CHAIRPERSON: We'll try again, Mr Levine.
MR LEVINE: At least the machine is working. Mr Chairman, I think logistically speaking Mr Williamson should sit behind the sign marked applicant.
CHAIRPERSON: I can understand that both persons questioning him would rather have him facing them than sitting next to them. You may later wish to change over yourself Mr Visser, when you come to cross-examine.
CRAIG MICHAEL WILLIAMSON: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE: Mr Williamson, I'd like to deal firstly with some matters of general background. Where were you born?
MR WILLIAMSON: In Johannesburg.
MR LEVINE: When?
MR WILLIAMSON: 23rd of April 1949.
MR LEVINE: And could you tell the Commission about your schooling, where did you go to school?
MR WILLIAMSON: I attended school in Johannesburg, first at St Stithians and then at St Johns.
MR LEVINE: And did you then attend a university?
MR WILLIAMSON: At later stage I studied at the University of the Witwatersrand and later at the University of South Africa, and also the University of Pretoria.
MR LEVINE: And did you attain any graduate qualifications?
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, I have a BA Degree in Political Science.
MR LEVINE: Now Mr Williamson, you have made three applications for amnesty before this Commission at this stage and I'd like to ask you a little bit about the background to those applications. Did you at any stage in any of the matters which are the subject matter of your applications, act for personal gain?
MR WILLIAMSON: No, I did not.
MR LEVINE: Was your conduct governed at all times by a political motive?
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, it was.
MR LEVINE: Did you at all times follow orders of a superior officer?
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, I did.
MR LEVINE: In regard to the three applications, who was your direct superior officer?
MR WILLIAMSON: In all cases, Colonel, then Brigadier Goosen, Piet Goosen.
MR LEVINE: Were you at any stage in any of the applications acting under circumstances or considerations of malice, spite or ill-well?
MR WILLIAMSON: No, I was not.
MR LEVINE: Now Mr Williamson, what was your perception of the South African situation from the early 1970's onwards, both inside and outside of the country?
MR WILLIAMSON: It was very clear to me that we were getting more and more deeply involved in a revolutionary war of which I was on one side, the state's side, the South African State's side.
MR LEVINE: And that applied both within and outside of the borders of South Africa?
MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct.
MR LEVINE: Mr Williamson, you served both in the South African Police and in the South African Defence Force?
MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct Mr Chairman.
MR LEVINE: Could we get some time periods for those?
MR WILLIAMSON: I served in the South African Police from approximately May 1968 until the 31st of December 1985 and from the 1st of January 1986 until approximately March or April 1987 I was with the South African Defence Force.
MR LEVINE: What rank did you attain in the South African Police?
MR WILLIAMSON: I attained the rank of Major in the South African Police and I was a Commandant or a Lieutenant Colonel in the South African Defence Force.
MR LEVINE: Now it was said by my learned friend, Mr Bizos, several days ago that General Coetzee was your mentor.
MR WILLIAMSON: I heard that Mr Chairman.
MR LEVINE: How would you react to that particular statement?
MR WILLIAMSON: I had a long and very close association with General Coetzee throughout my career in the South African Police and if I had a mentor it would have been General Coetzee.
MR LEVINE: The statement was also made by my learned friend, Mr Bizos, that you would not have done anything, and that was his wording, without your mentor, General Coetzee. What is your reaction to that?
MR WILLIAMSON: I think that's a simplification of the situation Mr Chairman. I must surely over a number of years done many things that General Coetzee didn't know about. I would never have done anything that I did not believe that General Coetzee would approve of but at the end of the day we were serving in a military hierarchy, and to say that I would not have done anything that General Coetzee did not know about shows a misunderstanding of how in a military hierarchy commands and orders are issued and carried out.
MR LEVINE: Just on a point of order, I understood you to say you would not have done anything that General Coetzee would approve of, I take it you meant you would not have done anything that General Coetzee would not have approved of?
MR WILLIAMSON: Sorry Mr Chairman, what I said, what I thought I said was that I would never have done anything that I did not think General Coetzee would approve of, would not approve of, sorry.
MR LEVINE: We know where we're going, it's just that we haven't got our knots in the correct places.
MR WILLIAMSON: I'm sure I often did things that General Coetzee didn't approve of also Mr Chairman.
MR LEVINE: I would like to move to the London Bomb incident. Do you have that particular application before you?
MR WILLIAMSON: I do Mr Chairman.
MR LEVINE: And it is the bundle number 1 if I'm correct, at pages 1 to 9 with annexures running from pages 10 to 86.
CHAIRPERSON: The number of the bundle has been changed to 3 I think, hasn't it?
MR LEVINE: You're quite correct Chairman, I apologise for that error.
Is that correct Mr Williamson?
MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct Mr Chairman.
MR LEVINE: Would you relate to the Commission what took place, how the application, how the operation was muted, what instructions you received in the form of orders and from whom you received such orders.
MR WILLIAMSON
"Mr Chairman, during January 1982 I received an order from my Group Head, Brigadier Piet Goosen to prepare a plan for an attack on the London headquarters of the ANC". ...[intervention]
MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, Mr Chairman, I'm sorry to interrupt my learned friend. The witness is reading the narrative part of the actions which he took. I would submit with respect, that reading out from a prepared document on issues upon which the credibility of the witness has to be weighed is not a satisfactory way of doing it. I can understand that people can read from documents which have some historical relevance but the narrative part, if the witness' credibility is to be assessed, I would submit Mr Chairman, that my learned friend, Mr Levine would be well advised to lead the witness in the ordinary course and not merely ask him to read his application.
CHAIRPERSON: Didn't the previous applicant read out the whole of his statement?
MR BIZOS: No, Mr Chairman, that was not Mr Chairman, a narrative of events which he himself took part in and which are directly related to the main issue in this case. I know that the rules of the Commission Mr Chairman, or the Committee, need not necessarily ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: He dealt in detail in that statement Mr Bizos, with the events that he was applying for amnesty for.
MR BIZOS: Yes. Mr Chairman, if I did not object then, perhaps I should have, but on merit Mr Chairman, I submit with respect, that it is undesirable for a witness to read the narrative part of what he has to say because the Committee cannot assess his credibility merely on what has been prepared in a written document. The Committee I submit, will keep him under observation, see what he, how he answers questions and what he says. His ability to read a prepared statement is not an issue as to whether he is telling the truth or not on every specific issue is in issue Mr Chairman. I may say Mr Chairman ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: I, Mr Bizos, have no objection to him reading save for the time it takes. Will it not be sufficient for him to confirm the facts set out in his application?
MR LEVINE: Well Mr Chairman, ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: And then ask him if you want him to amplify any of them. He has already testified, the application is on oath is it not?
MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, ...[intervention]
MR LEVINE: It is.
CHAIRPERSON: So couldn't he merely confirm and then let you ask him those points that you want him to deal with?
MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I'm loathe to then be confronted with an attack that he hasn't given chapter and verse of what he's seeking amnesty for.
CHAIRPERSON: You can remind him of that. I'm not saying you can't remind him, you can lead him.
MR LEVINE: Very well.
CHAIRPERSON: But rather than merely read the document as such. If he says: "This is my application, I confirm the truth of it", and then you ask him to now tell us about this and that.
MR LEVINE: I'm prepared to do that as well. I would have thought the method of placing evidence on record when witnesses appear in person and are able to be cross-examined, would be through the leading of evidence or through the reading of the background factors relating to it. I'm in the hands of the Commission in this particular regard. I'm merely doing what I believe to be correct and indeed a follow-up on the nature of the evidence given by General Coetzee and the manner in which he gave that evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Williamson, do you feel you have to read it or can you tell us what happened?
MR WILLIAMSON: Sir, the incident happened in 1982. I feel that I'm not only here, very importantly to apply for amnesty, I'm also here to attempt to give the fullest possible background information and I'm perfectly prepared to give my version or a summary as long as I am sure that the full statement that I've made is part of the record.
CHAIRPERSON: It is and it was made in 1997.
MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: When you obviously remembered all the incidents you put out in your application.
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, that is correct Sir.
CHAIRPERSON: Not 20 years ago.
MR WILLIAMSON: I'm perfectly prepared to just give ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Well carry on, let's get there.
MR WILLIAMSON: I received an order from Brigadier Goosen to prepare a plan for an attack on the London headquarters of the ANC. I was told that the orders for the attack came from the very top. I worked out first a list of officers who could participate in such an attack and it was finally decided between Brigadier Piet Goosen and myself that Captain Vic(?) McPherson, Captain John Adams, Captain Eugene de Kock, Captain Jimmy Taylor and Warrant Officer Jerry Raven should be designated as part of the team together with myself and the Brigadier to carry out the attack.
I instructed Warrant Officer Raven to obtain the necessary equipment, such as explosives and to make sure that this equipment was put into containers which could be sent to London. The sending of the containers containing the equipment to London was organised by Brigadier Goosen and I understood, though I had no direct knowledge, that this would go via a Military Intelligence/diplomatic bag.
It was also arranged that the, or a staffer Military Intelligence or otherwise but a military related staffer in London, Warrant Officer Klew(?) would deliver the ordinance to an undercover officer of the SAP, a Lieutenant Peter Castleton in London. Some time after these arrangements were made I received information from London that in fact the ordinance had arrived.
Further discussions took place about the operation, very specific instructions were given. Number one, that no non-ANC people or person was to be killed or injured. Secondly, that if possible no person was to be killed or injured, that damage to non-ANC related property was to be kept to the minimum and I was told that the attack was to be of a political and symbolic nature.
MR LEVINE: Now you then went to London during the second week of March 1982, was it?
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, that figure there is incorrect, it's 1982.
MR LEVINE: There's a typographical error, and I'd ask you to amend it please Mr Chairman. '86 should read '82.
And your team operated in four groups, could you name them?
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman, we operated in the four groups. First of all the command group was Brigadier Goosen and myself and then three other operational groups made up of Captain McPherson, Captains McPherson and Taylor, Adam and de Kock and Castleton and Raven.
MR LEVINE: What was the next step in the procedure?
MR WILLIAMSON: The team arrived and was safely in London and Warrant Officer Raven had been given instructions to contact Lieutenant Castleton and to manufacture the device.
CHAIRPERSON: I think that at that stage there should also be a correction to the application which alleges that this was in 1996.
MR LEVINE: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: It should be 1982.
MR LEVINE: 1982 Mr Commissioner.
CHAIRPERSON: And the same on the next two paragraphs.
MR LEVINE: They should all read 1982. It's a patent error I would submit.
CHAIRPERSON: Right you've told us then that ...
MR WILLIAMSON: On the evening of the 13th of March 1982 the entire team, which up until that time had not met all together, was assembled and we were given the go-ahead for the operation. Warrant Officer Raven reported that the device had been manufactured and was ready and the team was dispatched to carry out the operation. Brigadier Goosen remained at his accommodation while I manned a checkpoint which each team member had to pass after completing their various tasks.
Later in the evening or in the early hours of Sunday the 14th of March 1982, each member of the team had passed the checkpoint and I was happy that the operation or the device had been placed and that the team was safe. They then proceeded to leave the United Kingdom according to orders which had been given to them individually or in twos.
The Brigadier and I left London for Brussels and we heard that the ANC office in London had been destroyed by a powerful explosion, listening to the BBC news while we were in Brussels.
We returned to South Africa. I continued with my normal activities and I was later informed that everybody in the team had been awarded a declaration, the SOE or the South African Police Star for Outstanding Service, for the successful conclusion of this operation.
MR LEVINE: And do you confirm Mr Williamson, once again that the error in the date should in fact read 1982?
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman, it escapes me how in the proof-reading we didn't pick that up. I apologise.
MR LEVINE: Now on the question of injuries or killings, what were you able to find out in regard to that?
MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, according to the information I had, there were no injuries in the sense that we would have regarded injuries, i.e. the serious injury to somebody as a result of the bomb. I do remember, and especially after seeing the newspaper article presented this morning ...[intervention]
MR LEVINE: Exhibit K, Mr Chairman.
MR WILLIAMSON: I further remembered that an elderly lady was admitted to hospital for shock and that an ANC member in the building had sustained some minor shock or injury.
MR LEVINE: Is that the Mr Mbatha mentioned in the newspaper article?
MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct, Mr Chairman. My attitude then was that we had achieved what we'd been ordered to do.
MR LEVINE: Did you ever hear about Mr Mbatha again?
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman, I believe he was an ANC member who at a later stage apparently was arrested and convicted of rape, but that's the last I ever heard of him, in the UK.
MR LEVINE: What was the political objective sought to be achieved by this operation?
MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, as I understood it, there were several. The one was that there would be a symbolic and high profile strike against the ANC, not only in a town and a country where they would have felt safe but also during the year of their 17th anniversary, and as I said, the reason for a symbolic and high profile strike at that time against the ANC was also as a result of the armed propaganda attack which they had launched in 1981 against Voortrekkerhoogte. A further such an attack would obviously lead to a disruption of the activities of the ANC in London, planned in their London offices and aimed against South Africa.
And thirdly, as I understood it, the attack would in some way apply pressure or even given impetus to people in the UK who would be interested in attempting to make sure that the ANC or that military elements of the ANC, terrorists as it were, were excluded from the United Kingdom on the basis of the fact that they were involved in an armed struggle against South Africa and that is there was an attack on the ANC offices it would become clear to people in the UK that to allow these people to have a very important facility in London meant that if the war between the South African state and the ANC spilt over, it could spill over into the streets of London, which would obviously be undesirable.
MR LEVINE: Now, you go on to mention process of pressure against the ANC/SACP in NATO countries and elsewhere not ending in 1982.
MR WILLIAMSON: No, Mr Chairman, as I understood it, not only was the attack linked with the August 1981 attack on the Voortrekkerhoogte Military Base but there was from 1981, as a result of a plan which had been formulated I believe by the Secretary of State in the United States, the then General Haig, he had a plan to focus the new Reagan administration's policy on countering Soviet inspired international terrorism. At that time the entire western world was becoming very focused on countering Soviet backed terrorism, and the South African idea was to link our struggle against, and particularly at that stage our political struggle, against the ANC on the international level into the western policy which was aimed against all the international terrorist movements which were used by the Soviet Union at that time.
I have Mr Chairman, appended to my application a number of documents and minutes which relate to this policy.
MR LEVINE: Yes. Would you like to deal with those particular appendages?
MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I think we should then look first at the document appended to my bundle, marked B.
MR LEVINE: Would you give the page numbers?
CHAIRPERSON: 14.
MR WILLIAMSON: It begins on page 14. Basically Mr Chairman, this is a, I believe a, I'm not sure what they call it, it's a telex but it's got another name. It's a message from Washington Foreign Affairs to Pretoria and it all, but I think it appears from this to have been addressed for some reason via Bonn. It discusses General Haig's Foreign Affairs priority with regard to combating international terrorism. As a result of my work in Security Headquarters in Pretoria I was aware of this policy.
If I can go on and refer you to the next document on page 17. This is minutes of a sub-committee of what was, of the State Security Council ...[intervention]
ADV DE JAGER: What page?
MR WILLIAMSON: Page 17.
MR LEVINE: That is described as Annexure C.
MR WILLIAMSON: As Annexure C to my document, which is page 17: the Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Sub-Committee of ISAK. I'm afraid I - if somebody could perhaps help me with what ISAK stands for. I believed it was "Sielkundige Aksie", Psychological Action. And I amongst the number of other people were present at that meeting where South African involvement in attempting to link our international political struggle against the ANC and the Communist Party with this broadly NATO related attack on terrorist organisations by the American and other NATO governments was discussed.
MR LEVINE: You then refer as Annexure D, to a memorandum from General Coetzee to Minister le Grange, dated September 1983, which is marked D.
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman, the reason I appended this is to show that after the attack on the ANC in London, that this policy did not end there. The process of pressure against the ANC and the Communist Party in NATO countries did not end after our attack. Our attack was, as far as I was concerned and as far as I believed, part of an ongoing process and part of this process was for example, the further furnishing of information to foreign governments on the activities of the ANC and the Communist Party, and in particular on their links with international terrorism.
MR LEVINE: Then could you deal with Annexure E which is the Foreign Affairs Director General's Report of September 1983?
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman, this is page 29 and 30. This is all still part of the documentation relating to the general policy, but the reason why I in particular wanted to attach this document, and I have in fact also got it in, I think I submitted it in my evidence to the TRC hearings in Cape Town at which we dealt with the Armed Forces, was because it confirms the belief that I had at the time and that many other or my colleagues in the Security Forces at the time had, that we would defend our interests against the Soviets and their surrogates, and by surrogates I also would then include the ANC and the Communist Party: "selfs met geweld", even with force ...[intervention]
MR LEVINE: That appears in paragraph 3 of Annexure E.
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman, but the important point that I wish to make here is that this statement isn't being made by a member of the Security Forces, this statement is being made by the Director General of Foreign Affairs. By that I'm not alleging or implying that the war against the ANC was being directed by Foreign Affairs. What I'm saying is that throughout South Africa at that time and throughout the South African Government at that time there was a general attitude that the onslaught by, in particular, the terrorist organisations such as the ANC and the Communist Party which were in fact acting at that time as part of a co-ordinated onslaught, not only against South Africa but against the Western World co-ordinated by the Soviet Union, would be met where necessary by force.
So Mr Chairman, what I'm saying there is that where I was given an order to meet this onslaught by force, it did not surprise me. I regarded it as a natural ...[intervention]
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Williamson, could you kindly assist us. In this Annexure E, in which paragraph ...[intervention]
MR WILLIAMSON: Number three, Mr Chairman. If I may read it
"It was clear that the British team was out to persuade us about the possibility of weaning Angola, and especially Mozambique, from the Russians by means of economic aid, the influence of certain leadership figures in these countries, the cessation of cross-border military action from our side and the prevention of aid to opposition groups in the two countries"
And that Mr Chairman, refers to Renamo and Unita.
"Our reaction to this was that we were very sceptical about this argument, that we had no clarity regarding the measure to which the two governments could take their own decisions without Russian intervention, and in any event that this was an experiment which cost us much. We were thus prepared to have a dialogue but would not waiver to see to our own interests even by means of violence".
And Mr Chairman, this was not a statement made or a documents written in the pubic eye, this was a document after a top, top secret level meeting between British and South African political figures, sorry, civil servants dealing with security matters.
ADV DE JAGER: But it's dated the 29/30th of September 1983.
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, that is correct. I said that the action against the ANC in London was part of an ongoing process that went on for several years and that consistently during that time we took the same approach to the ANC, and that besides the political and diplomatic efforts that were being made to stop or to hinder or to frustrate ANC political and international involvement in South Africa's affairs and attacks on South Africa, there was also a physical Security Force related action against the ANC "en dit was geweld", or the use of force.
MR LEVINE: Now Mr Williamson - sorry, Mr Williamson, please carry on.
MR WILLIAMSON: And then Mr Chairman, to go back to the ANC's revolutionary onslaught, and I have appended as the Appendix marked G - I'm getting to the page Mr Chairman, page 39.
ADV DE JAGER: Could you before going to page 39, kindly help me on page 31, there are certain hand-written notes which unfortunately I can't read. I don't know whether you could read it on your copy.
MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, page 31 is Annexure F and is a letter from the South African Embassy in London to the Director General of Foreign Affairs in Cape Town and also in Pretoria. The hand-written note on it says, as far as I can read it
"Brigadier Goosen, would you and Major McPherson discuss something with me"?
And I assume that is "discuss this with me". And that is an instruction, this was procedure. You can see there's another hand-written note more in the middle where it says:
"Major Williamson, please discuss"
And that is Brigadier Goosen's handwriting. The other handwriting I believe could be General Steenkamp, he would have been the head. So there was an order from him to Brigadier Goosen, that Brigadier Goosen and I should discuss it and Brigadier Goosen has sent it on to me with a note saying: please discuss it with him. This relates to a request from the Embassy in London, from Ambassador Marais Steyn, for documents that had been stolen out of the ANC offices by an agent, in fact by Lieutenant Castleton at the time and that the British authorities wanted copies of these documents which we had obtained from the ANC offices.
MR LEVINE: Do you say that Lieutenant Castleton stole the documents from the ANC offices?
MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, it's well-known that Lieutenant Castleton was at the time, I think, I believe in 1982, was arrested in London, charged and convicted of burglary or conspiracy to burgle because he was responsible for certain burglaries on the ANC and the PAC offices in London and that he had stolen certain documents which he'd sent back to us in South Africa. May I just add Mr Chairman, that those actions of his were in fact while, obviously when they happened the documentation was welcomed, he was in fact called back to South Africa and given the specific instruction at that time by General Coetzee, that he had not been told to do this type of thing and he was told not to do it because he was going to end up in prison, which is exactly what happened.
MR LEVINE: Was he in fact defended, did he have legal representation to your knowledge, in England?
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, when he was arrested he was defended. The South African Police paid for his defence and I believe the firm of Sir David Napley in fact undertook his defence.
MR LEVINE: Sir David Napley is the gentleman whose name we heard of yesterday?
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, that's correct, Mr Chairman.
MR LEVINE: Very well.
MR WILLIAMSON: Then if we go Mr Chairman, the Aide Memoir, it's just an example again of the type of information that was being sent through from the South African Government through to the British Government. Obviously a lot of this information had had the origin of, a lot of this information was from the Security Police and other intelligence organs in South Africa.
MR LEVINE: Aide Memoir, are you referring to the letter from the Ambassador, Mr Marais Steyn?
MR WILLIAMSON: No, the ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Page 33?
MR WILLIAMSON: Page 33 there's an Aide Memoir which is an Aide Memoir from the South African Government to the British Government, and this relates to the letter on page 38 of this document which has the heading
"10 Downing Street"
And this is from the Political Office of the Prime Minister and relates to the type of activities that were going on diplomatically and politically at that time, to make the South African Government's attitude to the British Government absolutely clear in relation to the presence and activity of the ANC and the South African Communist Party in London at the time.
To go on then Mr Chairman. The document G from page 39 is a draft report, a draft chapter from an annual document which is produced or which was produced in my time by the intelligence community in South Africa and presented on an annual basis, like an annual intelligence review, an annual intelligence summary to the South African Government.
Basically the idea of this document was to inform the government of the security matters facing the state, not only some comment on the previous year but a projection of what could be expected in the year to come. And this document is the chapter relating to the: "Revolutionary Onslaught" and to the ANC. It's about the activities planned by the ANC during 1981, going over in to 1982 and gives in-depth, Mr Chairman, an explanation of the internal and external dimension of the struggle that was waging at that time between the ANC and the South African Government.
I think it goes to show clearly Mr Chairman, not only my and other intelligence officers' preoccupation but the preoccupation of the state at that time with the ANC's international and in particular with their activities based in London, the activities carried out and planned against South Africa on a political and a propaganda level from London.
MR LEVINE: And the final set of documentation attached is marked H, and could you just tell Mr Chairman and the Commissioners what you would like to highlight in Annexure H.
MR WILLIAMSON: Well Mr Chairman, it starts at page 58 and it's a document
"The Communist Threat in South Africa"
With specific reference to ANC and PAC activities in the country and elsewhere. Now this Mr Chairman, is a memorandum that was presented to a delegation of British Foreign Affairs and Security officials at a meeting in Pretoria in 1983. It's the documentation I believe of the meeting which resulted in the memorandum of the document marked E which I referred to at page, the one about "geweld". Yes, the one at page 29.
Now Mr Chairman, I believe also that this document from page 58 is a document from which General Coetzee has quoted in his application if I'm not wrong, and that time my legal representative asked General Coetzee if he knew who the author of this had been and which General Coetzee did not know and he put to him if it was me would it surprise him and he said: "No". Well Mr Chairman, in fact I was the author of this document.
This is a document presented to the British Foreign Affairs and Security officials as the policy, and I was asked to draft this document but once I drafted it it was obviously submitted to higher authority and approved and finally ended up being given at this meeting to the British as the policy of the South African Police and their attitude towards the communist threat in South Africa.
In the last paragraph on page 81, the documents says, and I as the author thereof say that:
"The RSA has a clear and successful security intelligence police which will be applied wherever the enemies of South Africa are to be found. And the South African Police stand ready to co-operate" etc.
Now Mr Chairman, my reason for appending this document is because in the light of the fact that in 1982 we had attacked our enemies, the ANC in London and in the light of the fact that at the meeting with these British Foreign Affairs and Security officials, they had in fact been attempting to convince South Africa to take a more, a softer line on cross-border activities etc.
I have to say that my belief was, and that's why when I authored this document I wrote this sentence, my belief was that we had a clear security intelligence policy which would be applied wherever the enemies of South Africa were to be found and that an element of that security intelligence policy was that we would use force against the terrorists who were using force against the South African State and public.
MR LEVINE: Then Mr Williamson, ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: I don't want to interrupt you, would this not be a convenient stage?
MR LEVINE: Sir, I'm in your hands. I've got two very brief questions and that would end off this chapter.
CHAIRPERSON: It doesn't affect me at all but some people have to catch aeroplanes fairly soon, but let's carry on if you say it's very brief. Let's carry on.
MR LEVINE: It is Mr Chairman. The orders and approval of the operation in London. You've mentioned on page 8 of your affidavit the origins thereof, and could you for the record merely mention that again.
MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman. The operation was approved during the first week of March 1982, by General Johan Coetzee but the final order to make the attack on the 13th of March 1982, was given to me and the others by Brigadier Piet Goosen.
MR LEVINE: Mr Williamson, you've sworn to the truth and correctness of the affidavit on the 14th of January 1997. I'm pleased that one of the dates would appear to be correct, Mr Chairman. Do you adhere to that particular oath which you've taken?
MR WILLIAMSON: I do Mr Chairman.
MR LEVINE: In each and every respect?
MR WILLIAMSON: In each and every respect. I apologise for the proof-reading error.
MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, would this be a convenient time?
CHAIRPERSON: I'm afraid I don't know where you gentlemen are all coming from. Monday, nine or ten? Ten? Very well, we'll adjourn till 10 o'clock on Monday morning.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
