NICOLAAS JOHANNES VERMEULEN: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.
Mr Vermeulen, you're an applicant in this matter and your application appears on page 65 up until the end of bundle 1, is that correct?
MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, yes.
MR CORNELIUS: You've heard the evidence and on page 100 of your application you've said the following
"The Why Not Night-club. We used a limpet mine and it was exploded in the premises. Brood van Heerden was involved in this and I waited outside of the premises."
Is that correct?
MR VERMEULEN: Yes.
MR CORNELIUS: Were you an explosives expert at this stage?
MR VERMEULEN: Yes, that is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: Were you active in Vlakplaas?
MR VERMEULEN: Yes.
MR CORNELIUS: What was your rank?
MR VERMEULEN: I was a Warrant Officer.
MR CORNELIUS: And your Commander at that stage?
MR VERMEULEN: It was Col de Kock.
MR CORNELIUS: Now I understand that your unit was disposed for acts of terrors in the Witwatersrand.
MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, yes.
MR CORNELIUS: Did you receive any instruction from Col de Kock to become involved in this Why Not operation?
MR VERMEULEN: No, Mr Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: Did you distance yourself from the acts of Mr van Heerden and Zeelie?
MR VERMEULEN: Yes, Mr Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: Is that why you remained in the vehicle?
MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, yes.
MR CORNELIUS: You did not receive instructions to stand guard or to act if something happened?
MR VERMEULEN: No, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So why did you go with them in the vehicle if you distanced yourself?
MR VERMEULEN: The whole group went there, Mr Chairman, so I just followed, but I said I didn't want to have anything to do with the whole thing.
CHAIRPERSON: And what were Van Dyk and Willemse, what were their ranks?
MR VERMEULEN: Willemse was a Sergeant and if I'm correct, Van Dyk was a Captain or a Major.
CHAIRPERSON: And the senior man was Van Dyk?
MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius.
MR CORNELIUS: It sounds a bit crass to say it but I got the idea that you went with for the joyride.
MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: And after the incident no steps were taken against you.
MR VERMEULEN: No.
MR CORNELIUS: Did you make a statement concerning this incident?
MR VERMEULEN: Not that I can recall, no.
MR CORNELIUS: And your application in front of this Committee is for amnesty for defeating the ends of justice because of the fact that you remained quiet, that you knew about the facts and you did not disclose it.
MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, yes.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
What did Zeelie tell you, Mr Vermeulen, when he arrived there at Goldfields?
MR VERMEULEN: As far as I can recall Mr Chairperson, there was a limpet mine at the Why Not - or that we had to go and place a limpet mine at the Why Not Club.
MR VISSER: If you as Vlakplaas members worked in a different Security Branch, under whose command did you resort?
MR VERMEULEN: It would be the Commander of that specific area.
MR VISSER: If Zeelie approached you that evening and told you: The Section Commander gave instructions that you must assist us in planting a limpet mine", what would your view for it be then?
MR VERMEULEN: I would not execute that instruction, Mr Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Can you say why?
MR VERMEULEN: The reason is that I will follow all instructions that I receive in the normal execution of my duties, but that was a special operation and I would then only follow instructions that came from Col de Kock.
MR VISSER: And no instruction was given?
MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Did Zeelie tell you that evening that there was an instruction from his Section Commander that you had to act, or was it as you just testified, that it was said to you that a limpet mine had to be planted?
MR VERMEULEN: I would say the last version you gave would be the correct one. I cannot recall that he told me that Erasmus told him or instructed him to do this.
MR VISSER: Or Gen du Toit for that matter.
MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, yes.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Rossouw, before I ask you I just want to ask Mr Vermeulen a question.
What if Capt or Maj van Dyk said: "Okay, we're in, we'll go and afford backup"? Seeing that he was your senior officer within Vlakplaas or GG1 or G10, I don't know what it was.
MR VERMEULEN: I would have queried it, Mr Chair, I wouldn't have done it.
CHAIRPERSON: Did Van Dyk in fact give you any order, did you disobey him at all or did he just sort of leave it up to each man to decide for themselves?
MR VERMEULEN: He didn't give me any orders, I just said I was not prepared to go with.
CHAIRPERSON: And he let it go?
MR VERMEULEN: Ja, he didn't force us to do anything.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Rossouw, any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, yes Mr Chairman.
Mr Vermeulen, why did Capt van Dyk accompany you then, as well as Mr Willemse?
MR VERMEULEN: I do not know, Mr Chairperson.
MR ROSSOUW: Do you know if he or Mr Willemse or yourself made any contact with De Kock, to clear this up with him?
MR VERMEULEN: No, Mr Chairperson.
MR ROSSOUW: If you say that as far as your recollection goes, that Mr Zeelie did not mention to you that this instruction came from Gens Erasmus and Du Toit, is it possible that he did mention it?
MR VERMEULEN: It is possible, yes, but as far as I can recall, I do not know about it.
MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ROSSOUW
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nyawuza, any questions?
MR NYAWUZA: No questions, Chairperson.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR NYAWUZA
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Coleridge.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS COLERIDGE: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Vermeulen, were you in the presence of all your Vlakplaas members all the time when Mr Zeelie had spoken to you?
MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.
MS COLERIDGE: So at no stage did you actually do something else, or were you focused on what Mr Zeelie was telling you constantly, or can you give us details about that?
MR VERMEULEN: When I heard that they wanted us to go and help to blow up the Why Not Club, I said no and I was not paying any attention anymore.
MS COLERIDGE: And how long did the conversation last for?
MR VERMEULEN: I don't think it was very long, say 10/15 minutes, I don't know.
MS COLERIDGE: And my last question, are you still in the Force?
MR VERMEULEN: No.
MS COLERIDGE: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS COLERIDGE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Cornelius, any re-examination?
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Only one question, thanks Mr Chair.
You worked on a need-to-know basis, is that correct?
MR VERMEULEN: Yes, that is.
MR CORNELIUS: Was it expected of you to question an officer like Capt Zeelie to ask him where his instructions came from?
MR VERMEULEN: No, Mr Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
CHAIRPERSON: Judge de Jager, any questions? Advocate Sigodi?
Mr Vermeulen, so all you're asking for amnesty is defeating the ends of justice in not revealing who the perpetrators were of the Why Not bomb?
MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: You're not applying for attempted murder or whatever else, damage to property, etcetera?
MR VERMEULEN: No.
CHAIRPERSON: It's just that aspect, because you say that you weren't part of the conspiracy. In fact you disassociated yourself for it actively?
MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Thank you, that concludes your testimony.
WITNESS EXCUSED
MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chair, I think that concludes the applicants as well.
CHAIRPERSON: Any further witnesses to be called on behalf of the applicants?
MR VISSER: No, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nyawuza?
MR NYAWUZA: Thank you, Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Any witnesses?
MR NYAWUZA: We're not going to call any witnesses.
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Coleridge?
MS COLERIDGE: I have no witnesses, thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that then concludes the evidence at this hearing, it's just a question for argument now. I see it's quarter to one, I don't know if you want to start now or do you want to take the lunch break now and start a bit earlier and then carry on with your submissions?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, can I start?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: The sooner I start, the sooner we finish.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you can start Mr Visser, certainly.
MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: Thank you, Chairperson.
Chairperson, I don't intend to be long. I would submit to you Chairperson, that the facts of the present matter or similar situations have been dealt with by the original Committee on amnesty. It was already dealt with by Gen van der Merwe in his evidence on the 21st of October 1996, based on his submissions to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is an exhibit which has served before the Amnesty Committee since February 1997, Chairperson. I think it was marked - in fact there is a reference to it in the general background, Chairperson, it was at page 1, P46 and P47. And at Exhibit P46, page 22, Gen van der Merwe dealt with the general background to situations similar to the present one, in paragraph 18, and he refers to prevailing circumstances and he says:
"These prevailing circumstances which I've sketched, were to have a further dimension, perhaps already alluded to, namely both the lowering of moral of the community and the Security Forces and the hardening of attitudes among both groupings. This was accompanied by the belief that the enemy had to be destroyed, no matter what. This outlook was in turn aggravated to a great extent, by speeches and pronouncements by government figures and commanding officers in various sectors of the Security Forces."
And he says:
"It is undoubtedly so that militaristic and politically inspired speeches often made it difficult for the Security Forces, who were becoming more and more emotionally involved, to be able to distinguish between that which was normally justifiable in terms of the law and that which was not. That the status quo led to members of the Security Branch, who had to deal with the most horrendous manifestations of violence on a day to day basis, ultimately becoming equally disillusioned and negatively influenced regarding these matters."
And then he also says what a hotspot the East Rand was and how it continued from the early '80s right through to the '90s, Chairperson. And that is what Gen Erasmus alluded to in his evidence as well.
And then Chairperson, in the original Committee on amnesty's decision in the Cronje matter, at page 4, Chairperson, would you allow me just to read a short extract. Where dealing with the general background, that Committee found, and I read to you at page 4, just the one paragraph in the middle of the page, it deals with the perspectives of the various sides, Chairperson, and then it is stated on page 4:
"On the other hand the police were pressured to maintain law and order, to deal with terrorists and guarantee the safety of ordinary citizens against such incidents as the Church Street bombing, the Magoo's Bar bomb, the St James Church Massacre, the murder of farmers and hundreds of other incidents of terrorism and killings."
We submit to you, if I may pause there Chairperson, that those are the facts which form the backdrop of the present application, which you will be entitled to bear in mind and take into account.
"This pressure did not only come from politicians, but also from the business sector, farmers and ordinary citizens. Words such as 'eliminate them, take them out, pursue them, pay them back in their own coin', 'betaal hulle terug in hulle eie munt', 'do to them what they are doing to you', were used.
According to the evidence of a number of applicants, they understood this to be authorisation to use bombs and handgrenades and in some instances, to eliminate or kill certain people. The fact that incidents did occur which must have been authorised by officers in higher command or in some instances were authorised or condoned by politicians, like the bombing of Cosatu House and Khotso House, led to a growing perception that the deeds met with the approval of the government.
In certain instances, members of the Security Forces were decorated for their actions in combating the total onslaught.
and then the important words, Chairperson:
"In the end the conflict ended in a vicious circle, a gruesome attack would lead to gruesome counter-measures, which would in turn lead to even more gruesome acts of revenge. This, unfortunately, forms part of our history and the conflict of the past."
Enough of that, Chairperson. The reason why we quoted those parts to you is to obviate a long argument, Chairperson, on the political background. We would submit to you that on the evidence before you, particularly that of Gen Erasmus, the operation which took place was clearly associated with a political objective.
We would submit, Chairperson, that it is clear from his evidence that the direct cause of the explosion at the Why Not Club, was a retaliatory action which was directly in proportion to that which they experienced themselves on a frequent basis. Namely, explosions at the Vanderbijl Square, at the Wimpy Bar and at other places, Chairperson. And Zeelie gave evidence here to say that the ones that he himself went to investigate numbered something like 168. It was a hotspot, Chairperson. And with great respect, one can today philosophy about the moral or the morality of such a counter-attack from police who are supposed to be people who should maintain law and order, but all of that, Chairperson, does not come into the picture when one has regard to the provisions of the TRC Act, which makes provision for amnesty to be granted within that spectrum of the conflict of the past, because that is where these things happened, where things went wrong, where offences were committed on both sides, and the morality of the matter, Chairperson, we submit with respect, should play no role. The only issue is whether there was proportionality. We submit that it is directly proportional in this particular case and proportionality would create no problem at all to you and the Members of your Committee in this particular case. Nor, as I have already submitted, will the issue of political objective play any role.
Chairperson, we submit that both Erasmus and Du Toit and the others fall within the purview of Section 20(2)(b) and (f) and (a) as well, Chairperson, of 20(2). And we submit that they have complied, the two applicants for whom we appear, have complied with the formal requirements of the Act and that in that sense, Chairperson, there is nothing standing in your way, all other things being equal, to grant them amnesty.
CHAIRPERSON: What about the question - I'm just raising this for purposes of argument, because I'll expect Mr Rossouw and Mr Cornelius to answer it, with regard to full disclosure? We have two versions that don't dovetail entirely into each other, they only meet to a certain extent and then they diverge. Now if we find - must we now make a credibility finding and find that one side is not telling the whole truth, not disclosing all the facts, or is it that maybe there's general mistakes all around and forgetting of facts, that sort of thing? In other words, are the applicants in two schools, the Generals and the others, or are they all in the same boat together?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, I was going to deal with that separately under the heading of full disclosure, where I was going to refer you to evidence as well, but it seems that it would be more convenient to leave that for 2 o'clock, because I see it's four minutes to one.
CHAIRPERSON: If we can then take the lunch adjournment now and then we'll proceed with submissions after that. Thank you.
MS COLERIDGE: All rise.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: ... from afterwards, but ...
MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: (Cont)
He knew, he knew broadly speaking, that there would have been. What they said, both of them Chairperson, it's paragraph 10, what both of them said is that they didn't know that the Why Not Club was going to be the target. Now that also doesn't take the matter any further, whether they did or didn't know, but the fact is that this is their evidence, they didn't know, and this is only something they found out later.
Du Toit says in paragraph 10:
"Dit is my herinnering dat ek vooraf geweet het dat daar gesoek word, in opdrag van Gen Erasmus, na a geskikte bymekaarkom plek van ANC mense ten einde 'n ontploffing te bewerkstellig." Although I cannot recall it clearly, I accept that Gen Erasmus would have told me about it."
So he makes no bones about it, that this is his recollection. He may as easily have said: "Well, you know I have no recollection that I knew beforehand and therefore I'm only asking for defeating the ends of justice", but he doesn't do that, Chairperson, he comes to you and he makes a clean breast of it.
CHAIRPERSON: Why should Mr Zeelie come and say that he got a radio call and went to the SAB canteen where he spoke to both the Generals aside and the specific target was mentioned, etcetera, and he got the final instruction?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, it's a good question and we'll probably never know the answer, but what I will suggest to you is that Mr Zeelie was accosted by the Special Investigation team of the Attorney-General and he was confronted and in spite of his denials, he knew at that time that what he was looking at was a prosecution for this matter, because he had already been implicated by Mr van Heerden. That is the evidence which he conceded here. So he's now looking at a prosecution and Van Heerden at that stage, on the evidence, was subservient to Mr Zeelie, Zeelie was a Captain, he was a Constable, the chances were that the Attorney-General would have prosecuted Zeelie on Brood van Heerden's evidence. So what does Zeelie do? He knows that they're looking for the Generals, Chairperson, it's an open secret, that's what the Attorney-General's still doing, they're looking for evidence against Generals, and Zeelie puts two and two together and he starts mentioning all these names.
Why and how he knew about the SAB, my witnesses can't explain to you, Chairperson, because you heard Erasmus saying that he can remember that one or two occasions the senior officers were invited by the SA Breweries for a braai or a function. And we know this happened with - a lot of concerns invited the police and ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: There was nothing sinister about that.
MR VISSER: There's nothing sinister about it at all. So it's possible, Chairperson, that he may have heard of that and that this is what he told the Attorney-General, and he finds himself in a position now where he's now got to defend that statement which he made. Because the critical point here, Chairperson, is that statement is made before the amnesty process takes off, it is made before Zeelie could have realised that both Erasmus and Du Toit were going to apply for amnesty. He must have assumed at the time that they would not, because at that time we all remember very well, Chairperson, that there was a blanket denial from everybody about complicity in any offences or delicts. We know that. And it's not unreasonable to assume that Mr Zeelie thought that he would be asked by the State Attorney - not by the State Attorney, by the Attorney-General, to be a State witness against the Generals if they were implicated. And Chairperson, frankly, with great respect, one doesn't really have to look further than that as a motivation for that portion of Zeelie's evidence.
You see the question which must exercise your mind is if Erasmus comes to you as he does and he says: "I gave the order", unless he's forgotten, what possible reason could there be for him to say: "I don't ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there's no particular reason, you know this is the sort of confusing part of all the evidence before us, if somebody comes and says: "Look, I take responsibility, I accept that what I said to him he regarded as an order and carried it out and I accept responsibility and in fact after the bombing I condoned it and in fact I went with it, I had no problems", whether the Why Not was specifically targeted or not, it doesn't materially affect the application, it's not a denial as opposed to an implication.
MR VISSER: Exactly. If Erasmus had come and denied the order, then of course it was a different story.
JUDGE DE JAGER: Why not admit that it was the Why Not?
MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, because he says those weren't the facts. And I don't want to fall in going around in circles, but as the Chairman has just put to me, is it a material fact? That's one of the questions. Is it really a material fact whether Erasmus knew beforehand that it was going to be the Why Not Club. That's another matter. And again the submission will be to you that it's not a material fact, the material fact is the fact that there was going to be a bombing of a gathering place.
ADV SIGODI: Is it not material to disclose your target?
MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I didn't hear that.
ADV SIGODI: I say, is it not material to disclose your target? If you are saying that you agree that you're going to attack a certain person, isn't it a material fact that you must disclose - if you know the target, is it not material if you sort of conceal or don't disclose that: "Look I knew what the target was or who the target was going to be"?
MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson, that's not the case at all here. It's never been denied that the Why Not Club was attacked. Neither Erasmus nor Du Toit has ever disputed the reason or the validity of the reasons for attacking the Why Not Club, all that they said is that they didn't know beforehand. Now your questions to me, Chairperson is, isn't it a material fact which is not disclosed if they didn't say beforehand that it was the Why Not Club? Well it may be in certain circumstances ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you see it would - if the focus of the opposition was on the fact that it was not an appropriate target ...
MR VISSER: Yes, that's a different matter.
CHAIRPERSON: ... then there might be reason to distance yourself from knowledge of the target.
MR VISSER: Yes, yes, correct.
CHAIRPERSON: You say: "Well I didn't know what the target was".
MR VISSER: But those are not the facts here, Chairperson. May I deal immediately, before I forget, with an issue which is directly relevant to that. It was put by Mr Nyawuza to one of the applicants, to Zeelie I think it was, that not a single person who was a member or a supporter of the ANC was in fact affected. Well, Chairperson, we can speculate about that but there's certainly no evidence as to that before you and certainly no evidence upon which you can make ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but we also know that any attack of this method, a bomb, is to a large extent, indiscriminate.
MR VISSER: Oh absolutely.
CHAIRPERSON: I mean you know, if you put a bomb in a public place, the shrapnel's not going to sort out its target, it's not smart shrapnel.
MR VISSER: We only have to think of the Church Street bomb, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Yes, absolutely.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I mean any bombing it's the same.
MR VISSER: You're quite correct, you're quite correct.
So yes to that extent, and that's perhaps again part of the morality which I referred to earlier, but hopefully we've gone past the question of proportionality and those issues.
But coming to the question of Adv Sigodi. In this particular case, Chairperson, there was no effort by either Erasmus or Du Toit to deny that the Why Not Club would have been a correct target, they simply didn't know beforehand that that was the particular club that was going to be attacked, but they accepted it afterwards.
JUDGE DE JAGER: ...(indistinct - no microphone) is that the type of target was - your submission is that the type of target was identified, that they were ad idem about the type of target, but the name of the target wasn't identified or they ... If it was, they might have had consensus on that, but there's a dispute as to whether the name was in fact mentioned, but the type was mentioned.
MR VISSER: Quite correct, Chairperson, and my submission on the score is that it could have been any one of 12 other places with different names and it would still not have made a difference. As long as that target answered to the requirement that it had to be, as far as the information in the possession of the Security Police were concerned, a gathering place of ANC supporters and sympathisers and/or members, etcetera. That was the requirement, Chairperson. And what makes the Why Not Club, on the evidence before the Committee, perhaps the ideal choice was that there was information that the attack on the Cafe Zurich was orchestrated from the Why Not Club. Now with great respect Chairperson, once that is so, then we submit to you that all relevant facts have been disclosed.
The only issue then remaining is if you look at the evidence of Zeelie, how important is it that he says that the final instruction was given at the SA Breweries, whereas the other two, for whom I appear, say that never happened? And we say, Chairperson, that in the greater scheme of things, having regard to what is relevant and material to the present enquiry, whether that discussion took place at the SA Breweries or not and whether or not Du Toit and Erasmus forgot about that, Chairperson. And I suppose it's possible, it is possible, although they are adamant that it didn't happen, just as adamant as Mr Zeelie is that it did happen. Then we say, Chairperson, the first argument would be that it is not a material fact.
The second argument, Chairperson is, if you feel yourself in a position where you have to make a credibility finding, it is our submission that you would have no difficulty in accepting the evidence of Gens Erasmus and Du Toit before you will accept the evidence of Mr Zeelie. Mr Zeelie's evidence was, to put it euphemistically, unreliable in very many respects. And I'm not going to refer to all of them, Chairperson. But it is quite clear that he has a history of giving evidence in principle against these particular two previous Commanding Officers of his. It happened in the Khotso House, it happened in Cry Freedom, it happened in Stanza Bopape, of which you will recall, and it happened again. And Chairperson, again the simple explanation may be that he made all those statements at a time when he didn't realise that these applicants would also be applicants in the amnesty process and he now finds himself in the position where he's got to defend what he had stated in previous statements. That may be the simple explanation. There may be another explanation, I would be speculating if I had to think of other permutations in that regard.
Would you just allow me a moment, Chairperson. Chairperson, I was going to come to that, but perhaps it is a convenient stage or an appropriate stage to do that at this stage. In the Cosatu House matter there is some precedence for an approach to this kind of dispute. In the Cosatu House, Chairperson, Mr de Kock, Eugene de Kock gave evidence to say that when he was given instructions to take part in the bombing of Cosatu House, he was given the instruction by Brig Schoon and he, if I remember correctly, he said that when Brig Schoon told him about this instruction he asked whether the instruction came from the top and Brig Schoon said to him words to the effect of: "Yes, from the very top", and Mr de Kock's evidence was that he took it that that meant that the State President, Mr P W Botha gave the instructions.
On the other hand, there was evidence Chairperson, by Mr Vlok, Mr van der Merwe and others to say that the instruction did not come from higher up, but that in fact, Vlok and Van der Merwe had decided on this operation on their own. And may I read to you how the Committee in that case and in that case Judge de Jager I believe, was a Member of that Committee, yes it was Judge Wilson, Judge de Jager, Adv Gcabashe and Mr Sibanyoni. They approached it in the following manner, Chairperson:
"The Committee has considered all the evidence presented during this hearing and has come to the following conclusion
With regard to the issue of full disclosure of the origin of the order to bomb Cosatu House, the versions of Vlok and Van der Merwe and Schoon denying P W Botha's involvement, as opposed to that of De Kock, remain unresolved. Both versions are plausible and it is difficult for the Committee to determine where the truth lies. It must be borne in mind however, that De Kock's evidence involving Botha was purely hearsay, based on information obtained from Schoon that the order came right from the top. De Kock had never met Botha or personally talked to him. This is a material factor (says the Committee) that impacts on whether full disclosure has been made to the Committee, in particular by Vlok, Van der Merwe and Schoon."
balancing it off with De Kock.
"For purposes of deciding the applications for amnesty however, all the other material facts indicate all the applicants clearly promoted a political objective acting in their various capacities. No evidence was presented to gainsay that of the applicants with respect to the issue of full disclosure of all the material facts, bar that of the origin of the order. In the premises, the Committee is satisfied that all the applicants qualify for amnesty on the basis that they have complied with the material facts prescribed by the Act.
The issue of the order to bomb remains undetermined. The Committee however does not consider this single issue to be so material as to be a bar to amnesty for any of the applicants."
Of course it is slightly different there, it is slightly different, it is more material there, if I may put it that way Chairperson, than in the present case, but at the end of the day the principle is clear. How the order was given, and in that case, by whom the order was given isn't that material as long as we know there was an order, there was an execution of the order and all the requirements of the Act had been complied with.
But Chairperson, we submit that it is, on that basis it is not necessary for your Committee and yourself to consider having to make an order of credibility, because it could fit in with both. Because even on Zeelie's own evidence there was an order to attack a premises of a particular description. It was done precisely as it was envisaged by Erasmus, and Chairperson, we know what the results were and we say that that is quite as simple as this application should fall upon.
Chairperson, as far as the injured persons are concerned, we don't know, unfortunately. We've attempted to find information. We went through the Harms Commission, because at the time of the Harms Commission and due to the brief of the Harms Commission, there were lists drawn and statistics drawn up of all violent incidents which could have had something to do with political motivation, and the Why Not Club was mentioned there. And what I found on the record, Chairperson, and I did this myself, was that there was a reference to 19 people that were injured, there was no description of how serious or otherwise it was. We've now heard from Ms Coleridge of 16 people who were injured - well, 16 names were mentioned, but some of those names we saw in bundle 2, said themselves that they weren't injured, they were shocked and they had a headache and some of them weren't even treated. But Chairperson, with respect, if you will follow our submission, with respect, of granting amnesty if you consider favourably to do so, granting amnesty for all offences and delicts committed as part and parcel of this incident, it won't be necessary for you to specify the names of people who were injured.
CHAIRPERSON: Although in that regard we've been specifically, as an Amnesty Committee, requested by the Committee on Reparations and we would certainly take a look at the list that Ms Coleridge has and we would check it against the various statements and all we do is refer the names to that Committee for their consideration and then they make the final decision as to whether the person is in fact a victim or not. And I must say just from my own point of view, if somebody's in a room where a bomb goes off and doesn't get physically injured, I personally would classify that person as a victim because of the shock and the trauma and the psychological trauma.
MR VISSER: As a victim, yes, because there's a psychological trauma as well.
CHAIRPERSON: So we would do that as a matter of course. We'd check it on the papers.
MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Chairperson. The only point that I'm making is, by way of apology really, is that we're not in a position to be of any real assistance, although we have attempted, but we will accept whoever is suggested to have been present there and to have been a witness, we will accept that, Chairperson. And all of those persons will then be part and parcel of what we ask for amnesty for.
Chairperson, the only other issue which is also in our submission a non issue, is the question of Du Toit being on the scene at the explosion at Vanderbijl Square and whether or not he spoke to Mr van Heerden and told him to remain in the car. The issue of the beard has now obviously fallen away as far as Mr du Toit is concerned.
JUDGE DE JAGER: He told him to stay in the car at the Why Not Club ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: At the Why Not Club, I'm sorry, did I say Vanderbijl - at the Why Not Club.
Now Chairperson, Du Toit says he wasn't at that scene ...(intervention)
JUDGE DE JAGER: No, Du Toit was at the Why Not scene.
MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I'm confusing the two scenes, I'm terribly sorry. Du Toit was in fact at the scene, but he has no recollection of speaking to Van Heerden. The question which was put by you, Chairperson, is why would he have spoken to Van Heerden, because on all the evidence, including that of Zeelie, there is no reason to believe that he knew beforehand that Van Heerden was involved in that explosion. So that is the first question mark that arises.
The second is, Van Heerden is sitting in a parked car quite a way from the Why Not Club and if Du Toit had anything to say to him, as you quite correctly put to him, why didn't he say to him: "What are you sitting in the car for, there's work to be done"?
And thirdly, Chairperson, if Du Toit had known that Van Heerden was in fact involved, why would he go to a man who's sitting in a car to say to him: "Sit in the car"? It just doesn't make sense. So there are improbabilities against the version of Mr van Heerden, and he very properly, with respect, said that's the way he remembers it but he may be mistaken, he may be mistaken. And frankly, Chairperson, if one wants to speculate and if one allows oneself a little room of speculation, who would have been the person to say to Van Heerden: "Stay in the car"? It would have been Zeelie, clearly. He's direct Commanding Officer, knowing that he was part of the group of people that went in to place the bomb, knowing that he didn't have a disguise, wasn't wearing a disguise at the time. Clearly it would have been Zeelie who said that to him. And it might just be, if one has to speculate, that if somebody really did say it to him, it wasn't Du Toit but it was Zeelie. But be that as it may, Chairperson.
The last question mark about that evidence which I must mention to you and I say this as a criticism of Mr van Heerden, that it's very strange this question of the beard. He remembers in the one statement that there was a question of growing a beard, it's now withdrawn and it's now brought to the doorstep of Mr Victor, who is not the J J Viktor that have been applicants for amnesty, someone else, who has apparently no real connection here, although Mr van Heerden said that he might have been the Chief of the CID at the time, of the Investigation Unit at the time, but we know it was At van Niekerk. So it's very strange, Chairperson, and what we say is, bearing in mind the probabilities of that version, we say that there is nothing inherently improbable in Du Toit's evidence, because he may as well have admitted it if it were so. But again, Chairperson, it is a long time ago and it's possible that Du Toit might have forgotten about it, and we readily conceded that and I believe that both the applicants for whom I appear have conceded very properly to you that they may be wrong, they have their recollection but they may be wrong. This is more than what Mr Zeelie was prepared to do, as you will recall.
Chairperson, I believe I've addressed most of the important points. If there's anything that arises as a query in your mind, please do ask me again and I'll attempt to address your concerns.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Thank you, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: I then ask Chairperson, for amnesty as we have asked for in Exhibits B and C, we believe that's the proper order. That certainly is the most proper order and we borrowed that from the London Bomb case where the Amnesty Committee heard argument on the issue of what a proper Amnesty Order would be, and very briefly the argument was that if one analyses the Act, what the Act authorises the Amnesty Committee is to grant amnesty for acts, omissions and offences which should be converted to read offences and delicts. Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Rossouw.
MR ROSSOUW IN ARGUMENT: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
I have to say at the outset, Mr Chairman, that I'm in agreement with Mr Visser on the issues as identified by him as the relevant facts to have been made a full disclosure of before this Committee.
Mr Chairman, I do not believe that it in any manner, comes close to a situation where one has to make a credibility finding and on that point, the probabilities for themselves, if you should find that whether the target was identified and conveyed to the Generals by Mr Zeelie, is a material fact which I am in agreement with Mr Visser, is not material, the type of target which was identified and carried out, is the relevant fact which was placed and targeted and on both versions there was full disclosure about.
But Mr Chairman, the probabilities are simply this, that one has to look at both versions and if you have a look at the General's version about the discussion that took place at the bomb scene at Vanderbijl Square, you'll note that his testimony was that he there requested Mr Zeelie if he could not identify a place where ANC members would come together and where they can be targeted in a similar vein as the explosion at Vanderbijl Square. Now the question that was put to Mr Zeelie was: "Why didn't you at that time mention Why Not Night-club, you were investigating this matter, you knew about Peter Dlamini, you knew about this place being frequented by ANC members or supporters or trained MK cadres, why didn't you mention it right there and then, in the heat of the moment when the General is saying to you: 'We must act now, do not wait a month, act now'. Why not?" Sorry, that would be wrong thing to say now, Mr Chairman, but why didn't he mention Why Not exactly at that time? There's a simple answer on the probabilities, that the further aspect of targeting only happened later, as Mr Zeelie testified. That's a probability in his favour.
JUDGE DE JAGER: On the other hand he was given instructions to identify something and come back, that was expected, but he never came back. He was summoned to come again.
MR ROSSOUW: Yes, Mr Chairman, but the probability of that is, you are in the heat of the moment at the scene of the explosion, he was involved in that investigation, he knew about it, Mr Chairman, he could have mentioned it right there. Why didn't he mention it right there? He didn't need to go and do an investigation. We know after the fact now, that there was no investigation carried out, the target was identified in exactly the manner in which I'm suggesting he could have mentioned it right there at the scene at Vanderbijl Square. So Mr Chairman, the fact of the matter is that the probabilities in that sense is something that must be taken into account. But I submit that it's not a material fact, the fact of the matter is that the target was identified and it was carried out there. That's the one aspect, Mr Chairman.
The other aspect is that drawing a credibility finding on previous evidence of Mr Zeelie with regard to differences between him and the two Generals, Mr Chairman would not be relevant in this application and I submit to you that the attack on Mr Zeelie, as far as his consultation and statements to the Attorney-General is concerned, and the suggestion that he tried to implicate the two Generals from the outset, Mr Chairman, loses sight of the simple fact that there is no dispute, he did not wrongly implicate the two Generals. They are here on their own version, admitting to being involved in this matter. So why would he - he didn't fabricate it at that stage, at the stage when he consulted with the Attorney-General. If the two Generals did not apply, then it might have been a relevant attack on his credibility, but exactly what he said in 1995 is what has today been placed before this Committee, by the two Generals. In fact Mr Chairman, dealing with that, Mr Chairman you would have noted from the evidence by Mr Zeelie that, and you would have gathered that there's a distinct feeling between lower ranking policemen that the top brass are not taking the blame for all the incidents. And Mr Chairman, that would have been the distinct feeling one would have gained from the initial applications by the two Generals. On the evidence provided, supplemented here, the order, the structure of the order, the acceptance of responsibility came out, but not initially. So the applications perpetuate that feeling. But Mr Chairman, once again, it was not an improper implication of the two Generals, and I won't take it any further than that. I say nothing turns on it, it can't be a matter of credibility in any sense.
Mr Chairman, about the specific meeting point, the two Generals conceded that they might be mistaken, Mr Zeelie will not concede that he's mistaken. Once again I submit that turning to the probabilities and the specific questions put by the Committee and the answer by Mr Zeelie is, why would he mention the South African Breweries premises? Why mention that premises if he was not even aware that that was a place which was frequented by the Generals, even if to a lesser extent, but in prior times they had been there? He was not aware of that. Probability one, Mr Chairman, he mentioned it because he was at that premises, he came to know about it because he was called to attend there. That's a probability. And that must be weighed against the concession by the Generals.
Mr Chairman, similarly, if Mr Zeelie wanted to mention the two Generals and implicate them, he could have mentioned any place, why this specific place? There's no evidence that he's trying to place the Generals in a bad light, to indicate that this was at a bar where there was a party and we've heard the evidence in other matters where there was a party going on when decisions were taken to eliminate people. There's not a suggestion of that in this instance, it's a, can I call it a neutral ground, Mr Chairman, nothing turns on it. That's my submission.
Mr Chairman, I submit that Mr Zeelie has complied with all the formal aspects of his application, Section 20(1)(a), that I agree with Mr Visser on the aspect of Mr Zeelie also falling under Section 20(2)(b) or (f), as far as his status as an employee of the State is concerned. The political objective, Mr Chairman, it was a counter-attack. That is not in dispute before this Committee. And on proportionality, it was not out of proportion in respect of the Vanderbijl Square bomb explosion and also taking into account the measures taken ...(intervention)
JUDGE DE JAGER: But it shouldn't be measured against the Vanderbijl Square incident, it should be measured against his own political objective.
MR ROSSOUW: Yes. Mr Chairman, but that is exactly the point.
JUDGE DE JAGER: Not against what the other party did, but against what he aimed to achieve, whether it was proportional to that.
MR ROSSOUW: Yes Mr Chairman, you'll remember I'm using the words specifically with reference to the Vanderbijl Square, as the General indicated, Gen Erasmus indicated - I'm using the Afrikaans word "They should be paid back in 'eie munt'". Now Mr Chairman, that's part of the, let's call it the instruction, so the proportionality in carrying out the order must also be taken into view with respect of the specific instance from which the instruction flowed. We know that there was a limpet mine used at Vanderbijl Square, there was a limpet mine used here, there wasn't a bigger device that was used, or a more extreme nature that was used. I'm using it specifically with reference to the instruction, Mr Chairman. But I submit, on proportionality as to what was to be achieved, Mr Chairman, in deterring and giving the message back to the ANC that these attacks cannot continue in the manner that you are continuing, that we will also take drastic measures, Mr Chairman, that was certainly not out of proportion, taking into account ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I suppose also, you know when you have two limpet mines in an enclosed place and there's 130 people, we don't know how many but a lot of people, and there's 13 or 19 people who are injured but not very seriously, one will then have to accept the evidence of Mr Zeelie that the bomb was placed with that in mind.
MR ROSSOUW: I would submit that, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Because otherwise one would have put it near the dance floor and killed maybe dozens of people and injured several dozens more.
MR ROSSOUW: Yes. Mr Chairman, his evidence in that regard is ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Because it was room, it was a sort of enclosed room and they said they were the only people there at the time. Okay, as we said earlier, you can't discriminate with that sort thing, but one can infer that if the intention was to kill as many people as possible, it would have probably been put in a place, a different place, if that was possible.
MR ROSSOUW: Yes. I would submit that is exactly correct, Mr Chairman. Page 106 in volume 2, the plan of the layout, the floor plan of the Why Not Club, I think clearly indicates that as well, it backs up Mr Zeelie's evidence as an explosives expert.
Mr Chairman, those are my submissions and I would submit that your Committee can be satisfied that all the formal requirements have been complied with and that a full disclosure of all the material facts has been made and I would request you to consider granting amnesty to Mr Zeelie for the same as Mr Visser has mentioned. I'm stealing his thunder. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Rossouw. Mr Cornelius.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. Following the full legal argument by my colleagues I'm not going to burden the record with ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: It's always best to argue third in line, isn't it?
MR CORNELIUS IN ARGUMENT: I will quite enjoy it, thank you Mr Chair.
On behalf of Mr van Heerden, it's clear that he was a footsoldier, he carried out the instruction of Capt Zeelie in all due respects, he complied fully with Section 20 of the Act, he complied with all the other requirements of the Act. His political motive is clearly stated in bundle 1 on page 29, which is basically what the other applicants are also saying. The contradictions that arose were cleared up in leading his evidence-in-chief. It is my submission that the annexed statements which was given to the Goldstone Commission, was drawn in a very brief manner in a short period of time. He cleared up the issue which I still say is not relevant, regarding the beard. And as far as Brig du Toit is concerned, he said: "Look, I can't remember, that's the way I recall the events, I presume it was him, but I might be wrong."
It's furthermore clear that he gained no financial bonus or any financial gain out of his actions. It is also further clear that he was a credible witness. As a matter of fact he quite impressed me. He came over very strongly, he was subjected to cross-examination by my learned colleague, Mr Visser, and I was impressed with his evidence. It is my submission that it is clear if you're going to make a credibility finding, that his evidence may be accepted. We can expect a certain loss of memory following a period of time, that can be expected, but it's also clear it's not of relevance ...(indistinct). And my submission is that he's entitled to be granted amnesty as prayed by my learned colleagues Mr Rossouw and Mr Visser.
As far as Mr Vermeulen is concerned, it's quite clear from all the evidence that he disassociated himself from this, he did not become involved, he did not enter the club ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we need really hear on Vermeulen, he's just asking for amnesty in respect of defeating the ends of justice. I don't think his evidence is in any respect, subject to what Mr Nyawuza might say, I don't think Mr Vermeulen, there's any dispute about his situation at all.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. Well that will then conclude my argument. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Nyawuza.
MR NYAWUZA ADDRESSES: Thank you, Mr Chair.
As I've stated in chambers, Chairperson, my instructions were not to oppose the applications by the applicants.
To some extent I would agree with my learned colleagues regarding their submissions during argument, that the applicants have indeed complied with the requirements of the sections that they're related to and I don't think there's anything that I can gainsay in whatever they've said. I leave it in the hands of the Committee to take the decision relating thereto. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Nyawuza. Ms Coleridge, do you have any submissions you'd like to make?
MS COLERIDGE IN ARGUMENT: Yes, thank you Chairperson.
Chairperson, it is very clear that both Generals memories are lacking in this instance, I don't know whether it's their memories or whether it's selective amnesia, as we sometimes call it, but the Generals basically couldn't give us any facts pertaining to the matter. The only help that Gen Erasmus could give us was at the Vanderbijlpark meeting, that he had made those submissions and Mr Zeelie had inferred that action was to be taken.
Mr Erasmus said he couldn't recall obviously, of the meetings, etcetera, etcetera, but he could recall one meeting that took place after the incident. None of the applicants, that is Zeelie and Van Heerden, could recall that meeting in his office. Van Heerden said it was not practice for subordinates to actually go and discuss something like this with the Generals and so forth, and that it would probably have occurred between Mr Zeelie and Gen Erasmus. So in that instance it seems that Gen Erasmus' memory is failing in that respect as well and that is the meeting in his office.
Mr van Heerden informs us that Gen du Toit as well as Gen Erasmus, as well as Gen Malherbe being at the Vanderbijl bus terminus incident, the second incident, that they were all present there. And it seems Mr van Heerden, his memory, he had quite a good memory in respect of this incident and that it ties in with Mr Zeelie's submissions that there was a subsequent meeting where Du Toit was present, Malherbe and Erasmus, at the Breweries. So it would follow, it seems that after the bus terminus incident, that those persons possibly could have still continued to liaise regarding this whole incident and their plans of action. And Mr Zeelie does also state that Mr Malherbe was also present at the Breweries. So his evidence in that respect, it kind of ties up, Chairperson, with the persons present at the bus terminus and the persons present at the Breweries.
Gen Erasmus couldn't really assist us much in forwarding to us whether there was the target and whether he agreed on the target and so forth. The fact that Mr Zeelie was involved in other incidents with the Generals, as well as in this instance, it seems that for a bomb blast of this kind of nature, it is a very serious attack and at a night-club there's normally a lot of people present ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Well Mr Vermeulen classified it as a special operation, it wasn't just a sort of routine type of operation, that's why he disassociated himself from it because of the very nature of a special operation.
MS COLERIDGE: So it would follow Chairperson, that Gen Erasmus would actually take this matter very seriously and that he probably wanted to carry forth with his plan as to revenge or just to get back at the persons that were responsible for the other attacks. So the version of Mr Zeelie, it's quite possible that it could have occurred in that way, Chairperson.
In relation to Gen du Toit, he denied that he was present at the bus terminus, at that bomb explosion, Zeelie and Van Heerden place him there at that instance, Chairperson. He further denies that he knew anything of the bomb explosion, but then in his supplementary affidavit which they furnished to us during the course of yesterday, he says that he could have known about it but he's not sure, but yet he also stated, which is contradictory in terms of his evidence, that he didn't know about the bomb explosion, he didn't know it was the Why Not bomb, that it was that club and so forth. So it's difficult to actually marry the two. I don't know if it's a memory loss or what it could be, or whether he just wants to disassociate himself with the target, or knowing of the target, Chairperson.
And then the fact that he goes to the incident and obviously as Mr van Heerden has stated, Mr Zeelie's car was a well known car and that Van Heerden always worked with Zeelie and that Du Toit was probably aware of that. And it's probable that Mr du Toit actually went up to the car, being strange that someone sitting in the car, maybe he could have been looking for Zeelie or, but strange that Van Heerden would sitting in the car and it would be a natural, as the Commander of that branch, that Security Branch, to say: "You better be under cover" because it could be possible that he knew about the incident. As he well said, he admitted it's possible that he could have known about it. So it's possible that he could have told Van Heerden to grow a beard, for instance, and that he'd known about this incident and ...(intervention)
JUDGE DE JAGER: But on Van Heerden's own evidence we have to accept that Du Toit didn't tell him to grow a beard, otherwise we must say that he committed perjury.
CHAIRPERSON: I think what you're saying is that in normal, as Mr Visser said, in normal circumstances if he didn't know about the explosion or the implication of the police in the explosion, he would have gone to Van Heerden and said: "Now why aren't you investigating, go and investigate, what are you doing sitting in the car?" The mere fact that he didn't say that might indicate that he did know about the bombing before, and he himself says well he may have known about it before.
MS COLERIDGE: This is exactly the point that we have with the problems regarding their memories, Chairperson. And as I have stated, Mr van Heerden in his amnesty applications, in both his submissions to the Commission, he kept on saying that Du Toit was the person and only because of their fading memories he conceded that it's possible that it was somebody else that said: "You have to grow a beard."
JUDGE DE JAGER: He didn't say because of my wrong memory, he said: "I've made a mistake." It's not a question of not remembering. He testified that he's made a mistake, it was in fact not Du Toit, it was in fact Victor who instructed him to grow a beard.
MS COLERIDGE: It's possible. I take your point, Judge de Jager, but that's the only part, the link that in my mind still leaves a problem in a sense. I take your point.
The other fact regarding Gen du Toit is that it seems that he wants his bread buttered on both sides, in the sense that he's saying: "I could have known about the incident", but then he also states: "But I didn't know about it, I didn't know it was the Why Not bomb blast, I didn't know that it was the target" and so forth, Chairperson. It is clear that he never gave instructions to any of the other applicants, as Gen Erasmus has admitted and that has taken responsibility for that. And the fact that Gen Erasmus had spoken to him after the incident and that's when he ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Just on that, if one just confines to the evidence of the Generals, just let's do that just for argument's sake and take Gen Erasmus' evidence, he says: "Look we had a discussion at Vanderbijl Square, I said look it's high time we should take revenge, I'm sick and tired", etcetera, etcetera, "are there any targets?" Then he expects Capt Zeelie to come back to him. He only accepts after he learns of the bombing, that what he said could have been interpreted as an order or an instruction, but in his own mind, before the bombing took place he was expecting Zeelie to come back and say: "Look here, these are the possible targets. Okay, let's go for this one." So if he, with that frame of mind, saying he's expecting Zeelie to come back, he hasn't actually given an order, although he later accepts that it might have been interpreted as being an order. If he spoke to Gen du Toit before the explosion, he wouldn't have said: "Well look, I've ordered that a place be blown up", he would have said: "Look I've asked Zeelie to go and get some info and come back to me." You know what I mean. So there wasn't an expectation, they didn't expect it to happen.
MS COLERIDGE: I take your point, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So any knowledge that Gen du Toit would have had from, on Gen Erasmus’ versions ...(intervention)
MS COLERIDGE: Full knowledge.
CHAIRPERSON: That's why I'm restricting it to that. ... it wouldn't have been an expectation that a bomb would take place that night.
MS COLERIDGE: I take your point, Chairperson, and I shall leave it at that. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Well we'll reserve our decision in this matter. I'd like to thank all the legal representatives for their assistance in the matter and we'll hand down a decision as soon as possible. The decision will not be along outstanding one because we've got a limited lifespan, which we'll be talking actually weeks, not years and months. We'll reserve the judgment. Yes, thank you.
Should we adjourn now and then reconvene, or ...?
MS COLERIDGE: Can we adjourn for five minutes, Chairperson?
CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn.
MS COLERIDGE: Thank you. All rise.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
