Amnesty Hearings

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody. Today we will be commencing with the hearing relating to the attempted coup in Transkei, the applications of Messrs De Kock, Nortje, Ras, Snyman, Vermeulen, Nieuwoudt and Gumengu, but before we start, I would like to just introduce the panel. On my right is Mr Ntsiki Sandi, he is a member of the Amnesty Committee, he is an Advocate from East London. On my left is Mr Jonas Sibanyoni, he is also a member of the Amnesty Committee, he is an Attorney from Pretoria and I am Selwyn Miller, I am a Judge attached to the Transkei Division of the High Court. I would like at this stage for the legal representatives to place their names on record.

MR CORNELIUS: Judge, I am Wim Cornelius, Cornelius Attorneys, Pretoria, I act on behalf of the applicant L. Snyman and applicant N. Vermeulen.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Cornelius.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I am Albert Lamey from the firm Rooth & Wessels in Pretoria, and I represent the applicant Willie Nortje.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Lamey.

MR HATTINGH: (Microphone not on)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Hattingh.

MR MALAN: Mr Chairman, my name is Kobus Malan, I am from the firm Kobus Malan Attorneys at Northern, I act on behalf of Mr J.A. Nieuwoudt and Mr Phumulelo Gumengu.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Malan.

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, I am Adv Rudolph Jansen from Pretoria Bar, on instructions Mr Julian Knight Attorneys. I act for applicant Ras.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Jansen.

MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, my name is Zuko Mapoma, an Attorney, I am the leader of evidence, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mapoma, before we start, I would just like to mention that these proceedings are simultaneously translated. They will be translated into Afrikaans, English and Xhosa. To benefit from the translation, you have to be in possession of one of these devices, they are available from the Sound Technicians in front, if you wish to have one. Channel 1 is Afrikaans, Channel 2, English and Channel 3, Xhosa.

Mr Malan, do you have anything to say?

MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Chairman. My client is Afrikaans speaking, and therefore I have prepared a piece in Afrikaans and I have not told you beforehand. As it pleases you Chairperson. I have a short statement in co-operation with Senior Advocate Bartlesman, that I want to read to the Committee with regard to the withdrawal of amnesty application of Jan Anton Nieuwoudt for this matter as well as for the matter next week, with regards to the death of Charles Sebe and Mr Arnold Guzana. I would like to read the following to you

"With reference to this second application, we would like to confirm that the past few days, we have consulted with our client, and he has considered his position. After deliberation with the Advocate and had regard for the applicable documents, we came to the conclusion that our client is not guilty of any misconduct and was not guilty of gross human rights' abuse and the application would be futile, because the subject thereof is not applicable to amnesty and we would be guilty of wasting your time and the State's funds if we should continue with the application, and therefore the application is withdrawn. We apologise that this decision was finalised over the weekend, but we had to prepare ourselves properly and we will attend the meetings."

Mr Chairman, I don't have a mandate to furnish you with the same regarding Mr Clive Brink, but I have indicated to Mr Mapoma, that I will get in contact with his Attorney before the end of the day to enable you to make a decision on that as well. I would like to place on record that Mr Gumengu's pieces has been incorrectly filed at these hearings, and we have discussed it with Mr Mapoma to postpone it to a later date. I thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Malan. Mr Mapoma?

MR MAPOMA: Yes Chairperson, so far as the applicant Phumulelo Gumengu is concerned, I confirm that we have discussed with Mr Malan and we have reached an agreement that matter be removed from the role at this sitting, it will be set down together with other co-applicants that Mr Gumengu has in some future date, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Then I understand Mr Mapoma that there will be a further hearing, some time in the future, also dealing with the attempted coup, but a different aspect of it and will Mr Gumengu's application be heard at that time?

MR MAPOMA: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: In the circumstances then, we will postpone the application of applicant 7, that is Phumulelo Gumengu, to a date to be arranged and his application will be heard at a later hearing. Mr Malan, we also note on record that your client, Mr Nieuwoudt has withdrawn his application in respect of this week's hearing and also in respect of the matter that has been set down for next week. Thank you.

MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Has it been decided Mr Mapoma, who is going to start? Is it going to be in the order as it appears in the papers or any different order?

MR MAPOMA: Yes Chairperson, the applicants are going to appear as in the order in the papers. The first applicant will be Mr De Kock to testify.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Hattingh?

EUGENE DE KOCK: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, the applicant would give his evidence in Afrikaans. Mr De Kock, you are the applicant in this matter, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You have applied for amnesty with regard to this incident, but you have also handed in an application with regard to a number of other incidents of which some have been heard and some have to be heard, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: In support of those applications, there is a general section which was drawn up with regard to your background as a Police Officer and the political motivation for your action during all these incidents, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: That part forms part of the first Bundle for your amnesty application?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: We have omitted to attach this part to the application, we have made copies of this Section and I believe it is before you already.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Hattingh, we have been given a copy of this, which Bundle we will mark Exhibit A.

MR HATTINGH: Mr De Kock, a copy has been placed before you, the introductional part, I am not going to ask you to read it in detail because you have perused it at a previous occasion, and in my consultations with you, have you read it?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm the contents thereof?

MR DE KOCK: I do Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: I am going to briefly ask you to deal with your background in the Police Force. You were in the uniform branch of the Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And then you were transferred to the Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Where you later for many years were in the service of the well-known Koevoet Unit and you were the Commander of a specific Unit in Koevoet?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And for many years you were embroiled in an armed struggle against Swapo?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And thereafter you were transferred to Vlakplaas in Pretoria, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Can you briefly tell us, Vlakplaas was a Unit of the Security Police, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: What type of Unit was it, was it a Unit within the Security Branch that collected information or was it an operational Unit?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was an active and operational Unit. There were several facets attached, the one was internal operations which were covert in nature and sometimes overt, and then it was cross-border operations to neighbouring States, and then at the same time it was a Unit that handled previous members of the ANC and the PAC, the liberation movements who walked over or were caught and then decided to join the Security Police.

MR HATTINGH: And they were known as so-called askaris?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, Mr De Kock, some more background on this aspect. When you joined Vlakplaas, you were not the Commander there, were you?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I was not the Commander.

MR HATTINGH: Who was the Commander when you joined there?

MR DE KOCK: With my arrival there, Colonel Jack Cronje was the Commander of Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: And afterwards did somebody else follow him up?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, I succeeded him.

MR HATTINGH: How many years were you attached to Vlakplaas before you succeeded Brigadier Cronje?

MR DE KOCK: For about 18 months Chairperson, during the middle of 1983 up to 1985.

MR HATTINGH: During that time, that is the period before you took command, were you involved with operations that were carried out by the Vlakplaas Unit?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, amongst others there were cross-border operations to Swaziland where the Chief of the Military Unit in Natal of the ANC was killed in a house, McFadden and then an internal operation where handgrenades, the detonators of handgrenades were changed from 4.5 seconds to 0 seconds and it was given to activists on the East Rand and six or seven of them were killed, and six or seven were injured, lost their hands.

MR HATTINGH: In other words Mr De Kock, what you are telling the Committee is that Vlakplaas were involved before you took command of it, and were involved in violent incidents where persons were killed or injured?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And those actions, was this on the orders of anybody?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Who gave the orders usually?

MR DE KOCK: The direct order came from Colonel Cronje, but amongst the Officers as myself who served under him, we were aware that it came from amongst others the Chief of Security and the Commissioner of Police.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. That is briefly the position before you took command. You then took command of Vlakplaas - when?

MR DE KOCK: It was in June or July of 1985, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: This type of action thereafter, did it continue, the cross-border operations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, there was an escalation in these incidents as there was an escalation in the opposition of the liberation movements.

MR HATTINGH: And the actions where you were involved as a Commander, is this something you decided on yourself or did you received orders in this instance?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, orders were issued at these instances.

MR SIBANYONI: I am sorry Mr Hattingh, for the intervention, Mr De Kock, who was the Commissioner of Police at the time you are talking about and who was the Chief of Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: If my memory serves me correctly, it was Gen Van der Merwe who was the Head of Security and Gen Coetzee, was then the Commissioner of Police.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

MR HATTINGH: Were these gentlemen aware of these actions or some of the actions in which Vlakplaas had been involved?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, and not only from Vlakplaas but also that some of the members had already been used in operations, in other words the bomb attack in London of which the Commissioner and the General had knowledge.

MR HATTINGH: That was the explosion at the offices of the ANC in London, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: When you were involved in that, were you already connected to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: No, I was still a serving member of Koevoet and another member and I were flown out from the north of Namibia to Pretoria and then to London for this specific order.

MR HATTINGH: The questions that I am putting to you in this relation, are directed at evidence which Gen Coetzee who was the then Commissioner, has given before the Commission during which he has stated that Vlakplaas was a Unit which was established primarily with the objective of providing accommodation for so-called askaris, and that these askaris would then be employed to identify former colleagues of theirs and to assist in the arrest of these persons as well as the giving of evidence in court thereafter?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: He maintained that it was not an operational Unit?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it was an operational Unit, it was a fully operational Unit in all aspects.

MR HATTINGH: Was Gen Coetzee ever informed regarding some of the incidents in which Vlakplaas had been involved, according to your personal knowledge?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, among others Brigadier Schoon and I and various other members of the Security Police of the Eastern Transvaal and Soweto, informed him one morning just after five, about an attack which we had just lodged in Swaziland and he wanted to know immediately whether or not it had been a success, and he congratulated the relevant persons.

MR HATTINGH: Was this an incident during which people were killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: (Microphone not on)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Hattingh, if I could just briefly intervene. Mr De Kock, Vlakplaas, did it have any other name, the Unit?

MR DE KOCK: The Unit's reference on the Security Police's organogram, was Section C1. That was defined as a Counter Terrorism Unit. I must just mention, not only Counter Insurgency, but Counter Terrorism.

CHAIRPERSON: And by the time you became the Commander, could you just give a (indistinct) figure of the size of the Unit, how many members did it have?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when I took over, I will give you an approximate estimation, there were about 14 whites, or 15 whites and 20 to 25 black members. That was a combination of members from the SAP, full members of the SAP and former members of the ANC or PAC.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Hattingh.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr De Kock, upon the occasion that you reported to Coetzee, were you on the way back from an operation in which you had been involved?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And did you go to his home on the way back?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And did you report back to him in his home?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Just broadly speaking, without going into too much detail about the incidents about which you have already given evidence and for which you are still applying, you were involved in the explosions of Cosatu House and Khotso House and what is the name of the other one, Khanya House?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And did those actions take place upon the order of higher Officers?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct and as well as senior politicians, such as the Minister of Law and Order at that stage.

MR HATTINGH: Thus was Vlakplaas involved in various cross-border operations in Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: During which people were killed and injured?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Were any awards given to you for your involvement in these actions?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: In his evidence before the Commission, Gen Van der Merwe stated that you were probably the Policeman who received the most awards for actions in which you had been involved?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Were many of these actions Vlakplaas actions during which people were killed and injured?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, two of them were, the other was for the action in London, with the planing of the bomb there.

MR HATTINGH: Some of these awards were very distinguished awards?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, some of the highest.

MR HATTINGH: And this would not be an award which would be given without the person who took the decision about it, knowing what happened?

MR DE KOCK: No, only the State President would be able to approve such declarations, nobody else.

MR HATTINGH: But certainly among the higher hierarchy of the Security Police structure, the persons who were involved with that, were thoroughly aware of why the award was being given?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: So it can never be said that the higher levels of the hierarchy within the South African Police didn't know exactly what Vlakplaas was there for and what Vlakplaas was involved in?

MR DE KOCK: No, they knew exactly what it was about.

MR HATTINGH: Just as we have spoken about cross-border operations, Vlakplaas was also involved in several operations within the borders of the Republic during which people were killed and injured?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: So in broader terms, did those actions take place upon your own initiative or as the result of an order which was given by an Officer?

MR DE KOCK: It was senior Officers and one would be called in and specifically informed about it and one would act accordingly.

MR HATTINGH: These incidents, against whom were they directed? Against whom was the action actually aimed?

MR DE KOCK: These actions were aimed against those who were regarded by the government of the day as opponents or the enemy of the policy, that would be the ANC, the PAC, the SACP and all other related or affiliated collaborators and sympathisers.

MR HATTINGH: In other words aimed against institutions who waged a struggle against the government of the day?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. The definition was very concise, if you were not for us, then you were against us. That was the basic attitude.

MR HATTINGH: And that would be the enemy who was the target? How did you feel personally about this so-called "enemy" against whom you acted?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by nature of my experience and with specific reference to Vlakplaas, we were the only ones who fought with real combatants as they were referred to. We were the only ones who ever really were involved in a situation of conflict with the freedom fighters or the opponents. My own view was that one would win, at any cost, it did not matter to which lengths one had to go. However, there were certain lines of value which one had to draw which would mean that one would not be able to move beyond the norm, such as child abuse, or rape. However, one had to achieve one's objective with regard to the enemy at any cost.

MR HATTINGH: With regard to these freedom organisations, did you also regard them as your personal enemy? Perhaps not your personal enemy, in your personal capacity, did you also regard them as the enemy of the former State?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and my attitude towards them was relentless.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. We have now listened to evidence about internal armed actions against political organisations such as the ANC, the PAC and the SACP and so forth. Was Vlakplaas also used for other objectives, for example sparing the Security Police any kind of embarrassment?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, at certain occasions it was requested from us and we obeyed such requests, fellow Security colleagues or Policemen had to be killed, and I will refer to the Motherwell incident briefly, and also where some of your own members within the Unit, appeared to defect to the enemy's side, one would have to kill such a person. There was no hesitation in safeguarding the secrets of the State.

MR HATTINGH: Was any action taken against anybody who was connected to Vlakplaas and then changed their opinion and threatened to expose information about Vlakplaas and the Security Police in general?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and I can refer you to somebody like Mabotha, that will still come, I don't want to discuss it fully at the moment. There is also the incident of Brian Ncqulunga, who was an askari at first and later became a member of the Force.

MR HATTINGH: The former person that you mentioned was also an askari?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And these persons were killed by Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, among others there was also the case of someone called Goodwill Sekakane who exposed Operation Vula and then threatened for example, to make it public to the ANC that persons such as Charles Ndaba, among others, had been killed by the Security Police in Durban.

MR HATTINGH: Mr De Kock, these actions against former askaris, such as the persons whose names you have just mentioned, did this take place upon the order of higher Officers?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And we think for example about the Harms Commission which was appointed at the time to investigate allegations of Vlakplaas activities, do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Was an investigation launched among others, into the deaths of Mr Griffiths Mxenge and others?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: During which Dirk Coetzee also gave evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And Brian Ncqulunga, there was also an involvement of him in that incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And it was also feared that he would expose information?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is not that there was a fear, but that the information already existed that he had made contact with the ANC.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, and who decided that he should be eliminated?

MR DE KOCK: Nick van Rensburg who was the then Commander of Section C1, in other words Vlakplaas as well as the Chief Investigative Officer of the Police and the Security Forces and the Harms Commission, Gen Engelbrecht.

MR HATTINGH: The evidence which was heard by the Harms Commission with regard to various incidents, which we will not discuss at length, was this correct evidence or fabricated evidence?

MR DE KOCK: No, this evidence was fabricated in all regards, documentary and other.

MR HATTINGH: In other words the Harms Commission was completely misled?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. The Judge was misled from the very first day.

MR HATTINGH: And were there high ranking Officers who were involved in this deception?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Can you mention any names?

MR DE KOCK: I could begin among others with Gen Nick van Rensburg, Gen Engelbrecht. I could refer to Brigadier Schoon, I can refer to the then Brigadier Johan le Roux, I could refer to Gen Basie Smit. It was a very high level and sophisticated cover up action.

MR HATTINGH: The removal of records and documentation and that sort of thing?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, among others my personal files were just about emptied and destroyed among others.

MR HATTINGH: Mr De Kock, and as a result of the internal armed incidents of which we have already spoken, during which people were killed, there were also post mortem inquests?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: During which certain members of Vlakplaas, among others yourself, had to give evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that evidence which was given during those matters, was that also the truth or was that also a cover up?

MR DE KOCK: No, it was a complete cover up.

MR HATTINGH: What did this high level action tell you, when you became involved in this sort of action, would you be prosecuted or would you be protected?

MR DE KOCK: No, one would be protected.

MR HATTINGH: And was that then the case?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Evidence was twisted and so forth to ensure that the offence or the crime would not come to light?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And was that your perception with regard to your task at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Can we then also ask you generally speaking, whether there was any co-operation between the Security Police and the South African Defence Force with regard to this sort of action?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. There was a written agreement of co-operation between particularly Vlakplaas or C1 and the Directorate of Covert Collections, which was DCC of the Military Intelligence, it was a covert Intelligence operation. And then on a second level, there was also an agreement with the CCB. This was not written, but we were all convened at Vlakplaas at a function, where this co-operation in all its aspects were established and mutual assistance was guaranteed.

MR HATTINGH: Were members of the CCB also involved in some of the cross-border operations and some of the internal operations in which Vlakplaas had been involved?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So it wasn't only an agreement, there was real co-operation in the execution of certain operations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Hattingh, could I intervene? Could I intervene again, Mr Hattingh, I just want to get one point clear. Mr De Kock, you have said that many of the operations that you were involved in, orders came from higher Officers. Was there a channel of command, did you when you were Commander of Vlakplaas, receive orders through a specific channel, through Head Officer perhaps, or would for instance the Head of the Witwatersrand division of the Security Branch give you an order without going through Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as the Commander of Vlakplaas, I liaised directly with the Commander of C1. Vlakplaas was for example Section C1, which was Counter Terrorism Unit, while Section C2 was the Section which undertook the identification of terrorists and that very same Section C2 also had membership of an organisation known as Trevits, which was a Counter Revolutionary Target Committee, which made decisions about targets. However, I liaised with Brigadier Schoon, who was the Head of Section 2C and he liaised with the Head of Security who would then have been Gen Johan van der Merwe. The Head of the Witwatersrand, for example Gen Gerrit Erasmus would not be able to contact me directly and give me an order. He would have to go to Brigadier Schoon, or to Basie Smit and from there on, the order would come to me. If anyone of those Officers however, was not available, then it would have been completely within line, or within our line, that one would be permitted to use one’s own initiative. However, this did not happen very regularly. I was one of the persons who insisted upon liaison with my Officers from higher levels, however, it could have happened.

CHAIRPERSON: So you said Brigadier Schoon was the Head of C2. What was Gen Basie Smit, what was his position at that time?

MR DE KOCK: After Gen Johan van der Merwe, he was the Head of Security. They succeeded each other quite regularly.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Thank you Mr Hattingh.

MR HATTINGH: You have just given evidence that sometimes one could use one's own initiative. You will recall that Gen Van der Merwe also gave evidence before the Truth Commission and that he also testified there that it was expected of members of the Security Police, to take their own initiative sometimes. Do you recall this evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it was expected of one as an Officer, not only to ask what must I do now, but to be able to take one's own initiative. If not, you would be removed. It would be no good just having a figure Head there. What made it more difficult with Vlakplaas was that it was an Operational Unit and it could have happened that if it wasn't an Officer who took that decision, it could have been a Sergeant or a Warrant Officer. The members of Vlakplaas acted individually sometimes. You could have a Sergeant in control of 20 persons and then he would have the responsibility of taking decisions within the framework of his operational qualifications.

MR HATTINGH: Were there instances where you used your own initiative and were there certain specifications, operational specifications that you had to fulfil before becoming involved?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it had to be against an enemy or against a sympathiser or against an organisation which did not regard the government favourably.

MR HATTINGH: In other words, it had to do with the political struggle between the government on the one hand and the political organisations such as the ANC and the PAC and so forth, on the other hand?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Gen Van der Merwe also gave evidence that Vlakplaas was the only Operational Unit of the Security Police, did you hear that evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, we were the only established active Operational Unit and we were also equipped accordingly.

MR HATTINGH: In general terms, regarding equipment, there has been much evidence about that, could you briefly inform the Committee regarding weaponry which was brought down from Namibia to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, upon two or three occasions, Brigadier Schoon had been approached or liaised with Gen Hans Dreyer from Namibia and Brigadier Schoon then conveyed to me that there was weaponry and equipment which was to be fetched in Namibia which we could use. We didn't use only Eastern Block weaponry such as AK's or Russian weapons, we also loaded South African weapons, because we undertook much training not only with our own weapons, but with all forms of weaponry which the opposition had to do with. SWAPO used the same weaponry as the PAC and the ANC and the reason for that was your members should be skilled in all aspects with regard to explosives and weapons which were used by the opposition and one's own group.

MR HATTINGH: The weapons which you went to fetch, could you indicate the quantity and the range?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the quantities were phenomenal, we are speaking of tons at a time. We are speaking of pistols, guns, machine guns, mortars, various calibre, handgrenades, plastic explosives, TNT, gun grenades, a non-backfiring cannon, 122 mm rocket launcher from Swaziland and the whole spectrum of launchers for anti-tank purposes - an entire spectrum of weaponry, even to light artillery level. I will also refer to the fact that we were in possession of missiles for the purposes of air to ground defence, whether it be offensive or defensive. There was actually nothing that we didn't have.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, these weapons, when you collected them, did you have your own armoury at Vlakplaas, were they actually kept there or did you go and draw them from some other Section or division?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, we had our exclusive arms stores and explosives stores at Vlakplaas which were filled completely to capacity. Later we had to enforce an additional room in order to accommodate additional weaponry, to the extent that Gen Smit wanted to establish explosives and arms safes which would have cost the State millions. In other words, there was a large capacity provision of arms for the fight against terrorism.

MR HATTINGH: These were the weapons that were brought from Namibia, which were stored at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson. Excuse me, I can just add that we had an enormous variety of landmines, not only South African, but Eastern Block limpet mines as well, detonators - just to give you an indication.

MR HATTINGH: And the weaponry which was taken to Vlakplaas ...

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If you could just repeat your question Mr Hattingh, your microphone wasn't on.

MR HATTINGH: The weaponry which you brought from Namibia to Vlakplaas, was there an entry made into any register, was it expected of you to have a register of the weapons, to record all the weapons that you had there or brought there?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did anybody else, except for ... (tape ends) ... to the stores where these weapons were stored?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I had exclusive access, except for my second in command at Vlakplaas, which was Major Baker, but he in turn would not be able to take any weapons before he cleared it with me.

MR HATTINGH: Did anybody from Headquarters or Head Office come and check up on the weapons that were there?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, but Head Office's people were there, but they came to collect weapons which they could have licensed. They were also looking for ammunition for the weapons that they wanted, but otherwise, I had exclusive control.

MR HATTINGH: You had exclusive control and nobody came to find out what it was used for and how it was used and so forth?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: It was left to you, to your discretion how to deal with the weapons?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Was any of these weapons used by supplying it to other Branches of the South African Police?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I gave weapons to the Security Police of Soweto, as well as their Intelligence Service at Soweto as well as the Johannesburg Security Police and I have also supplied weapons and ammunition to the Security Police in the Eastern Cape, specifically East London, to the Security Police in Natal and the Security Police in the Western Cape and initially I had a written record thereof, but it became too much later on and then secondly, there was the danger that if this record was lost, or it was found by the wrong persons, it would have dire consequences.

MR HATTINGH: Why did the Security Branches ask for these weapons, what were they to be used for?

MR DE KOCK: One of the reasons Chairperson that they gave, was that they wanted to train their own members, not the Police members, but some of these Branches had their own Askari Units, Units similar to the Vlakplaas Unit. There was a small Unit established in Bloemfontein, there was a reasonably growing Unit locally here in this part of the Cape, they were established in this city, here where we are now. And there was a group in Durban and they started training their members and brought them up to operational standard.

MR HATTINGH: Any other purpose which the weapons were requested for?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, this would be for clandestine, covert operations which would have led to the death or injury of the enemy.

MR HATTINGH: And what was the purpose thereof that they wanted to use Eastern Block weapons during these operations?

MR DE KOCK: It would leave the impression that the Security Police could not be connected with this, in other words, it would point in the wrong direction.

MR HATTINGH: Of these weapons, were any of them used in co-operation with the South African Defence Force?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: I don't speak of this incident - before we get to this incident, can you just mention briefly what it was meant for?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, amongst others it was, some of these Eastern Block weapons were supplied to the CCB, but to a lesser extent, except for one instance where a weapons cache was established for the CCB at Krugersdorp and which led the following day to this find of this cache and led to the attacks in Zambia and in Zimbabwe and in Botswana where several persons were killed and facilities were destroyed.

MR HATTINGH: Do I understand you correctly then Mr De Kock, it was requested of you to establish a weapons cache which would be "found" and this would serve as an excuse to launch attacks on bases of the ANC in the neighbouring States on the grounds of this weapons cache being discovered?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, when it is convenient, we can take the tea adjournment, but I don't want to interrupt your flow of questioning.

MR HATTINGH: This will be perfectly convenient for us, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We will just take a short tea adjournment now, until half past eleven.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

EUGENE DE KOCK: (still under oath)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, just before the tea adjournment the applicant was giving evidence about these false weapon caches.

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (continued) Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr De Kock, with regard to the weaponry on Vlakplaas and the use thereof, it was used for a variety of operations. Was it also used by members of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Were some of the weapons planted to use the word, at incidents in order to create the impression that these liberation movements had been involved in the incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, and sometimes weapons were provided to other Security Branches for the same purposes.

MR HATTINGH: When Dirk Coetzee and Albert Nofamela made their statements which led to the announcement of the Harms Commission of Enquiry, what happened to these arms?

MR DE KOCK: Initially the situation was static at Vlakplaas with regard to the weapons, but within the first 14 days approximately I received a call from Gen Staedtler who was the Head of the South African Police Intelligence Service, during which he warned me that a complete group of the press would be permitted to visit Vlakplaas and take photographs and be shown around, and we very hastily removed all weapons from Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: What was the purpose from Gen Staedtler?

MR DE KOCK: It was to warn me that the press would be visiting, but the objective with allowing the press to visit would be to indicate that Vlakplaas was not at all as per the allegations of Nofamela and that the impression would be created that this was a normal working facility of the SAP which was used completely for normal purposes and circumstances.

MR HATTINGH: Did you take the necessary steps to make sure that there wouldn't be any incriminating goods which could be found at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we removed all weapons which we did not have on the State Property Account.

MR HATTINGH: Would these among others be the weaponry that was brought in from Namibia?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and there was also a large quantity of commercial explosives which we used for practices and training, and we also removed this to another Intelligence facility with the operational name Daisy.

MR HATTINGH: That was a farm near Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And from there, Mr De Kock, from Daisy, the weapons were once again moved, where to?

MR DE KOCK: The weapons were moved to the Counter Insurgency Training Farm at Groblersdal, a completely established facility for the training of all members of the Forces for unrest management and counter insurgency services.

MR HATTINGH: What was the name of the farm?

MR DE KOCK: Maleeuskop, and all the ammunition and explosives were stored in the official safes which had been established for that purpose.

MR HATTINGH: So this was a bona fide official Branch of the South African Police which would take control of these weapons?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And from there?

MR DE KOCK: From there there was a request from Gen Dreyer, who had the returned from Ovamboland with regard to the breaking up of a Koevoet Unit, they wanted some of the ammunition and explosives. A large quantity of these weapons, approximately two five ton trucks full was delivered at the South African Police College in Pretoria at their weapons stores, but nonetheless a large quantity remained behind for the purposes of Vlakplaas and its activities, and it was stored at places such as Meken at Paardefontein, which was a facility of the Defence Force or Denel and members were also issued with weapons which they as individuals had to guard for operational purposes for our functions.

MR HATTINGH: So what you are saying is that individual members of Vlakplaas had their own arsenals of arms and ammunition?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is what it boiled down to.

MR HATTINGH: Very well Mr De Kock, that brings us to the incident which is of relevance for these proceedings. You have applied for three incidents with regard to which you delivered weapons which would be used in prospective coup d'etats?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Your legal representatives have recommended that with regard to you, these matters can be settled in chambers, however it was decided that one of the three would be publicly heard, and that is the one that we are dealing with today?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: I am going to lead you very briefly with regard to the two other incidents, because they do have a measure of relevance for what the Committee is dealing with today. Could you briefly tell the Committee how it occurred that you provided weapons for the very first time for the purposes of a coup d'etat in the Transkei?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was approached by Commandant Anton Nieuwoudt, who was a senior Staff Officer of DCC, the Directorate of Covert Collections in Pretoria and he served under the command of Colonel At Nel and Brigadier Tolletjie Botha. He approached me for a quantity of weapons, ammunition and handgrenades for a coup d'etat in the Transkei. I provided the quantity that he had requested. He fetched it at Vlakplaas and I understood that the weapons were delivered at Bloemfontein to a person who was involved in the attempt at this first coup d'etat, during which a group of men had settled on a farm near Queenstown and they were arrested there and the Queenstown Security Branch investigated the case further from there.

MR HATTINGH: So you supplied the weapons and apparently nothing came of this prospective coup d'etat?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Then we will come to the relevant incident. The Duli incident, will you tell the Committee what happened there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Gen Krappies Engelbrecht approached me in 1990 after he had visited the Eastern Cape and he informed me that he had held negotiations with a well-known Eastern Cape businessman by the name of Mr Chris van Rensburg who was also involved with the company, JALC. I don't know what the acronym stands for, but I understood that it was a military front or a front for Military Intelligence.

CHAIRPERSON: We were told, we had a hearing last week and we were told that JALC is the beginning, the first letters of the first names of four partners or Directors in the company, JALC.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am not entirely certain, but I will accept that.

MR HATTINGH: Might I ask you, what was Gen Engelbrecht's position in the South African Police at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: At that stage, he was the head of the Investigative Unit which dealt with related complaints and cases which were to be submitted to the Harms Commission, and he had already been earmarked as the next Commander for Vlakplaas or Section C1.

MR HATTINGH: C1? Continue, what happened then?

MR DE KOCK: Gen Engelbrecht informed me that this businessman, this Chris van Rensburg had given proof to him of the fact that in the Eastern Cape and especially in East London and adjoining areas, there was an economic slump as a result of actions by Gen Holomisa in the Transkei, among others that the Transkei was being used as a safe haven for members of the ANC and the PAC, that it was also a safe haven from where organisations such as Trade Unions were against the government and would go over to active terrorism if it be necessary.

MR HATTINGH: Apart from what Engelbrecht told you in this regard, did you have any information from your informers or your askaris which confirmed this information?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't work with the Transkei myself, and at that stage I didn't have any sources within the Transkei. However, I did have three members of the Transkei Security Police who had fled away from Gen Holomisa and I had accommodated them at Vlakplaas for their own safety. However, this didn't indicate that we were working on Gen Holomisa.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have any knowledge at that stage with regard to the information that the Transkei was being used as a safe haven for the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: It was general knowledge at Security Head Office, there were various reports with regard to this. I had liaison with Colonel Ras from the Intelligence Unit of the Pretoria Security Branch, who had managed a very sensitive source, a serving MK member, who provided information to him on a 24 hour basis with regard to where members of the ANC and the PAC were receiving training in the Transkei, where they were accommodated, where they had settled and that they were receiving assistance directly from Gen Holomisa.

MR HATTINGH: If any, what was the instruction which Gen Engelbrecht have to you?

MR DE KOCK: At that stage, he didn't give me any orders, what he did tell me however, was that he wanted to introduce me to a Transkeian businessman, who held interests within the Transkei and approximately a week later, Gen Engelbrecht took me to a house in Sandton where he introduced me to a Mr Vuli Mbotoli. He introduced me to this gentleman and Gen Engelbrecht requested me to act from there as the handler of Mr Mbotoli with regard to information which would be supplied from the Transkei, via friends and acquaintances of this Mr Mbotoli and that this information would involve with special reference to Gen Holomisa's share in the armed conflict and his assistance to members of the ANC and the PAC who had settled in the Transkei. I accepted this order, but I did find it strange because this arrangement was against the existing principle of the Security Police that a person or an informer who was supplying information, especially if it was such sensitive information, should be handled within the area where the local Security Branch or Security Division was situated and held jurisdiction.

MR HATTINGH: Did you begin to manage this Mr Mbotoli as you referred to it, in the Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I met him and we began to make arrangements for him with regard to the payment of a salary. We also appointed him as a source under a false name as a head of a source and if my memory serves me correctly, I obtained two passports for him, of which one had a false name, the other one was issued in his real name. I think that we also provided ID books, or documents for him, South African ID documents in those names, the same names that the passports had been issued in. Me and Sergeant Chait who was at C1, were involved in managing Mbotoli, he reported directly to me and I reported to Engelbrecht.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any information from this Mr Mbotoli?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, upon various occasions, Mr Mbotoli flew up to Pretoria, we covered the costs of his travel and his accommodation. On a regular basis, he provided information and it appeared from this information that he received very good feedback from the Transkei and on a certain day, I can't recall the exact date, he informed me, that is Mr Mbotoli, that a Colonel Duli wanted to speak to me urgently. Previously I had heard of this Colonel Duli, however, I had never met him. Nonetheless I agreed to meet with him and this meeting was arranged at the Jan Smuts Holiday Inn where Colonel Duli and another coloured man was introduced to me by Mr Mbotoli. At the same time approximately, I contacted Commandant Nieuwoudt and made enquiries about Colonel Duli and Mr Nieuwoudt, who was involved in the Transkei at that stage, I asked him about Colonel Duli and he told me that Duli was on our side and this on our side, indicates in that language that he was favourably inclined towards the government and governmental forces and that it was safe to negotiate with him and that is what I did. When I saw Colonel Duli during this meeting, there was a coloured man with him as his bodyguard. Colonel Duli told me that he had a shopping list and a shopping list within that context, military speaking, would be a list of weaponry or military equipment which would be required for some or other task, and he told me that he required military weapons for a coup d'etat in the Transkei. The purpose of this coup d'etat was once again to topple Gen Holomisa and then to appoint Kaiser Matanzima. This shopping list or list included assault weapons, handgrenades, machine guns, gun grenades, ammunition for all these weapons, 60 mm mortars, 82 mm mortars and mortar bombs of various calibre, anti-tank weapons with launchers and missiles, demolition chargers and radio contact equipment. I would just like to say that initially he did not have the radio equipment on his list and I made enquiries as to whether or not he would require it and he said that it would be acceptable if I could obtain this equipment. This weaponry and equipment was obtained in December 1992, I see that the date has been indicated as 1990, but I can't recall with certainty what the exact date was.

MR HATTINGH: So you provided the weapons. Where did you obtain the weapons?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, these weapons came from the weapons which Vlakplaas had at its disposal, which were held at Meken, where we had two shipping containers. The weapons came from the members' own arsenals which were in their possession and I also fetched some of Vlakplaas' weapons at the Police College which was under the control of Major Beneke.

MR HATTINGH: Would this indicate the weapons which came from Namibia originally to Vlakplaas and then found their way to the Police College?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You then delivered the weapons?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I provided these weapons to Duli at a small town not far from the Transkeian border, I think it was Maclear, I am not quite certain about that. During my first meeting with Colonel Duli at the Holiday Inn, I asked him on whose behalf he was acting and in this regard, I wanted to know specifically whether he was acting on behalf of the SAP Intelligence Services or the SA Defence Force. He told me that he had the support of both Intelligence Services, and before my departure to the Eastern Cape, I told Gen Engelbrecht that Mbotoli had introduced me to Duli and that Duli and I would provide weaponry with the objective of a prospective coup d'etat. However, he told me that I should be very cautious not to be caught. Gen Engelbrecht, however, said that it was high time that a coup d'etat be executed on Gen Holomisa.

MR HATTINGH: How did you interpret that statement of his?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in all regards was he not only in support of it, he even advised me on it, and I had his unequivocal support in this attempt.

MR HATTINGH: Please continue.

MR DE KOCK: Warrant Officer Nortje, Warrant Officer Snyman and Warrant Officer Vermeulen and I left for East London after that, where I met Colonel Duli. Gradually I also introduced the other members to him. Upon my arrival here in East London, he immediately requested four AK47 assault rifles with magazines and 16 handgrenades from me.

MR HATTINGH: Where did this meeting take place, can you recall?

MR DE KOCK: It took at the Osner Hotel where Colonel Duli had rooms from where he launched his operation.

MR HATTINGH: Did you provide the weapons, ammunition and handgrenades?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did. It did cause certain problems because all these weapons had been sealed, to be watertight and we had to remove the vehicle from which we retrieved it and break the seals and that meant that we could be spotted by the Police or the public. I understood later from Nieuwoudt that these four AK47 rifles, magazines and handgrenades had been given to four of his agents who would take it to Umtata. These four agents were actively involved, according to him, and they were kept as a sort of a surprise for whichever purpose he required. Whether they were there as contingency agents should something go wrong, or whether he had something else in mind for them, is unknown to me. Later that day, after the delivery of the arms, we heard by means of news reports that the coup d'etat had not been successful, and that Colonel Duli and various other members of the group who had participated, had been killed during this attempted coup.

MR HATTINGH: Where were you when you received this information?

MR DE KOCK: I was still here in East London. However, we used the news media and especially the radio in order to follow the events.

MR HATTINGH: When you heard about this, what happened next?

MR DE KOCK: From my side, not much happened. There wasn't anything else that I could do. Warrant Officer Nortje, Snyman and Henk Vermeulen and I later during that afternoon, had a beer at the Osner Hotel and while we were there, Colonel Anton Nieuwoudt and Clive Brink arrived there coincidentally, and it was a coincidental meeting. Commandant Anton Nieuwoudt was quite dejected and disappointed that the operation was not successful. I then told Nieuwoudt that I had provided the weapons for this operation.

MR HATTINGH: As far as you knew, at that stage, was he aware that you had provided the weapons?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, so you were informing him about this at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. He then in turn told me that this coup attempt could not be seen as a failure, that it was not futile, that there were still four people with guns, magazines and grenades who would make a further attempt to topple the government of Holomisa. The weaponry that he referred to was apparently the same weaponry that we have retrieved earlier that day for Duli. Commandant Nieuwoudt mentioned this to me.

MR HATTINGH: After that, did you have any further contact with Nieuwoudt?

MR DE KOCK: After that, at various occasions or on a regular basis, I maintained contact with Nieuwoudt, I even developed a source network in the Transkei and I was able to warn him timeously about coups from the Transkei which were aimed at the Ciskei. Approximately two to three weeks later, Nieuwoudt informed me that Duli had been wounded in the assault during the coup and that later in the presence of Gen Holomisa and Brigadier Matanzima and Holomisa's vehicle driver, known as Whiteboy, I think it was an MK name, I am not sure, he had been shot, he, Craig Duli, was shot dead by one of the aforementioned persons. I was also informed by Nieuwoudt that Colonel Duli before he had been shot dead, had been very seriously tortured. A short while after this failed coup, members of the Transkei Security Police under the command of a captain of the Transkei Security Police, abducted Mbotoli from his home in Johannesburg. An Austrian was involved in this, his name was Moringer. My information was that Mbotoli had been detained, tortured and tried in the Transkei and then sentenced.

MR HATTINGH: And all of your knowledge about this, was based upon hearsay?

MR DE KOCK: Not all of it. We also received Intelligence reports from the Security Branches in East London, among others also from the Ciskei Military Intelligence Services who confirmed some of these versions.

MR HATTINGH: Before I ask you to deal very briefly with the third incident, I would just like to finish this incident off thoroughly. With regard to the first incident about which you have given brief evidence and the second incident, did you ever receive any compensation or remuneration for your supply of weapons?

MR DE KOCK: No, there was no agreement for remuneration.

MR HATTINGH: Did you ever receive any compensation with regard to the first two incidents?

MR DE KOCK: No, on the contrary, it was own expenses for me. Naturally the State covered it, but there was no talk of remuneration for members of Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Why were you prepared to provide your co-operation in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: It was already known that Gen Holomisa had achieved success after 1990, that he had provided assistance for members of the PAC and the ANC and that assaults had been launched from the Transkei and in adjacent areas. I will refer to a case during which two MK members were arrested on the way from the Transkei or Umtata, I think they were on their way to Queenstown, with an AK47 and a Makarov pistol with a silencer. While they were in possession of legal ID documents from the Transkei Armed Forces, they were charged and found guilty, but later they were released. The ANC and the PAC after this availability of the Transkei, continued with their attacks especially on vehicles which were used by whites or which were driven by whites. There were various incidents during which whites in transit on the roads in Transkei, were attacked and wounded. There was also a base at Sterkspruit where six PAC members had established themselves in the town itself. There was also a PAC base, approximately a kilometre from the Aliwal North/Transkei border. It was a house which was used by them and which we had prepared to attack, but this plan was later abandoned by the Generals.

MR HATTINGH: If this coup had succeeded, how would it have been of any advantage to the former government?

MR DE KOCK: It would have established a friendly government in the Transkei for the National Party to have Kaiser Matanzima as the Head of State and to have Colonel Craig Duli as the Military Head. That would probably have benefited the manipulative objective of the NP.

MR HATTINGH: Would that have had any affect on the Police and the Army's ability to act against members of the ANC or the PAC who found themselves in that area?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would have given us unconditional access to the Transkei where Vlakplaas in particular would have been used very effectively with regard to the identification of PAC and ANC members, because virtually the whole of Vlakplaas consisted of former MK or APLA members and we would be able to arrest these persons and recruit them, we would also be able to neutralise stockpiling locations by being able to trace these places and destroying them.

MR HATTINGH: Did this contribute to your decision to cooperate and provide weapons for the coups?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, this bring us to the third incident. Once again, we are not submitting this to the Committee, I would just like you to deal with it very briefly. Did you also provide weapons at later occasions which were used to execute coup d'etats?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. After this second incident in which Duli died, I was approached by Commandant Anton Nieuwoudt and he requested me to assist him for the delivery of weapons, particularly Eastern Block demolition chargers and he specifically requested some seven missiles because the Transkei at that stage, had two helicopters which could be fitted with canons. I complied with that request and delivered a large quantity of weapons and ammunition to him. When I refer to a large quantity, I am not talking about tons, but it was more than what I had provided to Duli.

MR HATTINGH: The supply of these weapons, did a coup follow on this or was there an attempt at a coup after this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was an attempt from the Transkei where Colonel Guzana, I hope I pronounce it correctly and Gen Charles Sebe came to the Ciskei for the purposes of executing a coup in Ciskei. I would just like to mention here whether it was Ciskei or Transkei or any other country in the world, this was - an integral part of a coup was that you had to be sympathetic and you had to have armed forces, and from the public itself, you had to have assistance, but the two of them alone could not execute a coup by themselves. This was concurrent with unrest in the army barracks in the Ciskei. Some of the Army members died there in the Ciskei and the Gen Guzana was shot and Gen Sebe was murdered.

MR HATTINGH: These weapons which you supplied at this instance, did you receive any or did you have discussion for any benefit of this?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, remuneration was not asked for, it was not given.

MR HATTINGH: The assistance that you had to give ...

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, firstly, I was prepared to oppose the ANC and the PAC. I would not have gone with any compromise and this was not connected to any financial remuneration. For me it was about the case, the matter.

MR HATTINGH: After you had supplied the weapons, was any offer made to you for any remuneration?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, but the evening before we departed, the members who helped me with the supply of these weapons to Commandant Nieuwoudt, the same evening Commandant Nieuwoudt visited me and placed a white bag on my bed at which he said there was something here for me. When I asked him what it was, he said I had to have a look at it, it was for me. I opened the bag, it had money in it, notes.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know how much money was in there?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I did not count it. I was surprised. I told him that I did not want it and he told me that you must take it. He had seen to himself and the other members. I took the money and I loaded it into my vehicle, where it lay there for about two or three weeks. Afterwards I discovered, during those two or three weeks, that it was an amount of about R130 000 to R140 000. Initially I did not know what to do with the money. It sounds strange, but that is true. I later bought a plot in Pretoria, which I gave to Warrant Officer Nortje when he told me that he and his wife wanted to buy a house or wanted to build a house and I gave this plot to him. I think it was worth, it cost about R96 000 or R97 000 and the rest of the money, I bought a second plot with a house built on it, which I gave to Captain Kobus Klopper. Initially I would have stayed there myself, but Klopper approached me and asked me if I could assist him as I did with Warrant Officer Nortje which seemed like blackmail to me, but it was not important to me and I gave this plot to him. I must mention here that there was no benefit to me from any of these actions.

MR HATTINGH: On page 81 of Volume 1 of the documents which serves before the Committee, there appears an extract which would seem to me as if it came from the Truth Commission's report. I would just like to read this to you.

"Nieuwoudt asked for SAMS seven assault rifles, explosives, limpet mines, handgrenades, RPG7's, explosive devices, machine guns and ammunition and this was delivered to East London, to a house belonging to a Mr Kruger who worked with Nieuwoudt. On the night they left, Nieuwoudt gave De Kock a bag full of money saying "dit is joune". De Kock refused the money. Nieuwoudt insisted and said that the money came from sources of his. He said that he had already taken care of himself and his men. The bag contained R160 000. De Kock bought a plot with this money which he later gave to Willie Nortje. He used the remainder money for a deposit on a house in Lynwood which he later gave to Chappies Klopper, house 14 Ministerial."

Is this the version to which you have given evidence?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you ever give evidence to this effect, as it appears in this report before the Amnesty Committee?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, this is the first time today.

MR HATTINGH: So do you know where this information comes from that appears in this report?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall right now whether I have submitted such a report or have made such a statement, I don't know.

MR HATTINGH: Were you approached by Investigative Officers of the TRC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, very regularly.

MR HATTINGH: And with the full knowledge and co-operation of your Attorney, Mr Hugo, did you consult with him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: The information which they requested, did you supply them with it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And is it possible that during such an instance, you have given this information?

MR DE KOCK: That is possible Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You don't recall it?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Is it a correct version as it appears on page 87?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Is it correct that you did not supply these weapons in exchange for any remuneration and the money was given afterwards to you?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Just to clear it up for you - is that the amount of R160 000 could not have bought ten percent of these weapons?

MR DE KOCK: That is my version.

MR HATTINGH: When you had supplied these weapons with regard to the weapons, was it in regard to the matter which serves before the Commission, did you know that it was to be used in this coup?

MR DE KOCK: Definitely Chairperson, because this is the type of weapons that one keeps to feel good about yourself, you do not keep it for that purpose, these are assault weapons and that is what they were used for.

MR HATTINGH: Are you able and if you cannot you must say so, but could you place a value on the weapons which you have delivered?

MR DE KOCK: If I had to buy these weapons on the black market, it would not have been less than R1,5 million to R2 million, especially if one has regard for the surface to air missiles.

MR HATTINGH: Did you realise that if these weapons were to be used in a coup that people could be injured or killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that is what usually happens. MR HATTINGH: It indeed happened that people were killed in this attempted coup?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, that is the evidence that we wish to place before you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Hattingh. Mr Cornelius, do you have any questions that you would like to ask the applicant?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I have. Colonel De Kock, I am just concerned with the impression that were left at members of Vlakplaas, the impression of the approval. Is it so that Ministers visited Vlakplaas to compliment you for your acts?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, there were regular visits from Ministerial staff, even on a social level. This was not a irregular situation.

MR CORNELIUS: As Gen Van der Merwe had testified in the COSATU House incident, he gave evidence that he and Min Vlok visited Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, and this was more than once.

MR CORNELIUS: And thereafter, did you receive remuneration from the Secret Fund, it was no problem to get money from the Secret Fund?

MR DE KOCK: Not at all Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And then you had logistical assistance from the Army and the Intelligence, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And at all times, you permanently liaised with Headquarters?

MR DE KOCK: Headquarters were always informed with regard to the operations.

MR CORNELIUS: With the exception of decisions that members had to take themselves?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: At all times, as in the case of Gen Coetzee, did they have knowledge that murders had been committed and did this have their approval?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. Just to add to this, the position existed with the Generals, amongst others, Gen Coetzee, that if someone was killed in Swaziland, it was a covert operation. I believe that murder is universal, if it is here or in Karachi or in Swaziland, if one kills somebody it is murder.

MR CORNELIUS: I would just like to add that I agree. You refer to Gen Coetzee's evidence before Justice Wilson?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: You have read the application and you would have noted that one of the applicants, Mr Vermeulen, and I am spotting now that he said that he would receive some plot for his assistance?

MR DE KOCK: I do not want to argue that, but we never discussed any plots to be received.

MR CORNELIUS: Not during the planning stages, was any promises made during the planning stages, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: What concerns me as well is what would have happened if a member received an instruction from you and he refused?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would then approach some of my other members to execute the same order and if somebody didn't want to do it, I would do it myself, all by myself.

MR CORNELIUS: Gen Van der Merwe, during the Khotso House hearing answered as follows - Chairperson, and I quote from the record, the transcription thereof. I asked Gen Van der Merwe what would happen if an order was not followed, and he answered as follows

"... no, it would not create a security risk, but if a person refuses to carry out an order, it is obvious that such a person would be removed from that Unit. Nobody would have wanted to work with such a person, if that person was not willing to participate in a task with the rest of the Unit."

Is that your feeling as well?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, I would like to qualify it. It was that C1 at Vlakplaas was a voluntary Unit, people applied to come there, they were never forced or coerced to join. And then before any operation was launched, the group which was selected, was called aside, they were informed as to the nature of the operation and to those members who wanted to withdraw from this operation, I would then replace them with other members. This was not concerned with the fact that other people were scared. Our tolerant level are not the same or as high as the other members, it is not the same for everybody, but some members requested not to be sent on a particular operation, but would go on a next operation.

MR CORNELIUS: But the members right through, had all the political motives to keep the government of the day safe and to fight the enemies of the State?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, they were very committed.

MR CORNELIUS: I quote once again to an answer of Gen Van der Merwe

"... if it concerns that this person would be removed, thereof I have no doubt but no further steps would be taken against this person, except for the fact that I think in general, such person would have had a difficult life in the South African Police."

Would you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I would.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Cornelius. Mr Rossouw, do you have any questions you would like to ask the applicant? Sorry, Mr Lamey?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I do. Mr Chairman, I do have a few questions. Mr De Kock, in the annexure to Mr Nortje's application, Mr Chairman, may I just enquire whether you have been provided with the supplemented portions of the amnesty application of Mr Nortje yet, I do intend just to ask a few questions on that aspect, specifically ...

CHAIRPERSON: Are you referring to this addendum, this supplementary affidavit?

MR LAMEY: No Mr Chairman, that is also an additional portion, but I am referring specifically to the Form 1, that one before you.

CHAIRPERSON: So we will refer to this new Form 1 as Exhibit B and the affidavit as Exhibit C?

MR LAMEY: As it pleases you Mr Chairman. Mr De Kock, just as an introduction, as a review to your involvement at Vlakplaas, before this, you were an Operational Commander in Koevoet in Namibia, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje was also in your group in Namibia, he was part of Operation Koevoet?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje in his amnesty application, I don't know if you have had regard for the documents, I have given it to your legal representatives this morning, but at some stage he requested a transfer to Unit C1 at Vlakplaas and you had assistance in this application. Mr Chairman, I am referring to paragraph 2.2.1 on page 7 of Exhibit B.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje says that his future involvement he saw as a continuation of his experience in the bush in former Southwest Africa and he would continue it in the Republic and against the liberation movements and all related organisations?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson. This war had never stopped, it just continued.

MR LAMEY: What is of import here, and I deduce from this and I would like you to comment on it, that before your time as a Commander at Vlakplaas, when you took over command at Vlakplaas, this type of persons who had this operational experience were the ideal candidates to become members of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Such a person had foreseen that during his involvement at Vlakplaas, he would - his operational experience would be put to use during operations against the known liberation movements?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And he also further states, paragraph 2.2.5 that as you also have said that from his viewpoint, the border war had just moved to inside the country, to combat the liberation movements and the purpose during this process, was to keep the government in place?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And he further states that because of his exposure at that stage, that he was highly motivated to fight for the government and to stop the liberation movements?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, he was one of the best there was.

MR LAMEY: Mr De Kock, it is also true that as Commander, before a planned operation, you would select the persons who would be involved?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Your selection, was this that they would be selected for that task because of their merits of previous operations and the trust that you had in them, that they would be of assistance to you and had the necessary knowledge to carry out the operation and you had the confidence in them and that they would adhere to the secrecy of a covert operation?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: I would like to return to the role that was played by the DCC and Commandant Anton Nieuwoudt, in this specific instance, let's call it the Duli coup, just to distinguish from the other coups that was attempted, Mr Nortje in his amnesty application states that - let me ask you in the following manner, is it correct that Mr Nortje was only involved in one of the three attempted coups?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I believe that he was involved with the third instance where we delivered the weapons to Mr Kruger, Casper Kruger, who was under the command of Commandant Nieuwoudt. It was delivered at his house and it was later moved to an undisclosed place.

MR LAMEY: Is your recollection unsure or are you definitely sure?

MR DE KOCK: I have a vague memory thereof. I do not want to confirm it as irrevocable.

MR LAMEY: My instructions from Mr Nortje is that he was not involved with the third coup or with the supply of weapons thereof.

MR DE KOCK: I would accept it as such Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: What he does say in his application is that - the date 1992, it would seem that he says it would seem faulty, it was during 1990 that you told him that DCC was planning a coup and that Anton Nieuwoudt and Hendrik or Henry van der Westhuizen from DCC would be the particular persons involved with the planning thereof?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was the first instance.

MR LAMEY: Would you then say that there was no role that Van der Westhuizen and Nieuwoudt had played previously with regard to this specific attempt?

MR DE KOCK: Is this the first or the second?

MR LAMEY: The second?

MR DE KOCK: No, it is my contention that Anton Nieuwoudt played a very invasive role in the second attempt and during the first attempt, Henry van der Westhuizen delivered the weapons, because Anton Nieuwoudt and I flew to Vienna, where we recruited a senior ANC member.

MR LAMEY: Could you just shed some more light, what role did Van der Westhuizen and Anton Nieuwoudt play before this operation was launched with regard to the second attempted coup?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I know, Henry van der Westhuizen was not involved with the second attempted coup? Not at all, and I was not informed as such by Commandant Nieuwoudt and I had no information that Henry van der Westhuizen was involved with the second attempt.

MR LAMEY: Let us just limit ourselves to Anton Nieuwoudt's participation and in his official capacity in the DCC, when did he come into the picture for the first time?

MR DE KOCK: Is this with regard to the coup?

MR LAMEY: Yes, we refer to the second coup, the Duli attempted coup?

MR DE KOCK: Before the second coup, I liaised regularly with Commandant Nieuwoudt and just before he started in the Ciskei, he rendered services for Gen Gozo, he established a company with the name of Research International and at some stage, he attempted to recruit Willie Nortjie to leave the Force and come and work with him. Afterwards, when Nortje did not do this and I think he afterwards made the same request to me, and I do have the documents which were signed at that point, but Anton Nieuwoudt was very committed in this attempt, to overthrow Gen Holomisa, or to neutralise him in the Transkei.

MR LAMEY: What I wish to ask of you if I can summarise it, although Mr Duli came to the fore as a person who would execute the coup, but from the first attempted coup, it was a continual planning which led to a further attempt at the coup, where Anton Nieuwoudt and DCC played a role?

MR DE KOCK: It was a continuous situation Chairperson. Just before the second attempt, when Nieuwoudt, Brink and I met at a holiday house at the coast, I would not be able to find it again, but it was where Anton Nieuwoudt told me that there were 22 men who acted as sources for him, that he had to support these men and their families financially, these men served as sources for him and received salaries on those basis, that they were former members of the Transkei Security Forces, they gave training to the Lesotho Liberation Army who worked from Transkei into Lesotho, that these people were well trained, and after this unsuccessful coup, he told me that these men, some of them were killed and some were caught, but that he still had to support the families financially. It was not an impulsive attempt to usurp Gen Holomisa's government.

MR LAMEY: You have also mentioned the evidence that there was a written co-operation between Vlakplaas and DCC, so this continuous plan to execute a coup in Transkei, was between Vlakplaas with yourself in command, and the DCC, this was a continuous point on the agenda?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson. I would just also mention that the Chief of Security knew after the first attempt which was unsuccessful, that Commandant Anton Nieuwoudt and Brigadier Tolletjie Botha, the Chief of the DCC, did visit Basie Smit, the Chief of Security. After the members of the coup were arrested at Queenstown and Anton Nieuwoudt told me that Gen Smit was highly upset and on a lighter note he mentioned that Gen Smit walked around like a sheep and bit the carpet, that is how angry he was because I was involved with the Harms Commission.

MR LAMEY: If Mr Nortje says in his amnesty application and the statement thereof, that you mentioned that the Defence Force had planned a coup, and you have already mentioned Henry van der Westhuizen who was not involved, Mr Nortje maintains that it is his recollection that Van der Westhuizen's name was mentioned, would it then be incorrect, what he has stated in his application?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I think that his memory of Mr Van der Westhuizen is simply vague.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Mr Nortje's recollection is also that Nieuwoudt, or that you would have informed him that Anton Nieuwoudt also approached you for assistance with the supply of weapons which were to be used in the coup, that would be the supply of weapons to Craig Duli?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, however I don't have any recollection of that. Initially I kept it completely covered up.

MR LAMEY: But you will concede that you may have mentioned this to him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that possibility exists.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Then Mr Nortje says further that it is his recollection and in the amnesty application you mention that the impression was created that Duli upon his own initiative, wished to speak to you and for that reason the meeting was arranged at Jan Smuts Holiday Inn. Mr Nortje says that it is his recollection that you, from your side, also wanted to speak to Duli and that was also one of the reasons for this meeting at the Holiday Inn? Specifically according to his recollection, you wanted to know whether or not you could advise him with regard to the execution of the coup, but that Duli wasn't really accommodating to that advice that you offered, that was during the meeting at the Holiday Inn, the Jan Smuts Holiday Inn?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I spoke to Duli alone. The only person who was present, was his coloured bodyguard. I couldn't tell him to leave because Colonel Duli felt safer with him around. If anybody had been present, anybody other than the bodyguard, it would have been Sergeant Chait. Vuli Mbotoli was also present, he introduced me to Duli and after that, they requested among others that Chait and Mbotoli leave the room so that Duli and I could speak to each other in privacy, so the only other person that was present, was his bodyguard. I found it strange when Colonel Duli did not mention that he required radio contact equipment. No operation, in my opinion, would be of any value if one didn't have radio communication, that would be a basic principle in the execution of any operation, and that is the only suggestion which I made to him and that is why he said if you can obtain this for me, that would be fine.

MR LAMEY: Mr De Kock, my instructions from Mr Nortje are that he was present during the meeting between you and Craig Duli? I am not saying that he was present during every discussion of that meeting, but he was generally present during the meeting between you and Craig at the Jan Smuts Holiday Inn?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was only one such meeting at the Jan Smuts Holiday Inn. During that meeting, it was only Duli, his bodyguard and I, but also during that meeting, Duli and I worked out code names for ourselves, he provided a telephone number for me, so that I could contact him. It led to a telephone booth somewhere in the vicinity where a woman would usually answer and then I would use his code name and provide a time when I would call again, at which time he would be there.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr De Kock, just - was Mr Nortje at the hotel at all when the meeting was on? Did he go with you there?

MR DE KOCK: No, my recollection is that Sergeant Chait was there, he was the handler of Mr Mbotoli and Mr Mbotoli introduced me to Craig Duli. Nortje was not present.

MR LAMEY: Very well, I am not going to take this aspect any further, I just want to put it to you that Mr Nortje will testify that he was present during that meeting. However, he cannot recall somebody like Mbotoli. His evidence will be that it is possible that somebody like that may have been present, but that he was definitely present during that meeting at the Jan Smuts Holiday Inn. His recollection is that it was Van der Westhuizen who made the arrangements to have that meeting.

MR DE KOCK: No, I accept that Mr Nortje's recollection may be confused in that regard, it is not correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you only have the one meeting at the Jan Smuts Holiday Inn?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then I would like to talk to you about the period of time after your arrival in East London. Did you stay in the cabanas on the beach front, you and Willie Nortje?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, we did later, but upon our first day of arrival here, we went to a holiday facility on the coast, where we stayed in a holiday house. After the first day there, I decided that it wasn't appropriate to have two bakkies there which contained all these weapons, although we could lock the bakkies, it was very easy to break the locks to these bakkies, and we needed a facility where we could lock up these vehicles, because I didn't have a fixed date or hour upon which I was to hand over these weapons. This was spread out over a period of three to four days, and I needed a place where I would be able to secure these vehicles much better, and that is when we went to stay in the cabanas, after determining that there were lock up garages there in which we could secure the vehicles and keep them out of sight.

MR LAMEY: Very well, Mr Nortje will also state that there were actually two Vlakplaas groups, the one group consisted of Ras and Baker and Hoffman, they didn't know about this operation and they went on an overt, apparently normal, task to East London?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: But you did stay in the cabanas on the beach front ultimately, you and Nortje while Vermeulen and the others stayed in a holiday resort?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Warrant Officer Nortje and I definitely, however, I do recall vaguely that Snyman and Vermeulen also stayed in the cabanas so that I could have them closer to the vehicles.

MR LAMEY: I would just like to put it to you that Nortje's recollection is that before the delivery of the weapons to Duli and his people took place, upon a particular afternoon, you met Clive Brink and Nieuwoudt, Brink is also a former member of DCC, you met them at a hotel opposite the Holiday Inn in East London.

MR DE KOCK: That was the day of the coup, it was that afternoon. That is the afternoon during which we met Brink and Nieuwoudt.

MR LAMEY: That has to do with the coincidental meeting after the coup?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct yes.

MR LAMEY: My instructions in this regard are that Nortje states that there could possibly have been a second occasion after the failed coup which he cannot recall specifically, although he stated that before the coup and the delivery of the weapons, you also met Brink and Nieuwoudt at a hotel opposite the Holiday Inn?

MR DE KOCK: No, the hotel opposite the Holiday Inn is the Osner Hotel.

MR LAMEY: Yes, it is that specific hotel.

MR DE KOCK: And Craig Duli and another person who was a member of the Transkeian Foreign Affairs Department, also had a hotel room there, and it was there that we liaised with Duli. Brink and Nieuwoudt were not present. I know that after the execution of the coup, the Security Police of East London traced all the telephone records of that room, and among others, they found records that there had been liaison with the Security Police in Port Elizabeth. If I have it correctly, however, we did not find Anton Nieuwoudt, nor Brink there. I didn't see them.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje's recollection as he mentions in his amnesty affidavit, is that there was a request or at least, let me get to this first, he stated that there was another discussion with Craig Duli in that hotel, opposite the Holiday Inn, that would be the Osner Hotel as you have spoken of it, where certain strategies were discussed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, commentary was given to Craig Duli regarding the sort of weapons that were available. We attempted to determine whether they would be familiar with the use of these weapons, if not, we would have to give them a crash course in the bushes, thirdly, with regard to the use of the radio's, which were SA53 radio's, which could be used from ground to air, with the assurance that the batteries were correct, that they were sealed, that there was no leakage, that the magazines were loaded, how many rounds there were, and everything that went along with the weaponry. However, no strategies were discussed there. Craig Duli worked on an absolutely need to know basis and the impression which I gained from his attitude and his conduct was that his plan was already devised, that he didn't need any ideas or suggestions from me.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Lamey, when you had that discussion with Duli in the Osner Hotel, was Mr Nortje present with you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible that he was present during the meeting in the Osner Hotel.

MR LAMEY: Mr De Kock, when I speak of strategy, and I have just confirmed my instructions, I am not speaking of consultation with regard to the execution of an operation. My instructions are indeed as you have stated it now, what was discussed and Mr Nortje confirms this, but also during this further discussion with Duli, the arrangements were made for the date at which he would me met and where the weapons would be handed over?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that would just be a thorough finishing off or completion of Duli's request. I understood strategy here as a long term planning for an objective in terms of tactical planning.

MR LAMEY: Then Mr Nortje's recollection is also that you hired a kombi vehicle which was used, to transport the weapons to a racing course near East London, from where it was loaded from the bakkies to the kombi, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then he states that after this was done, you also received a request to keep some of the weapons aside and he says that 16 AK47's were held aside, but he says that you mentioned four AK's and 16 magazines and he maintains that 16 may have stuck in his head with regard to the magazines, but the point remains that a separate group of weapons were kept aside for another objective and that these weapons would also find their way to the Transkei as part of the attempted coup?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this took place before the weapons were loaded over to the kombi. This took place before we moved into the cabanas and Snyman and Vermeulen went to the cabanas and retrieved the weapons. We had to break the watertight seal and this created various problems for us, however, this didn't take place at the race course.

MR LAMEY: With regard to this, my instructions from Mr Nortje are that it is possible that this could have taken place at the hotel, but he maintains that the reason why he remembers that this could have taken place at the racing course is that the risk was too great for the public eye to see these weapons being withdrawn and handed over, and that is why he feels that it took place at the race track?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, my recollection of that is clear and that is my version.

MR LAMEY: And later you departed in the direction of Maclear and late that night, you met Duli and his group and that is when the weapons were handed over to Duli?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then I would just like to deal with this aspect, Mr Nortje states in his affidavit that you, Van der Westhuizen and Anton Nieuwoudt drew a great financial benefit from this operation and I would like to put it to you that Mr Nortje will give evidence that this is something which he heard subsequently during a discussion, he cannot recall exactly when and who the person was who mentioned this to him. He said it may have been you or somebody else at Vlakplaas, however, he states that he will give evidence that there was no direct transfer of money upon the delivery of the weapons or any mention thereof beforehand, any mention of remuneration for you or any other members of Vlakplaas or for Nieuwoudt, before the operation. With regard to this he is in concurrence with your evidence, however, he maintains that he heard subsequently that you and Nieuwoudt and Van der Westhuizen had drawn financial benefit from your participation in this operation, and from this discussion which he heard, he drew the inference that it had to do with this attempted coup in which he had been involved, but he says that it could also be possible that this is in reference to the other incident, which you have mentioned, which would appear to be the later attempt.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no remuneration was given to Vlakplaas members, not in the first or the second or the third attempted coup.

MR LAMEY: Yes, I agree with you that there was no prior talk of remuneration, all that he maintains is that he subsequently heard from a discussion that you had received remuneration, but in the same breath he is not certain whether his inference has to do with this operation, or that it has to do with another incident.

MR DE KOCK: I can confirm surrounding the remuneration for Nieuwoudt, I am not saying this out of malice, I am quite fond of the man and I have a lot of compassion for him. With regard to Van der Westhuizen, I cannot say anything, and I must just mention that for Vlakplaas, there was no remuneration.

MR LAMEY: When you speak of the benefit for Anton Nieuwoudt, are you speaking of this specific operation or the ... (tape ends) ... the later operation with the missiles and this is when money was received?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje states that the plot which you later purchased was in your name, but that you transferred it to him in 1992 before the dissolution of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: I can't recall whether this was before the dissolution of Vlakplaas, it existed until the end of March 1993.

MR LAMEY: Or at the state during which the dissolution of Vlakplaas was tabled? I am not speaking of the date of the specific dissolution, but I am referring to that time period?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was still working and operating from Vlakplaas.

MR LAMEY: Mr De Kock, then I would like to refer to your evidence with regard to the house which was purchased for Mr Klopper. I am not representing him in these proceedings, however, I do represent him with regard to other amnesty applications. He mentioned or you mentioned that his motive for asking you to buy him a house was some form of blackmail. I would just like some more clarity regarding that, I have no instructions with regard to this matter from Mr Klopper, but I would like to mention that I will receive instructions from him at some point in time. Do you believe that blackmail was the motive?

MR DE KOCK: No, it appeared that way. It sounded that way because his precise phrase was and I can recall it specifically for that reason, it was whether I couldn't help him the way I had helped Willie Nortjie. However, he wanted cash and I told him that there wasn't anything such a cash and that he could take the house, which he did. I could find myself in the problematic position that it would scarcely have been possible for me to help one person and not another, ultimately I ended up helping everybody at Vlakplaas and I will give explanation later on as to the various reasons for this.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Lamey. Yes, I see it is just past one o'clock, this would be a convenient time to take the lunch adjournment, we will adjourn until between quarter to two and two o'clock for lunch.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Malan, do you have any questions you would like to ask the applicant?

EUGENE DE KOCK: (still under oath)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MALAN: Mr De Kock, upon a question of Mr Lamey you answered that it was your impression that Colonel Duli was in charge of the operation, that he had worked it out, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: I stated that he had already, or at least it appeared that his planning was finished, that he had already completed his modus operandi.

MR MALAN: Would it be correct to say that Mr or Colonel Duli was in control of this operation?

MR DE KOCK: He would have been in control of the attempt to execute the coup?

MR MALAN: And anything else, any other control?

MR DE KOCK: I would say and this is my unequivocal understanding that Nieuwoudt would have been in charge, because some of the men that were in charge, were agents of Nieuwoudt, they were paid agents.

MR MALAN: That is your opinion?

MR DE KOCK: I beg your pardon?

MR MALAN: That is your opinion, you do not base that on first hand knowledge?

MR DE KOCK: No, Anton Nieuwoudt told me that because I was present when he told Sergeant Clive Brink to pay the people's salaries and at that stage they were already sources of the Ciskei Intelligence Service.

MR MALAN: On page 5 of Volume 1 of the minutes you indicate that Nieuwoudt was quite disappointed and dejected and he said that his operation had failed. Do you mean by that that it was his operation, that he was in full control or was it just an unfortunate choice of words? Was this an operation in which he had a restricted involvement?

MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't be able to say how deep his involvement had been with that operation. If he had mentioned that it was his operation, I would accept that he was in charge of it. That would be my opinion. And also the fact that he mentioned to me that the operation was not yet finished, that there were four AK47 guns and handgrenades and magazines which were secure, that would still reach Umtata.

MR MALAN: How many weapons did you supply to Colonel Duli with the eye on this operation, I am not asking for specific quantities, just an approximation?

MR DE KOCK: I would say between 60 and 80 weapons of various types and calibre.

MR MALAN: Would this be the sum total of this consignment?

MR DE KOCK: I would say it was either more or less, it is very difficult for me to give you a definite determination.

MR MALAN: In conjunction with what you said to Mr Lamey, it appeared that his plan was already devised and that these would be the weapons that would be necessary for him to achieve his goal?

MR DE KOCK: Those were the only weapons that I could provide him with, I wouldn't say that that was all he needed.

MR MALAN: Do you suggest then that more weapons would have been advisable?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know. I can't tell you.

MR MALAN: Would it not have been a bit far fetched if it is said that four persons were given four guns, that these people would be able to take over a country with those weapons?

MR DE KOCK: No, the way that I understand Nieuwoudt's statement, is that these guns and magazines and grenades and that small operation, was not part of Craig Duli's operation. In other words these four persons had nothing to do with Craig Duli, although their goal was also to get rid of Holomisa.

MR MALAN: So we have two separate groups, disregarding their sizes, they had the same goal and as far as you know, these persons with the four AK's, did nothing?

MR DE KOCK: No, not as far as I know.

MR MALAN: I have a mandate to put it to you, Mr De Kock, that Mr Nieuwoudt, should it be necessary, would deny that he drew any financial benefit for himself and his men as you put it from this operation?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot speak regarding the second situation with Duli, I am referring to the third incident where I provided weapons to Commandant Nieuwoudt. There was definitely a financial advantage for him and I will stand by that.

MR MALAN: Very well, I will also stand by that, should it be necessary to elaborate on that at a later stage. It is not necessary for us to explore this any further, let it just suffice that it has been put to you. Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MALAN

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen, have you got any questions that you would like to put to the applicant?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. Jansen, on behalf of applicant Ras. Mr De Kock, could you be of assistance to explain the presence of Mr Ras and other members from Vlakplaas in the Eastern Cape, on that day?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they were not informed surrounding Colonel Duli's actions and also not with regard to the others who were involved in this attempted coup. Their duty with an enlarged group of former PAC and ANC members, was to monitor activities in the Eastern Cape under a cover. The actual reason behind that which I kept to myself, was that should this coup be successful, that entire group of askaris and my members, would have gone into the Transkei and begun with the identification of ANC and PAC members, their arrests and the handing over of those ANC and PAC members to the Duli forces, so that we could identify and trace the weapon stockpiling locations of the ANC and the PAC in the Transkei. They didn't have the slightest clue of what was really going on, what the left hand was doing and what the right hand was doing.

MR JANSEN: So this was according to the need to know principle or basis, upon which covert operations functioned and therefore, it would not have been strange to foresee a possible role for people without them knowing exactly what the operation as such, was about?

MR DE KOCK: Could you please be more clear regarding that?

MR JANSEN: Perhaps I have stated it a bit clumsily. Inherent to all covert operations, there was this need to know principle, in other words, specific persons would not necessarily be aware of what other persons' involvement was or what the entire operation was about, the person would simply know what he needed to know at that point?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR JANSEN: So their presence in the Eastern Cape and their possible involvement in the Transkei at a later stage, was all conditional to the success of the Duli coup? They didn't have any other role?

MR DE KOCK: No, their actual role in this area in which they were working, was to trace ANC and PAC members, however they couldn't enter the Transkei. If it had been successful, then yes.

MR JANSEN: Then they would have had access to the Transkei?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: I just want to confirm something which you mentioned in your evidence, it would also not have been strange for a person in the Security Police and more specifically a Vlakplaas member, to be involved in an operation during which there would be a co-operation between the Security Police and the Military Forces?

MR DE KOCK: No, it would however have to be cleared with me as the Commander, especially if the operation was of a serious nature.

MR JANSEN: I don't know if you have had the opportunity to peruse Mr Ras' application, it appears on page 20 and goes until page 28. Chairperson, I must just mention that if you study that application, between pages 20 and 28, that which should have been pages 2 to 5 of the application, does not appear there, it is simply the usual personal background of the application, it has absolutely nothing to do with the facts of the case, and gradually we will submit those documents when Mr Ras gives evidence, as it is not of cardinal importance at the moment. It simply has to do with his personal and career background. Mr Ras' application, if I could put it to you in general terms, has on a peripheral level to do with the Duli matter, but more specifically a plan or a proposal to kill Mr Bantu Holomisa and then there were also certain steps which were taken to identify the target, with regard to Mr Holomisa. Can you recall anything like that?

MR DE KOCK: After I read his affidavit, I recalled that there was a report from the East London Security Branch which stated that Holomisa upon occasion had a storehouse between Umtata and Queenstown and I don't know if it was me that asked Marthinus Ras or whether he suggested it, but it was agreed that we should investigate the route to see if there was a possible spot for an ambush so that we could attack and eliminate him. However, I didn't deem it necessary and a week to ten days later, he was in Johannesburg again, he was part of a function which was held near Kempton Park. He had a flat in the city centre in Johannesburg, so if we wanted Holomisa and by we, I mean Vlakplaas, it wouldn't have been a problem for us.

MR JANSEN: Yes, I assume that there were many operations or ideas which were discussed or from which certain initial work had been performed, but it never went any further than the original suggestion or preparation, that is probably not unusual?

MR DE KOCK: No, I will concede that because one would gather information as one went along.

MR JANSEN: Yes, but I don't want the Committee to be concerned about the fact that you yourself, have not applied for amnesty for this specific matter, but that Mr Ras has indeed. I would just like clarity so that we can establish that something like this would not have been unusual?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR JANSEN: And you don't dispute it, it is just that this is probably something which was part of the routine of your work at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: You see, Vlakplaas was a division of the Security Police and the constitution of that stage managed to keep Vlakplaas going on an unconstitutional basis. People would gather information over a period of time, which they might use two years later, but it fell within the framework of Vlakplaas/ operations.

MR JANSEN: Aspects which may come to light are things like the fact that in 1990, the ANC had already been unbanned, it was a legal organisation in South Africa after February 1990?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: Could you just inform the Committee to which measure there was still hidden agendas on both sides, we have heard of Operation Vula and there was talk of persons within the South African Defence Force who had so-called contingency plans in the event of the Codesa negotiations being unsuccessful. Could you provide some information for the Committee about the perception of the Security Policemen and the Policemen on ground level, regarding the fact that on the one hand the ANC had been legalised, and that there were negotiations or at least that the preamble to the negotiations was underway, but on the other hand, there was still this contingency planning taking place.

MR DE KOCK: The perception was, at Vlakplaas in particular, that there would be conflict, that a full guerrilla war would break out, that we would take each other on, that there would be a war. Apart from the changing of names of Units, in order to give it a different appearance, the entire atmosphere was of such a nature, that it was believed that we would enter into combat with each other again, and when I asked Gen Engelbrecht why we didn't disband Vlakplaas, he put it to me that if CODESA would be fail, we would be sent into the field immediately. I will give you an example of the attack on the Chant family. The politicians on the top level, sat in their offices, but the field workers were still involved in conflict, on a physical basis.

MR JANSEN: Thank you. Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Jansen. Mr Mapoma?

MR SIBANYONI: Sorry Mr Chairman, I wanted to ask a question immediately after Mr Jansen. According to Mr Ras, the order came from Colonel De Kock, apparently from you, in connection with the incident for which he is applying for amnesty, what do you say about that, on page 26 of the Bundle, paragraph 11(b)?

MR DE KOCK: Would this be along with the request that Gen Holomisa be killed? I noted it and I refer you to page 23, the third paragraph and Mr Ras says that I, he said that he said to me that he said to Colonel De Kock that he would make the plan to kill Holomisa. I did not ask him to kill Holomisa. If we wanted to kill Holomisa, it wouldn't be a problem, and I can give you surety that those are his words today, but Marthinus Ras says that he came to me and said that he would do the planning for the operation, and you would see further that he did collect information and the matter was not continued, so no other action was taken against Gen Holomisa at that stage.

MR SIBANYONI: In other words, you didn't issue an order or instruction to assassinate Holomisa?

MR DE KOCK: No, if Martiens Ras said that he wanted to gather information to murder, I cannot recall that he said that he wanted to murder him, but information, yes because there was a written report from one of the Security Branches surrounding his transport between Umtata and East London or Queenstown, but the word murder, no. I don't have a recollection of that that we wanted to murder him. That was not within my mandate or Vlakplaas' mandate to murder him.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Mapoma, do you have any questions to ask the applicant?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAPOMA: Yes Chairperson. Colonel, in your evidence in chief, you mentioned that even before the Duli coup ...

MR DE KOCK: Can you repeat that please.

MR MAPOMA: In your evidence in chief you mentioned that, I am going to refer now to some incidents before the Duli coup, you mentioned that in Vlakplaas, you did supply weapons to a number of Security Branches in the country, including East London, do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR MAPOMA: In East London in particular, when did you supply those weapons, do you remember the year perhaps?

MR DE KOCK: It was to the Commander of the askari group that worked here. The Overall Commander of that group was a Captain Willie de Lange. I cannot recall the Warrant Officer who was directly in control of this, but the weapons and ammunition, he collected it himself at Vlakplaas. And as far as I know, it was used for training purposes. It could have been used for other purposes, but I cannot testify to that.

MR MAPOMA: For training askaris here in East London?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR MAPOMA: Did you ever visit that training perhaps?

MR DE KOCK: Excuse me?

MR MAPOMA: Did you ever visit East London during that time for the purposes of training?

MR DE KOCK: At several instances I visited East London, but the askari group, I only visited them once, but I never gave any training here and I did not attend any training sessions either.

MR MAPOMA: Thank you. Now let's go to the first coup attempt, the supply of weapons there. I seem to recall that you said Anton Nieuwoudt came to you to ask for those weapons with a view to using them in the coup against Transkei?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: What I want to find out from you, was it expressly known to you at that time, that Nieuwoudt wanted those weapons specifically for that purpose?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: Right, thank you. Now, you also gave evidence to the effect that at some stage in Vlakplaas, you kept the former Security Branch Police from Transkei, who fled from Transkei during Holomisa era, you kept them in Vlakplaas, there were three, that is what you said?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: Can you supply with the Committee with the names of that personnel?

MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot. They were appointed as sources, in the first instance as Headquarters informers, this was a safe haven for them and Gen Holomisa wanted to kill these people. He regarded them as traitors. Gen Holomisa regarded them as traitors, and I understand that later one was killed. I think he was shot, he was shot by an AK47, but I do not know their names, nor that of their families.

MR MAPOMA: Were these people in fact members of the Security Branch in Transkei?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: Were they not involved during the Duli coup?

MR DE KOCK: No, not that I am aware of except if somebody else had put them to use, without my knowledge, but as far as I know, they were not involved with the attack on Gen Holomisa at the second instance.

MR MAPOMA: You don't want to mention them, otherwise you know their names? Am I made to understand that?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall their names unfortunately. One can probably through inference of who they were, but even if I had their full names, I would not want to mention it here and it is not to be obstructive, but one has a responsibility towards sources, those who one protected then. There were several instances where we harboured people at Vlakplaas to guarantee their safety.

MR MAPOMA: Then you went on to say that Mr Ras was having an MK cadre who reported to him on a daily basis, about the activities in Transkei during the Holomisa era, do you recall that one as well?

MR DE KOCK: If you can repeat the question please.

MR MAPOMA: When you gave evidence, you said Mr Ras had an MK cadre who was reporting to him on a daily basis about the activities in the Transkei during the Holomisa period, when MK cadres were kept there.

MR DE KOCK: Anton Nieuwoudt I know, he had a source who regularly gave him information, but my information came from Mr Vuli Mbotoli. With regards to Mr Ras, no, I don't know of any permanent source who reported to him on a daily basis.

MR MAPOMA: I am sorry, I may have misread what you said. Let's come to East London incident, when you handed over weapons to Mr Duli. You said you gave him two AK47 and other weapons and then they were given to four agents to take them to Transkei?

MR DE KOCK: That was four AK47's with 16 magazines and 16 handgrenades that we fetched and we handed it over to Colonel Duli and at later contact, the day afterwards, with Commandant Nieuwoudt, he told me that he sent those weapons of agents of his and that those weapons and handgrenades have not been found yet.

MR MAPOMA: These agents were Mr Nieuwoudt's agents?

MR DE KOCK: Can you repeat?

MR MAPOMA: The four agents who were given these weapons, were they Anton Nieuwoudt's agents or Duli's agents?

MR DE KOCK: No, Anton Nieuwoudt told me that that was his agents, him, Nieuwoudt's agents, it wasn't Duli's agents, but Anton made it clear that he gave these weapons to the agents. In other words, Duli asked us for the four AK's with the accessories which would mean that Duli gave it to Anton Nieuwoudt, Anton Nieuwoudt's agents had possession of these weapons.

MR MAPOMA: And those agents were they, you said they were actively involved in Umtata? Were they actively involved perhaps in the Transkei Defence Force or where?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know. I cannot say if they were Defence Force members.

MR MAPOMA: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MAPOMA

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairperson, just on one aspect. Mr De Kock, later in the year there will be another cluster of incidents which will be investigated by the Committee and one of the subjects that you were asked to address there, was Vlakplaas as a Political Unit?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: With our assistance, additional submissions were made in this regard, it was about 90 typed pages which had been handed up, if you are aware of that?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And there you deal amongst others with the position of Vlakplaas after it was dissolved and after the disbanding of the liberation movements?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you address Vlakplaas in its entirety there?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: I am not going to ask you here to address that aspect once again, but can I ask you to point out a few points there? Already you have said that you wanted to dissolve Vlakplaas, but Gen Engelbrecht did not want to. Was Vlakplaas involved in political work thereafter?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you still identify so-called terrorists and arrested them?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: After the unbanning of the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And Gen Nyanda, you will remember his evidence against you during your sentencing?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that he was asked about Operation Vula?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And parts of his evidence, or his whole evidence which he gave, was placed before this Committee?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: In general it pointed out that the planning for amongst others, armed resistance, continued from the ANC's side after the unbanning of the ANC and if Operation Vula was not exposed, it would have continued much longer, do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: I do Chairperson, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And thus Vlakplaas was still ready and still active in the area of combating the previous liberation movements, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you afterwards also focus yourselves on the combating of trade in weapons?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And amongst others you had success with the finding of weapons and weapons which you smuggled into the country?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you will recall Gen Nyanda’s evidence that this was one of the manners in which the ANC smuggled weapons into the country?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you will also recall that after Operation Vula, and a while after the unbanning of the ANC, there were arrests made at the border between Swaziland and the Republic where two ANC members were caught with a large quantity of weapons.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And to conclude with regard to these names, you say you cannot recall these names which you were asked to mention here, the names of the persons who were accommodated at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Unfortunately I cannot remember.

MR HATTINGH: But if it is possible to by means of investigation or inference, to find these names out, would you have a problem if we place these names on paper to the Committee?

MR DE KOCK: No, I won't have any problems. I do not want it to lead to these people's deaths or injury to them.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, sorry to interrupt. Mr Chairman, may I with your permission just ask a question or two which flows directly from the questions Mr Sibanyoni posed?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr De Kock, the one aspect with regard to the instruction or the approval of your plan, I don't think from the context that Mr Ras sketches here, is that there is an allegation that there was an instruction from you, but I think the argument at the end of the day would be that there was approval from your side to do the investigative work and the observation work, to go ahead with that, what is your comment thereof?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR JANSEN: Will you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is important to do reconnaissance work.

MR JANSEN: And if one would look at it in general terms, if one refers to other incidents, is it a correct observation to make that many operations would start from junior operatives, they come and make a suggestion or proposal and they did the initial work, but the operation will not take place if there is no approval or authorisation from above?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, the junior persons are at ground level, they do all the hard work, the detective work, and from their information that they gather, they put a picture to the seniors.

MR JANSEN: This would not be contradictory to the normal practice at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. I will just ask members of the panel whether they have any questions to put to the applicant. Mr Sandi, do you have any questions that you would like to ask to the applicant?

ADV SANDI: Yes, just to get some more information pertaining to the money aspect of the evidence. Mr De Kock, who was present when this bag of money was given to you by Mr Nieuwoudt?

MR DE KOCK: I was just myself and him, it was in my bedroom in the cabanas where I was busy packing my stuff, and somewhere I still have that white bag. Somewhere in some of my possessions, I still have that bag, I will try and find it for you.

ADV SANDI: Did he tell you the reason why he was giving you this bag of money?

MR DE KOCK: He just said that this is for you. The implication was clearly that - and I do not want to create something here - but he said, I got the impression that it was for the weapons, he did say that he had looked after himself and his other people already.

ADV SANDI: Now, when you accepted this bag of money, what were you intending to do with it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not want to accept it initially, because there was nothing that I wanted to do with it. There was nothing that I wanted to buy with this money as I stated previously, and it remained in my vehicle for about two or three weeks. It was not a factor because I never took this into account. It was not something that I wanted specifically and so I never had any plans with it, it just came to me.

ADV SANDI: Did you tell anyone like for example Mr Engelbrecht, who I understand was one of your superiors, did you tell him that Mr Nieuwoudt has given me this bag of money, what should I do with it? Did you confide to anyone about the money?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: So the money was in your car for two to three weeks, you did not know, I understood from your evidence, you did not know how much exactly the money was that was in the bag?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Where was your vehicle parked, were you not concerned that someone could break into the car and steal the money?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. I lived in a State house, a house provided by the State and when I parked my car, it was not in front of the gate. The vehicle was parked at Vlakplaas. I would have had the same concern because we had several weapons in the vehicle, in the boots of our vehicles. There is always the situation that someone could break in, but the money was not of import to me, it was nowhere a factor.

ADV SANDI: Why did you buy a plot with part of the money and give it to Mr Nortje when he came to you and said that he and his wife were looking for a plot? Why was it so easy for you to just give it to Mr Nortje?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, because it wasn't my money. I want to repeat it, it was not my money and it was not important to me and before this, I had made sure that all the members at Vlakplaas received financial benefit.

ADV SANDI: So when subsequently Mr Klopper came to you and said to you that he wanted to buy a house, you were able to just hand over to him one of the plots you had bought with the money?

MR DE KOCK: That plot was bought with the rest of the money that remained, and yes, I had no problem with it. I am not materially orientated, it was not a problem for me, and it wasn't my money.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr De Kock, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Sibanyoni?

MR SIBANYONI: Mr De Kock, you say Mr Mbotoli was your source and you issued passports for him, one in his real name and another in a false name. Are we to understand you that you also are applying for amnesty for having contravened some of the regulations in issuing false passports to Mr Mbotoli?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if you would give me 30 seconds so that I can explain it with my representative. No, I do not apply for that.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you. Mr Mbotoli was here last week and then he told this Committee that he was not involved in any politics, that he was merely a business person. You are saying to us that he was your source and he arranged a meeting between you and Duli, he introduced Mr Duli to you. What would you say to his statement that he was not involved in politics?

MR DE KOCK: That is not true, Chairperson. I know specifically that he was paid for his reports, his transport costs were paid, we paid him a monthly salary, he was a Headquarters' source. I was introduced to him by Gen Engelbrecht, so what he says, is not true. I have no problem if Mr Mbotoli and I came to sit before you and if they attached us to a polygraph machine and then we will see who will give the machine melt down, but it would not be me.

MR SIBANYONI: I now come to the question of the decorations which ... (tape ends) ... what those decorations were for, but I remember you saying in the previous hearings that during those decorations, it was not mentioned which purpose those decorations, or the rewards, were given. How would the senior members know the reason for the decorations?

MR DE KOCK: The awards was not given at a public parade where the public had access, and in all these instances, it was in an office, it was given to us in an office. For example with the bomb in London, after the decoration, it was just Gen Mike Geldenhuys, Gen Johan Coetzee, the six persons who received the award, it was just us, there were only eight of us. This was awarded in secret and there was a law which prohibited us to say what we received those decorations for, if one has regard for - the instructions were awarded and there was a short heading that the facts surrounding this operation, could not be made known because of the sensitivity of the operation.

MR SIBANYONI: Perhaps lastly, you said you were aware that the weapons you supplied, will be used in a coup and then that normally in a coup, people are injured or killed. Do you take responsibility for the people who were killed during the attempted coup?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, where I provided the weapons, I will take responsibility and I also take responsibility for my own people's actions where I involved them. I have no problem with that.

MR SIBANYONI: Therefore you may have to amend your application on page 6 where there was a question whether there were any people injured or killed and your answer was not applicable, and you are aware that in this attempted coup, indeed people were injured and some were killed, although you may not know the identity of such people?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

ADV SANDI: Can I just - something, Mr De Kock, would it be correct to say that from the evidence you have given, you were not compelled by Mr Nieuwoudt to accept this money, were you?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he did not force me to take it, he did not threaten me to take it.

ADV SANDI: Why did you not say to him that I don't want any money, I was carrying out my official duties, you don't have to give me any money for this? Why did you not say that to him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, initially I did tell him, but I did not persist. It did not happen.

ADV SANDI: Is it the position that in some of these Vlakplaas operations, members who were involved, would derive some personal benefit at the end of the day, would it be correct to think that that was the position?

MR DE KOCK: No, it is not like that. There was a principle according to which the askaris would be paid a certain amount of money as an incentive, but not as a salary, not as an amount of money which would be paid if they performed an action. If somebody had done good work, they could be remunerated or compensated for that. In the Uniform Branch, people receive a medal of some form of bonus and in the Security Police, they were compensated from the Secret Fund. After the Harms Commission in 1989 the situation originated where members would be compensated either from the Secret Fund. There are people here today who drew that advantage and later used it to promote themselves, however they are not serving any prison sentence for that, while I am and that is the price that I had to pay.

ADV SANDI: Did you know where Mr Nieuwoudt had obtained the money from?

MR DE KOCK: In what specific matter, or is this with regard to all the cases?

ADV SANDI: Were you interested to know where he had obtained this large amount of money that was contained in the bag, did you believe that it was perhaps his personal money or some money he had obtained from his employers for execution of his duties? Did you ask him such questions as to where the money could have come from?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes. He told me that he had submitted a false request to Gen Gozo during which he mentioned that weapons had been obtained by means of a contact in Mozambique, for example the ground to air missile originated from Mozambique and I think that the claim must have been substantial. He told me that he looked after all his people, those were his own words. Among others he purchased a two motor fishing boat and a Land Rover with which to tow this boat and according to him, he had also purchased a house on the Gonube River mouth. I cannot tell you what the total amount was and I was also not interested in what the amount was.

ADV SANDI: Thank you very much Colonel, thank you Chairperson.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: You indicated Mr Sibanyoni, you would like to ask another question?

MR SIBANYONI: Yes thank you Mr Chairperson, I forgot to ask this question. Mr De Kock, you remember you told the Committee that when the press was about to visit Vlakplaas, all the weapons were removed to Daisy Farm and eventually to Groblersdal. My question is what happened to the askaris which were in Vlakplaas on the day when the press came there, were they still there or were they removed and if so, where to?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. If I have it correctly, it was a case where the askaris rested there for seven to ten days, we would deploy them for 25 days at a stretch, after which they would have approximately 10 days of rest. If they had been there, we would have simply told them to take the day off and go somewhere. Vlakplaas was not a detention camp, it was not a punishment camp, they could come and go as they pleased, and upon that specific day, I do know that very few of the white members were there, they were too busy driving the trucks with which they transported the guns away to Daisy Farm. There were approximately three to four trucks, so it wasn't that we hid the askaris away.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr De Kock, I would just like to refer you to a portion of the Volume 1 paper of the papers. This is relating to the first incident of the supplying of arms because after that, Gen Duli was arrested and charged with being in possession of arms, is that not so and then he was released on bail and then, while he was out on bail, the coup, the failed coup attempts took place in Transkei, is that correct or don't you know?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot assist you there. With the very first attempt for which we collected the weapons and when it was delivered by Van der Westhuizen in Bloemfontein, for transport to Queenstown, at that time, if it wasn't the very same day or the day after, Commandant Nieuwoudt and I left for Vienna in Europe where we recruited a senior ANC member for DCC. However, I cannot give you any further details regarding that, apart from the fact that upon my return, I was informed by means of Security and press reports, that 25 men had been arrested at Queenstown and that weapons had been found. However, I do not know whether Commandant Duli was one of the people, I didn't know him. Even if I had seen his name, it wouldn't have meant anything to me. I don't know whether or not he was released on bail when the failed coup attempt was made.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, he was actually tried for possession of weapons and sentenced and then he applied for leave to appeal against the sentence, I think it was six years, and he was granted leave, bail pending leave, bail pending his appeal and while out on bail, this occurred. What I want to refer you to is on page 71 of the record, this is an extract from his trial when he was charged with being in possession of arms and it says here, I will just read it, this is the extract, this is what the Prosecutor says

"PROSECUTOR: Now after you found that you had no use for the mortar bombs, why didn't you dispose of it?

DULI: Well, as I say I have indicated that there was an over supply on the equipment I asked for and the intention was that after the threat had stopped, all the weapons would be returned to the owner.

PROSECUTOR: Being the person who sold it to you?

DULI: The person who supplied, yes.

PROSECUTOR: Well, he sold it to you, didn't he?

DULI: He didn't sell it to us, they were leased.

PROSECUTOR: For how much?

DULI: R50 000."

Do you know anything about that?

MR DE KOCK: With the very first incident for which these weapons and ammunition were supplied to Van der Westhuizen and Nieuwoudt, and Nieuwoudt and I then left for Europe, and Van der Westhuizen delivered it, it was said to me that R350 000 had been made available to him through DCC for this operation, for the operation for which the people were caught in Queenstown. However, I don't know whether this was true and whether R350 000 had been made available, if it was so, then I do not know about it. I think that we can ask Van der Westhuizen and Nieuwoudt about it. I also don't understand how it is possible to lease a weapon and then not receive it back. I am referring to mortars, if you have launched a mortar, then you have launched it, and that is that. I don't know about any funds.

CHAIRPERSON: It is a consumable?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, this doesn't make sense to me whatsoever.

CHAIRPERSON: And then there is just another aspect, I think you have already dealt with it, but just to clear it up. It is something that appears in Mr Nieuwoudt's application, okay we know that he has withdrawn his application, but just in relation to what you said. If you go to page 42 of the papers, I am just trying to find it here. Yes, page 42, this is Mr Anton Nieuwoudt's application, he says

"I was called in by Oupa Gozo and told that I was to supply him with ammunition and arms. I refused to do so because the weapons could be traced back to the Transkei. Oupa Gozo and I agreed to make money available to him, so that he would be able to purchase weapons. I compiled a motivation to Oupa Gozo for the obtaining of R150 000, which he approved. The funds were handed over to Duli before witnesses and he signed for it."

Now you mention something about getting large amounts of money, of which you yourself, ultimately ended up with more than R100 000, in addition to the buying of fishing rigs and houses on the Gonube mouth and all that sort of thing. What do you say about this extract here that I have just read to you now?

MR DE KOCK: This R100 000 which is being discussed here, has to do with the second incident if I study this application, it is the second incident which was not successful and in which he died. I didn't know anything about that, I didn't know whether or not he received any money and I don't know who provided the personnel funds. As I have said the radio equipment and the packing material and the operational preparation thereof, came from my Secret Fund by means of false claims. So in other words, this R100 000 and the funds that were involved in the third instance of weapons supply, have absolutely nothing to do with one another. This R100 000 is unknown to me, I cannot give any evidence surrounding that.

CHAIRPERSON: Now when you had that meeting with Gen Duli at the hotel at the airport, did he at any stage ask whether there would be any cost involved with regard to the supply of weapons, did he make the enquiry or did he just assume that he would be given weapons free of use, or that they would be supplied free?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, after he was introduced to me by Vuli Mbotoli, he gave his so-called shopping list to me and he asked whether or not I would be able to supply these weapons and I answered yes. No price or money was ever discussed, the quantities were discussed.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he ask whether there would be, did he ask whether it was going to be a donation or a sale, if there would be, I am not asking whether he discussed the actual price, but did he say look, is it going to cost us or is this going to just be supplied without any cost?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, this entire situation from the very beginning was the supply of weapons, without any cost, with no prices, it was a question of business, there was no money involved. He was not under that impression, and neither was I, not at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions arising from questions that have been put to your client, by the panel?

MR HATTINGH: No thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius, do you have any questions arising?

MR CORNELIUS: I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, just one aspect. Mr De Kock, this plot which you later purchased for Willie Nortje, it was quite some time after the incident, correct?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't purchase the plot for him as such.

MR LAMEY: No, I beg your pardon, the plot which you later gave to him, you didn't purchase it with the objective of giving it to him later?

MR DE KOCK: No, I just didn't know what to do with the money.

MR LAMEY: So you bought the plot?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And much later you basically gave it to him as a friendly gesture?

MR DE KOCK: No, not only as a friendly gesture, I believed that he deserved it.

MR LAMEY: And that gift or donation which you gave him, had nothing to do with his involvement in any incident as such?

MR DE KOCK: No, I never gave money to my members for something which had been done, or somebody that had been shot or assaulted.

MR LAMEY: And he didn't know where the money came from with which you had purchased the plot?

MR DE KOCK: No, not at all.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan, do you have any questions arising?

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MALAN: Thank you Chairperson. Mr De Kock, I must just put it to you and stand by the fact that Mr Nieuwoudt, if necessary, would deny that he ever purchased a vehicle or a house on the Gonube River mouth with funds that he had obtained by means of his involvement in certain operations. Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MALAN

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Jansen?

MR JANSEN: No questions, Mr Chairman, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mapoma?

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, one question, though it is not directly related to this particular sitting, but it is related to ...

CHAIRPERSON: Is it arising out of questions put by us?

MR MAPOMA: Not necessarily, but it arises from the evidence that he gave before.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, let's hear it and I will give the others an opportunity to ask questions afterwards.

MR MAPOMA: Mr De Kock, Johan Griebenauw has made an application for what he arranged, that is he arranged that certain Security Policemen who were in Transkei, to be fugitive of justice and be kept at Vlakplaas. I just want to know whether you know about those Policemen who were kept in Vlakplaas as arranged by Mr Griebenauw?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in the first place, it was to protect these persons and to safeguard them. Such persons also could be used at a later date, because they knew the area and they knew people, they had friends and family and by nature of that, one could gather information. You didn't need anybody to infiltrate because you would already have stable sources on the inside, such as friends and family.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mapoma, are these questions relevant to this application, they certainly are not arising out of questions put by the panel and I don't know what the relevance is?

MR MAPOMA: Thank you Chairperson, let me withdraw it.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MAPOMA

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr De Kock, that concludes your testimony.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, is there any further evidence you are going to lead on behalf of your client?

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Hattingh. Mr Lamey?

ON RESUMPTION

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I am ready to proceed with Mr Nortje, thank you. I call him to the witness chair.

W.A. NORTJE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Nortje elects to testify in Afrikaans, if it would please you, thank you. Mr Nortje, you apply for amnesty for several incidents where the facts which arise from those incidents, and for this purpose you handed in an application for amnesty before this Committee before the closing date which was correct, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Would you please have a look at pages 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Bundle. Is it correct that this application for amnesty was an initial application which you filled in yourself personally, and where you want to incorporate statements which you had made before the Goldstone Commission as well as before the Investigative Unit of the Attorney General, after you were involved in the investigation?

MR NORTJE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: On page 14, is that your signature and was this confirmed by a Commissioner of Oaths.

MR NORTJE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And as part of that initial application, you made an affidavit with regard to your involvement with the Transkei coup and you indicated the date as 1992, but in hindsight, it seems that this date is wrong, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: The particulars which you give is also an extract from the statement, or it is the contents of a statement which you made in Denmark while you were under a Witness Protection Programme, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And this statement was also made before the Goldstone Commission, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Before you handed in this initial application, which is contained in this Bundle, you also obtained legal representation to assist you with your amnesty application as such and a supplementary amnesty application was drawn up which was handed up to this Committee as Exhibit B, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You confirm the correctness of the contents thereof?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: With regard to the Transkei coup, and I refer to Exhibit B, with regard to the nature and particulars thereof, the statement which you have already made and which is incorporated in the Bundle, you want to incorporate that?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And furthermore you specifically mentioned the offences for which you apply for amnesty and provided particulars as far as your knowledge stretches and whether other people were killed or injured and you deal with the political objective and the authorisation for your participation in this operation?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: We will refer back to that in future.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Lamey, sorry to interrupt. This supplementary application if I can call it that, Exhibit B, we only have portion of it, could you just give an indication more or less when it was made?

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Nortje, you signed it on the 22nd of September 1997 in Pretoria, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, as far as my memory is concerned ...

CHAIRPERSON: The closing date was the end of September 1997, so it was before that, yes.

MR LAMEY: If I may just inform, this was also submitted to the Amnesty Committee prior, and timeously, before the ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I accept that, it is just that I didn't have the signed page on Exhibit B, so I just wanted to know.

MR LAMEY: In preparation for this hearing, you prepared an addendum and signed it before a Commissioner of Oaths and that is already handed up as Exhibit C before this Committee, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And do you confirm the contents thereof?

MR NORTJE: I do.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just point out on page 2 of Exhibit C, the second paragraph under 1.2, there is a grammatical error, where the sentence reads - or it has to read "my involvement has to be seen against this background as given by Gen Johan van der Merwe as well as Mr Vlok in other hearings before the Amnesty Committee." We have got all that extracts available, but if it pleases you Mr Chairman, I would submit that it would perhaps be, to spare time, be more appropriate to refer to that in argument before the Committee. Mr Nortje, can we then just return to the incident. Can you tell the Committee how you became involved in this so-called Transkei coup or the Duli coup as it is also known?

MR NORTJE: As it pleases you. Chairperson, as you know, I was at Vlakplaas with Mr De Kock.

MR LAMEY: May I just ask you, what was your rank in 1990?

MR NORTJE: I was a Sergeant.

MR LAMEY: In your amnesty application you mentioned that in January - I refer to page 2 of the supplemented Exhibit B, in January 1991 you were promoted to Warrant Officer, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And at that stage you were a Sergeant?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Was there any mention to you by Mr De Kock?

MR NORTJE: Yes, he mentioned to me that Anton Nieuwoudt and Hendrik van der Westhuizen, they were members of the Defence Force and a coup was planned in the Transkei.

MR LAMEY: Can I just ask you in the following manner, did you Anton Nieuwoudt and Hendrik van der Westhuizen at that stage?

MR NORTJE: Yes, they were regularly in contact with us, there was co-operation with the people of DCC.

MR LAMEY: DCC is not Directorate Covert Co-operation which was a division of Military Intelligence of the Defence Force?

MR NORTJE: That is correct. He mentioned to me that they requested some weapons from him if the coup would take place, and he gave us instructions to make certain preparations and we collected some of the weapons.

MR LAMEY: May I just ask you, was the name of Mr Duli mentioned at that stage?

MR NORTJE: At that stage, I am not sure, but later it was mentioned.

MR LAMEY: The instruction was that you had to collect weapons, to provide for the purposes of this coup, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct. Mr De Kock then told us that the weapons which we had in our possession at Vlakplaas and other weapons, which we had already delivered at the Police College, we had to collect these weapons and prepare. We did not have everything at the farm, the mortar pipes we fetched those at the Police College and during some time, it could have been two weeks, we collected these weapons, and we prepared them for the coup and the handing over of the weapons. With the run up, as I have said, the run up to the operation, Mr De Kock told me that at some stage he would like to meet Mr Duli.

MR LAMEY: May I just ask you, the person who was of assistance at the Police College, this was Major Beneke?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And the other members at Vlakplaas who were involved by Mr De Kock to collect these weapons were also Mr Snor Vermeulen and Mr Snyman?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And later in the amnesty application, you can have a look at it before you describe what these weapons entailed, amongst others AK47's, four RPG missiles, 16 mm mortar pipes, handgrenades and a large quantity of ammunition for all the weapons and I think you say that there were a few LMG machine guns, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And radio's were also provided?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Which you picked up from the Radio Technical division at Police College?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: This brings us to the run up of the operation, can you tell the Committee, at some stage was the name of Duli mentioned?

MR NORTJE: Yes, during the run of time, his name was mentioned, because as I say, we were in constant or Mr De Kock was in constant contact with Nieuwoudt and Van der Westhuizen and according to me, they were the major role players, that is the information that I received. After he mentioned the meeting that he wanted to have, and I assume that he had spoken to them, because my recollection is that Hendrik van der Westhuizen would arrange this meeting.

MR LAMEY: So you recall that Mr De Kock would arrange a meeting with Mr Craig Duli, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And Henry van der Westhuizen was instrumental in the setting up of this meeting?

MR NORTJE: That is correct. I cannot remember if Anton played a role there, I am not sure, but I remember that Henry van der Westhuizen was the person who arranged that at the Holiday Inn.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Nortje, how do you know that Van der Westhuizen arranged the meeting?

MR NORTJE: I saw him there.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you see him there or hear about it?

MR NORTJE: No, I saw him there.

MR LAMEY: Before the meeting was arranged, you heard that Duli was the person who would be the person who wanted to usurp the government of Holomisa?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you say that there was a meeting between Colonel De Kock and Craig Duli?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And this was at the Jan Smuts Holiday Inn?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Were you present there?

MR NORTJE: Yes, I was present. And when Mr De Kock gave his evidence, I just recalled that he did speak to Mr Duli on the side, and my inference that I drew was that afterwards, what I had heard from him and what he had told me, I know there was a separate discussion between Mr Duli and Mr De Kock, but Mr Duli did not want to speak before anybody else, he wanted to speak to Mr De Kock apart and what Mr De Kock says happened there, I recall that it happened there.

MR LAMEY: And you also mentioned in your statement, there was a certain strategy discussed with regards to advice, with regards to military strategy in this coup?

MR NORTJE: If I see the strategy here, it does not fit. It was a discussion about what would happen, I would assume, because afterwards he told me that he told him, or he told me that they did not want to involve him, because he wanted to keep it to himself and he did not want to accept his advice. I did not ask him what he said with regards to the advice. But this is how I remember.

MR LAMEY: So what you are saying is you were not present, you were present at the meeting, but you did not listen to the discussion between Colonel De Kock and Duli and afterwards you heard from Mr De Kock that Duli did not want to accept the advice, he had already established his own modus operandi?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Lamey, I think something needs to be clarified before we go any further. Did you say you were present whilst Mr De Kock was having a discussion with Mr Duli?

MR NORTJE: I was in the hotel room where Mr Duli was, and where Mr De Kock was, but I was not part of the discussion, I could not hear what they were saying, they were standing apart from where I was.

CHAIRPERSON: Was anybody else at the meeting besides yourself, De Kock and Duli?

MR NORTJE: I would recall that Mr Van der Westhuizen was also in the room. I cannot specifically say where he sat, but I imagine I was not there by myself, somebody else was with me.

ADV SANDI: Is it therefore the position that whatever you know about what discussion had taken place between Mr De Kock and Mr Duli, is what was conveyed to you by Mr De Kock?

MR NORTJE: I cannot say that he conveyed it word for word, what they had discussed there, but in general, he told me that they did not want to listen to him, he made certain proposals, but they did not want to listen to him. I assumed that that was the strategy, that is why I use the word strategy, that I say they had their strategy planned already, but apparently it was not so.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr Lamey, I just wanted to have that cleared up.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Then you say that a week or two after the meeting, you left for East London. Two groups went down, the one group was Martiens Ras, Dave Baker and Hoffie Hoffman, they did not have any knowledge of the operation? They were sent for normal duties to East London?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And the second group was yourself, Colonel de Kock, Lionel Snyman and Snor Vermeulen, who drove a day later with a Cressida vehicle?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you also further state that Colonel De Kock and yourself went to the cabanas at the beach front and Snor and Lionel remained with the first group at the holiday resort?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct. I would just like to make a correction here, as Mr De Kock explained it, that is how it happened. We first went to the holiday resort, and then the members from Security Branch went back to the hotel where we locked up the bakkies in the garages.

CHAIRPERSON: When you say the hotel, that is the cabanas?

MR NORTJE: Yes, the Windsor cabanas.

MR LAMEY: And you say the packaging of the weapons was done the following day, and you sealed it, is that correct, in black refuse bags?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you discuss a meeting which took place, can you shed some more light on this meeting?

MR NORTJE: The meeting as far as I recall, took place in the bar of the Osner hotel, where Anton and Clive Brink came to see us. I would recall that other people were present, because I know at some stage, there was more than one meeting, but at some stage, there were other members of the Ciskeian Intelligence Service, I don't know who they worked for, but there were other persons who met us at some other stage, there was definitely more than one meeting. This meeting could have been the following day, I am not certain, but a meeting did take place between Clive Brink and Anton, that is true. I cannot say whether it was planned. I would assume that they had spoken or liaised with Mr De Kock, I just know that they arrived there and there was a discussion. I don't know ...

MR LAMEY: This was probably with regard to the supply of weapons?

MR NORTJE: Yes, the supply of weapons, but I did not note as to what was exactly discussed there.

MR LAMEY: But is it your recollection that that meeting took place before the weapons was supplied to Duli?

MR NORTJE: I have to concede that I am not entirely certain.

MR LAMEY: But what you do recall is that there was more than one meeting?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Very well. There was a meeting with Mr Duli in the hotel before the weapons were supplied?

MR NORTJE: I would imagine that it was the same day, because Duli stayed in the Osner hotel and there was a meeting there as well, and I cannot recall whether I was present there, but I would assume that afterwards, I spoke to Mr De Kock and he told me that they were not interested, or what arose from this was a specific agreement as to where they would meet and where the weapons would be handed over, the final planning was there, the details with regard to where the weapons would be handed over.

MR LAMEY: Can you continue from there, what happened then?

MR NORTJE: As I said here, we had the 16 AK's, and as Mr De Kock told it, I remember correctly, it might have been 4 AK's and 16 magazines, but as I recall the kombi was already packed and once again ...

MR LAMEY: Excuse me is that the large quantity, in your statement you mentioned that you hired a kombi vehicle from one of the car rental services, from Avis or Budget, and the weapons were taken to a race track in this kombi but during that time, or you are not sure at what stage, but there was a request to the amount which you described as 16, but which might have been four AK's and 16 magazines, was taken aside or was withdrawn from the larger amount of weapons and would find their own way to Transkei or by means of another way, be transported to Transkei?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Nortje, this race track that you are talking about, is this a motor car race track on Westbank, where they have motor car races, thank you?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Very well, it is at that race track ... (tape ends) ... the weapons to Craig Duli?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this during the night or day time, the hand over?

MR NORTJE: This was in the evening.

MR LAMEY: And then furthermore you say in your statement, that afternoon you departed for Maclear and you met Duli at approximately eleven o'clock in the evening in the (indistinct) area, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct, I don't recall in which town it was, but he only arrived at eleven o'clock that evening, and he was not alone, his driver was with him, this coloured person, Boetie Davis I think his name was, and they said that we should drive behind them. About 20 kilometres outside the town, we encountered a group of vehicles there, bakkies with black men, we stopped there. Initially we remained in the vehicle, or we climbed out but the vehicle was - it was loaded over.

MR LAMEY: You say in your statement that during the handing over of the weapons, you remained in the background?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then, if you have a look at page 18 of the statement, do you have it before you, you say that - in a paragraph there you say that De Kock, Van der Westhuizen and Nieuwoudt received great financial benefit from this and in the sentence before that, you say it was just before the weapons were handed over on the RSA side, but it would seem from there that there was a monetary transaction there, during the handing over of the weapons, can you comment on that please?

MR NORTJE: In the context in which this sentence appears, it does not fit here. The fact that I said that they received financial benefit, this was an opinion which I formed long afterwards, this arose from discussions, things that I had heard, assumption that I had made that there must have been some money involved, but I cannot say specifically in this operation, that money was involved. As you know there were other operations where money was involved, and I just mentioned it here.

MR LAMEY: When you made this statement in Denmark, did you mention it to the person who took the statement from you, and he slipped it in chronologically here, but it is not within this context, you just mentioned it on the side?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You went back to East London and the following day you heard that the coup was unsuccessful and that Craig Duli had been killed?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And from information which you received from a certain source, was that Duli was arrested by Holomisa's bodyguards and was executed in the presence of Holomisa?

MR NORTJE: That is correct, that is something that we had heard.

MR LAMEY: And afterwards, you returned to Pretoria?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: To summarise Mr Nortje, your instruction, or can I put it in the following manner, from whom did you receive your direct instruction to be involved?

MR NORTJE: From Mr De Kock.

MR LAMEY: And the instruction had regard to the supply of weapons to Craig Duli, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You understood that this coup operation would be in co-operation or would have been planned in co-operation with DCC, the persons Anton Nieuwoudt and Henry van der Westhuizen as the main role players?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Your instruction did not reach as far as to be involved with the execution of the coup?

MR NORTJE: No, it did not.

MR LAMEY: With regard to your involvement, I refer to Exhibit B, Chairperson that will be page 67 thereof, you apply for amnesty for your assistance and supplying of weapons in an illegal manner and the offences with regard to the Weapons and Ammunitions Act, as well as your involvement in the attempt at a coup in Transkei. Furthermore any other participation in any unlawful act which can emanate from this deed?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You were aware that when you were involved with the supply of arms, that they would be used by certain persons to attempt a coup on the government of Gen Bantu Holomisa?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: May I just proceed and ask you that you knew that with such an attempted coup, Gen Holomisa would be the target and that persons within his government or himself, could possibly be killed?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, on this point I have, I don't know whether it is necessary to lead evidence on the more specific offences which amnesty would be sought for?

CHAIRPERSON: The dealing in arms, that sort of thing?

MR LAMEY: Yes, the particular sections ...

CHAIRPERSON: No, I think if you wish to do that, it would probably be more appropriate at the time of making the submissions, if you want to give a list.

MR LAMEY: As it pleases you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Then Mr Nortje, with regard to the political objective, you say in your affidavit that the objective was to topple the government of Gen Holomisa as you understood it, and according to your knowledge, his government was in support of the ANC at that stage and that he as such, was also an enemy of the State, the Apartheid State?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Craig Duli on the other hand, was according to your knowledge a military leader in the Transkei who was favourably inclined towards the government?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And the objective was to bring the Transkei under his control instead?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: You also state in your affidavit that according to your knowledge, there were also deeds of unrest and violence in the Eastern Cape at that stage which were committed by the ANC with assistance from the Transkei and supporters within Gen Holomisa's government?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: You have also listened to the evidence of the former Commander De Kock in this relation, and you agree with it?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Your conduct emanates from an order which you received, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: In your capacity as a Sergeant of your Commander, Colonel De Kock?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: That the toppling of the Holomisa government would be a set back for the Transkei and would create problems for the activities in the Eastern Cape?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: De Kock also referred to the fact that should the government be toppled, the Security Police would have easier access to the Transkei in order to facilitate their task of monitoring the activities of the ANC from within the Transkei, that had to do with revolutionary activity?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: With regard to the order and approval, we understand from Colonel De Kock that this was an operation which was born and bred in DCC?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And that you received your orders from Colonel De Kock, and that as far as you know, Nieuwoudt and Van der Westhuizen from DCC were the most prominent persons with whom De Kock had consultation, with regard to this operation?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then Mr Nortje, Exhibit C the annexure, or the addendum to your application, supports your political objective. With regard to the evidence of Gen Johan van der Merwe in his submission in 1996 and you request that this be incorporated as far as it is relevant, along with his evidence as well as Mr Vlok's evidence in the Khotso/COSATU House incidents?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You yourself were an applicant during those hearings and you heard their evidence, you concur with it with regard to the survey which they provided regarding the revolutionary climate in South Africa at that stage, as well as the background information about the Security Forces and the Security Police and you, as a member of Vlakplaas were tasked with combating this revolutionary atmosphere or onslaught?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: You also request that the findings of the Amnesty Committee in the decision regarding the hearing of Brigadier Cronje also be incorporated in this application, in so far as it is relevant?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then initially in your amnesty application, in paragraphs 10(c) and (d) with regard to remuneration, you state that you did not receive any additional remuneration. When you received the bundle of documents, you see that Snyman has mentioned an amount which was received to cover expenses for example food and drink, do you agree with that? You also state that it is correct that Mr De Kock also made provision for expenses from a fund?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Was there any mention of additional remuneration or financial benefit, whether it be prior to the order to supply weapons for the coup or thereafter?

MR NORTJE: No, there was no such mention.

MR LAMEY: You have also heard the evidence of Mr De Kock with regard to a plot which was later given?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And that has nothing to do with this incident or any of the other incidents in which you have been involved?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR LAMEY: So to summarise the motivation for your involvement in these operations, emanates from an order which was given as well as the background which will sketch the political climate along with the objective of toppling the government of Holomisa?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius, do you have any questions you would like to ask the applicant?

MR CORNELIUS: I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions that you would like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, I do have some questions. Mr Nortje, it has appeared from your evidence in chief that the affidavit which you originally submitted in support of your amnesty application, was an affidavit which was compiled in Denmark?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: At that time, you were one of the secret witnesses which appeared before the Goldstone Commission of Enquiry?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And as a result of the fact that you and people like Mr Klopper and Mr Van Heerden gave evidence before the Commission, you have developed a fear for your own safety and the safety of your family?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And the Goldstone Commission then made immediate arrangements in order to take you out of the country and you were taken to Denmark?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: In Denmark you were represented by various members of an Investigative Team which included Dr D'Oliviera, the then Attorney General for Transvaal as well as people like Adv Pretorius and Adv Ackerman and so forth?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You will recall that you gave evidence as a State witness against Mr De Kock, and that I placed you under cross-examination and that after cross-examination, it appeared that these affidavits which you made in Denmark, were made under great pressure and in great haste?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: It was continually told to you to finish these affidavits, because Dr D'Oliviera was to get a flight back to South Africa before a certain time?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You had to make an affidavit regarding a great number of incidents in which you had been involved during your career at Vlakplaas?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And I assume that these circumstances under which you made those affidavits, were not very beneficial for accuracy?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: I recall, and if I am incorrect, you must please correct me, I recall that you gave evidence at that time that you did indeed experience great emotional pressure or stress while you were making these affidavits in Denmark, it was stress which was caused by the facts that you had turned on your former colleagues and that you were providing information against them, and that this was caused by the fact that you feared for your life and that you found yourself in a foreign country, under very strange circumstances?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And in the course of your evidence, Mr Nortje, at various occasions, you had amended your affidavit which you made for the case?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And at various occasions you said that you were not certain, that your recollection told you one thing, but that you were not really certain about it?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Would it be fair of me to say that on face value or according to the evidence which you have given, it would appear that your recollection of the specific events, is not as clear as that of Mr De Kock?

MR NORTJE: I would concede to that.

MR HATTINGH: Because you agreed with his version after you had heard it, and your memory had been refreshed in certain aspects?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that his recollection of these events is therefore more reliable than yours would be?

MR NORTJE: With relevance to certain aspects, I wouldn't say everything.

MR HATTINGH: Then finally, your Attorney has already highlighted this, there was no talk of remuneration before the incident?

MR NORTJE: No, there was not.

MR HATTINGH: Did you hear anybody speak of remuneration during the planning?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR HATTINGH: And afterwards did anybody speak of remuneration?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR HATTINGH: You made that affidavit of yours on the strength of information which you obtained afterwards from certain individuals?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: People other than Mr De Kock?

MR NORTJE: Mr De Kock also spoke of it, he also spoke of remuneration which was received.

MR HATTINGH: But beforehand there was no talk of remuneration?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Hattingh. Mr Malan, do you have any questions that you would like to ask the witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Nortje, at the beginning of your affidavit you say that Nieuwoudt and Van der Westhuizen were the key role players in this operation. Is this based on the information which you gained from Mr De Kock, or is this based upon your own observation?

MR NORTJE: This is what I received from Mr De Kock and upon my own observation, I observed them together and to tell you the truth, I didn't ...

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon?

MR NORTJE: I didn't know about the first incident, Mr De Kock told me about it afterwards, and he also told me who had been involved. After this, according to what I can recall, they were the key role players in the organisation of the weapons, and according to me they knew everything, or at least the incorrect impression may have been created by Mr De Kock, I can't say for sure, but that is what I saw.

MR MALAN: At any stage when you were present, was the name of Mr Anton Nieuwoudt ever mentioned?

MR NORTJE: No, not at all.

MR MALAN: Your knowledge about the "key players" is also not based upon a fact which you inferred from other circumstances, except that which you heard from Mr De Kock?

MR NORTJE: No, that is only what I heard from Mr De Kock.

MR MALAN: Well, let me define it further for you, Mr De Kock said during his evidence that for a coup to be successful, the hearts and minds of the masses and the Army was to be behind you, so you suggest in your introductory paragraph that Nieuwoudt also orchestrated this aspect?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR MALAN: The alternative would be that Duli was already the kind of person that had that influence?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is how I understood it.

MR MALAN: And the issue surrounding the financial benefit has already been cleared up, we don't need to discuss that any further, thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MALAN

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Malan. Mr Jansen, do you have any questions?

MR JANSEN: No Mr Chairman, no questions.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mapoma, do you have any questions?

MR MAPOMA: I have no questions Chairperson.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAPOMA

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, just on one aspect. Mr Nortje, just in reference to the question which was put by Mr Malan, you did indeed understand that Duli from the inner circles of the Transkeian government would have planned and executed the coup?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: But if you indicate that Anton Nieuwoudt and Van der Westhuizen were the key players, could you just explain what you mean by that in coherence with the idea that Duli would have been the instrumental player, what would have been the role of Nieuwoudt and Van der Westhuizen?

MR NORTJE: Well the idea which I had was that Duli used them as the links between the two governments. Who was involved behind the scenes, is unknown to me, but Van der Westhuizen and Nieuwoudt were the people who represented the Army and I knew that to plan a coup, would not have been undertaken only by them, there would have been higher ranking Officers who were also involved, but they were the links as I understood it.

MR LAMEY: You say that Duli would have used them, and is it also the case that they may have used Duli as an instrument?

MR NORTJE: Yes, it is possible.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I have nothing further.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Sandi, do you have any questions you would like to ask?

ADV SANDI: Thank you Chairperson, maybe just one. Mr Nortje, is it - you heard Mr De Kock saying that on a certain day, after the attempted coup in the Transkei, you approached him to say that yourself and your wife wanted to buy a plot, do you agree with that, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is not true sir. That is not true.

ADV SANDI: Did you hear him saying that?

MR NORTJE: I heard him saying that, but that is not true.

ADV SANDI: What exactly is the position?

CHAIRPERSON: You may speak Afrikaans if you wish.

MR NORTJE: I did receive the plot from him, but at that stage, it was not in the discussion. It was only late in 1992 that I registered the plot in my name, so it wasn't a point of discussion at all, I didn't tell him that, he didn't tell me that. As far as I can recall, we never had such a discussion about him buying me a plot or giving me a plot.

CHAIRPERSON: So why did you get the plot then? What was the reason for the plot being transferred in your name?

MR NORTJE: He gave it to me or at least, he said to me do you want a plot, do you want this plot? I knew he had the plot and he said take the plot for everything that you and I have done together, I suppose we could call it goodwill.

CHAIRPERSON: So it was a straight donation?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sibanyoni, do you have any questions you would like to ask?

MR SIBANYONI: Only two short questions Mr Chairperson. Mr Nortje, in other words, as a goodwill, not specifically for the supply of the weapons for the attempted coup, but for everything which was done during the period that you were with Mr De Kock?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: In your application, on page 14, you say

"... deeds were committed in order of the seniors, of Commanders, and the Ministers of the government of the day."

Who are those Ministers of the government of the day that you are referring to?

MR NORTJE: I cannot recall specifically what the names of the Ministers were, but I would then say that it would be the Ministers who were then in control of the country. We did not receive specific orders from them, we received them from De Kock, what happened further up, is unknown to me.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nortje, when did Vlakplaas close down?

MR NORTJE: April 1993.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, do you have any questions arising from questions that had been put by the panel?

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Yes, thank you Chairperson. Just to return to the question put by Mr Sibanyoni, where you say in your initial application that the deeds were committed because of the orders of seniors, Commanders and Ministers of the government of the day, that refers in general to the totality of the incidents and deeds for which you had requested amnesty, you are not referring specifically to the Transkei coup, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Among others you were also an applicant in the Khotso/COSATU House incident and it emanated from evidence given there, that the action had been approved on administrative level?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then just to return to the plot which was given to you later in 1992, by Mr De Kock, is it also correct to say that when you refer to the fact that this was given to you because of everything that the two of you had done together, could you just elaborate on that, might I ask you, you and Mr De Kock travelled a long road together?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: From the days of Koevoet?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And before you eventually testified as a State witness before the Goldstone Commission, was it correct that you and Mr De Kock had been very close to each other as friends? In other words there was more, you were more than just an ordinary Vlakplaas member?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is the impression which I had.

MR LAMEY: This gift of the plot, do you recall why he gave it to you?

MR NORTJE: Well, it was as a result of the fact that we parted ways, and I wasn't the only one. He did that because he was that sort of person, perhaps he just had too much.

MR LAMEY: And you accepted the gift as such for that reason?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And at that stage, when it was given to you, was there any talk of the dissolution of Vlakplaas, even though it hadn't taken place yet, was it at that time when it was tabled?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Before you parted ways?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, I have nothing further.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius, any questions arising?

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman, no.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh?

MR HATTINGH: No thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan?

MR MALAN: No thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MALAN

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen?

MR JANSEN: None, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mapoma?

MR MAPOMA: No questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MAPOMA

CHAIRPERSON: Could I just ask one question, I am sorry, I should have asked earlier, did you at any stage on your way back or any time after, on your way back from East London or any time after, see a white bag in the possession of Mr De Kock that he says he received from Mr Nieuwoudt?

MR NORTJE: No Chairperson, I did not see it.

CHAIRPERSON: And the car that you went to East London in, you said it was a Toyota, who car was that?

MR NORTJE: Cressida. That was my vehicle, I am not certain if I already had the vehicle in my possession, it was first Mr De Kock's car before he gave it to me, I am not sure at which stage I took over the vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: Because Mr De Kock, you heard him when he mentioned that he left it in the car for two to three weeks, so if it was your car, did you see a white bag full of money?

MR NORTJE: I did not see the money.

CHAIRPERSON: Or the bag?

MR NORTJE: And I don't know about the bag, I simply heard about the bag, but I didn't know about it. I remember that that vehicle was an 1989 model, and at that stage it was still Mr De Kock's car, I only took it over at a later stage, it was not yet my vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: So when you went back to Vlakplaas from East London, Mr De Kock would have kept the vehicle?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Anything arising?

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairperson, may I just clarify one aspect here, Mr De Kock's evidence was that he received the money after the third incident, not after the Duli incident?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I apologise, thank you. I don't think there need any questions then arising Mr Lamey, unless you want to. Thank you Mr Nortje.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: I see it is now just before four o'clock, I think this will be a convenient time to adjourn. What time will be convenient time to start tomorrow morning? What would be convenient, half past nine or nine o'clock? What would you prefer?

MR MAPOMA: Half past nine.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, we will make it at half past nine, I think we have made quite good progress today, so we will then adjourn until half past nine tomorrow morning at the same venue, thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS