ADV DE JAGER: Can we have your full names please?
GERRIT NICHOLAS ERASMUS: (sworn states)
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I've just discovered and I'm taken a bit by surprise by the events but I'll do as best I can. Perhaps if you will allow me when we return before cross-examination, just to make certain that I'm going to cover or I would have covered everything that I need to cover in the evidence in chief.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.
MR VISSER: I wasn't mentally precisely ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, if you lead the witness in chief now and when he is recalled for cross-examination if there is anything that you realise that you should have led in chief we will give you the opportunity before cross-examination to, if required, conclude the examination in chief.
MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, this is similarly an application for amnesty for any illegal or unlawful act or omission committed by this applicant in regard to the death and the disposal of the body of Stanza Bopape and events which followed. His application you will find in Volume 1 at page 128 and following.
Mr Chairman, as far as page 130 of this application is concerned, paragraph 7(a) and (b) you will note that we have the same situation as we had with General van der Merwe, however in the case of General Erasmus the amendments had already been granted in the case of the application for amnesty in regard to the death of Mr Kondile, the result is that - if you will just make a note of that Mr Chairman, that application has already been granted to read in 7(a) National Party:
"Nasionale Party"
and (b):
"ondersteuner".
Mr Chairman, ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, that application form in the other matter, was it the same form?
MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: The actual same form, yes.
MR VISSER: Indeed that is so, but because we don't have the luxury of Court proceedings here it wasn't, there was no way practically in which the amendment could be effected in all the applications and that is why I mention that Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Then paragraph 7(a) of the application form which appears at page 130, I take it there's not objection, with then be noted that it's been amended to read
"Nationale Party"
and the section 7(b) to read: "ondersteuner" instead of: "nie van toepassing nie"
MR VISSER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, another matter which I wish to mention at this point is that General Erasmus was also an applicant in the incident of Mr Kondile's death and in the death of Madaka and Mtimkhulu and he gave evidence there. The reason why I mention this Mr Chairman, is that I propose not to repeat all the evidence which he had given before but I realise that not all of the Committee Members presently in this particular application now serving before you were involved in those applications or have knowledge of that evidence.
For as far as I do go briefer about general matters as far General Erasmus is concerned, in the event of you later finding that you may require clarity about anything at all due to the fact that I'm not going to lead all that evidence again, you can find that evidence in the Mtimkhulu and in the Kondile cases Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.
MR VISSER: General Erasmus, you on the 3rd of January 1957 became a member of the South African Police Force, is that correct? I just want to read it. If there is anything that is wrong then you have to stop me. In 1957 you receive training at the Police College in Pretoria and you were transferred to head office Pretoria at the accounts department, is that correct? No, you don't have to answer.
In 1958 you completed a detective course successfully and you were transferred to Marshall Square in Johannesburg where you served on several personnel in connection with investigations. You then applied for a transfer to Cape Town and in January 1959 you were transferred to Caledon Square in Cape Town where you did your internship as a detective.
In 1960 you completed a promotion examination and in 1960 during December you became the Branch Commander at Umzimkhulu in East Griqualand and you were promoted to the rand of Sergeant.
The first half of 1961, on instruction from the District Commander of Bizana to help out with several investigations in connection with the unrest and at that stage there was a proclaimed State of Emergency in that area because of attacks on traditional leaders, meaning Captains and Chiefs.
From the beginning of 1962 you went to Ngobo as Branch Commander and in the same year you were transferred to Rosebank Johannesburg's Detective Branch. Is it then also correct that from 1963 you were associated to the Security Branch at The Greys and you were in service there in the Investigation Unit because of your detective background?
Is it correct that during this time, from 1963, you were involved or had interest in certain, let us say, investigations, you were connected with the Rivonia hearings that became known as the Harris Bomb or Park Station Bomb and the African People's Democratic Union of South Africa which was also investigated at that stage?
You were promoted to the rank of Lieutenant during December 1965 and from 1966 you were a Liaison Office between the uniformed branch units of the head Security Branch and you also participated in the search for terrorists and the investigation of the activities of agitators and these duties were of a short period, to approximately 1968.
The following point, at the end of 1971 you went to Rundu in South West Africa as Branch Commander, where you did security work and you left there in January 1977 when you were transferred to Pietermartizburg as second in command of the Security Branch there.
In 1977 you were promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and in December 1979 to December 1983 you were at Port Elizabeth where you replaced Colonel Dreyer as Commander and you were promoted to the rank of Colonel.
In January 1984 you were transferred to Johannesburg as Divisional Commander at the Security Branch of the Witwatersrand and you were promoted in that year to the rank of Brigadier.
From the 12th of January 1984 until approximately December 1988 you were the Divisional Commander of the Security Branch of the Witwatersrand.
At the end of 1988 until May 1989 you served as Commander of the Security Branch Intelligence Unit and from May 1989 you were appointed as the Divisional Commissioner of the Witwatersrand and in 1990 to 1992 you were the Regional Commissioner and you were promoted to General Major and with that rank on 30 November 1992 you retired from the service of the South African Police, do I have that correct?
GEN ERASMUS: That's correct. On point 2.12 on page 2 it’s just like to say that the Liaison Officer duties there was in South West Africa and in Pietermaritzburg I also trained Dreyer as Divisional Commander. Otherwise I confirm everything as it's been read.
MR VISSER: Give us a brief description of your personal background please General.
GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I was born Fraserburg on the 28th of August 1936. Like most Afrikaans people I grew up in a conservative household, member of the NG Church when I started getting knowledge. My parents were also supporters of the then National Party.
MR VISSER: Can I just interrupt you, you listened to the evidence of General van der Merwe and you already said that like most South Africans you grew up in the same milieu as them.
He gave evidence that he was under the impression, considering that his parents were supporters of the National Party, that most of the influences on him made him, there were very few influences that made him think that the policy was wrong. He did not have influences from politicians or the church or people he considered important, for example his teachers.
He didn't hear from any of these that the police of the National Party was wrong and most people whom he came into contact with supported the police and believed in the policy of the government. Does the situation agree with yours?
GEN ERASMUS: That's definitely so Chairperson.
JUDGE NGCOBO: Do you have a written statement by any chance?
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, no, the events have overtaken me slightly, we don't unfortunately. I may say, what I have in front of me are the consultation notes with the witness of which he's got a copy and that is why he referred to paragraph number but unfortunately we haven't got a statement.
General, please continue at paragraph 3.7 which you have in front of you.
GEN ERASMUS: In later years I experienced everything concerning the National Party police and I realised it was the case and a lot of people had different opinions about this. Right up until the change in the government of this country I experienced that a lot of authoritative opinions and statements were made abroad in sympathy to the support of the previous government's policy.
MR VISSER: It was those years, we know things have drastically changed in the meantime, let's leave it there. Please tell the Committee something about your own experiences and what you've seen as a policeman.
GEN ERASMUS: I'm a member of the SA Police Force and in the execution of my duties as well as the other members of the South African Police, we did not have any reason, we had to support the State and we no reason to criticise their policy.
The sayings and statements of nation leaders and also politicians in the public as well as the supporters of the apartheid regime who wanted the support from the police in order to fight terrorism and unrest and this contributed to my support of the National Government's policy ...[intervention]
MR VISSER: Can I just interrupt you, are you saying that while you were in the police your idea or comprehension was that it was the National Party's policy to join the struggle against what was then considered the enemy of the State?
GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, yes, within all my power. During the struggle of the past where a lot of people died or were injured and a lot of damage was done to property because of the behaviour of radicals who attacked the apartheid regime, it had an effect on all policemen and it motivated them to support the policy even more, even if it was indirectly so by exercising his duties and performing his duties in order to maintain law and order in this country and to maintain internal security. We as policemen felt that we were the only defence line against total chaos and anarchy.
In my official capacity I had access to publications of radical organisations, for example the ANC, PAC and many others and the aggression and the encouragement of violence which was seen in these publications enforced us in our goal to fight the revolutionary onslaught within all our power.
When the ANC and SACP Alliance tried to overthrow the government and they did not hesitate to kill harmless and innocent people as well as to maim them, this caused me and other members of the Security Police and the majority of the members of the South African Police more resolute to fight the onslaught.
Except for that, several practical experiences of political violence which I experienced touched me in such a sense that I did everything within my power to fight against the revolutionary onslaught.
In the beginning of 1960 there was a great march of black people to Caledon Square in Cape Town, around 30 000 people partook in this march which was led by Philip Khosana. After this march dispersed there was plundering of businesses and then the tragic events in Langa where a lot of people were injured. Because of these events, the ANC was banned by the National Government.
During 1961 I had a case in Flagstaff High School, I investigated a case concerning the damaging of the school building, for example windows and doors were broken and even at this stage it was almost impossible to obtain witnesses to testify against suspects because of intimidation on a big scale. Here I can just add that from my experience also in Port Elizabeth, small boys and young boys chased high school boys out of classrooms, just to show you how intimidation worked amongst the people, I'm not an expert but his happened.
During 1963/64 there were several cases of sabotage, for example power lines, railway lines, sub-stations, in which case I had to protect several of these institutions. A lot of sabotage was committed.
On the 24th of July 1964 after several members of the African Resistance Movement were detained and questioned, a bomb exploded on Jo'burg station and it placed underneath the seats of passengers. I remember this bomb was around 16H34, it exploded yes, 16H40 but I think it was 16H33 which was the busiest time on this platform and 23 people were injured and they had to be taken to hospital after which a woman of 77 years old died.
Several of the victims had permanent psychological scars from this and this incident left a very definite impression on me, to have seen all the blood and to have looked for clues amongst all the rubble and blood and bits of people. You must have read in the papers recently about the young girl who is now a grown woman, two years ago I still saw photos of her in magazines and she still has a scarred face.
After 1080 and specifically in the middle and the end of the '80's, sabotage moved onto terrorism ...[intervention]
MR VISSER: We understand what you are telling us concerning your experiences as a policeman and also of your personal experiences. What was the reaction of the government of the day to this onslaught?
GEN ERASMUS: The reaction of the government was that these acts of terror and attacks and chaos had to be stopped.
MR VISSER: General, I do not want to repeat this but General van der Merwe gave evidence about exactly how the political objectives of the ANC and the ANC/SACP Alliance look and how they developed. He also told the Committee, he gave them a quote which was summarises how the struggle was taken up by the ANC. He quoted from: Forward to People's Power - The Challenge Ahead and General van der Merwe also explained, which is anyway common knowledge - I don't think there's a question about that, the four phases or pillars on which the revolution was founded and on which these revolutions developed. Did you agree with what van der Merwe said about that, because you've told me basically the same things?
GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I agree with it wholeheartedly.
MR VISSER: You also told me that as far as your own experience is concerned, it was a possible weapon in the hands of the liberals, of the freedom fighters or freedom organisations and this weapon was to use emotional issues, to grab them literally and then to incite the masses and that was one of the pillars of the organisation in order to create massive unrest. Now we're talking about issues such as social problems, crime, detention, housing, detention of political perpetrators and specifically the death of people in detention, of political prisoners, economic issues etc., anything that lay closely to the heart of the people, the people they focused on and that was of course the black people within this country, do you agree with that?
GEN ERASMUS: Yes, I agree with that Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Now the whole idea was then to make people dissatisfied and so many people as possible, and specifically we're talking about the black masses, to make them dissatisfied under the banner mobilisation of the masses and to create a culture of dissatisfaction with the government and the willingness to take up the weapon, is that how you understood it?
GEN ERASMUS: That is how I understood it and I experienced it in such a manner as well.
MR VISSER: We also know for a fact that part of the onslaught was the application of foreign pressure as well as economic sanctions and other kinds of pressure and also making the government look suspicious in the eyes of the foreigners, and let's say they did it with a great amount of success and the role that his played, specifically now the sanctions, was to deteriorate situations within South Africa which was then once again used to incite the masses and to make them feel dissatisfied. Would you say that is a correct summary of your evidence in this case?
GEN ERASMUS: That is true Chairperson.
MR VISSER: The document in front of you, paragraph 5.8, I wonder if you could just tell the Committee what is written there?
GEN ERASMUS
"One of the Security Branch's duties was, in terms of the police law, was to maintain internal security and it should immediately be realised that the multi-dimensional attacks against the government as is explained above, all had an effect on the internal stability and security and consequently the members of the Security Branch were forced to act with that. Specifically the issues that I've referred to which had an effect that the government of the day would be placed in embarrassment and this led to great pressure being put on the Security Branch by the politicians and the Security Branch had to solve all the problems. In this case it is necessary to give comment about the acceptance of certain people within the Security Branch, that standard practices of torture and brutality were used. So it must be logic that the use of these practices would have been contra-productive. Not only was it the experience of experienced policemen ..."
END OF TAPE, POSSIBLE WORDS LOST
"...things which could lead to criticism on the government. Because of this reason all existing order in accordance with interrogation and torture was strengthened. I do would not want to say that this did not happen, the torturing and assaults on detainees but it seems, I wish to put it categorically that it was not the general practice and it was not condoned"
...[intervention]
MR VISSER: Can I interrupt you there? Can we cut short a long relation with reference to the testimony of General van der Merwe in this whole question of the application of violence. With questioning, is there something that General van der Merwe said that according to you was wrong or do you agree with what he had said in this sense?
GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson, I agree with what he had said in this regard.
MR VISSER: Concerning the pressure from above, if I may call it that, the knowledge or involvement of politicians, can we accept immediately that you were not in the position that General van der Merwe was as the Chief of Security, to work as closely with the Minister for example and possibly higher up, you were not in that position? In your case and persons of the same rank and downwards who did not have the advantage of that personal contact, you already had said that it was your impression that the politicians had to know about what was happening during the struggle, do I have that correct?
GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Since you don't have the personal experience and direct testimony as General van der Merwe had, what do you base your impression on that the politicians had to be aware of what was happening although it is being denied now?
GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson, the expressions made by the politicians gave the impression to all the members that this struggle had to be fought with everything that was available. If you make such a speech then you must be expected to, it must be expected that they would be acted in accordance to what was said and I'm convinced that the politicians of the past, although they were not directly informed, that they should have understood that the statements that they made and that they expected from the security forces, that it would go in a certain direction.
MR VISSER: If you can refer to 5.19 and continue from there.
GEN ERASMUS
"In my opinion it was necessary that pressure would come from politicians because this was a political incident and the politicians wanted to solve this problem at all costs, it doesn't matter what means were used, legal or illegal, as long as there was no problem for them. You just have to remind yourself of the rhetoric of the politicians of that day, openly there was spoken in the media of the elimination of terrorism and the common policemen including myself could only interpret this as the killing of such terrorists. In my opinion the politicians should have been aware that people beneath them or under their command who had watched the press and TV would say that we would eliminate the terrorists etc. ..."
...[intervention]
MR VISSER: If I could interrupt you again, if you refer to the well-known incident where the past State President, Mr P W Botha, used words to the effect - Mr Chairperson, I can remember the video recording at some stage was shown to the original Amnesty Committee but I don't know if that video recording is still available, I don't know if it was handed in. Maybe Commissioner de Jager could tell me.
ADV DE JAGER: I don't think it was handed in, I think Mr du Plessis showed it but I don't think it was handed in. I don't have any notes of this.
MR VISSER: We will attempt to find this video tape or similar tapes but I don't think there will be any argument.
General, the whole situation in South Africa developed into a war situation, the security forces had said so, the ANC said the same and the PAC said the same, there were no disputes in that sense, so much so that our whole security machinery was established and was maintained starting with the State President, the Cabinet, certain Ministers of certain departments, State Security Council and all the structures under the State Security Council, everything to oppose the war or the onslaught.
All those structures were put into place to oppose the total onslaught as they put it and yourself and others in your position in the South African police were convinced of the correctness and the necessity thereof?
GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And in so far as today we have a shortage of time. We (...indistinct) critically and in short you completely testified in the amnesty application of Mr (indistinct) and Madaka and Mtimkhulu (...indistinct) and if the Committee would want to know anything from your complete opinion, your political motivation and we can then refer to those records that is available to the amnesty Committee.
GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Let's get to the question of the incident that you are applying for amnesty now. The death and the incidents surrounding the death and the consequences with reference to Mr Bopape. Can you just tell the Committee what your involvement and connection was and what you did and said, etc?
GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson my participation in the incident from Bopape incident and what followed thereafter must be seen in the light of what I have already said in connection with my education, the influences, the political struggle that there was and the pressure that we all felt as members of the security branch to oppose anarchy and chaos. Stanza Bopape was in detention at John Vorster Square in accordance with Section 29 of Internal Security. I just have to add here that what lead up to the fact that Mr Bopape came to John Vorster Square. I received a call from the divisional commander of the West Rand. I think it was on the Friday the 10th. He asked for assistance with the questioning of Bopape.
MR VISSER: Can I just interrupt you. Two things. You can just talk a little bit slower and the other the name of the commander was that Le Roux?
GEN ERASMUS: That is so. It was Colonel Le Roux. Then I asked Captain van Niekerk if they could help and I told him that if he could be of assistance Le Roux told me to contact a certain Kleynhans. From there onwards this whole story of Mr van Niekerk (...indistinct) of what happened there.
MR VISSER: And according to your knowledge do you broadly agree with what Mr van Niekerk told the Committee?
GEN ERASMUS: I agree with that.
MR VISSER: Continue please.
GEN ERASMUS: On Sunday the 12th of June At van Niekerk phones me at home. It was in the afternoon it was after lunch. I am not sure whether it was one 'o clock or after one 'o clock but it is in that vicinity of time. And he asked me if he could come and see me with regards to a problem that came about and I agreed to that. He came to my house and he told me that Mr Mostert, Engelbrecht that specific morning questioned Bopape. They had some information which came from the division of (...indistinct) the security branch there and which indicated that Bopape was a trained ANC terrorist. And he was probably involved in acts of terror in Pretoria, the Rand and the Vaal Triangle. The Vaal Triangle includes Vereeniging, Krugersdorp, etc. And he was a member of the Maponga group.
MR VISSER: M-a-p-o-n-g-a?
GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairperson. That he probably had information concerning future acts of terror. That he refused during the questioning to give them any information. And that then between Van Niekerk, Mostert, Engelbrecht and Zeelie decided amongst them that coercion was to be placed on him or applied to him. Because of the importance of the information he apparently had. He also told me that Bopape suddenly and surprisingly during the questioning died and apparently because of a heart attack. He also informed me that the use of the telephone shock device when they practised the coercion on him. And he also told me that (...indistinct) because of the sensitivity of deaths within detention just before the Soweto Day and the general explosive situation in the area in general did not contact the District Surgeon and did not inform him about this death. He and the other members discussed the issue in depth and decided that it could not be possible to go ahead with the normal legal process or when a detainee died in detention. As I already said they applied shocks to Bopape. At that stage I did not ask him how.
MR VISSER: Can I just interrupt you. General the Sunday afternoon you sitting at home and here van Niekerk appears with this news. What was your reaction?
GEN ERASMUS: My reaction was firstly one of shock and surprise to hear that a person died after these shocks and that they applied these shocks.
MR VISSER: Did you express your satisfaction to them?
GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson I immediately told van Niekerk that they have placed us in an unbearable situation.
MR VISSER: And then you asked him if there were marks on the body?
GEN ERASMUS: Yes. I asked van Niekerk if the man was assaulted and if there were marks on his body. But he told me that on the wrists there were marks, rubbing marks. My conclusion was that it must have been handcuff marks. And then I heard they made use of some elastic. There were no other marks indicating assault.
MR VISSER: General van der Merwe was asked in cross-questioning with regards to the fact that why did he not go and make sure that this man's arms and legs weren't broken or something to that effect. And now you are hearing the bad news from van Niekerk and you asking him if there were marks on his body. Did it occur to you and would it have made any difference to have gone and investigated this yourself and maybe to see if the situation was different? How did you see the situation at that stage?
GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson if I think back 10 years now. Here I am, I am sitting here in a difficult situation. A Section 29 detainee has died and here now I receive the news. The facts in front of me says that this person has already been dead for a few hours or even longer. So time became an important factor. At that stage I could not decide and tell these guys look do this or that. I asked him about the normal procedures and it was already said that we should consider the normal procedures so time was a real factor because we had to decide between two options. So I didn't even think about going to John Vorster Square and look at the actual situation. And also I believed van Niekerk's story because he always did trustworthy work for me.
MR VISSER: And certainly there would have not been any point for him to lie about this because you could always have gone to investigate if you wanted to.
GEN ERASMUS: Yes that is correct. At a later stage I could have any ways have gone there to see what was the actual situation.
MR VISSER: Please continue with 6.7
GEN ERASMUS: I would like to put this nature of any coercion that was applied by the members would not have made any difference to the dilemma with which I then sat. I accepted that the death of the detainee was a result of a desperate attempt in order to obtain information and to make sure we prevent the attempts of the ANC and the SACP Alliance against the government. What was relevant was that I had a body on hands and in this case the normal legal procedures were not followed by me. And I am saying now the District Surgeon were not contacted, the detective branch was not contacted. The death of Bopape happened at a really unlucky time. It was a few days before Soweto Day and the people were already excited, the masses were already excited at that stage. They would have exploited this situation completely in order to incite the masses further and the government would have been placed in a major embarrassment. At this stage the political situation in the country was very unstable and very explosive. And where the member was a prominent activist the facts and the circumstances of his death would have lead to further wide-spread unrest. Because of the existence of these facts it was my consideration that there was nothing else that we could do and other questions concerning the death of Bopape was not the biggest priority. I already realised that this situation had very far-reaching political implications and therefore I decided not to take a decision on my own. Consequently I left my problem in the hands of the Chief of Security Forces, General van der Merwe. I phoned him and I then went there. I told General van der Merwe what van Niekerk told me that Bopape suddenly and unexpectedly died presumably because of a heart attack. And my attention was focused rather on the solution as the problem than the causes thereof. We took the whole political situation into consideration and we discussed Soweto Day and also the fears which would be created by Bopape's death. Me and General van der Merwe came to the conclusion that there was only one solution and that was to dispose of the body of Bopape. To make it disappear. And the way we decided how to do it was to do it by means of creating a mock escape.
MR VISSER: Can you just give me a second? Mr Chairman I notice that it is three minutes to four. I haven't made enquiries from my learned friends what their situation is this afternoon. I am just wondering whether we could possibly go a little beyond four 'o clock today. I don't know whether it might be convenient or inconvenient for you.
CHAIRPERSON: I don't think it will. Will it inconvenience any panel member. No I think it would probably be preferable if we could finish General Erasmus' evidence in chief today.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman I may give you the news that we are not far away.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: General you say that your priority was how do I solve this problem. Not what was the reason for this problem. Because you said you confronted with the fact and it is a particular circumstance because of all the other factors you have just referred to.
GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE: Could I ask General. This was still your priority despite your recent history in the Kondile incident. Despite experiences like that you still felt that you would rather focus on the solution to the problem rather than the causes of it. Can you just explain that to me? Particularly because of your experience in these types of matters and your participation in these types of matters?
GEN ERASMUS: I sat there with a fact where we already had a body Chairperson. And I focused and I kept my attention fixed on a solution to this problem.
ADV GCABASHE: I understand that. But I am saying taking into consideration where you were from and where you were at this particular point in time regarding detainees and what happened to detainees you still feel that the major consideration here wasn't to try and find out why your junior officers had acted in this manner? Why they had tortured with a device they knew they weren't supposed to use? You decided you had better get rid of this body as quickly as possible rather than go through your normal legal procedures?
GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson I did not say that I wanted to dispose of the body as quickly as possible. I said that I had to solve this problem in whichever direction. And when I went to General van der Merwe I was not convinced about what his answer would be. I didn't know how he would react. In other words whatever I was involved in, in the past I already gave evidence about that, the circumstances were not the same at all as it was. And now I had to try to send a deafened fact into some or other direction.
MR VISSER: So what you are saying in answer to the panel member's reaction, you did not take this decision. You went and you had van der Merwe make the decision?
GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson I already gave evidence that I decided not to take the decision on my own. And at that stage when I realised that, I did not know what the reaction of van der Merwe would be.
MR VISSER: So it is a Sunday afternoon that you phoned General van der Merwe and you ask him if you can come and see him. And the Sunday afternoon you arrived there it must be around three, four 'o clock? Is that true? It is a Sunday afternoon it must have been around three 'o clock or maybe later and you told van der Merwe about your predicament you found yourself in and you had the discussion. And then did you tell him what was your point of view concerning this matter?
GEN ERASMUS: I told him according to the discussion I had with van Niekerk that it would be very difficult to follow the normal legal procedures and at that stage four or more hours already went by and then to continue process and an inquest etcetera these things could have been determined very easily the fact that he died only a few hours before.
MR VISSER: And it would be very difficult to explain, not true?
GEN ERASMUS: Yes I don't think it would have been explicable.
MR VISSER: How did Eastern Transvaal come into the picture?
GEN ERASMUS: After we thought about the mock escape and both of us realised that the Witwatersrand was very highly populated we had to think about an area where there weren't that many people or not so populated. And which was also close to other borders. Now Eastern Transvaal in this instance would have been the ideal place for the body to disappear.
MR VISSER: Did you know Brigadier Visser?
GEN ERASMUS: I have known Brigadier Visser for a very long time.
MR VISSER: How did you feel about him?
GEN ERASMUS: My feelings about Brigadier Visser was that we were friends and that I could trust him. Chairperson my feelings concerning Brigadier Visser was that except for the fact that we have known each other for such a long time and we were such good friends and we worked together often and also played rugby together I also felt that I could talk to him. And ask him what his reaction would be. What his reaction would be at that stage I didn't yet know.
MR VISSER: Did you agree with General van der Merwe that it was a good choice that Schalk Visser be involved in here in spite of the need-to-know policy?
GEN ERASMUS: There was no other choice.
MR VISSER: You had your discussion that today say was ten years ago you don't remember everything but broadly this is what you discussed and decided and you leave General van der Merwe's house and you go back to Johannesburg and you called someone.
GEN ERASMUS: ... I told him I had a problem. The exact words I could not remember but I did not say anything over the phone that could come back to me later. (...indistinct) I have got a problem concerning a detainee can he be of assistance. He told me yes he would be of assistance. But he didn't know what he was helping me with. And then I told him that when I get to Captain At van Niekerk I will tell him to later meet with Brigadier Visser to make the necessary arrangements to meet somewhere.
MR VISSER: Did you call any one else before you got to John Vorster?
GEN ERASMUS: I also called my second in command, now General du Toit and asked him to meet me at the office. I think we arrived about six 'o clock at the office.
MR VISSER: Was there now a meeting between you and General du Toit and some of the members?
GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairperson. It was I, General du Toit and van Niekerk and Zeelie.
MR VISSER: And what was the discussion to the best of your memory of that meeting?
GEN ERASMUS: I told (...indistinct) van Niekerk that I visited General van Niekerk and that we decided that there should be a mock escape and that the disposal of the corpse had to take place in the Eastern Transvaal and I have already called Brigadier Visser in that connection and van Niekerk had two contacts with him later to establish a time and place for a meeting.
MR VISSER: What was the discussion concerning the question of the escape?
GEN ERASMUS: As far as my mind went this mock escape I left this to Colonel van Niekerk and his members. I did not prescribe anything to that effect.
MR VISSER: The end of your involvement for this particular day of the 12th of June that later that evening you were contacted by somebody I think it was the service officer by telephone and it was told to you that Mr Bopape had escaped.
GEN ERASMUS: But I could just add here is that I know that myself and Captain van Niekerk stayed in the office and Colonel du Toit then went to have a look at the body. And afterwards myself and Colonel du Toit left and I went home. And during the night, I think it was after twelve that night the night of the 12th, the morning of the 13th I was informed by an officer that the operation was concluded and that Bopape has escaped.
MR VISSER: Was there a discussion between yourself and du Toit after he had a look at Bopape's body?
GEN ERASMUS: If I recall correctly he told me that he does not see anything extraordinary on the body.
MR VISSER: As he would testify himself to that fact. But after the 12th of June after you received the instruction. It was then important to maintain the smoke screen concerning this escape?
GEN ERASMUS: Yes we had to maintain it continuously.
MR VISSER: And your actions were they in writing or verbally or was to maintain the smoke screen. Is that correct?
GEN ERASMUS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: In volume 3 on page 675 it is written dated 19 August 1988. Page 675 a letter dated August 1988 to Lieutenant General van der Merwe where the author of this letter H Merckling. I hope I pronounced that correctly. And in paragraph 2 he says
" Subsequent to your letter we consulted with Brigadier Erasmus and Colonel du Toit at John Vorster Square, Johannesburg on 21 July 1988 and asked certain questions concerning the circumstances of Mr Bopape's alleged escape."
Can you recall such a meeting General?
GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson I can recall that a lady attorney, I cannot remember her name and the deceased's father visited us.
MR VISSER: I do not know all the facts there but I am not sure. In paragraph 2
"The purpose of these questions was to seek information in order to enable our client's family to pursue their own investigation into his disappearance."
And I would just like to tell you the following sentence for your comment:
" We were informed by Brigadier Erasmus and Colonel du Toit that they were only prepared to consider answering questions submitted to police head quarters in writing."
And then the author continues and he puts 17 questions there. I would like to ask you the following question. Do you agree with the allegation that during a discussion with representatives of Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom in the company of Mr Bopape's father you refused to answer any question unless it was not in writing and addressed to head quarters?
GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson I cannot remember and I don't see the logic in it. If I would have said that the person escaped and I don't know why I would refer them back to head office and the writing and all those things.
MR VISSER: So what you say there what you had that here you had an opportunity to propagate this mock escape? And if I understand correctly you would have grabbed this opportunity to do such?
GEN ERASMUS: That is so. We sat and spoke for a long time with these people and I cannot think that I would have referred them back to head office.
CHAIRPERSON: Can you think General of any reason why they should write a letter to General van der Merwe with a copy specifically addressed to yourself and say this if it didn't happen?
GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson I find it strange. I cannot remember the events clearly. I did not mark anything that day. The people came to see me that day and they sat there, Colonel du Toit was there. We spoke about the incident. The father, I remember the father clearly. He was upset because of this escape and because of where his son was and I had the impression they did not believe what we told them. That the man escaped. That is the impression that I had but I cannot recall. I am honest when I tell you it is possible that I could have made such a remark but I do not remember it.
MR VISSER: Is it also not possible that, just to indicate a possibility. Is it not possible that you told them at the end or during this discussion if they needed further information that they had to contact with head quarters?
GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson that is possible but I do not recall it as such.
MR VISSER: In any case I do not want to ponder this too much but if we look at the questions it is difficult for me to find any question that you could not respond on if you did.
GEN ERASMUS: That is correct. I don't think there was anything that I could not answer to and at the end of the day they received those answers the same from head quarters.
ADV DE JAGER: You say that you had the impression that they did not believe what you told them. Is it then not possible that you said: "Put it on writing and I would give it back to you in writing if you do not believe me"?
GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson it is possible. I said I had the impression that the father was upset. It was a long time since this mock escape and I just drew that inference and it was possible that they did not believe what we were telling him that his son did escape.
JUDGE NGCOBO: In view of the fact that attorneys were now making enquiries of and concerning this disappearance would it not have been a proper procedure that you refer the matter to head office for them to answer any questions pertaining to the disappearance?
GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson yes one could draw that inference because everything we write goes to head quarters in any case. So head quarters would know and would have the same answers that we had.
JUDGE NGCOBO: I mean couldn't you then have told them that if you want to ask any questions of and concerning this direct your questions to head office. They will reply to you?
GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson I will not deny this. It is possible that we made such a recommendation to them.
ADV GCABASHE: It would be correct to say that in Johannesburg you were head office. So in fact the enquiries were being made at the right door in terms of the overall authority in that area. Would I be wrong in assuming that?
GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson in with head quarters we understand head quarters in Pretoria. I was the branch or regional office of safety branch in the Witwatersrand.
ADV GCABASHE: Yes and in that sense you would know what was happening in your branch?
GEN ERASMUS: That is positively so.
MR VISSER: But you also said that head quarters was the place where the reports was mailed to and they would have the same information that you had?
GEN ERASMUS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: I am being told that, I want to put it in the form of a question to you. Was there a standard policy concerning enquiries from attorneys with reference to political detainees and where was these enquiries directed at? If you don't know say so but was there a standard policy with the security branch?
GEN ERASMUS: Yes when you mention it now there was a legal department and all these types of attorney enquiries were handled by them.
MR VISSER: I think that should be the explanation of page 675. Can you just conclude with 8.2?
GEN ERASMUS: It has to be (...indistinct) primarily that every policeman made a promise of loyalty to the government. But I did not do for own gain or for personal reasons. I did it because of what I saw as my duty as a policeman in the war situation that the country was in and as a supporter of the National Party. In other words the government of that day against the powers of the liberation movements and their members. I bona fide believed that my actions were necessary to save the previous government embarrassment and to protect them. Therefore I believe that my participation in this matter was part of my police work and I believe that I acted in my sworn capabilities as a member of the SAP to stop the possibility that the revolutionary climate could be heightened because of the death of Mr Bopape. And it was my duty as in the act of the police to act and those acts mention that I have to maintain law and order and security and stability in the country. My actions were in the best interest of security and was necessary to support the previous government and to maintain position. On both sides of the struggle there were people who inherited the situation and did not do it themselves and we were both play balls on both sides and we did things that we would not even have considered under other conditions.
Consequently I am now before this Commission to apply for amnesty for acts which were committed because of my background and the influences on me in order to protect the government of the day and to carry out my duties as a police officer.
MR VISSER: And thereby you are not trying to excuse your deeds and you are not trying to deny the fact that you participated in an illegal act and that is why you are applying for amnesty. We just went telegram style over this whole statement or this document. I would believe that the Committee would give you the opportunity to when we return if you want to add anything. In the meantime I would like to ask you, you are conversant with the knowledge of the written application on form 1 as I have referred to it in the record and do you confirm that what is in there is correct? And that it is true?
GEN ERASMUS: Yes I confirm that.
MR VISSER: And in conclusion in your application form in paragraph 10 a and b, excuse me Mr Chairperson. Paragraph 10 indeed. You also ask that the document to which is referred to in the evidence of van der Merwe that is b 45, 46 and 47 also should be seen as incorporated into your application. Is that correct?
GEN ERASMUS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman I am sorry I went way beyond any decent or what would have been decent but at least we are finished with the evidence (...indistinct)
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Mr Rautenbach will you speak to either Mr Steenkamp and Mr Wagner regarding getting hold of those documents referred to now? Until when should we adjourn tomorrow? Until which time? Would ten 'o clock be convenient tomorrow?
MR VISSER: Yes. Thank you Mr Chairman.
MR RAUTENBACH: I am now exactly in the type of situation that Mr Visser warned this morning and that is that when I went over the normal court time I still don't have the documents, but even the documents from Mr Visser he must first go and get, so I must wait here and I will do so. He will bring those documents to me and I will then only be in a position to look at the first part of the documents. The second part of the documents that are due to be courier'd I will not have. It seems to me there is no indication that I will have them over-night.
CHAIRPERSON: No we understand your difficulties Mr Rautenbach and we are not putting you on terms for ten 'o clock.
MR RAUTENBACH: No it is just (...intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: It is just we said earlier that maybe we could at that stage, depending on what the situation is continue with the evidence in chief of Mr du Toit.
MR RAUTENBACH: Yes I understand. I think if I may make a contribution here ...
JUDGE NGCOBO: The evidence of General du Toit and then once we are finished with the evidence of General du Toit we will then determine whether you are in a position to continue the
cross-examination then. So that no one is placing you on any terms. We do understand your situation and if necessary we may even break earlier tomorrow and then we can give you the weekend to go over those documents. Yes.
MR RAUTENBACH: Judge may I just in light of what you just said, if that is the case then surely there is actually no reason why we couldn't start normal time tomorrow morning as we normally do?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes I am easy. We can make it half past nine. It makes little difference to us. We then adjourn until tomorrow in this hall at half past nine in the morning.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS: .
