MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, before I proceed I just want to put on record that we have copies of the affidavits that were handed in during the Cosatu and Khotso House, the affidavits made by Minister Vlok or the former Minister Vlok and General van der Merwe and we have also furnished the respective legal teams with copies of those affidavits.
CHAIRPERSON: Could we give them a number now?
MR HUGO: ...[inaudible]
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but that was that hearing and not this hearing. So they should be Exhibits PP(a) and PP(b), PP(a), being Mr Vlok's.
MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman.
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: (continued) Very well Mr de Kock, yesterday we reached the decorations which were awarded and I mentioned that there were just a couple of final loose aspects which needed to be addressed.
You will recall that during cross-examination by my learned friend, Mr George Bizos, it was put to General Coetzee that you were involved in an operation in Swaziland and simultaneously I handed in a document, Exhibit E which is an extract from your book.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HUGO: Have you had the opportunity to study Exhibit E?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HUGO: Are you satisfied that the content thereof is true and correct and that the facts are correctly reflected?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.
MR HUGO: Then during cross-examination it was also put to you that you were also involved in an operation in Swaziland where a Mr McFadden and Nyanda were killed and that this was also a part of a Vlakplaas operation of which you were part.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.
MR HUGO: And was that also essentially put correctly during cross-examination?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.
MR HUGO: Once again with regard to the decorations, did you receive any similar decoration at any other stage, a similar decoration to the one which we referred
to yesterday, the one which was awarded to you by Mr Louis le Grange?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that was actually for the operation during which Zwelibanzi Nyanda was killed. He was the head of the Natal machinery in Swaziland and it has to do with the McFadden incident to which we have referred.
MR HUGO: Mr de Kock, you will also recall that Mr Craig Williamson during his evidence in chief submitted a document, Exhibit V(1) regarding the attack on Gaberone and various other neighbouring states, do you recall that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.
MR HUGO: And if I understood Mr Williamson's evidence correctly, he said that the first portion of this video was a recording which was made of the crown scene in Gaberone, that was in 1985, can you remember that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that may be correct, however, I have no information and I cannot offer any evidence regarding the crowds during this attack which took place in Gaberone.
MR HUGO: You were not personally involved in those attacks in Botswana?
MR DE KOCK: No, not with those attacks but with others.
MR HUGO: The weapon stockpiling location which we saw on the video, would you tell us where that came from and how it came about that it became important?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a meeting held at Vlakplaas. Brigadier Schoon was in attendance and I was there as well as members of C2, Martin Naude, General Martin Naude, Captain Jan Coetzee from Krugersdorp, from the Security Branch there which was involved with terrorism and the investigation into terrorism. General Joubert from Special Forces was also there. There were two other officers in attendance who were from Special Forces but I can't remember their surnames and I wouldn't like to implicate anybody randomly.
An instruction was given to me to prepare an amount of weapons and spring-charges and that would have to be of Russian or Eastern Block origin. I think that we used between 36 and 37 AKM's, that is another version of the AK47, because the ANC was exclusively using AKM's with regard to their internal operations. The landmines and the ammunition also had to be checked by me in order to ensure that it was not manufactured in South Africa and that it would be of Russian origin.
After that we also had to clean these weapons, clean the landmines and ensure that there wouldn't be any traces of sand from Ovamboland. We wiped the landmines with paraffin in order to remove fingerprints. Some of the landmines still had blood on them and we had to remove that.
Furthermore, we also serviced the weapons to make them look as if they had been used in service. These weapons were handed over by me to Colonel Naude and I was not aware of where the weapons were going. I later heard that these weapons were planted in the mine heaps in Krugersdorp. The following morning however, there was a light storm, storm troop - that is where you make use of helicopters and soldiers to launch an operation quickly in and out, and later on I saw on the news that this weapon stockpiling location or this find led to the attacks which, it was the catalyst for the attacks in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Lusaka. However, when the equipment appeared on television, I identified it as that equipment which we had handed over.
MR HUGO: Very well. Then with regard to the political objectives, you have already addressed the political objectives, but would you just look at Volume 4 on page 36 of the paginated documents, paragraph 37 on page 36.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I accord with that.
MR HUGO: Is that what you attempted to achieve with this operation against the ANC?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HUGO: And then on page 38 there is a summary of the execution of instructions.
MR DE KOCK: And I am in accordance with that as well.
MR HUGO: The orders which you received in this case were orders which were by-and-large given by Mr Williamson?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HUGO: And did you have any reason to doubt his bona fides to the extent that he would have conducted the proper research and would have ensured that the action would be aimed against political enemies?
MR DE KOCK: I knew him as someone who was thorough in that aspect and also a perfectionist. I'm not saying that to place him at any disadvantage.
MR HUGO: And you did not find it necessary at all to question his orders or his motives?
MR DE KOCK: No, not at all.
MR HUGO: And then finally, would you turn to page 44 of the same set of documents in which discuss the cross-border operations. Is that also a correct version of how you experienced it?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HUGO: You will notice in that paragraph, that's paragraph 58, reference is made to neighbouring states but is it correct that that is also of application to operations such as those which were carried out in London?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is of application to any place where the enemy found themselves, the enemy or the opposition.
MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, perhaps just one question.
Mr de Kock, Mr Taylor for whom I am appearing says that he did not know exactly what the purpose of the operation and the content thereof was before he arrived in London, would that according to and your knowledge of the need to know principle be correct?
MR DE KOCK: No, logic would also tell me, and I'm not saying anything about you, but logic tells me that it would be irrational for any security policeman to go from South Africa to London during that time without knowing what he was going to go and do there. He might as well just have been given over if Mr Williamson would have been a double agent. There would have been questions. Mr Taylor was a very sober and experienced Security Branch policeman and he attended the lectures at Daisy Farm. There could be no idea that he would not have known.
MR VISSER: Are you saying in other words, that if he tells this Committee that he knew that the operation had to do with something against the enemy but that he didn't know what the entire extent of it was, that he would be lying?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. During the lectures he passed his officer's course but during the lectures at Daisy Farm it was very clear that we didn't have anything to do here with the destruction of spring-charges, we were working with anti-terrorism. There is no way in which he could have questioned it. And by attitude and conduct all of us felt that we had been selected and we were proud of that.
MR VISSER: Well I think we're actually missing each other here Mr de Kock, because the point that I'm trying to make to you is that he says that when he left South Africa he did indeed know that this was an action most probably against the ANC in foreign territory but he didn't know that he was going to blow up the ANC offices in London, that is his story.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, let's just accept that version.
MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Are you accepting it because you feel that he was one of your colleagues or are you accepting it as being the truth?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we were given the addresses here in South Africa, the addresses of the SACP offices and the ANC offices in London, and that is all I have to say.
FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, perhaps then I should ask a follow-up question.
That is not denied by Mr Taylor, but he says to me that he didn't know whether or not you were going to commit a robbery at those offices or what you were going to do. He didn't know that the purpose of the operation was to cause damage with spring-charges to any one of those two buildings.
MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, I knew and all of us were collectively informed at Daisy Farm regarding this situation.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr de Kock, you were not present when Mr Raven manufactured the bomb?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Did you ever inspect the bomb in the bag?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR DU PLESSIS: In other words, you would agree with me then that the only person who can testify regarding the time for which the bomb was to go off would be Mr Raven?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: And the only person who can tell this Committee exactly what mass the bomb was is Mr Raven because he's the only person who had personal knowledge thereof?
MR DE KOCK: At this stage I would like to qualify. Every since 1989 when Section C1 had to do with the welfare of Peter Castleton who is now deceased, he spent quite a length of time at Vlakplaas and he and I had various discussions and he told me, because I asked him one morning, how large the charge had been and he said 12 pounds. So therefore that concurred with what my opinion had been.
MR DU PLESSIS: And that is what he told you?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, and as I understand it, he was the person who fetched the spring-charge, as Mr Raven said. This is actually jogging my memory even further now that you you've mentioned it. Mr Castleton during this discussion told me that not far from where this spring-charge had been buried there was a .22 gun with a silences and a telescope which had also been buried there. I never followed it up. I asked him to draw me a sketch of it because possibly the British could go and look for it in case it should fall into the wrong hands, but that is all I have to say.
MR DU PLESSIS: You did not testify regarding what Mr Castleton said to you, during your evidence in chief. I was not present yesterday.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR DU PLESSIS: This is the first time that you are testifying about it?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: Then Mr de Kock, you would also not dispute Mr Raven's evidence that Mr Castleton was not present when the bomb was manufactured?
MR DE KOCK: I have a very clear recollection of a discussion between Mr Raven and Mr Williamson during which Mr Williamson requested, or it all boiled down to: "Is the place clean"? And Mr Raven explained how the floors and the walls had been covered with plastic and then with newspaper for the purposes of forensic prevention for any kind of evidence which could be left behind. I remember something like that.
MR DU PLESSIS: I think you're misunderstanding me. All that I want to know from you is whether you would dispute Mr Raven's evidence in any way, that he was the person who set the time and that he was the only person who manufactured the bomb?
MR DE KOCK: No, I don't dispute that at all, regarding the manufacturing of the bomb and the time mechanism and the mass.
MR DU PLESSIS: We will discuss the mass shortly. But the only person who had personal knowledge thereof and who can testify regarding his personal knowledge of it, who saw the bomb, who manufactured the bomb and who set the time, was Mr Raven?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: You were not here yesterday, Mr du Plessis. The question is the size of the bomb. This witness, as I recollect it he gave evidence yesterday as to his estimate of the weight of the bomb when he carried it.
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I understand the evidence having been exactly that Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, that would have been my following question. Your testimony was that you carried the bomb?
MR DE KOCK: Well I climbed up over a gate and took it from Mr McPherson and in going over the gate I could feel that there was a reasonable amount of tension, which was caused by the mass of this object on the shoulders. My first impression was that this was quite a charge.
MR DU PLESSIS: And you will concede then that your evidence regarding the charge is an estimation, it's merely your opinion?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. At that stage I would have said that this was a rather exact estimation. At that stage in Ovamboland I planted explosives below vehicles. Some of them went off, others didn't and I worked on a daily basis with spring-charges and landmines and especially the Eastern Block type, and I will stand by that which I said yesterday.
MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, you've said it now, but we have the situation that Mr Raven gave evidence that the mass of the spring-charge was one kilogram and he was not cross-examined regarding what else was in the bag, he was not questioned regarding that, and it was not put by your legal representative to him.
That places my client and I in a very precarious position, unless I'm incorrect in my assumption that it was not put.
MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, it was said by Mr Raven, and I think under cross-examination as well, that the containers were also put in this particular bag and that could have made a difference. That is why I didn't put it.
MR DU PLESSIS: Well that is actually what I'm heading at. Thank you Mr Hugo.
Mr de Kock, let's just get to the point. It wasn't only the spring-charge which was in the bag, the canisters were also in the bag, the so-called containers?
MR DE KOCK: Well if you're saying that, I will have to accept it because I didn't expect it.
MR DU PLESSIS: So you can't dispute it?
MR DE KOCK: That's correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: And your legal representative did not dispute this during cross-examination, so will you concede that with regard to the charge, Mr Raven would be the only person who would have personal knowledge thereof and that he would probably be correct regarding the charge, that it was a one kilogram charge.
MR DE KOCK: I will concede that he is the only person who knows and I wouldn't be able to say that is was a one kilogram charge.
MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Let me ask you this, is there any reason that you may be aware of why Mr Raven would not sketch the true picture of the charge to the Committee?
MR DE KOCK: No, I'm not here to attack Mr Raven, I'm simply giving evidence regarding my own perceptions and that which I experienced on the scene. I have nothing to do with Mr Raven or anybody else at this point.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Jansen on record on behalf of John Adam.
Mr de Kock, just two aspects. The first one is, the information regarding when the bomb was to go off, who gave you that information, can you recall?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the date or the day I was informed of during our first visit to the apartment where Mr McPherson and the others were staying, that is my recollection thereof.
MR JANSEN: The apartment in London?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.
MR JANSEN: And who would have conveyed the information regarding the times at which the bomb was to be planted, for how long it was supposed to be set and so forth?
MR DE KOCK: Well, my recollection is that Brigadier Goosen gave us this information because I can still remember that Adam and I were concerned about the surveillance and Brigadier Goosen told all of us that we were selected to be there because of our perseverance and now was the time to hold on.
MR JANSEN: And just based upon logic and experience, Goosen is the most logical person to have taken those important operational decisions regarding: "What time are we going to plant the bomb, for what time will we set it the next day"?
MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't be able to say that. Brigadier Goosen, with all respect and compassion, was there, he was the operational commander but according to my opinion he didn't have the knowledge and the brain power to manage an operation such as an operation in Britain. He simply didn't have the background for it. I'm not saying this to place any person at a disadvantage. I think he was informed with regard to knowledge and advice by Mr Williamson. That is what I'm basing my evidence on.
MR JANSEN: Well the other alternative is that because of Mr Williamson's knowledge he would have relied heavily on Mr Williamson or whoever had the knowledge or the local knowledge.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. If it is put later there will be reason for this and you will understand why I am saying this.
MR JANSEN: When you departed from London you said that you went to Brussels. I don't think that there's really anything very important there, there's just a minor difference. Someone else said that you went to Frankfurt, he can't really remember. Do you have any commentary regarding that?
MR DE KOCK: We landed as Schipol in Amsterdam. The reason why I can remember that and the Brussels aspect, is that it was the first time that I was in a country where there was no terrorism and two fully armed guards walked past with sub-machine guns. It was ironic that we didn't find anything like that at Jan Smuts Airport where we actually did deal with terrorism. This is something which I noticed.
MR JANSEN: Something which I might have missed, later at the medal parade in 1982, can you recall that General Geldenhuys was present?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I can recall that.
MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius on behalf of McPherson.
Mr de Kock, you will recall that Mr McPherson drove the getaway car or he was at least part of the getaway team, along with Jimmy Taylor?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was part of the getaway team.
MR CORNELIUS: And the additional aspect that he had to sit like a drunk person on the pavement, was that also an additional aspect to his tasks?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.
MR CORNELIUS: And my client's recollection is that after the operation you left London and you went to Frankfurt.
MR DE KOCK: I can't dispute that. I know that we weren't on the same flights when we left London, and I can remember that Adam still took my ticket and after that we sought out a second venue, so to speak.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Booyens.
Mr de Kock, just one aspect. The cameras which you mentioned, which you purchased, that was simply part of your disguise as a tourist?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.
MR BOOYENS: And Mr du Toit tells me that he does not know about it but that you would most have withdrawn it from the supply section of the Technical Division. That was another component of the Technical Division.
MR BOOYENS: Yes, I hadn't met Mr du Toit there at all. It was arranged that we would go and fetch it there.
MR BOOYENS: So you can't be of any further assistance regarding that?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR BOOYENS: Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS
MR LEVINE: Alan Levine on record. I have not cross-examination, Mr Chairman.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Bizos. I have a number of questions, Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, I'd like to deal with your understanding of this need to know rule and how it operated in the system as you knew it. I want to take as an example the Cosatu House bombing in which you took part. Who told you to do that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it came from Brigadier Schoon and after that he and I and Captain Jan Meyer went to Johannesburg where we met General Gerrit Erasmus. I understood that this order came from the above. This is the understanding which Schoon and I had. I asked from what level this order came and he said from the most high and when I asked whether or not this was the President, he said yes.
MR BIZOS: Did you feel reluctant to ask those questions?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. Brigadier Schoon and I had a reasonably open relationship in that regard. However, I was concerned because this was the first operation of such an extent which was going to be carried out internally.
I think I have mentioned this earlier, but in 1982 we bombed the ANC in London and in 1987/1988 we bombed them in Johannesburg. In other words the borders had moved, not only tactically but also strategically. We actually regressed ...[end of tape]
MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] because of the relationship, did he have any difficulty in informing you as to where the order actually came from?
MR DE KOCK: No, only until I asked him whether or not it was the President. It was as if he was a bit hesitant but he then conceded this and he informed me.
CHAIRPERSON: Who precisely was this?
MR DE KOCK: That was Brigadier Schoon who was the Commander of Section C under which C1 fell.
MR BIZOS: Did you ever hear about the Target Identification Committee?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. A group like that originated, I think in 1985 or shortly before then. I understood that the creator thereof was General Buchner as well as members of Military Intelligence Services as well as National Intelligence Services. Their task was to determine target. And upon enquiring from Mr Naude he said it was also to prevent that we shoot one another's sources because the police had their own sources and the military had their own sources. This was to prevent any kind of neutralisation and ultimately any kind of disadvantage, so there had to be a greater level of co-ordination of the internal Intelligence Services before such an operation could be launched.
MR BIZOS: Before there was this formal committee which you say was some time before 1985, how important would it have been for anybody to go and kill people without proper consultation with the Head of Intelligence of the Security Police?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, one would never be able to out of oneself and blow someone up or conduct a cross-border operation or any operation of that sort, there had to be clearance from above. When I say that, according to me it had to be from the Security Head all the way to Commissioner level, there was no other way to do that.
I once risked going over the borders when the information was fresh, in other words about an hour old, and I was severely reprimanded for that and I very nearly destroyed my career through that.
MR BIZOS: Let us just take an example outside the First and Schoon killings and take an example like Joe Gwabe. You've heard that he was the Head of the ANC office in Zimbabwe and we know that he was killed. And if I understood at least Mr Williamson, that that would likely to have been an operation by the Security Forces even though General Coetzee washed his hands of any operation being on behalf of the Security Forces.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, not an objection or anything, but Mr Bizos is not speaking at his normal decibels. Could I just perhaps through you ask that he perhaps give us a few more decibels. I've got a bit of a problem hearing him.
CHAIRPERSON: I've been using this here.
MR DU PLESSIS: I haven't got one here Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, you will please remember you're at the far end of the table.
MR BIZOS: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman, I'm sorry. I find it difficult to speak to someone who is so nearby at the decibels I'm now using. I will change the button Mr Chairman.
Let us take Mr Gwabe's case. Assume for the moment that it was done by one or other of the Security Forces or combined operation by the Security Forces, if you had been asked to go and kill Mr Gwabe in Harare, what would you have wanted, in the system in which you were working, what would you have been asking in relation to the authority to do this operation?
MR DE KOCK: Well the first question which I would have asked would be: "Who said so, who's requesting this, where does this come from"? That would have been the very first question which I would have asked and by nature of the situation there are a number of reasons for this. But the very first question would have been: "Who said so"?
MR BIZOS: You say that there are reasons for that, what would the reason be, Mr de Kock?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in the first place there would be political implications and by nature of the situation in the Security Branch, it was basically a political or politically formulated and oriented unit.
Secondly, it was a cross-border operation so there could be foreign implications.
Thirdly, one would require manpower and equipment, finances and it was impossible to carry this out alone. There is no way that you can just disappear with vehicles, personnel and equipment and weapons and execute an operation just like that.
MR BIZOS: What about your own protection? Sometimes operations go wrong, what might the consequences have been if the thing went wrong and the people at the top were able to say that they didn't know about it and you were on your own? How would you have felt about that?
MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, I believe that one would have felt, firstly if one had done it alone, they would have cut your career short right there and then, there can be no doubt about that. And even though you might have had the approval of the Generals and the Ministers on the upper levels and you had been caught, they would in either event have washed their hands of any involvement. It was a question that you would be alone if something were to go wrong.
MR BIZOS: Would you not have expected those at the top to take steps, either to have you released or to negotiate with someone from the other side that had been caught in a similar situation? Wouldn't you have wanted to be satisfied that you would have whatever support you could get from the top?
MR DE KOCK: Well one would have expected, even though it would take time, even up to three years, but that on a daily basis your welfare would be attended to and that there would be negotiations which would free you from your situation. I think we can use the example of Wynand du Toit in this particular case. That's just to give you an example.
MR BIZOS: To stay with Mr Gwabe's death as an example, would you have expected that the Head of Intelligence of the Security Police would not have known anything about the death or the planning and execution of the death of Joe Gwabe in Zimbabwe?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. It is hardly possible that any Minister or any Head of the National Intelligence Services, the Military or the Police would not have made any queries or that this would not have emerged in any discussion. We had three of the best Intelligence Services in Africa, and also in comparison with certain countries in Europe and America. If it wasn't one of the two then it was the other.
There was no way in which the Head of Intelligence would let information like that slip away. He could not do that, he could not afford to do that. If he was not informed then members below him did not do their work properly and he would have addressed them.
MR BIZOS: Do you know whether Mr Williamson knew or participated in Mr Gwabe's death?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I can't say that. In discussions, and many of us were present, the name of this person emerged at various occasions and the inference which I drew from that was that within the Security Forces there was a group which was operating but I can't give any evidence regarding that because it would incorrect of me to do that.
MR BIZOS: Who was - at the time of Mr Gwabe's death, who was the best informed intelligence person in relation to the workings of the ANC outside the country, in your opinion?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe that that would have been the Head of the Security Branch and the Security Police. There can be no doubts surrounding that. The death of such a high profile person would automatically draw attention.
MR BIZOS: You have heard responses of General Coetzee to the questions put to him about your early morning visit after the deaths of three people in Swaziland. What do you say, from what was said there, from the conversation that you and others had of him, did he or did he not know what the purpose of your visit and the reason why the people were killed in Swaziland?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by behaviour, conduct and approach that morning, he knew why we were there. It wasn't a question of surprise, it wasn't a question: "Only two of you come in", such as Brigadier Schoon and Colonel Visser, the entire group went in. The English word is animated. He was excited in a way about it and I had no doubt that he knew precisely what it was about.
MR BIZOS: How did you interpret his remark that your hands were full of blood? Did he refer to the blood spilt only on this occasion or did you believe that he knew of other things that you had done?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was naive enough to look down at my hands to see if there was indeed blood on my hands because I thought that I might have made a mistake somewhere, and that there may be stains, blood stains on my hands.
It didn't really upset me but it did agitate me ever so slightly. And after that when Brigadier Schoon and I drove away from General Coetzee's home, I was driving the vehicle, Brigadier Schoon asked why General Coetzee had said something like that and then he said that General Coetzee had been joking. I then asked: "Well why wasn't anybody laughing"? The discussion ended there.
This is something which has been embellished in my mind and later reflected to me his attitude towards people regarding the more unsavoury aspects of the execution of tasks with regard to terrorism or counter-terrorism.
MR BIZOS: You told us yesterday that General Coetzee was the ultimate authority in Koevoet.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct Chairperson.
MR BIZOS: Did Koevoet enjoy a high regard for lawful or lawful and unlawful activity in Ovamboland and in the Ovamboland/Angolan border, Mr de Kock?
MR DE KOCK: Koevoet was well-known for its successful counter-insurgency operations. A small group of people probably participated then in small counter-insurgency programmes and one of them was me. With regard to the number of SWAPO soldiers which died there one can then infer that it was one of the most successful units. However 32 Battalion was miles ahead of us.
Something which I can mention and General Coetzee will know about this, I must mention that the first three years where the files and photographs of those persons who'd be captured have been burnt. We captured 86 members of SWAPO's Intelligence Services. They were highly trained, very well trained and these persons who were responsible for the bombs in a bread shop in Swakopmund in Walvis Bay, as well as the explosion of a train track near Mariental, murders and so forth. And none of those 86 appeared in court.
Some of them later worked as Askaris. Some of them disappeared one by one and nothing was ever heard of them later. It was a sort of a tit-for-tat kind of war situation at that stage. And General Coetzee visited Koevoet numerous times during that stage.
I found it rather interesting when he said to 11 of us young men who were there that it was a pity that people like us who were so unsophisticated had to be exposed to this sort of life and life experience.
The inherent establishment of Koevoet was a joint operation between the Army and the South African Police, the Security Police and than also the Special Forces which was 5 Reconnaissance Command.
It had to establish a unit which was similar to Renamo, which could operate internally in Ovamboland under the code-name: "Operation Vanguard". And for that clothing and weapons were obtained from Rhodesia, of Eastern Block origin, most probably originating from the Rhodesian Intelligence Services, as I understood it.
I believe that the political reasons within Ovambo were not suitable for such a type of Renamo action. After a number of successes, the Counter-insurgency Unit of which I was a member slotted that group over to counter-insurgency as well. In other words, if General Coetzee says that there is or was no co-operation between the police and the army, he is lying.
MR BIZOS: You say that some of the 78 disappeared. What happened to them Mr de Kock?
MR DE KOCK: They died.
MR BIZOS: Would you ...[intervention]
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, with respect. We are busy here with applications in regard to an explosion which took place in London at the ANC offices. My learned friend is presently asking questions of this witness relating to a witness who has given evidence before you, who was never confronted with any of what you hear now regarding incidents in Ovamboland and Koevoet etc., and people who may or may not have disappeared there. And he is now being called a liar by de Kock when none of this was put to him. With great respect Mr Chairman, my learned friend ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that one of the problems Mr Visser, when we are inquiring into the activities of a force in the past, that you cannot expect people from outside to know those facts. Mr Bizos' clients were not part of these activities, Mr de Kock was. Is Mr Bizos not entitled to seek to get information from other members? He should in all fairness then permit General Coetzee to respond to it if he wishes to put this to and have it accept as evidence against General Coetzee, because at the moment I agree with you entirely. General Coetzee has been given no opportunity to deal with this and it may have no weight against him. What Mr Bizos is doing as I understand it, is seeking to dig up information about the manner in which the Security Police behaved in those years.
MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, but one has to ask the question: "What has that got to do with the incidents of Ms Ruth First and the Schoons"?, because there doesn't seem to be any connection between the questions being asked now and those incidents. And with respect Mr Chairman, it couldn't possibly be the intention that hearings of this Committee should be used in order to dig up matter which are totally irrelevant to the present ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Are they irrelevant to the credibility of your client?
MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, credibility, that's a collateral issue. My learned friend has ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: If we find he is to be, I'm not saying for a moment we do, a witness on whom we can place no reliance whatsoever, it is surely a very important issue in deciding whether he should succeed in his application.
MR VISSER: Yes. But Mr Chairman, when the credibility of a witness, and it's trite law, is being attacked and the collateral issue is advanced in order to do so, then Mr Chairman, our rule of evidence and procedure says that the answer of that person, and I again hasten to say that he hasn't been asked Mr Chairman, is final and ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: As I have explained Mr Visser, this is not the normal courts of this land. We are investigating here the activities of the Security Police in the past, where one would not expect people outside the Security Police to know of it. Are you saying that they can burn their records, shut their mouths and sit and say: "You don't know and you're not going to find out"?
MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairman, but what I am submitting to you Mr Chairman, is that the facts relevant to a particular incident are those which are relevant. The moment it goes beyond that Mr Chairman, it could only relate to credibility.
What our objection is Mr Chairman, is that the credibility of a witness who has spent two or three days before you, is now attacked on this basis that my learned friend is doing at present.
CHAIRPERSON: He has indicated he is trying to get information that he didn't have. If he doesn't use it, it cannot be used against your client. Your client has not had the opportunity, I think that is entirely obvious. And I certainly would attach no value to any argument by Mr Bizos that we should accept something said now which was not put to your client and our client has been given no opportunity to answer, as a reason for disbelieving your client. But if Mr Bizos wants to get information which he subsequently wants to use, I don't think it would be proper to stop him at the present time.
You must bear in mind that your client was the officer in charge of these, in all these incidents he was the officer in charge, either of the Security Police or he was the Commissioner of Police.
MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, may I by the way of personal explanation, was that I was surprised to hear yesterday afternoon that Mr Coetzee was in charge of Koevoet. Had I known that fact before Mr Chairman, I would have put the questions that I am now putting to him, if I had the information from anyone. But in due course we will consider, we will ask you to consider an application for the recall of Mr Coetzee to deal with these matters Mr Chairman.
May I say that the manner in which the Security Police worked during this period is not a collateral matter in these proceedings, Mr Chairman. May I proceed please?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I will ask you, Mr Bizos to confine yourself to matters that will directly involve the General.
MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman. I will try and do that Mr Chairman, but you will realise that this is not a person with whom I'm privy to and I ask a question and information comes out which will have to be adjudged and adjudicated upon at the end.
MR JANSEN: Sorry Mr Chairman, if I may interject just to remind you Mr Chairman, that I did ask the question to General Coetzee, under whose command Koevoet fell. If you can recall he was fairly evasive about the answer, making a distinction as to its commands and its functions. I was subsequently compelled to ask the question on the basis of who paid their salaries. I don't know if you can remember those questions. So the issue of Koevoet's command was canvassed with him very, very tangentially.
CHAIRPERSON: As I recollect it, we've heard a great deal of evidence, there was no evidence before yesterday that he was in direct command. And certainly I didn't ...[intervention]
MR JANSEN: No, certainly because he didn't want to say it, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I didn't receive the impression when you were questioning him, that he regularly visited them in the field of conflict.
MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman, it must have been so tangentially dealt with that I missed it altogether. May I just proceed Mr Chairman. This happens after these interjections Mr Chairman, I don't remember what the question was.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, my learned friend has misconstrued my objection for an interjection, with respect.
MR BIZOS: Can I proceed?
You told us that the people who disappeared were killed and I think the question that was objected to was: "Who killed them"?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I myself shot about four or five of them.
CHAIRPERSON: I didn't hear that, could you repeat?
MR DE KOCK: I myself shot four or five of the Intelligence Agents and in time others also disappeared. From discussions with the small group of us who were involved there, one could surmise where the rest of them had gone. Not many of them were left. I believe that if I had kept the photo album of this specific group very few, indeed if any of them, would have been found in Ovamboland.
MR BIZOS: Were there records kept of the people detained?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the first three years worth of files were the original files with the original documents. All of this was sent by telex to head office, to the South West desk where there was a certain Colonel in charge and it was brought to the personal attention of General Coetzee.
It was heard with great joy after the arrest of such agents, that we had acted with a lot of effectivity. I know that the Colonel went to the RSA for additional funds, that he spoke directly to General Coetzee about this issue and the doors were basically open with us with regard to equipment, the purchasing and obtaining of equipment as a result of our successful actions.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr de Kock, you previously said that if somebody had to be killed an order would be given and you would be sure that this would come from above.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I will sketch it for you. General Dreyer usually came to me and specifically in this instance he came to me, he said that some people had to go. That had only one connotation, there was no misinterpretation of any sort.
I know that a Captain Sakkie van der Merwe came to me on a certain morning and said: "There are three people who have to go". I asked him why he didn't take them and make them go and see if he could sleep easily that night. I told him that he should rather work through the appropriate channels even though he was my senior by a year. But that is just to sketch it.
ADV DE JAGER: General Dreyer, was he a member of the police or the army?
MR DE KOCK: No, he was South African Police.
MR BIZOS: You say he was a General, was he a Deputy Commissioner?
MR DE KOCK: Upon his arrival in Ovamboland he was a fully fledged Colonel and after that a Brigadier and ultimately he became a Deputy Commissioner.
MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] these, and the reason will become pertinent, depending on your answer, were these persons purportedly held in detention under 6 of the Terrorism Act?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they were held at 5 Reconnaissance base. They all lay on the ground on cement. Their feet were chained together and their hands were cuffed behind their backs and there were bags over their heads.
For some of these people it took five to six months of being detained in such a fashion to the extent that some of them eventually achieved a kind of a blue sheen on their face. I don't know if it was some form of fungus. I know that some of their eyes became very light sensitive. I managed to get some of them to work for me and they always had to wear dark glasses.
MR BIZOS: Could these things have happened without the knowledge of the Head of the Security Police and/or the Commissioner of Police?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, General Dreyer definitely knew. I don't know whether General Coetzee knew. He definitely didn't ask any questions. He didn't ask why there hadn't been any court cases, why any evidence hadn't been given. It was a question of: "We're paying you back with your own medicine".
CHAIRPERSON: This base, was it police or army?
MR DE KOCK: It was 5 Reconnaissance Commandos base which was built completely away from the rest of the base next to the tarmac for the aeroplanes. Koevoet and the unit which I had functioned on an assistance level as well and we were also in a capacity as a fire force operational unit. If there had to be problems with any other unit we would be prepared to go in with helicopters. I lived at this base for a few years.
The detainees were not held in police cells, they were held in a type of a wooden hut structure. They lay next to each other side by side, there was nothing such as privacy or anything like that.
CHAIRPERSON: Who administered this, that's the point of my question. Who fed them, who was responsible for their daily maintenance?
MR DE KOCK: 5 Reconnaissance Command base was responsible for feeding them as well as for medical attention. I don't believe that their detention - and this is not very easy for me to say this, but their detention did not differ much from the detention of those in Quatro.
MR BIZOS: There was - we have heard that there was a war on, would you have treated prisoners of war in this way, Mr de Kock?
MR DE KOCK: I must describe the war to you like this. The Defence Force described it as a low intensity war. That may be so if you go and look at the definition of strategy but for those people who were being shot, it was high intensity.
Not many prisoners were taken, not on either side. It was cold-blooded, point-blank and later I heard that I had taken the most prisoners. I know that that's not really very honourable but I took the most prisoners and that wasn't many.
MR BIZOS: Would you have done any of those things if you felt that your advancement in the Police Force or possible danger of being prosecuted would have followed if the Commissioner of Police or the Head of the Security Police found out? Did you have that fear at any time when that happened, Mr de Kock?
MR DE KOCK: Not if the Head of Security or the Commissioner had known. He would not have withdrawn us. We were regarded as the best in our field.
MR BIZOS: Now we've heard that Mr Joe Slovo was enemy number one. Did you do anything in relation to Mr Joe Slovo whilst you were in London?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not at all.
MR BIZOS: Do you know whether any of your colleagues did anything in relation to Mr Slovo whilst they were in London?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, and I didn't receive any such information later.
MR BIZOS: In relation to who was in charge, how urbane or how much of a sort of a city slicker was Mr Goosen whilst you were in London?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think he experienced a number of unqualified problems surrounding that personally. I know that before we left the country here we were specifically warned that we should guard against pickpockets. I understand that he was pickpocketed and I know that this was a British speciality of British pickpockets to clean you out completely. Furthermore we were instructed not buy anything in the line of a weapon, such as a sharp knife or a sword or anything like that because at Heathrow Airport one would pick up problems.
The morning when Adam and I arrived at the airport I was quite stressed because I saw that next to me on the table three of the customs and excise officials were busy with Goosen. He had bought himself a number of axes. He was quite fond of woodwork. Apart from myself, I think he and I were on an equal level, we were both equally like country bumpkins in that regard.
MR BIZOS: So who called the shots so to speak, in London?
MR DE KOCK: Mercifully, and this is not to place him at a disadvantage, this is simply with respect to his capabilities, I would say that it was Major Williamson. He was the only person who was streetwise. Please excuse my language us but he was the only person who could lead us within the European context in that regard.
MR BIZOS: Do you have any knowledge of Mr Coetzee, General Coetzee coming to Vlakplaas to get any AK47's from you?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not personally but Brigadier Schoon contacted me on more than one occasion telling me that Coetzee was looking for ammunition and that he had a certain weapon registered on his name and by the first opportunity in that context, I gave him a hundred to two hundred rounds. I was later told not to be greedy with my rounds and later I gave him a thousand four hundred rounds. It happened on a regular basis.
MR BIZOS: What were they to be used for?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I accept that he himself had a gun like that, that he himself would shoot with it and that possibly he had friends or acquaintances who had similar weapons registered on their names, but that's simply an inference, I'm speculating. The ammunition was sent to him personally.
MR BIZOS: Did Mr Raven ever tell you how the envelope that found it's way to Maputo and killed Ruth First was sent?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in the conversation - and I can't remember the exact date or time or whether it was during the day or during the evening, our mutual trust was very good and during this conversation he mentioned to me that there was an envelope and I'm assuming that the inference to be made there was that the bomb was Mozambique.
They had opened the locks of the mail bags at Jan Smuts and the envelope had been replaced into the mail bag to be sent to Maputo. I was aware that Mr Raven was very good at picking locks. That was part of a course which had been presented when the Task Force fell under the Security Police.
I would have joined the Task Force as well if it had not been for the fact that I was to go on an officer's course. I was one of the founding members of the Task Force.
MR BIZOS: Have you ever heard the expression of the appointment of a sweeper after crimes were committed by the Security Police, Mr de Kock?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not during the Harms Commission. I was only later informed of the terminology of sweepers. What I did notice with the Harms Commission was that things could be arranged, that the law could be obstructed and that things could be construed in order to mean nothing, it could also open doors for you.
For the sake of thoroughness I can mention that General Coetzee, although he was, or at least when he was on pension I met him on two occasions at General van Rensburg's officer where he was very concerned, firstly about Dirk Coetzee who would swear at his elderly mother over the phone because he knew that his phone was tapped and he was highly upset about this. By nature of the situation I suppose anybody would have been.
Secondly, in a discussion in General van Rensburg's office, he asked me: "Will you be able to hold the fort? You must stand firm". And then the whole thing about: "We're right behind you men".
Upon a third occasion I found him in the building next door near the Commissioner's office. I was on my way to a unit. He asked me again: "Will you be able to hold the fort? Can you stand firm? Can you take this thing through the Harms Commission?" And once again the attitude of: "Stand firm men, we're right behind you", and all that sort of nonsense.
Personally I can testify to this. I know it and he knows it. So he was very much aware of what was going on in the Harms Commission. He could have gone to the Harms Commission if he was innocent, and said that he didn't know anything about the Swaziland border operation, that he didn't know what had happened there. He could also have said that he didn't know about London. Once again I will reiterate that General Coetzee is a liar.
MR BIZOS: If you'll bear with me for a moment, Mr Chairman. Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS
FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, is it possible that I may ask one or two questions flowing from this? I know I'm always doing that and I promise you it will be, you can count Mr Chairman, two.
Mr de Kock, I'd just like to find out the following from you. You gave evidence at a stage and you said that you would not have conducted an operation if you were not certain that the order came from above. Was this evidence of application to cross-border operations as well?
MR DE KOCK: That would have included internal operations but by nature of the seriousness thereof, if I recall correctly, I said in Port Elizabeth that there were certain occasions where you had to make operational decisions in the field, that you didn't have the opportunity to make enquiries or to consult and you take to take responsibility for your decision.
MR DU PLESSIS: But what I'm trying to find out is that it wasn't a rule that you had to make sure all the time that this came from the highest level in government, because the way I understand it, this was not the situation with regard to a number of operations.
MR DE KOCK: The more senior became in rank, the more responsibility one carried and the more responsibility one had to assume. And by nature of the situation a lot more authority was devolved to you once you occupied a higher rank.
MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Those who were under your command and who carried out orders, you didn't expect of them with regard to an order which you had given for an operation to eliminate someone, to come to you all the time and ask you: "Who gave permission, was it the Commissioner, was it the Head of the Security Police, was it the President"? You didn't expect that from them?
MR DE KOCK: No, but from my view of matters, I would always tell them where it came from. I would tell them that it came from Brigadier Schoon or from head office and in my case I would always tell people that: "This would be the nature of the operation and those who don't want to go, tell me so that I can replace you with someone else because I don't want someone who acts a second too soon or a second too late because that could lead to loss of life".
MR DU PLESSIS: But you didn't give them all the particulars?
MR DE KOCK: No, I didn't.
MR DU PLESSIS: And if you didn't say anything to them or that which you said to them was satisfactory, they wouldn't have come to you, you wouldn't have expected of them to come to you for more information in order to ensure that this had been cleared and so on and so forth?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR DU PLESSIS: Did it ever happen that anybody questioned your orders and asked: "But are you sure that this is coming from the highest level in government"?
MR DE KOCK: No, not once.
MR DU PLESSIS: Then finally. The actions of Koevoet up in South West Africa, you have just given evidence that General Coetzee was aware of that and that there was knowledge of Koevoet's actions, and I'm sure we all know what Koevoet did up there. The police had knowledge in South Africa, the structures so to say. Would you say with regard to yourself and other persons within the Security Police scenario, the impression entrenched that those sort of actions such as that which you have given evidence about regarding the SWAPO operatives which you caught and so forth, did that firmly entrench the idea that it was allowed and that it was permitted and that that is what you could do?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, well I would venture as far as to say that this was a controlled practice and that it had been devolved and that would not necessarily have filtered through to people who were involved with Koevoet but the entire Security Police.
In the Security Police it was a well-known inwoven idea within the Security Police fabric, with the exception of a number of aspects here and there.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I'm indebted to you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I don't want to ask any questions at the moment but I do have to place something on record. Insofar as it is necessary, we have to give fair notice that at the continuation of this hearing we will bring evidence, we will have to bring evidence to address the issues that have been raised here today. Mr Chairman, we trust that you won't stop us at that stage on the basis of irrelevancy.
It is clear that we will have to address these issues fully and at that stage we would ask for Mr de Kock to be recalled to face further cross-examination from us. Thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Was that the end of your one or two questions, Mr du Plessis?
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, but they sort of flowed into each other, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, can I clarify something in my own mind? I can understand if you are stationed here in Pretoria and you are ordered to a cross-border operation, that you would enquire where the instructions came from, what level they came from.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: But when you were in the field with the Koevoet unit, I take it you then did what had to be done?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: When you were in Okavango, you didn't turn round and expect instructions from Pretoria every morning?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, and I will give you an example. I'm not going to name any names however. And I would say that it was just about general practice that one would hear over the radio that there had been a contact. I'm trying to give a broader picture here because otherwise we'll never to able to understand exactly what happened.
You'd hear that there was a contact and then the commander would come through and say: "Three have been killed, I've caught two and they are wounded". Then three hours later you'd hear that these detainees had died as a result of their injuries, but these were not the injuries that they had sustained during the conflict, these were new injuries. So those who were detaining them had finished them off.
It was that sort of war. No questions were asked on either side and ultimately it could have created that understanding among people, that this is how guerrilla warfare was to be conducted if you wanted to win.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr de Kock, who was the commander of Koevoet?
MR DE KOCK: General Hags Dreyer.
ADV DE JAGER: And what was or how long did you serve in Koevoet?
MR DE KOCK: Koevoet was established on the 1st of January 1979 and I began there. I worked there for three and a half years, during the formative years, during the initial problematic years with adjustments and the implementation of techniques and methods.
ADV DE JAGER: So when did you leave there?
MR DE KOCK: I left at the end of May 1983.
ADV DE JAGER: Just something about the London bomb. In your evidence in chief yesterday you said that the information which you received at Daisy Farm was very scarce and that nothing specific was said. This morning questions were put to you in that regard and could you just explain what you meant when you said that the information was scarce?
MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, I would have wanted to see things like aerial photos. I wanted information regarding guards. I would have wanted information about whether or not there were private companies who were performing guard duties there. I wanted to know whether or not there were lights in the backyard, whether or not there were alarm systems which could possibly go off, should you enter an infra-red area or come within infra-red distance such the current alarm systems which are in use today. That is the sort of information which I wanted but we had to go and find out that information for ourselves on ground level. And as I remember correctly, we only saw the photos. That's basically what I meant.
CHAIRPERSON: Miss Patel?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: There was just one aspect I wanted to clarify, Mr de Kock. At Daisy Farm, who was in charge of preparing the members to go over to London? Was it Craig Williamson solely or was he assisted by other people?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, for Adam and I there was Derek Broon but the information which he gave us regarding England and the aspects surrounding that was in direct contradiction with the information which Mr Williamson had given us. I picked up feelings of jealousy towards Mr Williamson from Mr Broon and we stated that we did not want any further information from Mr Broon and that we would only take information from Mr Williamson.
MS PATEL: Are you saying that yourself and Adam were briefed alone and not with the rest of the members of the operation?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, with regard to Mr Broon we asked questions because it was a foreign experience and one would try as much as possible to gain information. Upon later interviews when we were informed and briefed at Daisy and photos were shown to us, it became evident that Mr Broon either didn't know what he was talking about or he purposely tried to mislead us.
MS PATEL: Right, so then the sole person in charge of briefing you must have been Craig Williamson?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MS PATEL: Okay. Now just one minor aspect I wanted clarity on. You remember you testified about the canister that was given to you, which you said wasn't really teargas but was a substance that would immobilise the person that it was used against. Mr Adam in his application says clearly that it was teargas. Where would you have got your information from that it wasn't teargas?
MR DE KOCK: No, it was probably teargas. I'm not a chemical expert. And I'm sure that one can vary the components in the composition of teargas. It wasn't the type of teargas which we used in unrest control, which would make people cough and splutter. This was a gas which brought about a disorientation effect which would immobilise a person for approximately 10 seconds to the extent which would allow me for example, to get away or to overwhelm you. It was something in that line. It had the teargas effect, the burning sensation and so forth but I wasn't sure whether or not one or more of the components had been added to that chemical composition.
MS PATEL: Alright. Then just one final aspect. I'm not sure whether you testified about this yesterday or not but, Mr Adam says somewhere in his application that at some stage he suggested to Mr Williamson that you both be withdrawn from the operation. I believe that that was after the time that you were approached by certain men at the hotel, that you got the feeling that you were being followed. What is your comment on this?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr Adam was a highly intelligent person, as I'd already seen in Ovamboland and politically he was extremely mature. For me it didn't really matter whether or not I was working in Ovamboland or in Brussels or in London and it didn't matter to me if I was shot there or anywhere for that matter because that's what I was there for.
Mr Adam had certain reservations which he didn't want to express at that stage and upon various occasions we were having conversations during which he appeared to be cautious and he was rather reticent but apart from that he still had the courage to still go ahead. And that is where I will conclude.
MS PATEL: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL
ADV DE JAGER: Let us put this in quotation marks: "the teargas", you kept the canister with its contents when you came back, you didn't hand it back in?
MR DE KOCK: No, it was said to us here that this is what we could use, this is what we had at our disposal and the overall situation was that no British policeman was to be injured if a confrontation should occur. In no way should a British police person be injured, it would be better to be placed under arrest.
It wasn't my intention to take any such teargas canister. I would have relied on my bare hands for my specific task together with Mr Raven, in order to protect him. I want to just tell the
Committee that there was a second aspect ...[end of tape] ...[inaudible] in explosives, and I was the only other person other than Mr Raven who was qualified in explosives.
MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, are you aware or do you have any information whether these ammunitions which were requested from Vlakplaas were ever used for Stratcom purposes, like to parade them as it was done in the case of the, where they were paraded before the raid into Botswana?
Or let me just be specific to say, in the past there used to be instances where a trained terrorist will infiltrate the country, he will be arrested and there will some allegations that there were a lot of arms found in his possession but families of those people will deny, that the arms came with the police. I'm asking you in relation to that, whether you have any knowledge with regard to that?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I know no such case or incident during which additional ammunition or weapons were planted on people. There was an incident at Piet Retief, a shooting incident during which the information was indeed correct but the operational group didn't come over and weapons were put down during that incident. However I don't want to quote that incident right here. I think in the future it will be clarified completely. But I don't know of any operational MK member regarding who additional arms or ammunition or explosives were handed in during court proceedings. It could have happened but I don't know about it.
MR SIBANYONI: Were these arms and ammunition found from either the ANC or PAC, all of them kept at Vlakplaas or are there any other places where they were kept?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, later, and when I say later I'm referring to 1987 or 1988 here, a written order was issued by head office that all Russian explosives and Russian explosive devices as well as weapons should be brought to Vlakplaas. On the contrary a written order was given by head office with regard to this and I remember that I was busy with training of former ANC operatives as well as other members. But with regard to all types of weapons from East and Western Block origin.
I ensured that 10 to 15 years after we could act conventionally and I was beginning to instruct members with regard to parachuting and other techniques.
CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination?
MR HUGO: I have no re-examination, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO
CHAIRPERSON: The time has come for the short adjournment. We will adjourn till 11 o'clock.
WITNESS EXCUSED
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
