CHAIRPERSON: For the record, today is Monday the 10th of May 1999, it is the continuation of the amnesty applications, in this particular instance, W.F. Schoon and Others which applicants will be identified as the application proceeds. The panel is constituted as has been previously indicated on the record. The appearances for the applicants are as previously indicated. The Leader of Evidence also as indicated earlier on the record. For the victims this morning, Mr Mohlaba, would you put yourself on record?
MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair, my name is Bonka Mohlaba, I am appearing on behalf of the victims, that is the family members of Sebopa, the deceased and the Take Five, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mohlaba. Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: Good morning Mr Chairperson. Chairperson, I appear for five, all five the applicants in the matter of Take Five and Pule. We will be referring to the following Bundles, the rest you can move aside, it would be Bundle 1, Bundle 3 and obviously Exhibit A. We have prepared Chairperson, over the weekend, a statement for Brigadier Loots who will be the first witness to give you some background as well, and we beg leave to hand that up. That will be, if I am not mistaken, Exhibit L, and at the same time, might it be convenient for you to receive from us, a document which I will explain more fully as we go on, as Exhibit M and you could mark that document as Document X - Operation Vula. They are Operation Vula extracts, Chairperson. Having said that, the first witness which we wish to call is Mr Loots, Brigadier Loots. He is available to give evidence and he would like to give his evidence in Afrikaans.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much Mr Visser, we have received Exhibit L, which is the statement of Brigadier Loots and Exhibit M which is Documents X in Operation Vula.
WIKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Brigadier Loots, you are an applicant in this application and you apply for any unlawful actions emanating from the incident which is know during this procedure as Take Five and Sadie Pule, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And before you, you have Exhibit L, this is a statement which was drawn up on the basis of information give by you, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Beforehand you had the opportunity to have regard for the general background document, Exhibit A, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Is there anything in Exhibit A that is not applicable to you and that you do not want the Amnesty Committee to take into consideration when they consider your application?
MR LOOTS: No, I agree with the full document.
MR VISSER: If we can turn to Exhibit L, you there refer to Exhibit A and in (c) - ... in my ears all the time - you have also referred in Exhibit L under (c) to your own evidence before the Amnesty Committee and you refer there to the Nietverdiendt 10, the Silent Valley and the McKenzie incidents, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: They have been completed but judgement is still pending? In Bundle 1, excuse me in Bundle 3, on page 593 and following we find your application that you had filed when you applied for amnesty, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Do you confirm the evidence and the correctness thereof?
MR LOOTS: Yes, I do Chairperson.
MR VISSER: If I could turn to page 2, in 1986 and 1987, what was your position?
ADV DE JAGER: One moment, the pages where this application is dealt with?
MR VISSER: It is 593, that is the start of it and 605. The question was could you please tell us about the command structure in December 1986 and January 1987 in the Western Transvaal, what was your position?
MR LOOTS: I was the Commander of the Security Branch of Western Transvaal.
MR VISSER: And at Zeerust, who was the Branch Commander?
MR LOOTS: At that stage, if I recall correctly, it was Colonel Du Preez Smit or Major Colonel Crause was up to the end of December and from the 1st of January, Colonel Smit took over command.
MR VISSER: If we could turn to the role that Botswana played on page 2, would you please inform the Committee from paragraph 1 as to your knowledge of the circumstances there?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, it was the knowledge and experience of myself and other members of the Security Branch at Western Transvaal as well as other divisions, I refer to the Western Cape, Northern Transvaal, Johannesburg, Soweto and indeed the whole South Africa that Botswana, since approximately 1997 (sic) had played a more important role for the ANC/SACP alliance with regards to the organisation, strategy, planning and provision of weaponry and human resources for the revolutionary struggle in South Africa. It was known that Mr Marius Schoon during approximately 1977 had left for Botswana and that he fulfilled an important function for the ANC/SACP alliance there. Amongst others, he successfully set up a sophisticated network of infiltration routes and logistical support between Botswana and South Africa. Already from 1977 there were indications that weapons, ammunition and explosives had been brought into South Africa illegally from Botswana and that the terrorists had left the Republic through Botswana and returned. Members who were recruited for MK in South Africa were trained in Angola, East Germany and Russia, and according to information they had bases in Zambia and Botswana. With these bases, we refer to transit camps, refugee camps, weapon and ammunition cache places, places where accommodation and logistical, financial and other support were provided as well as military training centre. I could mention here that even hotel rooms were used in that instance.
MR VISSER: Could I just ask you with reference to logistical, can you please just go a little bit slower so that the Interpreters can keep up with you.
MR LOOTS: Very well Chairperson. I continue with paragraph 5, as the war continued, Botswana became more important with regards to the following: the maintenance of insurgency routes from the RSA and the support and assistance to persons who had left South Africa to receive military training abroad, the assistance to returning trained terrorists and the smuggling of weaponry, ammunition and explosives to the RSA. After completion of their training in the named countries, members, trained terrorists as members of MK, came into South Africa where they committed deeds of terror. Swaziland was also used as a thoroughfare route. MK mainly used Botswana as an insurgency routes during 1986 and 1987. Weapons and explosives were stored in Botswana and brought into the country from there, where it was used for terror attacks. Examples of this is the fact that Robert McBride and Gordon Webster had used explosives which they had received from Botswana. I refer furthermore in this instance, to one Piet Mogoai.
MR VISSER: I spell it for the record, Mogoai. Continue please?
MR LOOTS: Piet was an MK Commander in Botswana, he became disillusioned with the ANC and became an askari later. He was in control of weaponry in Botswana and when he had returned, he had 10 metal containers which were filled with weapons and ammunition, hand grenades and explosives which he handed over to the Police. I can also mention that four of those containers in Botswana were stored in such difficult places, that we could not remove it. As early as 1978 there were MK terrorists who had infiltrated the RSA from Botswana and in this instance, we can refer to the murder of Jaap van der Merwe, a farmer in the Northum vicinity and a skirmish on the 19th of January 1979 between the Security Branch of Zeerust and a group of terrorists who had infiltrated the RSA from Botswana. One MK member was killed there, if I can recall correctly his MK name was Authu Muzerewa.
MR VISSER: Could you repeat the name?
MR LOOTS: Authu Muzerewa.
MR VISSER: Can you spell that?
MR LOOTS: I will spell it for you, it is Authu and then Muzerewa. I cannot recall his correct name. By 1983 the activities of the ANC/SACP alliance in and from Botswana had reached a very progressed stage. At this time the informants from the Security Branch had infiltrated the ANC structures in Botswana and large quantities of weapons, ammunition and explosives were smuggled into the RSA for ANC.
MR VISSER: Do you refer to the McKenzie situation who was an agent or a source of the Northern Transvaal Security Branch but the ANC did not know and he transported these weaponry and ammunition with his vehicle?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson, it was known to the Security Branch that weaponry and or explosives were smuggled into the RSA from Botswana and was used amongst others in planned attacks on strategic places in Transvaal with weaponry and or explosives which were brought in by McKenzie, which the South African Police had found before it could be used. Chairperson, the second instance is the destruction of three transformers at the Trident power station close to Rustenburg on the 5th of September 1984 if I recall correctly. The total damage was about R14 million. The attack on Constable Molete who was stationed at Stilfontein, he was attacked with a RGD5 handgrenade on the 28th of September 1984, on the 3rd of January 1985 Major Laubscher from Counter Insurgence Services and Constable Clau from Mafeking were murdered.
MR VISSER: Would you stick to the words that you have before you because the Interpreters have a copy of this and you are going to confuse them if you diverge from the words on the paper.
MR LOOTS: The fifth instance, murder of a border guard, David Motlala at Kopfontein border post on the 3rd of February 1985; the sixth instance, murder of Mr and Mrs Joubert, farmers at Swartruggens on the 13th of March 1985; following instance is the murder of Constable D.J.F. Boshoff, stationed at Ventersdorp on the 8th of April 1987 and the following instance the placing of landmines on farms Ottoshoop at Ottoshoop and Zeerust by MK persons, Biscuit, MK Thabo as well known as Semane, on the 22nd and 23rd of November 1987; attempted sabotage of power installations in the Vaal Triangle on the 7th of March 1988, bomb explosion at Marine Parade, Durban and the provider of the explosives there was Lekotho Pule; attempted sabotage of Sterland property in Pretoria, Odirele Maponya was arrested or was killed on the 15th of April 1988 during this instance. Just to provide clarity, if I recall correctly, he was in the process of setting up a limpet mine. The following instance was a skirmish between insurgents and Security Forces close to the RSA/Botswana border on the 11th of August 1988 where Constable N.C. Claassen was killed. The following instances were explosions in the Western Cape, Ngunwana, Tawana and Sibeka. Furthermore attempted sabotage, a shopping centre at Parow by one Petani during 1986; the following instance Mr Chairperson, is the Chamberlain Road substation at Jacobs in approximately November 1985. Because of a second delayed explosion, caused the death of a Colonel of the South African Police.
MR VISSER: This is the instance I believe where Mr Gordon Webster was involved with?
MR LOOTS: If I recall correctly, that is indeed so. Attempted sabotage of Meyville substation by Webster, sabotage of the Nottingham Road transformers at Camperdown and sabotage of the Westville substation in Durban. Chairperson amongst others, in 1988, by means of statements, I had tried to establish an image whereby one could provide the role of Botswana and certain ANC figures in Botswana and the attitude of the Botswana government was set out. This document deals with the time period between 1984 to 1988.
MR VISSER: Would you please pause there. Brigadier in Bundle 1, on page 681 there is a statement of Wikus Johannes Loots and this goes to 666 if I recall correctly?
MR LOOTS: Yes, it runs up to 666 if the annexures are added to it.
MR VISSER: Is this an extract from a larger Bundle which was compiled by yourself and amongst others - 655 Chairperson, it runs up to 655.
MR LOOTS: Then some annexures which run up to 666, that is correct Chairperson, the annexures had been added and it runs up to 666.
MR VISSER: I would just like to know from you, this is a statement to which I refer Chairperson, and this statement and the annexures, were these which you had added to your application?
MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson, it was the men from Cape Town and other places who had also placed ...
MR VISSER: ... at the last amnesty hearing concerning the Silent Valley and the Nietverdiendt 10, as stated before, we in an attempt to cut down on reproduction costs and so on, decided that we were not going to ask for this to be reproduced for you again. What we have done is in the statement which Brigadier Loots has just read to you, we have given you a summary of those incidents, so that really comes directly out of this thick Bundle. The various statements by other people, are contained in this Bundle. We don't intend to make too much point of it, or to rely too heavily on the other statements, except in so far as they from their own knowledge in their statements refer to the incidents which you have at pages 5 and 6 on the statement before you. So on that basis, we did not think that we were going to encumber the record with yet another Bundle.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Can you just take me to the document that you got the witness to refer to? I think he was referring to page 655, which Bundle is that, I am trying just to locate it.
MR VISSER: Bundle 1.
CHAIRPERSON: Bundle 1.
MR VISSER: Bundle 1, Chairperson, and that is where the amnesty application is found. For some reason, Loots is bound into Bundle 3 and I just can't seem to get used to it, but sorry, yes. The page number starts at 618 and if you turn to that you will see Chairperson, that it is a statement that starts "I, the undersigned ..."
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.
MR VISSER: It starts with the words "I, the undersigned number W36919K, Colonel W. Loots ...", that one, that runs up to page 655, the statement itself where he signs the statement on the 21st of October 1988 and there are certain annexures to which he refers in his statement, also attached from page 656 to page 666. We won't be referring to those Chairperson, it really just presents proof of what he is saying in his statement, and again, we have attempted to summarise all of that, or most of that, at pages 5 and 6 over the weekend, in his statement before you, in order to make it more manageable.
ADV DE JAGER: The reference to the Silent Valley, was which Bundle in the Silent Valley incident?
MR VISSER: ... where this whole Bundle had been reproduced. Now, if we've got this so-called original one before us, if you want insight in it, of course you are most welcome to page through it, to get the feel of the document if you wish to, it is available. You have said that this document to which we have referred, deals with the time period from 1984 to 1988, is that true?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Would you please continue on page 7?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, certain examples of the activities of the ANC/SACP alliance in Botswana is referred to in the abovementioned document. From there one can form the impression of the problems that had emanated from Botswana and the high level of activity of known ANC, MK activists which changed periodically from persons known as Abubaker Ismail, his MK name was Rashied, Lambert Maloyi, the third person Johannes Mnisi, Lester Dumakhode and then Lekotho Pule and others in Botswana.
MR VISSER: You refer to Lekotho Pule, this person has the same surname is Sadie Pule, is there any connection between the two of them?
MR LOOTS: They are brother and sister Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Continue with number 11.
MR LOOTS: The Security Branch at Western Transvaal was aware during 1986 of the activities of two MK Commanders namely MK Take Five and Sadie Pule, who had worked together to establish weapons caches and to smuggle it into South Africa as well as smuggling trained terrorists into South Africa to commit acts of terror and to be of assistance to people who want to leave the country to receive military training abroad.
MR VISSER: You describe them as high profile targets?
MR LOOTS: Without any doubt Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR LOOTS: These persons were deemed dangerous and were a source of great concern because of their part in the revolution. I might just add here Chairperson for clarity sake, that their names at several occasions had been given to the Botswana Police during visits there.
MR VISSER: Please continue with 12.
MR LOOTS: The problems that I refer to above, is repeatedly by the South African government brought under the attention of the Botswana government. We went so far as to give addresses, telephone numbers, registration numbers, names and other information to the Botswana Police. However, no real steps were taken by the Botswana government to stop the activities of MK in Botswana. The security situation in the RSA forced the government to on the 21st of July 1985, and on the 12th of June 1986, announce emergency situations and this was renewed yearly until on the 8th of June 1990, it was ended except for Natal where it was ended on the 18th of October 1990. Apart from the additional competencies that were created by the regulations, the safety situation got worse and the government and the Security Branch were first to take drastic measures to stop the revolutionary onslaught. This led to the members of the Security Branch feeling more obliged to take certain steps in certain instances, that would fall outside the ambit of the law, but that they saw as their duty, especially concerning Botswana. There was a need to act drastically so that the threat that came from there, could be countered more effectively.
MR VISSER: Just to go off the document for an instant, do I understand you correctly in saying that the threat from Botswana got bigger and bigger? Attacks occurred right across the RSA with weapons that come from Botswana. To complain with the Botswana government does not help. Is this the background that you are trying to create for us?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And in the meantime what did the politicians and the Generals expect in this country, what did they expect you to do?
MR LOOTS: That law and order should be maintained, Mr Chairperson at all costs.
MR VISSER: You had to normalise the position?
MR LOOTS: Absolutely Chairperson.
MR VISSER: If we can now get to the current incident. Can you please read from paragraph 16 first in your amnesty application. You refer on page 593 of Bundle 3, excuse me 594, 605, pardon me Mr Chairperson, 605 you refer to 31 October 1986, is this date correct?
MR LOOTS: The correct date should be 31 December Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Please can you then please continue on paragraph 17.
MR LOOTS: On the 31st of December 1986 information was received that MK members Take Five and Sadie Pule were at a safehouse in Ramotswe, Botswana and that they would stay there that evening.
MR VISSER: Who gave you this information?
MR LOOTS: Officer Modise who was stationed at Zeerust, Mr Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Did he report this directly to you or to his Commanding Officer?
MR LOOTS: To his Commanding Officer.
MR VISSER: And who was this?
MR LOOTS: Captain Wehrmann at that stage, but in the meantime he has unfortunately died.
MR VISSER: Wehrmann Chairperson, he was there for the time being in the absence of Brigadier Smit. And this information was given to you?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR LOOTS: It was known that they didn't often stay for more than one evening at a specific place, for the night and this was information was of great value for the Security Branch. Take Five and Sadie Pule were members of the Special Operations Group of the ANC and they regularly sent weapons and explosives for use by the MK members to the RSA by means of couriers. I went to Zeerust myself to go and investigate the situation and I accompanied Modise and Captain Wehrmann to a place between Zeerust and the Botswana border where I heard the source to be able to acquaint myself with this information. I was satisfied that this information was reliable and that there could be acted upon this information. I informed Brigadier Willem Schoon per telephone and he considered the matter and I proposed that steps be taken to eliminate the two MK members and after this, he gave me to make the necessary steps with Commandant C.J. Naude of the South African Army. At these steps I can remember that the following members were involved, myself, Brigadier Loots, Commandant Charl Naude, Colonel Du Preez Smit, then still a Captain, Lieutenant Colonel Wehrmann, then a Lieutenant, Captain Flip Crause and Warrant Officer Modise together with a team of Special Forces people, I think they were three if I can remember correctly.
MR VISSER: And you do not know their names?
MR LOOTS: No, not at all. The members that were to take part in the operation, arrived at a desolate farm in the Nietverdiendt area where I informed Naude of the situation. From this moment on, the moment was executed by Special Forces of the Defence Force. The only part that the Security Branch had after this, was that Modise had to show the members of the Special Forces, this specific house so that a wrong house would not be attacked. This house was apparently situated very close to the border. With arrival at the border, it was found that the Ramotswe river was full of water. Seeing as Warrant Officer Modise could not swim, I asked Warrant Officer Crause to help him through the water. Warrant Officer Modise knew the environment very well and he showed the target to the couple of members of Special Forces and I can just point out that Colonel Charl Naude and myself waited on the RSA side. It is just Crause, Modise and the three members of Special Forces that crossed over the border. After midnight they attacked the target and upon their return, it was reported to Commandant Naude that people were killed.
Later from information and newspaper articles, it came to light that a black woman was killed. Information came to light that an unknown man was quite possibly also killed in the attack, but I do not have any further information concerning this.
MR VISSER: Yes Brigadier, this information that you are talking about, is Exhibit M. Exhibit M on the first page, has a note that was sent by Warrant Officer, or written by Warrant Officer Flip Crause, is this correct?
MR LOOTS: Yes, this is.
MR VISSER: He must actually testify about this, but while you are now here, can you please address this document, Exhibit M?
MR LOOTS: What he says here is that Take Five's correct name is Aaron Mkwanazi.
MR VISSER: Is it relatively safe to deal on this information?
MR LOOTS: I accept it like that Chairperson.
MR VISSER: According to him and he will testify to this, this name comes from the Vula Documents that are not in front of the Committee. Are you prepared to accept that Take Five was Aaron Mkwanazi?
MR LOOTS: I am 90 percent sure, Mr Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Very well, and then it would appear from the so-called clusters Chairperson, we have duplicated this document exactly as we received it, we did not want to retype it, we preferred to leave it in the original state. If you look at page 2, unfortunately it is not numbered, oh yes, it is, at the top it says P02, if you look at page P02, you read
"... house on 31-12-1986 in Ramotswe."
And then it is spoken of what happened further and then -
"... used 01's house to discuss the marital problems with her husband ..."
this is not important and then at the bottom of the page -
"... in infiltration operations ..."
it is very difficult Mr Chairperson. I think it is a fullstop there and then the sentence stops there, and then it is said on page P03, they talk about an apartment and what happened on the 1st of May 1987. We can skip that and then on page P06 it is said, if we can just start with the third line Chairperson -
"... house in Ramotswe on 31-12-1986, two men on bicycles rode passed the house a number of times under suspicious circumstances. She (Pule) and Take Five, then decided to spend the night in Gaberone."
According to information that the ANC had at their disposal, this is what happened? That caused suspicion and that is why they weren't there that evening?
MR LOOTS: That is what I can assume.
MR VISSER: And then the last sentence of
"... about the following, the arrest of three MM members at Lubatsi and the confiscation of hardware."
What would MM stand for would you say, or don't you know?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I am not sure.
MR VISSER: The next sentence
"... en route to Francistown ..."
and it ends there. What would hardware refer to?
MR LOOTS: Hardware is definitely explosives and weaponry.
MR VISSER: And then lastly, in this document I am just trying to find it, it is on page P05, it is referred to, or it refers to "Chairperson, this is the first ...", the sixth line which starts with Makelakhi. A certain Makelakhi apparently were questioned by the Botswana Police and it is said here that
"... about this by the Bots Police who told her that a crate of arms was found ..."
in reference to the house of Materu, if you start on the fourth line, I just made a mistake, sorry, I should have started with -
"... Materu's neighbour, on 11-1-1987 told her that on the night of the attack, three unknown men came to her Makelakhi house from Materu's to use the phone ..."
and then the sin which I have read, apparently there was a crate of arms in this house. Chairperson, this is the only reason why we handed in this document, to provide some background of aspects of which the applicants have no knowledge, but that come from a different source, to maybe sketch a better picture of what happened that evening. Page 1 of Exhibit M is actually a summary of what you referred to on these different pages?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : May I just ask, this document came into the possession of Mr Crause when?
MR VISSER: Some time ago, I did not ask him precisely when, but it is some time ago after Operation Vula was uncovered. As an information exercise, extracts from those documents were sent all over the country to Security Branches, so he must have had it for some time.
ADV GCABASHE : Ex post facto?
MR VISSER: Oh yes, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Will you lead him on this stuff Mr Visser? Will you lead him? ... (tape ends) ... the questions, because I am not quite clear on the document, but you will lead him on this one.
MR VISSER: Of course. Brigadier Loots can deal with the document, so perhaps you should ask him the questions and if there is anything that he doesn't know, then perhaps Mr Crause. Chairperson, there is one thing that I forgot about, you would have noticed in the various applications of the present applicants before you, there was a great uncertainty as to how many people might have been killed or injured. Two of the applicants refer to two persons and the others to one. Now also in that regard, there is indication, there is an indication in Exhibit M, it refers to there to Materu herself and an unknown man and that you find at page P02. It says from the bottom, it is the fifth line on the right hand side it says
"... on 1-1-87 am, a man and woman both unidentified, were killed by Special Forces and at Materu's house."
That adds a little bit to the confusion as to whether it was Materu herself or a man and a woman, but I am just drawing your attention to that. It may have been two people, we don't know. Brigadier Loots, can you please tell us exactly what the status of this document, Exhibit M, except for the first page is, from page P02 further, where does it come from, what is the status of this document?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, this document was found during the arrest of I think it was 1992 or 1993, I speak under correction, but during the arrest of Siphiwe Nyanda and the current Minister Mac Maharaj in Durban. During the seizure of a few computers by the Durban Security Branch, this and a lot of other information was taken from this computer.
MR VISSER: How did you get this information?
MR LOOTS: The Security Branch of Durban referred it to us? MR VISSER: Because it was relevant to our region?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, that is the only reason why we came into possession of it.
MR VISSER: If the panel wants further information, they will probably ask you about this. In paragraph 27 you deal with the suggestion that one gets from Exhibit M that it is Materu that could have been killed. You yourself do not know if it is her or someone else?
MR LOOTS: I am not sure Chairperson. According to newspaper articles there was a woman killed, I am not sure of the name.
MR VISSER: We have already looked at Aaron Mkwanazi, could you please continue with 29?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, these handlings that I did, I did in executing my official duties and as part of my opposition to the struggle, and it was aimed against the supporters of the freedom struggle. What I did, I did to protect the government and the National Party's interest and to stop the revolutionary onslaught. I humbly apply for amnesty for what I did in this relation.
MR VISSER: At the end, you did act upon orders of Brigadier Schoon?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, that is the evidence in chief, which we wish to place before you, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Visser. We will take the tea adjournment, and we will reconvene in 15 minutes.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
WIKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (s.u.o)
CHAIRPERSON: Exhibit M, do we understand correctly that this is an excerpt from the contents of the computers that was in the possession of the ANC members?
MR VISSER: It was brought to my attention that it was 1990 and not 1992, as I have stated previously.
CHAIRPERSON: This is an extract dealing with this incident in Botswana?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Is it a type of report which was drawn up internally for the purposes of the ANC in this format?
MR LOOTS: We received it in this format from Durban Chairperson, I was not present where the copies were made from the computers, I would assume that it was printed from the computer in this format.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well, and then regarding the contents, is this the type of internal report of the ANC itself or what is the position?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, at the Northern Transvaal Security Branch, there was a member who printed ANC reports as well as in Durban and reports which we circulated from Western Transvaal. It was in secret crypt, it fell into the hands of the ANC and it was placed on the computer along with their comment, that is my interpretation.
CHAIRPERSON: This is then their record of this incident?
MR LOOTS: Absolutely Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Mohlaba, do you have any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair, I've got a few questions. Brigadier Loots, if I can refer you to paragraph 13 of Exhibit L where you deal with having received information about Take Five and Sadie Pule, that they would overnight at a particular house, may I just find out from you what was your rank during this period, the 31st of December?
MR LOOTS: I assume it is paragraph 17 that he refers to Chairperson?
MR MOHLABA: Yes, my question will be, in fact I just want to get some clarity in respect of that paragraph, that is why I want you to look at the paragraph. I just want to know what your rank was?
MR LOOTS: Is it paragraph 13 or 17?
MR MOHLABA: 17, yes.
MR LOOTS: My rank? At that stage I was a Colonel.
MR MOHLABA: We know the rank of Modise, what was Modise's rank at that time?
MR LOOTS: If I recall correctly, I don't think he was a Warrant Officer at that stage, he was possibly a Sergeant, I am not sure Chairperson.
MR MOHLABA: You have mentioned of you having received information from Modise, how was this information communicated to you, was it telephonically, can you just explain?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, on that day if I recall correctly, there was a funeral at Zeerust, one of our members, Warrant Officer Gerber, this was the day of his funeral, I attended his funeral and that is the main reason why I was in Zeerust.
MR MOHLABA: My question was did you meet with Modise and talk to him and him explaining, giving this information to you?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, it was Modise and Lieutenant Wehrmann.
MR MOHLABA: I understand that but still I am not answered, I want to know did you sit with them, I want more information about that, was this mentioned by one of them or you sat and discussed the matter in detail that these people were to overnight there, etc, etc?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, practice was that Modise would usually after he had discussions with his source, he came to the office and in the office the thing was discussed by myself, Wehrmann and Modise.
MR MOHLABA: You have mentioned of you having attended a funeral at Zeerust, was this discussion taking place at the funeral or was it in an office at the Police station, just explain?
MR LOOTS: No, it was at the Security Branch Chairperson.
MR MOHLABA: The people present when this discussion was taking place were yourself and Modise and somebody else, you were only the three of you?
MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.
MR MOHLABA: Can you explain to this Committee, did you know these people, Take Five and Sadie before this discussion with Modise?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, specifically Sadie Pule, except for Sadie it was her brother Lekotho who was a member of Special Operations. The Pule family as such was known to us, not personally but by photo's which appeared in the official photo album as well as photo's which were found in the possession of arrested persons where they were identified positively as well as more recent photo's of Sadie. Take Five as such, if I recall correctly, his photo album number was 2447, but I never met him personally or Sadie Pule.
MR MOHLABA: But you heard of them as knowing their activities, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: Their names were mentioned on a regular basis, not only from sources from Western Transvaal but also from Durban as well as Cape Town. Their activities were reported frequently. And for the sake of clarity, I would like to mention that Lekotho Pule was so well known at some stage that when I communicated with Adolph Herschfeldt, he was the Commander of Botswana Special Branch, when I referred to Lekotho he referred to Galaxy Man. This was based on information which was given to us at a stage where he would receive a telephone call from Durban and he was arrested in the possession of a pistol and to summarise Chairperson, I can say that the Pule's over a long period, were active in Botswana.
MR MOHLABA: ... receiving this information from Modise as you have indicated, what did you do to try and confirm, was anything done to confirm or to establish whether the information was correct?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, with the highest exception, it happened in the past that Officers would have personal conversations with their subordinate sources and the confidentiality aspect was of such a nature that we knew our members and based on the information which such a source gave to us, a value would be attached to such a source and a source then would give us reliable information over the time, but in the light of my suggestion to Brigadier Schoon to act drastically, emanating from several discussions with the Botswana Police, I deemed it necessary to confer with Modise and we met with this source between Zeerust and Botswana and we had a discussion with him. I confirmed with this discussion with this source, that there was no doubt that these persons would be at this facility that evening.
MR MOHLABA: ... in Botswana, in the particular house where an unknown elderly woman was killed, did it take place a day after you had received the information, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the information I received before eleven o'clock of that morning, and the same evening, just after twelve o'clock, the attack was launched.
MR MOHLABA: Do you know whether any steps were taken before the attack to establish whether the people you were after, were actually in that house at the time of the attack?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the South African Police had no jurisdiction in South Africa firstly. Secondly, when we went to the border that evening, we had infra red equipment. The driver had infra red equipment so that we should not use the headlights of the vehicle and as it emanates from the Exhibits which was received from Vula, it would seem that two unknown persons went passed this particular house on bicycles, but without our knowledge and this was the cause, this caused Pule and Take Five to leave the house and they went somewhere else. I can also mention Chairperson, that such action by MK members was after the attack of the 14th of June 1985, this was something of a general nature. Barry Gilder in a book by the name of "Living on the Frontier" describes these circumstances and during the June 1985 attack, he was directly opposite one of the targets that was attacked and afterwards he says that they moved from house to house on a regular basis, which also happened in this instance.
CHAIRPERSON: You mean it is available in any library, you said chemist?
MR LOOTS: Excuse me Chairperson, library not chemist.
MR MOHLABA: Were you subsequently briefed of the developments after this attack at this particular house?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, yes the team returned and they did indeed report to Colonel Naude, it was dark and if I recall correctly they said that a man and a woman were killed.
MR MOHLABA: So the report was given on the 1st of January 1978?
MR LOOTS: The early hours of that morning, yes.
MR MOHLABA: And to learn that the people you were after, were not at that place at the time of the attack, what was your response, how did you respond to that?
MR LOOTS: Could you please repeat the question?
MR MOHLABA: After you have learnt that the people you were looking for, the people whom you sought to attack were not at the house at the time of the attack, how did you
respond to that?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, all that I can say is that it was a great disappointment to us.
MR MOHLABA: According to the information which you had at your disposal, who did you, rather, did you know who the house which was attacked, belonged to? Did you know the owner of the house or the tenants there?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the persons who normally occupied the house, I did not know them personally. According to information the house was inhabited by an elderly woman, usually.
MR MOHLABA: So it occurred to your mind at the moment that Sadie Pule and Take Five did not own that house and they were not the normal residents thereof?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
MR MOHLABA: Was any steps taken to ensure that persons other than Take Five and Sadie Pule were not killed or injured in that house?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no, the moment after the information was conveyed to Special Forces, they were in command of the operation or in control of the operation and it is difficult to determine beforehand who would be in the house.
MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair, I've got no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MOHLABA
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mohlaba. Ms Thabethe, do you have any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Yes, Mr Chairperson. Thank you. Mr Loots, according to your evidence you had a meeting before the actual attack took place, in this meeting, did you discuss the plan, did you have a plan on how you were actually going to attack the house or on how you were actually going to attack the targets?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, under normal circumstances I would just like to emphasise that Sadie Pule and Take Five were well known in Security circles, several Forces from the Security Branch reported their activities and a second aspect, the house that Modise pointed out as a target was also in the past used for accommodation. We had information to that effect. I don't know if that answers your question.
MS THABETHE: Not really, what I wanted to know is did you have a plan on how you were actually going to attack them? The means that you were going to use for attacking them, that is my question?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I am not aware of the plan. The normal practice would be that when such a team goes into the area, we had no doubt that Take Five and Sadie Pule would be there and no specific plan was established. If I recall correctly, it was a one or two roomed house, I have no more detail other than that.
ADV DE JAGER: It does not mean that whether you had a plan of the house in the sense whether it was a one or two roomed house or where the kitchen or whatever was, but whether you had, there was planning as to how the attack would take place?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no. Special Forces act independently of the SAP, they do their own planning as to how such an operation would be launched.
MS THABETHE: Exactly what did you finalise at this meeting, how were these targets going to be killed so to say?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, once again Take Five and Sadie Pule their activities were reported regularly to us in the past. We refer to Trevits, the list of targets and in Special Forces, also gathered information independently through the DCC, the Directorate of Covert Collections and they knew who we referred to and the type of weapons they would have in their possession and therefore we cannot prescribe to them as to how to act. They take their own decisions, this is Special Forces.
MS THABETHE: I don't know whether I am hearing correctly, are you saying whoever had to carry out the killing, had orders that they had to kill Take Five and Sadie Pule, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: It as entirely up to them how they did that, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: According to your evidence, you say you did not prescribe to them how they should go about killing these people?
MR LOOTS: No Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: The order that you gave is that Sadie Pule and Take Five should be killed, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: So I guess you wouldn't be in a position to respond about the fact that why maybe they didn't break into the house to find out whether Sadie Pule and Take Five were present?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, it is difficult to comment there on, because the person at the scene is the most important person and in the light of information to which a whole team had available, that both Take Five and Sadie Pule regularly had weapons in their possession, this would place them in a very difficult position. It is a matter of ...
MS THABETHE: Because I don't think answered, exactly who were the people who went there to carry out this order?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the Commander was Colonel Charl Naude of Special Forces, his subordinates were unknown to us, for security reasons they wore balaclavas and for security reasons they are also not known to us.
MS THABETHE: You see Mr Loots, what I am trying to determine, and maybe you can't comment on it, is the fact that since they had direct orders, specific orders to kill Sadie Pule and Take Five, and since it was well known that the house that was targeted, wasn't their house, they were not the only people who lived there, why didn't they break into the house to ensure that the intended target was hit? That is my question.
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I find it difficult to answer that question, I was not at the facility when the team of Special Forces arrived there. We had no information as to what type of weapons they had available and that is the only explanation which I can give, that such circumstances makes it very difficult for a person who has to act against a well known enemy.
CHAIRPERSON: Did they know who they were to attack?
MR LOOTS: Regularly Chairperson, with regards to the photo album that we had, we exchanged information as to who the targets were.
CHAIRPERSON: So Special Forces would have known who these two persons would have been?
MR LOOTS: Colonel Charl Naude would have known.
CHAIRPERSON: They had access to photo's of the two targets?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson. In all fairness I have to add that some of the photo's in the album, were quite old because it was difficult to acquire recent photo's regularly of these persons.
CHAIRPERSON: But I mean they had a reasonable idea as to who the targets were? For example Sadie Pule, if I understand you correctly, would not be an elderly woman as the owner of that house?
MR LOOTS: No Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So therefore they would know they are looking for a woman, they know it is not an elderly woman, they have an idea of what she looks like although it is not a recent photo that they had access to and they have a photo of Take Five?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson. I would like to add that this happened so quickly, it is either you or him. There is no doubt about that.
CHAIRPERSON: That is understandable.
MR LOOTS: And for that reason it is difficult for such an operative to have a look first, it was dark, it was dark moon that evening, there was no moon.
CHAIRPERSON: Did they have the night sight equipment, the operatives?
MR LOOTS: I am not sure what equipment they had. They had a separate conference before they left.
CHAIRPERSON: So you are not sure about the equipment?
MR LOOTS: I am not sure Chairperson, but I would assume that they did.
MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair. Was it reported to you Mr Loots after the attack, how the attack was done?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, once again, this team when they return, they report to their Commander not to us. I cannot recall any detail as to that, but what I can recall it was close to the border, I heard an explosion and afterwards there was fire. There was more than one explosion in any case.
MS THABETHE: My last question to you Mr Loots is, since the wrong victim was targeted or was killed eventually, how would you justify that politically, how would you justify the act of killing the wrong woman, how would you justify that politically? That is in relation to your application for amnesty?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, all that I can say is that when something of this nature happens, it was traumatic to me personally in the sense that no person, no person would like to kill innocent persons. Personally I feel very sorry. Just as Chairperson, we can refer to many instances in this sad country, the church bombs, the Church Street bomb, how many innocent people were killed there, I feel sorry for those people because us as members of the Security Police were tasked to prevent it, and we could not. That is my answer. Personally I feel very sorry. I wish I could erase it with an eraser, but I cannot.
MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Thabethe. You say that you contacted the source personally?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Was this in the early hours of the morning?
MR LOOTS: It was before eleven o'clock, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So you spoke to the source personally?
MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: And what convinced you that these two people would overnight in that specific house?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, as I have said previously that this house, this was not the first time that the house was used as a facility and secondly it was New Year's Eve and according to information which we received on a regular basis after the 14th of June 1985, concerning several targets in Botswana, it is true that the MK members were really frightened for their security and on a regular basis, they moved from facility to facility and I interpreted it as that they were far away from Gaberone in a rural area and this would be the ideal place for them to overnight on a New Year's Eve, under safe circumstances.
CHAIRPERSON: According to your information at that stage, regarding these two people Pule and Take Five, were they people who were rather mobile, did they move around a lot? If I heard you correctly then your evidence is that they almost never, that they never stayed more than one evening at the same place?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, yes, that is a fact. I don't know on how regular a basis they personally moved from place to place, but that it was the case, cannot be doubted. I would not say every evening at a different place, but on a regular footage. As the one Exhibit does indicate of the two people, we don't know who these people are that went passed the house, it is definitely of our people and these two, they were jittery enough if I can put it that way, that even two people that passes the house on a bicycle is enough to drive them out of the house. If I, by means of retrospect, then I would also do the same.
CHAIRPERSON: But it would appear as if there was no planning for the operation itself, for the steps that would be taken itself between where you could make an inset and to say these people are people that are very nervous and that they move around a lot, in other words you did not have an opportunity where you sat down with Naude and did some planning?
MR LOOTS: Naude Chairperson, to give you an idea, only arrived in the evening and in other words there wasn't much time. There wasn't much time.
CHAIRPERSON: Between yourself, you were in control of the Security Police?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: And you were in control, and he was in control of Special Forces and between the two of you, the two senior people, there was no planning that took place?
MR LOOTS: The only thing that we could offer him, we could not offer him a plan, follow this road and turn right here, for that reason, Modise was taken through the river. The second aspect Chairperson, that I would like to mention in this regard is that the nature of the information that this specific source had given over a long time, was so reliable that I had absolutely no doubt that those two people were going to be there.
CHAIRPERSON: In other words you relied completely on what the source said?
MR LOOTS: On the reliability of the source, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: You did not deem it necessary to take any independent steps or to ...
MR LOOTS: We did not have any other methods, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: And that was the morning that you had received the information?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: And the house was never placed under observation?
MR LOOTS: No Chairperson, not from our side.
CHAIRPERSON: And the attack occurred about 13 hours later, you say it was about before eleven o'clock in the morning and did you have this conversation with the source then?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And the attack happened just after twelve o'clock at night?
MR LOOTS: That is approximately 12 to 13 hours later then.
CHAIRPERSON: What did you do in the meantime then?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the terrain from Zeerust to the place where we had to cross the border, is very bushy, thorn trees, lots of thorn trees and it is not a general open road to the border. We also had to use a casspir vehicle which moved relatively slowly and this also was quite time consuming.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you have this conversation with the source in Zeerust?
MR LOOTS: Between the Botswana border and Zeerust.
CHAIRPERSON: And then from there, you moved closer to the border, after you had this conversation?
MR LOOTS: We were at a safe farm where we waited for Naude and from there, we moved to the point where they had to cross the border.
CHAIRPERSON: But you see Naude, after dawn he arrived there and it was already getting dark when you moved away from the safe farm? In other words you didn't know when the operatives or Special Forces went over the border, you had no idea how they were going to execute this operation?
MR LOOTS: No.
CHAIRPERSON: And Naude also did not tell you what they had in mind?
MR LOOTS: In later cases evidence will be given about the Kangwane operation where 10 targets were attacked, the SAP gives the information and the Defence Force does the attack, we have absolutely no insets about who, what or where they should do something.
CHAIRPERSON: But you and Naude waited on the RSA side while the operatives executed the order and you never spoke amongst each other and said "see Naude, we are going to do this" or something like this? He gave you no idea how they were planning to execute this operation, for example to determine if Pule or Take Five or both of them were in the house, to for instance knock on the door?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, once again the dilemma and this is my own interpretation, if you arrive at such a target, then it is people about whom reliable information had been gotten over a long time and the problem is you don't know what that person has in his possession. If you had to knock first to ensure then you would be the casualty. This was our dilemma Chairperson, in this kind of operation.
CHAIRPERSON: In other words does one have to understand, I know you weren't there, but the picture that you sketch is one of an attack where you kick the door open and you start shooting, is this the kind of image - I accept that there was a window broken and a handgrenade was thrown in and I also accept that the image that you have then, is an attack without any warning?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: It is then a surprise attack?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Then the people would hopefully be sleeping, the targets?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: And they would then not be in a position to fight back?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: You don't have any idea about who was in the house at the time?
MR LOOTS: According to our information, it was an elderly black woman that stayed in the house Chairperson, that is the only thing I know.
CHAIRPERSON: You did not receive any information about ... (tape ends) ... they came back and they mentioned to Naude that a man and a woman was killed. Did they say that those were the only people in the house or what?
MR LOOTS: That is the only thing that I can remember Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: The order to them was to kill a man and a woman?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Good. But you say that you had no idea, you don't even know if the alleged owner of this house, Materu, if this is the person that was killed?
MR LOOTS: No. This only became clear out of a Botswana newspaper article, the person that was killed.
CHAIRPERSON: But it was a person that wasn't known to the Security Police?
MR LOOTS: We did not know her Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: You did not aim to kill her?
MR LOOTS: Never Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well, and we are not sure if there was a second person killed as well.
MR LOOTS: It could be or it could not be, it is possible. From the Vula documents it looks as if it is possible, it looks as if it is possible that a man was also killed, but his identity I am not sure of.
CHAIRPERSON: If we suppose that it is indeed so that another man was killed, then he would be in the same position as the old lady?
MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : The reports you got, did it indicate whether the operatives went into the house to check on what damage might have been caused, how many were injured, if there were other people in the house, etc, etc?
MR LOOTS: Could you please repeat it for me.
ADV GCABASHE : The operatives who carried out the operation, did you get a report on who they might have found in the sense of it was an old lady because we went into the house to check. There were no other people because we went in to check. This damage was sustained because we were there and we went in, I just want that kind of detail please.
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, if I remember correctly then they did report to Colonel Naude, those three people and they reported that a man and a woman was killed in the house. The age and the descriptions, it was dark and so on and it was simply impossible for them to ascertain the ages and as far as I can remember, it wasn't even mentioned.
ADV GCABASHE : ... a general report, not a detailed one?
MR LOOTS: No, not a detailed one.
ADV GCABASHE : ... with a detailed report would be Mr Naude, because he got it directly from his operatives?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
ADV GCABASHE : But he reported to you as soon as the operation was completed?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
ADV GCABASHE : And you were actually close to the border at the time of the operation, you heard the explosion?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : ... help me in terms of Geography, Ramotswe, you know I can find my way from Zeerust to I think Gaberone border gate, Lohloweni, Ramotswe, which side of Lohloweni border gate would Ramotswe be?
MR LOOTS: It would be, can my colleagues help me just here, is it the Western side? To the Western side, thank you.
ADV GCABASHE : To the Western side?
MR VISSER: (Microphone not on)
CHAIRPERSON: Would you mind if we confiscate that and mark it, give it a reference, Exhibit N, thank you.
ADV GCABASHE : This is the house that Mr Modise would obviously have surveilled over a period of time, I mean he knew a lot about what happened at this house, is that so?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
ADV GCABASHE : When you had your discussion with Mr Modise on the night of the 31st going into the morning of the 1st, did he indicate to you how often Pule and Take Five visited this particular house?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no. No, all I can say to you is that different sources had reported about Ramotswe. Just to give you an indication, from the 11th of May 1984 up to the incident of that night of the 1st of January 1987, 13 different groups had infiltrated and during that same period Chairperson, in 17 occasions, they verbally and telephonically as I have given evidence, given telephone numbers, addresses and registrations to the Botswana Police and to answer the question, Modise as such did not on a regular footage receive information that Materu's house is used, but also from other sources.
ADV GCABASHE : As I understood your evidence it was just per chance that you were in Zeerust that weekend, the chance being the funeral of a colleague, yes?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : Where would you normally be stationed, Pretoria?
MR LOOTS: Potchefstroom.
ADV GCABASHE : Had you not been in Zeerust on Sunday, was that a Sunday, well, had you not been in Zeerust on the 31st, would you have received this report?
MR LOOTS: I would have Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : Would they have telephoned you in Potchefstroom?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : You know, what I am really trying to probe is the urgency in dealing with this issue there and then, why you had to immediately react without getting the opportunity to verify in any other way that the targets were the targets you were after, because it now transpires that you did not get the targets that you were after?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the reason why we reacted speedily, hastily was based on the fact that after 14 June 1985, after the attack on ten different targets, Barry Gilder refers to this, MK members were especially those moving underground in Botswana, were in a difficult situation to such an extent that on a regular basis, they changed houses and the quality of the information that we had received from this specific source, that was very reliable over a long period and I had no doubt, even if I had received it telephonically, I would have made this proposition to Brigadier Schoon so that he can consider it?
ADV GCABASHE : Coming back to the Special Forces, was it standard practice for you to ask them to execute operations like this for you?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : Had you, because this was your region, had you asked them to do this before?
MR LOOTS: Before?
ADV GCABASHE : Yes?
MR LOOTS: Yes. I am referring to the Gaberone attack on the 14th of June 1985.
ADV GCABASHE : And where would they get the authority to do as instructed by you, would they again have to check with their own command structures before they took an order that you had given to them?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson, their own command structure.
ADV GCABASHE : So Colonel Naude would have been told that Colonel Loots is going to give you an instruction, you execute that instruction? He would have been told by his superiors? How did it work, I really don't know how it worked?
MR LOOTS: Colonel Naude under these circumstances, I clarified it with Brigadier Schoon and Brigadier Schoon asked me to inform Charl Naude and on his turn, he gets authorisation from his Commanders and this is how it worked in the past Mr Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : You see, you indicated that the Special Forces, that the military, the Defence Force, had their own information on activities in Botswana and certainly had information on the Pule family. I heard you correctly?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson. DCI, Directorate of Covert Intelligence was specifically tasked to gather information about specific activities of certain individuals and normally we pool this information to see how it relates to each other and to see how we can support each other.
ADV GCABASHE : When you had a discussion with Colonel Naude about the information from your source. Was he able to verify that maybe they had the same information, was he able to exchange his own information base with you, I mean what was the nature of that discussion?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no, they had no additional information.
ADV GCABASHE : They did not even have the same information?
MR LOOTS: No Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : But there really wasn't time any way to check on what other information they might have received, because Mr Modise had just recently, that very same day or a day before, received this information?
MR LOOTS: Yes, it was very difficult.
ADV GCABASHE : In the time that you were the Commander in that region, how many times did you have this type of mistaken killing, you know, wrong killing?
MR LOOTS: This was the only one.
ADV GCABASHE : In your time?
MR LOOTS: The only one that I know of.
CHAIRPERSON: Can I just have a follow up question Mr Loots, when Naude conveyed to you what his operatives had said, what was your reaction, did you think that the operation was successful?
MR LOOTS: We accepted that we had hit the right targets, Chairperson, I was under that impression. It was a disappointment and a shock to us when we were proved wrong.
CHAIRPERSON: When did you find out that you were wrong?
MR LOOTS: The Botswana newspapers reported it firstly and then from the source as well.
CHAIRPERSON: The source also came to tell you that you had killed the wrong persons?
MR LOOTS: I cannot recall how long afterwards, but it was also on the Botswana radio as well.
CHAIRPERSON: And the source also confirmed that the wrong people were killed?
MR LOOTS: That is indeed so Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: You never found Pule and Take Five?
MR LOOTS: Never again, no Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well, thank you. Re-examination?
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Just one question Chairperson. Brigadier Loots, let us just get clarity over this point, when you decided along with Brigadier Schoon as to what action to take along with Special Forces, did you realise that the possibility existed that innocent persons could be hit in this operation?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson yes.
MR VISSER: And did you reconcile yourself with this?
MR LOOTS: Yes, I did Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Thank you. Then just a final point, I think you understood Commissioner Gcabashe's question incorrectly, I think what she wants to know from you Brigadier Loots is simply the following - when these operatives returned and reported to Naude, please tell me first hand, were you within hearing distance or did he come and tell you?
MR LOOTS: No, I was within earshot of them.
MR VISSER: What the Commissioner wants to know is did they report that they went into the house after the attack or not?
MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Before or after?
MR LOOTS: After.
MR VISSER: Did they say that after the incident they went into the house?
MR LOOTS: That is as I recall it Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : Are you saying you still don't know who the other person is who was killed, you know Materu was killed because of the report. The other person's, the identity?
MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson, I do not know.
ADV GCABASHE : The reports in the papers did not identify that person?
MR LOOTS: Not as far as I recall Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : So it could have been a citizen of Botswana or it could have been a South African, you just have no clue at all?
MR LOOTS: It could have been Chairperson. I do not have any confirmation, strictly speaking when such a person is killed, his identity is made known, but I cannot recall it. There were indeed rumours.
ADV GCABASHE : You know, knowing that Materu facilitated the work of the ANC in your region essentially, why did you not do something about this before? What made you act, I know these two people were important, is this the only reason you acted on this particular day?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, in the light of, I refer to 13 infiltrations and 17 discussions with Security Police of Botswana and also the involvement of the Pule family, we then decided that the information came from a reliable source and even their own brother, Abraham Pule was arrested after he came into the country from Botswana, so the Pule family was over a long period, involved. I made the proposition to Brigadier Schoon and that is the only answer I can give you.
ADV GCABASHE : Thank you Chair, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Adv De Jager, have you got any questions?
ADV DE JAGER: This brother Abraham, was he before this incident or after this incident, was he arrested?
MR LOOTS: I cannot recall, maybe some of my colleagues at Zeerust could recall because they were involved there.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, have you got anything else?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, I am just informed that Ms Thabethe has just handed us a document, I haven't seen it before, I don't know what it is about. I am not sure, perhaps before you release this witness, may we quickly scan through it and see if we've got to deal with it through this witness? In order to save time, Chairperson, I just have it in front of me, perhaps I should go through it aloud with you, in order to save time.
MS THABETHE: Sorry Mr Chair, can I just clarify, I gave it to Mr Wagener, it is a human rights violation statement that was made by Take Five, but why I give it to him is because it clarifies who the victim was on the day.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, why is it handed to me at the end of my witness' evidence, why couldn't it be handed to us before?
CHAIRPERSON: Can't you, I don't know, there may be some assistance forthcoming from the document to identify possible witnesses. Can you do that by agreement or something?
MS THABETHE: Sure. Mr Chair, if I can clarify for Mr Visser, there is no new information in the document, it is just newspaper cuttings which clarify that there was one victim.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, I have a real problem with a document being handed to me at the end of my witness' evidence, which I never saw before. Really I don't want to criticise anybody, but Ms Thabethe should give us these things beforehand. It could save time, it could make a huge difference. I don't know, she says there is nothing in it, I don't know about that. Really with great respect, could we ask you to perhaps, it might be an idea if I may suggest it Chairperson, that we take the lunch adjournment until quarter past two so that I can have time to look at this document?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. No, I think it is fair enough, you should have a look at the document and perhaps we can take the lunch adjournment, but not until quarter past two.
MR VISSER: Quarter to two?
CHAIRPERSON: All right, we shall do that, we shall adjourn and you can use the time to look at it and we will reconvene at quarter to two.
MR VISSER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, I don't know whether you have made mark on your original map, could you perhaps mark ours too please?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Visser?
WIKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (s.u.o.)
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (cont)
Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, first of all may I suggest to accept the document handed to us before the lunch adjournment as Exhibit O. There is quite a lot that appears from this document, for one thing we have an identification of the deceased. We believe that it is best to be dealt with in argument. The witness can't really take the matter any further and it would be a waste of time for me to go through the document with him. Under those circumstances, we have no further questions for Mr Loots, thank you Chairperson. I am sorry, perhaps incorrectly.
MR VISSER: I am sorry, perhaps incorrectly I just assumed that you would be provided with copies of the document.
MS THABETHE: I have given it to (indistinct).
MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Chairperson. Perhaps there might be one question which does arise from page 4, paragraph 9, which I might just put to Brigadier Loots for his general comment. Brigadier, there is a statement in Exhibit O from one Aaron Mkwanazi, the house that was attacked on New Year's Day was a house in Ramotswe that belonged to an elderly lady and then he also says
"... supporter and used to be an activist."
Thus far you have believed that she might have been an innocent person?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: But now we do know that she was indeed and from further remarks from this Exhibit that she was a collaborator and an ANC activist?
MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: With regard to all this documentation, have you a better idea as to how many people were killed in this operation?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no. In the statement mention is made of four persons. ... people, a man, woman and child have been killed. There are newspaper extracts attached to this, but nowhere in this newspaper extract is it mentioned who these people could have been and I do not know.
MR VISSER: ... page 4, paragraph 10 Chairperson. You will see right at the bottom he says
"... that an old woman and three unknown people, a man, woman and child had been killed."
But when I have the opportunity to address you in argument, I will point out to you that in the rest of the documentation, there is no reference at all to anyone except the old woman. Incidentally what has now also appeared, is that the Botswana Security Police went to this premises the next day, where they discovered the arms cache to which reference was made on Exhibit M P02 and when they lifted the arms cache, there was an explosion in which five of them were seriously injured. That is at page 15, you will find that Chairperson. I must say if I may be allowed to say so, it helps to have this kind of information when you hear amnesty applications, in order to gain some of the background. At page 15 it is an article in the Daily News, it reads like this, the middle column, the second last and the last paragraph, it says -
"... five members of the Botswana Defence Force were injured when a life handgrenade exploded as the soldiers tried to remove it, to defuse it outside the village. One of them were critically injured and had to undergo - yes - Princess Marina Hospital in Gaberone where explosive shrapnels were removed from his body."
It doesn't talk about an arms cache, but it talks about an explosion. It seems to tie in with what Exhibit N tells you. Chairperson, if there are no further questions to Brigadier Loots, may I then call Brigadier Schoon?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Loots, you are excused.
MR VISSER: Oh, I am sorry.
WITNESS EXCUSED
