ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We will now commence with the application hearings of Messrs E. Mathebe, C. Mathebe, P. Mathebe and J Maake. I've already introduced the Panel. I would at this stage request the legal representatives to kindly place themselves on record.
MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson. My name is Brian Koopedi. I represent the four applicants before you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Koopedi. Mr Engelbrecht.
MR ENGELBRECHT: Chairperson, my name is Jan Engelbrecht. I represent Mrs Fourie. All the other Fourie people are also present. I do not directly represent them for these purposes.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Engelbrecht.
ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Chairman. My surname is Steenkamp. I'll be the Evidence Leader and just for the record, one of the other victims, one of the other matters, Inspector Sipongwane is present here today. I am not officially representing him, but my request is that if there are any questions that he would like to raise after the testimony, that he can do so. At the moment my instructions are that he is not opposing the application in totality whatsoever.
CHAIRPERSON: But you'll nevertheless look after his interests, should the need arise.
ADV STEENKAMP: If that can be allowed ... (indistinct -speaking simultaneously) Thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Mr Koopedi.
MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, I believe we are ready to begin and if the Honourable Committee would allow us, we would like to call the applicants in another order, not as they have been indicated in our documents and the order will be, the first will be Jerome Maake and then followed by Piet Mathebe, the third one be Doctor Mathebe, Charles Doctor Mathebe and the fourth one be Chakie Edison Mathebe.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Koopedi. So you'll be commencing with the evidence of Mr Maake?
MR KOOPEDI: That is indeed so.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, Mr Maake is seated right next to me. He's ready to be sworn in.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
JEROME JOSEPH MAAKE: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi.
EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Mr Maake, is it correct that you are an applicant in this matter?
MR MAAKE: That is correct.
MR KOOPEDI: Is it also correct that the document appearing on page 62 to 68 or this bundle of documents, that is the document I'm showing to you now, is your application form?
MR MAAKE: That's correct.
MR KOOPEDI: Is it also correct that the signature on page 67 is your signature?
MR MAAKE: That's correct.
MR KOOPEDI: Would you briefly enlighten this Honourable Committee as to your activities and perhaps starting first with when did you join the ANC and where?
MR MAAKE
"My name is Jerome Joseph Maake. I joined the ANC in 1980 Swaziland. I was trained in Angola and then I came back into the country in 1981. I conducted operations in the then Northern Transvaal.
In 1982 I was arrested and I was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment and I was sent to Robben Island. In 1985 I made an appeal and I won that appeal and there was a re-trial in Pietersburg and I was given a suspended sentence.
In 1985, after the State of Emergency was declared, I left the country again and I attended a refresher course in Angola. In 1986, I infiltrated the country again and I operated in the Mawudse area. There was a problem concerning the incorporation of Mawudse into the then KwaNdebele. My main task was to train the Comrades in the vicinity of Mawudse so that they could resist that incorporation into KwaNdebele. I became the Operational Commander in my unit at Mawudse.
In this unit was myself, Piet Mathebe, Doctor Mathebe and Chakie Mathebe and Mike. Our unit was responsible for several operations. The first one was the Tsantsabela or Sansloo operation where our unit received a message that one of our comrades, that is Khala, he has been kidnapped and it was believed that the person who kidnapped him is the same person who threatened him at that day, so our main aim was to go and get that person as Tsantsabela, that is the place where comrade Khala was.
Unfortunately when we arrived there, when we wanted to go with him he said he was afraid to go with us. I remember I fired three to four shots at him and a commotion ensued and there and then we decided to retreat. Our second operation was ...(indistinct)"
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry to interrupt. You say you fired three or four shots at him. Did you strike him, hit him with the bullets?
MR MAAKE: I do not remember because it was at night. I didn't receive a report-back about what happened, but I shot in his direction.
CHAIRPERSON: And did you see him fall, or - could you just give a couple of more details - how far were you from him when you shot him?
MR MAAKE: I could have been about 10 metres from him because he was running away. If I remember well, he did fall.
CHAIRPERSON: And did you have an AK47 or did you have a pistol? What sort of firearm?
MR MAAKE: I had an AK47 and it was on semi-automatic. "The second operation was Sempupule or Dennilton Magistrate Court. It is known as Sempupule. In that operation we used a limpet mine because people were being harassed in that area. We undertook reconnaissance of that Magistrates Court and we decided that the best way was to put a limpet mine in order to destroy that building. Because that Court always had people, we decided to put that limpet on Friday in the afternoon. According to the delay mechanism of this limpet mine, it was supposed to have exploded within two to three hours but what happened, it did not explode from Friday, Saturday until Sunday and then on Monday we decided that the delay mechanism of ... (indistinct) had a problem and we decided that we have to warn the people that there was an explosive in that building. Our unit decided to send one of us to go and phone to warn the people there that there was an explosive there and I later learnt that that limpet mine was destroyed."
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Maake, so when you originally placed and if it had worked according to your plan, at what time of the day would it have gone off, if nothing had gone wrong?
MR MAAKE: It was supposed to have exploded at around half-past three. It was put there rather at half-past three and was supposed to explode around 5 o'clock.
CHAIRPERSON: That is when the work of the Court is finished?
MR MAAKE: That's correct. ...(no translation)
CHAIRPERSON: We're not getting the interpretation coming through.
MR MAAKE
"The next operation took place at Mothethe, the corner of Mothethe at the T-junction between the road from Marble Hall and Dennilton, that was supposed to have been an ambush. At that corner it was the place where many policemen used to meet, policemen from Kwagga police station, Siabuswa and Dennilton, when they were meeting there to plan their harassment operations, so we decided that that was the right place, so that the police vehicle could not pass there. If I remember well it was at night, at around 9 to 10 o'clock at night. It was the three of us, in fact we were four. Our drive was Chakie Mathebe who waited for us in the vehicle a distance from that corner. We were waiting for any police vehicle that would come. We will identify that vehicle by its numberplate. While we were still waiting there, myself, Mike and Johnny, a vehicle appeared. If I remember well, it was a white car. There was a green lamp on top of that vehicle. He turned at that place and came to a standstill and then we realised that was a police vehicle, then we shot at it and then from there we retreated and we left with our vehicle."
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Maake again. You said yourself, Mike and Johnny. Now you mentioned Mike earlier as being a member of your unit. Do you know what his name was, or was that just his operative - his war name? Who was Mike?
MR MAAKE: I don't know the real names. We used our pseudo names. I wouldn't know their full names but as far as I know he was from that area and he was trained from outside and the same thing applies to Johnny. He also worked with us in the same unit.
CHAIRPERSON: And you don't know where they are today?
MR MAAKE: I learnt that Mike died in an operation on the way from Swaziland to the RSA. I'm not sure about Johnny because since I was injured I left the unit and went back to Zambia where I received treatment.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes and did all three of you shoot at the vehicle, you, Mike and Johnny?
MR MAAKE: If I remember well, the person who struck the car was Johnny, we were just providing a cover, but also firing. When we were firing we were also retreating.
CHAIRPERSON: And this was - was it with AK47s?
MR MAAKE: That's correct.
"Another operation took place at Kwagga police station. At that operation we also used a limpet mine. After we realised that the limpet mine that we used at the Sempupule Magistrate Court had a problem with its delay mechanism, we decided to booby trap this one because its timing mechanism is a plate, then we decided to remove that plate so that immediately you pull out that pin, it explodes. My understanding of the three foot pot was that its material was the same one that is used for hand grenades, so we used that big pot, the biggest one, three foot pot and then we put the limpet mine inside and then we constructed a flag on that pot and we wrote that MK is here. We took that pot and we put it at the corner of the police station. That would mean that if you pull out the flag, the limpet mine would immediately explode. I don't know whether it did explode because it was never reported in the newspapers or radios.
Another operation is the Dennilton police station operation. We undertooK a reconnaissance of that police station and our understanding was that the police station could be attacked. We went there on Friday around 8 o'clock in the evening and then we took cover next to the police station. Our aim was to attack that police station around 9 o'clock in the evening, but people were going in and out of that police station, so we could not go there whilst civilians were at the police station. We waited there from around 8 o'clock until the early hours of the morning the following day and at that time there was no civilians at the police station. When we tried to get inside the gates were locked and we shot from outside the fence into the police station and we threw in a mini limpet mine which did not explode and there was also an exchange of fire that ensued. The police were shooting back at us. After that we fled."
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Maake, when you say we, who carried out that operation with you?
MR MAAKE
"Still on this operation, I was with Chakie who was the driver. He was at a distance of between one to two kilometres away from us. I was with Mike and Johnny again."
MR KOOPEDI: I believe that is the whole detail of the operations which you were involved in, which are the subject of the application for amnesty today. Is that correct?
MR MAAKE: That is correct.
MR KOOPEDI: Now, do you think that you have told this Honourable Committee the whole truth as far as you can recall?
MR MAAKE: That's correct.
MR KOOPEDI: And do you strongly believe that you have dealt with the requirement of full disclosure which is required from you, for you to be able to get any amnesty?
MR MAAKE: That's correct.
MR KOOPEDI: Now did you receive any personal gain, payment or anything of the sort for having participated in these operations?
MR MAAKE: The only thing that I gained is that South Africa is today liberated and all of us can vote.
MR KOOPEDI: Now your actions, do you regard them as having been politically motivated and with a political objective?
MR MAAKE: That's correct.
MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, that is the evidence for our first applicant. Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KOOPEDI
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Koopedi. Mr Engelbrecht, do you have any questions that you would like to put to Mr Maake?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ENGELBRECHT: Could you explain what political gain, what was the political reasoning for these actions?
MR MAAKE: South Africa was then in a state of war. It was a political war as far as I'm concerned, and all the operations that I was involved in were aimed at the core of the system itself. That is the police, the police stations and those were the people who were at the core of the operation, so I believe that everything that I did was political.
MR ENGELBRECHT: What was the involvement of Chief Mathebe?
MR MAAKE: Chief Mathebe was one of my recruits and he received training from me internally. He was in our command structure.
MR ENGELBRECHT: Was he anyhow involved with the operation pertaining to the Fourie police people?
MR MAAKE: Because we planned together as the command structure for each and every operation, as far as I'm concerned he was involved because he was part of the people who undertook the planning.
MR ENGELBRECHT: Were there any people supporting your action and your operation who were members of the police at that particular station at that particular time and stage?
CHAIRPERSON: Which station are you talking about, the Dennilton or Kwagga? Just Dennilton station?
MR ENGELBRECHT: Yes Chair.
MR MAAKE: There were no policemen in our unit.
CHAIRPERSON: I think the question was not whether they were in your unit, but whether there was any assistance received from any policemen in your operations.
MR MAAKE: No. As far as I remember, we never received any support from the police.
MR ENGELBRECHT: How long in advance before this operation took an event, has it been planned and decided and who were the people involved in the planning?
MR MAAKE: Which operation are you referring to? Are you referring to the police station operation, or the Fourie operation?
MR ENGELBRECHT: I am referring to the Fourie operation.
MR MAAKE: There was no specific time frame that you could put for planning and the time of implementation of the plan or the operation itself. It is difficult for me to say that we planned that for two days or so, but because it was at the corner, that we knew that police will definitely come at that place. I don't think that it took us a long time to undertake the planning.
MR ENGELBRECHT: What I need to know is, was it an impulsive decision on that particular date, to, at that particular date that evening go down and do the operation, or was the operation planned before the evening?
MR MAAKE: We made a plan before that time.
MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir, could you lead me on how long before the incident occurred did you do the planning? Certainly you should remember that?
MR MAAKE: Like I've said earlier on, I would not be able to estimate when we did the planning and when we implemented the plan but we decided that that was a good spot for ambush.
MR ENGELBRECHT: I learnt from your testimony that ...(intervention)
MR MALAN: Sorry just before you proceed. On this point, Mr Maake, is it possible that you got to that decision on that same afternoon or evening and decided simply to go to that spot to see if you could find a police vehicle stopping there that night and implement the operation? Could it have been on the same day?
MR MAAKE: Like I said, on deciding about the ambush spot, we might have decided about that long ago, that that was the appropriate spot. We didn't plan for a specific person or for a specific car, we just planned that at that spot, the police would definitely pass there.
MR MALAN: I'm not sure that you understand my question. I asked you whether it was possible, because you are saying you can't remember at all when the planning was done, if I understood you correctly. My question is, is it possible that you planned on that afternoon? You see, if you'll bear with me Mr Engelbrecht, I can's see what much planning you had to do because it seems all you had to do was to take the AK47s and move to the spot and if you do find a vehicle, to shoot at the police. That's not planning, that's simply a decision and implementing it. There's no logistics that you have to attend to, so my question is simply, is it possible that the decision to carry out such an operation was made on the same day? Is it possible?
MR MAAKE: Yes, that's correct.
MR MALAN: Thank you. Thank you Mr Engelbrecht.
MR ENGELBRECHT: Thank you Chairperson. Why would it have been beneficial to kill the police or pardon me, to do the operation in which police people were evidently killed? Why would it have been beneficial for your operation, for your whole enterprise which you had there, Sir?
MR MAAKE: As I said earlier on, policemen were the symbol of oppression and in the vicinity of Mawudse, there was ...(indistinct) and other members of the police were involved in harassing the people, searching their houses, assaulting them and they were seen by the community as enemy number one of the people. Shooting of them would depose to the morale of the people and it would also show that we could fight back and that would demoralise the police themselves.
MR ENGELBRECHT: Sir when I listen to your testimony pertaining to the limpet planning or the second operation more specifically, I got the impression that it is your policy not to have caused harm or injury to women and children, is that correct?
MR MAAKE: That's correct.
MR ENGELBRECHT: On the particular evening when this incident occurred during the third operation, there was a young person together with Lieut Fourie, accidentally happening to be his son, were you aware of that fact, or not?
MR MAAKE: I know today.
MR ENGELBRECHT: On the particular evening, had you had any notice of who the in sitting people of the vehicle were?
MR MAAKE: Our understanding was that they were policemen because the registration number of the vehicle indicated that the vehicle belonged to the kwaNdebele police and it also had a green light on top.
MR ENGELBRECHT: There might be some technical issues pertaining to my next question and I would wish the Chair to direct me on these matters, but on page 74 of the transcription, there is a statement, a report by the Chief PM, Mathebe, in connection with the amnesty application of Charles Mathebe and if I may refer your attention to paragraph 4 of the said statement, on to page 74 and I quote there, it reads as follows
"The second operation which was also sanctioned by our structure, was that of Lieut Fourie and his son, at Mothethe."
It seemingly, or the impression one gets from reading this report is that it was known that the Lieutenant, together with his son, would have been there. If you could just explain the seeming contradiction which I find here, Sir.
MR MAAKE: Now I have explained that the people who were in the vehicle, we only knew about them after the operation, that is when we read that in the newspapers. According to our plan, it was to ambush the police vehicle at that spot. There was no way that we could have known earlier on who would be the occupants of the vehicles at what time. We only learnt that after.
MR ENGELBRECHT: Could you explain to the Tribunal that the location of your self, Mike and Johnny on this particular evening pertaining and regarding the vehicle, where was each one of the people standing, where were they shooting at, and more particulars regarding that, please.
CHAIRPERSON: Just before you get onto that, Mr Maake, this intersection to Marble Hall and Dennilton, is it in a rural area? Is it in the countryside or is it within a village, or what is the situation? What does- at that time what did the T-junction look like? Where was it, in a built-up area or was it out in the country somewhere?
MR MAAKE: It is outside the village. The village is about 500 metres from the T-junction.
CHAIRPERSON: So there's no buildings right at the place, no houses or shops, or petrol stations or anything like that, right at the intersection?
MR MAAKE: I remember there was a garage but it is at a distance from the T-junction itself. It can be about 500 metres from the T-junction.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Now Mr Engelbrecht has asked if you could just give some detail as to the actual attack, you know, where the vehicle was where you attacked it, where you positioned yourself, Mike and Johnny, Chakie, if you could just describe how the actual attack was carried out.
MR MAAKE: Okay. What happened was that myself and Mike, I think that the best way would be for me to make a sketch, but I can try it in this way. The car was coming from the Marble Hall direction and then it turned as if it was going towards Dennilton and then it turned around, made a u-turn and then in the direction of Marble Hall again and then we were on the left-hand side of the car. Where I was standing with Mike, I was at the corner but along the road to Dennilton and Johnny was on the other side next to the road to Kwagga.
MR ENGELBRECHT: Could I get some more indication Sir, yourself together with one person on the left-hand side of the vehicle and Johnny on the other side of the vehicle?
MR MAAKE: I say the car came and made a u-turn at that T-junction, as if it was going to Dennilton and it made a u-turn and it stopped on the left-hand side of the road to Marble Hall, we were on the opposite side.
MR ENGELBRECHT: Did you shoot at the car when it was in a stationery position or when it was still in movement?
MR MALAN: I think he said it had stopped, Mr Engelbrecht.
MR ENGELBRECHT: The other people who accompanied you, where did they - are you familiar with where they got their training and how they became members of the structure?
MR MAAKE: I know they were trained outside the country and they were members of the MK.
MR ENGELBRECHT: When did you take command of the operations in that particular area? I learnt that you came there that particular year, did you immediately take command or was it only after some time and how long had you been in command when this operation pertaining to the Fouries, took an ...(indistinct)?
MR MAAKE: I have explained this earlier on and I said that most of the people that I worked with were internally trained by myself, so that means that I was their Commander.
MR ENGELBRECHT: I have no further questions at this particular time and stage, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ENGELBRECHT
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Engelbrecht. Mr Steenkamp, do you have any questions that you would like to put to the witness?
ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Honourable Chairman. My instructions from the victim is not to ask any questions at this stage. Thank you.
NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Sandi, any questions? Mr Malan any questions?
MR MALAN: Mr Maake, I just want to go back to the question about the planning. You will appreciate it that this has been the subject of speculation as to who had ben responsible now for the best part of 15 years and it created a major question in the minds of the next of kin, but really everyone. There were all kinds of innuendos and let me just put it to you that the impression led there is that this was a kind of almost on the spot decision. It was - it couldn't really have been a long term planning thing as you have conceded that the decision could have been taken on the same day. Can you remember where this decision was taken?
MR MAAKE: The decision for the operation, like I said earlier on, was the identification of that particular spot as a good ambush spot, that meant if we were to undertake an ambush, that would be an ideal sport. I would not be sure as to when we decided about that because we sit down and think about possible targets. Sometimes possible targets will be police stations, Magistrate's Courts and others and this spot was one of the areas on which we could ambush. I cannot say that on a specific day we sat down and planned the operation, but as far as I remember, what we used to do, somebody will go there under the instruction of the unit to reconnoitre the place and thereafter we would take a decision on the basis of the information that we'd received from him.
MR MALAN: I don't want any explanation as to how you would normally have planned. I want you to speak only to your recollection and if you can't recollect it, then just say so. I'm not trying to put you on the spot. I'm trying to get some clarity for the sake of the next of kin of the Fourie father and son. My question really was, can you remember where you were when the planning was done, when this decision was taken and can you remember who was present?
MR MAAKE: I cannot remember the place where we took the decision, but I remember that Chakie and Kgoshi were there.
MR MALAN: Chakie and?
MR MAAKE: Chakie Mathebe and Petros Mathebe, they were part of the Command structure of this unit. That is when we were coming to identify that spot as an appropriate spot for ambush.
MR MALAN: Now a follow-up question from that, why did you decide to involve only Johnny, Mike and Chakie? Why did you not involve the other decision makers in the command structure, in your unit, in carrying out this operation?
MR MAAKE: I don't think I remember your question well. If you had a three AK47s, that would mean that you are going to use three people. We involved Chakie as a driver, there was no need to have many people, three people were enough for the operation, if I understood your question well.
MR MALAN: No. Are you saying that you had only three AK47s at the time, or did you say that you thought three people would be enough?
MR MAAKE: Three people were enough for that type of an operation.
MR MALAN: So you can't recall why you decided on the specific three people? Why Johnny and Mike and not, for instance, Charles Doctor or Piet Mathebe?
MR MAAKE: Okay. Mike and Johnny were trained outside the country. At that time, the other people were only internally trained.
MR MALAN: Thank you, that it explains it to me. Thank you very much, Mr Maake. Thank you Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Maake, with regard to the incident where Khala was abducted and then you went and there was the shooting. The victim there who's been referred to variously as Mr Mishi or Mnisi, from the papers its not 100% clear whether he was injured. I've seen some statements saying that he wasn't injured and I've seen other statements saying that he was shot in the leg because he was seen on crutches. Did you see him after the incident?
MR MAAKE: No, I haven't.
CHAIRPERSON: So you don't know yourself personally whether he was injured or not?
MR MAAKE: No, I don't.
CHAIRPERSON: But it would seem that if he was injured, the extent of the injury was a shot in the leg?
MR MAAKE: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: With regard to the attack on the Dennilton police station where you waited till the early hours of the morning and you started shooting from the fence because the gate was locked, did you just shoot at the building, or were you aiming at policemen that you could see? What was the situation there? Was it just random shooting at the building or were you sharp-shooting? Sniping at policemen?
MR MAAKE: We were shooting through the windows. From where we were standing at the gate to the entrance of the police station, my estimation is that it can bee 25 metres, so we were shooting through the window and the door.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you personally know, we know from the papers, but at the time of that attack when you terminated it and left, were you aware that you had injured anybody at all, or didn't you know at that time?
MR MAAKE: I did not know, even today I do not know whether a person was injured in that shooting.
CHAIRPERSON: With regard to the attack on Lieut Fourie and his son at the T-junction, whereabout did Chakie park your vehicle in relation to the T-junction?
MR MAAKE: He was at the next village, about three to four kilometres from where we were, that is from the T-junction.
CHAIRPERSON: Was that the first time ...(intervention)
INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry. Was that the first time that you or members of your unit had gone to that intersection to wait for police or had you or any of your members been there previously and waited unsuccessfully when no police turned up?
MR MAAKE: It was for the first time besides the reconnaissance.
CHAIRPERSON: Now, how long had you been waiting there before the vehicle arrived, the vehicle that you ultimately shot at?
MR MAAKE: I would not be sure, but it can be around 30 minutes because where we were standing was something like a taxi rank or a bus stop because taxis used to stop there. We were waiting there just like any other people and there were also other two people waiting there, waiting for the taxi.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and I don't know if you had thought about it, but had you made up your minds or discussed how long you would have waited, I mean, if that vehicle didn't come, would you sit there the whole night, or what did you say to Chakie when you left him, when will you see him again? How long was he expected to wait for you? If nothing happened, let's assume nothing happened, how long would you have waited for a vehicle?
MR MAAKE: We didn't plan as to how long we were going to wait there, we just told Chakie to wait for us until we come back. Because of the movements of police in that area at that time, we didn't expect to be there for a long time.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Koopedi, do you have any questions arising out of questions that have been put by members of the Panel?
MR MALAN: Chair, just before Mr Koopedi proceeds, flowing from an answer given to one of your questions. You said you were waiting at the taxi rank and there were other people there and you specifically remember two people waiting. Where did you keep the AK47s when you were standing at a taxi rank, taxis are stopping and departing?
MR MAAKE: They were in the bag, we put them in the bag.
MR MALAN: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Any questions arising Mr Koopedi?
MR KOOPEDI: No questions, thanks Chairperson.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Engelbrecht, any questions arising?
MR ENGELBRECHT: Please Chairperson.
FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ENGELBRECHT: My question only relates to the organisational aspect of the structure. Sir, would you agree that an operation is complete when the aim is achieved?
MR MAAKE: I don't think I understand your question well.
MR ENGELBRECHT: I'll put it to you more directly. It strikes me peculiar that after the shooting of the police station, no follow-up was done to see who was struck and who was not struck. Only after the shooting of the Fouries had already taken place, you learn in the newspaper that there was a son involved and it strikes me surprising that something is planned, but it seems not, to me, whether yourself in your capacity then as the leader of the structure, follows up whether what has been planned has been actually executed and completed, so can you explain to me then, if not to the Tribunal, how come that afterwards assessment of what has been achieved, has never been done properly?
MR MAAKE: In this operation involving Mr Fourie and his son, it was reported in the City Press newspaper. It was explained that it was Mr Fourie who was a Commander of the KwaNdebele police and his son, who was an instructor in Pretoria police college. That was what appeared on the City Press report.
MR ENGELBRECHT: Within your organisation, how many people should be present when a meeting is chaired? How are the decisions made? Is it done per consensus, or are you actually guiding the people to give them instructions and they must execute that? Can you just explain to the Commission how the organisational aspects of your command structure look like?
MR MAAKE: Are you referring to the plans?
CHAIRPERSON: I think what Mr Engelbrecht is asking is, how did you arrive at decisions? When I say you, your unit or your command structure, how did you work? Did you work by consensus or would you as a Commander say: "Well, this is it" and everybody would go along with you? He just wants to know how you functioned and what procedures you adopted, if any, in arriving at decisions regarding operations.
MR MAAKE: It would depend on the type of the operation, but usually we would sit down as the command structure and decide and then we will send somebody to go and undertake a reconnaissance and then thereafter we will agree on the operation. On the operational part, two people would be given the task of planning on the type of material that would be used in the operation, that happens after the reconnaissance. It was not just a one-man show.
MR MALAN: I think the question, just also for my sake, is when you sit down on the command structure and you come to a decision, do you vote, do you simply all agree, if someone would be dissenting would you discuss it further, how - was there any prescriptions as to how you had to get to a decision? That's how I understood Mr Engelbrecht's question.
MR MAAKE: We take a decision and everybody has a right to air his views. Every person has a right to disagree with the operation, so we will discuss that and debate about it before we arrive at a decision, whether this is an appropriate target or not.
CHAIRPERSON: And then was your decision usually on a consensus basis, where everybody then would agree, or would you go ahead with an operation where two of your members would say: "No, we're very much against it", but because three have said: "Yes, we're for it", you would carry it out, or did you work on a consensus basis where you all at the time of making the decision, were in favour of it?
MR MAAKE: As far as I can recollect, I don't remember any disagreement amongst ourselves, but we wouldn't simply go for an operation if there was no agreement about it.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Engelbrecht.
MR MAAKE: The decisions made by the unit you were the Commander of, did that have to be ratified or sanctioned by a higher office, a higher unit, a higher command structure, before operation and if so, did that in particular happen, pertaining to the shooting of the police people at the T-junction?
MR MAAKE: No, we were the last people to take the decision. The general order that was given from PMC in Lusaka was that because people were being harassed, they were forced to - the people of Mawudse were forced to be reincorporated into KwaNdebele and they resisted that so the decision about a specific operation was taken by us.
MR ENGELBRECHT: I wish to ask you ...(intervention)
ADV SANDI: Sorry, Mr Engelbrecht. I'm not sure, will you be moving on to something else? Just on this, did you give any report subsequent to this operation? Did you give any report to anybody in Lusaka about this operation?
MR MAAKE: That's correct.
ADV SANDI: Who was the report given to and when was that?
MR MAAKE: I reported to members of the PMC in Lusaka. If I remember well there was Chris Hani, Ronnie Kasrills and JJ Jele and Sue Rapkin.
ADV SANDI: Was that immediately after the operation had been carried out?
MR MAAKE: I'm not sure whether it was immediately after the operation, but it could be three to four months thereafter.
ADV SANDI: Just explain one thing to me, who was the first person in your group to suggest that you should go to this T-junction and wait for a police vehicle? Whose initial idea was this?
MR MAAKE: I would not be able to remember because we worked as a unit. I don't remember who specifically suggested that.
ADV SANDI: Thank you. Thank you Mr Engelbrecht.
MR MALAN: Sorry. Just flowing from this again. I'm sorry Mr Engelbrecht. If my mind serves me, or my memory serves me correctly, the ANC did not, in their submission to the TRC, accept responsibility for this Fourie operation. Now if you did report to them, why did they not do it? Who specifically did you report to? And I'm open to correction, but to the best of my memory, they did not accept responsibility. They didn't know how this happened. Who did you report to? You gave four names, did you do it telephonically? Did you go over there?
MR MAAKE: I went in person to Lusaka. I reported to them in Lusaka.
MR MALAN: Can you tell us why they would not have accepted the responsibility, this having been reported to them?
MR MAAKE: Well, I don't have an idea why.
MR MALAN: Thank you.
MR ENGELBRECHT: Chairperson, my question has been taken by the person from the Council. Thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ENGELBRECHT
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Steenkamp, any questions that you'd like to put?
ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you.
NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Maake, thank you. That concludes your testimony. You may stand down now.
WITNESS EXCUSED
MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, if allowed by this Committee, we would like to call Mr Piet Mathebe, the second applicant.
