Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody. I apologise for the slight delay, but one of my Panel Members took the wrong turn this morning and had a free trip around East London, seeing the place which he is not fully acquainted with, but he's here now.

Mr Knoetze, can you continue?

MR KNOETZE: May it please you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: General van der Westhuizen, I remind you that you are under your former oath.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR KNOETZE: (Cont)

General, we were busy on page 81 of the bundle ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Which page?

MR KNOETZE: That is page 81. I said Mr Chairman to the General, that I'm reminding him that we are on page 81 of the bundle and dealing with Plan Katzen, about to proceed to paragraph 6.

General could you please continue to explain what is contained in paragraph 6 on page 81, and what you meant by that.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson yes, paragraph 6 has to do with the pro-RSA and the pro-Transkei/Ciskei leaders to reconcile themselves or to unite them and to then establish under Transkei leadership with the idea that Xhosaland is born and then be recognised by the RSA as an independent State.

And on page 82, the constitutional process then has to continue, meaning then that is the cabinet and then later followed by an election and then in 8, the preparation of the corridor for phase 3. Now we will return to that a bit later.

MR KNOETZE: You may continue.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Then phase 3 aligned with 1. The aim there was - paragraph C1, was before December '87 and that was within the 18 months then to incorporate the corridor with the Ciskei and Transkei. Now the execution is then given in broad guidelines. It would be aligned with phase 2.

Then a further climate establishment or creation, especially among the whites in the corridor. And then the third paragraph is then the development of the area, that is Ciskei/Transkei in the corridor as the fatherland or the motherland of the Xhosa. You can understand why there must be a creation of a climate because that the corridor becomes part of the Xhosa land. That is from East London up to Queenstown. That is a corridor that is part between the Ciskei and the Transkei and that is then the Xhosaland with one nation, one country. Now this Xhosaland would then also, would then establish the land claims, the embarrassing land claims.

Then paragraph 4: The current three areas. It went economically very difficult. And then also with East London as a free harbour they would have the power to be much stronger and the RSA then had to assist them with this, with financial assistance.

Paragraph 5: Xhosaland is then a success, presented as a success and the envisaged Xhosaland can become an African power. And I realise it must have been perhaps a bit ambitious to put it in such a way and that could have perhaps led to international recognition.

In paragraph 6: As an example we also thought that King William's Town with Bisho next to it would be the logical choice to incorporate first and the rest of the area would then follow. In those years there were industrial growth points and Berlin in this area was one of them and we thought that that should be stimulated further as a growth point.

Paragraph 7: There was also urbanisation and we thought that this plan would then arrest urbanisation in this area.

Paragraph 8: Xhosa election with participation of whites should be held in order to establish the first fully representative parliament. I think I mentioned yesterday that a group of us were not in favour of this, the whole idea of a three-chamber parliament, and the idea was that on regional level we would establish a four-chamber parliament and the State would then have to function. Now that is the end of the action of 1, Chairperson.

MR KNOETZE: On page 84 the course of action 2 started now. Before you continue with that, could you just say why they were different courses of action that were suggested?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, in a presentation such as this one has to point out different alternatives to the person who is going to make the decision, you have to aligned the choice. It is still something just being considered, speculated about. And we usually do that by means of presenting courses of action where we then give an exposition of a course of action with the different options within that action, different phases, time-frames, and usually it is then repeated in the following action, but still to obtain the original aim. That's just a way of planning that we usually followed.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you, could you just continue with the course of action number 2.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Now with 2 I also say that the aim in execution also occurs as for phases 1 and 2, that is for action 1. Phase 3 thereof will be put in abeyance or frozen. Now you will remember I've just read it, and this had to do with the corridor with the white inhabitants then as part of Xhosaland. Phase 3, that is the corridor is then frozen for later possible application and it then makes provision for white reaction, negative reaction against the incorporation of the corridor into Xhosaland and this further implies that such incorporation shall occur only when the population is ready therefore. One isn't quite sure when this would be ready, but as soon as it is then the incorporation can proceed and then also prevent that this aspect places our government in an embarrassing position with voters. That's the whole idea of selling out. Phases 1 and 2 are in fact powerful enough to let this action work.

MR KNOETZE: Right, then course of action 3 please.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Now 3, perhaps I should say that that originates in Strelitzia and there is a lot of comparison between the one that has not been approved. Now it occurs in two successive phases, it's for a year up to June '87. Phase one is the XWB, also as referred to in the first course of action. Now the aim here is to establish a confederation of States in the Eastern Cape before June '87. Now this refers back to Plan Strelitzia.

Perhaps I can just explain here. With Plan Strelitzia the idea was an independent Ciskei/Transkei with the Eastern Cape, Region D. That would not be this whole confederation of States in an alliance. Now the Eastern Cape would have been a province.

Now the execution thereof, that's on page 85, that would have been based on the KwaNatal concept, that is joining Eastern Cape and Ciskei/Transkei in a confederation. There should have been influencing actions. The Eastern Cape then acquires provincial status and second-tier government. That would have put it in position to become a fully fledged member of this confederation.

In paragraph 4: Lennox Sebe and his supporters then are removed from the political scene, they were not in support of this plan. The same as phase 2.

And then in paragraph 5: Lent Makoma and his party colleagues could then replace Lennox Sebe.

And in paragraph 6: There is a word "Xhoscape", Xhosa Cape Confederation is then established and that is then followed up by treaties and agreements for cooperation.

MR KNOETZE: Then the implications, General?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: There were different variations, once again because it was a broad idea. So there were many ideas that could come into play with these different courses of action. It can be noted that the first phases are the same. That is then the liberation of Charles, the establishment of the resistance movement, getting rid of Lennox Sebe. That's part of the first phase. This also underlines the importance of a strong pro-RSA XWB in the Eastern Cape as a prerequisite for permanent stability and normality. That is the counter-revolutionary front idea.

13: And with this plan a condition of permanent normality in the Eastern Cape can be attained. Now the existing plans are good but it can't guarantee it and therefore this plan is also an extension of this.

Then paragraph 14: Lennox Sebe is an embarrassment for the government. The SP, that's the State President, said it himself, and with the implementation of this plan he will be got rid of. Now this action is not linked to a specific phase or plan, it could happen now. That was now before this plan was approved or put into action and it can just facilitate the execution of this or similar kinds of plans.

Then 15: The proposed unification of Ciskei and Transkei is possibly the best logical means to satisfy the aspiration of the Xhosas. One could perhaps just say that all the different aspirations expressed for Xhosa unity was emotionally loaded. In the unstable instable(?) that we had in the Eastern Cape the fear we had was that there would be execution of Xhosa unity done without proper thinking and it would lead to further instability, so this had to do with ordering the situation.

Now the feeling in the Eastern Cape was that Xhosa unity had to come. The question was just how it should come into being and when. And then the incorporation of the corridor in Xhosaland with upset the whites in the area, especially the right-wing people may try to get some gains out of this. But there is a common factor which would make this more acceptable for people, and that would of course be the great economic growth that would be possible and the government must be prepared to pay for this incorporation.

Paragraph 17: A formidable Xhosa ally would be positive for the RSA and this could then be used to keep the people contained and together Xhosaland can also then fight against this onslaught. And from a military idea that was the aim, that was in the counter-revolutionary war.

MR KNOETZE: Then in paragraph 18 you start with personalities, could you also just discuss that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson yes, the first one is Charles Sebe. We saw him as the logical leader of the XWB. He enjoyed a lot of status, especially among the Security Forces, that's the police and the army of both countries. He had the background, the ability, the personality, the stature, to activate and lead the XWB, but he was someone that you had to control - I don't know what the Afrikaans word is, he was a maverick. And we felt that we had to strictly control him in order to let this plan proceed orderly.

Then page 88. He projects traditional authority and it can then be expected that the Security Forces and the older generation will support him. Opposition from the left and the youth and also from Lennox could be expected, but that kind of opposition must be wisely turned around.

Paragraph 7: Should Charles for any reason not be able to lead the XWB, then we would have to look at other leaders such as Brigadier Holomisa and Major Sandile who were part of the Transkei Army as other candidates for the leadership role.

And D: Charles' physical and psychological health condition must be strengthened after he had been freed.

MR KNOETZE: Right, then paragraph 19, the XWB.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: This movement's headquarters I saw that in the command area, probably in Port Elizabeth. That was just so that control could be exercised so that we don't lose control over them so that a power base can be built up. And then accommodation facilities should be made available, capital must be provided.

And then page 89: Covert Xhosa-speaking troops. Now with troops it is meant people who had already received training as constables or soldiers so that you don't have to start with training right from the start. They should be appointed to the XWB so that this movement could have teeth with visible power. The XWB would then operate under the cover of a front organisation as a counter-revolutionary movement.

And then just the conclusion. The course of action or variations is then the cardinal idea to fight the revolution in the Eastern Cape. 2 and 3 are watered-down models and would not have the same effect as action 1.

And then in 21 I ask for approval in principle for action 1 or then alternatively for courses 2 and 3. And then I also ask if such approval is granted, that it is suggested that a team be assembled to give details to this plan, because this plan wasn't written for execution but it was written just to suggest the idea and then I signed the whole plan.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. If we can now return to Annexure A, paragraph 20 on page 21, the top part there. Now you have already said that you took it to Pretoria and you gave it to your direct superior.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct. What I read now I presented to General Liebenberg.

MR KNOETZE: Could you perhaps just quickly say what his reaction was and what happened after that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well the first presentation, General Liebenberg told me that it's not a bad plan, we won't be able to do everything, but he can see that this plan can assist us in the Eastern Cape with the problems that we were experiencing. He then, well sometime later, sent Colonel van Wyk to Port Elizabeth to give his input into the plan and Plan 1 that I have just presented was then rewritten and that led to Plan 2.

MR KNOETZE: Who is Colonel van Wyk?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: His first name, that was Ferdie van Wyk.

MR KNOETZE: And the second rendition of this plan is 113 of the bundle, could you just proceed to that? In whose handwriting is this?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, that is the handwriting of Colonel Piet Hall. He was my senior Staff Officer of Operations in Commandment Eastern Cape. He was assisted in writing this by Colonel Ferdie van Wyk and Commandant Lourens du Plessis. Colonel van Wyk represented the Chief of the Army and du Plessis was also one of my staff officers.

MR KNOETZE: General would you please just continue and refer the Committee to the differences between the second rendition and the first one.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Perhaps I could just say, Chairperson, the essence of Plan 1 and 2 do not differ, they are in essence the same. There are certain differences which do not really affect the aim. I will work through them. Now the first difference is the date is 9 July, approximately a month later, after the plan was presented in Pretoria.

Now this plan does have annexures that the other plan did not contain. Now here you will see that we here refer to Operation Katzen. That is why there is OP given there, it's Operation and it had a name, Katzen. We referred to it yesterday. Paragraph 1 and 2 on 113 is new. That gives an introduction and it refers to the order that we received from the State President - that is in paragraph 1 - that the situation had to be normalised by December, not only in the Eastern Cape but in the whole country. I yesterday already said that it was an impossible time-frame, so it imply that the situation had to be stabilised by the end of October, which is even more impossible for us because the stabilisation bases that we had to create had come into operation.

Now 2 is also new and it is very clear that the current unrest situation cannot be normalised against the background of the state of emergency. Should I just refer to the differences, Chairperson?

MR KNOETZE: Yes, please.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: And then on page 114 the aim was formulated differently and that is to develop the Eastern Cape into an independent power block against the ANC and the UDF by December '87.

Paragraphs 5 and 6: The plan must have minimal political risk for us. And in 6, it should not be traced back to the RSA because of the sensitive political nature and also concerning the whites and their reactions.

7 to 10 is also new. That is the Xhosa aspiration for unity. It's not new, it's also in 1. Traditional leaders must be used maximally. The present Ciskei Government must be replaced with a pro-RSA government. Perhaps I should just add, because of the friction between the RSA and the Ciskei Government at that time, this Ciskei was not seen really as anti-RSA but they weren't pro, so this perception was strengthened by what Lennox Sebe said during his public statements that he made.

Paragraph 10: Elements of the execution of the plan did not have to be dependant on one another.

11: And then the scope. That's also new except for the first sentence that is the resistance movements. Then you have four phases and the first plan only had three phases. And then the different phases are then given in terms of priority and they could also be done independently.

Then page 116, that's the same. Also 117, nothing new there. 118, there are a few aspects where there are differences. On 118 you will see that it only says method. It's not only an idea, the plan has been strengthened, it's not necessary to give different courses of action. The method or the course of action given here with the four phases now contain what I expressed on 1, with three courses of action. So it's now proceeding more in the direction of a plan, whereas the first one was more an idea.

And then the execution is done in four phases. That is up to the date of December '87. Now phase 1, it's difficult to say exactly which phase is new but I would say that phase 1 would be the newest of those included, and the aim is to stabilise the Eastern Cape and the Ciskei, November '86. That's on the security terrain.

And then the execution ...(indistinct) of a climate at Namba Sebe and then also the establishment of the XWB and then the Transkei leader's acceptance thereof. Now that at that stage had already been in existence, it had been achieved.

Paragraph 2 on that page, the establishment of the XWB and the expansion thereof. And then also the Ciskei People's Rights Protection Party had to be extended and then also involving smaller moderate groups. And then 4, climate creation for the Xhosa nation with all the different groups, Transkei, Ciskei and Eastern Cape. And 5, the liberation of the Sebe group. I think it was two of his sons, two children. Chairperson, I can't remember but I think Namba Sebe's son was also involved, and then the appointment of Charles Sebe as leader of the XWB.

Paragraph 6: Then the training and organisation of smaller moderate groups for the take-over of third-tier authorities. Those are the local authorities.

And then 7: The coup d'état. I don't think that appeared as a concept in the first plan, where Lennox Sebe is then replaced by moderate people, pro-RSA such as Lent Makoma, Namba Sebe and Charles Sebe.

8 is the same, that is the security alliance.

Chairperson, I'm going to continue with the differences, is that in order? Then phase 2, the aim was to establish an Eastern Cape confederation of States before January '87. That refers back to Strelitzia. There's nothing new there. Also not on page 120, also not on page 121, 122 also not, 123 also not. Then the implications on 123, the same, 124 is the same, 125, 126. 127, there is a small technical difference. In paragraph 22(a) I said the XWB headquarters would probably be in Port Elizabeth and here we say that it should be in the Transkei area. 128 is also the same, I also ask for approval in principle and I also signed it.

MR KNOETZE: Could I then refer you to Annexure A, page 28, paragraph 28. Do you have that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I do.

MR KNOETZE: Is it correct as it is stated here, that on the 9th of July 1986, you presented this second version to General Jannie Geldenhuys?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR KNOETZE: And on this page the people are indicated who were present there, General Johan Coetzee, Colonel Jan Griebenauw and a Mr Hall of National Intelligence. Do you confirm this?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As I can recollect, I can recollect that Liebenberg was also present.

MR KNOETZE: What was the decision taken at that meeting concerning this plan?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: If I can remember correctly it was decided that we can start with parts of phase 1, to get that into operation and depending on how that proceeds, a decision will then be taken concerning the rest, executing the rest of the plan.

MR KNOETZE: Now in this regard, can I take you to page 118. That is phase 1 of the second version of the plan.

Could you just indicate to the Committee what was approved.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: On page 118, that was the creation of the climate for Namba Sebe. Now that already existed spontaneously. Then the establishment of the XWB, we could proceed with that. The strengthening of the Ciskei People's Rights Protection Party, the involvement of the groups there, we could continue with that, climate creation by using pamphlets. In regard of Xhosa nation unity, that could proceed. It was also mentioned that the Sebe group, especially Charles Sebe, that he should be freed as part of this phase and that attention should be given to the substitution of Lennox Sebe, by people such Lent Makoma. Those are the only aspects that we had authorisation for.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, sorry, could I just the General a question while we are on this point. When you were talking about Operation Strelitzia, you said that you approached the State Security Council for authorisation or approval thereof, with this Operation Katzen, you've now spoken about now going to meet with certain high-ranking Generals, General Liebenberg, Geldenhuys, why was this not presented to the State Security Council as had been Operation Strelitzia? Were they being short-circuited or what was the position?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, Plan Strelitzia was a plan that came from the National Management System, almost with not a security component, non-military. Now the military advantage would have arisen from the processes in Strelitzia. Now in departmental regard it wasn't necessary for me to put on my military hat to go to my chief with Strelitzia. Now as opposed to that, Katzen, especially the initial parts, is a security plan, it's more of a departmental plan. The members that we referred to earlier were also ex facie members of the Security Council of the State Security Council and therefore the State Security Council could then by means of those members be cognisant of the plan.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Knoetze.

MR KNOETZE: Could I just refer you back to page 119, paragraphs 6, 7 and 8. Was that discussed, that particular part of the phase?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can't remember whether paragraph 6 was discussed. As far as I know we thought that that would follow later after the party had been established. One could not involve them at an early stage. Then the replacement of Lennox was discussed and it was written here it had to be done by a means of a coup d'état. I would accept because the plan was available, I can't think that we discussed it in any detail. And then also a conclusion of a security alliance, I don't think that was discussed.

MR KNOETZE: Now if we get to the execution of what had been approved, could you perhaps just address that. Could I perhaps refer you to paragraph 30 on page 30. Now before we get to that, the last part of paragraph 28 on page 29 says that Brigadier Moore, part of Military Intelligence, Directorate Special Assignments, as then appointed as officer for Katzen and the management or control for the execution of this part. Could you perhaps just explain to us what is meant by control over the execution?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Now the plan fell outside of the ambit of the Defence Force and the plan was presented to the Chief of the Army and the other Generals were also present there, Geldenhuys etc., and the command went to the Head of Intelligence. Colonel John Moore was an officer at Intelligence ...(indistinct) and then he was appointed as the officer in charge. Perhaps I should just explain, that is now referring to the Chief of the Army, so that referred to the Army Headquarters level. So John Moore took over command of the execution from the Army side, the Defence Force side for the execution of the plan.

MR KNOETZE: Now who was Colonel John Moore's chief, his superior, the Head of Military Intelligence?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That was Admiral Putter.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 29 refers to a meeting that was held in Cape Town and the people involved there are mentioned, you weren't present?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I received an invitation for the meeting in Cape Town but I could not attend it. The meeting had in fact taken place, according to my information.

MR KNOETZE: Then we go back to paragraph 30, page 30. Could you just tell us what is referred to in this paragraph and to what extent you were involved here.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, it was in July after we returned from Pretoria. It was myself and Commandant du Plessis. We went to the Transkei where we spoke with George Matanzima, Lent Makoba, Namba Sebe and Ben Namoi, and the plan then was sketched, presented to them in general terms. General Matanzima said that it was urgent, the Ciskei were prepared to take the initiative with the implication, they were all in agreement that Lennox Sebe had to be replaced or removed and Namba Sebe indicated that he would lead the XWB. That was before Charles Sebe had been liberated from prison.

MR KNOETZE: Right, paragraph 31 please.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The XWB was established, well the idea was established under the name Ciskei Ilizalomsa Movement, the eye of the nation and Namba Sebe and Lent Makoma would then have their headquarters on a farm in Elliot. The movement would be extended by distributing pamphlets. Funds were urgently needed and on the 31st of July R10 000 was handed over Lent Makoma and R5 000 to Namba Sebe.

MR KNOETZE: Who gave this money, whose money was it?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: If I remember correctly, the money was handed by Commandant du Plessis who attended the meeting with me. I think he also received receipts for that. I'm not quite sure where the money came from. Well it could just have been from two sources, that could have been the Chief of the Army and if it had gone over to Intelligence, it would have come from there.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 32, do you have any knowledge of what is referred to there? Paragraph 32.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can try to recollect it, it could have been at that meeting we attended with Matanzima where we referred to the liberation of Sebe, that he had to be freed on the 25th or the 26th and that the guards at that time of night perhaps are not awake. It was recommended that Kwani Sebe, Lennox's sons also had to be removed with Charles' liberation. He was the head of the elite unit. Aerial photos of the prison where Charles Sebe was being kept was taken on the 1st of August by a pilot. I wasn't aware of that, I only got to know about this later on.

MR KNOETZE: On page 32, do you have any knowledge of what is referred to in paragraph 33?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, no. Now we recommended the liberation of Charles Sebe. While he was not liberated by people under my command, it was done by soldiers from a special unit. I was not aware of the liberation, I also heard of it the following day. Perhaps I can just add it's not strange, the liberation of Charles Sebe was a covert operation and the Special Forces were involved. At that stage they weren't even under the command of the Chief of the Army, so it wasn't a Defence Force issue. Brigadier Moore supplied the funds for this exercise.

MR KNOETZE: Did you have any knowledge of what happened in paragraph 34?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I did not have any knowledge about this.

MR KNOETZE: Do you mean that you didn't know that it was being planned and when it would be executed, but afterwards you heard of it?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. No, I didn't know that they were kidnapped that night.

MR KNOETZE: Right, paragraph 35 there was an indication given of the repercussions. This doesn't have anything to do with the execution. And if we then go to paragraph 36, page 33, there it is said that because of the increasing fear that Katzen would be made known in any way, it was decided that the Defence Force's involvement there would be scaled down and just to continue with it in a low profile manner.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct, that is what General Liebenberg also told me when we discussed this. So the idea was then that from our side and from the Defence Force side, that the establishment of the XWB, that we should assist with that with the liberation of Charles Sebe and that the Transkei would then take the lead assisted by the Ciskei leaders in exile and then behind the scenes in a low profile we would then assist the Transkei to continue with the rest of the plan.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 37 says that on the 22nd of October '86, Colonel Hall and van Rooyen visited Major General Ron Reid-Daly and then discussed certain actions with him to discredit Lennox Sebe among the people. Did you know of this?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. During the meeting with George Matanzima, Ron Reid-Daly who was a General in the Transkei Army was on holiday, and Matanzima then said that they cancel his holiday and bring him back. Colonel Hall and van Rooyen, who was also one of my officers, informed him of the plan and then discussed actions to discredit Lennox Sebe.

MR KNOETZE: Just to put it quite clearly, you also said it earlier, both of these people were your staff officers and they also worked under your command and you take responsibility for what they did here?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR KNOETZE: What is in paragraph 38?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: On the 28th of October, myself, Colonel Hall, van Rooyen, Deysel, that was my Group Commanding Officer in East London, we had an appointment with Lennox Sebe and he expressed his dissatisfaction with the relations between Transkei and Ciskei. I could perhaps just add that the emotions were running high at that stage. I just asked that there shouldn't be any violent actions and then I undertook that we would increase our forces in this corridor area, to prevent a direct confrontation between the Ciskei and Transkei.

MR KNOETZE: Did you do it?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I did that. I sent armoured vehicles into this corridor. We also did air patrols in the corridor.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 39 refers to a meeting held on the 1st of November '86, with representatives of the Ciskei, Transkei and yourself. What happened there?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: If I can remember correctly, it was a meeting in East London and the Joint Management Board members of Transkei, Ciskei - it was the first time that they got together, I was Chairperson. Perhaps I can just say that we always met separately once a month. It was only myself with Ciskei and then myself with the Transkei. So this was a meeting where the three parties came together and the problems that arose were discussed, and trying to solve the problems, trying to say that it would be done in a peaceful way.

MR KNOETZE: Then we get to paragraph 40. This refers to a meeting on the 10th of November '86, between yourself, Ron Reid-Daly, Namba Sebe, Charles Sebe, van Rooyen, van der Merwe ...

...(end of tape)

... Mesikaba Now before I put questions to you, could I just refer you to Annexures A and B. Annexure A is the affidavit submitted by van Rooyen and he says at page 2, paragraph 5, the following. Now that was after he indicated that he was present at the meeting and that he was a scribe.

"Regarding the wording of the report, I want to indicate the following: The meeting was held in English and the words that were used in my report were my own translation of the English words which were used by those present."

Is that correct, that the meeting was held in English?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR KNOETZE: And that van Rooyen was only there to take the minutes?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, he took notes. It wasn't a very formal meeting, and he took notes regarding what we said there.

MR KNOETZE: Now the word in Afrikaans "uithaal", paragraph 1.C.1.C, means that Kwani had to be removed from his sphere of influence, it was not meant to mean that he should be killed. Now that is a reference to his own notes. It's a reference to what he wrote in this paragraph in his own handwriting. It's an annexure to this document. He continues in paragraph 5.2

"The word "uithaal" in paragraph 1.C.1.C of the report means that Kwani Sebe has to be removed from his sphere of influence. It was not intended to mean that he had to be killed."

Paragraph 5.3:

"The words "permanently removed" in paragraph 1.C.1.D means that he never had to become involved in Xhosa politics again, he had to be totally discredited. It never meant that he had to be killed."

Paragraph 5.4:

"The words "Lennox had to be taken out", on page 4 of the report, also meant that he had to be taken out of the political sphere."

Paragraph 5.5:

"The words "Namba Sebe has to be removed from the scene", on page 4, also meant that he had to disappear from the political scene, the Xhosa scene."

The words "the members on which Lennox places his support, on page 4, that that should also mean that he should be taken out of the political sphere by for example, being discredited. It did not mean that these specific members had to be killed.

That is also what is meant by the word "taken out" in that paragraph.

"The words "indien nie vir altyd opgesluit nie, moet hulle verdwyn", paragraph 1.F.4, page 5, should mean that Kwani Sebe and his second in command should disappear out of the Ciskei. It was not intended that they should be killed."

Paragraph 6:

In conclusion, I confirm that during the meeting at Mesikaba no decision was taken that any person had to be killed. And in this regard it must be mentioned that I then read the affidavit of van der Merwe and his view of what had happened at the meeting, that I confirm that."

General, the statement by Isak Ferdinand van der Merwe in Exhibit B, he refers on page 4, paragraph 7, to the meetings. Can you just turn to that page? He starts explaining it and then a lengthy exposition until he gets to paragraph 12, his page 6. Then he says:

"In my presence there weren't any plans made to kill any person in any way. I would not have not become involved in such an offence in order to kill someone. There was a request made to me during the meeting to monitor the political situation in the Ciskei, to monitor and measure the political campaign and I did that by means of media reports and informants."

Now you hear what these people say, is this also how you can recollect it?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it is.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Advocate, can I just ask one or two questions on this? That is regarding paragraph 5.5, about Namba Sebe, what was the problem about him? I see it says there he had to be taken away from the political scene. Was there a problem about him? Namba Sebe, what was the problem about him?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chair, Lennox Sebe was planning to attack his half-brother, Namba Sebe. Namba expressed the fear in this regard. There were two ways of thinking, one was that we should pretend that he was abroad, somewhere overseas, so that Lennox Sebe could stop with these attacks or his purported attacks on Namba.

And the other method was that we should go and hide him somewhere on a farm. And I think it's the latter that was intended here, that he should no longer be seen in the public spotlight, he was quite an outspoken man, but that he should rather maintain a low profile. It was in any event to place him outside of Lennox Sebe's reach.

MR KNOETZE: And in this regard, can I also take you back to Exhibit B, paragraph 9 on page 5, where Brigadier van der Merwe says the following

"As an alternative for the Ciskei Government, an existing resistance group would be developed after a Xhosa resistance movement. And it was also suggested that the following persons were in the way of the proposed planning and that they should be removed from the political dispensation: Lennox Sebe, Kwani Sebe and Colonel Zibi."

Do you confirm that? Does that also strengthen what you've just said?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

ADV SANDI: He has answered my second question which I was going to ask, about Colonel Zibi.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you, Chair.

Again, could you tell us how it came about that this particular group of people met at Mesikaba?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well I was actually extremely curious and I was very interested in seeing Charles Sebe because I knew him well before he was imprisoned. Apart from the fact that I wanted to see him, I wanted to also satisfy myself as to the fact that he was strong enough to continue with the resistance movement. His half-brother, Namba was with him and I think that explains Namba's presence. Major van der Merwe from the Security Police represented Colonel Griebenauw at the time and then it was myself and my staff officer.

MR KNOETZE: Alright, if we can then return to Annexure A in the bundle. On page 35 there is a portion which reads

"It was made clear that the RSA would co-operate, but that the taking out would be done by the Transkei itself."

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's entirely correct. We'd already been given the instruction to keep a lower profile and that further actions should actually be performed by the Transkei and the Ciskei.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 41, could you explain that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, at this stage I think there were 11 members, it was a small team who had been recruited in the Ciskei. Once again, if I remember correctly, there were members of the Ciskei Defence Force and/or police and they were trained at Port St Johns.

The Transkei had a military base at Transkei, or at Port St Johns where they did Special Forces training, and this team received their training there. I think it was only the one small team which had been trained there for a very short period.

MR KNOETZE: Could you just pertinently tell us, what was it intended that this team would do after having been trained?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: They would form the initial phase of the resistance movement and later it would be strengthened, stepped up, and in the initial phases they would look at the protection of Charles and Namba Sebe and also Chief Lent Makoma, but in the end it never really progressed much further than this. It never developed into a counter-revolutionary front. And I may add, the idea was that they should form a military wing for Chief Makoma's party, but nothing came of that either.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Paragraph 42, page 36 says

"The actions, the influenced actions to try and discredit Lennox Sebe continued."

How were you involved in these actions to discredit?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well we assisted by for instance the printing of pamphlets which discredited Lennox Sebe and reports in the media were placed at our initiative, reporting about the corruption in the Ciskei. There were also radio reports about that.

Later on we noticed that this type of discrediting action should no longer take place at my headquarters but should be moved to the Transkei. - pamphlets were also dropped from planes. A private plan was hired for this purpose so that it couldn't be traced back to the Defence Force.

MR KNOETZE: So this was done by your subordinates with your knowledge, and you take responsibility for that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then paragraph 43. That explains what happened then, that

"President Lennox Sebe became aware of these actions against him and he then took certain steps to bolster his own position."

Then let us go to paragraph 44 on page 37. It says that:

"About November/December '86, General Liebenberg gave Lieutenant-General van der Westhuizen oral instruction that the Command Eastern Province should no longer be involved in the carrying out of Operation Katzen. The further involvement of Lieutenant-General van der Westhuizen and his staff officers was in a JMB context or as assistance to Brigadier Moore. Lieutenant-General Kritzinger, who succeeded General van der Westhuizen as Commander of the Command Eastern Province, repeated this instruction shortly afterwards, although no member of the Eastern Province Command was at that stage still involved in that."

Is it true that General Liebenberg told you orally that the Eastern Province Command should no longer be involved?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then in paragraph 45 there is a reference to an abortive incursion into the Ciskei by the TDF forces, that is the Transkei Defence Force, TDF. It says that the SADF's involvement in Katzen ended, but the financial assistance to the liberated Charles Sebe was continued. You were not involved in this financial aid?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, the funds were dealt with and managed by Lieutenant Moore.

MR KNOETZE: Then it continues

"The idea to try and topple Lennox Sebe by means of pressure of a resistance movement was hampered by the attack on Lennox Sebe. Katzen died a natural death."

Is that correct?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct. The attack to which paragraph 45 refers, I think is what also is referred to in paragraph 46.

MR KNOETZE

"On the 19th of February a group of 23 armed men, consisting of members of the Transkei Defence Force, including ex-Rhodesians, launched an attack on the house of President Lennox Sebe. One member was killed, one was seriously wounded, two were arrested and the attack was averted. The SADF was not involved in the attack and it was also not part of Katzen."

Can you comment on that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, as I've already said, in December I was transferred to the Witwatersrand and at that stage, according to the instruction which I got from General Liebenberg, we had to withdraw from Plan Katzen and only assist and monitor where necessary. The attack on the 19th of February therefore took place after the instruction to end involvement which I received, so I don't have detailed knowledge of that attack. But it was my observation or my perception that the Defence Force was not involved in that and that it was also not a part of Katzen.

I might just add that the only reason why it could be seen as a continuance of Plan Katzen, was that I had recommended it in my plan. Not an attack per se, but I recommended a coup d'état and the TDF could have launched the attack as a continuation of that which I'd recommended in my plan.

I might add that whilst I was in Johannesburg, I received a call from General Reid-Daly in which complained that he was alone, in that we didn't assist him. I told him that we'd terminated our participation in the project and that he should liaise with General Gleeson if he has any further problems. That was before this attack took place.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Paragraph 47

"The attack on President Lennox Sebe led to a revolt in the Transkeian Defence Force, in which those who were rebelling under the leadership of Major-General Holomisa, got the upperhand and took over the Government of the Transkei. The new Government of the Transkei committed breach of contract vis à vis, the former ex-Rhodesians and evicted them from the country. At that stage the Transkei Government owed the ex-Rhodesians approximately R6-million.

Paragraph 48: It says that the relationship between the Ciskei and Transkei kept worsening and as a result of that the then Minister of Defence on the 7th of October 1982, authorised R2-million to conclude Katzen, to terminate it. General Coetzee after this, paid out R2.225.030-million to the ex-Rhodesians, which money was provided by the Department of Military Information or Intelligence, and was paid for out of the Scraper Fund. You were not involved here, so you don't have any knowledge of what is mentioned here?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR KNOETZE: It then says that a report which was drafted by General Coetzee regarding this matter is attached as Annexure B.

Mr Chairman, I must indicate that at the stage when this document was drawn that annexure was available, but we couldn't get a copy of it when this amnesty application was prepared. People are still trying to determine where it went, but we haven't been able to. It doesn't really to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think it's too vital that we don't have it.

MR KNOETZE: I agree, thank you, Mr Chairman.

And then paragraph 40 or page 40, paragraph 49. It says that there were certain payments made to Major-General Holomisa. And in paragraph 50 it says that, or it refers to Major-General Holomisa and the ex-Rhodesians. You have no knowledge of that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, accept what I heard afterwards.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, I must just indicate there are documents in the bundle, reports by various Staff Officers, dealing with what we've just dealt with. I don't intend to go through that. I would suggest it would be a duplication, but they are there for the Committee to read.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Knoetze, we've got the documents, we'll read them.

MR KNOETZE: And they appear on 887 to 913, Mr Chairman.

Generally, if we can return to your amnesty application which we deviated from actually. If we could please go to page 4 thereof, paragraph 10(a). You are asked to indicate the political objective with which you committed these actions to which we've just referred. It says:

"As a member of the South African Defence Force, and in terms of the South African Government's counter-revolutionary strategy, to conduct the counter-revolutionary war, to prop up the RSA's constitutional dispensation and to protect it. The political objectives were

(a) To prevent by means of military action internal and abroad, to prevent the revolutionary forces overthrowing the RSA Government violently and damaging or destroying their constitutional dispensation."

Would you like to comment on that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It is a technical point, it's not quite technically correct to refer to the constitutional dispensation as I referred to yesterday. That was not the only issue at stake, also the economic and psychological aspects. In other words, the entire picture of the power bases of the State were involved. So I think technically you can replace constitutional with the State's power bases.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Then page 5, paragraph 10(b). It asks you to indicate what your motivation was, why these acts or omissions or offences are regarded to be as being in connection with a political objective. Could you then supplement this with what we said yesterday regarding the documents which were marked Annexure C?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well broadly, what it was concerned with was to improve the ability to defend yourself and dealt with all the processes having relevance to the power bases of the State and trying to promote and strengthen those power bases. It deals with population in this part of the country and getting them on our side, winning the hearts and minds and to combat and to stabilise the instability which reigned here, and to attempt to create a more normal environment in the Eastern Cape.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Then page 6, paragraph 4. You say

" I was very much against the revolutionary onslaught against the Republic, and I saw it as my duty to support the South African Defence Force counter-revolutionary war."

And that also follows very clearly from everything that was referred to yesterday.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, yes.

MR KNOETZE: And the same with (b), which says

"I saw it as my task to oppose the revolutionary onslaught and to confront the people were carrying out that revolutionary onslaught. In many such cases this meant that in an attempt to protect the populist, both white and black, against these acts of terror, I participated in the planning and carrying out of operations or actions where military violence was actually used."

And Plan Strelitzia and Plan Katzen on the other hand as we'd seen, were not primarily aimed at killing people.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR KNOETZE: And then reference is made to the support of friendly organisations, and this would include for instance, the XWB to which we've referred.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Is it correct that you wanted to add a third point there, namely territorial protection?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. In the Eastern Cape our troops were present mainly to protect the territory and territorial protection is nothing other than the presence of troops by means of patrols, roadblocks, searches, etc., in an area. That is how we utilised the military, apart from the confrontation with terrorists which actually led fights, real battles.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 5. There is reference to an additional document or documents, and you are requesting that those documents in Exhibit C are also incorporated into this particular application.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have nothing further at this stage.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KNOETZE

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Knoetze. Mr Avenant, do you have any questions that you would like to ask the witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR AVENANT: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

General, I'd like to deal with Annexure A to your application. Yesterday you said that this was not drafted by yourself personally.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, correct.

MR AVENANT: Who actually drafted this annexure?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As I said yesterday, this annexure is a result of a team effort. There were a group of people who were involved to some extent or another in the Katzen Plan. The group of people were brought together at the request of my attorney, Mr Jan Wagener in Pretoria and what you see here is a version of what was said by the various parties there. I also made a certain contribution as to the parts where I was involved, and I think all the other people did exactly the same. I'm not exactly sure who this group of people were.

MR AVENANT: In other words, this was a piecemeal compilation?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR AVENANT: But the end result, in the end product you checked it and you endorse that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I think where there's a slight deviation or a change I indicated it as such, but I did go through the end result and I think it is probably the only full and complete picture of all the many different components of Katzen.

MR AVENANT: Page 20 of the document, there you refer to the fact that General Magnus Malan and PW Botha visited the Eastern Cape and that they gave the instruction that the situation be stabilised in the Eastern Cape. You say that General Malan, or it says here that Mr PW Botha made the same demand, namely stabilisation, and indicated that it should be done even if it amounted to the Security Forces springing Charles Sebe from prison. Was that an instruction given to you personally?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I knew about it, I can't remember that either General Malan or former President, PW Botha told me that I should liberate Charles Sebe from prison.

MR AVENANT: So where would this remark have come from?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As I've said, this is the result of the contributions made by several people. And maybe this remark was made towards somebody else.

MR AVENANT

"Lieutenant-General van der Westhuizen emphasised or his duties were further emphasised by personal instructions which the then Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan and PW Botha had given to him."

So that creates the impression that it was given personally.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, but what was involved here are my duties. I can remember that visit, quite a lot of pressure was placed on us by both Malan and Botha, to address the situation in the Eastern Cape. What was involved was the actual situation of unrest. In the first sentence reference is made to my aforementioned duties. So these duties which not only I had, but the Eastern Province Command as a whole. There were many such visits, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Avenant, if I could just ask a question.

You've said that the then State President issued this instruction, that the area, and the Eastern Cape in particular, had to be stabilised or normalised by December 1987, initially I think it was 1986 for the whole of South Africa, December 1987, isn't it contradictory, would there be a setback in that regard with your having been transferred on the 1st of January 1987? After all you were in charge of the Army in the Eastern Cape and then six months after being given this fairly heavy instruction, difficult to carry out, the Army then transfers you out of the area to Witwatersrand Command. Would that have had an impact on the adherence to that directive given by the State President, namely to stabilise the area by the end of '87?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, Chairperson, you are entirely correct. I was not very pleased with my transfer, but it was thought that the Witwatersrand should perhaps enjoy a higher priority, and as a result of my experience in the Eastern Cape, it was decided that I should be transferred to the Witwatersrand. I might just add that my staff and my commanding officers who worked with me stayed behind and they would be able to assist the new commanding officer to just take over and continue.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Thank you, Chair.

MR AVENANT: General, just to get back to this instruction. This would not be something which somebody would just fabricate and lie about, that Charles Sebe should be liberated from prison?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No. As I indicated yesterday, the imprisonment of Charles Sebe in Middledrift Prison enjoyed a high level of interest, media interest etc., everybody talked about it. I don't think it would be too far-reaching to say that even President Botha would have known about it and talked about it. But I can't personally say - well, President Botha didn't tell me personally to liberate Charles Sebe from prison.

MR AVENANT: Thank you. But that then actually became part of the plan, the liberation of Charles Sebe?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, whether PW Botha said so or not, we all thought that that was necessary, and for that I accept responsibility. I felt that he should be liberated from prison.

MR AVENANT: Would you be able to link this instruction or the idea with President Botha's visit to the Eastern Cape?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It was in August '85 when President Botha visited the area. I can remember it very well, especially as a result of the pressure which was placed on us during that visit. There were also other visits, but I can't remember the dates, but I can remember the August '85 visit. And we also visited East London in August '85.

MR AVENANT: But it was as a result of this pressure exerted on you that Plan Strelitzia was developed?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No. Plan Strelitzia was conceived even before this visit, in May/June of '85. Plan Strelitzia had a long genesis and months before the presentation, in June '85 I think, we got together and started compiling Strelitzia. So that was part of my ongoing duties.

MR AVENANT: On page 28, the meeting of July '86, the 9th of July '86, the version of Katzen was conveyed to General van der Westhuizen or General Liebenberg. There you also refer to the fact that General Griebenauw attended this meeting in Pretoria.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think that is correct.

MR AVENANT: My instructions are that he was not present at that meeting.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I will accept that.

MR AVENANT: My instructions are that his first getting to know of the plan was in East London, or I beg your pardon, in Port Elizabeth in August.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I will accept that too.

MR AVENANT: It is possible that you're perhaps confusing him with Brigadier Schoon who was at that stage in Pretoria.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: What you're saying is correct, it's possible that I'm getting him confused with somebody in Pretoria, a police officer, because there was somebody from the police present there but I can't recall who. It's possible that it could have been somebody other than Colonel Griebenauw. This meeting, if I remember correctly, took place in General Geldenhuys' office.

MR AVENANT: I'm accepting that you were assuming that you were personally involved in the Port Elizabeth meeting, but there were so many of them. The first meeting which took place in Port Elizabeth where General Griebenauw was present, we think took place the end of July, beginning of August, but we don't have a specific date for it. It was at this meeting that the plan was discussed in broad terms, in Port Elizabeth.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I think that is the meeting where General Joubert was present, yes.

MR AVENANT: And is it correct that this plan was not discussed in its full extent, but only in broad outline?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: Is it correct that General Griebenauw voiced his concerns and objections to his participation in this plan, he did not want to take instructions from the Defence Force?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That I can't remember pertinently. I know that there were certain objections to the plan from the police side and also from the Intelligence side, but I can't remember the details.

MR AVENANT: My instructions are ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, by that then I gather you won't deny that there was that opposition expressed?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I will accept that.

MR AVENANT: At that same meeting, Brigadier Schoon told Griebenauw that it was an instruction from the Commissioner of Police, do you remember that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can't recall it but I will accept it, especially in view of the fact that South African Police knew of this plan, and Colonel Griebenauw was their representative in the Eastern Cape. So by virtue of his office he would have been familiar with it, he would have known of it.

MR AVENANT: What was the police's function, the Security Branch in particular, what was their function in relation to this operation?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: From the Eastern Province Command side there was no need for us, for the South African Police to fulfil any function other than what we would normally require, namely our co-operation inasfar as Intelligence and the operational side of things were concerned. I can't recall, given the fact that I had written Plan Katzen, that I had in that document expressed any desire for the SAP to assist us.

MR AVENANT: Is it correct that the South African Police's primary task, well the Security Police, was to gather Intelligence?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: And Intelligence was what was necessary for the liberation of inter alia, Charles Sebe?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: From whom would this request for information about Charles Sebe have been received?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: From Special Forces, Special Forces of the Defence Force.

MR AVENANT: How was that co-ordinated?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I don't think it was co-ordinated, but I will accept that the normal practice took place, namely that the commanding officer would approach all Intelligence sources and he would have consulted certain people and would have required information from people who for instance, knew about the prison and knew where Charles Sebe was etc. So I don't think it was a co-ordinated effort, it was a mere request for information which came from the operational commander.

MR AVENANT: So this was not the kind of thing that would be discussed at a meeting?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, it was never discussed at any meeting where I was present. I don't think that kind of thing would be discussed at a meeting.

MR AVENANT: I think it was the meeting at Mesikaba, where General Griebenauw was not present, he sent Major-General van der Merwe, or Major van der Merwe.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR AVENANT: And that is also - is it correct that the police, just after this meeting, withdrew from the operation?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: Did you make any enquiries as to why they withdrew?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, this was in the same period where the Chief of the Defence Force told me that we had to scale our involvement in this plan down, so I didn't find it strange at all.

MR AVENANT: You at no stage asked General Griebenauw for instance why they withdrew?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, not as far as I can remember.

MR AVENANT: Were you at any stage approached by the Transkeian role-players to ask why the police were no longer involved?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR AVENANT: At this meeting at Mesikaba - I want to refer to the expression "to take out", in Annexure A, of which you are not the author. I notice that if you look at Exhibits A and B, A was the statement of van Rooyen. Namba Sebe - to link up with a question from the Panel, Namba Sebe had to be removed from the scene. So that was actually to secure him against the Ciskei, or as against the Ciskei?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it was a protective measure. Actually it was disinformation to say that he was going to a farm or he was going abroad. It was simply to move him from the public glare.

MR AVENANT: It's my instructions that at that stage there was pressure from the Ciskei Government that Namba be extradited to it.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: Because Namba accepted liability and responsibility for the liberation from prison.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, Namba said that it was due to his actions that Charles Sebe had been sprung from prison and that there was now pressure on him as a result of that.

MR AVENANT: At what stage did the SADF withdraw permanently from this plan?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can't recall the exact date, but I think it would have been in December '86, definitely before I was transferred to the Witwatersrand. I told my successor about the plan because at that stage we from the Army's side played no further role, so I'm not exactly sure what role Colonel Moore played.

MR AVENANT: But there was no question of any supportive functions provided?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it was implied that if the Transkei continued to replace Lennox Sebe and continue with the phase, as I have sketched it in the plan, it was implied that we would support that effort undertaken by the Ciskei and Transkei. MR AVENANT: In other words the initiative came from the Transkei?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that was my instructions.

MR AVENANT: So Transkei would have had to take the lead?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: So that if Ron Reid-Daly attacks the house of Lennox Sebe and something positive would flow from that he would receive the support of the South African Defence Force?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, although we did not foresee, and certainly didn't want a coup d'état to take place by means of an attack on a house. If things had turned out better than foreseen, it would have assisted the plan, or promoted the plan.

MR AVENANT: Your allies in the Transkei, they would have been of the impression that they had foreseen

it would have assisted the plan, promoted the plan,

or that they were still continuing with this course?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. The termination of Plan Katzen from the South African Defence Force's side, did not mean the termination of Katzen for leaders in Transkei and Ciskei, such as the Lennox Sebe's and the Namba Sebe's, etc. Those aspirations continued to exist after Katzen.

MR AVENANT: Katzen was the seed that had been planted?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Katzen tried to create a programme of action for a seed that had already been sown, the idea of just Ciskei and Transkei in Unity was already present when I assumed command in 1983, Katzen was simply the formalisation of that and the organisation of that, so that there would be no further instability.

MR AVENANT: Chairperson, I just want to have a look at the original submissions, if you will allow me a moment.

General, this document written in your own handwriting, I want to refer to that. There were several phases, for instance page 81 where reference is made to - if you look at 81, paragraph 5, that was course of action 1, and then course of action 2 and course of action 3. Course of action, you suggested that somebody be removed for instance?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: And course of action 2, it was suggested that somebody be removed from the political life?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: Do these two removals mean exactly the same?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, different interpretations could be attached to that. I said yesterday that I now realise that it was even possible that a sinister interpretation could be attached to these words. At that stage our intention was that he be removed from the political scene so that he could no longer play a role there and that he then had to be replaced by a moderate pro-South African ally against this whole revolutionary onslaught.

MR AVENANT: Yes, but course of action 1, there we talk only of remove?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: And then in course of action 2, reference is made to a political scene?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I think in context we actually are talking about the same thing.

MR AVENANT: The fact that you say that courses of action 2 and 3 on page 89 are watered down models and they will not have the same degree of success as course of action 1, that should also not be read into that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, because in numbers 2 and 3, the later phases then vade(?) as a result of the involvement of the corridor, etc.

I realise that the time frame was very limited, but that would have been the ideal culmination point for Plan Katzen. This unity which would then be established, which would then have a constitutional element, one government, the aspirations are all amalgamated in one Xhosa people, so the leaving aside of those things which were important to me, was a watering down of the first course of action.

But I realise that those actions were very politically sensitive and that is why I leave the opportunity here by means of courses of action 1, 2 and 3, that if the people who had to decide about this, did not actually want to take that step, those parts would not have to be carried out.

MR AVENANT: I am trying to understand this little play on words that was used. The meetings were held in English, this is now the meetings with the Ciskei/Transkei allies and that we are dealing here with translations?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR AVENANT: But what I am trying to determine is this, the persons who attended the meetings, how would they have interpreted this and how would they have conveyed it?

The meeting at Misikaba was attended by Major Van der Merwe and I am trying to find out how he would have reacted to these word plays, irrespective of what he says in his statement? The fact is the Security Police withdrew from the operation immediately after this meeting?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct. I accept that a person like Major Van der Merwe who was involved right from cold as it were, would be able to view the matter with quite a great degree of objectivity.

I am accepting that what he put in his statement, was correct and that is how he experienced it. I may just add that I don't find anything that he says in his statement, strange. I can accept his version.

MR AVENANT: I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR AVENANT: .

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Avenant. Mr Claassen, do you have any questions?

MR CLAASSEN: I have no questions Mr Chairman, thank you.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CLAASSEN: .

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Penzhorn, do you have any questions?

MR PENZHORN: Once I have eventually got this thing on, Mr Chairman, I have no questions.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PENZHORN: .

CHAIRPERSON: Mr der Hoven, do you have any questions?

MR VAN DER HOVEN: I have no questions, Mr Chairman, thank you.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER HOVEN: .

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nontenga, do you have any questions?

MR NONTENGA: I have no questions, Mr Chairman, thank you.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NONTENGA: .

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, I do have some questions.

General, can you remember Gen Gert Beetge, he was under your command?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. I think he was a Major and I can't remember the exact period, but there was a stage in which he was in PE under my command.

MR JANSEN: Yes, will you accept it if he says that in 1986 he was transferred from Namibia to service in the Eastern Cape, so he was under your command from 1986, will you accept that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I will. I can't dispute that.

MR JANSEN: You will also accept that he was second in command of Intelligence? He was second in command of your Intelligence staff in the Eastern Cape?

Perhaps I should be a little bit more accurate, he served under Colonel Rastie van Rooyen, was Rastie van Rooyen your Intelligence Officer?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Colonel Rastie van Rooyen was the Senior Staff Officer, Intelligence. In my command, there was no second in charge or second in command in Intelligence.

There were Senior Staff Officer 1 and 2, the SO 2's were Majors and the SO 1's were Commanders, Commandants.

MR JANSEN: Yes, I see he was an SO 2 in charge of Collection, I suppose that is the gathering of information.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Under Colonel Van Rooyen, there were several sections or divisions and each one of them, had a Captain or a Major or whatever at the head of it, but they were not Commanders in a staff sense of the word. They simply were at the head of a particular section.

MR JANSEN: Can you recall an operation in 1986, operation by the name of Orpheus?

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, I really don't see the relevance of such an operation if it never existed?

CHAIRPERSON: Is there any relevance in this Mr Jansen? On the face of it, it appears not, but if you can satisfy myself about the relevance of this, with regard to Operation Katzen, then we can decide whether the question be answered or not.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, you must understand the position from which I am asking these questions. Firstly I am not asking them in any way in opposition to this amnesty application.

I will have to seek certain answers from Gen Van der Westhuizen at some or other stage. My client, Mr Hugo, it will be central to his application that he received, for what he is asking amnesty for, he either received orders or he reasonably perceived his actions to follow from orders.

Now as I understood the original round table meeting that we had with Judge Wilson, was that we must try and shorten all these proceedings as much as possible.

I will take possibly half an hour at the most at this proceedings, to ask Gen Van der Westhuizen certain questions about the Eastern Cape in general and - otherwise what will happen Mr Chairman, is at the time, at later Eastern Cape hearings, I will be compelled to seek Gen Van der Westhuizen's attendance then through a subpoena or somehow.

CHAIRPERSON: But if this is just to establish whether somebody did a particular act under orders, and that is not placed in issue at that applicant's hearing, you don't have to call the General who issued the order? It will be accepted that he, on his evidence, unless there is opposition to the fact that he acted under orders, and it is a point in issue.

I mean must we now listen to Operation Orpheus here which has got nothing whatsoever to do with this hearing? I can't see, I wasn't present at that meeting where Judge Wilson sat, but I don't think that this can be used as a basis for Hugo's application, which has got nothing to do with this.

If it had something to do with Katzen, I would go with it.

MR KNOETZE: May I just also add to that Mr Chairman, that obviously our client is not prepared to answer these questions, it is completely unfair to confront him with this, and I fully agree with yourself that it is an absolute waste of time of this Committee, misuse of this Committee's time. It can never be brought under this heading.

CHAIRPERSON: If it had some link to this Operation Katzen, I can understand it, but otherwise you know, if that is the situation, you know at each and every hearing, not only of Security Force matters, but liberation movement matters, we could get a whole array of legal representatives asking questions of a particular person, for some application that has nothing to do with the application under consideration, just to get information to assist them in their later application, it would lead to chaos.

MR JANSEN: No, I accept that Mr Chairman, but please understand the following. There has been a long ongoing debate before many of the other Committees and the original Committee as to what extent is evidence in other Committees admissible in a particular hearing and to what extent can reference be made to evidence in another hearing and how is that evidence introduced in a later hearing.

My problem is the following Mr Chairman, and I take issue with you there, with respect as far as whether if he had taken orders or whether if there is no opposition to his allegation that he was under orders, there are Amnesty Committee judgements on record saying that people's allegations that they were acting under orders, were not corroborated by those people whom they said, gave them the orders.

It is in fact crucial for a person in, especially of a lower rank, in the Security Forces or in any liberation movement or resistance movement, to establish at some or other forum, that they were acting under orders.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen, next week we have an applicant who is going to be involved in 24 weeks of hearing. I have read his papers for next week, and he is giving, he has put up about six pages relating to his participation in connection with an incident that took place in the Transkei.

Now, if your approach is followed, would we then have to allow potentially weeks and weeks and weeks of that person being asked questions about dozens and dozens and dozens of other incidents, which have got nothing to do with the hearing next week?

MR JANSEN: No, Mr Chairman, and I want to conclude here on the following. What I will ask you then for, is a ruling because I can assure you the one thing that I have not in this entire process indulged in, is long, lengthy examination in either chief or cross-examination.

It will certainly not take weeks, I unfortunately know that in many cases cross-examination have taken weeks or at least ...

CHAIRPERSON: What I am meaning is with next week, that example I gave, I might have a hundred Attorneys present here, asking for half an hour.

MR JANSEN: Yes, but the alternative Mr Chairman, is that at each and every hearing where these junior officers are, they will then be seeking that half an hour in 30 different hearings, instead of going to one hearing and each seeking their half an hour at that hearing, that is what the debate has been about.

There has still not been a ruling on that, even though we have asked the original Amnesty Committee far back as 1997, to make a ruling on some of these issues. I take it, and I certainly don't want to create the impression that I here want to side-track this hearing which really at the end of the day, seems to be about a jail break and nothing more, on issues in general. All I am stating on record now, firstly, that I would be requiring of yourself and your Committee to make a ruling that I am not entitled to ask these questions here, because I can't be seen at another hearing saying well, there was the Commander of the Eastern Cape testifying about what happened in the Eastern Cape, and you know, you just let things go.

Then I want a ruling about that point, number 1, that I am not allowed to go further than what is strictly the facts of this application, and secondly then I just want to place on record that this issue will be raised at a later stage and I can foresee that we will either be seeking Gen Van der Westhuizen or Colonel Van Rooyen's voluntary assistance in our application or we will have to compel them somehow.

I have no other submissions in respect of that, because other than the purposes of asking about another operation, I have no other purpose here, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Jansen, Mr Knoetze, do you have anything to say?

MR KNOETZE: Yes, Mr Chairman, I would just like to say that I find it strange that my learned friend attends this meeting for that purpose, I am not sure who he is funded by, but if that is his only reason for attendance, perhaps he should have made contact with us before and he could have saved whoever the expense of being present.

CHAIRPERSON: Any other submissions from any other of the legal representatives present?

MR PENZHORN: No, Mr Chairman, thank you.

MR VAN DER HOVEN: No Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any reply Mr Jansen?

MR JANSEN: No, I don't know why my learned friend finds it strange. I just want to place something on record there, that this has been an ongoing problem of which I think my learned friend is ignorant, as to what exactly the status of evidence given at other Committee meetings, and I am not taking it any further than that, Mr Chairman.

I will just want, just the other problem that I want to place on record is, one of the problems of the process is we don't know what other incidents or other Operations Gen Van der Westhuizen has asked amnesty for. We don't know whether he has come here, or whether he only asks for Katzen or whether there are other incidents that he asks for.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no we don't know that ourselves either.

I see that it is now five past eleven, this will be an opportune time to take the tea adjournment and then we will resume again at half past eleven.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: (still under oath)

CHAIRPERSON: Just before we adjourned for the tea break, Mr Jansen asked the Committee to make a ruling in regard to a point of procedure.

It is apparent from Mr Jansen's line of questioning that he was about to ask the applicant questions relating to an incident that was in no way related to the subject matter of this particular application.

The basis for the application made by Mr Jansen, is that to allow such questioning, would have the effect of shortening proceedings in another application as had been discussed at a meeting that had been held with one of the Amnesty Committee members, namely Judge Wilson.

I don't know what actually occurred at that meeting, I wasn't present, but we are left with the principle now as to be decided whether to allow this questioning in relation to an incident which has nothing at all to do with the subject matter of this application.

We all know that in these hearings, these amnesty hearings, that we are liberal in the application of the laws of procedure and evidence far more so than we would be in a court case, and there is a bit of latitude with regard to the leading of hearsay evidence and with regard to leading questions, and indeed even with regard to certain points that may be irrelevant. It is not as tight, one can put it that way, as would be applied in a court case.

We, the panel have discussed this matter during the adjournment and we are of the view that it would be improper to allow the questions to be asked and make such a ruling, the ruling being that we will not allow it. To do so would in our view, lead to various potential difficulties. For instance if we did make the ruling that the questions of this completely irrelevant to this application, evidence be led, such evidence would then become part of the evidence of this particular application, which might, depending on the answers given or the answers not given or refused to be given, have an effect on whether or not the criteria of full disclosure has been made.

If there is not a full disclosure in respect to a piece of evidence that is completely irrelevant, but which is ruled can be pursued, how does that effect non-disclosure in this application, that sort of problem.

We also believe that this questioning would not really have the effect of shortening proceedings because the time taken in this, the questioning in this application, would be the same time, presumably that would be taken if the evidence were to be led, where it ought to be led at the application of Mr Jansen's client.

In the circumstances, we are of the view that seeing that the evidence is completely irrelevant to this application, that we will not allow the questions to be put. However, Mr Jansen of course is free to put any questions to the witness that are relevant to this particular application and the subject matter thereof.

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, could I have five seconds just to take instructions from my Instructing Attorney?

CHAIRPERSON: We will just take a very short adjournment and then you can take instructions.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, members of the Committee. I have no further questions. May I then also ask, we will be, my Attorney and I, we will be in attendance probably until lunch time, we won't just desert the place, but may we then also be excused at any time thereafter?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly. Thank you.

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN: .

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prinsloo, do you have any questions to ask the witness?

MR PRINSLOO: On behalf of my clients, Brigadier More and Colonel Hall, no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO: .

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagener, in your other capacity as representative for various implicated people and interested parties, do you have any questions to ask the witness?

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, no questions, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mapoma, do you have any questions to ask the witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAPOMA: Yes, Mr Chairperson, thank you. General, in your evidence which you gave yesterday, or background, you made mention of the Joint Management Councils, would you just explain the structure of this JMC? I just want to get, to be clear, was Transkei having its own JMC and Ciskei its own, just explain this please?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, the English term was Joint Management Board - according to the prescriptions for these Boards, the military representatives of the command and I was the Head thereof, served on this Board with the military representatives from the Ciskei and that was called the RSA/Ciskei Military Board, it was just military in nature.

And then there was also an RSA/Transkei Board, also military. As observers on these Boards, you had Foreign Affairs and in the mid 1980's, there was a department Development Assistance. I think they aimed at giving assistance to the TBVC States and they also had sitting on the JMC.

Now the other representatives were people from the military, myself, Staff Officers, people from the Air Force. I don't think the Navy was represented, sometimes from the Medical Services when medical assistance was on the agenda.

CHAIRPERSON: General, were those Joint Military Boards or Councils, was it only in the Eastern Cape with respect of Ciskei and Transkei or was there also one in Port Elizabeth which didn't include Ciskei and Transkei?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, no the JMC or JMB was an unique institution for the TBVC States, each one of those Venda, Bophuthatswana, they each had a JMC. I had two of them, of those areas or States in my area and therefore there were two, north was Venda, northwest with the Headquarters in Potch, they had the Bophuthatswana one.

MR MAPOMA: Thank you sir. You said you were a co-Chairperson of this Board. Who else was chairing?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: If the meeting was held in Port Elizabeth, then as host I also acted as Chairperson. When it was in Ciskei, with the JMB there, then the Chief of the Defence Force there, then acted as Chairperson and it was first of all Brigadier Nel. In the Ciskei he was succeeded by Malan, I can't remember the date. I think it was approximately in 1985 that Malan took over from Nel and then one of those would then act as Chairperson.

In the case of the Transkei, if the meetings were held in Umtata, it was originally Ron Reid-Daly and later on, it was Gen Mitigaga who was then Chairperson.

During the only joint meeting that we had in East London, I acted as Chairperson.

MR MAPOMA: This plan, Strelitzia, what does the name Strelitzia arise from, why was it named by this term?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Strelitzia is a flower, I think you find it especially in the area of Grahamstown. It is representation of the Eastern Cape, we just wanted to find a symbol that would convey the Eastern Cape idea.

I don't know whether it is unique to the Eastern Cape, but I know that one finds it here. We just took a name that we could identify the Plan with.

MR MAPOMA: As I understand it, this Plan did not go any further, when it was not approved by the Council which you presented it to.

After it was not approved, then there arose Plan Katzen. Now, for Strelitzia you had an Advisory Board that you established, now was this Advisory Board involved in the Katzen Plan?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, no. Not as a Board, but one of the members of the Advisory Board that I had, that was Dr Tertius Delport, I had a personal friendship with him, and especially elements such as the normalisation parts of Katzen, I discussed with him.

He was not part, such as my Staff Officers would have been, he was not part of Katzen.

MR MAPOMA: Was he part of the drawing of the Plan which you presented to Gen Liebenberg?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, no Chairperson.

MR MAPOMA: In your evidence, you said the freeing of Sebe, you did not take part in it, all that you did was to recommend? Do I understand you correctly?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I understand what you are asking, I only recommended that he be liberated or freed, I did not participate in it myself.

MR MAPOMA: And you did not order anyone to?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I never gave the instruction to anyone, I just recommended it.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, have you finished General?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I suggested or recommended it to the Chief of the Defence Force in my Plan.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Mapoma, if I can just come in here. In regard to that incident where Mr Charles Sebe was unlawfully liberated from Middeldrift prison, should we understand you to be making an application for amnesty?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson, I recommended it, it occurred. Whether it was directly because of my recommendation and whether it was decided upon on another level, I cannot say anything about that, but I feel that I suggested, recommended this and therefore I also have a certain measure of liability in this regard.

MR MAPOMA: To whom did you suggest this plan actually, the freeing of Charles Sebe?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That was to the Chief of the Defence Force.

MR MAPOMA: And he had to consider it and either accept or reject it?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: Now, I understand on the 19th of February 1987 the attempt was made on the life of the President, Lennox Sebe, by the Transkei Defence Force. You say that plan was not a Katzen Plan?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, what I said was that the attack itself, was not explained in Katzen and also not suggested by me. But what we wrote in Plan 2 was that a coup d'etat could be used as one of the methods of getting rid of Lennox Sebe and in that regard, the fact that I had written it, and then recommended it, I can accept that the February 1987 attack could possibly have been a result of Plan Katzen.

I think it can also be accepted that a person such as Ron Reid-Daly had knowledge of the essence of Plan Katzen. I would then accept the fact that Ron Reid-Daly then as an extension of Plan Katzen, then launched the attack in February 1987 on Lennox Sebe's house.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Mapoma, if I can once again come in here.

General, the attack on the house of Mr L.L. Sebe, are you seeking amnesty for that also?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, in as far as Plan Katzen could have served as a reason or perhaps as an excuse for the attack in February 1987, on the house of President Lennox Sebe, in that regard, I also apply for amnesty.

CHAIRPERSON: But General, you did say, correct me if I am wrong, that you had informed Gen Reid-Daly prior to that attack that your command in any event, was no longer persisting with Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson. I also referred him to the Chief of the Defence Force, Gleeson, to take it up with him.

But I know that the Defence Force wasn't involved in that attack.

MR MAPOMA: And even during the time when Katzen was still in operation, it was never a plan to eliminate President Sebe by killing him, is that so?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No Chairperson, I never planned it, and during, when I wrote it, the Plan, I didn't intend that.

I never gave the instruction for anyone to kill Lennox Sebe.

MR MAPOMA: On the abduction of Kwane Sebe, did you play any role there?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No Chairperson.

MR MAPOMA: And I take it that you don't apply for amnesty for that action?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, in Plan Katzen it is mentioned that Kwane Sebe, there were also others referred to, created a problem. I think it was Kwane Sebe, the Head of the Elite Unit and in that regard, he was a threat for people such as Namba Sebe and Charles Sebe and if I remember correctly, it also states in the Plan, that he should be removed.

So, in so far as that removal or abduction of Kwane Sebe would flow from the Plan, I also then ask for amnesty in that regard.

MR MAPOMA: Who kidnapped Kwane Sebe?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I wasn't personally involved, but my information was that it was Special Forces from the Defence Force.

MR MAPOMA: Who was the Commander of that Special Forces?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It was Gen Joubert, that was at the time of Katzen.

MR MAPOMA: Do you know of any operative who participated there directly, with the abduction?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No Chairperson.

MR MAPOMA: Apart from these incidents which I have just mentioned to you, is there any act that you know of, for which you seek amnesty?

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, may I at this stage intervene and indicate to you that in our view, it is not necessary for our client to specify each and every incident as my learned friend is now trying to indicate.

The Act refers to acts, omissions and offences and Gen Van der Westhuizen's amnesty application clearly indicates that he seeks amnesty for everything in connection with Katzen, and everything that we have discussed, everything that we have placed before you.

So that an enquiry such as this, firstly in my view, is unnecessary and secondly, would perhaps bind my client to those incidents that my learned friend is referring to, and we do not wish to be bound.

It is possible if you take a Plan such as Katzen, that somebody thinking that he is exercising his official duties, and thinking that he has to act in terms of what was written there, does something of which my client is unaware.

It may come out later, and if we have then not mentioned such an incident and asked for amnesty for that, we can be held responsible for that, be charged subsequently.

That is why, on purpose, we did not in this application specify offences, acts or omissions, we ask amnesty for everything, as a whole. I may however, indicate Mr Chairman, that we have prepared a list of incidents which may either be delicts or offences and if you wish, we are prepared to hand that to you, but we would only do that on the basis that we make it very clear that we do not restrict our application to those incidents that we have identified. Somebody else may have another view, some Prosecutor, some Judge, some Magistrate and as I have already said, somebody may have done something that we do not know of and may then say but I did it in terms of Katzen and then by implication, the implication will be that we are also guilty of that. We do not want to be in that position.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Mapoma?

MR MAPOMA: Thank you Chairperson. Chairperson, with respect, I disagree with the submissions which have just been made.

Chairperson, it is my submission sir, that it is the requirement of the Act, that is the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 34 of 1995, that the applicant must specify the act, omission or offence for which he seeks amnesty and that particular act or omission is the one sir, which has to be considered by this Committee, whether amnesty should be granted for it.

As it is, Chairperson, now, I submit, the applicant applies for general amnesty and it is my submission that if that is the route that the applicant is going to follow, then he does not comply with the requirements of the Act, for he seeks a general amnesty.

It is incumbent upon the applicant to specify to the Committee that I seek amnesty for this, that and that, and that has not happened here as it is now.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, with respect, may I refer you to Section 18 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 34 of 1995.

It says, any person who wishes to apply for amnesty in respect of first of all, any act, secondly, any omission, thirdly an offence, on the grounds that it is an act associated with a political objective, shall within 12 months from the date of the proclamation referred to in Section 7(3) or such extended period as may be prescribed, submit such an application to the Commission in the prescribed form. I reiterate, Mr Chairman, act, omission or offence.

Then if I may take you to Section 19(6), it says, if the act, omission or offence which is the subject of an application under Section 18, constitutes the ground of any claim in civil proceedings instituted against a person, and then it continues, once again, three possibilities are mentioned.

The same goes for Section 20(1)(b) which says if the Committee, after considering an application for amnesty is satisfied that (b) the act, omission or offence to which the application relates, is an act associated with a political objective, committed in the course of the conflicts of the past, in accordance with the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) and it shall grant amnesty in respect of that act, omission or offence.

The act, I reiterate Mr Chairman, that he seeks amnesty for is everything in connection with Katzen, that has been spelt out in his application, the formal, written section thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think if we could have that list that has been compiled - we are taking into account the submission you have made, it is not uncommon for amnesty to be granted in such a way that it covers all offences or delicts that may emanate from a particular act.

Why I say it is not uncommon, because it is very often the situation that the actual applicant doesn't know precisely what the effect of his act or omission has been. It is often worded in such a way that the amnesty, if it is granted, it is granted to cover all omissions, and all offences and delicts emanating from an act.

I think that this list, now that you say that you have done a list, setting out as far as the applicant is concerned, under the advice of his legal representatives, which offences or delicts may flow out of Operation Katzen, that would go I am sure a long way to answering Mr Mapoma's question.

MR KNOETZE: As you please Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mapoma, can take a look at that and then continue with his questioning.

We will receive this list as Exhibit E.

MR KNOETZE: Correct Mr Chairman.

LIST OF INCIDENTS COMPILED BY GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN, HANDED IN AS EXHIBIT E

MR KNOETZE: Would you like me to read it into the record, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you can do that.

MR KNOETZE: Actions that could possibly believed or be considered to be offences

1. The liberation of Charles Sebe:

2. Discrediting actions against Lennox Sebe;

3. Kidnapping of Kwane Sebe and his second in command;

4. Recruitment, training and arming of, or weaponing of the Ciskei soldiers to form the core of the Xhosa Resistance Movement;

5. The aimed coup against Lennox Sebe, with regards as 5.1, it was envisaged in Plan Katzen and 2, in so far as Plan Katzen could have served as the reason why Gen Ron Reid-Daly in February 1987, launched an attack on Lennox Sebe's house.

6. The use of words such as remove, get rid of, take away, as contained in Plan Katzen. In so far as an uninformed person who could possibly read the Plan, could be encouraged to kill or kidnap or discredit the involved people;

7. Interference with the State authority of the Ciskei. 7.1 by discrediting the Head of Ciskei, Lennox Sebe, 7.2, the establishing of the shadow cabinet for the Ciskei, and 7.3, the clandestine training of the Ciskei people at Port St Johns, and 7.4, the planned toppling of the government of Ciskei and 7.5, the liberation of Charles Sebe.

That is the list Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Knoetze. Mr Mapoma?

MR MAPOMA: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MAPOMA: .

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Knoetze, do you have any re-examination?

MR KNOETZE: I do not, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR KNOETZE: .

CHAIRPERSON: I will just ask members of the panel if they have any questions to put to the witness. Mr Sandi, do you have any questions?

ADV SANDI: Not really a question, but should you not add to this list then plus any other offence or omission flowing out of the implementation of the Katzen Operation?

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, I didn't think it necessary. This is in addition to what is already in the written application and there we say everything. As I have said, this is not a list that we bind ourselves to.

ADV SANDI: I thought that is what you were suggesting, in response to some questions by the Chairperson, that it is not only in respect of specific incidents, but also any act flowing out of the execution of that? But if that is not the way that you want it, you can leave it at that.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the situation as I understand it, is in the application, the application is made for any offence or delict arising out of Katzen and then this is merely a list specifying certain offences or delicts which the applicant considers to have arisen, as a result of the Plan.

MR KNOETZE: That is correct Mr Chairman. If I may just refer the Commissioner to page 3 of the written application, paragraph 9(a)(i) where we are asked to indicate the deeds, omissions or offences that we seek amnesty for. There we say Katzen. I apply for amnesty for any offence based on my own involvement herein.

That is our departure point.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sandi, any further questions? Mr Sibanyoni, any questions?

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, just one or two. General, I heard you saying that this document which you drew, which eventually became known as Katzen was an a-political piece of document, but the way I see it, it seems it was a political solution to solve what you were required to do to normalise the area in the Eastern Cape. Wouldn't you say this was purely a political document?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, yes. What I said was that myself, the military, is a-political and we serve the government of the day.

In the context of Katzen, which was a counter revolutionary plan, and in this regard, you move in all the power bases, and as I indicated that 80 percent of the war was waged on the welfare base of which the political or the constitutional part was quite substantial.

The initial part of Katzen as I indicated, the first part of phase 1, yes, that was military and the rest, there you move on the terrain of social welfare. Phase 2, 3 and even parts of phase 1, and then it would also out of necessity touch upon the political area.

I am not trying to say that I would want to promote the interest of the National Party.

MR SIBANYONI: As the Head of the Army in the Eastern Cape, the request that you should normalise the area, was it supposed to be done in a military fashion or in a political fashion?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, both military as that in the security component, but also non-military, on the welfare and psychological terrain. Politics per se and I am referring here to party politics and our approach against counter-revolutionary war, played a very limited role and perhaps just an influencing role. I repeat we were a-political, we served the government of the day.

Katzen and also Strelitzia were Plans which covered the whole spectrum of the State's power base and party politics did not play a role, or not a very important role, or even a minor role.

MR SIBANYONI: You also talked about the placement of teachers or lecturers at Universities. What role did they play, how did that role benefit the Defence Force?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, we were in the privileged position by the recruitment of the National Defence Force members, that we had access to a lot of expertise, graduates, technical people and a variety of occupations, professions. Instead of using a Doctor to keep guard, we decided to use such a qualified person, in community upliftment projects and for that purpose a component of information was established that was Citizen Affairs, Civil Actions.

Those people that we had then as National Servicemen, would be utilised in the communities to assist the local people whether it was with regard to medical issues, assisting them on farms, sowing, whatever, there were a variety of projects, and funds were made available and budgeted for, by me as Commander as well, for these actions.

I used some of these people in Transkei, Ciskei and also in my own command for the time that I was here in the Eastern Cape as well as in the Witwatersrand.

MR SIBANYONI: Lastly, if I look at this Plan Katzen, it bypassed some of the departments, for example you were dealing with Ciskei and Transkei which were by that time, independent States, but I didn't see any involvement of other departments like the Department of Foreign Affairs.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct Chair. The Plan had its origin as a departmental idea, even in the planning phase, it was the security community involved, and not departments such as Foreign Affairs.

Whether Foreign Affairs were later notified about this, I do not know, but yes, that is correct. It was part of the security environment, and I think in the whole cycle of the Plan, it stayed within the security community.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: General, you said that you started working on Strelitzia some time before and Strelitzia was your own initiative and you worked on it, and then you ultimately submitted it for consideration and approval and that was refused.

Thereafter, you get if I may call it, added pressure, coming from the then State President to say look, these areas must be stabilised by the end of December. You then come up with Plan Katzen, which has a thread running between it and Strelitzia, although there is differences, there are similarities.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I get the feeling that that Plan Katzen was drawn up as a reaction to a situation that you had been placed in, in other words come up with a plan to stabilise this area or normalise it, so you just improve on or amend slightly Strelitzia and resubmit it. Did you in your heart of hearts believe that Plan Katzen was a Plan that could succeed, if not within that 18 months in which you were given to normalise the area and I think you had mentioned that you thought it was optimistic, do you think it could have succeeded at all?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, even today, I doubt, I think it was desperate times. One can read of this desperate factors if you read Plan Katzen and even Strelitzia.

Besides the very short time frames that we had, it is also true that the situation in the Eastern Cape reached peaks of being out of control, or not being controlled. No, I did not think that Katzen could stabilise or normalise the whole situation. In Katzen, I also wrote that this does not replace our existing plans and we had plans on a variety of terrains.

Katzen was seen as, I won't say as a desperate effort, but as being a more drastic way to see whether we couldn't perhaps in that time frame, start to address this one big problem in the Eastern Cape.

The idea was that it should commence, make a start and then by means of good control, keep things on track and then through that, that we could address this one main problem, existing in the Eastern Cape.

But to put it in this way, I did not really put all my hope on Katzen.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Knoetze, do you have any questions arising out of questions that have been put by the panel?

MR KNOETZE: No, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KNOETZE: .

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Avenant, do you have any questions arising? Anybody else?

MR PENZHORN: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you General, that concludes your testimony.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Knoetze?

MR KNOETZE: I have nothing further, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, so does that conclude the evidence for your applicant?

MR KNOETZE: It does, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Avenant, do you want to proceed with your application?

MR AVENANT: Mr Chairman, we will proceed, yes. I believe they wanted to rearrange the microphones.

CHAIRPERSON: We will take a short adjournment while I have been indicated - two minutes' adjournment, while the microphones are adjusted.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS