ON RESUMPTION
MR BIZOS: In the evidence of the next witness, the Committee will require the volume 2, which is the application of Mr van Jaarsveld, and you will also need the applicant's bundle, and I would ask you to turn to page 101 of the applicant's bundle, which is a portion of the judgement of His Lordship Mr Justice Zietsman, but at the bottom of page 101, the signal of June 1985 is reproduced.
Mr Chairman, we call to give evidence Mr Jakob Jan Hendrik van Jaarsveld.
JACOB JAN HENDRIK VAN JAARSVELD: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: You have applied for amnesty, and the documents, or at least a portion thereof has been placed before the Committee as volume 2. Do you confirm that this forms part of your application?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That's correct.
MR BIZOS: And there was an Annexure A which is attached, it is a statement of the facts relevant to this application. That has
also been placed before the Committee. Would you please read out the statement and if there is anything which you wish to add, would you then do so. Will you please read it.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: "Chairperson, during 1984 I was connected to the Intelligence Unit of the Security Branch in Pretoria. I was a Lieutenant. Approximately during the middle of 1984 I received an order from Mr Craig Williamson to investigate whether it would be possible to take out Matthew Goniwe, that means kill ...(intervention)
MR BIZOS: Can you stop there for a moment. Who is Major Craig Williamson and where is he stationed, what was his job during 1984?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Mr Craig Williamson was the Head of the South African Police Security Branch's Intelligence Unit stationed at the Security Head Quarters in Pretoria.
MR BIZOS: What were you asked to do?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I was asked by Craig Williamson to investigate whether it would be possible to take out Matthew Goniwe.
MR BIZOS: What did that mean?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: It meant to kill.
MR BIZOS: Continue, will you read the next paragraph.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: "At that stage due to my work obligations Matthew Goniwe was familiar to me. I had read a number of reports regarding him. He was the father of the G plan, that was about Ground structure's street committees, ...(intervention)
MR BIZOS: Where did you get the information of reports?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: It was made available to us at Head Office.
MS BOSMAN: Who sent those reports to the Head Office?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: According to the activities of the Security Branch at that stage, it would have been reports gathered or compiled on local level and the sent via the Security Branch in PE in the Eastern Province to Head Quarters.
MR BIZOS: You describe the so-called G plan and what it entailed, what was it about?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: The G plan was a revolutionary document compiled by Matthew Goniwe which described the activities of those occupying positions in the ground level structures at street committees.
MR BIZOS: Did you go to Port Elizabeth?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes. I will continue,
"Captain Bassie Bouwer and I drove down to Port Elizabeth in a blue Sierra 2L. We reported to Colonel Gerrit Erasmus at the Security Branch of PE who was at that point the head of the branch. Their offices were in Strand Street in Port Elizabeth. Colonel Erasmus was aware of the purpose of our visit."
MR BIZOS: Can we just pause for a moment there. It is alleged that you may be wrong in connection with the identity of Colonel Erasmus. It is alleged that he was transferred and was not here in Port Elizabeth during 1984. What do you have to say about that?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is the first time that I journeyed to Port Elizabeth and it was the first time that I met Colonel Erasmus. I remember him very well, we still sat in his office chatting about things like Rugby. If I'm not mistaken, I don't know exactly what his position was, he was either the Vice-President or the President of the Eastern Province Rugby Union.
MR BIZOS: Do you have any doubt at all that that was Colonel Erasmus?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Not at all.
MR BIZOS: What did you discuss with him apart from Rugby and his position on the Rugby Board?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: We discussed what was happening in the country and amongst others at that stage he jokingly told me, I don't think we should attach too much value to this, if things in the country were to change, if things were to happen, he would see to it that the Policemen would receive their pensions, he would ensure that well-organised and executed bank robberies would take place in order to do that.
MR BIZOS: But that was a joke?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, that's correct.
MR BIZOS: But that is the level of detail which you can remember?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, that's correct.
MR BIZOS: Did you stay in Port Elizabeth or did you go to Cradock?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Later that morning we went to Cradock. One of the members of the PE Security Branch accompanied us. He went in his own car. He had come from Koevoet and I assumed that it was - that Sakkie van Zyl at that stage was a Captain. In Cradock we went to Henry Fouche who was the Security Branch Commander there. The meeting was held at his offices. Fouche showed us their VIP room, that is where all the tapping devices were monitored, and according to him the Goniwe house was very well covered with tapping devices. After that we went to Goniwe's home, in Henry Fouche's motor vehicle. The road to the house was very bad, but the house itself looked very different to those in its environment. As I remember it was painted white. Mrs Goniwe was at home when we arrived there. We greeted here and walked through the house. Fouche pointed out a double-adaptor for the radio to me and told me that there was a tapping device inside it. After a while we left the house and went back to the Cradock Security Branch. From there we went back to Port Elizabeth. That evening, along with members of the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth we monitored a meeting and later on I threw a stone through one Janet Cherry's motor vehicle window.
MR BIZOS: Why did you do that?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That was purely mischief.
ADV POTGIETER: Could it have been anybody's car window, or was it specifically hers?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Could you repeat that.
ADV POTGIETER: The mischief, was it aimed specifically at Janet Cherry's car, or would it have been aimed at anybody's car?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: No, it was aimed specifically at her car.
ADV POTGIETER: Janet Cherry's car?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That's correct.
ADV POTGIETER: How did you know it was her car?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: The vehicle was pointed out to us by other passengers in our vehicle.
MR BIZOS: We can determine the date and if the owner was Janet Cherry, because that was the 21st of March. It was Sharpeville day. Can you remember whether that was the date or not?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: No.
MR BIZOS: But was it approximately during that period of time?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: If the evidence says that it was the 21st of March then I will accept that, because the two incidents are directly connected to one another.
MR BIZOS: What did you do the next morning?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: The following morning we drove back to Pretoria. I gave feedback, I think that Captain Bouwer was present, so I gave this feedback to Captain Williamson. I recommended that Goniwe could not be taken out at his house because there were too many people in the vicinity and it would make the process problematic. I recommended that he be followed and taken out alongside the road somewhere. I cannot say with surety who took the recommendations. I found out later that Mr Goniwe was dead. A telex was sent, which recommended the permanent removal of Goniwe and others. According to my opinion it was possible that the State Security Council would approve such an operation.
From 1989 I was involved with the Secretariat of the State Security Council and I'm aware of what the procedures were. Van Rensburg was a member of the Secretariat of the State Security Council, even though he had retired he was still in service of the Police. Mr Stemmet was second in command of the SSSC.
MR BIZOS: There are a number of questions which we'd like to put to you. You mention a telex which was that signal sent on the 7th of June from Port Elizabeth to General van Rensburg. Could you please look at page 101 to 102. Did you read the signal?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I have read it after you showed it to me.
MR BIZOS: Very well. It was a common fact that during the post mortem this signal was sent by Du Plessis from the Army on behalf of the then Brigadier and later General van der Westhuizen to General van Rensburg. When you worked at the Head Office, did you know how the system operated?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: If you're referring to the system within the SSSC and the JMS, yes.
MR BIZOS: How did it happen that you came to acquire that knowledge?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: As a Police Deputy Officer, I had been devolved to the Secretariat of the Security Council from 1981 until 1982 and later on from the late 80's for a short while.
MR BIZOS: We are aware of the EP JMS here in Port Elizabeth, and that Brigadier van der Westhuizen was the Chairperson thereof, and that Colonel Snyman represented the Security Police in the EP JMS, and if he was not available then Mr van Rensburg would represent him. What according to the procedures had to happen at the EP JMS before the signal could be sent, whose decision would it be to make such a proposal?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Chairperson, the communication structure of the National Security Council worked in a dual fashion. Firstly any action in terms of Government strategy within the JMS and JMS organs or the joint operational centres and so forth would be controlled by State departments from which it would move via the structures of the JMS to the State Security Council Branches, but those connected to the Management System on local level would also send this information to the other Security Offices.
MR BIZOS: Could the Chairperson of the EP JMS here in PE have sent such a signal without the permission of Mr Snyman or one or other person who represented the Security Police here in Port Elizabeth?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: It would have been very difficult for him to do so without the permission, because an operation such as this would have to be planned within the JMC of the JMS and this was a very important aspect of that system. The JMC worked along with the Co-ordinating Committee of the JMS. It consisted of members of the Security Branch, Military Intelligence, National Intelligence representatives and in cases where other departments who were also there, such as Education and Training in certain respects, they would be co-ordinated as such within that Committee.
MR BIZOS: You'll see in paragraph 3 on page 102 that it is a proposal to remove the three mentioned persons from the community. Did you have any difficulty in interpreting the meaning of paragraph 3?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: No.
MR BIZOS: What does it mean?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: It is very clear that it is a proposal to initiate the operation, but one has to look at it in a broader perspective as well, in terms of the Government's counter-revolutionary strategy which had begun at that stage, had gotten off the ground at that stage. The proposal for action was referred to Secretariat of the State Security Council and then also Trevits, in order to ensure that it was co-ordinated, that it would take place, and that people would take note thereof.
MR BIZOS: Will you please explain what Trevits is.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I have the documents before me, it is the documents with the number TNV2 from 1985, it's confidential. It is inscribed "The strategy of the ANC". It was compiled by National Interpretation of the Secretariat of the Security Council and was distributed in 1985 in March as a Security document. The introduction and interpretation of this document includes the name of the Organ Trevits as a foundation. I will read to you,
"For the purposes of continuity and co-ordination in a comprehensive counter-revolutionary strategy, a monitoring centre which will include strategic information gathering, the Counselling Centre for monitoring."
It would not be feasible to have such an organ.
MR BIZOS: Who would have taken the decision to allow the proposal made by the EP JMS to continue or not?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: If one observes the structures of the National Security Management Structure, I have previously provided a document to the Amnesty Committee which was handed in to them on the 6th of March 1997. In this document it is clearly set out how the National Management Structure functions. An operation such as this would be sent to the highest level of this structure, that would be the Cabinet and State Security Council level. It had to be cleared out there.
MR BIZOS: If the proposal was permitted, who would have known about it?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: It would then be the members of the State Security Council who knew about it.
MR BIZOS: And if it had been permitted, which steps would be taken to execute it?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Once again a dual function via the National Management Structure back to the JMS, the local EP JMS, and secondly with the departmental representatives, the Ministers and senior officials within the State Security Council.
MR BIZOS: And if the proposal was not adhered to, what would have happened?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: In the same way the negative would have been communicated back.
MR BIZOS: Would this proposal be studied?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes.
MR BIZOS: The Security Police here in Port Elizabeth was not involved?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Mr Chairperson it is difficult for me to say, I did refer earlier to Trevits, an order like the permanent removal of Goniwe group could also have come from Trevits, so one has to look very carefully at this, in that it could have been a dualistic function.
MR BIZOS: Now, paragraph 4, there is an explanation of what the writer considers as a reaction on the local level and national level that must be taken into consideration. Why is that so, do you know?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Mr Chairperson, any revolutionary warfare like we had in the country at that stage has got one main goal and that is that the war cannot be fought without the support of the masses and if such a reaction occurs, it is counter-revolutionary warfare and you also have to control the masses, and that is why paragraph 4 is important.
MR BIZOS: Who will have considered these circumstances?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Mr Chairperson the circumstances would have been considered by all the organs of the State, all the departments would have the order to monitor the situation and would have acted with the necessary means. Other officials as well as reaction from the politicians on the left, as well as protest actions will have to be monitored and would have acted on that.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I will be able to start with my cross-examination of this witness. This witness, however, referred to certain documentation, things referring to Trevits as so on, so I'll get as far as I can and then I'm afraid I'll have to ask for an adjournment, because, my eyesight is not that good, but if I can see I think this document is from here it's a voluminous document, so perhaps I'll find myself in a position to study that.
Just in passing, Mr van Jaarsveld, it seems as if the two documents are very thick, is that correct?
ADV POTGIETER: No, Mr Chairperson, this document is not applicable, it's just these two.
MR BOOYENS: Yes, I'm talking about them, but it seems as if it's almost 80 - 100 pages. Okay, fine, thank you. Mr van Jaarsveld, I'm asking you a general question and I don't expect from you to go into detail, the order that you got from Craig Williamson, was that a strange order, the order to go and see if this person can be killed or not?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Mr Chairperson, no, at that stage we - a lot of that type of actions did occur in our country. These things started from as early as in the 70's ...(intervention)
MR BOOYENS: What I actually want to know from you is where that type of order was initiated there in the Intelligence Service, or maybe higher up, is that not true? It was also not unique, is that true?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: No.
MR BOOYENS: You refer to Herman Studdler and Piet Goosen. It - I'm talking about your knowledge, it would not have been initiated by them, it would have been above them, they would have only been the people who carried the message down, is that true?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, that would have been the case.
MR BOOYENS: And, seemingly, already in '84 Mr Goniwe was seen as a problem for then Government of the day, and that it was seen as a viable option to kill him? Mr van Jaarsveld, where would the Head Office get that idea?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Like I said earlier on, all the reports that was available at Head Office comes through the local Intelligence Branch and other organisations. Head Office did not have the ability to gather the information.
ADV POTGIETER: And when you returned from Port Elizabeth, did you tell anybody here what was the nature of your visit or business in Port Elizabeth?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, if you can remember my statement, I told Sakkie van Zyl, then Captain van Zyl, he received us, he was involved with this, and in this discussion I told him that Colonel Erasmus knew why we were here.
MR BOOYENS: An operation like this, this planned operation is, because of the nature of it, were handled on a need to know basis?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: Mr Erasmus, as far as you said here, knew what was the purpose of your visit. Would you go so far as to say that he knew the purpose of your visit was to look into the possibility of killing Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: Sakkie van Zyl went with you to Cradock, is that correct?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: He went with us, yes. If I can remember correctly he was there pertinently to assist us with the investigation and to see what could be done.
MR BOOYENS: That is to say if it was Sakkie van Zyl, but you're not even sure of that?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I met him later. Let us say that I stand with what I said here.
ADV POTGIETER: Would you recognise him if you see him today?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, Mr Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: When did you compile this statement?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Mr Chairperson, if I look at the date here,
MR BOOYENS: I see it's '97, it was handed in at the TRC, 10 December 1996. The annexure, was that handed in as well?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, that's correct.
MR BOOYENS: And at that stage, did you suspect that it was still Sakkie van Zyl?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, Mr Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Do you stand with that, that you suspected that it was Sakkie van Zyl, that you stand with what you said in your statement?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: So, your statement about the identity of the person in PE who accompanied you is based on a suspicion in the light that you thought it was him?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I would just like to give more clarity around this matter, in that I suspected it was him, because during other applicants's hearings in Pretoria and in Johannesburg, I've met Sakkie van Zyl, and I immediately realised that it was him who met us here.
MR BOOYENS: Okay, could you tell us did Erasmus speak to him alone, when he gave him the order, did Erasmus speak alone to Sakkie?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I do not know when he gave him the order.
MR BOOYENS: So, you don't know what he said to him, you did not know that Sakkie was informed?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: No, I did not.
MR BOOYENS: You yourself was on a need to know basis and you would not have told Sakkie that you came here to see if you could kill this person, you did not know if he was trustworthy?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Sakkie van Zyl was introduced to us by Colonel Erasmus. We drove with him, he was the local person who would have assisted us.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr van Jaarsveld, what would have been the sense in it that he did not know what your business was, or why you were here?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I would not say that he did not know anything.
ADV POTGIETER: He had to know something if he was sent with you?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, certainly.
MR BOOYENS: You do not know if he necessarily knew that it was to gather information and to later kill Goniwe?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I do not know what orders he received from Colonel Erasmus.
MR BOOYENS: You, for example, or Erasmus, could have said to him that the people are interested in Goniwe, what his activities were, what his movements were, where he lives, with proper observation, etc, there could have been any possibility.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Like I said, I do not know what the order was from Colonel Erasmus.
MR BOOYENS: And you cannot say today that Mr van Zyl was aware what the purpose of the recognisance?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: The matter was discussed, yes, but I cannot remember the discussions in detail.
MR BOOYENS: I assume that you, were potential co-accomplis in this murder and I understand that you are fearful and that you think before you say, you are not going to come forward with the whole truth, unless it's needed.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Certainly, that is true.
MR BOOYENS: The position with Henry Fouche, do you know what was said to him, what orders he received?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: No, not at all, he only showed us Goniwe's house.
MR BOOYENS: Do you know if van Zyl was with you then?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Sakkie van Zyl was with us the whole time.
MR BOOYENS: The statement that you made and the way in which information was gathered, that it came from Cradock via PE is only speculative, it could also have been information that was gathered by sources, reports from the main Security Branch in Port Elizabeth.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: So, it's not an absolute statement that could have been from Cradock, it could have been from PE, so you're not sure where this information came from? I cannot say if everything came from PE or Cradock, but if you go to the VL10 or VL 11 system, a lot of information had to come from Cradock. I'm not disagreeing with you, what you're saying is that the information could have come from different sources?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is true.
MR BOOYENS: Then you said that Mr Goniwe, as you got to "know" him, was the father of the G plan, which was a revolutionary document. Revolutionary in the sense that it was directed towards revolutionary warfare which in that stage was fought by the revolutionaries, and revolutionary in the sense that that document was not an innocent document, it was a document with the potential to become a problem for the Security Forces.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: If we look further at the knowledge that you had about Goniwe, he was the father of the G plan, the revolutionary document. I assume that you also received information about his other activities that he was involved in, that he created a revolutionary climate, is that true?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: No, Mr Chairperson, the situation in which I found myself in the Security Forces was of such a nature, that I, as a student of revolutionary - who studies strategies and revolutions, I did not work at the same desk where the information where Goniwe was.
MR BOOYENS: So all you say to us is that he was the author of this document, is that true?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: Did this document fit into the broader strategy of Marxism, ANC Marxism, toppling of the Government at that stage?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Mr Chairperson, if I can just read it once again from this document is that Mr Oliver Tambo, on 8 January 1984 said the following,
"All revolutions are about State power, ours is no exception. The slogan "power to the people" means one thing, and one thing only, it means we seek to destroy the power of the Apartheid tyranny and replace it with popular power, with a Government whose authority derives from the will of all our people, both black and white. We do not fight to reform Apartheid, but to abolish it in its entirety."
MR BOOYENS: Now, this G plan document, did that fit in there?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Mr Chairperson it's now very difficult for me to say that it fitted in there 100% or 99%, but what I do know is that if you take the G plan and the so-called N plan, and you place it next to each other, the one is a blueprint, the one was originally written by Mandela, he was also the author of that, it was a revolutionary document, and the G plan was later regarding the Street Strategy set up by Matthew Goniwe.
MR BOOYENS: In other words Goniwe fine-tuned this document to make it more accessible for the rural areas?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: You can put it that way, yes.
MR BOOYENS: And you are an expert in this area, Mr van Jaarsveld, could you explain to the Commission why you say that the G plan was a revolutionary document?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Mr Chairperson, at this stage it would be difficult for me. In '88 I was actively involved then with these things, and I would like to rectify that, I am no expert in this area, I am only a student of it.
MR BOOYENS: I see, but even as a student who, which is more that what I can say, was things like the G plan and the implementation, was that essential to stop the revolution?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, definitely.
MR BOOYENS: And things like the G plan was that used to initiate the revolution?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I will not say that it was used to initiate the revolution, the revolution was already going, but to develop the structures and the mobilise the masses.
MR BOOYENS: I see. So, the revolution is there, the people wants to topple the Government, this is the vehicle - see, the G plan was about organisation of Street Committees?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: And that was a vehicle that was used to spread the flames of the revolution to the masses, that was a vehicle to mobilise the masses?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: And that is the vehicle that was used to, if I now talk about existing structures, I think you know what I'm talking about, but just for clarity sake, the existing structures of the State, whether first, second or third level Government, in order for it to be used to replace them?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is correct. In this instance we can think of some functions that the G plan could have replaced, that at third level Government the G plan was used to, for example, to replace the Black Local Council, can I just explain there, in January 1989 Makatini, I do not know exactly who that was, said that,
"we know we cannot win a conventional war which is what the racist regime wants, that we shall fight them in the kitchen, the factories and in the streets with surprise attacks."
So it gives you an overall or global picture.
MR BOOYENS: So he was involved in third level Government, second level Government regarding education, more that likely. Could you just repeat, we know that it was used in third level Government, was it also used in second level Government - then second level Government which included education, this G plan?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Mr Chairperson, yes. Revolutionary warfare at that stage was about winning the hearts and minds of people, and I can just quote the following,
"That a certain National African Congress competing for the hearts and minds in South Africa, it sees revolution not as a single eruptional catalytic event, but as a process of wide-ranging presence, above and below ground, at home and abroad. It aims at undermining and eventually overcoming minority racial domination. A pragmatic generality of this strategy throughout the generality of the ANC's aims masks disagreements and differing tendencies within the ANC."
MR BOOYENS: Yes, it goes about the global spectrum. The reason why I'm asking this question is, after what some of the applicants said here, it goes up to first level Government, because under the G plan strategy there's the situation where there's no-go areas where the Police could not go in, that certain Courts were created, that Policing with the targets that was target in the revolutionary system, that the Police could not reach these groups.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Well, Mr Chairperson, interesting to add to that is that the Police by names was at the front of the revolutionary strategy and it was on behalf of the Government, and it was a revolution that was created in '85.
MR BOOYENS: Are you now talking about Trevits?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Trevits was the monitoring strategy, but the Government had its own revolutionary strategy to win over the hearts and minds of the people. Whatever form of intimidation was used, counter-revolutionary movements was fought in the same way as revolutionary strategies.
MR BOOYENS: In other words, the Police was at the vanguard of the revolution? You were the foot-soldiers, you were Apartheid's foot-soldiers?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is very true.
MR BOOYENS: And you were the people who in corresponding with the revolution, you had to extinguish the fires on the grass root levels?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That is true.
MR BOOYENS: I'm very sorry, Mr van Jaarsveld, I will not be able to finish, but I just need clarity about JMS and the signal. The JMS, as I understand it, was basically the greater JMS meeting, it was a meeting that was held at which basically was attended by not only the Security Forces, but also the Municipalities, other Government structures, you specifically mentioned Education, and everybody was involved with that. Is that correct?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, that is correct.
MR BOOYENS: And we heard evidence in this case that at the whole JMS system, also at this stage, and I think it was at the State Security Council, there was a Committee that was appointed to consider and investigate the re-appointment of Mr Goniwe as teacher, and that happened in the same time frame as 7 June when the signal was sent. Now, there's also an affidavit which was submitted of an official of Education, who at the JMS meeting did not carry any knowledge of the signal. What I would like to know is, was there a type of, let us call it an inner-circle or a strategic group who considered decisions like this, and let us say this to each other, that this signal for Mr Goniwe that came from JMS. If I understand it correctly, it means the permanent removal from society, it means to kill him. Do you agree with me?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, the Government says that in it's own documents.
MR BOOYENS: It's an interesting answer, I will come back to that. We dealt with it now - so you agree with me that being permanently removed from society means that a person must be killed, is that correct?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: Now, an order or a request like this from a provincial JMS, I'm talking about the Eastern Cape JMS, would that type of decision or request come from the greater JMS where all the civilians sit, or would that come from where the Security people sit?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: It would be difficult if you talk about the Security core. This target could have been decided there, but it could have come from Trevits.
MR BOOYENS: Maybe you can help me, the signal was sent from the EP JMS, or doesn't that matter?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, it does matter.
MR BOOYENS: I mean you said it could have come from Trevits to identify the target, but we need clarity here.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Trevits, what I mean there, is that the Organ which I quoted earlier on, was established to monitor the counter-revolutionary movements of the Government.
If you go back to applicants who gave evidence before these Committees, for example In Johannesburg, you'll see they all made reference to Trevits. The order was then sent to the other organisations lower, so it would have been communicated to the JMS on local level, so it would not mean that it would have been identified on a local level only, Goniwe as target then, but it would also have been identified as a target at Trevits.
ADV POTGIETER: And who would have taken that decision?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I can't tell you who served on Trevits, unfortunately I don't know.
ADV POTGIETER: Well, let me put it to you as follows, did Trevits decide that Mr Goniwe was such a target that he had to be killed. What was the function of Trevits, how would they go about killing somebody?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I wish I could be of assistance to you, that is one of the major things which is still unclear to me. I don't know how or where Trevits communicated, whether it obtained permission somewhere, whether it worked through Ministers, whether it worked through the members, we don't know. Those who served on Trevits have not yet come forward.
MR BOOYENS: So those who know don't want to tell us, that is actually what you're trying to say?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I believe that that is the case.
MR BOOYENS: Earlier you made the statement "when I referred to the signal that the Government sent its own documents", like that, what exactly were you referring to.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I'll quote from that very same document, just allow me one moment to find it,
MR BOOYENS: Which documents are you referring to?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Pardon, the strategy of the ANC which was compiled by the Interpretation Branch.
Page 76, paragraph (f),
"Strict security actions, for example arrests, the elimination of terrorists, sourcing weapons and arms facilities with the ANC's armed onslaught."
MR BOOYENS: I know that they mentioned elimination there once again. I would just like to ask you something about that, what I had in mind was the permanent removal from society. I thought that you said they used that term in their documents.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: No, I meant elimination, killing.
MR BOOYENS: From your experience with the Information Division, and the State Security Council, this permanent removal from society how would that be interpreted there?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I think that what happened to Mr Goniwe and his friends was the exact interpretation thereof.
MR BOOYENS: In other words, it means only one thing, and that was killing. Regarding you, at least in that context, it would have meant one thing only, and that would be that people were going to be killed.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, that's correct.
MR BOOYENS: If one were to look at your earlier orders which you received from Craig Williamson, you've said that you had to determine whether or not it would be possible to take him out. Would that operation be operated from your side, or what was Williamson's intention, did you just have to do the recognisance and then orders would be issued to local Security Branches and so forth?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I can't tell you anything more than what he told me.
MR BOOYENS: So therefor you had to undertake a recognisance at that stage?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes.
MS PATEL: Mr Booyens, excuse me, Mr van Jaarsveld, did you have any other idea of anything that gave rise to this operation other than that which Mr Williamson told you?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I don't know of any other reason why the order was given, other than that which was made known to me. ADV POTGIETER: Do know whether Mr Williamson was in the Eastern Cape for a while?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I don't know, he travelled quite a lot, so I don't know where he would have been at any given time in the country or in the world for that matter.
MS PATEL: Just one more question, Mr van Jaarsveld, was it an unusual thing to you that an order was given from somewhere in the upper levels for Goniwe to be taken out, surely there would have been members of the Security Branch locally who would have been more than competent to deal with something like this. Wasn't it unusual that someone came from Pretoria?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: There was a lot of close co-operation between the Head of Office and the Branches of the Security Forces. Often co-operation took place, people would travel from Head Quarters to come and assist with certain exercises.
MR BOOYENS: Reference was also made to one of the Sub-Committees of the JMS, I think it was the Security Committee.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That's correct.
MR BOOYENS: On that Committee, as I understand, only those from Intelligence served?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That's correct.
MR BOOYENS: Could such a suggestion, let us suppose, that on the general JMS, please pardon my phraseology, as long as we understand each other, on the general JMS where the civilians also sat, a lot of complains were heard about Mr Goniwe who was a problem in the area. Could it have been that there was a suggestion that he should be murdered, for example from the Committee?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: As I've said previously, the communicative activities of the National Management Structure was so complex and I would keep you busy for quite a time if I had to explain every little aspect of it, but it was so complex that things would be initiated on a local and a national level. Where this specific order was initiated, I wouldn't be able to tell you.
MR BOOYENS: I was actually referring to the signal. It would appear that the signal was initiated in the Eastern Cape. If one just studies the use of words, it came from the EP JMS and it was a request or a proposal, there's a proposal on page 102, paragraph 3, therefor it would appear that the proposal came from the Eastern Cape.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: If you read it that way, then it does appear so.
MR BOOYENS: This proposal, could it for example have come from the Security Committee? You won't find this proposal in a JMS minutes.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: No, you wouldn't.
MR BOOYENS: Would you then go to the SSC where this decision was approved, would that be in the minutes of meetings held there? I have never seen anything which came close to something like this, because it it's an order for murder. It wouldn't appear in the minutes.
ADV POTGIETER: Why would the proposal then be in the minutes?
MR BOOYENS: I don't know whether or not the proposal was recorded in the minutes.
ADV POTGIETER: Page 101 and 102.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Well that was the signal, but I think Advocate Booyens is referring to the minutes of meetings and that the signal is not recorded in the minutes of those meetings.
ADV POTGIETER: Well what about the reaction to it, the reaction to the signal.
MR BOOYENS: It's a written signal.
ADV POTGIETER: Surely the reaction to the signal could be placed in writing.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: This is the type of order which would not very easily be found on paper. I don't know what the actual nature of nature of the signal was, whether it's ever been tested before, but a signal such as this would be sent under very confidential circumstances to Pretoria, I can assure you of that.
ADV POTGIETER: Yes, I understand the logistics behind it, but what about the effect, the signal was sent and whether or not there was approval for it, there should be no reason why there shouldn't be a response.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Well, perhaps the response, the approval hasn't made its appearance yet.
ADV POTGIETER: Well there is no suggestion in the pieces before this Committee that there was a reaction to the signal and I'm asking you in principle.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: In principle if one studies the signal, and it's very clear in paragraph 3 that it's a proposal, it is my opinion that if the proposal be put over into an order, had to have been communicated back by means of a signal or a telephonic message. A lot of such equipment is still in use in our country, and it was used back then.
ADV POTGIETER: So it might have been a telephone call?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Yes, any form of communication back to say "go ahead".
ADV POTGIETER: It is quite strange that the signal took on this form and not in the form of, say, a telephone call, because this is a proposal. Is it something that is fed into the system?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: I find it quite strange as well that back then they would have placed a proposal of this nature on paper and sent it as a signal. A lot of mistakes were made, not everybody worked that wonderfully.
ADV POTGIETER: We've heard about that before, thank you.
MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) and if need be we will refer to the judgement in the evidence, that it was common cause that this signal was sent from Port Elizabeth as a signal on very high grade of ...(indistinct), and the - what was left in Port Elizabeth was a duplicate original with carbon copy, or some other form. It's the duplicate original that was found in Port Elizabeth, and not the original in Pretoria. I though that I would clarify that because of the query by the - but it was accepted by counsel for the Army, counsel for the Police, us of course, and by the Court eventually, that it was a genuine document.
MR BOOYENS: I'm indebted to my learned friend for that bit of evidence, My Lord.
Mr van Jaarsveld, to return, you said earlier when Commissioner Potgieter asked you that very sophisticated telephonic equipment was used, I've heard about certain things being scrabbled, that is an Americanism, but that the call was scrabbled, so if you were to pick up the call, you wouldn't be able to understand what was being said.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: That's correct.
MR BOOYENS: And you would have expected that normally a request such as this, and a response to it, would be scrabbled on a telephone line, that there wouldn't be a paper record of it?
MR VAN JAARSVELD: If those involved applied personal security, it wouldn't have been on paper, but as I've said, a lot of mistakes were made.
MR BOOYENS: Yes, but for the same reason one could expect then that those in Pretoria wouldn't have made the same mistake, and would probably rather have communicated their response to this verbally, and not have placed it on paper.
MR VAN JAARSVELD: Well, we can continue speculating about this, however, the possibility did exist, yes.
MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I do not want to inconvenience the witness unnecessarily, but I have heard of Trevits here and so on, as well as certain other documents, and in order to enable me to really try and make sense of this whole, which is an important issue in this matter, unfortunately I find myself in the position, I undertake to the witness that I will treat the documentation he has got with him, which are obviously confidential, I will treat that with the necessary respect, but I would like to have a look at that this afternoon and tonight, if at all possible. So, unfortunately I am not in a position to finish my cross-examination. I'm extremely sorry if I inconvenience Mr van Jaarsveld, but there's nothing I can do about that.
MR BIZOS: It's not an unreasonable request, and I do not oppose it, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: I would like Mr van Zyl to be in attendance tomorrow morning, I don't know if he can or can't.
MR BOOYENS: I will try to get hold of him, Mr Chairman. He was excused on the previous occasion, I don't know whether he's in the country at the moment. As far as I know he's, as you're probably aware, I don't know if he gave the evidence here, he's involved in lifting land-mines outside the country at the company he's employed at. I don't know - I will find out, I will see what I can do, Mr Chairman.
HEARING ADJOURNS
