Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I call General Steyn. He is available and ready to give evidence. He has no objection to taking the oath and he prefers to address you in Afrikaans.

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Steyn were you in 1985 a commander of the Security Branch, Western Transvaal?

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Your amnesty application appears in bundle 1 from page 233, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you deal with the incident of the Botswana Raid on page 242 to 243, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm to the best of your knowledge the contents of your amnesty application?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You are familiar with the document that we call Exhibit A, the General Background to Amnesty Applications, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have studied it, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And do you request that that document be considered with your application?

MR STEYN: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Steyn, in 1985 we know that Brig. Loots was your second-in-command in the Western Transvaal, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have listened to his evidence?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And do you agree that Western Transvaal because of its geographical location acted in a co-ordinating capacity with regard to revolutionaries coming from Botswana to South Africa?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Then on page 242 you refer to an annexure that you have attached to your amnesty application, JS1 on page 248 of bundle 1, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you request that this also be considered along with your evidence?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: That is only one and a bit pages. Does this concur with your knowledge and experiences from the threat out of Botswana during that time?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: I would just briefly like to tell you that the document - firstly where does this document come from? Where did you get this document from?

MR STEYN: This was statements from Brig. Loots, Capt. Liebenberg.

MR VISSER: You don't have to read the names. Does this come from the collected information that Brig. Loots submitted to head office?

MR STEYN: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: And on page 248 it says

"According to a continuous flow of confirmed information and evidence it has indisputably been established that terrorists of the African National Congress, Pan Africanist Congress and other terrorist organisations have since 1984 used Botswana soil as one of the main infiltration routes into the Republic of South Africa".

and it continues, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now Brigadier, if we could get to page 242 of your application, I want you to tell the Committee, we know that information was collected on a continual basis of the activities of revolutionaries in Botswana. How did this information and the attack that eventually happened on the 14th June, how did this happen according to you?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, information was collected on a continual basis with regard to the activities from Botswana by the ANC and PAC concerning attacks within the R.S.A.

MR VISSER: What did you do with the information at Western Transvaal?

MR STEYN: This information was collected and the information as it became available to us was monitored by us and we analysed it.

MR VISSER: And did you at some stage receive an instruction to attend a meeting at head office?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And how did you get there, not with what vehicle, with what type of information did you go there?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, we collected information about the various types of onslaughts that was organised from Botswana and it is for that type of information that I went to head office.

MR VISSER: So if we can refer to targets on what did you concentrate, what type of targets did you concentrate on?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, these targets consisted of facilities from where the ANC, PAC and others, from where they launched attacks on the R.S.A. and this included offices which were used by the ANC, houses, safe premises from where arms were stashed and then from there brought into the Republic to commit acts of terror and it also comprised information about addresses of premises where persons underwent instant training and were then sent back to South Africa on short notice to launch attacks. It was addresses where propaganda was collected, it was addresses from where persons patrolled the border in order to establish safe infiltration routes.

MR VISSER: Yes, along with people who usually occupied those facilities or usually visited those facilities?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson. The facilities consisted of terrorists who would overnight there before they would infiltrate South Africa, for example they would live there for a week or two, sometimes longer, reconnoitre their routes and then depart from there.

MR VISSER: It was asked of Mr Loots if it was known from information that an infiltrator had slept or over-nighted at one house, would that house then be a target according to you?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, not if that information was not supported that it happened on a regular basis. If it was a once off occasion it would not have happened.

MR VISSER: The information that you submitted at this meeting at Wachthuis to where Mr Loots accompanied you, in your opinion did this contain so called innocent targets?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson. If I may explain, this information was collected by various intelligence communities which was then checked and supported from several sources and then this information, when it came to a stage where one could see that this address or these premises or this office was a specific meeting place or a place from where these activities were orchestrated, then that was the type of information that I would submit.

MR VISSER: The type of information, did you have a look at extracts from the book by Mr Peter Stiff? Does the type of information that you refer to now concur with the type of information that he refers to when he refers to the targets that were attacked?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: For example a safe house that was regularly used?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And that certain people were expected to be there?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: What was your experience of the movement of revolutionaries in Botswana, did they remain in one place for a long time or what was the position?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, there were indeed some facilities, homes or offices where the people stayed for some time but specifically the top structure did not remain more than one night in one place, they regularly changed addresses.

MR VISSER: So was it consequently necessary to update the information on a daily basis to ensure whether the status quo of the previous day remained the same in that facility?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And when you went to Pretoria with the memorandum, what did the memorandum consist of? To which targets did this refer because we know over a time period of five years there was a build up of facilities in Botswana and that memorandum, to what did that refer?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, that referred to those places, premises from where the onslaught was arranged.

MR VISSER: What I really want to know and wish to know from you, was that updated information?

MR STEYN: Yes that was the newest information that we had at that stage.

MR VISSER: Did you indeed, you Steyn, did you decide on certain targets or what was the situation?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, we drew up a number of memoranda according to the information that we had available to us which included photos, addresses and everything that accompanied such targets.

MR VISSER: You can mention it, vehicle registration numbers?

MR STEYN: Who the usual occupants were, who the visitors were, how regularly it was used, were there persons at those premises at that time, was it a place from where regular reconnaissance was done before infiltration, was it a place from where arms were stored and then taken from there into the Republic.

MR VISSER: Yes, very well. Now Mr Loots testified about one meeting here. Can you recall whether you attended one meeting or more meetings where you provided information to Pretoria, to representatives from head office?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, on more than one occasion I can think of two occasions where I gave information.

MR VISSER: Can you recall who was present according to your recollection on the first occasion?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, on the first occasion if I recall correctly, it was Gen. Constand Viljoen, Gen. Johan Coetzee and Comm. Charl Naude.

MR VISSER: And yourself?

MR STEYN: Yes and myself.

MR VISSER: And was information exchanged there and tabled?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson. I submitted the intelligence information and Comm. Charl Naude submitted the practical side of it.

MR VISSER: Did you yourself, from your own point of view, recommend targets or motivate these or did you just supply information to them?

MR STEYN: No, I only conveyed the information according to what we had available to us.

MR VISSER: Could you just wait a moment? Please continue?

MR STEYN: I submitted the information which satisfied these requirements which I've just mentioned now and according to that the chairpersons, Gen. Viljoen and Gen. Coetzee decided on what would be done with regard to which target.

MR VISSER: And then there was the meeting that Mr Loots referred to where more people were present?

MR STEYN: That is also so, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you recall, I think he said Dr van Heerden or Neil Barnard was present, can you recall that?

MR STEYN: I'm not certain about that. I'm not certain about Dr. Barnard.

MR VISSER: But with regard to the rest of the persons there do you concur?

MR STEYN: Yes, I recall Gen. Coetzee, Gen. Viljoen, there were other people as well.

MR VISSER: And was your role at that meeting once again the submission of new information on targets in Botswana?

MR STEYN: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Steyn, did you ever with regard to the attack on the 14th June 1985 decide on targets which had to be attacked?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, my instruction was to make submissions to head office where the decisions would be taken.

MR VISSER: Now we know from the evidence that you were entirely aware that the army would execute the attack?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And that the information that you supplied would find its way to the operatives of the army and that that information would be used to go and kill people and to damage facilities in Botswana?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And is it from that viewpoint that you request amnesty for that part in this attack?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr Visser, if I may interrupt? Concerning the decision of the submission and the up to date keeping of the newest information, always the newest with regard to where the threat was coming from, did you not exercise judgement with regard to the information and indicate what the primary threats were to be?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: That is also what Mr Loots said, is that what he says when he says that we decided what the targets were because he mentioned you, himself and Naude?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I think his choice of words was incorrect. We only collected the information concerning facilities that satisfied these criteria which I have mentioned now and this we had to submit to Gen. Viljoen, Gen. Coetzee and on occasion Gen. Liebenberg, if I recall correctly, who would have the final say.

MR MALAN: But in between you, Loots and Naude, you decided which criteria satisfied or which targets satisfied which criteria?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: The point is just that in that sense you did exercise discretion. You would, what would for you and I think that is Mr Malan's question, what would be a lesser important target to you, you would omit in favour of a more important target and in that regard you exercised your discretion?

MR STEYN: Entirely correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Were you present in Botswana or close to Botswana or somewhere while the operation was launched?

MR STEYN: Chairperson no, I was not in Botswana, I was at the border post when the operatives who would go to do the work when they went in.

MR VISSER: Which border post was this?

MR STEYN: This was at Kopfontein border post.

MR VISSER: Did you see vehicles going in? What did you see?

MR STEYN: Yes, I saw one large vehicle go in and I was aware that there were a number of people in that vehicle.

MR VISSER: Please tell the Committee what type of vehicle was it?

MR STEYN: It was a vehicle that was sealed, that would make it difficult if we at a late stage go through the border post we could get safely through on our side but it might be searched on the Botswana side and we hoped that the Botswana authorities would not search the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Was it a motor vehicle?

MR STEYN: No, it was a truck.

MR VISSER: And you said it was sealed at the back?

MR STEYN: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Concerning the people, while there was a discussion about targets, is it so that people were discussed when targets were discussed in Botswana?

MR STEYN: People who were attached to a facility, those people were mentioned.

MR VISSER: Now Brig. Loots expressed it in the following, he said people who in some or other manner were involved in the insurgence and attacks in the Republic of South Africa from Botswana. Would you in general agree with that?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And would the type of information that you had about such people. For example if we study bundle 2, page 46, would it be the following type of information? Page 46 there is a newspaper report wherein the centre column it is said

"A former Alexandra musician, he was involved in ANC cultural and political training as well as handgrenade crash courses."

Would that be the type of information?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And with regard to Duke Machobane for example

"responsible for transporting ANC members coming to Botswana for terrorist training?"

Once again, would that be the type of information?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If you did not have this type of information concerning a person, would he have been targeted?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson. As I have already said there were certain criteria on which we decided that had to be satisfied and what the instruction was to be otherwise we could not submit it as a target.

CHAIRPERSON: It was put to Mr Steyn or Loots yesterday that one of those persons that were killed actually lived in Soweto and he only arrived there the day of the attack? I'm not certain what words were used when it was put to him that he was not involved in any ANC activities. What would be the position of such a person?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if such a person, if I understand you correctly, it was somebody who was not tasked with the ANC activities. If such a person was present at a target that was identified he would also have been caught in the crossfire.

CHAIRPERSON: I can understand that but in the case of someone to whom Mr Visser referred to as a musician but according to Mr Visser's quotation also had dealings with the ANC and it was not so and we suppose that Mr Berger's proposal to Mr Loots is the truth, where would such information come from that he was indeed involved in ANC activities? I have previously heard that the police distributed false information during the course of their work during those times. Would such types of information also be distributed for an attack that should not have taken place?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, concerning this operation we had to identify targets according to facts as we collected it from our colleagues and from other intelligence services and we would not if I can use the word frame an innocent person.

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Steyn, would you agree that it happened previously? I'm not saying that it happened here now, but there were instances where it did happen previously?

MR STEYN: Yes I am aware or rather I have heard of such instances.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, thank you. Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Is it not so that Military Intelligence and National Intelligence also did their own detective work, if I may call it such, in Botswana?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And a person, let us say Duke Machobane, who was known to you at the Security Branch, could it be that he at the same time was monitored by one of the other intelligence communities?

MR STEYN: That is definitely so, Chairperson, because the information was pooled and then more than one intelligence service would concentrate on such a person.

MR VISSER: And if the Police, the Security Branch, you, arrive at that meeting and you have a person like Joseph Malaza who is an innocent person and you submit him as a target, what would the reaction be from the other intelligence services?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I would not be able to propose such a target if he did not satisfy this criteria according to which one had to determine firstly what his activities were, how active he was, was he a threat and such types.

MR VISSER: So the long and short of it is you would not submit an innocent person as a target?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And if you made a mistake it would be controlled and seen by the other intelligence communities?

MR STEYN: That is correct, we could eliminate possible problems by correlating with other intelligence services.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Visser. Mr Steyn, if that was the case, when you went to that meeting where information came from the Police, Military Intelligence and National Intelligence, did you bring your notes to compare whether you all agree or what was the position?

MR STEYN: Yes, Chairperson, that was done previously. At the latest before we went to such a meeting we verified the information to find out whether we still on the correct road.

CHAIRPERSON: How was it verified?

MR STEYN: From ground level, all the handlers who were on ground level, the various intelligence services who were busy in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Did this all deal with the SAP or do we refer to military sources?

MR STEYN: We refer to all the other intelligence services.

CHAIRPERSON: Because you said before you went to that meeting?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Where did this happen or how did this happen?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, a final document was drawn up according to which a specific - I identified a specific premises as a target and as time went by this was updated.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think you understand my question, that is why I asked because I understand that that list and information changed from day to day, it was not a constant situation. At this meeting where it was decided upon who would be killed and which buildings would be attacked, was everyone who was involved in the operation present at that meeting. Mr Loots said that he would go there with a list of 29 names and at that meeting, let us say Mr X was proposed as a target by the Police, was that verified by let us say the sources from Military Intelligence or was the Police's word just accepted?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, our submissions were made by ourselves as well as the representatives from Special Forces, Charl Naude, but Chairperson, if I could answer you, that was the newest information that was submitted at that meeting.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand that but the newest information along with Police targets, is that not so?

MR STEYN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Now you were asked earlier that if you had made a mistake with the target, would there have been other sources that could verify whether or dispute any of the information at that meeting where that list of 29 was taken?

MR STEYN: I do not know whether it would be physically possible where we were submitting the targets to make amendments but the day afterwards, before the operation would be launched, it would still be done.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe I'm not expressing myself properly. You went there with a list of 29 and from those 29 names you proposed that Mr X has to be killed because he did this, that and the other and as I understand your evidence, was there a manner in which the military people or the intelligence people or both could dispute that name as a target? Could that happen at that meeting?

MR STEYN: It could have happened, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And I assume that is why the list of 29 was reduced to 10?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Because they did not agree with you that 19 of those people should not be killed?

MR STEYN: May I just explain myself, Chairperson? The reduction of the targets happened at a later stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Not at that meeting?

MR STEYN: At that meeting it was reduced but it was reduced even further later on.

CHAIRPERSON: To how many was it reduced?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall but I do know that the final figure was ten.

CHAIRPERSON: But at that meeting and up to the time this attack took place, the 29 was reduced to 10?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser?

MR MALAN: Chairperson, may I just? I am confused here. Mr Loots testified that on the list there were names of persons but also the names of premises that were targets. The targets were premises and persons who were mentioned of which he could not recall any names and he could not commit himself to any names on that list. Your evidence, if I understand you correctly, as you referred to premises as targets to which names of persons were attached who would possibly be there. Can you tell us what this list looked like? Was it 29 MK names, what did the list look like?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the names that we submitted all concerned premises from where the threat was launched whether it be MK members who lived there and from there trained MK members or other MK members who sent them in or whether there be arms at those premises, whether instant training was given there, whether there were persons living there who transported arms or persons who would transport terrorists to safe houses, those were the targets that we had on the list.

MR MALAN: Very well, but I still want some clarity. If there was a target on the list, let us say premises on the corner of first street and second avenue then it would have said in this house we expect to find these people?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: It would have said that the ANC head office at 2068 whatever, that is a target and it would have said we would expect to find no one there at one in the morning?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR MALAN: And amongst those 29 names would there have been names of individuals where the premises were not the targets but only the individual? In other words you had to go there and take the man out but don't damage the premises, we just know that he stayed there that night?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, if the premises was the target and that person was there then he would also be the target.

MR MALAN: So if the list was premises as target then there would be people there as well and there were arms there as well?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR MALAN: And where there were children, was it said that there were people living there, with people who went through but this family has four small children, would that have been removed?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Was that the type of thing that would be removed from the list?

MR STEYN: Yes, I personally made sure that they were removed.

CHAIRPERSON: When did you do this Mr Steyn?

MR STEYN: At the first meeting.

CHAIRPERSON: And at that meeting fourteen or twenty one days before the attack were there people's names or the names of buildings or descriptions of buildings taken away from that list because of the fact that there were children there?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall at the last meeting but I do know that at the first meeting many names were removed from the list and because of the fact that there were children there and there were women there, it could have happened at the last meeting but I cannot recall it quite clearly.

MR MALAN: Very well then, and then my last question because I want to understand this list of yours. So all the targets that appeared on that list was your intention to render the infrastructure obsolete?

MR STEYN: Yes Chairperson, the infrastructure also had to be damaged.

MR MALAN: So the houses had to be bombed or destroyed?

MR STEYN: Absolutely, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: So it was not only just to go and kill people?

MR STEYN: No, the whole facility had to be destroyed so that it could not be used again.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: So the operation was not aimed at people but at buildings and if there were people in those buildings then they would also be killed?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson, but those are the buildings where we had information that specific persons would be there.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your answers now, Mr Steyn, the buildings that comprised as targets were buildings were there were certain activities?

MR STEYN: Absolutely?

CHAIRPERSON: And some of those buildings were buildings, for example houses where in the middle of the night you expected there to be people in the building?

MR STEYN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But the building was the actual target and indirectly the occupants were also targeted because they were coincidentally there. It was fortunate if they were not there but the building would still have been destroyed?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson. If I may just explain? The information that we submitted that would indicate and did indicate that these premises were manned by terrorists or manned by someone who was orchestrating the onslaught on the R.S.A. from there, that was the information. Or there were arms that would be used against the R.S.A.

CHAIRPERSON: But that is what Mr Malan wanted to know. The primary reason to describe someone as a target for that operation, did that list only comprise buildings and coincidentally persons that you expected to be in that building or was it only people or was it both?

MR STEYN: It was both, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But that is what Mr Malan wanted to know from you.

MR MALAN: Yes, but I would just like to make sure again. From the answer you gave to me, I understood that the people's names were attached to the building?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR MALAN: It was not that number 13 target was a person, it was still a building and a note would accompany it saying that in this building we would expect someone to be there.

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That is how I understand your answers.

MR VISSER: To illustrate this, may I refer to page 79 of bundle 2, Chairperson? Once again, what Stiff describes as the targets, would this be the type of information that you are trying to explain to Mr Malan

"ANC safe house in Tlokweng near Oasis Motel. The target was 200 metres from the Oasis Motel. First information suggested it was used by ANC Transvaal Rural Machinery and was usually occupied by about four MK cadres. This had been updated by last minute information indicating that as many as 17 guerrillas could be sleeping there. Information suggests that planning for the murder of Mr Soon and Mrs Annetjie Joubert on the Swartruggens Farm in March 1985 had been conducted there."

Is that the type of information?

MR STEYN: That is exactly so.

MR VISSER: I'm not asking if that is the correct information but is that the type of information?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then just to come closer, on page 82, target 13, and address is given 15717 Broadhurst, Gaberone North, would that be the target? Is that what you are trying to convey?

MR STEYN: That is true, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And in this regard, Stiff says

"Occupied by George Pahle and his wife Lindiwe Maud Malaza"

And then the second paragraph says:

"The Security Police maintained George Pahle had planted a bomb at Johannesburg ...(indistinct) Centre in 1976. Both he and Lindiwe were members of the SACP. In the early 1980's when things got too hot for them they left for Botswana."

and then it continues to say:

"They were involved in intelligence work for the ANC and their residence was used as a safe house by MK cadres in transport and they were also responsible for MK logistics and smuggling weapons and equipment in South Africa."

Is this the type of information that you are referring to?

MR STEYN: That is exactly so, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: So the facility would be the target and if George Pahle was there then he would be killed?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon? But that would also be the target because George and Lindiwe Pahle operated from there?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Steyn, with regard to the persons that we know or that is told to us that were killed and/or injured here, can you recall were there any of these persons were mentioned at these two meetings that you are referring to?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the most of those people, if not all, had to be have been mentioned otherwise I would not have been able to submit these targets because there would not have been an involvement of a threat to South Africa from that target.

MR VISSER: Can you today recall exactly what the role of each and everyone of those persons that were killed?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, I cannot.

MR VISSER: Do you know exactly how many and indeed who were killed by the army in this attack were killed and/or injured?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I heard a figure of twelve.

MR VISSER: But no, from your own knowledge?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, I don't.

MR VISSER: After the incident, was there any reflection - just hold on? I'll repeat. After the incident was there any reflection with regard to the success or whether the correct targets were hit or not?

MR STEYN: Yes Chairperson, in our own division and in the army division there was some reflection done and by means of informers that we had in Gaberone we received feedback concerning the result of the attack.

MR VISSER: Yes and did it also become known later that it did indeed happen that certain innocent persons were hit during the attack?

MR STEYN: That is so, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: There was mention of a six year old boy and other persons that may have possibly been innocent?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And were press statements also released in that regard?

MR STEYN: Yes I saw some press releases.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, an example would be in bundle 2, pages 51 and 52 of exactly that aspect.

MR MALAN: Before you continue there? The statements that were released or are you going to deal with the Williamson Conference?

MR VISSER: I was not going to but you are free to do so.

MR MALAN: I think it is important. The conference that was held where information was released by Mr Williamson, I think this appears, there's a report thereof. Mr Visser, would you like to assist me? In any case, I shall get to it soon, but Williamson - page 45

"Top cop says ANC arrests on cards after raid."

It was Stadler and Williamson that held a press conference and at other places there is reference to it, from the extracts here with regard to the victims, the individuals, and then certain activities were attached to them to say that these people that were killed were ANC people or ANC collaborators. Were you involved in the preparation for that press release, the press conference?

MR STEYN: No, I was not physically, personally involved.

MR MALAN: Did they ask you information with regard to the particulars after the attack?

MR STEYN: I accept that from my office information must have gone.

MR MALAN: Do you recall if it was specifically asked of you?

MR STEYN: No, I cannot recall.

MR MALAN: But you accept they could or did approach your office?

MR STEYN: Yes, because they approached head office, they had all the information.

MR MALAN: Or they could have received it from military intelligence sources?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR MALAN: Or they could have made up this information with regard to involvement?

MR STEYN: That is also so, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But you cannot recall that you were specifically involved in that conference?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Also not in a supportive role?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall now, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Concerning the facts that came to light after the events, after the raid, what was your opinion? Did the army attack the correct or the wrong target according to your information?

MR STEYN: Our information was that these were the correct targets.

MR VISSER: Did this attack have any effect on the activities of the revolutionaries in Botswana, Mr Steyn?

MR STEYN: Yes Chairperson, our information was that some of the more top structure persons ran away, amongst others to Zambia and other countries.

MR VISSER: Yes, while you are referring to that, Mr Loots suggested that with regard to the human targets the most important persons were concentrated on, most important persons of the ANC in Botswana. What is your comment?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I interpret that correctly, following on what he says then that was the most important persons at that stage, the most important targets we had at that stage about the information we had, enabled us to submit it.

MR VISSER: That is correct because there were more important people, that is with respect towards the people who were killed here than them in Botswana?

MR STEYN: That is so, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: But once again depending on the evidence it was attached to targets?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was the choice targets influenced in any way by accessibility as far as you can recall?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, it was whether we could submit a complete picture of a target with exactly what was organised from those premises.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

MR MALAN: Just a follow up question on this answer? Initially you testified that Charl Naude spoke about the executionability of this attack itself, so the accessibility of the targets at some or other stage must have been a factor?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Can you recall that certain targets were taken off the list or specific targets because it would be difficult to execute the attack on those targets?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall any specific targets, Chairperson, it was the special operations of the army, went and physically reconnoitred the circumstances of the targets.

MR MALAN: So you cannot think of a target or can you think of a target that is not in this final list that was hit but that was earlier on on the list or can you give us an example of such a case?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, with regard to accessibility, I cannot think of one right now. As I've already said, where there were women and children, those were removed but accessibility, I cannot think of it for a moment. I am not in a position to answer that.

MR MALAN: Can you recall the particulars of any of those targets? What type of target it was, where it was, the nature of the building, when it was removed, never mind the reasons?

MR STEYN: It was normal homes where there were Botswana citizens and there were children, those were taken off.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, we have a problem. Our bundles did not contain those pages and we've been trying to get hold of them so unfortunately we haven't studies that document and we haven't got one to place before Mr Steyn unfortunately. I understand Mr Cornelius has one.

CHAIRPERSON: You testified about Duke Machobane? Do you recall that name?

MR STEYN: I beg your pardon, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Duke Machobane.

MR STEYN: The name was mentioned here, yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you recall the name from then?

MR STEYN: Yes I recall the name from then.

CHAIRPERSON: The building in which he lived was a target?

MR STEYN: If I recall correctly, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you have information about who the occupants of that home was?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, as I've already said that each and every target that was submitted was attached to weapons and/or training and/or planning so I am not able to say who was involved at which premises.

CHAIRPERSON: But hold on, Mr Steyn, you took the decision and at a stage people and/or buildings were taken off the list because of the fact that there were children on the list. Did you testify to that?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That is why I am asking in the case of Duke Machobane, did you take the trouble to find out who lived in that building?

MR STEYN: Concerning to each and every target it was done.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but I am referring to Machobane specifically. You had to take the decision, were you completely informed about whom the occupants were?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I must repeat, it was done regarding each and every target because if I would submit such a target without being able to tell the top structure there are children or there or not children, I did not have a choice, I had to convey that information.

CHAIRPERSON: What would the position have been or what was the position if this building was a target and there were people who lived in there who had nothing to do with the ANC? What would have happened then?

MR STEYN: It would not have been approved by Generals Viljoen and Coetzee because I know of such instances where it was refused.

CHAIRPERSON: I see. Thank you. Mr Coetser?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR COETSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

General, if I understand the position correctly then, dealing with individuals at the target houses or establishments concerned, what you had to do or were required to do given the decision that this raid to go ahead, was in relation to the physical targets chosen to rely and to convey based upon the latest information available to you from various agents and agencies, who was likely to be in the houses or establishments concerned. Would that be correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: And if that information indicated that there was, for example, a family living there with children even though one of the adults may have been, would have qualified as a target in his or own right, that establishment would have been taken out of the picture insofar as being a target is concerned for this raid, would that be correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson, it would not have been a target.

MR COETSER: But I take it that obviously all you could do in the circumstances was to rely on the information that you were provided by individuals in the field tasked with gathering this information in. If you for example had been advised that in a certain target house there was a particular individual or individuals living there, who themselves by virtue of their activities based on information were targets themselves, but really didn't know anything further insofar as they had permanent stay over guests or other people staying in the house, it would just simply remain an unknown factor and you would have to accept that in making your decisions as to whether that establishment would remain a target or not.

Would I be correct in saying so?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: So in other words, really at the end of the day, there were obviously various targets considered, given the logistical problems in conducting a raid like this, where there would be certain unknowns, where risks would necessarily have to be taken with regard to the potential of civilians being killed or injured in the raid. That inherent risk could not be taken out of the decision making and the target identification process that you were involved in, wouldn't that be true? That inherent risk had to remain to a certain degree insofar as civilian casualties?

MR STEYN: That is correct to a certain extent, yes Chairperson.

MR STEYN: Now it would seem to me that given the tenor of the cross-examination and the subject matter that has been of interest, coming out of the cross-examination so far, is the concern about the fact that innocent civilians ran the risk of being killed and injured and that innocent ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think that is badly put, innocent ...(inaudible)

MR COETSER: I'm sorry. Civilians, people not involved directly, were killed, that seems to be the case. My impression is that has been grappled with here is the issue of the level of morality that was employed in the decision making in choosing these targets given the civilian risk because we all know for example what the content of the Geneva Convention on war is. We all know that military organisations or people embarking upon military actions are required as far as practically possible to avoid in their actions innocent people being killed. What I would like to ask of you is, in the decision making and in the identification of targets, within the means available to you, did the Police Force do its best to reduce that risk as far as possible even though that risk remained?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: The other aspect I'd like to canvas with you is also, if the soldiers who carried out this raid at the end of the day were in their final instructions given orders by their senior officers. For example, to kill all occupants they found in the target houses and establishments, would the Police have had any control over that or say in those orders?

CHAIRPERSON: Which orders are these?

MR COETSER: If in the final briefing to the soldiers that carried out this raid, their military officers instructed them to kill all occupants in the target houses concerned, that they raided, would you have had any influence or control over those orders or such an order? Would the Police have had such control?

MR MALAN: Mr Coetser, does that not speak for itself? The final briefing must have been after the last contact?

MR COETSER: Well, Mr Malan, what I'm trying to find out is whether or not individuals such as the present applicant before the Commission were in sufficiently close contact with the officers, military officers of these soldiers, to be part and parcel of final orders to made, militaristic orders being made?

MR MALAN: Well why don't you ask that question then?

MR COETSER: That is the question I'm asking.

MR STEYN: No, the instruction that finally at the latest minute that was given to the soldiers, we could do nothing about that.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetser, at the end of the day that order or that meeting where these final orders were given was known as an intervening event which would detract from the guilt of this witness.

MR COETSER: Mr Commissioner, depending upon the evidence that is led that might be a consideration.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR MALAN: Mr Steyn, do you know at any stage of any instruction that the army, the army commanders gave to the operatives before they went in to shoot anyone at any of these targets?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson.

MR COETSER: Continuing on that aspect, as we now know, effectively physical targets were pointed out to the military. Individuals who were targeted were associated with physical targets identified. From the military side, was there any discussion or was the Police's assistance or advice invited by the military as to exactly how the military were going to deal with the situation where they had a target establishment but they were also advised to try and kill a particular person in that house in circumstances where there may be, in other individuals in that house, who were not targets and the strategies that were to be employed in dealing or coping with such a situation, did you ever have discussions with the military as to how one was going to go about dealing with that kind of target?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, we would not be able to tell the military how they should do their work on ground level.

MR COETSER: It seems to me to be a rather difficult or catch twenty two situation for the military. If they were asked in the middle of the night to go into or to attack a physical target, where not only were they asked to attack the physical target but to search for a specific individual or individuals at that target, eliminate them or kill them but then deal with ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Sorry Mr Coetser? I'm not sure that I understand the interest of yourself and your client in the military's activities on this. You're representing Mr Olifant?

MR COETSER: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Is there a relevance to this question as far as the interest of your client is concerned?

MR COETSER: Most certainly because Mr Olifant at the end of the day will be testifying as to the final orders that the military received when he went with them insofar as these targets are concerned, but he was not a representative of the military, he was a representative of the police.

MR MALAN: Can this witness help you on the principle of those questions, the dilemmas of your client?

MR COETSER: Well, I just want to get clarity from this witness as to what extent dealing with these problematic aspects of this attack, to what extent this was left to the discretion of the military.

MR MALAN: Didn't he say he does not know? He did not attend any further such briefing meetings?

MR COETSER: I would just like to get clarity on this issue, that is all Mr Malan.

MR MALAN: Proceed.

MR COETSER: Just to get back to this, it seems to me to be a physical, logistical dilemma, tactical dilemma, that the military might have been involved. Did the military raise with you, for example, problems associated with trying to attack and destroy a physical house or building but at the same time fulfil a function or a task of eliminating a specific individual identified that may or may not be at that premises? Did they raise any objections to this?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, no. I think one has to see it in the light that a target was submitted that was approved at top structure and that at that stage was taken away from us to the military and what will happen from there, would be planned by military's top structure. They would not now ask us what should we do and what should we not do. The top structure of the military would take that final decision.

MR COETSER: Were you asked ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetser, just to help you out here. I think this applicant has been represented by a team that must rank with one of the more experienced amnesty application teams and if there's at the end of the day a possibility that you're going to have to argue that there was an intervening order in terms of the military orders that affected the intentions of this witness, then he has already answered exactly what he understood his information was going to help in a particular way this operation was going to be conducted and if this other order, if it does exist, changed that, then this witness is stuck by what he has told us and I'm sure had there been any possibility of those instructions changing, I'm sure Mr Visser would have led him on that issue, as far as this witness is concerned. Therefore, I'm suggesting to you that it's hardly likely that this witness is going to be able to give you any more information about what might have occurred at military level. I understand your point and I take your point that there very well may have been an intervening order which changed the intentions as originally planned but I don't know if this witness can shed light on it.

MR COETSER: May I just finish off this one aspect please?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR COETSER: General, as far as you are aware, in supplying the information that you did for the purposes of identifying targets in this raid, in the meetings that you had with these generals in the military, did it appear to you that they were fully prepared to take on the task of not only destroying physical targets but individuals which according to your information were associated with these physical targets and were themselves in your judgement justified being targets as well? Were they prepared to take on that task of not only dealing with the physical targets but those individuals too?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, that is indeed what I had said in my

evidence, that if a target was identified then it was attached to a specific onslaught that was manifested from those premises to the Republic so that if that premises was attacked an people were killed then it was in the process of attacking those premises. Whoever was there at the house and who was not there, neither I nor the military would have known.

MR MALAN: Mr Steyn, I think you misunderstand the question. Mr Coetser, if you will allow me? The question was whether you have any knowledge that the military's instruction with regard to specific targets could have been you must take out this target, destroy the infrastructure, bring back documents, but at this target person X would be present and it is a priority that you eliminate person X, that is the question. Do you know?

MR STEYN: No, I do not know.

MR MALAN: And if the military took such decisions or the implementation team?

MR STEYN: That is outside my knowledge, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR COETSER: I must just take this one step further just to get clarity. What I'm actually looking for General, is what was represented to you by the military in these meetings?

CHAIRPERSON: Before or after the event?

MR COETSER: Before the event.

JUDGE MOTATA: But who would have been doing the information gathering if you phrase your question in the manner that you did?

MR COETSER: Mr Commissioner, just to explain my thinking, if one looks at the situation, we have a decision that is taken, a raid is going to be conducted on various targets in Botswana. The overall idea is to eliminate the effectiveness of the attacks that are coming from Botswana. That is the overall idea. The Police are told that the military are going to undertake this operation and they then request ...(intervention)

JUDGE MOTATA: The thinking is that the South African Police cannot attack Botswana as another country but this can only be done by the South African Defence Force hence their hands were tied to information gathering and identifying the targets, that was their task. Otherwise, as we know the situation, had it happened within the country they would have done it themselves?

MR COETSER: I appreciate the legalistic situation involved but what I'm trying to secure from the General is practically speaking what the military represented to them, the Police.

JUDGE MOTATA: You may proceed.

MR COETSER: What I'm trying to establish, General, is with the military, with you being advised that the military are going to undertake this operation, this is the general idea of the operation etc, it is obvious to me on the totality of the evidence so far that the military were interested not only in physical targets but also particular individuals associated, that could be associated with those targets? It seems to me that they represented to the Police, to you people, at these meetings, that they were prepared to take on the task not only of destroying these physical targets, but they were prepared to go so far on information provided by you to try and identify specific individuals at these targets for elimination and that they were prepared to carry out that function in terms of the raid? All I'm asking you is, did they military represent to you that they were prepared to try and undertake that task too? In other words, that they were prepared to actually go so far in the course of the attack on these targets to try and identify individuals at those targets to be eliminated. They were prepared to be as sophisticated as that in the raid process?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, that may have been decided by the military itself, that they would execute it in that manner, but the specific planning that they had said beforehand that they would do that specifically, one should read that in the sense that there was a proposal of a facility attached to names and that is what was referred to in order to eliminate those persons to which were attached to the premises. If that is what ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: To bring this thing to an end, Mr Steyn, or this aspect, do I understand correctly that with regard to you there was a final decision at that meeting, approximately 14 to 21 days before the attack where a list of targets to which names were attached, where names were attached to buildings, this was finally decided upon and the understanding of the policy of the attack and whom would be killed and whom should not be killed, children and so forth, it was decided at that meeting?

MR STEYN: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And no one could misunderstand it?

MR STEYN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: If there was another plan that could solely be on the side of the army or special forces, you would not know about it?

MR STEYN: No, I would not know about it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR COETSER: That's all I have, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR COETSER

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, you asked the Committee to incorporate certain sections of that green dossier. If I could just have a look at it again? Thanks. This green dossier that was referred to yesterday by Mr Loots. I take it that you've been through this dossier, would that be fair?

MR STEYN: Yes Chairperson.

MR BERGER: It's entitled "Infiltration of African National Congress and Pan Africanist Terrorists to the Republic of South Africa via Botswana" and it's, as I understand it, it's a presentation that was made by your office, if I'm incorrect please stop me, to head office, to illustrate the extent of ANC/PAC operations in Botswana against South Africa. Would that be correct?

MR STEYN: Correct Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And in this dossier, numerous affidavits from security policemen, including Mr Loots as well as captured ANC cadres and it gives chapter and verse of a whole host of ANC and PAC and Qibla cadres, am I correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, how does that dossier define Qibla? Who are they?

MR BERGER: Qibla? Well Chairperson, if you're interested I can refer you to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I just want to know which version of Qibla that dossier refers, so I want my own idea as to who or what Qibla is?

MR BERGER: There's an affidavit here by a person called Abdul Wahab Amied.

CHAIRPERSON: It seems like the same lot but just carry on?

MR BERGER: Which is Exhibit G in the dossier. You might care to read it.

CHAIRPERSON: Are they classified as a military terrorist organisation?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, perhaps Mr Steyn would be better qualified to answer that question.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Mr Steyn, was Qibla, were they identified as a terrorist organisation?

MR STEYN: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Within South Africa?

MR STEYN: They were attached to the PAC.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

MR BERGER: Now Mr Steyn, you'll correct me if I'm wrong? ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I thought they were religious?

MR STEYN: Maybe I am confusing them.

CHAIRPERSON: No, it says in the dossier that they are a terrorist organisation?

MR STEYN: Yes they were but I cannot recall, I said they were attached or they part of the PAC but I'm not certain of it now.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, as I was saying, correct me if I'm wrong, but I went through this dossier last night and I was unable to find the name of a single person who was killed during the SADF raid on Gaberone in June 1985. Did I miss something?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall. I cannot recall all those names.

MR BERGER: Well, you're not aware of any of the deceased in this raid of any one of their names being mentioned at any point in this dossier?

MR STEYN: No, I cannot recall now, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Well, as I say, I couldn't find one either.

MR VISSER: I'll accept that.

MR BERGER: Maybe Mr Wagener will find something.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you just tell us?

MR MALAN: We don't have the full dossier, I don't know if it's necessary for us to have it but what period does it cover?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, it professes to cover the period and Mr Loots gave that evidence from 1984 to 1988 but if you analyse it and my learned friend could correct me if I'm wrong, the affidavits really deal with post beginning of 1986, with the McBrides and the rest of the people who were provided with arms and ammunition from Botswana and so on, so it really ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I just want to make sure because we have the extract in our bundles and I wanted to make sure that it's the same period and only that period that's being covered. It was '84 through '88, I think?

MR VISSER: Yes absolutely.

MR MALAN: Only a few incidents covered prior to the raid, two or three.

MR VISSER: That is the point yes, Chairperson and that is why we didn't burden the record with the whole dossier and why we only made the extract available.

MR MALAN: Thank you. Mr Berger?

MR BERGER: Mr Malan, it's correct that a lot of the incidents occurred, that I referred to there, occurred after the raid but there are more than two or three that referred to the pre-raid period, definite ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Sorry, I wasn't trying to limit it to specific numbers, my impression simply was that that was by far the minority of the incidents covered, it was dated before the raid. That's why I asked simply the question, wanted to know. Yes I accept that Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Mr Malan. The point I was making is that according to the evidence of Mr Loots yesterday it was meant to cover the period '84 to '88. I take it no further than that.

Now Mr Steyn, I must confess that I'm still a bit confused as to who actually was targeted according to your information. At one point you said in response to a question from my learned friend, Mr Visser, you said you never decided on targets. At another point in response to a question from Mr Malan, you said you had a discretion as to who was a target and who wasn't a target. So what was the position as far as you and Mr Loots were concerned when you presented the original list of 29 targets? Had you exercised your discretion in formulating that list of 29 targets or did you not have a discretion?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, as I've already said, we went through a sifting process to see who satisfied the requirements for being a target or not. We did not take a final decision. The final decision was taken with top structure in Pretoria.

MR BERGER: The final decision taken by the top structure in Pretoria was limited to the 29 targets that you had proposed, isn't that how it worked?

MR VISSER: With respect, Loots said they started with 37, not that it's all that important but if something is to be made of the 29 targets per se, then Chairperson, one must bear in mind that there were many more, apparently, that they started with and it was reduced later.

CHAIRPERSON: At some stage it was at 29.

MR BERGER: The list that you and Mr Loots put forward at Wachthuis two or three weeks before the raid, that list I understand had 29 targets listed in it?

MR STEYN: Yes, it was approximately 29 if I recall correctly.

MR BERGER: And ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, there's some other concept involved here now, whether it was buildings or names. I always thought there were 29 names of people but it seems like it wasn't exactly that way. Maybe you can clear that up then when you talk about targets?

MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Steyn, let's get clarity then. The approximately 29 items on the list that you presented at Wachthuis, two or three weeks before the raid, was each item a building, a name, or a building with sub-items containing names?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson. It was a premises, a building that was attached to individuals who planned the onslaught against the R.S.A. from there.

MR BERGER: So would it be fair to say we have a memorandum, these are the proposed targets. Number 1 - ANC headquarters at such and such an address?

MR STEYN: Correct, yes.

MR BERGER: 1.1 - following people will be found or are likely to be found at this address and if there are any they are listed as sub-paragraphs to 1, would that be fair?

MR STEYN: That is correct. With the information to our availability, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Then 2, the next building with the address - 2.1 up to whatever, the following people would be found at this address or are likely to be found at this address?

MR STEYN: Persons and/or weapons or collaborators or persons receiving instant training or persons giving the instant training.

MR BERGER: So as you then go through the list there are 29 main paragraphs, each containing their own sub-paragraphs, would that be fair?

MR STEYN: I do not understand the question, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: These 29 items, were they all buildings?

MR STEYN: They were all premises, yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And each and every premises had a number of names of persons under each building?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And/or arms or whatever?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now we've got 29 paragraphs consisting of buildings and names and items?

MR BERGER: We have 29 main paragraphs and each paragraph has sub-paragraphs depending on whether there were people that were going to be targeted in that building or whether there was information that was being sought from that building or whether there were weapons that were being stored in that building, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr Berger, let us not argue about this again. Earlier you referred to documents that you knew were in certain places and had to be brought back, so it is not that each and every one of the 29 were limited to the three, there was a history about the activity, it would have been said what persons were there, what documents were kept there, where weapons were or where persons where there would be a history of each and every one?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But underneath that would have been names of the persons that one could expect there that you could attach to there and the particulars would have been there as to where the documents were to be and whatever persons who gave training?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: The full argument with regard to why that would be a target?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And what the priorities were to be with regard to the target?

MR STEYN: Absolutely.

MR MALAN: And what the "profit" would be if the infrastructure was attacked?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Okay, at least we have clarity on that now, Mr Steyn. But now I have a further difficulty with your evidence because in response to a question from the Chairperson you said the operation was not aimed at people but at buildings where certain activities were being carried out. Isn't it correct that in certain instances the building was a target because of the people who stayed in that building, or have I misunderstood you?

MR STEYN: Yes, if I understand correctly Chairperson, because the persons that lived there were involved in the organisation of the onslaught against South Africa.

MR BERGER: So there were many targets which were selected not because of the building but because of the people who were in that building or expected to be in that building?

MR STEYN: The target was the building because from that premises it was manifested to South Africa, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So the people were just secondary, it was the building. You wanted to destroy the infrastructure, not the people. If you got the people at the same time that was great?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson. The facility.

CHAIRPERSON: For purposes of the operation, was it the people, the people were not targets?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the person was a target with the facility if he was there because the information was that he trains people, he had weapons there and from there the onslaught arranged and manifested, so the building was attacked and in the same process, if the persons were there according to the information, then it was correct and then it was a bonus.

MR BERGER: But you see ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What if there were people who were not supposed to be killed at a specific targeted building?

MR STEYN: Those targets as we proposed them were shot down by top structures, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Shot down by top structures? And the military people, they knew about this?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It was a strict policy that was exercised there at that meeting?

MR STEYN: Absolutely, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, what I don't understand is, yesterday Mr Loots told us that the purpose of the attack was to wipe out the top MK personnel in Gaberone?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson. That included the structures with everything accompanying it. The structures that consisted in Botswana that was used to launch the onslaught in the Republic.

CHAIRPERSON: Please listen to the question.

MR BERGER: He said, as I understood his evidence, that the manifest purpose of the raid was to execute those people who were involved in the planning or carrying out of military operations against South Africa. That, he said, was the prime purpose of the attack, whereas you say that the prime purpose of the attack was to destroy the infrastructure, the physical infrastructure of MK in Botswana?

CHAIRPERSON: But he goes further and he says and you deal with this, that if in so doing certain MK members were assassinated was a bonus but I understand that your question is directed at the primary target?

MR BERGER: My question is directed at the emphasis of the raid. Mr Loots' emphasis is on people and your emphasis is on buildings, on cement, on bricks?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the targets were the facilities from where these onslaughts were launched and these facilities were only approved if a specific task was launched from those premises. If this included persons ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You already testified that and I understand your evidence. I think the question is aimed to get comment from you, whether you agree with Mr Loots or not?

MR STEYN: No, my answer Chairperson, is that it was the structure facilities which included everything accompanying it.

CHAIRPERSON: So you do not agree with Mr Loots?

MR STEYN: If Mr Loots would say that it was only individuals.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but you heard what he said.

MR STEYN: The target was the facility and whatever accompanied it.

CHAIRPERSON: So you do not agree with Mr Loots?

MR STEYN: That is correct, on that point. That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, you also said that you believe and you believed after the fact that the military hit the right targets. Am I correct?

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You also said that if you had gone to a meeting where there were other intelligence agencies as you did, present, and you had proposed that Danny Berger should be executed ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: He might have accepted. Apologies, Mr Berger.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you hear the question?

MR BERGER: I haven't finished the question. And then somebody from National Intelligence or Military Intelligence would have come forward and said no, Berger is just an innocent bystander, leave him out. Well let's assume they would have said that. My point is, you're saying that if you had proposed somebody who was not involved in MK activities, either a planner or a person who carried out MK activities, that some other agency would have acted as a check and balance against your proposal and that person would have been removed as a potential target, that facility would have been removed as a potential target, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And so therefore, according to your evidence, there is no reasonable possibility that the wrong targets were attacked according to you?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, no. The military who did the execution of it, according to the documentation, if they went and did the execution then they should have hit the correct targets or the mistakes they made at the scene, I cannot answer for those mistakes.

MR BERGER: But you were gathering intelligence over months and years and that intelligence was being checked and counter-checked and there were other agencies gathering their own intelligence which was being checked and counter-checked. So the possibility of error was so minimal that it could have been excluded. Isn't that what you're saying?

MR STEYN: That is the ideal that there would not be any mistakes?

MR BERGER: I'm sorry, I didn't catch what you said?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, that was the ideal that there would be no mistakes.

MR BERGER: Yes, but according to the process in which that you describe, if there had been a mistake it would have been one mistake or perhaps two mistakes, there couldn't have been a whole host of mistakes if there had been this balance and counter-balance?

MR STEYN: Yes, there should not have been mistakes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Would you agree that - I think Craig Williamson said this in his amnesty application, concerning the death of Ruth First and Jeanette and Katryn Schoon, he said that he was in charge or he had at his disposal one of the most sophisticated intelligence machineries in the world. Would you agree with that statement?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And you were part of the highly sophisticated intelligence machinery?

MR STEYN: We were part of a very good intelligence machinery, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, are you going to rely on that statement that is attributed to Craig Williamson?

MR STEYN: I used it to ask this witness whether he agreed.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not to sure whether one should but you carry on, you know why you're using it.

MR BERGER: No, I do. I want to refer you to the article that you referred to in your evidence-in-chief. It's a paragraph from a book by a man called Peter Stiff and you were asked in relation to information at page 79 and page 82 whether that was the type of information that you had and you said yes, that's the type of information that we had. Now I don't really understand that so let's go through that. Chairperson, the article is to be found at page 74 of bundle 2.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Now the targets are dealt with, starting at page 78, according to this author. Now we know that you said that from the 29 targets, now we know what we're talking about when we talk about targets, we're talking about establishments, that that number was reduced, that final meeting it was reduced below 29 and then subsequently it was reduced to ten, ten targets and you say also while you've that open, you say at page 242 of bundle 1 in your amnesty application that the act for which you seek amnesty, I'll read in Afrikaans, is

"Conspiracy to elimination of ANC MK members and collaborators in ten transit facilities and ANC offices in Gaberone."

So you were aware that the final list, am I correct, was 10 targets?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I do not know at which stage I heard that it was ten targets, I could have known beforehand but yes I was aware at some stage that it was ten targets.

MR BERGER: And those ten targets would have been drawn from the 29 that you had originally proposed?

MR STEYN: That is so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: At page 78 the first one he says was an ANC safe house in Tlokweng, Gaberone East. He says it was attacked but no one was killed, so we'll leave that one alone. Then he says the next one was an ANC safe house in Tlokweng, Gaberone East and he says there it was supposed to be occupied by Thami, a well-known South African artist, an Indian called George who was responsible for ANC logistics and Tim Williams, a former member, Williams, a former member of the Black Consciousness Movement had switched loyalties, he says, to the ANC in 1977 after his return from military training in Libya and Syria. Now that house, he says, was attacked because those three people were staying there. Do you confirm that?

MR STEYN: I see that, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: No, I'm not asking whether you can see it, I'm asking whether you confirm the contents of that paragraph that I've just read out?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, may I ask, is the question asked of me whether I confirm that that was the target and that was the information that was in that target that I proposed?

MR BERGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You see what is written in that paragraph there? Is that the truth?

MR STEYN: With regard to this target, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Whatever is written there?

MR STEYN: I cannot comment on each on every target what the information was at this stage, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Might I just interrupt to say, Chairperson, that it is under the heading "ANC Safe House"?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I don't understand why my learned friend intervened with that comment.

MR VISSER: Because the question was put to this witness that the reason why this place was attacked was because these people were there.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was, Mr Visser, does the witness agree with the contents of that paragraph, that's all. Perhaps what you suggest was still coming, I don't know.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, I'll read it to you again. The first paragraph under Target 1 Bravo, says

"It was supposed to be occupied by three people"

Now what I'm putting to you is, what one reads from this paragraph is that according to your intelligence, these three people were supposed to be in the house that night when it was going to be attacked? Now did you have that intelligence or not?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, once again I have to give the same answer, I cannot recall what information I had about which target. It's impossible. If I had those memorandums today I could have told you word for word what information I had about which target.

MR BERGER: Look, if you have - I'm going to go through this chronologically or systematically, but if you have a look at page 80 you'll see that at another house near the oasis motel somebody was killed and you see at the bottom the author writes

"The Security Police later identified the deceased from photographs as a junior MK leader, Thami Mnyele, who was also involved in training suicide squads. The raiders had expected to find him at target 1 Bravo or target 1 Alpha not at target 2."

And target 1 Bravo is the target that I'm referring to at page 78. Now the raiders had expected to find him at target 1 so it must mean that according to the information that you had, which you passed on to the raiders, Thami Mnyele would be at target 1 Bravo and Thami Mnyele was to be killed because he was a junior MK leader who was involved in training suicide squads?

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Now is that the information that you passed on to the SADF?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I must repeat. We proposed several targets which satisfied certain criteria. Whatever information with regard to whatever target at whatever address, is not possible for me to say today.

MR BERGER: If this information is correct it could only have come from you and Mr Loots?

MR STEYN: No, it could have come from any of intelligence communities who collectively collected the information and dealt with it.

MR MALAN: Yes but eventually it would have gone through your hands finally as the co-ordinator?

MR STEYN: Yes, the document that was drawn up finally would have contained that information.

MR MALAN: So you would not have had the merits from your own knowledge but that would have been an evaluation and the documents, all of this would have gone through your hands?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is so.

MR BERGER: Your hands and Mr Loots' hands?

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And Mr Loots, if I understand his evidence yesterday correctly, conceded that the death of Thami Mnyele was a mistake?

MR STEYN: I heard he said that, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Remember he said ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What do you say about it?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if he was part of the target or rather of one of the targets that we proposed then his death would not have been a mistake.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I will ask again. You have now heard and you have concurred what Mr Loots said about this. What do you say about the death of Mr Mnyele?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I know what the information was that I had proposed about Mr Mnyele and that target was approved, then the death of Mr Mnyele would not have been a mistake.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I don't want to argue with my learned friend but perhaps we could check the notes on what Mr Loots said because I have a very cryptic note, but what my note says is ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The applicant says what was quoted to him was correct.

MR VISSER: Well you see, Chairperson, that's the point I tried to make yesterday. When a statement is made to a witness, he is apt to agree. I couldn't remember exactly until I referred to my notes but there were ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, his answer was in the form of "I heard he said that"

MR VISSER: Chairperson, may I just put what I've got here, what I wrote down Mr Loots said is, Thami Mnyele wasn't placed on a list by Western Transvaal. That's what he said and my learned friend might have a better note and I'm not arguing with that, I'm just pointing out the fact that I have no such note.

CHAIRPERSON: That your note says something different?

MR VISSER: Yes and I would ask the Committee perhaps to check their notes, Chairperson, because we are now leading off on a line of cross-examination all based on what might not have been said by Loots.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steyn, did you hear what Mr Loots said concerning the death of Mr Mnyele?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I can testify about it but I cannot recall everything, I tried to keep notes but I did not keep up with him.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but two or three minutes ago you said that you heard him saying something. Do you recall saying that?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It was with regard to Mr Mnyele's death.

MR STEYN: I think Chairperson, I beg your pardon, I think it was put to me that that is what Mr Loots said. I'm saying yes, if the learned friend says it is so, then I accept it, I cannot confirm it.

CHAIRPERSON: No, then why did you answer in the following, "that is what I heard"? You did not say yes or no, you said "that is what I heard."

MR STEYN: Yes Chairperson, I am not sure.

MR BERGER: It's fine Chairperson, I'd also like to just place on record that my learned friend, Mr Visser, when he led Mr Steyn, put many, many leading questions to which I didn't object and to which Mr Steyn's answer was a simple yes or no. Perhaps one can attach the same weight to those answers.

Mr Steyn, let me try and jog your memory. Mr Loots when he was giving evidence said that what he could remember of Thami Mnyele was that he belonged to an ensemble. Do you remember that evidence?

MR STEYN: I'm not sure, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Will you agree with me that someone who was involved in training suicide squads was unlikely to be leaving the day after the raid for France to study art?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, I don't know if this witness can answer that.

MR BERGER: Alright, let me move on then.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you left the issue of what Mr Loots had said?

MR BERGER: Yes, I'm not - if the record will bear me out one way or the other, if I'm wrong then I'm wrong, if I'm right then I'll argue.

CHAIRPERSON: If you were right then I would expect you to follow it up but I'll leave it in your hands then on that aspect.

MR BERGER: Well Mr Steyn, let me just ask you this. If Mr Loots had information that Thami Mnyele was an artist, a musician, what have you, who was not involved in MK activities, he would have shared that information with you, am I correct?

MR STEYN: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And on the basis of that information you would have excluded the house where Thami Mnyele was staying as a target, am I right or am I wrong?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot say whether I had that information or not.

MR BERGER: Well let me ask you this ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It was put to you that if Mr Loots had that information then you would have also had that information?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And in that case the question is what would you have decided with regard to the building in which he was?

MR STEYN: If he was only a musician and not involved in any ANC activities, if that is the question, then no, he would not have been a target, if that was the only information, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Chairperson, I found my note. Cross-examination by Mr Berger, Loots was asked whether he was aware of the fact that Mnyele was on his way from Gaberone to France, he said he did not have it. He was asked whether the information came from what was pooled, which he confirmed. And he was then asked whether that information on Thami Mnyele emanated from Western Transvaal on which he said no, he only thinks that he was involved in arts or music but he wouldn't put at issue anything that's put to him, he doesn't know. That's my note for the record.

MR VISSER: Perhaps if you turn a page, page and a half, just to the evidence just before 4 o'clock yesterday, Chairperson. Loots was asked by my learned friend

"Now which names were on the list"

and he said:

"Harry Mnyele"

which is Thami Mnyele.

MR BERGER: And according to my attorney's note in response to a question from the Chairperson, the question was

"Can't you assist us to understand why some people's names appeared on the list?"

and his answer was:

"They were all identified MK members except Thami Mnyele."

But I have a recollection of Mr Loots saying that the death of Thami Mnyele was a mistake. Maybe I'm ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: That is indeed also my recollection that you then put it to him, then it would have been a mistake and he conceded. But it wasn't offered as sort of evidence-in-chief emanating from it, he was responding to your question.

MR BERGER: No, I'm not suggesting that it came out in chief, no not at all.

Mr Steyn, as I understand your evidence, if a particular target was chosen and it then transpired or from further intelligence you discovered that children were living there or a woman was living with a particular operative, then that house was excluded as a target, am I right?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I assume that it also followed that if you had information that a particular operative was living with other people who were not involved in MK activities that house too would be excluded as a target?

MR STEYN: It was excluded by the Generals, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So if you had information that Thami Mnyele was an artist and I use artist in the broad sense of the word and that he was living at a particular location which otherwise would have been a target and that he did nothing more than be an artist then that location would have been excluded as a target?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson, if that was the only information that we had with regard to Mnyele.

MR BERGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What would the position have been if he stayed in that house together with somebody else who was indeed a target?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the policy or not the policy but the decisions we made during the submission of these targets was that those targets were not approved.

CHAIRPERSON: For so long as a person who was not supposed to be killed was in a house or in a building then that building would not be attacked?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And this was the policy at least two to three weeks before the raid, is that right?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Are you certain about that?

MR MALAN: It's not policy, that is the decision.

MR BERGER: I thought he said "beleid".

CHAIRPERSON: We don't want to get into a semantic argument but at least the policy for that attack as decided by that meeting.

MR BERGER: So the decision two to three weeks before the attack was that we will go for these targets and we will go for these targets because we are not likely to hit any women, children, people who were not involved in MK planning or carrying out of operations, local inhabitants, we will hit these targets because in doing so we will only hit the people who we are targeting, is that right?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I want to read to you from page 77 of volume 2. If you would have a look, this is again from this book of Stiff about one third of the way down that page he writes

"That afternoon..."

this is now the afternoon before the attack,

"Major Brian of Barnacle crossed back into South Africa and attended a final debriefing at the Forward TAC HQ, the joint operations command centre at Nooitgedacht."

Do you know who Major Brian is?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: He reported that a last minute check had revealed that ANC personnel were no longer staying at three of the targets, they were either unoccupied or occupied by locals. It was too late to change targets, he was told. The teams would hit them anyway. Were you present at that final debriefing?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER

"Brian was unimpressed, nor was he impressed with the senior Police and Military officers there. They were partying, drinking beer and braaing meat as if celebrating the victory in advance. They spend little thought for the Recce and Barnacle operators whose lives were out on a limb just across the border. This lack of sobriety and professionalism imbued him with little confidence in their collective judgement should an emergency arise."

Were you not one of the senior Police officers involved with the final details of the raid?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I'm not sure of what stage we are referring to now.

MR BERGER: We're talking of the afternoon before the raid, the afternoon before the attack.

MR STEYN: No, I was definitely not there, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Where were you? You said you were in a truck or did I misunderstand that evidence?

MR STEYN: No, I was never in a truck, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You were near the border post?

MR STEYN: With the entry of this large vehicle, I was at the border post to see that the vehicle goes through.

MR BERGER: And the joint operations command at Nooitgedacht? Was that about 20 to 30 kilometres from the border?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

JUDGE MOTATA: After the vehicles, everybody that went through that was a day or two before the attack, wasn't it? The vehicles went through a day or two before the attack, the actual attack?

MR STEYN: Vehicles went through before the time, Chairperson, yes.

JUDGE MOTATA: After you saw them through, where did you go?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, may I explain? Vehicles with operatives a day or two before went through but the large vehicle with the operatives in, I was present there but I did not know of the previous people how or when they went in.

JUDGE MOTATA: Okay, after seeing that, where did you go?

MR STEYN: I went back to Nietverdient where the operational room was.

JUDGE MOTATA: Until the attack?

MR STEYN: Yes and later I went back to the border post when the vehicles came back.

JUDGE MOTATA: Thank you.

MR BERGER: Judge Motata ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I'm just wondering whether I shouldn't rectify something which I perhaps should have done. I didn't think it was important at the time that the final vehicle I think, there's no argument about that, was the container truck which took in the operatives and that went in on the evening although there were other vehicles and other personnel that went in before. I'm not sure whether this is a bone of contention but it seems that you were not aware of the fact that the actual operatives were taken in a container truck where they almost suffocated apparently, but that was done on the evening just before the attack.

JUDGE MOTATA: No, my interest is that after Mr Berger had read this paragraph, that where did he end up, that was my interest.

MR BERGER: Thank you Judge.

Mr Steyn, have a look please at page 81. This is style target 4, but it's actually the fifth target that was hit if you count them. The author says:

"This was a safe house for the ANC underground and Special Operations. It was believed to be occupied by Duke Machobane, a high-ranking member of the ANC's underground machinery, his wife, Whitehead, who was involved with Transvaal suicide squads, two trained guerrillas and several women."

Does that ring any bells?

MR STEYN: The name, indeed Chairperson, but the circumstances, the precise circumstances of this instance, no.

JUDGE MOTATA: As Mr Berger is taking you through this document and having regard to the information gathered, doesn't any of this ring a bell how you gathered the information before it was placed before the top structure prior to the attack?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, as I have explained, that this information was obtained from various intelligence communities and it is not possible for me to say that Duke Machobane's information came from a specific intelligence community. All the information was collectively dealt with in one analysis, I cannot say exactly where, what information came from, it's not possible.

JUDGE MOTATA: No, no, I'm not asking you that, I say what I understood the task of the Western Transvaal was, is that not one intelligence community would gather information, but eventually the information would be transmitted to Western Transvaal co-ordinating officers, or would I be mistaken in that?

MR STEYN: You're entirely correct, yes Chairperson.

JUDGE MOTATA: That eventually this list was whittled down, let's forget the numbers until we reach the number 29 and the top structures had to say but this is occupied by women and children and whittled down further to ten?

MR STEYN: Entirely correct, yes Chairperson.

JUDGE MOTATA: Now you were in possession of that list prior to headquarters, you know, giving the final say, having the final word about that?

MR STEYN: The final list was taken from my hands after we did the submission at head office and it was then reduced and in the final list, was not reduced in my presence, Chairperson.

JUDGE MOTATA: But you had the 29 for instance?

MR STEYN: Yes Chairperson.

JUDGE MOTATA: And the final 10 came from the 29?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

JUDGE MOTATA: Now what I'm asking you is that once you are taken through these targets, doesn't it ring a bell or rather give you a recollection of that I know something of Machobane and that could be the place where he had been?

MR STEYN: I've already said, Chairperson, I can recall the name Machobane but the specific information concerning Machobane, I'm not able to say what that entitled. If I had any documentation but it is really not possible to after fifteen years say that this was information that we had with regard to Machobane and that this was the information about this person or that person.

CHAIRPERSON: Something that troubles me is that you were one of three people at least that decided certain names had to go onto the list, is that not so?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you must have certain reasons for including those names on the list? It is an important decision to decide to kill someone, is it not?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now why can you not recall why a certain name was placed on that list?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, may I just say once again, each and every person that we had on that list and that was eventually approved had to fulfil certain criteria and all of them did fulfil the criteria here but I cannot tell you exactly that Duke was a weapons supplier or Duke trained people, but he fell within this framework according to which the top structure gave their approval.

JUDGE MOTATA: ...(inaudible) the idea was that there was this heavy onslaught emanating from Botswana and according to the criteria, there was certain MK members or cadres or ANC members who played a pivotal role in organising this onslaught and it does not mean that because there was this heavy onslaught in South Africa emanating from Botswana that every cadre met everything according to the criteria, but if certain houses and individuals could be demobilised, this onslaught, that's my understanding, would be minimised or it would vanish. That's the way I understood you?

MR STEYN: That is correct, yes.

JUDGE MOTATA: Then you are told about a guy like Duke Machobane, he should have been a prominent person according to this document of Stiff, couldn't he? And couldn't you remember such people because I'm not asking you to remember 20 000 cadres in Botswana, I'm saying that prominent people in Botswana, who were ANC members, who were causing problems for you in South Africa?

CHAIRPERSON: Who deserved to die?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I have the facts before me with regard to the submission I made to the top structure then I could have answered you clearly because there was more than one. I cannot tell you who did what at that stage but the fact is that he fell within that criteria that was submitted and that was approved by the top structure. So it could be that he smuggled arms, it could be that he sent people in, it could be that he planned sabotage attacks. Those facts I do not have. I honestly do not have it.

MR MALAN: Mr Steyn, we are not asking you to justify it, we accept for all practical purposes that this list of 29 targets was prepared exactly as you say it was prepared. What we want to know from you is that a number of people were killed and this is Mr Berger's question. Amongst others, Duke Machobane, you say you recall the name?

MR STEYN: Yes I do.

MR MALAN: We know you do not have the list on which you did the submission. You say if you had documentation you would be able to look at it to refresh your memory. Those documents can only refresh your memory in the same manner that documents here can refresh your memory. What is being put to you is an extract from Stiff's book on page 81 that says, that's the first paragraph there

"He was a high-ranking member of the ANC's underground machinery. His wife, Whitehead, who was involved with the Transvaal suicide squads, two trained guerrillas and several women."

Now you are saying you recall the name Duke Machobane. Can you recall that he had a wife by the name of Whitehead?

MR STEYN: I do not recall that.

MR MALAN: Do you recall anything about his connection or his wife to the Transvaal suicide squads?

MR STEYN: No, I cannot recall that.

MR MALAN: Do you recall anything about Duke Machobane?

MR STEYN: I knew that he was a member of the ANC.

MR MALAN: How do you know that?

MR STEYN: Because I can recall it, he was the subject of the ANC in Botswana.

MR MALAN: But you can only recall the name?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR MALAN: You do not know what he did?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Very well, I'm not going to take you through the others, I assume Mr Berger will take you through them.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, you had to satisfy yourself that the targets that you were proposing to head office were the right targets and so you would have gone through the intelligence reports and the intelligence gathering to satisfy yourself of that, am I right?

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And if your intelligence operatives had kept Duke Machobane under observation, surely they would have passed the correct information on to you. What they would observed would have been passed on to you or to someone else, were eventually synthesised through to you? Now what I don't understand is, if he was kept under observation for so long, as he must have been, how is it possible that for a start his wife, it's said his wife is Whitehead when in fact his wife was Rose Machobane. They got married in January 1984. They were students. They met when they were students at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria. They came to Botswana, they lived together from the time they were married in January 1984 until Duke Machobane was killed. How could the intelligence gathering have been so bad? And I can tell you also that Duke Machobane taught English to high school kids. His wife Rose Machobane also had a teaching post at one of the local schools. How could any of this have been missed by the intelligence officers who were gathering this information?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, but I do not understand now. I have repeatedly said, with respect, that we had information about various persons and we drew up files with regard to various persons. I cannot recall each and everyone's specific situation.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but the question is not about that. The question is, as I understand it, about the acceptability of certain information on which the decision to kill the person was based. The question from Mr Berger is, this let's call it slack intelligence gathering, how could you accept it, to make a decision to kill a person?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I'm not certain whether it was slack intelligence gathering, whatever was available to me, placed within this framework in which he qualified ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Let me ask you, did you accept that Machobane's wife's name was Whitehead?

MR STEYN: No, I do not know what her name was at all, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The name Whitehead did not play a role?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall the name at all, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Because you see if this is the truth that is written here then I question the intelligence because it is highly unlikely that a black woman's name would be Whitehead, specifically in this country. It doesn't sound right and even if it was so, then the persons who took the decisions should have questioned it, is that not so? How can this man's wife's name be Whitehead? Is our intelligence correct?

MR STEYN: Our information was confirmed from one intelligence community to the other and it is only where we had confirmation with regard to a target that we submitted that information for approval, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But that is why the intelligence just accepted like that?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm asking this question and then you say but this is the information that came in, that is the information that was available to us, that is your reaction to my question. Did you just accept everything just like that?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson. Various intelligence agencies brought this information and we checked it with each other to make sure that the information with regard to specific people was correct, that it was supported from various sides, otherwise I would not have been able to make such a submission. This would have been a mistake.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, I'll go further and I'll put it to you that before her marriage Rose Machobane was a citizen of Lesotho, she wasn't even a South African. And I'll go further and I'll tell you that for six months before the raid her nephew, Peter Mofoka was staying with her, with Rose and her husband, Duke. Now if that is so and we will lead evidence to prove that but if that is so surely your intelligence operatives would have put that up in the six months that the little boy lived with Rose and her husband?

MR STEYN: They would have picked it up, yes Chairperson. They would have picked it up.

MR BERGER: And if you have a look at what this author writes in this description of the attack on 7819 Broadhurst, he talks about a child being shot. He says a child ran from a bedroom and by reflex an operator shot him in the leg and he says one press report identified the wounded child at Peter Mofoka who died as a result of that shooting. You see, my question to you is was it that your intelligence was so "slap" or was it rather that you knew precisely what was happening but nevertheless chose the targets regardless of who might be killed in the attack or proposed the targets regardless of who might be killed in the attack?

MR STEYN: Definitely not with regard to the last statement, we would not have deliberately submitted that information, Chairperson. I have to repeat that the information was cleared with other intelligence communities so that we could submit a proper story to head office.

JUDGE MOTATA: If you may allow me, Mr Berger?

Now here, if you identified a building with weaponry and a person who is highly regarded as a person who is infiltrating or training people within Botswana and despatched them as such and you found that in that house there were women and children but this was an important ANC person would you exclude that target?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, usually that house would not be approved as a target by the chairpersons. Women and children was the final cancellation of a target, absolutely.

JUDGE MOTATA: Even if a Joe Slovo lived there?

MR STEYN: The chairperson, Generals Constand Viljoen and Johan Coetzee should answer to that because if I submitted something like that, they would have decided on it, but my experience was that where there were women and children this was not to be approved. Definitely not.

JUDGE MOTATA: Irrespective of the position the person held within the ANC in Botswana?

MR STEYN: Once again, Chairperson, I will not answer on their behalf but the only thing I can say to you is that, Chairperson, women and children changed everything.

JUDGE MOTATA: Thank you, you may proceed, Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Thank you Judge.

So regardless of what Duke Machobane or Rose Machobane or Whitehead, if such a person existed, were doing, as soon as it came to your attention that there was a little boy staying with them, that target would have been crossed off the list?

MR MALAN: No, Mr Berger, let me just get it clear. Is the evidence not that they took 29 targets to this meeting at head office. The 29 included particulars where women and children were present. In other words as far as this group of Steyn, Loots and Charl Naude is concerned, they were quite prepared to have the women and kids taken out or killed in crossfire. It was by those at head office, the chief of the Police and the chief of the Defence Force decided that on those items where there were women and children, they should be crossed off the list. It was not a decision of those who presented the list, this is what I hear the evidence to be.

MR BERGER: Thank you Mr Malan. Is that so, Mr Steyn? You and Mr Loots and Mr Naude were quite prepared to have women and children slaughtered in the attack as long as you've got the right targets?

MR STEYN: No, we did not take the decision, we submitted targets where if I recall correctly there were children and women in the houses but it was not our decision, Chairperson. The decision was taken by top structure and in all those instances were refused.

MR MALAN: But I just put it to you now, Mr Steyn, that - or I put it to Mr Berger, I did not put it to you directly. In the list that you drew up there were targets identified and on this list, particulars were given that amongst others there were women and children living there, on certain of them?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR MALAN: So that was still on the list, this 29 should go in. If those women and children in the execution of this operation were injured and/or killed, with the drawing up of that list that was not a priority to you?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: The decision to take it away or to remove it from the list was the decision under whose command you proposed this list and it was they who decided who must be removed?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR MALAN: So with the composition of the 29 it was not a factor to remove targets where there were women and children?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: This was only with the finalising of the targets, that was when the decision was taken?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson. As the Honourable Judge asked me earlier, if there was an important person he would have been submitted with the information that there is a women and that information had to be submitted and that was not approved.

CHAIRPERSON: If the decision was with you, would those 29 names of targets have remained that way, is that not so?

MR STEYN: No, I do not believe so.

CHAIRPERSON: So why did you have 29 names on the list?

MR STEYN: Amongst others the places which I said fulfilled the criteria and it was for the chiefs to decide, not for me.

CHAIRPERSON: But that list of 29 names were priority, is that not so?

MR STEYN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what you submitted to those who would make the eventual decision?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And now I'm asking you, if the decision lay with you would you have thought that those 29 targets must have remained like that?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, I would have myself led by top structure.

CHAIRPERSON: But that is why I want to know, if the decision was yours would that list have remained 29?

MR STEYN: No, it would not have remained that way?

CHAIRPERSON: Why not?

MR STEYN: I would also have removed the women and children.

CHAIRPERSON: So why did you not remove it before you took it to the meeting?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the information of about what was important within the structure I had to submit to the Committee, that was my responsibility and they would decide.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand you correctly then that as part of a preparation of a list you did not know who would be killed and who would not be killed?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, we did not have a say.

MR MALAN: Let me hear again. In answer to a question by the Chairperson and it seems like we will reach a point now. You had an instruction from this intelligence report that was pooled and that was double checked and rechecked, depending on criteria, were to list certain targets which fulfilled those criteria?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Those were the sort of important places from where the attacks were launched, the most important persons who were involved, weapons, documents, whatever and you drew up that list but it was not a proposal to go and blow away all 37 or 29?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: This was to say these were the priority areas, we should decide from here how many can we attack, how many do we want to attack, what is the most important, where are the risks and after the submission of it the list was shortened and after you left it was shortened once again without your knowledge. So the list was not a proposal for attack on anyone who was on the list, it was an extract from the source documents or from the correlated - what is the word I'm looking for, evaluated documents in order to ensure that you had at least the proper information from more than one source?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR MALAN: It was not a proposal to go and attack all 29 or all 17 or whatever the number is?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But from that, how did you receive your instruction? You received instruction to compile that list and the criteria with it?

MR STEYN: This came from head office, Chairperson, I am not able to tell you who personally spoke to me but the criteria was stated clearly, as I have already explained a few times, which persons will qualify and which premises and that is what we went according to.

MR MALAN: Did you have the criteria in writing or verbally?

MR STEYN: It was verbally.

MR MALAN: Can you recall who told you?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Who would have given this to you, who did you liaise with at head office?

MR STEYN: It could have been the terrorist unit, Brigadier Schoon or one of his staff members, any of those people.

MR MALAN: Could it have been General Coetzee?

MR STEYN: No, I don't believe that General Coetzee would have contacted us personally on that level.

MR MALAN: Did whom did Schoon report?

MR STEYN: The commander was General Coetzee.

MR MALAN: He reported directly to Coetzee?

MR STEYN: If I recall the structure correctly.

MR MALAN: So you cannot recall but you think the instruction could have come from?

MR STEYN: It could have come from Schoon but it could have come from Coetzee but I did not get it personally from him.

MR MALAN: But you did not receive anything in writing but you received it verbally, you say you think?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall, I suspect it could have come from Brigadier Schoon or one of his staff members.

MR MALAN: Is it not criteria that you decided upon in Western Transvaal in your office that you would this submission on?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, this was a long time ago but this was the criteria. We could not just left, right and centre put targets on the list, there had to be a very good reason to do so. This was a long time ago.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steyn, tell me, as I understand your evidence now, when that list of 29 was drawn up you did not know who would be killed and whether someone would indeed be killed?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It could have well worked out that whoever took the decisions with regard to the killing of the persons in Botswana would have scratched all those targets from the list?

MR STEYN: It's possible, Chairperson, anything could have happened.

CHAIRPERSON: But when the list was drawn up you did not know to where that list would be taken?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And this applies to your subordinates also?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you did not know whether anyone would be killed from that list when it was drawn up? You yourself knew who would be killed afterwards or during the meeting but when the list was drawn up you did not have any knowledge as to whether someone would be attacked or who would be attacked from that list?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, no, I could not say because top structure could take a decision and say that we will now cease everything.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We will take the break now.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: (continues) Mr Steyn, I'd like to clear up an answer you gave just before lunch in response to a question from the Chairperson and Mr Malan. You say that you didn't intend that all the people mentioned on the list of 29 targets were to be killed?

MR VISSER: I object, Chairperson. It wasn't his evidence, he said - your question was very clear. You did not know that all the people or any of them would be killed?

CHAIRPERSON: The question was he didn't know who, if any.

MR VISSER: That he didn't know, not that he didn't intend.

MR BERGER: Alright, let me rephrase that then and please don't feel obliged to answer yes to this question. Did you accept that all the people on the list would probably be killed as a result of your forwarding that list to head office?

MR STEYN: I beg your pardon Chairperson, my hearing device? Can you repeat that please?

MR BERGER: Did you accept that all the people on the list of 29 targets would probably be killed as a result of your forwarding that list to head office?

MR STEYN: I couldn't have accepted because the decision was not mine. I made a submission according to which the Generals would take their decisions.

MR BERGER: So is your answer to my question no?

MR STEYN: No.

MR BERGER: Is your answer yes?

MR STEYN: I'm not following Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The question is did you think that when the list was sent to the meeting that all those people whose names appeared on that list would be killed?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I do not believe that I could have accepted it, I could not take a decision about it, I could not tell myself that it would or would not because it was not my decision.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you think would happen because you were a part of the process of taking that decision, you were chief of the Western Transvaal, that was an important aspect in the whole control of what would happen at that meeting. What did you think?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I executed my task by submitting a list of persons whom at that stage according to the information available to us was a threat and from there the Generals would have decided what would happen and what would not happen.

CHAIRPERSON: Then I should ask you the following. If that is your answer, did you have nothing to do with a decision about who would be killed or not?

MR STEYN: No, I had no final say.

CHAIRPERSON: No? Did you contribute anything to the decision?

MR STEYN: My contribution, Chairperson, was to submit information that we had available to us, information about the targets according to which the top structure would decide.

CHAIRPERSON: Now what did you think would happen with this information and the people about whom you supplied information?

MR STEYN: I accepted that an operation would be launched in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: And what results did you expect?

MR STEYN: An operation by the South African Defence Force, an operation that would attack people and buildings.

CHAIRPERSON: And kill them?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now this was when you drew up the list, that's what you thought?

MR STEYN: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The question from Mr Berger is then, did you think that all the people whose names were on that list at that time would be killed?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, it is difficult for me to say because I do not know what the decisions of the Generals would be. I only have that which was a threat at that stage that I submitted.

MR MALAN: Mr Berger's question is a very comprehensive question in the sense that he asked you whether you accepted that all the persons whose names were mentioned would probably be killed?

MR STEYN: Probably, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: The question includes more than that, the probability, his question was with regard to everyone or did you already think that there would be sifting process, that it would not be all of them but that it would at least be a number of them?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I accepted that it could be all of them, that it could be some of them, depending on how those chairpersons decided.

MR MALAN: And it could be any of them.

MR STEYN: It could be any of them.

MR MALAN: Very well, I think that clears it up. Thank you Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: So would it be correct to say that you - you've already told the Committee how you exercised the discretion as to which targets should be included and which targets should be excluded in coming to you list that you put forward to head office. In the exercise of that discretion, would it be correct to say that you reconciled yourself with the possibility that all the people mentioned on your list could be killed as a result of your having identified them as targets?

MR MALAN: I think the answer already was yes, as I put it to him, Mr Berger.

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Sorry, I accept that you're asking it again but the answer was yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BERGER: And so it follows that you reconciled yourself with the fact that women and children who were not involved in any way in MK activities could be killed as a result of your having identified their houses as targets for attack?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, as I have already said, the targets that we submitted, it was not the intention to attack women and children.

MR BERGER: That's not my question. My question is, did you reconcile yourself with the possibility that women and children could be killed as a result of the discretion which you exercised?

MR STEYN: Yes that was possible, Chairperson, that is so.

MR BERGER: Now, you've also said that a decision was taken subsequent to your list of 29 to exclude anyone or to exclude any target which contained women, children or other people, local inhabitants not involved in MK activities. Remember that evidence? Now on that basis, would it be correct to say that if your intelligence had reported that Peter Mofoka was living with Duke and Rose Machobane, that whatever activities Duke and/or Rose were involved in, their house ought to have been excluded as a target of the attack?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So then there are one of two possibilities. Either your intelligence never picked up the fact that the little boy was staying with them or there was no decision to exclude houses containing small children from attack. It's one of those two, am I right?

MR STEYN: No, with regard to the second question, Chairperson, there was definitely, very definitely, a decision that women and children would not be acted against. The first question, if I understand correctly, I would like to answer as follows. At the stage of our information it appeared that the circumstances at target A, B and C was the following and then in such regard it would not have included women and children.

MR BERGER: Would it be correct to say that the decision to attack the specific houses was taken on the most up to date intelligence available? We're talking about two weeks before the attack, the freshest intelligence available was facted into the decision to go for those ten houses. Would that be fair?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, yes, that is correct but I want to add to that that after the final decision was taken at head office these targets were processed further to the South African Defence Force who would do the final work. It was also said to them and it was the instruction to as far as possible try to monitor the targets up to the last minute to see if the situation has changed or not.

MR BERGER: Do you find it strange that Security Branch intelligence failed to pick up the simple fact of this little boy living with Duke and Rose Machobane for six months prior to the attack? Do you find that odd if indeed that is so?

MR STEYN: Yes, it is strange, Chairperson. With regard to the intelligence at that stage, as I see it, it was not available because had it been available then this target would not have been approved.

MR MALAN: Mr Steyn, the question is do you find it strange that they did not pick it up?

MR STEYN: I beg your pardon, Chairperson?

MR MALAN: The question is put, we accept for purposes of the question that the child, the cousin, had lived with them for six months. If that was the case would you find it strange that the Security Police and the informants did not obtain that information?

MR STEYN: Yes that is very strange, Chairperson, that they did not pick it up.

JUDGE MOTATA: Mr Steyn, had you known that the top structure in regard to the ten targets, if there were children and women there, would you influence the choice of the ten targets?

MR STEYN: I beg your pardon, Chairperson, would you please repeat that?

JUDGE MOTATA: We say eventually out of the 29 we had 10 targets. I say if it came to your knowledge that within those ten targets one or two houses had women and children would you have influenced the process?

MR STEYN: If any of our intelligence communities at any stage before the attack obtained that information then we would have submitted it definitely, Chairperson.

JUDGE MOTATA: Thank you, you may proceed.

MR BERGER: Thank you Judge.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steyn, the persons executing the operation were they in contact with, what did they call it, central contact there close to the border?

MR STEYN: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: Whatever it was called, were they in contact with that group of people?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I did not follow, please?

MR VISSER: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: I think it's referred to as TAC HQ, TAC Headquarters, the operational point at Nietverdient.

CHAIRPERSON: The people who executed the attack, were they in contact with the - what is the word now? What was that place called, the operational base? Yes, let us call it the operational base at Nietverdient. Were they in contact with them?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: During the operation?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know of any reason why they could not inform those people, listen there's a child here, should we continue with the attack on this house?

MR STEYN: No, I do not know of a reason Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So they could have done so?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, it depends on the circumstances at the scene because it was an attack where one would not be able to properly see how many people were in the house before the attack was launched. I do not know how they would have dealt with that.

CHAIRPERSON: If they wanted to they could have asked you or informed you that there was a child there?

MR STEYN: I believe so, Chairperson. It was possible at the time of the attack, this was a night attack that had to be executed very quickly and they had to come back to South Africa very quickly.

JUDGE MOTATA: Yes, those were probably reasons that could be advanced but I'm not asking about that but I'm just asking whether they could have contacted the people who took the decisions.

MR STEYN: As far as my knowledge goes, Chairperson, there was radio communication between the persons on the ground level and the persons at Nietverdient.

MR MALAN: May I ask are you sure that Hills was there at Nietverdient?

MR STEYN: That's where he was.

MR MALAN: Where was Charl Naude?

MR STEYN: Charl Naude if I recall correctly was at the border post at some stage with me and he may have also been at the operational room. I cannot place him now.

MR MALAN: Was he not in Botswana?

MR STEYN: Not that I know of.

MR MALAN: Who was in command of the Botswana invasion at ground level?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall who of the army.

MR MALAN: Do you know whether this was under a central command? If I understand the background of the bundle correctly they went in various groups, there was no overhead singular attack, everybody had his own responsibilities?

MR STEYN: That's entirely correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: So the contact with the operational bases, that each and every one of these groups have contact with the operational base?

MR STEYN: I'm not sure but there was contact.

MR MALAN: More than one?

MR STEYN: I accept so, Chairperson, I'm not sure.

MR MALAN: So just the nature of the contact, it would not have gone to the central point in Botswana to come to operational base?

MR STEYN: I do not know whether there was someone in charge of central control, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Can you recall, you say there you monitored the operation or in other words you were present where it was monitored?

MR STEYN: Just for a short while, yes Chairperson.

MR MALAN: So you did not continually observe the whole thing?

MR STEYN: No, not at all.

MR MALAN: So you cannot tell us what the nature of feedback was?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: You did not really know how it went during the attack, is that your evidence?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Can you recall anything that you heard while you were there?

MR STEYN: If I recall correctly there was feedback that from a specific person that I have attacked my target.

MR MALAN: Was it a report?

MR STEYN: Yes it was actually a report, we are coming back.

MR MALAN: If a specific person said that, that one would accept that each and every one of the group had contact of that nature?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR MALAN: And then the inference from Mr Berger's question would be that it was probably possible for each and every one of the groups to request instructions from Hill's operational base?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, you said that - we had a lot of questions on this point and you said that you reconciled yourself with the possibility that women and children could be killed as a result of the information that you forwarded to head office. I have a note here that in your evidence this morning you said that you personally removed targets where people lived with women and children, you personally excluded them as targets. Is my note incorrect?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, I think the removal of women and children took place at the submission. We ourselves drew up the targets because of the priorities thereof, if I recall correctly.

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, the question to him was a follow-up. If he had to make the decision, would he have removed them or would he have left them and he says he thinks he also would have removed them. So it was not - it was related to a question whether if he had to make that decision, whether he would have left them there and attack or whether he would have removed.

MR BERGER: Alright, then it's not the way I noted it, but I accept what you're saying.

Can I also ask you, Mr Stiff records at page 81 under Target 4, that the deceased, he says, was photographed and identified by the Security Police as Duke Machobane. Now you'll recall yesterday, that Mr Loots said that no photographs were taken as far as he could recall. What, according to you, was the position? Do you know?

MR STEYN: I can really not recall whether photos were taken.

MR BERGER: Okay, the next target, Target 6, 2914 Kudulogo, the author says the following at page 81, he says

"This was an ANC safehouse used by Mike Hamlyn. Hamlyn, MK trained and a member of the ANC since 1982, recruited whites, Indians and Coloureds for intelligence work. He also conducted crash courses for "suicide squads". Hamlyn lived in the servant's quarters. Four or five others, including MK operative, Urial Abrahamse alias Abrahams, used the main house."

It seems like a lot of the targets were involved in training suicide squads. Does that ring a bell in any of the intelligence which came to your notice?

MR STEYN: There was such information, yes Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Relating to Mike Hamlyn?

MR STEYN: I cannot specifically attach that to him.

MR BERGER: Well what information do you recall about Mike Hamlyn?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall any information about him.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, I find this amazing that you cannot recall information about a specific target that you spent months working on. You can't recall anything about Mike Hamlyn?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, may I just explain. We submitted various targets and who was involved with what at which offence, I am not able to say now. It is impossible to say after 15 years that Hamlyn was involved with this, or that person was involved with that.

MR BERGER: How often did you prepare a list of potential targets for assassination? How often in your career did you do this? Were you in the habit of preparing lists?

MR STEYN: No, it was not a habit.

MR BERGER: This is the first time you prepared such a list?

MR STEYN: Yes, if I recall correctly this was my first involvement in this.

MR BERGER: And the only time you prepared such a list, or did you prepare other lists after this? Lists of people who would be assassinated.

MR STEYN: If I recall correctly it was just this one instance where it was planned to launch an attack in Botswana.

MR BERGER: Did you know that - does it ring any bells if I tell you that Mike Hamlyn was a student at the University of Botswana, that he had left South Africa and was avoiding military service?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall that exactly, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Maybe this will ring a bell, that Mike Hamlyn was living in the house that Marius and Jeanette Schoon had previously lived in. I'm sure the name Marius and the names Marius and Jeanette Schoon ring a bell for you?

MR STEYN: Yes, I recall the names very well, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I thought so. You'll also know that Marius and Jeanette Schoon left Botswana at the end of 1993 - sorry, 1983, I think.

MR STEYN: I cannot recall when.

MR BERGER: You don't know when?

MR STEYN: No, I cannot recall.

MR BERGER: Oh Mr Steyn, do you know that ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: With respect, Mr Berger, isn't it fair to say "I can't remember that it was at the end of 1983"?

MR BERGER: Well I'm going to jog his memory a little bit more, maybe then he'll remember.

You do know, or I assume you know that Jeanette Schoon and her little daughter, Katryn, were killed by a bomb sent by the Security Branch?

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And that bomb killed them in June 1984.

MR STEYN: Once again, Chairperson, I cannot recall the date but I do know that they were killed.

MR BERGER: A year before this raid?

MR STEYN: If that is the date, then I'll accept it.

MR BERGER: Is that perhaps the reason why this house was attacked, because it was the house that Marius and Jeanette Schoon lived in, and that Mike Hamlyn was just caught up in the attack, that he was never a target of the attack? Is that possible?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson. If he was one of the targets that we had submitted, then he was a target. If we submitted him on that occasion he was a target.

MR BERGER: Well that is - I mean that speaks for itself. But what I'm saying to you is, you can't recall any specific information about Michael Hamlyn, you can't recall that he was a member of MK, that he trained suicide squads, that he was involved in planning any acts of violence against South Africa. And I'm putting to you that he was a university student, that in fact he was a pacifist.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall with which activities he was involved. I want to repeat, I cannot say who was involved with which activities, we had the information, we drew up a memorandum about every target and what is said in that memorandum today I cannot recall, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr Steyn, the question that you did not answer of Mr Berger was, is it not possible that that address 2914 Kudulogo Close was actually on the list because it was connected with Marius and Jeanette Schoon and that it was not connected with Hamlyn, is that possible?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, that could be possible. I want to say that I do not know whether Marius or Jeanette Schoon were there at that stage.

MR MALAN: But you don't know anything in any case. The question is, is it possible that this was related to Marius and Jeanette Schoon, as part of the target?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall that, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Can you deny it?

MR STEYN: No, I cannot Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But you can also not recall Hamlyn?

MR STEYN: I can recall the name Hamlyn.

MR MALAN: But you recall the names Marius and Jeanette as well, but you cannot even connect Hamlyn to the list, you can recall the name but you cannot recall whether it was on the target?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, I say if he was ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: No don't talk about "if", we ask what you recall, do you recall that Hamlyn's name was on the list?

MR STEYN: If I'm correct, then his name was on the list.

MR MALAN: So what makes you think that now?

MR STEYN: If there was an attack on his house, then he was a target.

MR MALAN: But if it was Jeanette and Marius Schoon's house, then they were the targets.

MR STEYN: Jeanette Schoon and Marius Schoon, I do not recall that their names were on this list, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: In other words, you recall that Hamlyn was on the list?

MR STEYN: I believe so.

MR MALAN: But that's something else, you are drawing an inference that he was on the list because he was a victim at a certain target that you infer had to be on the list, but you cannot tell us that you can recall that this address was the target, you're saying that if it was attacked then it had to be so.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I wish to explain. Names and targets were prepared quite a long time ago and I cannot go into each and every one in detail, it is really impossible to assist or satisfy the Committee there.

MR MALAN: But that is not what Mr Berger asked you, Mr Berger asked you: "Mr Steyn, for purposes of my question I accept that you cannot recall anything", because that's been his experience so far. Now he asks you further: "Is it possible ..." - because you cannot recall which names and which targets were specifically involved, you say that you would have to go and have a look at your records which were unfortunately destroyed, so you cannot verify it. Now he asks you: "Is it not possible that this target, 2914 Kudulogo Close, was actually a target because according to the information that was not so up to date, that was outdated actually, was probably connected to the Schoons. Is it possible?" That's the only think he wants to know from you.

MR STEYN: I cannot recall Chairperson, but it could be possible, I cannot confirm it.

MR MALAN: Can you tell us from your memory of then, whether Hamlyn was connected to this target?

MR STEYN: Hamlyn was a target.

MR MALAN: How do you know that?

MR STEYN: Hamlyn was one of the person who at that stage was connected to the ANC, but whose particulars I cannot recall and from research since, Hamlyn did appear on the list I had seen. Without being able to recall everything.

MR MALAN: So you are certain that Hamlyn was connected by the Security Police, in terms of the criteria?

MR STEYN: If I recall correctly that is so Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But you cannot say why you recall it?

MR STEYN: I can really not, Chairperson, there were various targets.

MR MALAN: Could you be mistaken about this?

MR STEYN: It's possible, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Mr Malan.

It seems to me Mr Steyn, you want to have it both ways, you're saying "maybe I've made a mistake, but I'm sure that Hamlyn was a target."

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I do not want to have it both sides, I would just like you to understand that I cannot recall all of these things anymore.

MR BERGER: Also killed in that house was a Dutch man and his wife was injured in the attack, now if you look in the middle of page 81, the author writes - he talks about a man by the name of Urial Abrahamse as having been shot and killed. I don't see that name on any list. Where did I find that? Middle of page 81.

MR MALAN: Is that on 491 or 490?

MR BERGER: On 491, it says there

"Sgt Mick led the team dealing with the outbuildings, while Capt Jenks targeted the house. Sgt Mick's team shot open the door of the first room on the left, but it was empty. They found pots, pans and tinned food with labels indicating it had been supplied by a UN agency. Books and other SWAPO propaganda material. They shot a man in the second room and his body was later identified from photographs as Urial Abrahamse."

It's not on any list. But then they go - this author goes and says:

"Within the house they killed Mike Hamlyn and a Somali national with a Dutch refugee passport, Achmed Mohammed Geer, alias Geer, 36. Mrs Rueli Geer, alias Geer, 26, a Hollander, according to press reports took shelter in a wardrobe and was shot in the legs and critically wounded. She was six months pregnant. The Security Police said the documents found and information subsequently gleaned, indicated the Geers were involved with Hamlyn and Abrahams (who is this person Urial Abrahamse I suppose), in local ANC activities."

Does that ring any bells?

MR STEYN: I only have the names, but then I cannot recall any factual particulars Chairperson.

MR BERGER: If Hamlyn was involved in local ANC activities, that wouldn't have qualified him as a target for assassination, would it? It would have had to have MK activities, as I understand it.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, no, if the target, the place or the building or the instance was identified from where a certain action was launched and Hamlyn or whoever was there, then he would also probably have been killed in the attack.

CHAIRPERSON: But that is if the building was shot at, is that not so? But if the operatives entered a house and kicked down doors and whatever, why were people who were not supposed to be killed, shot? I can understand if the building was bombed and in that manner people died, who were inside, but if the group entered the house by means of a door and they were busy kicking open bedroom doors, why was someone who was in one of the rooms and not on the list of persons who had to be killed, why was that person killed?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot say why the operatives ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But that was not the plan?

MR STEYN: ... on the ground did that.

CHAIRPERSON: But that was not the plan, that was not the instructions from you?

MR STEYN: Probably not, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Not probably, that was not the case as I understand your evidence.

MR STEYN: Yes, possibly we did not even know who would be in that building.

CHAIRPERSON: I know that.

MR STEYN: In other words, that we would not have agreed that such a person should be killed if we knew he was going to be there.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, this is what troubles me, if what is written in this book is the truth, I don't know whether it's the truth and you can also not tell us because you were not there, but if they chose to enter this house without blowing it up, why then kill all the people, specifically those people who were not on the list? I understood all the time that this list was a list first and foremost, of buildings that had to be attacked and in the buildings it was expected that certain persons would live there and specifically if it was at night, then we would accept that these people would be there. Indeed, those who took the decisions in certain instances approved attacks on buildings, is that so? I assume that there where they said there would be computers and documents and whatever, they would have gone in there and taken those items without blowing up the buildings, but as I understand your evidence thusfar, the house in which these people would have been were identified as targets because something happened there on behalf of the ANC and that had to be blown up or destroyed. Now if this story is correct of Mike Hamlyn, about where Mike Hamlyn was, the way I understand then, that house was not blown up but it was entered and doors were kicked down and where in one room they did not find anyone and they found food and kitchen utensils and this man, Abrahams, he was then found in a place in that house and he was killed. Was he a target?

MR STEYN: Not that I am aware of, Chairperson. And why the operatives there on the ground would do it, that was out of our control.

MR VISSER: Just for the record Chairperson, regarding your question, apparently according to page 81, demolitions charges were placed in the house - third-last paragraph from the bottom, at page 491, in the outside rooms, in a Volkswagen Beetle and a pale blue Volkswagen Golf, normally used by Muff Anderson. So it appears that the buildings were blown up.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I thought I had demonstrated by now that not much reliance can be placed on Mr Stiff's account, but I'm ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No but Mr Berger, I prefaced my question by saying "if this is true", as you put it to the witness.

MR BERGER: ...(inaudible) to what my learned friend said about it being apparent that demolition charges were placed, according to Stiff, that is.

CHAIRPERSON: We traversed that argument yesterday already.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, you say that you can recall certain information which indicated that Hamlyn would have been a target of this raid, is that correct? Is that your evidence?

MR STEYN: Could you please repeat.

MR BERGER: Your recall certain information which came to your attention which indicated that Hamlyn was indeed a target of the raid.

MR MALAN: Did he not respond to my question that he believes that to be, that's what he thinks, but he didn't base it on any information, it's just a recollection.

MR BERGER: No Mr Malan, he said that certain he recalls certain information which linked Hamlyn to certain activities which would have justified him as being a target of the attack, and then you said to him: "Is it possible that you could be mistaken?" And he said: "It's possible."

MR MALAN: We can check the record, my note was simply - I in fact challenged him: "On what basis do you say that Hamlyn was there, is it a recollection, or is it just a ...(indistinct)." But it's not that important, you may continue if that's your note.

MR BERGER: Well Mr Steyn, let me get it from you.

MR STEYN: Will you please repeat the question.

MR BERGER: Is it your impression that Hamlyn was indeed a target of the raid?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I recall correctly then I do think he was.

CHAIRPERSON: Why do you think so?

MR STEYN: Because I recall that he was attached to the ANC.

CHAIRPERSON: And?

MR STEYN: And I want to say once again Chairperson, the facts that we had available to us was compiled from all those facts, whether a person was identified as a target or not. I do not have those facts before me.

CHAIRPERSON: But that doesn't matter to me, the point is you say you have reason to think that he was a target, so why are you giving that evidence? That is the question.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I've already said that if I had the facts then I could verify it.

CHAIRPERSON: Then you wouldn't have given that evidence, because you don't have the facts before you, is that not so? If you want all the facts before you before you answer something, then it is so, but you testified that you thought that he was a target.

MR STEYN: That's as far as I can recall.

CHAIRPERSON: So now I'm asking why do you think so.

MR STEYN: Because his involvement in some or other form of the ANC activities, that is what I can recall, that is what I think.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, that is why Mr Malan has problems with your answers, they are ambivalent.

MR MALAN: Chair, that's exactly how I understood him responding to my first question, that he cannot tender any basis for his belief that Hamlyn was a target.

CHAIRPERSON: Now I wish to ask you, why do you give that evidence if you cannot advance any reasons why you think so?

MR STEYN: I've already said Chairperson, because of my ideas that I can recall of his involvement with the ANC. I do not have more facts at the moment, I cannot recall.

JUDGE MOTATA: Then why would you make a statement that if the target was identified and Hamlyn was there, then he would have been attacked, if you say now you have some recollection? Because you said you couldn't recall Mike Hamlyn.

MR STEYN: Initially I said I recalled the name, Chairperson. Initially I said that I recall that he was involved with the ANC, but I cannot recall the finer details of his involvement.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson, I'm going to move on.

Mr Steyn, does the name Dick Mtsweni mean anything to you?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall the name, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: At page 78 of volume two, right at the bottom, the author writes, second-last paragraph

"The team leader for Target 5, 13212 Broadlands, Gaberone North, an ANC safehouse for underground and special operations, reported that his vehicle had developed mechanical problems. The TAC(?) HQ ordered him to abort and join Capt Bill at the RV. There was no point taking chances. The ANC operative expected at that target, Dick Mtsweni Mkhulu, who was in charge of ANC Finances and Logistics in Botswana, would be killed somewhere else."

as indeed he was. "In charge of ANC Finances and Logistics in Botswana." Did you have any information as to who was in charge of ANC Finances and Logistics in Botswana?

MR STEYN: I do not have that now with me, I do not recall.

MR BERGER: You heard me yesterday put it to Mr Loots that Dick Mtsweni was an elderly man, in his 70s.

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What is correct, that you recall that he said it yesterday?

MR STEYN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you comment on the truth of that statement?

MR STEYN: No, I cannot Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You see even the author refers to Dick Mtsweni as Mkhulu, which is how he was known, he was an old man. I don't know if that means anything to you.

CHAIRPERSON: Well sometimes the name is Mkhulu, meaning big. Are you talking about the Lesotho word? I don't know, I'm asking.

MR BERGER: When a person is referred to as Mkhulu, my understanding is that it's an old man.

CHAIRPERSON: Well maybe also old, but big too. But the point of the matter is that if he was a young person, would he not also be known as Mkhulu? Would that not be his normal surname, or first and second name? Won't you find that out?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I can't give you information on that.

CHAIRPERSON: Because there was a reaction here from the public about the interpretation of Mkhulu, perhaps some of your clients can tell you whether he was christened with that name, or was that a name that was attached to him with his age.

MR BERGER: I'll take instructions on that.

MR VISSER: Perhaps my learned friend can ask him clients what madala then means.

MR BERGER: My learned friend would know that. Anyway I'm not going to start being flippant about it.

The point I want to make, Mr Steyn, is that Mr Dick Mtsweni was a grandfather who took his family out of South Africa so that they could live in Botswana in peace. When he was in Botswana he started attending school where he could learn to read and write. As I said yesterday, he was employed as a driver for the ANC, to drive people around, take people to the airport and so on, and what I'm putting to you is that he was not in charge of ANC Finances and Logistics in Botswana. I want to know whether you have any evidence to counter that.

MR STEYN: No, I do not, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I hate to interrupt but I have to ask my learned friend this, because it now seems that all the persons who were killed were wholly innocent, had nothing to do with anything. I want my learned friend to inform you, to take you into his confidence, is it going to be his evidence that this person, Dick Mtsweni was not a member of MK? I'm challenging him to put that on record now.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, if I wanted that I would have asked him and I think he must conduct his case like he wants to, and if he leaves out those things and it turns out to be detrimental, so be it. I'm not going to compel him to put anything on record.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, whatever I have put to either Mr Steyn or Mr Loots will be backed up by evidence which I will lead. And if my learned friend wants me to put on record, I will gladly put on record.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, I'm not going to get involved that, I've made a statement about that yesterday and last week, I'm not going to tell you how to run your case, that's your case and you do as you think best with your case.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I thought it was implicit in what I had already put, but I will make it clear that I am putting to the witness that Mr Dick Mtsweni was not involved in MK activities. And if he transported Mr Chris Hani from his house to the airport, I do not, in my submission that is not part of MK activities, if he was a driver for the ANC, transporting personnel around. If my learned friend wants to make that part of MK activities, so be it.

Mr Steyn, I also want to put to you that Mr Mtsweni did not move around, he was not changing houses, he had two wives, one lived in the house where he was living, one lived in another house, in the house where he was living he also stayed with his granddaughter, Busisiwe Mokoena ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, does this take us any further if his original answer was the name means nothing to him, he doesn't recognise the name?

MR BERGER: Mr Malan, I want to make the same point that if there was this intelligence, as they claimed to have been, this great ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I think that's common cause, that argument we accept, but if he has no knowledge he can't take it any further. Then your argument stands.

MR BERGER: Mr Malan, I just want to put this on record, what evidence we will lead, so that I can't be accused of taking anyone by surprise.

MR MALAN: Okay.

MR BERGER: His granddaughter, Busisiwe Mokoena stayed with him and a young boy, he's now a young man, Thebogo Xabi, was also staying in the house. Busisiwe Mokoena, the granddaughter was 12 years old at the time of the attack. Now my question is the same as with Duke Machobane, surely you would have - if it were so that his granddaughter had been living with Dick Mtsweni in the house, that there was this young boy in the house, surely the intelligence operatives would have picked that up. Do you agree?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson, it's possible, they should have picked it up.

MR BERGER: And if they had picked it up, this house too would have been excluded as a target for attack, correct?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is if those children had indeed stayed there, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You were asked a question by Mr Malan whether you knew of any order that the SADF gave its soldiers, to the effect that everyone at a particular target house was to be killed and you said you don't know of any such order. Do you remember that evidence?

MR STEYN: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I want to ask you, because that answer sounds strange, was it not the order or was it not the plan even before the final orders were given by the SADF to the soldiers, was it not the plan to kill everyone at the target house, at a particular target house? If people were found there they were to be killed, everyone. And the reason that I ask you that question in that way is because if there had been so-called innocent people at any target house, be it women, children, local inhabitants, or someone not involved in MK activities, then that target house would have been excluded before the attack. So once the final list of targets was arrived at, surely the order was to kill everyone in the house? What have I missed?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, only the persons, only the targets that were identified with the particular people who were involved in some or other activities, would have been the target. That was the part of the question that I can recall, I cannot recall the rest of the question.

MR BERGER: Surely the decision, when it was finally decided that these would be the 10 targets, surely the decision was that everyone found at the target house, at one of the 10 target houses, was to be killed?

MR STEYN: The SADF who worked on the ground would at that stage have, depending on the circumstances, act on the ground.

MR BERGER: No, I'm asking when the decision was taken these are the final 10 targets, these 10 installations are the final 10 installations to be targeted, we've now excluded all those targets where there are innocent people around and about, so-called, surely the decision at that stage was to everyone at the target house?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the 10 final targets were taken after the situation had passed me, it had passed my hands, and I accept those targets would have been attacked with whatever was in that premises and people would be killed and/or injured there.

MR BERGER: You know yesterday Mr Loots told us that you would be the person who would be able to tell us how the final 10 targets were arrived at. Are you saying that's not so, it was a decision taken beyond you?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, what I am saying is that after the submission was made by me, this matter was given over to the South African Defence Force, thereafter it was reduced to 10 targets. So I cannot say the final word about those 10 targets, the South African Defence Force took its decision there.

MR BERGER: When your involvement ceased, how many targets were there?

MR STEYN: When I submitted the targets there were approximately 29, which were reduced thereafter and was dealt with by members of the Security Forces and where the number were still reduced at a higher level.

MR BERGER: But you're now saying that your involvement ended when the target list was still at 29, but you also ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: No, that's not what he said.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what was meant, he didn't say it in so many words, it was reduced from 29 to a certain number, I'm not too sure what that number is, but thereafter when it was out of his hands, the final tally of targets was 10. And I'm not sure when that occurred.

MR BERGER: So you can't recall what the number of target was when you fell out of the picture?

MR STEYN: No, I cannot recall Chairperson.

MR BERGER: How is that possible, you can remember the 29, you can remember the 10, you can't remember the middle bit?

MR STEYN: I recall that there was approximately 29 targets submitted and during the submission decisions were taken, chairpersons did not make their final decisions known, thereafter it was referred to the SADF, who did further submissions on a higher level and then the targets were reduced even more.

MR BERGER: When the targets were reduced in your presence, from 29 to whatever, at that stage already targets had been excluded on the basis of women, children, locals, etcetera, is that right?

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So therefore at that stage it was already contemplated that everyone found at a particular target house would be killed, am I right?

MR STEYN: The Defence Force would do the attack and if the persons who were involved at that safehouse were there, then they would also be killed. If there were innocent persons who were not there previously or who were coincidentally there, they would probably also have died.

MR BERGER: You see, why I ask you this question is because Busi Mokoena says that when the attackers came, she hid in a wardrobe and one of the attackers opened the wardrobe door, found her there and fired shots at her. A 12 year old girl. She says she felt extreme pain and pretended to be dead. It appears as though the attackers didn't conduct interviews before they opened fire.

MR STEYN: I believe that wasn't the case, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So they wouldn't have known who was targeted and who was not targeted, or would they? Which people were targeted and which were not targeted.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, they should have known because, look, the final decision was taken by them. After all information was placed on the table before them, it went through various processes, they should have known, but with the regard to the executionability on the ground, it was most probably another story.

MR BERGER: You see that's why I put to you that at the time that your target list of 29 was narrowed down, it must have been contemplated by you at that stage, that everyone in the target house was to be killed.

MR VISSER: He's conceded it on three occasions now, Chairperson, that very question.

MR BERGER: I'm terribly sorry that my learned friend is getting so irritated with my questions.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I don't want to object to my learned friend's cross-examination but truly, my learned friend must perhaps consider drawing a distinction between what this witness knows and what the decision makers know. He keeps on asking this witness, as with the previous witness, as to the merits of decisions taken and this witness is quite clear, he took no decisions, he presented a list, the decisions were taken by someone else. Whether they decided everybody is to be killed in the house, whether they decided children are to be killed in the house, he's got no knowledge and no control over, Chairperson. And we're going around in circles. But I don't want to stop my learned friend if you're not going to stop him, but really, to repeat a question four/five times, in my respectful submission, serves no purpose at all, except waste time.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, I'd like to refer you to page 82 of bundle 2, the author ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Just before you get to the question.

Mr Steyn, please listen to my question. I understand now that your evidence - although you gave the information to those who took the decisions, when you gave 29 items on the list of targets, were you not part of that decision? Did somebody else take that decision?

MR STEYN: The decision to act, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: And who and what.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And also the same goes for decisions that were taken afterwards to bring the total of targets to 10?

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If that is the case, can you tell us - I do not know whether you can, but can you tell us on what basis the attack took place eventually?

MR STEYN: I beg your pardon, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Can you explain to us on what basis this attack eventually took place? Was it on the information that you gave, or something else, or some other decision or whatever? Are you in a position to say?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, what I am able to say is that it was on the information that we conveyed which may have been supplemented by other information.

CHAIRPERSON: So why are you saying that the decision upon which the attack was eventually based is the same that you gave?

MR STEYN: What I meant, Chairperson, was that ...(interven-tion)

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all that you did, you just gave information, you do not know what the decision was or what happened to that information thereafter?

MR STEYN: If I understand correctly Chairperson, thereafter I do not know what process was used.

CHAIRPERSON: So you do not know on what grounds those decisions were taken, it was made in your absence?

MR STEYN: Yes, in my absence, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you a position to tell us on what basis, on what real basis the attack was really executed?

MR STEYN: What the final instruction, if I understand you correctly Chairperson, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm not talking about ...

MR STEYN: With regard to the final instructions to the operatives, I'm not aware of that, I'm not up to date with that. I know how it was executed.

CHAIRPERSON: And you assume, as I understand your evidence, that somewhere the information that you created for them, they could have used it to make these decisions, but you cannot really say?

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Do you have page 82?

MR STEYN: I do, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: The author says

"The house was occupied ..."

this is Target 13:

"The house was occupied by George Pahle and his wife, Lindiwe Maud Malaza. Ostensibly, George worked as a driver in his own business while Lindiwe was employed as a spokeswomen for Botswana's Ministry of Local Government. George kept his vehicles, which included a bus, at his home address.

The Security Police maintained, George Pahle had planted a bomb at Johannesburg's Carlton Centre in 1976. Both he and Lindiwe were members of the SACP, South African Communist Party. In the early 1980's when things got hot for them in South Africa, they fled the country. They were dispatched for military training in Angola and ultimately ended up in Botswana.

The were involved in intelligence work (says the author) for the ANC, and their residence was used as a safehouse by MK cadres in transit. They were also responsible for MK's logistics and smuggled weapons and equipment into South Africa. Another of their responsibilities was the transportation of MK guerrillas to the border prior to them infiltrating South Africa.

Despite their virtually full-time commitment to political work, the ... (I think it's couple, I've got a big hole there) ... the couple had still managed to come fairly well-to-do from their business activities."

Does that ring any bells?

MR STEYN: George Pahle rings a bell, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Just the name George Pahle?

MR STEYN: That he was involved with the ANC, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Anything more specific than that?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So it's the same as Michael Hamlyn?

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And on the same basis would you say that George Pahle was on the list of targets?

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And again, would it be correct to say that you have no basis for saying that?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I do not have my facts before me and this was a long time ago.

MR BERGER: And then at page 83, top of page 494, about a quarter of the way down

"The clearing teams number one and first in was Staff-Sgt Kay. The first room was empty, but in the second four rounds were fired into a wardrobe and a dead man toppled out. The Botswana authorities contended he was George's nephew, on a visit from Johannesburg. The ANC said he was Lindiwe's cousin. The Security Police identified him as Joseph Malale (should be Malaza), an ANC courier."

Does that ring any bells for you?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Nothing?

MR STEYN: No, I cannot recall this instance, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You heard me yesterday put ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, tell me, because something just crosses my mind and I'm not too sure whether you have considered it, I don't expect you to have, if it is this witness' evidence that yes, they did produce this information to the decision makers, even given thinking that they thought that these people were candidates for assassination, but thereafter he doesn't know how the decision makers came to conclusions and decisions and furthermore, on what basis the attack was concluded, what in fact does that evidence have on his application? I ask the question of you because I wonder, and I'm speaking for myself, if that impact is not critical. Carry, you can have time after ...(inaudible)

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I will consider it, thank you.

You heard me yesterday put to Mr Loots that Joseph Malaza had indeed been visiting from Johannesburg, that he had arrived on the day of the raid, that Lindiwe Pahle was a social worker who worked for the Botswana Government, that George Pahle owned a bus company. Would you agree that if this house was attacked as any other house, it would only have been attacked if it was on the list of targets?

MR STEYN: I accept that, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And this house would only have been attacked because of the activities of George and Lindiwe Pahle, am I correct?

MR STEYN: I think so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: By the way, Livingstone Pahle was also in the house at the time. I take it that you have no information and you haven't been able to produce or find any documents to support the conclusions that the author comes to in the passage that I've read, about the activities of George and Lindiwe Pahle. Am I right? Or do you have any information?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, I do not have information, but during the planning of this operation there was information available to us that I do not have now and I cannot recall it.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, I've been through most - I think I've been through all of the houses that were attacked of the people that I represent, and in every case I've tried to show to you that the people who were killed did not fall within the criteria that you've set and that Mr Loots has set as criteria for assassination. You say I'm wrong, those places were attacked, there was a good reason for attacking those places, no mistakes were made. All the targets were vetted and no house was attacked where there were innocent people, so-called, living amongst the guilty people, so-called. But then at the end of your evidence you said ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Sorry Mr Berger, I don't think he ever that, he said no house, as far as he was concerned, was attacked where there were women and children present, on that list. He conceded right at the start, if they were innocent people present they would probably have been shot up too.

MR BERGER: No, Mr Malan, what I was referring to was in response a much earlier question where Mr Steyn was asked if X, who qualified for assassination, was living in the same house as Y, who didn't qualify for assassination, then that house would have been excluded from the list of targets.

MR MALAN: Okay, thank you.

MR BERGER: It's on that basis that all the final targets that were selected were targets where only the guilty, so-called, were residing unless someone came unannounced. I leave open that possibility.

MR MALAN: Like Malaza?

MR BERGER: Like Malaza, indeed. Although according to the author of this book, Malaza was not a surprise for the Security Police. So he says.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.

MR BERGER: Yet you said at the end of your evidence-in-chief, that subsequent to the raid there was talk that certain innocent people, so-called, and you said "a six year old boy and others" had been killed in the raid. Do you remember that evidence? Now besides the six year old boy, who else were you referring to?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I only referred to persons - if I understand the question correctly, who coincidentally were at a target that was attacked, that were injured and/or killed.

CHAIRPERSON: But the question is clear, Mr Steyn, to whom did you refer? You're making the application with regard to the murder or attack of Messrs A, B and C, and Mr Berger wants to know, except for the six year old child, - and you also applied in his regard as well, to whom do you refer to as the "others" that were not targets, but because of the attack that were necessarily injured and/or killed.

MR STEYN: I refer to persons who coincidentally would be at those targets.

CHAIRPERSON: But who are they?

MR STEYN: Visitors, home guests, anyone.

CHAIRPERSON: Don't you have any names?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, I don't.

CHAIRPERSON: But that is why I'm somewhat confused now. If a person came here to apply, then you must know in whose case you are making the application. Do you not know the names of the persons who died and in respect of whom you are applying?

MR STEYN: No I have seen lists of persons who were killed and/or injured, with regard to everyone who was killed and/or injured.

CHAIRPERSON: But listen to the question then, if you have knowledge about it, Mr Berger wants the names of persons except for the six year old boy who was not on the list and who were in case killed during these attack. Is that the gist of the question?

MR BERGER: That is the question.

Who was killed by mistake, who ought not to have been killed?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall the names now, Chairperson, I would have to check it.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson, I do not have names with me.

MR VISSER: I must say, Chairperson, with great respect, we made it quite clear in the evidence of both the witnesses so far, is that they have no knowledge of who was killed, who was injured, what buildings were destroyed, but they accept the information that has been given, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: And they're applying for amnesty for all offences and delicts relating to this incident, flowing from their participation in giving the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, it's not that simplistic, they're making application for the deaths and attempted murders and whatever and delicts flowing out of this actions or actions, there are names of dead and wounded mentioned, in coming to the conclusion that he has come to, that he's entitled to make the application, surely he must know in respect of whose death and whose attempted murder he's entitled to make the application.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, with the greatest respect, if you're correct in that statement, then Mr Aboobaker Ismail can never obtain amnesty ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: On his instructions, 265 were either killed or injured in the Church Street bomb, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steyn, did you not try to find out who was killed because of this attack?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I have seen the names before but I cannot recall them. I get it again, I can research it again.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what Mr Berger wants to know from you, who was it that should not have been killed, or who was not on the list but was indeed killed. Do you not know?

MR STEYN: Not off the top of my head, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Steyn, I'm sorry I don't understand the evidence that you tendered at the end of your evidence-in-chief. You were asked by my learned friend to give evidence about your reflections after the raid, after the attack, you said that: "In our division and in the Army ..." this is my note: "... that there was some reflection done", and also that you received feedback from informers. And you said: "Later there was talk, this is my note, maybe I'm wrong, "... that certain innocent people (a six year old and others) were killed during the raid." My question is simple. To whom were you referring when you said that certain innocent people were killed? I don't see why it's a difficult question.

MR STEYN: The only thing that I want to say is that that was the information that we had, but I do not know the names of the persons.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, just tell me, is the Aboobaker matter published already, the result of it?

MR VISSER: No, Chairperson, my submission was that he can then never receive amnesty if that is the test, but no, his decision has not - Judge Motata was ...

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: No, no, there's no decision yet.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: I said then he can never obtain amnesty if it's a test that you've got to know all the names of the injured and the dead, that's what I said.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR BERGER: Sorry Mr Steyn, did you answer my question?

MR STEYN: Will you please repeat the question, there's been interruptions in-between.

MR BERGER: I'm asking you a very simple question. You tendered certain evidence, you said you did reflection after the raid, you got feedback from informers ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: His answer to that question was, Mr Berger, that he got information that innocent people were killed, but he didn't get any details as to names or how, and he left it at that. That was his answer to your question.

MR BERGER: Didn't that concern you? Here you've gone to an enormous amount of trouble to get the correct targets, to make sure that your intelligence is accurate and now you are told after the fact, that innocent people died in the attack and you never ever bothered to find out who they were or how it came about that they were killed?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, how they were killed, the Army on the ground would be able to say, who executed the operation. Probably at that stage we received information about who these persons were who were killed and/or injured, but I do not have the facts before me. It's that simple.

MR BERGER: I want to refer you to page 76 of volume 2, page 474 of Stiff's book, three-quarters of the way down that page, the author writes

"To provide an additional excuse for the raid, the Security Police put together a cache of Eastern-bloc weapons, which was hidden in an abandoned mine in the Krugersdorp area and then 'found' and claimed as terrorist weapons originating from Botswana."

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, does that pertain to this application? I thought it pertained to another application, The Krugersdorp Cache matter ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: ...(inaudible) reference was made to this very passage and it was by evidence to clarify the situation in that regard. I don't want to repeat the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I don't know if Mr Berger and I are talking at cross-purposes, that's why I'm raising it with him. There is a matter that I heard in preparation to justify an attack on Botswana, a cache was planted in Krugersdorp, where all the statements that flowed from the police after the attack on Botswana, was already paraphrased before the attack and it was said that they discovered this cache that they found out originated from Botswana and in preparation for MK cadres that are going to come into South Africa from Botswana, and that is why the South African authorities had to attack people in Botswana. Now if you're talking about another incident, please carry on, but ...

MR BERGER: No, I'm reading from Stiff's book where he links it to this raid and if I'm ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR BERGER: It pleases me greatly.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) we're almost ready to make a finding on that matter, that the facts as I presented it to you was applicable to that, to another raid in Botswana. I think it was a different year even.

MR BERGER: Would that have been the EPG raid?

MR VISSER: It was the one with the helicopters, Chairperson. This one was the one where they went in with vehicles and the other one was helicopters. An air strike.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, following on from your answer that you can't say who the so-called innocent people were who were killed in the attack, are you in a position as Mr Loots says he was, to say whether any of the following people were definitely on the list of targets that you submitted, or not? Now you recall - perhaps I can assist you, he said that Duke Machobane, Thami Mnyele, Dick Mtsweni and George Pahle, you'll recall, those four names he said were definitely on the list that you submitted to Head Office, as possible targets for attack. And you'll understand the shorthand that I'm using, I know that you said it was buildings with people in them, but these were the names that he mentioned. Now I'm going to read you a list of names and I'm going to ask you whether you can say, like Mr Loots said, whether any of these people were definitely on the list. There's: Dick Mtsweni ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Let's get an answer one by one.

MR BERGER: Dick Mtsweni?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Michael Hamlyn?

MR STEYN: I suspect he was.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the best you can do, Mr Steyn?

MR STEYN: I suspect so, I'm not sure Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Thami Mnyele?

MR STEYN: I'm not sure, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Joseph Malaza?

MR STEYN: I think so. I cannot recall, but I think so.

MR BERGER: Livingstone Pahle?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Lindi Pahle?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: George Pahle?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Busisiwe Mokoena?

MR STEYN: I cannot recall, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Thebogo Xabi?

MR STEYN: I'm not sure, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Duke Machobane?

MR STEYN: I previously said I'm not sure, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Rose Machobane?

MR STEYN: I'm also not sure.

MR BERGER: Whitehead Machobane?

MR STEYN: Not certain.

MR BERGER: Peter Mofoka?

MR STEYN: I'm not sure.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR STEYN: Could you repeat please?

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR STEYN: No, not at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Please Mr Steyn, you must listen to the question, you are confusing everyone, including your own advocate. I was still Whitehead Machobane: Not sure. And Peter Mofoka.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR BERGER: M-o-f-o-k-a.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR STEYN: Not at all, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Mr Steyn, was this raid approved by the State Security Council?

MR STEYN: As far as I know, indeed yes.

MR BERGER: How do you know that?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I accept it because I made submissions to Gen Coetzee and Gen Constand Viljoen, who were members of the State Security Council.

JUDGE MOTATA: In the same meeting where you made these submissions, or whatever, was it in the same meeting or independently?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, it was a later stage. I was not present at that meeting.

JUDGE MOTATA: Thank you, you may proceed, Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Judge.

There was more than one meeting, wasn't there Mr Steyn?

MR STEYN: Where we made submissions, Chairperson?

MR BERGER: And it was in the second meeting where you handed over the list of 29 targets.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Thank you, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP: Afterwards, did anyone from the Army report back to you about the incident?

MR STEYN: Would you please repeat.

ADV STEENKAMP: After the attack, did anybody report to you?

MR STEYN: This was dealt with at a higher level. We convened at various occasions and then the documentation and those types of things were checked, but the final consultation was done at a higher level.

ADV STEENKAMP: No further questions, thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Steyn, just to place this whole issue of innocent persons, the question to you was, do you accept that innocent persons were killed in this action, can you recall that?

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And I can refer you, Chairperson, to page 47, it's a newspaper report, it you turn it sideways, in the centre column you will read, the bottom of the middle column

"The dead also included six year old Peter Mofoka, of Lesotho, Achmed Mohammed Geer, a Dutch citizen and two Botswana women, Eugenia Kobole and Gladys Kesopile(?)"

Chairperson, I also refer you to page 49, under the heading:

"Vengeance in the night"

it says:

"The official death toll stands at 12, with 6 injured. The dead included three women and a five year old boy, who had several bullet wounds in the hip. Said a statement of the office of President Quintin Masire. The injured included a 10 year old girl who was shot in the leg and a Dutch lady who had multiple bullet injuries."

And then at page - just to name a few, page 51:

"Gen Constand Viljoen told a press conference in Pretoria, that his men had reported to him that two children were wounded and said that radio Botswana subsequently revealed that one of these had died. The SADF members involved had been given photographs of trained terrorists expected to be at the houses, and being carefully briefed to avoid casualties among Botswana civilians, police or military personnel and among innocent members of the family, of terrorists. General Viljoen said ..."

So Chairperson the only point, with respect, of the evidence, was to draw to your attention that we accept and we acknowledge the fact that innocent people may well and probably were killed. That's the only point. Thank you, I have no further questions to Gen Steyn, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I was hoping to complete two further witnesses this afternoon. I don't know whether you want us to continue with one witness, we would prefer if we could. I know that if you leave in the middle of the traffic it's terrible to get to Pretoria. I don't know whether you're going to Pretoria. Well last night it took us until 7 o'clock to reach Pretoria. But if you're prepared to listen to another witness, Chairperson.

Chairperson, I now call Crause. He's available and ready to take the oath. He also prefers to address you in Afrikaans.