ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: You're ready to commence are you?
MR LANDMAN: Thank you Mr Chairman, yes we are.
CHAIRPERSON: As I understand the position it has been agreed that we should now join the one applicant, Mr Dumakude to the present application, that he, his legal advisor and I take it he has had notice of the evidence that has been led before us so far.
There is however a problem in that the wording of his application does not deal directly with the present incident and we are hearing this evidence on the basis that the evidence will be noted and when a decision has been taken as to the acceptability of his application we will reach a decision on that, we will not do so at the present time. We will hear this evidence subject to the provision that there may be problems arising from the wording of his application. You accept it on that basis do you?
MR LANDMAN: We will deal with that during the course of his evidence but we accept that that's the basis on which we're here.
CHAIRPERSON: We continue.
MR LANDMAN: Thank you Mr Chairman, I prepared a bundle with a statement and a copy of his amnesty application which I would like to hand out and to make available to the other parties. I may do that before he's sworn in.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairman can we - I appear on behalf of Mr Dumakude.
CHAIRPERSON: You have put your name on record and everything, have you?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairman, I'm Eric van den Berg from the firm Bell, Dewar and Hall, I appear on behalf of Lester Dumakude who has been joined in this application. For purposes of the record Mr Chairman, my firm has acted in the past for one of the other applicants, a Mr Dube who has not made contact with us and so I don't know what our position is in respect of him. I can simply advise you that were he to make contact with us there would be a considerable amount of precognition and preparation which would have to be done in respect of his application and in that case we would not be in a position to lead him sort of inside a period of 21 days as has been ruled in some of the other matters. But I don't foresee that that will arise and I imagine that there will be a separate hearing in respect ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Well it seems to me that and I'm not making a ruling on this, but my view at the moment is that we are required to hold public hearings whether there had been gross violations of human rights but I do not understand that to mean that there must be repeated public hearings. Where there has been a public hearing where the matter has been ventilated, it seems to me that if there are others that arise later that they can be dealt with on paper or as a less public hearing and that may be the answer to Mr Dube, that he can be dealt with after we have disposed of this matter but not necessarily as a full public hearing but that is a matter we can decide later but I merely indicate my views to you so far as he's concerned. We don't propose to ask you to suddenly act for him.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairman. Can I call Lester Dumakude?
LESTER DUMAKUDE: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairman, a statement has been prepared, that's a statement in English. I intend to lead Mr Dumakude through the statement. There are certain areas which we would need to clarify and I will ask questions at the appropriate times. He has requested that when those questions are put to him that he might answer in Zulu and have that translated. Thank you Mr Chairman.
Mr Dumakude, can I refer you to the statement which has been prepared and can you take us through it starting at paragraph 1?.
MR DUMAKUDE
"On the date of the Ellis Park bomb blast which was on the 2nd July 1988, I was the commander of the special operation units of M.K. I succeeded Abubaker Ismail known to me as Rashid, it was during 1987. Before this, I was the subordinate commander in Botswana having been transferred from subordinate command in Swaziland. This was after the agreement known as Komati Accord where we rounded up, arrested, deported to Tanzania" ...[inaudible]
CHAIRPERSON: Is this coming through on the - no?
MR DUMAKUDE: Sorry Mr Chairman, must I repeat from ...[inaudible] On the date of the Ellis Park ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: We've heard the first and second paragraphs, we've all heard those.
MR DUMAKUDE: Thanks Chairperson. Third paragraph
"As a commander of the special operational unit of M.K. I reported to the ...[inaudible]"
CHAIRPERSON: It's gone again. Are the interpreters receiving him?
INTERPRETER: No Chairperson.
MR DUMAKUDE: From the third paragraph Mr Chairman
As the commander of the special operation unit of M.K. I reported to the M.K. Command. At one time it was the Chief of Staff, the late comrade Chris Hani.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Can I interrupt you there Mr Dumakude? Can you refer and I refer you to a document entitled "The further submissions and responses by the African National Congress to questions raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation" and to page 51 of that document. Mr Chairman, we've made copies and those are attached to the statement. This deals with the ANC structures 1985 to 1990.
CHAIRPERSON: For the benefit of those who like myself always look at the top of the page, the page number is on the bottom right hand corner of the page.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairman. If I can refer you to page 53 on the top of the page there's a paragraph entitled "Special operations", can you read that into the record please?
MR DUMAKUDE: Abubaker Ismail known as Rashid was the commander of the Special Operations Unit until August 1987 and I took over from Comrade Rashid.
MR VAN DEN BERG: The document makes reference to "Tommy Masinga" who was that?
MR DUMAKUDE: It was myself, that's my M.K. name.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Can I return you to your statement and to paragraph 4 thereof?
MR DUMAKUDE: Paragraph 4 reads as follows
"My responsibility as a commander of the Special Operations Unit, it was the planning of operation, infiltration of units, material as well as maintaining of units already infiltrated inside the country"
MR VAN DEN BERG: Please continue.
MR DUMAKUDE
"I confirm that the modus operandi of the Special Operations Unit did not differ materially from the one employed by Ismail. There was however great emphasis on the deployment of units operating in terms of a broad mandate. This was primarily to the heightening of security blanket in the Republic at that time"
MR VAN DEN BERG: Now Mr Dumakude, not everybody here had the benefit of hearing the evidence led at the application of Abubaker Ismail. Can you just summarise for us the two types of units which were employed by Special Operations?
MR DUMAKUDE: The two types, one was the one with the broad mandate. They were to be infiltrated based on the policy of the movement, based on their experience, they were to select targets at their own discretion and report after fulfilling the operation.
The other type used to prepare units by sending them for specialised operation, they will select a target and will send a unit to further confirm our information at the time. Based on the situation politically they will be given the date and time to carry out the operation in order to tally with the situation on the ground, that's the other part of the unit.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Now the unit which was responsible for the explosion at Ellis Park - I'm referring you to paragraph 6 of your statement. Was that unit a specialised unit or was it a unit with a broad mandate?
MR DUMAKUDE: Part of the member of the unit that specialised and who was an experienced member of our Special Operations Unit and he also had the mandate to operate within the policy of the movement. The member is Comrade Dube.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Can you continue with your statement at paragraph 7?
MR DUMAKUDE
"It was decided that the unit operated on a broad mandate. As the commander of the Special Operations Unit I was responsible for maintaining communication with as many of the units deployed inside the country. I communicated with the units in order to give them the latest information from M.K. command. This related primarily to the identification of targets and the undertaking of operations. I also communicated with the units in order to meet their material needs both logistically and otherwise.
Ellis Park was identified as a legitimate target in terms of the policy of the ANC to take the struggle into the white areas"
MR VAN DEN BERG: Can I interrupt you there Mr Dumakude? Can I refer you to the further submissions, that document we referred to earlier and to page 66 thereof. Again Mr Chairman there are copies attached to the statement that we've handed up. Page 66, Mr Dumakude and in the first column about halfway down the page is a paragraph which starts "By the end of 1985". Could you read that into the record please?
MR DUMAKUDE
"By the end of 1985 a special pamphlet titled: 'Take the Struggle to the White Areas' was distributed inside the country. Targets were identified as follows: The Racist Army, Police, Death Squads, Agents and ...[indistinct] in our midsts and the call to take the war to the white areas is defined as follows
For strengthening our working organisation and engaging in a united action in the factories, mines, farms and suburbs. Spreading the consumer boycott to all areas of the country. Organised and well planned demonstration in the white suburb and central business districts. Forming underground units and combat groups in our places of work and taking such action as sabotage in the factories, mines, farms and suburbs and to disrupt the enemy - all energy, transport, communication and other vital system. Systematic attack against the army, police and the so called area Defence Unit in the white areas. Well planned raids on the armouries and ...[inaudible] of the army, police, farmers and so on. To secure arms for our own units."
MR VAN DEN BERG: Could you read the next paragraph as well please, Mr Dumakude? The next paragraph on page 66, the one that starts "The ANC Leadership."
MR DUMAKUDE
"The ANC leadership had called on all members and supporters of the ANC to intensify the struggle at all cost, to move towards creating a situation of ungovernability and peoples war."
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Dumakude. Bearing that in mind Mr Dumakude can you explain what your motivation was when you identified Ellis Park as a legitimate target?
MR DUMAKUDE: Here what motivated me, it was a place where a large number of white people will be gathered. These were the people who had the vote to make a change in this country. To bring that struggle closer to the white community, to dispel the belief that they were immune from change. I wished to emphasise to them that it was better to change now rather than later. The operation was conducted in terms of a normal modus operandi of the Special Operations Unit.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Can I interrupt you there, I'm sorry. I'm not sure that you're working from the same document that I have. There's a paragraph 11 in that document, that's the paragraph which reads "The intention was" - would you carry on from there Mr Dumakude?
MR DUMAKUDE
"The intention of this operation was to use the spectators to spread the message of the struggle. It was not our intention to kill civilians. I did however foresee that civilians could be killed. The operation was conducted in terms of normal operation, modus operation of the Special Operations Unit. Reconnaissance was carried out, the area was reconnoitred days before Friday and on Friday before the attack, which was on Saturday, we ensured that the situation was as reconnoitred. The material used in the attack was contained in a DLB. I obtained the material from the DLB."
CHAIRPERSON: Is that a dead letter box?
MR DUMAKUDE: ...[inaudible]. The unit was instructed by myself to get a vehicle for the operation. I recognised myself as a specialist in the manufacture, assembly and operation of explosives and explosive material. The explosive device was planned to detonate towards the end of the rugby match.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Dumakude, could I interrupt you there? Did you receive any special training, specialised training in the use of explosives and if so, where?
MR DUMAKUDE: During my training in exile from 1978 I was trained by the Cubans. One of the periods during those years I went to the Soviet Union also to specialise in the usage of explosives. Based on the training that I received and the experience that I gained during the struggle I recognised myself as a specialist in the field of explosives.
CHAIRPERSON: Can I interrupt you for moment just to make sure, perhaps save time, we've been told that on the Saturday morning you went to buy gas cylinders, battery and a clock which was to be used to, as part of the explosive device. Do you agree with that?
MR DUMAKUDE: I fully agree, Chairperson.
MR VAN DEN BERG: One other question in respect of that, Mr Dumakude, is that were you assisted by any of the other applicants in the preparation of the explosive device which was used?
MR DUMAKUDE: Here I'll mention Harold Matshididi was always next to me during the assembling of this device.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Did he have any experience or was he simply your assistant?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will say simply the assistant.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Dumakude could you continue, I think we got to paragraph 16 of your statement?
MR DUMAKUDE
"The explosive device was planned to detonate towards the end of the rugby match and I had taken the precaution of inserting three separate detonating devices. This included a timing device which was the primary device, the watch and a remote control. The device was set to explode prior to the end of the rugby match. I did however foresee the possibility that civilians could be killed. It sometimes happens that people leave a match before the end of the game. It was for this reason that I used three separate detonating devices. This could assist me or allow me to react to the situation as it unfolds."
MR VAN DEN BERG: Is there anything which you wish to add to this statement in terms of what happened on the day in question?
MR DUMAKUDE: On the day in question specifically where the bomb was placed, we went before placing the explosive to confirm our reconnaissance. According to the situation it was as expected. I then went with one of my colleagues, which is Harold, to fetch a car with the explosives, driving towards the identified place. I dropped him metres away from the area to provide protection. I went and placed the car with the parked explosive material.
During my withdrawal, I think my action attracted attention which I will say now it was positively identified by myself to be the victims. Due to the planning to try as much as possible to avoid civilian casualties, there was no way but to trigger it on time which was the time according to our plan before the end of the match which was five o'clock. The delay in doing that was going to cause many civilian lives. Like I've stated the policy of the movement was to try to avoid civilian casualties. This was as far as I could go.
After the triggering of the material - after the explosive, I retreated, I joined Harold. We moved to our pick up point which was Checkers and that's what happened on that particular day concerning the Ellis Park.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Now Mr Dumakude, you've prepared and submitted an application for amnesty. A copy of that is attached, Mr Chairman, to the statement. Can I refer you to page 3 thereof and paragraph 9(a)i. Then can I ask you why it is that your application does not deal with this specific incident?
MR DUMAKUDE: The reason for this was that at this time I was not aware whether all the operatives have applied for amnesty but I hope that the submission when it was demanded I was going to give it in detail.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Do I understand you correctly that you envisaged a situation in which your application would have to be supplemented through the asking of questions by the TRC?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes I fully agree with your thinking.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Please will you read paragraph (a)i into the record?
MR DUMAKUDE
"Here I endorse the submission made by the ANC, uMkhonto weSizwe to the Truth Commission as well as the General National Executive declarations submitted to the Amnesty Committee. I take the command responsibility for all acts which took place within South Africa committed by units under my command. This will cover the period from 1981"
Why 1981? Here it was a time when I finished with my training."
CHAIRPERSON: Well I think you should make it clear, what he is reading into the record and the explanations he is giving.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: I think you should just continue reading this paragraph into the record and you can then give your explanations. You had come so far as to say you took all units under your command from 1981. I think you should read on from there.
MR DUMAKUDE: Where these actions fall within the general policy guidelines of the African National Congress. I do not know at this stage whether all the operatives have applied for amnesty but I hope that my submission will cover them if they have not. Details regarding the task mandate of the Special Operations has been provided in the amnesty application of Abubaker Ismail, known as Rashid, and I endorse this. If there are any operations for which I hold sole responsibility I will answer accordingly.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Dumakude. You were going to give us an explanation about the date of 1981, do you want to give that now?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes I do. Why do I say from 1981? Around this time I finished with my training and I've joined some of the instructors' panel to deliver the knowledge that I gained during my training. Some of the operation, they might have been influenced by my contribution as an instructor during those years.
Around 1982 until 1984, around Swaziland, I operated as part of the auxiliary staff where one way or another I contributed knowingly or unknowingly in the sense that I used to infiltrate material, personnel and maintaining communication with units inside the country. From 1984 I was re-deployed in Botswana where I continued with auxiliary tasks. This was until 1987 around August, and from 1987 I took responsibility of the Special Operations Unit where some of the operations were sanctioned by me.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Dumakude, do you anticipate that there will be a further hearing in which you will deal with those operations in detail?
MR DUMAKUDE: I'm hoping if the Chairperson or Truth Commission will be interested I will be available to provide this information.
ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr van den Berg if I may interpose for a moment? What exactly is this meant to convey, is the witness trying to indicate that he is making an application for amnesty in respect of those incidents?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairman. My instructions are that this application that you are hearing today is purely in respect of Ellis Park. It is anticipated that arising from his amnesty application as it is presently formulated, there will be a request for further particulars and that at that time he will set out in detail those other operations.
It is not my instruction that he applies here and now for all of those other actions in which he takes responsibility, of which he has personal knowledge and those which he does not have personal knowledge of; that is not the idea at all Mr Chairman. The evidence given is purely by way of background. I think Mr Chairman if I could wrap this up for your Committee by asking one last question to Mr Dumakude pertaining to Ellis Park?
Mr Dumakude what is your attitude to the two persons who died and the persons who were injured during the explosion at Ellis Park?
MR DUMAKUDE: Chairperson, if I'm allowed I've got two ways of answering it. If the question was raised during the struggling years I was going to say there was no way of avoiding it but today the situation is totally different. The answer is yes, there is a way of avoiding. I'm saying sorry to those who lost their beloved ones.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairman I've no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DEN BERG
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LANDMAN: Mr Dumakude is it correct that in relation to the two applicants Aggie Shoke and Harold Matshididi, you were a senior commander in M.K. whilst they were best be described as foot soldiers?
MR DUMAKUDE: I fully agree with you.
MR LANDMAN: Would they have been obliged to follow your instructions without question?
MR DUMAKUDE: First as an M.K. operative you are trained first politically. You'll only fulfil or carry out orders that are in line of the policy of the movement. Immediately you take it upon yourself to carry out an M.K. operation, that means you fully understand and follow the policy of the movement.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Dumakude when you asked Mr Matshididi and Mr Shoke to participate or instructed them to participate in this operation could they have understood and rightly understood that because you, a senior commander, was instructing them that this was an operation in line with ANC and M.K. policy?
MR DUMAKUDE: To take you back, like I've indicated, before one is to deal with operations you are first drilled in the policies of the movement, meaning if you understand the policies of the movement you have got all the rights to defy whoever if the order is not in line with the policy of the movement.
MR LANDMAN: In this particular instance did you inform Mr Matshididi and Mr Shoke that you intended to detonate the bomb before people left the stadium?
MR DUMAKUDE: This was the plan as part of my mission to come and visit the unit inside the country, was to re-emphasise the concern of the leadership in the M.K. concerning the operations that were taking place where at times civilians were injured or killed.
MR LANDMAN: So was it the instructions from the higher echelons of M.K. that civilian casualties should be avoided?
MR DUMAKUDE: This is a policy of the ANC as the political body and the M.K. as a tool of this political body.
MR LANDMAN: Then Mr Dumakude when the car containing the bomb was driven to Ellis Park on that Saturday afternoon would Mr Matshididi and Mr Shoke have believed that that bomb would explode at a time when there wouldn't be civilians in the area?
MR DUMAKUDE: For sure I took it upon myself. Somewhere in my document I've mentioned the three devices. This was partly to counter any eventuality. This was also explained to the comrades as the participant in this operation.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LANDMAN
DR TSOTSI: Mr Dumakude, just explain this, it's not quite clear to me that this question of the three devices how you were able to solve the situation which might occur if people had left before the time of the explosion. You said the three devices, could you just explain that? What these devices are and how their effect would be?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will start by explaining the time device. Here it's a device where a clock is being used. You'll tune the clock according to the time that you want the explosive to go off, to explode. The second one it's a mini-limpet mine where metal plates based on their sizes and the temperature of the day you can tune them according to the time that you want the explosive to explode.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I didn't hear the beginning of that. What is it that you can tune, what sort of device is it?
MR DUMAKUDE: Mr Chairperson, I've started with the clock one. The second one is a limpet mine where metal plates are used to set it on. The third one, it's a remote where waves between two mini-radios or walkie talkies are used to transmit the wave that you want to trigger the mechanism with. Here they were going to act as a backup to one another in the sense that based on our experience, it happens that at times things don't go according to the plans. Here it was to make sure that if whatever happened not all of them will be faced with the same circumstances. That was the purpose of having three to back up one another.
DR TSOTSI: In other words to make sure that they would detonate at the time they were set?
MR DUMAKUDE: Sure, to make sure that that is going to happen according to the planned time.
CHAIRPERSON: What I understand then is you have a timing device which should determine if it goes off and then a limpet mine device but as a back up you have a remote control which you can then bring into play if the other two don't work?
MR DUMAKUDE: Mr Chairperson, the purpose of the remote control was for effect that if it happened before the planned time where civilians were going to be around the placed that means this was to trigger it before many lives or any life was going to be around the placed explosives. This was to be used to try and avoid at whatever cost if things goes beyond the planned time.
ADV SANDI: Is that to say that if things happened in such a manner that those who attended the match dispersed earlier than the expected time, is that what you're saying?
MR DUMAKUDE: Earlier on I did explain that we did foresee the possibility that people might leave before the end of the match and if that happened and life was going to be lost, that was the purpose for having a remote control.
CHAIRPERSON: But that would mean that you had to stay in the vicinity and keep watch?
MR DUMAKUDE: First, Chairperson, I started by minimising the time. The time of placing the material and the time for the material to go off was within ten minutes and within the ten minutes was going to be in the position to maintain eyesight of the placed car with material. This was to guard within the ten minutes from the time when I set it or when I tuned the clock device.
ADV SANDI: If the match came to an end at five, what would have happened?
MR DUMAKUDE: If the match was to come or to end five minutes before time the remote control was there for that purpose. That means to avoid that people must move into that area. It was going to tripped to explode.
DR TSOTSI: Are you saying - there's two questions I want to put to you - are you saying that you remained at or near the scene of the explosion until after the explosion?
MR DUMAKUDE: As I've indicated that based on my observation, unfortunately the people who happened to be the victims who died, they were the people who made me to trigger the material before any people could venture into the area.
DR TSOTSI: You haven't quite answered my question. Were you in the area or were you nearby, could you - in a place where you could see what was happening in the vicinity of the bomb?
MR DUMAKUDE: Based on the remote control, the only way to trigger the device is when you maintain the visual contact with the place where the material and the device or placed.
CHAIRPERSON: Well were you in visual contact with this car when it exploded?
MR DUMAKUDE: Chairperson I was in the vicinity.
DR TSOTSI: We have evidence here that the explosion took place round about ten minutes past five. What do you say to that?
MR DUMAKUDE: I can't answer to that because the material I tuned it not only according my watch, like I have indicated we were concerned about the time, we were listening to the radio, the proceeding of the rugby match and when I left the material in the car I tuned it according to the match, my watch and the radio.
DR TSOTSI: When you went to park the car with the bomb you said that Harold got off before you reached the point, was he - you said in order to protect you, you said, was he armed?
MR DUMAKUDE: Not armed, it was protection in the sense of if there was going to be a report needed, there was going to be somebody - was going to be in the position to give a report.
MR LANDMAN: A report to who, Mr Dumakude?
MR DUMAKUDE: First, as people on the scene we operate as a unit. He was going to be in a position to inform the unit if there was anything that happened and it was going to go further than that until the M.K. command.
CHAIRPERSON: So he wasn't there to keep watch and report to you, he was there to see if anything went wrong and then go and tell the unit. Is that what you're saying?
MR DUMAKUDE: Chairperson, excuse me Chairperson, could you please repeat your question?
CHAIRPERSON: What you have just said, I understand he wasn't there just to report to you if somebody was coming or something went wrong, he was there to watch and if anything went wrong to report to the unit and to M.K. command?
MR DUMAKUDE: I might have viewers to the wrong way for providing security, security in the sense of information that means information of whatever happened there, it was not just going to end up with me.
ADV SANDI: Should one understand that to mean that if the bomb went off and killed you before the time for which it was tuned, he would have to go and give a report about what had happened?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will agree with you on the basis that explosives are explosives and there's always the danger of things not going according to the plan therefore when you plan with explosive as I was trained you had to be sober minded, you had to have somebody next to you to remind you that you are dealing with something that is dangerous. That's the first precautions of explosives.
DR TSOTSI: Look if before the explosion there was inside a police van or police van coming along, would Harold have been - had time to go and report to you that you know, the police are coming let's get away?
MR DUMAKUDE: Chairperson, not to report to me, I was going to provide my own protection on the spot. His presence like I indicate was to give the information back if things didn't go according to the plan. This was part of the plan that we don't all go into the danger area, at least we must leave a chain of feedback.
ADV SANDI: How were you going to protect yourself, Mr Dumakude, were you armed?
MR DUMAKUDE: As a trained person on a mission of that nature you plan according to the situation and yes, I was armed.
ADV SANDI: What weapon were you armed with?
MR DUMAKUDE: The weapon to protect oneself I use a pistol which is a Makaroff.
ADV SANDI: And members of your unit were they also armed?
MR DUMAKUDE: Not only members, it was myself in a sense that I was going to drive the car with the material and in case of roadblocks if we're all armed it was also going to create problems. This went according to the plan that only the person that is going to drive the car will be the persons armed.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm afraid I don't understand why it should create problems if there was a roadblock if you were both armed?
MR DUMAKUDE: Here part of the plan was that he was a passenger who asked a lift. At times we do manage to escape roadblocks based on that information. If you have got something that incriminates you in the process, you are closing all the chances of manoeuvring out of the situation.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, now you had a Makaroff pistol and a car loaded with explosives. I don't think you had much room for manoeuvring out of any position if you encountered a roadblock, had you? It could have been no worse because the other person in the car also had a pistol?
MR DUMAKUDE: There are incidents, Chairperson, where we managed to slip out or to manoeuvre roadblocks based on being armed, having to fight it out.
CHAIRPERSON: And if you had to fight it out you would do better if both of you were armed?
MR DUMAKUDE: It depends on the situation. It's not always where you'll find the unit, all of the members being armed. This will go according to the available resources.
CHAIRPERSON: You're now giving a completely different reason from the one you gave a few minutes ago. Now you say it's according to the available resources, do you, that he was not armed?
MR DUMAKUDE: I'm trying to stick to my previous answer Chairperson. A pistol, it's not really something to fight it out but something you use to defend oneself. If it was a plan to fight it in case of roadblocks, as the person was responsible or in command, I was going to make sure that things heavier than pistols - AK's - were going to be planned for the operation. Therefore according to the plan I didn't foresee any need or reason for AK's or every member to be armed and today when I appreciate the situation, I think it worked out correctly.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Perhaps I can assist Mr Chairman. Was it the intention that, if you came upon a situation which involved some sort of trouble that ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: I thought Mr Landman was cross-examining the applicant?
MR VAN DEN BERG: I'm not sure what the order of procedure was.
CHAIRPERSON: You've interrupted Mr Landman but you certainly are not re-examining at the present time.
MR VAN DEN BERG: As it pleases you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Carry on Mr Landman.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman seeing that all the relevant questions were asked by the Members of the Committee I have no further questions.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior sitting over there, yes.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman.
Mr Dumakude we're grateful that you appeared today and at such short notice but there are certain areas that puzzle myself and no doubt, I'm assisting the victims in this matter, try and find out the truth. Particularly Mrs Klukas who lost her husband and Mrs Erasmus who lost her husband.
Now if I understand your evidence, you agree that the policy of the ANC at the time was that at these type of operations conducted by Special Units of M.K. a loss of civilian life was to be avoided. That was the general policy, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: I full agree with you there.
ADV PRIOR: And that policy had come a long way in formulation because of the experiences of the past is it not correct? That decision had been taken at the highest level within the ANC and the M.K. is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: Here to further ...[indistinct] on my answer, yes it was to avoid but we can't totally as the late president O.R. states, we can't totally avoid civilian life being lost.
ADV PRIOR: Yes, I just want to establish some background because as I understand the policy of the ANC as it was announced at the various open hearings to which your counsel has referred, it was made quite clear at the open hearings - that is Mr Chairman, the last armed force hearing on the 10th October 1997 at page 1 of the transcript. I refer to a statement made by Mr Maharaj on behalf of the ANC that he said "In the '88 August National Executive the ANC again in
the public statement to the people stated that the ANC hereby underscores that it is contrary to our policy to select targets whose sole objective is to strike at civilians."
And what I want to put to you that what Mr Maharaj said there is that the ANC was reaffirming what the policy had been all along that targets ought not to be selected where purely civilians were to be effected. I just want your comment, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: The purpose of placing the explosive was not directed at the civilian as targets but as civilians who were going to spread the message. That was the intention.
ADV PRIOR: Alright, I'll come back to that. Now further on in that submission which is already before the Commission, reference was made to the McGoo's Bar Bomb, are you aware of that incident? That happened in Durban on the 14th June 1986. Are you aware of that incident?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes I am aware.
ADV PRIOR: Now at page 38 and 39 of the submissions of the security forces on the 10th October, Mr Maharaj was asked about that type of incident where purely civilians were targeted and he said at page 39 of the transcript, he said
"Firstly, again in our representation we show how when we noticed this phenomena manifesting itself that civilians were becoming the people who were suffering"
and he was referring to the McGoo's Bar bombing, that was in '86, he said:
"President Tambo called a special meeting of military headquarters to raise the problem, give a directive and arising out of that meeting, senior commanders including the overall commander Joe Modise, were sent out to the forward areas to brief the command structures."
and he says further:
"Furthermore, as happened with the land mine cases we saw that the consequences we deed were not being realised, we put a stop to the action."
You understand what I'm reading to you?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes I do.
ADV PRIOR: My question is actually twofold. Were you at such a meeting when President Tambo addressed the hierarchy of M.K. on this issue of civilian targets?
MR DUMAKUDE: No, I was not present.
CHAIRPERSON: When was that, Mr Prior?
ADV PRIOR: When was what?
CHAIRPERSON: When President Tambo addressed this meeting?
ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman I'm reading from pages 38 and 39, it's unclear when the date was but the reference by Mr Maharaj on behalf of the ANC was in reply to the question after the McGoo's Bar bombing, what was the reaction and Mr Maharaj answered that
"When we noticed the phenomena of civilians"
he put it in that perspective so I understand it was sometime after the McGoo's bombing, exactly when I don't know. Possibly the applicant or Mr van den Berg is in a better position to answer that or to assist us.
Mr Dumakude, if I understand your evidence, if you saw that the crowd was leaving the stadium earlier than you anticipated, you would have then detonated the bomb before the timing device was set to explode, is that correct? You would have done so with the remote control?
MR DUMAKUDE: That's what I've said.
ADV PRIOR: And you would have done so with the sole intention of avoiding injury or casualty with civilians, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: That is correct.
ADV PRIOR: Do I understand from that you were in such a position to see the exit of the Ellis Park Stadium?
MR DUMAKUDE: That's according to my reconnaissance.
ADV PRIOR: Sorry, I beg your pardon and that was in relation from your position, the car, where the bomb was and the exit of the stadium, you had a good view of that position?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes I did.
ADV PRIOR: I understood your evidence also to indicate that you had been observed and you seem to refer to the two people that died in the explosion, can you maybe just explain that? Or let me ask you this - had you been observed by these, the two deceased, persons while you were setting the device?
MR DUMAKUDE: This is my perception. Yes I was in the sense that after placing the vehicle they moved towards my direction.
ADV PRIOR: Had they come from the direction of the stadium of Ellis Park?
MR DUMAKUDE: Not from the direction of Ellis Park. This according to my observation at the time, there were people who were minding security around the area.
ADV PRIOR: Well I want to try and assist you. I want to show you photograph 1 of an original bundle of photographs which gives an aerial view of Upper Meyer Street where the bomb exploded. It's marked by Point A. Photograph 2 is a closer closeup of the street, the position where the bomb exploded. Mr Chairman, that photograph is represented at page 53 of the bundle before the Committee.
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes I do recognise the area.
ADV PRIOR: Are you able to tell the Committee from where was your position, your observation post as it were before the bomb was detonated. Where were you standing or where were you positioned in relation to Point A on photograph 1?
MR DUMAKUDE: On the South of Point A.
ADV PRIOR: Are you able to maybe make a mark with a pen?
MR DUMAKUDE: I've done that.
ADV PRIOR: Thank you. Could we possibly just familiarise ourselves, all the representatives and the Committee?
CHAIRPERSON: Where did he say the point you've asked him to indicate, what was that?
ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman the point where he was standing keeping observation prior to the detonation of the bomb.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike is not on.
CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] it appears to be - he indicates it is at the point of intersection of Upper Meyer and Byte would it be?
ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman certainly from my observation it seems to be the position. Maybe if I can ask him a question.
Mr Dumakude, you were standing further away from the stadium. In other words you were - you weren't closer to the stadium in relation to the bus as it was parked there?
MR DUMAKUDE: Between myself it was a bus, that means I was in the position to observe the exit or the entrance of the stadium which was, if I can still recall, it was gate 4.
ADV PRIOR: So you could see more or less in the direction of gate 4 of the stadium?
MR DUMAKUDE: That is correct.
ADV PRIOR: Thank you, I'm indebted to you. So I think that's clear Mr Chairman, the bus was between him and the stadium and it would put him in the position of Byte Road or Byte Street as he has indicated.
Now I hear your evidence that it wasn't your intention and similarly Mr Matshididi and Shoke also echoed that, that it was certainly not your unit's intention to take human life, to kill anyone there and I also hear you when you say that you wanted to ensure that no human life was lost, that you had the remote control device and you would have activated that should you have suspected or seen, sorry let me rather use that word - seen that the crowd was now leaving the stadium, you would have then detonated the explosive device. Now having said that Mr Dumakude, you say these two persons who later died had observed you, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: I say as we are seated here or judging back, ten years back, their approach was that my action attracted their attention in the sense that they approached me. When I was preparing myself to react to the situation, they turned back, one first to where the car was parked and because of the wiring which was going to cause more attraction and many people were going to be injured if I was to save my skin and move away from my direct observation of the vehicle.
ADV PRIOR: I want to understand, are you saying that what - did these two people actually stop at the vehicle that was loaded with the bomb?
MR DUMAKUDE: At first they moved toward my direction.
CHAIRPERSON: Let's go a little - you say they did not come, you said earlier, they didn't come from the direction of Ellis Park, is that so?
MR DUMAKUDE: Chairperson, after I have placed the car with the explosive I moved as I've indicated on the sketch towards the South and the action that was taken by the two people that I assume they were the victims, they came towards the direction and ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Where did they come from, from what direction?
MR DUMAKUDE: Maybe to try and explain, Chairperson, there was a bus parked on the right hand side as I was facing the stadium. I had a clear view of any approach from the stadium. They didn't come from that direction. That's why now I assume that they were around the area providing security.
CHAIRPERSON: You were looking up a road, there were buildings on either side, there was a bus in it. Did they come down that road or where did you see them coming from?
MR DUMAKUDE: I'll assume that they came from the direction of the bus for the mere action that they came towards me as I moved away and they went back to where I placed the car.
ADV PRIOR: So they walked towards you where you were standing, passing the bus that we know was situated on the right hand side as you were positioned, they then - did they walk past the car that had been parked, that is the car with the bomb, then they went back to the car. Is that what you're describing?
MR DUMAKUDE: Sure as I've said, their action was not of people who were passing but people who were approaching me.
ADV PRIOR: I'm trying to understand that. You saw two men approaching from the bottom of the road, coming past the bus towards your position on the South of Upper Meyer Street, is that correct? They were coming towards you, walking or were they running or what?
MR DUMAKUDE: I think if maybe you can bring picture around again to have one and the same perspective of the picture?
ADV PRIOR: I need to know from your perspective - were they walking - these people coming towards you, were they walking, were they running, were they walking on their hands? What were they doing? Are you able to say whether they were walking normally, were they walking fast, were they running towards you or towards your position, can you say?
MR DUMAKUDE: People who are providing security they will employ whatever means. The means that they employed was sufficient for me to say they were not walking past, they were reacting according to the suspicions that I raised.
ADV PRIOR: As I understand your evidence, you were satisfied that the street was deserted, there was no one around and it suited your purposes because if would have avoided loss of life in that street, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: That is correct.
ADV PRIOR: You then parked the motor vehicle that was loaded with the bomb and that was close to where the bus was parked, it was like just opposite the street from where the back end of the bus was or the front end of the bus, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: That is correct.
ADV PRIOR: I presume you got out of the car, closed the doors and then walked to the South of Upper Meyer Street to the position ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: No, first of all he had to - according to the evidence we've heard - he would have to arm the bomb. You will recollect we heard evidence that it was disconnected while they travelled there.
ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, I beg your pardon.
You then armed the bomb is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: That is correct.
ADV PRIOR: Was the bomb in the boot of the vehicle?
MR DUMAKUDE: The bomb was in the boot but the wiring was not in the boot.
ADV PRIOR: So the arming of the bomb would have been done whilst you were in the vehicle?
MR DUMAKUDE: That is correct.
ADV PRIOR: And while you were arming the bomb did you notice anybody approaching your vehicle?
MR DUMAKUDE: The wiring was in that position that I was going to observe or be in the position to identify anything that was coming from that direction of the stadium.
ADV PRIOR: So whilst arming the bomb you were looking towards the stadium. Did you see anyone approaching at that stage?
MR DUMAKUDE: There was nobody approaching at that stage.
ADV PRIOR: Did you then, after you had armed the bomb, did you then get out of the vehicle?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes I did that.
ADV PRIOR: And when you got out of the vehicle, did you notice anyone coming towards you at that particular stage?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes because before I moved away I acted as a chauffeur waiting for somebody.
ADV PRIOR: You pretended that you were a chauffeur?
MR DUMAKUDE: That is correct.
ADV PRIOR: And did people come past you?
MR DUMAKUDE: Not past me, passed by in the sense that they were not from the direction of the stadium.
ADV PRIOR: Alright, at some stage you were satisfied that you could move away from the car, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: That was according to the plan.
ADV PRIOR: And do I understand you, whilst - when you had got to your position on the South of Upper Meyer Street, the position you marked on the photograph, is it at that time you saw these two men coming up the road towards you?
MR DUMAKUDE: You are wrong there.
ADV PRIOR: Assist me, was it before you took observation at the South end of the road, so before you got there you had seen people, these two men coming up the road?
MR DUMAKUDE: The reason for me to move away from the car was because they were approaching me.
ADV PRIOR: And you say you believed in your mind and you assumed, as you said, that these people were related to a security, whether they were security or police or what, is that what you believed?
MR DUMAKUDE: Not only to believe it was confirmed by their actions.
ADV PRIOR: And is it so that whilst they were near the car you then detonated the device?
MR DUMAKUDE: Based on all the calculation as I've mentioned here that immediately if I moved away from the line of sight more damage was going to be made by the explosive.
ADV PRIOR: So are you in fact agreeing with me that when these two men who you believed were security personnel were near the vehicle, had actually turned back to go back to the vehicle, that is when you triggered off the device, you activated your remote control ...[intervention]
MR VAN DEN BERG: Device.
ADV PRIOR: Sorry - and caused the detonation of the bomb, do you agree with that?
MR DUMAKUDE: I full agree because their action - their action fitted people who were working for a system.
ADV PRIOR: And that is why you detonated the bomb at that time?
MR DUMAKUDE: It was because of that, to save more casualties that could have happened if I've moved away from the area.
ADV PRIOR: I seem to get the sense that the reason why you activated the bomb is that you did not want bomb to be discovered. Am I incorrect in that assessment?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will disagree with you in the sense that I was the one who timed the device. As I've stated that I wanted the device to go off before the end of the match. Any time from the interference of the material according to my setting of the devices anything could have happened. The only way of saving that situation was to trigger it before I move out of this area.
ADV PRIOR: You see the two men that died there, Mr Klukas and Mr Marais, were not security people, we've heard that. They were people who had been at the rugby and they were leaving the stadium in order to go home?
MR DUMAKUDE: ...[indistinct]
ADV PRIOR: So I'm suggesting to you on your assessment must have been wrong that they were security people, policemen, people associated with the regime as you put it. I'm suggesting to you that that is not so.
MR DUMAKUDE: By that time I didn't have that information.
ADV PRIOR: I'm going to suggest to you that it seems unlikely that if - if Mr Klukas and Marais were leaving the stadium before the general mass of people had left, they were presumably and probably on their way home and walking to where their transport had been stationed and it so happened that it took them up Meyer Street and it seems on your evidence that when they got near your car, that is when you detonated the bomb?
MR DUMAKUDE: I was the one at the situation, at the place. What I'm saying here it's what I've always said.
ADV PRIOR: Why didn't you wait and see whether they moved away, they could possibly have gone back to the stadium and then you could have detonated the bomb with no fear of killing anybody. Could you have done that?
MR DUMAKUDE: Like I've said, I didn't just trigger because I was trigger happy.
ADV PRIOR: No I'm not suggesting you were trigger happy, I'm suggesting that why didn't you wait and assess the situation to see whether these two people who you believed were security personnel may have moved away from the car, back to the stadium or back to wherever they had come from, then you could have detonated the bomb?
MR DUMAKUDE: Your question, I think it undermines my thinking capability. I did take that into consideration and when I reached the decision of triggering the device it was based on the decision after I've observed their action.
ADV PRIOR: Well when they moved back to the car, what were they doing, can you remember? Were they looking into the car, were they standing at the car, what were they doing?
MR DUMAKUDE: Not only looking at the car but with the intention of finding out and as I've indicated there were many things that were going to expose the car - to the car with a certain intention.
ADV PRIOR: Are you saying to this Committee that your fear was that they would have discovered the presence of a bomb in that car at that time, that was a fear that you had?
MR DUMAKUDE: Not a fear of the bomb being discovered but the fear of what was to come after I move away from the area without triggering the device.
ADV PRIOR: Do I understand you now to say or do I understand what you've now said is that you had a decision to make. Either kill two people or wait for the bomb to go off as per the timing device and maybe kill many more? Was that the dilemma that was facing you?
MR DUMAKUDE: Partly I will agree with you, it was a question of you wait for them, the bomb or the devices explode on their own or I have to protect what I can protect.
ADV PRIOR: But you knew that you had set the bomb to explode at a time when there was going to be nobody, in your mind, around except you said that maybe some people would have left the game early but your intention was not to kill, that's why you'd set the bomb to go off before the end of the match, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Well had you done that, you see we have been told that you set the bomb off - bomb to go off at five o'clock?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes it was set to go off five o'clock but at the same time making sure that the message of the explosion will be taken back to the areas where the spectators were going to go to.
CHAIRPERSON: So why didn't you time your bomb for half past four or four o'clock, long before the match was to end, when the message would still have been taken back? Why wait for this crucial moment when people might pour out of the stadium?
MR DUMAKUDE: Partly it was not to disrupt the match, the rugby match.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying you didn't want to disrupt the rugby match? Are you serious about that? That you went with a large bomb to send a message but you didn't want to disrupt the rugby match?
MR DUMAKUDE: Honourable Chairperson, here I planned, I took into consideration the match, the time when people will be moving out of the stadium. In the aim of what I wanted to achieve, what I wanted to achieve was that they must enjoy watching the football match and at the same time they must help the struggle by moving out of the stadium and taking the message back that the country is at war, with our vote let's do something. Just to elaborate on this, why Ellis Park? I'll take you back 1975 when the regime invaded Angola, the white community of this country they were not concerned. I mean white community in the sense of people who were having the vote, their sons and daughters were invading our neighbouring countries, they started to be concerned only when their sons and daughters they were coming back in black plastic bags. It's then when they started to question the then Government. They went to Botswana, Zimbabwe, it was the same situation. Here it was a question of it's no more in Botswana, Mozambique or Angola, this thing is happening here, they are not going to be transported in black plastic bags in the sense of we have got the vote, let them use the vote, let them start to query the Government. This was the reason that place it there, they must enjoy it as they have done in the past, coming back, celebrating, slaughtering of innocent kids in our neighbouring countries and here now it was the time for them to indicate to their Government that it's no more outside our boundaries, outside our borders, this is happening within the country, that what ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: So when they were brought back in black bags from Ellis Park they would start questioning their government, is that what you say because you made the point a few minutes ago that when they were brought back in black bags from Angola they started to question. When the children were brought back in black bags from Angola they started to question the Government. You said that yourself a few minutes ago, is that what you meant to happen at Ellis Park?
MR DUMAKUDE: To go back to my reasoning of Ellis Park, these were the people with the vote. Soldiers are soldiers because of that vote. Here it was for them, not to kill them as I've indicated, this is totally not the policy of the movement, was not the policy of the movement as it is still standing but these are the civilians with the vote. It's not only soldiers that are voting and if you want to cut the hand that feed the soldier, cut the hand that support the Government, make them aware that they are not protected. Here it's a question of protection. We're fighting to have a say in this Government and I think we did achieve that. Other people were voting to deny us that opportunity and it was their vote. Our parents they were paying tax but people were having the vote to control this tax. They were not concerned, this was the reason. Take this to the people who were having the vote, make them aware that this vote - if they are not going or if they are not using it the correct way, one day it will be beyond the leadership's control in the sense that people on the ground at times they act according to the prevailing situation. It is nice to come and say he was not supposed to act like that but if you are in the situation by that time you might have also taken the same decision. That's why I'm saying you are in the position to sit down and analyze. It was bad, sure, the situation by that time it was like that but today it's a different situation. I think we have got the chance to sit around to peruse our past. This was what I was fighting for and I think unfortunately, I'll also apologize, unfortunately it's not only on the other side. If you can go to Soweto you ask any parent who lost a child how does it feel. It's the same. We're not all here but at least to listen to our past. That's the reason. I didn't intend to kill civilians. The explosive was placed there for them to exercise or for them to remind the Government that if the Government of the day is protected, they are not protected, this thing is happening now at their doors. Thank you Chairman.
ADV PRIOR: Yes I just want to come back to the question - we're trying to understand what happened on that day. You've told the Committee it wasn't your intention to cause injury or loss of life and we're trying to understand why you triggered off the device. Now is it possible you were mistaken about your fears or is it in fact whether people were killed or not would even provide a stronger message to the Government. It didn't matter, you placed a very powerful bomb near a sporting stadium where there were thousands of people present and you've agreed in your submission, in your evidence, that although it wasn't your intention you did foresee the possibility that people could be killed.
But you go further. You say whilst two people were at the vehicle, you then intentionally triggered off the device. Your intention was to kill those two people, is that no so?
MR DUMAKUDE: If the chairperson can allow me, I can also pose the same question back to you.
ADV PRIOR: No please just answer my questions, it's a simple question. Was it your intention when you activated the timing device to kill those two people who you believe were police or security personnel. Did you believe it or didn't you? Sorry, did you intend it or didn't you intend it?
MR DUMAKUDE: It was not my intention.
MR DUMAKUDE: What did you think would happen to them when you detonated this bomb whilst they were standing next to the vehicle?
MR DUMAKUDE: As I've indicated from the onset that a good plan it's only after it had been carried out. The planning was totally to avoid casualties. I still stress it totally, if - I repeat - the purpose of placing it was the message. Dead bodies, they don't take the message back, only living bodies will take the message back, that was the reason.
ADV PRIOR: On behalf of the victims I want to suggest to you that when you say the two deceased - we know there were only two deceased persons, Mr Klukas and Marais, there was no reason why they would act like policemen or security personnel on that occasion. So I'm suggesting to you that you're not telling us exactly what happened there, you're not telling us where they were going to and you're making it sound as if you no option but to detonate the bomb because you believed that they were going to discover the bomb in the vehicle.
MR DUMAKUDE: For your information, today in this free country of ours, I can carry out a citizen arrest. I feel as part of this country. Yesterday I was not going to do that. I strongly say there presence there was of the same purpose, defending and when I balanced the two, many lives are going to be lost if that was not the opportune time to trigger it. I still repeat it, the plan was totally to avoid that but it was unfortunate at that time.
ADV PRIOR: Are you able to explain - we know according to the documentation that 31 other people were injured to varying degrees by the explosion, shrapnel flying around, glass flying around. Did you anticipate that so many people may well have been injured?
MR DUMAKUDE: That's news - I depended on the information given by the press but what I've given the account up to now, the two people that I've seen, these are the people that I fully account on.
ADV PRIOR: What about black people at the stadium. Did you have account of their lives and safety or was that not part of the equation, did it not matter if black people were killed or injured?
MR DUMAKUDE: As I've indicated the mission was to avoid civilian life whether black or white.
ADV PRIOR: On a technical point how much explosive was used in this bomb that you built? We are not experts like you in explosive devices. Can you tell us what the explosive material was and how much of it was there?
MR DUMAKUDE: This happened ten years ago, I'll be just giving kg's out of my head which tomorrow might be used against me, I'll ask not to give an answer to this.
ADV PRIOR: Alright but do you agree that it was a very powerful device that destroyed to a very large - well completely destroyed the vehicle in which it was placed and it destroyed other vehicles and buildings in the immediate vicinity and - well from an estimate of the aerial photographs at least 30 or 40 metres around it?
MR DUMAKUDE: This was part of the mission. This was part of the mission.
ADV PRIOR: You see I'm asking you these questions because part of the amnesty - the Act, if I may put it that way, also considers questions of gravity and proportionality. Could you have possibly built a smaller device that would have sent exactly the same message to the Government? Maybe a device that would not have been so devastating. Could you have done that?
MR DUMAKUDE: What I planned upon is what I carried out. That was the amount, that's why I even to the extent of reinforcing that amount for the message to reach where I wanted it to reach.
ADV PRIOR: So you wanted the explosive that you were very familiar working with even to have a more devastating effect by using - is it using the gas cylinders? Is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: The purpose of the gas cylinder was only to reinforce the shock waves. Where the vehicle was placed the gas waves or the shock waves they were not directed, they were going to, as they did, escape. That's why I made it sure that where I'm going to place it, it mustn't be a place where civilians are going to be killed, where the message will reach the civilians.
ADV PRIOR: Just one final aspect I need to ask you on.
CHAIRPERSON: Can I ask you something now? As I understand it from the photographs and what we have been shown and the statements, the car was right opposite a house which was occupied by people?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes it was at the house but based on the reconnaissance that was carried the place was deserted. After we evaluated all the spots to place the device that was the only suitable place where at that time based on the reconnaissance there was no life to be lost.
ADV PRIOR: You see the evidence yesterday, I think it was Mr Matshididi, said that after the bomb or the car had been parked there - I speak under correction because I'm not sure whether he said he was with Mr Dumakude but my impression was that it was only when he reached the Kombi at Checkers did they hear the sound of the bomb going of and we know that that distance is about two kilometres from where in fact the Ellis Park Stadium is. I want to ask you, when you activated the bomb did you go with Mr Matshididi to Checkers where you were to rendezvous with the others?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes I did.
ADV PRIOR: Is that your clear recollection that he went with you to Checkers and that was after the bomb had gone off?
MR DUMAKUDE: After the bomb has gone off, after I've activated the device.
ADV PRIOR: Yes?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes he did go with me.
ADV PRIOR: And the reason why he was close by to you was that he had to report in case you had been killed or injured in an explosion that had gone off, if there had been an accident for example?
MR DUMAKUDE: I might be confusing your question, if you say close, how close?
ADV PRIOR: Well you had deployed him in such a position that he could go back and report should you have killed yourself in the explosion but he was certainly close enough for you to meet up with him and then proceed ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Well he has said they went to Checkers together hasn't he, Mr Prior?
ADV PRIOR: He said he wasn't clear on the question, I was trying to explain the question. But he has answered it. Mr Chairman, may I just enquire whether there is any question that the victims wish to put? I've certainly finished my questions.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Landman may have to rely on his memory because he was the man who was leading the evidence at the time but I think it only right to say that my note accords with what Mr Prior has said. You Mr van den Bergh obviously weren't here yesterday, you didn't hear, the note I have of the incident is
"We went to Checkers and met the others. I heard the sound of the bomb - we heard the sound of the bomb and then went back to Diepkloof."
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman that is my recollection of the evidence.
ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman may I just place on record both Mrs Klukas and Mrs Erasmus don't have questions. Thank you, that is all Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV PRIOR
CHAIRPERSON: You finally get your chance to re-examine.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairman I'm not sure till what time this Committee sits?
CHAIRPERSON: Which is just after the normal adjourning time. If you would prefer to take the adjournment now so you can check up on anything else we would be quite prepared to meet you in that, if you want to finish the evidence?
MR VAN DEN BERG: I'd like to take the adjournment just to consider my position. There are a number of things which hopefully we can clarify and a number of things with the benefit of a good night's sleep we may not have to retroverse. Thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Let's try for once if we can to start at nine? I'm not - there's no blame attaching to you for that.
WITNESS EXCUSED
HEARING ADJOURNS
