's seen so many different numbers in his trial, in reports etc, so I wouldn't go so far as to say that the suggestion here has been that there's been an over-bloated number given for propaganda purposes.
MR RICHARD: Thank you.
MR ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, if I may. I think when we consider amnesty applications, one needs to understand intent. What was the intention of what anybody intended to do and what was the outcome? Mr Chairperson, we, in the African National Congress that fought for the liberation of this country, would rather nobody at all had died. We would rather that there wasn't any struggle to be fought, but when we engaged in the arms struggle, we accepted that there would be casualties. In this case, the intention was to strike at Security Force personnel and for me, even if the figures were 40/50 Security Force personnel and the remainder civilian personnel, to me it is still sad, it is unfortunate. Even if it was only 1 civilian person that died, it is sad and it is unfortunate. It is regretted. The African National Congress has said: "We never targeted civilians, but we accepted at some point in our struggle, that we had to act because the Security Force personnel were using the civilian population as a buffer" and I want to state and I'll quote you from page 59 of that Hearing, Mr Maharaj again says
"In case there is any misunderstanding, the African National Congress unreservedly apologises to all civilians who lost their lives, whether in cross-fire or any other circumstances, as our aim has never been to attack civilians and whatever the intensity of the struggle where civilians have died, we believe that it is appropriate in our country today and in the interests of reconciliation and unity, that we should apologise and we do so, and that is done so unreservedly."
MR RICHARD: Thank you. I go back to the question I was asking you. I've outlined the factual situation at the time. Do you want me to outline it again?
MR BERGER: What was the question?
JUDGE PILLAY: Mr Richard, before we proceed. When you made an application to recall Mr Ismail, you solemnly undertook to deal with the conversation between Mr McBride and Mr Ismail regarding the planting of the bomb outside the hotel. Furthermore, can you tell me what the purpose is of this question and how it's going to help us, seeking an objective view from Mr Ismail?
MR RICHARD: My question is, taking into account the facts which I have outlined and which I will lead as evidence if I'm required to, as to what the real concentration of so-called security personnel might have been at that time, the question: On those facts would it be a legitimate target?
MR ISMAIL: No, on the basis of those facts not. However one must reiterate. In the minds of the operatives, they understood there would be Security Force personnel in that place. They could not say exactly how many, they understood that they congregated at that point, they understood it could be in large numbers and that is what is before us and on the basis of that, they acted. For that the African National Congress and I take responsibility.
MR RICHARD: I believe, in reply to Judge Pillay's comment, it's appropriate for me to say the questions arise out of the evidence that I've got. And then you've made reference in your statements this morning of a comparison between what is known as the Parade Hotel, which is a tourist come hotel venue on the Durban beach front and the Church Street attack on the Air Force's Headquarters and you've also referred to the other situation where, if I recall the incident without going back to my papers, there was an attack on a building where there was a Standard bank and a Security Branch office in that building and I think that's the attack where you put it under the category of a civilian buffer. My question, do you not think that an establishment such as the Parade Hotel is very different to either one of the other two situations that we've outlined in the bundles?
MR ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, if there is a large concentration of Security Force personnel in the Parade Hotel, then it is not different because at that point that is where the concentration would be and that would then form a legitimate target.
MR BERGER: Chairperson with respect and I waited for Mr Ismail to answer, these questions do not flow from the conversation between Mr Ismail and Mr McBride in Botswana.
CHAIRPERSON: They're matters that can be raised in argument as well.
MR RICHARD: My next question is, none of these contextual possibilities were ever discussed with Mr McBride in the course of his discussions with you in 1986?
MR ISMAIL: No, but he often had discussions with some of the other sub-Commanders in Botswana.
MR RICHARD: Now, Mr McBride and I don't have notes to the answers to my questions, gave evidence to the effect that the timing and nature of this attack was premised on the fact that it was the anniversary of the SADF raid on Botswana in 1985 and two days before the June 16th events 10th anniversary. Now, taking into account that June 16 was 10 years before that and the SADF raid was a year before that, was this a retaliatory raid?
MR ISMAIL: No Chairperson, but I want to go further. The ANC has always marked many of the dates of operations. When we carried out the SASOL attack, we were hoping to carry it out on the night before Republic, unfortunately we only managed to carry it out on the night of the Declaration of Republic. That cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered retaliatory. When an operation is carried out on January 12th, the anniversary of the ANC it cannot be considered retaliatory. A retaliatory attack for June 16 would be if the ANC went and massacred white school children in their schools. The ANC never did. We never gave such orders. I'm not finished Mr Richard. When innocent civilians are massacred, peoples of another country, Botswana citizens amongst them, unarmed people in their beds, we did not then order the massacre of white civilians in their beds. That is retaliatory. There was no personal gain, there was no personal motive. What does the Act say about it? There was no retaliation in that sense. Now, when our people are massacred, we reserve the right to defend ourselves and to fight. We fought and we made the enemy bleed, that's what we were doing, we were fighting for the liberation of our people, there was no retaliation. We have said before, if we wanted to massacre whites, we wouldn't have bothered to come the full length and gone through a lot of pain in order to get into the bases and to strike at Security Force personnel. We could have massacred, we never did.
MR RICHARD: Thank you. Now, in the documentation alluded to in the various papers and there's the statement, revenge attacks, I presume your answer to the question whether this was a revenge attack or not, is the same as the one as to whether it was retaliatory?
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Richard, I thought you were going to question about the discussion that took place in Botswana. Now we're going back to what we've already covered before.
MR RICHARD: I have one last question, with the leave of the Committee. Is it contested that the outcome, and this is with the Commission's leave and it's my last question, the outcome of this attack, is it seriously disputed that it was as an outcome, an attack, whatever the perception before the attack might have been, on civilians?
JUDGE PILLAY: Does that matter? It may be your last question but does it matter?
MR RICHARD: It is for argument at the end.
JUDGE PILLAY: Mr Richard we're not going ....(indistinct - mike off)
MR RICHARD: Yes.
JUDGE PILLAY: You prefaced your question, irrespective of the perceptions before the attack, isn't that the important issue?
MR RICHARD: That is the test in the Act. Mr Chairperson, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RICHARD
MR ISMAIL: I would like to state that my examination of the outcome is that yes, perhaps the overwhelming numbers were civilian personnel, that is regretted. What comrade Robert McBride sought to do, what we sought to do, was to strike at enemy Force personnel. Sadly we may not have achieved the intention, the intended target and I want to turn again to all of the victims and the families and say to them, we are deeply sorry for that. We never intended to strike at you. Our intention was to strike at those Security Force personnel who upheld the apartheid State and I say to all of you, sorry from me personally for the hurt and the pain and from the African National Congress. We need to understand that all of these casualties were the casualties of a war that was foisted upon all of us, black and white, in this country by people who thought themselves superior beings. We had to get rid of that heinous enemy, that which was declared a crime against humanity, that which was equivalent to Nazism and I hope that all of us can walk together in the future to democracy and freedom and I hope that all of us will stand together and fight any attempt to impose any form of supremacy of one over another. I say to all of you, sorry for your hurt and your pain, for the loss of your beloved ones and I say to you, we are proud of the many cadres who have been ready to take up the fight, many who have lost their lives, the many black civilians and white civilians who were the victims of apartheid. Until we recognise the humanity in every one of us, we cannot go forward. We must be ready to fight for our rights as people. I thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Berger do you have any re-examination arising from the cross-examination?
MR BERGER: Chairperson, I don't know if Mr Prior has any questions?
ADV PRIOR: No questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV PRIOR
MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson, I just have a few questions.
FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Mr Ismail, you said, in answer to a question from Mr Richard that you did not discuss the Kabwe Conference with comrade Robert in the context of a specific operation. In case that is misconstrued, you're not, or let me ask you, are you seeking to change any of your evidence that you did discuss the Kabwe Conference and the decisions taken at Kabwe, specifically in the context of comrade Robert's next operation, which involved the car bomb?
MR ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, so it is not misunderstood, I was saying in the context of that specific target, we did discuss the Kabwe Conference, we did talk about the possible loss, or the possible occurrence of civilian casualties, so I'm not changing my evidence, no.
MR BERGER: Now you also said that the decisions taken at Conference, at Kabwe, never spoke about percentages and you said that to you mind, to use your words, an appropriate concentration of Security Force personnel would be between 60 and 70%. Is it not correct, however, that the appreciation or the decision as to what would be an appropriate concentration was specifically left to the discretion of the Commanders on the ground?
MR ISMAIL: Absolutely, Chairperson and I have said I had full confidence in comrade Robert and that I believe he acted on the understanding that there would be concentration of Security Force personnel at that point. We have no reason to doubt it.
MR BERGER: Finally, Mr Ismail, I want to ask you a question which I believe goes to the nub of this whole matter and I want to go further than both you and comrade Robert have gone in your evidence. I want to say to you, if comrade Robert had come to you in Botswana and said: "I have, well we can't go ahead against Natal Command for the reasons already discussed, but I have done reconnaissance and I have information on a bar which is in an hotel on the Marine Parade in Durban, the bar is called the Why Not bar and is situated there", had shown you a photograph. "The intelligence that we have, gathered by me and comrade Gordon is that the place is infested with Security Personnel, but there is the real likelihood that if we put a car bomb outside that bar, that civilians are going to get killed. comrade Rashid, do I have your authority to proceed with this operation?" What would you have said?
MR ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, had he reported the specific target, I would have then gone into the detail of it. I would have then discussed when those people were there, at what time, how best could we have carried it out, were there any possible other things we could have done and at the end, having satisfied myself that a large concentration of Security Force personnel did indeed congregate at that point, I would have given him the go-ahead.
MR BERGER: Now, I want to go further. I want to say, comrade Robert reports to you that on his information there is a large concentration of Security Force personnel at that location. In other words, what I'm doing , what I'm saying is, he tells you that there is the Why Not bar where this concentration of Security Force personnel is to be found off duty, but within the context of a civilian population and he asks you, "Do I have the authority to proceed with the operation?" Do you give him the authority, or not?
MR ISMAIL: Yes.
MR BERGER: Yes, you give him the authority?
MR ISMAIL: Yes, I do.
MR BERGER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER
CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you, Mr Ismail. That will then conclude your testimony for a second time.
WITNESS EXCUSED
CHAIRPERSON: Mr McBride I omitted to mention earlier that your testimony is now concluded.
MR McBRIDE: Thank you Sir.
MR RICHARD: With regard to these hypotheses of what and who was in the complex of the entertainment places at the Parade Hotel, I do have the witness available. Should we call the person involved at the end of the Hearing or ...?
CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you can discuss that with Mr Prior, between you and the other legal reps when would be best, what would be most suitable.
MR RICHARD: Thank you Chair.
MR BERGER: Chairman, my ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: It doesn't make a huge difference to us.
ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I would propose that we simply complete the applicants.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the usual way is to complete the applicants, but as I say, if there's any need because of any circumstances that a witness has to be brought in, there's not a problem, but you can discuss it with Mr Prior.
MR BERGER: Chairperson could I just place on record that if Mr Richard is intending to lead any person, that he furnish us with a summary or an affidavit of that person's evidence before that person gives evidence?
MR RICHARD: There's no obligation on me to do that. The person is here and ready to give evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes well we'll, if he gives evidence and you want a bit of time before, to take instructions before questioning, then that will be given.
MR BERGER: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: I see now it's past 1 o'clock. We'll take the lunch adjournment. Which applicant will be called next? Mr Dehal, would it be one of your clients?
MR DEHAL: Ms Narkedien otherwise known as ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Narkedien. Thank you. And before we start, I'd appreciate it if the legal representatives could just briefly come and see us in our room, well perhaps now. Yes we can do it just before lunch. It's very briefly, it's nothing too important, but we just want to give notice about argument.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: I believe there's been some discussion between the applicants and some certain victims and I don't know of the outcome of those discussions, but I would just like to, on behalf of the Panel here, indeed the Commission, express our appreciation and gratification that such a meeting could take place. It's very important.
Mr Dehal.
MR DEHAL: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Chairperson and Honourable Members, before I begin to call Ms Narkedien, may I just raise the following aspect.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry I see Mr ...(indistinct)
MR MALL: My mandate from my three clients I think, up to this stage I have fulfilled the mandate. It was to sit in on the applications for Mr Ismail and Mr McBride. My instructions are that as both these gentlemen have finished their evidence and the Commission has generally finished the evidence of these two gentlemen, I wish to seek leave from the Commission to place on record that my clients are not opposing the application for the amnesty of these gentlemen. They are satisfied with the disclosure that has been made by these two gentlemen with regard to the events of the Chamberlain Road blast and they accept the word of Mr McBride and Mr Ismail. In the circumstances, may I take leave of the Commission?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you very much for that Mr Moll and I'd like to thank you for the assistance that you have given in this Hearing. Thank you very much. You're excused.
MR MALL: Thank you, Mr Chairman. There's just one more point. For the record, yesterday Mr Ismail, Mr McBride and Mr McBride's legal representative, myself, Mr Zimmerman, Mr van der Merwe and Mrs Dunn, who's the wife of the victim Mr Dunn wasn't here, but those three of my clients met with Mr McBride and Mr Ismail. We met privately and we all spoke for about 20 minutes and I can safely say that there was reconciliation, as what I believe this whole process envisages and it has left my clients satisfied. If I may put that on record.
CHAIRPERSON: We're very pleased to hear that Mr Mall and again express my appreciation for your clients and the applicants concerned, for what they have done. I agree with you, we find it to be a very important aspect of this whole process and thank you very much.
MR MALL: Thank you.
MR DEHAL: Mr Chairperson, I confirm what Mr Mall said and we want to express our gratitude and indebtedness to him for having assisted as well.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much Mr Dehal.
MR RICHARD: Chair, my report as to what occasioned the delay, is a process has started, it is not concluded yet, in fact I will be able to consult properly with people as to what the outcome so far is, after we've concluded this afternoon.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Richard, I did express our appreciation, I don't know if you were present then, at what has occurred, we think it's important. Thank you. Mr Dehal?
