Amnesty Hearings

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We apologise for the late start in this matter today. The reason being was that a number of the applicants did not arrive on time.

Is Mr Mohlaba here?

MS MTANGA: Yes Mr Chairperson, he is around, but I think he is not aware that we are starting now.

ADV DE JAGER: He has been warned that we start at ten o'clock. Actually we should have started at nine.

MS MTANGA: He is aware of that Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mohlaba, we said we would start at ten, we have been sitting here doing nothing, not for very long, but the fact is we have been here since ten. Is there any reason for the late delay in today's proceedings and yesterday's proceedings, the missing of yesterday, except for Mr Maluleka's application?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. I first wish to apologise for today's delay.

CHAIRPERSON: We get the feeling that it is almost intentional, the delays have been done to irritate us. Is there an explanation, proper explanation given?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. Certainly not, the delay was not intended to irritate the Committee.

Yesterday's delay was as a result of the apparent misunderstanding between the TRC in Cape Town and a letter which was sent to one of the applicants, who in turn went around and told the co-applicants that the proceedings have been adjourned until February.

It was not very easy to get in contact with the other applicants, but ultimately we did, and I did not myself, consult with Mr Toka, being the second applicant here, who we had scheduled a consultation for Sunday, but as a result of the message sent to him that the proceedings will be adjourned until February, he decided to go back to Mafikeng without contacting me.

I, when he came in this morning, after getting lost, he could not locate the venue with ease and after he came in, I stole this moment just to have a brief consultation with him and I was not aware that - I was in the consulting cubicle when the proceedings started.

ADV DE JAGER: I see you've got a watch, so you could have seen, you have requested us to delay it until ten. We have granted you that privilege and you were even being late and coming in after ten?

MR MOHLABA: Certainly Chair, I should believe that my watch has misled me, because the moment Mr Mohema came for me, it was indicating a minute to ten, and my apologies in that regard.

CHAIRPERSON: I think Mr Mohlaba, we have lost a great deal of time in this application. If we can in future, now commence proceedings timeously and also if we can handle these applications as efficiently as possible.

Mr Molefe, I believe that you are now representing some of the applicants. Would you mind coming forward and just getting to a microphone to place yourself on record please.

MR MOLEFE: My surname is Molefe, initials M.M. and I will be appearing on behalf of George Mathe and Johannes Maleka. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Molefe. Yes Mr Mohlaba?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. I am ready to commence by leading the evidence of the second applicant, being Rodney Abram Moeketsi Toka.

CHAIRPERSON: The application appears or commences on page 9 of the papers.

MR MOHLABA: That is correct Chair.

RODNEY ABRAM MOEKETSI TOKA: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Mohlaba?

EXAMINATION BY MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. Mr Toka, you are the applicant in this matter?

MR TOKA: That is correct.

MR MOHLABA: You were born on the 17th of April 1963 in Mamelodi, Pretoria, is that correct?

MR TOKA: That is correct.

MR MOHLABA: For record purposes, what is your occupation presently?

MR TOKA: I am a Captain in the South African Police Services.

MR MOHLABA: You are applying for an amnesty in respect of several offences, which appear in paragraph 9(a)(v) of the application form, and I refer the Committee to page 10 of the paginated documents. The offences, it is an AK47 raid, grenade attack and a bomb blast, you mention bomb blast again, and a bomb blast Proes Street, bomb blast Atteridgeville Municipality building, grenade attack at Mveke's place, grenade attack at a house in Mamelodi East, grenade attack at Ronald Molauzi and a bomb blast at Lion Bridge, Pretoria and escaping from lawful custody, is that correct?

MR TOKA: That is correct.

MR MOHLABA: The basis on which you ... (intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Isn't he applying for murder and attempted murder?

MR TOKA: I think, what happens in my application is that it is generally stated and are not specifically stated. Like the AK47 involved the murder of three policemen in Atteridgeville. That is what I am applying for.

Mamelodi East grenade attack, it involves the murder of a one year old baby, and that is what I am applying for as well. The attack at Sterland and Wimpy Bar and Juicy Lucy, Proes Street, Vermeulen Street, I think they also involve some injuries there and attempted murder. That is what I am applying for. It is just that they are not specifically stated.

CHAIRPERSON: I think if you take a look at paragraph 9(a)(i), it does say murder for the Mariana Street, Atteridgeville incident, an attempted murder, an attempted murder and murder for Mamelodi East, etc. It is there.

MR TOKA: That is exactly right.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. You are applying for amnesty in respect of these offences because they were committed with a political motive, is that correct?

MR TOKA: That is correct.

MR MOHLABA: Did you during the currency of this offence, during the time of the commission of these offences, were you a member of any political organisation?

MR TOKA: Yes.

MR MOHLABA: Can you tell the Committee the name of the organisation?

MR TOKA: I was a member of the African National Congress and its military wing, Umkhonto weSizwe.

MR MOHLABA: Can you explain to the Committee in full details how and when did you come to join the African National Congress and the roles which you were playing?

MR TOKA: I joined the African National Congress in - I left the country in October 1985, I joined the African National Congress on the 21st of October in Botswana.

How I joined the African National Congress, it is because I started first in the youth movement in the country. I was a member of the (indistinct) organisation, which was formed in 1984 with a view of the International Youth Year in 1985.

Through my political activities in this youth organisation, I had the courage to go further in my political beliefs and join the African National Congress, but except that there is also some other things that influenced me in my life to join the African National Congress.

MR MOHLABA: You told the Committee of having joined the African National Congress in Botswana. Can you take us further until to the moment when you came back to the country if you ultimately did, and the roles you played in the African National Congress and its military wing, Umkhonto weSizwe inside South Africa?

MR TOKA: Yes, after joining the African National Congress in Botswana, I think I spent about 14 days in (indistinct) settlement, somewhere in Botswana, where our passports were organised and then we were taken to Zambia. From Zambia we were then taken to Angola where I went for military training in a camp called Kibashe.

My training was basically a general Commanders' course which takes about six months and from this course, I was taken for another three months at Bangu camp in Angola, for specialising in Engineering, that is Military Engineering. I was taken back from Angola to Lusaka, then I think from Lusaka we were then transported into Botswana and we entered South Africa on the 2nd of July 1987.

When we entered South Africa, it was me and my Commander Mishack Maponya. When we entered the country, our mission from exile was simply a four worded mission, it was recruit, train, arm and lead our people to battle. That was our basic orders from exile.

We came into the country, we stayed in the country.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, could you kindly repeat that, recruit, train?

MR TOKA: Arm and lead our people to battle.

ADV DE JAGER: And lead the people to?

MR TOKA: Battle.

CHAIRPERSON: Continue please.

MR TOKA: Then from there, our main aim was to recruit people to join Umkhonto weSizwe and then from there, we had to arrange with Lusaka to send in our arms cache, give the people training. From there, give them orders to attack whatever target we found that was appropriate at the time.

Amongst this people that we recruited, the other applicants who have made the applications here like Francis Pitsi, Ernest Ramadite, George Mathe, Johannes Maleka. That was in Atteridgeville and in Mamelodi we recruited Peter Maluleka, we also had the late Stanza Bopape. We recruited Reginald Legodi, Reuben Khotsa and James Kgase.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you in fact recruit all the other applicants that are appearing in this particular hearing?

MR TOKA: That is correct, My Lord.

CHAIRPERSON: Amongst other people you say, amongst others?

MR TOKA: Can you rephrase your question?

CHAIRPERSON: Were these the only people you recruited?

MR TOKA: No, there were other people that we recruited as well.

CHAIRPERSON: There were other people, yes.

MR TOKA: Yes sir. Then from there, after we recruited, we trained them in the usage of different arms like hand grenades, AK47's, limpet mines and after we felt that they were fully trained, we gave them orders to attach the mentioned places in this application Your Worship.

MR MOHLABA: You have stated in paragraph 7(b) of your application, that is page 9 of the paginated bundle where you were requested to state the capacity which you served the organisation, you have indicated that you were a soldier, Commissar and Commander.

Can you explain to the Committee what were your duties as a Commissar or what was expected of you?

MR TOKA: My duties as a Commissar was just to give the political objectives and aims of the organisation, and it was generally to look at the welfare of the men on the ground and to make it a point that at all times, the morals were boosted and they understand exactly what the organisation requires out of them.

MR MOHLABA: And your responsibilities as a Commander?

MR TOKA: My responsibilities as a Commander is to see to it that the (indistinct), to see to it that soldiers are carrying out their orders as expected from them, and again to see to it that you give out the necessary orders.

MR MOHLABA: So in other words, you were giving orders to your subordinates, is that correct?

MR TOKA: That is correct Your Worship.

MR MOHLABA: I want to take you through the relevant offences which you are applying amnesty for.

I want you to tell the Committee about what you call an AK47 raid. Is that the incident where three police officers were killed in Atteridgeville?

MR TOKA: That is correct.

MR MOHLABA: Can you in full details explain to the Committee how this raid was planned, ordered and executed?

MR TOKA: Yes. You see, what happens on the ground is that an individual soldier would see a target and he would bring it over for a discussion and we will look at the political side of that target.

Normally what you do is that you look at the hardware that your men will need to execute the order and you give them the necessary training. From there, you give them the go ahead to carry out the mission.

So generally the men in charge of this (indistinct), Mensday Maponya, who was the Commander and he brought the matter to me, we discussed it with him. He told me that this Unit had this target that they wanted to attack and that the three policemen were known to be very notorious, they were known to be amongst those that were petrol bombing our comrades' houses in Atteridgeville and other areas there by Atteridgeville. The whole thing was well motivated in a way that a go ahead was given for that raid to be carried out.

The raid was carried out and three policemen died in this way. Some people who were there, were caught in a crossfire.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Toka, the policemen were the targets specifically identified, the policemen, or were they just any policemen would be the target in this raid?

MR TOKA: Your Worship, in this case, those policemen were specifically target because this were amongst the group of policemen who were identified as amongst those that were petrol bombing our comrades' houses in Atteridgeville and other neighbouring townships.

CHAIRPERSON: When I mean specifically identified by name, we are going for policemen X, Y and Z?

MR TOKA: Exactly Your Worship.

ADV DE JAGER: Can you recall the names of the policemen?

MR TOKA: I can recall only maybe two of them. One was Barney Mope.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you just repeat that?

MR TOKA: Barney Mope. The other one was, I don't know, the surname was Mphahlele and the last one was, I have forgotten the last one Your Worship, but I think it was something like Phenyane.

ADV DE JAGER: Were you charged with the murders?

MR TOKA: We were charged with the murders.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Mohlaba, can't you refer us to the names, haven't you got a copy of the judgement or the charge sheet?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. Could the policemen in question, Mr Toka, could that be Samuel Mope?

If the Chair could bear with me one second, I have a copy of the judgement which details the victims and if the Chair could bear with me.

ADV DE JAGER: What page is it at?

ADV SANDI: I think it is 72, right?

CHAIRPERSON: Page 72 I think Mr Mohlaba.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. Mr Toka, could the three victims be Barney Mope, Andrew Mphahlele and Nelson Phenyane?

MR TOKA: Correct yes.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you. Can you explain to the Committee where was this attack carried out, what was the venue? Was it a police station, was it a private house?

MR TOKA: It was a private house.

MR MOHLABA: And were you present when this attack was carried out?

MR TOKA: I was not present.

MR MOHLABA: So you did not yourself participate in this attack, is that correct?

MR TOKA: That is correct, yes.

MR MOHLABA: And you - did you give instructions or orders to somebody, to some of your subordinates to carry out this attack?

MR TOKA: Yes Your Worship.

MR MOHLABA: Can you explain who was given the orders to attack and specifically the - and explain to the Committee with details, the specific orders that were given to them.

MR TOKA: The specific orders given to them was simply that they were given the go ahead to attack that place and that the people who were given the orders were Francis Pitsi, George Mathe and Ernest Ramadite.

There were no clear, specific orders given, except that the target was recommended for attack.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Toka, who was the third person, Ernest?

MR TOKA: Ramadite.

CHAIRPERSON: He is not an applicant here?

MR TOKA: I think because of some, he is not fit to stand trial Your Worship, I think so.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR MOHLABA: After this raid was carried out, did you have an opportunity to sit with the people who carried out the attack and discuss how the mission was successful or not, did you have that opportunity?

MR TOKA: Yes, it is normal course that after the soldiers have carried out an operation, the Commanders must sit down with them and view the whole thing and see it as a success or a failure.

At that stage, we took it as a successful operation.

ADV DE JAGER: They reported back to you after the operation? Did they report back to you after the operation?

MR TOKA: Yes. Not immediately after the operation, I think the following day after the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Mohlaba, I just want to get one point cleared before you proceed Mr Toka.

Did you as the Commander or Commissar there, have autonomy, in other words once a target was identified like these three policemen, did you or your Commander, have to refer that to Headquarters or somebody elsewhere to get approval of the target before the operation or were you autonomous, could you decide and if you decided that it was an appropriate target, carry it out without reference to any other person in the organisation or movement?

MR TOKA: Yes, normally that would be the procedure that any target, a senior person like our immediate Commander in Botswana, will have to be told about it so that he can give the overall order, to carry out such an attack.

There was, normally it would depend on the type of target that is there. If it is a target which is purely, which you will see that it is there and you cannot wait for another two weeks or so, it might move out of place, then you can take a decision on that.

CHAIRPERSON: In this particular incident, the attack on this house in Mariana Street where these policemen were, did you get that outside approval or was that done just within your group?

MR TOKA: No that one, we had to contact the Headquarters for its approval, via our command structure in Botswana.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, and in the full disclosure here, who did you contact and who gave the approval?

MR TOKA: Our immediate Commander in Botswana was Nalede Molefe, he passed away, he died in an SADF raid in Botswana in 1988.

Above him in Lusaka, our immediate Commander was the late Chris Hani.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You may proceed.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. Were you responsible to reply the necessary, you called it hardware, for this particular raid?

MR TOKA: Yes, I was responsible together with Mensday Maponya.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, this Mr Maponya you are referring to, was he also known as Odirele?

MR TOKA: Odirele Maponya, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

MR MOHLABA: Is it your case Mr Toka, that the elimination of these three police officers would have enhanced the objective of your political organisation?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Mohlaba, just one thing which is not very clear to me about these three police. Were they staying in the same house or separate houses?

MR TOKA: They were not staying in that house, they were staying in separate houses.

ADV SANDI: When they were attacked, were they ...

MR TOKA: They were in the same house, in the same location.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

MR MOHLABA: With regard to this specific raid to the three police officers Mr Toka, do you have anything to add to the Committee?

MR TOKA: I don't think so, nothing.

MR MOHLABA: I want you to take us through the grenade attack which you mentioned in paragraph 9 of your application. Where did this grenade attack happen?

ADV DE JAGER: Were there several grenade attacks?

MR MOHLABA: I want you first to take us ...

CHAIRPERSON: This is the grenade attack in Mamelodi East.

MR TOKA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: If you look it is paragraph 9(4)(iii), read with paragraph (9)(a)(i)(iii).

MR TOKA: This grenade attack took place in a place called Mamelodi Gardens, in Mamelodi township in which an one year old baby died.

Actually what was happening in this attack is that the father to that child, I don't know if he is still a policeman, but he was a policeman and he was amongst our targeted policemen in that area.

The intelligence conducted on that house in Mamelodi, it went to the extent that he would be home by about the time when this attack was carried out. I can no longer remember exactly what time he was supposed to be home.

It was later learnt that actually the attack in itself was earlier and the baby and its mother, were caught in a crossfire because of this attack. But mainly the attack was not against the child or the mother, it was mainly against the father who was a cop at that time, and who was amongst our targets.

ADV DE JAGER: But at the hour when the attack was planned, wouldn't the baby and the wife in any event have been in the house?

MR TOKA: You see Your Worship, what happens normally is that you have an intelligence group that works mainly on the reconnaissance and the intelligence gathering of a specific target, and you mainly depend on the report of that intelligence group.

It is the one at the end of the day, that will tell you what time to attack the place, what time to carry out the attack. And you have a problem as a foot soldier, that when you attack that area, you solely depend on the intelligence.

Normally it will put you in a fix, sometimes people are caught in a crossfire because of that.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, no this catching in a crossfire, let's get down to that.

Was your intelligence that this child and the mother wouldn't be in the house at that time, when the attack took place?

MR TOKA: That is - you see, I am not clear on that, but I do not remember it stated that the mother and the child were somewhere within the vicinity.

ADV DE JAGER: Wasn't this attack carried out regardless as to whether the mother and the child would be present?

MR TOKA: I think it would be, if I have to be human enough, I think it would be very unhuman for anybody to throw up a grenade where he knows that there is a small child, because of the - if you look at the effect that the grenade causes. It has got splinters on it, and a well trained soldier, you know the shockwaves, you know the movement of the splinters, and I think it would be very unhuman for anybody to do that.

That is why I am saying it was not clear in our intelligence, whether the mother and the child would be there.

ADV DE JAGER: If that is the position, could you kindly give us the names of the people who informed you who would be present at the time when the attack would take place, your intelligence people?

MR TOKA: Yes, our intelligence people, Your Worship, was Webster from East Rand, he died after our arrest.

CHAIRPERSON: You say his name is Webster?

MR TOKA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, is it correct that the one year old child who was killed in the incident, was called Patience Kalele?

MR TOKA: Exactly Your Worship.

MR MOHLABA: If I can take you back to what you were, you have just said after you were asked certain questions by the panel, I want to take you back to, you have mentioned that the foot soldiers get given instructions and this instructions are - or orders, are based on the intelligence which you have accumulated or captured.

Can you explain to the Committee whether you explained to the foot soldier the nature of the intelligence, or it is only when you are satisfied that this target according to our intelligence, could be hit appropriately at this moment, that you tell - my question is so longwinded, let me try and rephrase it. What I want to know is, the orders which you normally give to the foot soldiers, did you give them orders with specific details of your intelligence or you only mention to them that there is a target at position (a) which must be attacked at six o'clock?

MR TOKA: You see, like I started from the beginning, some of the targets themselves will be brought in by the foot soldiers themselves after a certain policeman has been targeted.

From there, it would be the work of the intelligence team to see to it what time can this be carried out, and whatsoever, and what appropriate means of attack can be used in such an attack.

From there, it is then that they will come, Webster will come and see the command structure, and discuss the whole thing. When the command structure is happy about the whole thing, then it is then that it goes to the foot soldiers.

You see the problem with our structures is that the first rear from behind, will never know the sixth one from behind him, you see. It was a matter of different units will only know the command structure, but they only know each other.

MR MOHLABA: If I understand you correctly, the foot soldier who was told, who would get given orders to execute a particular mission, no reasons are furnished to him, he must just carry out the order as given, is that correct?

MR TOKA: Yes, and the reasons that are given to him as a soldier is that there must be a political briefing given to him. He must know exactly what is the organisation going to benefit, if it is going to benefit the liberation of the country, if it is going to enhance our aims and objectives or the organisation, he must know that before he carries out the mission.

He will also be told on the details of the target that is there.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you. Taking you back to the details of this raid, can you explain to the Committee the part you have played in the attack where Patience was killed and how this whole exercise was planned?

MR TOKA: As I said, at that time I was - okay it was after, yes, I was the Commander at that time, and the part that I played, was that I approved of the attack at that place.

I also, the other role that I played, I discussed with the role players in the whole attack.

ADV DE JAGER: Was this attack also approved by the Commander in Botswana?

MR TOKA: Your Worship, it is proper that for every attack, the leadership must know.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, who were the operatives in this attack?

MR TOKA: Here it was Joseph Nkosi and Bernard Mkonyana.

ADV DE JAGER: Applicant number 6, Joseph Nkosi, is that correct?

MR TOKA: Exactly Your Worship.

CHAIRPERSON: And Bernard who?

MR TOKA: Mkonyana. I think maybe the idea is that he was acquitted by the Court of law.

CHAIRPERSON: Just before you move on Mr Toka, was a person Rose Mary Muzwaheni also injured in that attack?

MR TOKA: (Indistinct) is the charge sheet.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I am going on the charge sheet, page 73. There is an attempted murder charge for the 10th of May and the victim was Rose Mary Muzwaheni.

MR TOKA: Correctly Your Worship.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you ...

MR TOKA: Yes, she was injured in that attack.

CHAIRPERSON: And also, just sorry, just while we are on this point, just go back to the previous attack on the police house in which the three policemen were killed. Were Ananias Nkoane and Tickey Maleka also injured in that attack?

MR TOKA: That is correct Your Worship.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Mohlaba?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you. So you were not involved in the attack itself, is that correct?

MR TOKA: I was not, yes.

MR MOHLABA: After this attack was carried out, did you have an opportunity to meet with the operatives to discuss how it, whether it was a success or a failure?

MR TOKA: Yes, we had that opportunity to discuss with the operatives and we felt that it was not that successful because only the baby and its mother got in the crossfire and not the supposed target.

MR MOHLABA: Do you have anything to add with regard to this attack where this child was killed?

MR TOKA: I've got nothing to add.

MR MOHLABA: I would want now to move to the bomb blast ...

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, were you very surprised that a child was injured and a woman injured in that house?

MR TOKA: Yes, as I said Your Worship, I think it is only someone who is (indistinct), who will jubilate over such a thing.

ADV DE JAGER: No, I don't think whether you jubilated about it, but this man was staying in a house and usually if one is staying in a house, there is a family staying with you?

MR TOKA: That is correct Your Worship. I cannot say we were surprised, it is just that we were not happy about the thing.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, and didn't you feel that you didn't in fact do enough to prevent this, an innocent child of a year old, being killed?

MR TOKA: Yes, I think we - that is generally our unhappiness into the whole thing that not the target was actually effected.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Mohlaba, Mr Toka, did you go back to this - you mentioned, was it Webster who gave this intelligence information, did you go back to Webster to say why did you not tell us that there was a woman and a child staying there?

MR TOKA: Yes, I think we discussed it with him, but there was no appropriate answer given after that, because you see the problem with myself and my Commander, myself and my Commissar, Liverpool, at that time it was Godfrey Makobe, we discussed it with him, and we felt not quite happy about it, because in his intelligence nothing of that nature was indicated.

It happens just like any other military attack where civilians are caught in a crossfire and it is not the aim of the man behind the barrel to start shooting at the civilians, that is the whole thing.

ADV DE JAGER: The Commissar was Godfrey?

MR TOKA: Makobe.

ADV DE JAGER: Makobe?

MR TOKA: Makobe, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: He is not one of the applicants either?

MR TOKA: I am sorry, he passed away.

ADV SANDI: Did you do anything Mr Toka, that is before you approved of this operation, did you do anything to satisfy yourself that no such people as Patience and this woman would be caught up in the crossfire?

MR TOKA: You see, normally as a Commander or as MK operatives, you go for different trainings, and this Webster that I am talking about, he has been in the Soviet Union Special Agent in intelligence and I could not doubt his integrity to collect intelligence information on that.

ADV DE JAGER: But when he reported to you this, he said I've kept this house under surveillance, this policeman is staying there. Didn't you ask him is there any family staying with him?

MR TOKA: I think I did ask him.

ADV DE JAGER: No Mr Toka, you repeatedly say I think. Did you or did you not?

MR TOKA: You see Your Worship, here we are talking about incidents that happened 10 years back. You may not know what was your appropriate answer at that time, because nobody knew that today I will be standing here, explaining these things.

Unless if I knew, then I think I could have kept a diary and tell you exactly what I said.

CHAIRPERSON: You say you are not sure whether you asked whether there were family members besides the policeman himself, in the house?

MR TOKA: Yes, normally when somebody comes with a private house, an attack on a private house, you will generally ask for the occupants of the house, is there any other occupant in the house? Can we have some people suffering injuries, which we did not plan for?

It will depend on the guy who is conducting the intelligence, on the answer that he is going to give you and if he says in my intelligence, I think the whole operation will go smoothly, that is what we take from him.

CHAIRPERSON: Because one would imagine that if the intelligence was that there were family members such as a one year old child and a mother in the house, then wouldn't one then not just hurl a hand grenade through a window, you would kick the door open and go in with your guns rather, and select your victim?

MR TOKA: You see, Your Worship, in this case, we talk about a one year old child, and if one really knew there was a one year old child in the house, then you see, it is not only the shrapnels that can kill that child, but also the shock waves can still do it.

And I don't think whether that child is in another room whatsoever, I don't think that any clever man would carry out such an attack. That is why I am saying it was not clear from our intelligence that there was a child and a woman in the house.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Mohlaba?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. You have mentioned the person who was doing the intelligence. Can you explain to the Committee the relationship in so far as it relates to the chain of command between yourself and him?

Was he naturally supposed to report to you or he was only involved with the intelligence and that was his department?

MR TOKA: Yes, the way the structure was, I was the Commander and Godfrey Makobe was the Commissar, that was the second in charge, and Webster was our intelligence man. Webster was generally involved not only in the intelligence gathering of a target, he was as well involved in the screening of new recruits.

If we wanted to recruit somebody, it was the work of Webster, to go into the biography of this person and see if he was good to be recruited whatsoever. Then from there, he would then come back to me and report and say whether this is a good guy or a bad guy.

MR MOHLABA: When it relates to intelligence gathering, Webster's word was final, you trusted him because that was not your domain, is that correct?

MR TOKA: Correctly.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going on to the bomb blast?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair, yes. Can we move over to the bomb blast? You have mentioned if I can show it to you, I am always reading it, does this bomb blast relate to the Juicy Lucy bombing?

MR TOKA: Yes, at Vermeulen Street, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Could we just structure this? The first incident at Mamelodi, would cover if you look at the charge sheet Mr Mohlaba, page 72, that would cover charges 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and maybe 8?

CHAIRPERSON: No, not 8.

ADV DE JAGER: It is on the same date?

CHAIRPERSON: No, it is the 18th of March, 8 is the 10th of May.

MR TOKA: Only up to charge 6.

CHAIRPERSON: It is the second incident.

ADV DE JAGER: Oh 8 is also relating to the second incident, charges 4, 7 and 8, that would relate to the second incident?

CHAIRPERSON: 4, 7 and 8 relate to the incident in which the attack was made on the policemen

MR TOKA: 4, (indistinct)

MR TOKA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And the other ones mentioned earlier, were the first attack, the one in Marian Street, is that right?

MR TOKA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And then the bomb blast that you are referring to now, if you take a look just so that we don't get confused, is that charges 26, 27, 28, page 79, and 29 and 30?

MR TOKA: Correct Your Worship.

CHAIRPERSON: The 26th of May 1988?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Okay, 26 to 30 inclusive. Yes, Mr Mohlaba?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. This bomb blast, it is what is normally referred here as the Juicy Lucy bombing, is that correct?

MR TOKA: Correct.

MR MOHLABA: Can you take the Committee through that incident, how this bombing was planned and executed?

MR TOKA: According to our intelligence at that time, it is that I think the National Party on that day was celebrating 40 years in power and according to our intelligence from Juicy Lucy, there is a military building which is about plus minus 400 meters and that is now according to our intelligence is that the soldiers that were working in that building, that is where they used to have their lunch.

If that limpet mine was properly placed in that area, then those soldiers that were having their lunch in that area, will be effected by that blast. We looked at the intelligence, we analyzed it, we discussed it and it was true that just next to that area, there is about a military installation there and we then went to Atteridgeville, myself and Liverpool and we discussed it with the Unit in Atteridgeville, Francis Pitsi, George Mathe and Ernest Ramadite, to carry out that operation.

We gave out orders that that operation should be carried out.

CHAIRPERSON: Where precisely was this Juicy Lucy?

MR TOKA: Juicy Lucy is at Vermeulen Street.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that in the CBD in the centre of town?

MR TOKA: Yes, in the CBD, in the Central Business District, yes Your Worship.

CHAIRPERSON: Please continue.

MR TOKA: And we gave them the order, myself and Liverpool, for them to carry out that operation and we saw it as, politically we saw it as an operation to be carried out for the enhancement of our struggle and that is why the operation was carried out there.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there prior approval given from Botswana?

MR TOKA: As I said before Your Worship, it is the nature of all of us to report back to the leadership in exile to give the final approval.

ADV DE JAGER: And did they approve an attack on Juicy Lucy?

MR TOKA: Yes, they approved it based on the motivation that there were soldiers who were eating there.

ADV DE JAGER: At what time did this attack take place?

MR TOKA: I can't hear you properly.

ADV DE JAGER: At what time of the day did the attack take place?

MR TOKA: I am not sure now, but I think it was around lunch, the lunch hour which might have been between one and two or twelve and one, but it was around those lunch times.

ADV DE JAGER: In central city?

MR TOKA: Yes Your Worship.

ADV DE JAGER: Between one and two in the afternoon?

MR TOKA: Yes Your Worship.

ADV DE JAGER: When all the people come for lunch and visit eating places?

MR TOKA: Exactly Your Worship.

ADV DE JAGER: Mothers, children, everybody?

MR TOKA: Your Worship, once you identify a group of soldiers who eats in a certain place, what is in the mind of a soldier when you place a bomb, is to carry out an attack against those soldiers who are eating there.

He is not carrying out an attack against those people that are passing there.

ADV DE JAGER: Was there a single soldier injured in that attack?

MR TOKA: There was no, according to the report on the newspaper, there was no soldier injured. I don't know, maybe those ladies, if we go back to their backgrounds, maybe they were soldiers. I am not sure, up to now.

ADV DE JAGER: Well, I think they are represented here, they would be able to tell us whether they were soldiers.

MR TOKA: That is good Your Worship.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Toka, if you could just mention, the attack was carried out you say by Mr Pitsi?

MR TOKA: Yes Your Worship and George Mathe and Ramadite.

CHAIRPERSON: Which one, oh yes, the one that is not here. The type of weapon used?

MR TOKA: It was a limpet mine, I think a mini limpet. I don't know what they, it was a mini limpet mine.

CHAIRPERSON: With a time set?

MR TOKA: Yes, with a time delay metal plate, lap plate.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mohlaba.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. You say this attack was carried by the people that you have mentioned.

Are you saying this because you have discussed this issue with them and gave orders to them to carry out this attack?

MR TOKA: Yes.

MR MOHLABA: And do you know whether one of them or all of them, carried out the attack, the actual placing of the mini limpet mine inside the shop, whether it was done by all of them in concert or was it done by one of them, are you aware of that?

MR TOKA: I don't remember exactly who did that.

MR MOHLABA: In placing this limpet mine, you say that the intended target was the soldiers who frequented that shop as opposed to the civilians who were caught in the crossfire? Can you explain whether it was your intention to only attack the soldiers or regardless of the fact that there could be civilians, you gave orders to attack that area?

MR TOKA: When we gave orders Your Worship, we mainly looked at the main target, the soldiers. It is very unfortunate that some people were caught in the crossfire there.

MR MOHLABA: Do you have anything to add with regard to this attack at Juicy Lucy?

MR TOKA: No, I've got nothing to add there.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry just before you move on, Mr Toka. Mr Toka, I had a look at the submissions that have been made by the ANC, they are contained in various documents and when one takes a look, they set out a number of incidents which they say were carried out under the flag of the ANC and then when one takes a look at this list, all the incidents that you have referred to in your applications, when I say you meaning plural, you and the other applicants, are mentioned in this list, save for this Juicy Lucy one, it doesn't appear.

You can take a look at the list yourself, it doesn't appear there, and then in addition, in the submission they give another list, a second list of operations which they call armed actions for which target category and/or responsibility is uncertain, in other words they are not sure whether they were ANC operations, approved operations or not, and also on that list, there is no mention of this bombing in the Juicy Lucy.

Can you give any reason for that, can you give any explanation for that?

MR TOKA: I think the fact is, I don't know exactly what exact reason I can give to this, but you see the whole thing is that the target might relate to Juicy Lucy as a place in the CBD.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I see we are having the tea adjournment just now, perhaps you can take a look at the list yourself, they do it date by date and then a description, and there is nothing for the date on which this occurred.

MR TOKA: Okay, I think in that case Your Worship, I would ask my ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Take a look at it. I am just asking if you've got any reason why it doesn't appear here.

MR TOKA: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: Would this be a convenient time to take the tea adjournment and can we take it just for quarter of an hour, and start again at twenty past eleven? Just take a short tea adjournment, we will start again at quarter past eleven.

Mr Mohlaba, you can take a look, I will give you this list here.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

RODNEY ABRAM MOEKETSI TOKA: (still under oath)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mohlaba?

EXAMINATION BY MR MOHLABA: (continued)

Thank you Chair. Before I proceed Mr Chairman, there was a question which was directed to the applicant with regard to this particular incident, not appearing in the submissions of the ANC.

During this tea adjournment I contacted the national office to clarify the situation, and we spoke to Brian Kopedi of the national office, who indicated to us that it has since come to their attention that the list of these incidents, it is not complete and they are looking into bringing another, further submission in that regard, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mohlaba.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry Mr Mohlaba, but could he tell you whether this incident would indeed by included in the next list?

MR MOHLABA: All he indicated was that they are aware of this particular incident having been excluded in particular and they said there are some other incidents which are not forming part of their list, and they are looking towards doing an addendum to the list.

I don't know whether it will specifically be included in the next list. May I then proceed Mr Chairman?

Mr Toka, you have mentioned about approval which you normally sought from Botswana?

MR TOKA: That is correct.

MR MOHLABA: Can you explain to the Committee how was that done? Was it done telephonically, by writing or did somebody need to go to Botswana for that reason?

MR TOKA: Normally is that one of us, one of the members of the command structure, would have to go to Botswana to sort out an approval from them.

MR MOHLABA: With this particular incident, you have mentioned that approval was sought and obtained from Botswana about this particular incident, can you remember who went for this approval, was it yourself or somebody else if you can remember?

MR TOKA: At this instance, on this particular incident or any other incident, I cannot remember exactly who went there for an approval, but it was either, it would be me or my Commissar going there.

MR MOHLABA: Can you mention him by name?

MR TOKA: As I mentioned at that time, the Commissar was Godfrey Makobe.

MR MOHLABA: So either yourself or Makobe could have gone to Botswana to seek this approval and are you certain that approval was sought and obtained in respect of this attack?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR MOHLABA: And you have mentioned that attacks such as this, were not carried out without such approval, is that correct?

MR TOKA: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: In the attacks where you were involved, was there any one where you took local initiative, without approval?

MR TOKA: Your Worship, I think in almost all of our attacks stated here, the approval was got from Botswana, or Lusaka directly.

CHAIRPERSON: We heard yesterday Mr Toka, when Mr Maluleka was giving evidence, that in that particular attack, him and his Commander Mr Maponya, they had a meeting and then the mission was that they would go into town, armed with their limpet mines, and separate once in town, each seek out a target of their choice, which they felt would be an appropriate target, place the mine and then meet back later.

Obviously in an operation like that, they wouldn't have got approval from Botswana in the time that they placed the mine, because they only determined the target once they were in town, they were walking the street and look for a place, they didn't go to a specific target, that is what we heard yesterday?

MR TOKA: Yes, I think to answer that question, I would say Your Worship, if you look at these attacks, there are those attacks that were mainly for military propaganda, where a limpet would be put in an isolated place, where it would just go off by itself, just to register to the people that Umkhonto weSizwe is present in the country and we have such attacks like if you go to the attacks at Proes Street, where an isolated mine blew up a Renault car that was parked there, those were such attacks.

CHAIRPERSON: You wouldn't get prior approval?

MR TOKA: Yes, in such attacks, what we needed only was just the propaganda, the military propaganda and we looked for specifically isolated places where there is no movement of civilians or people whatsoever.

That is where we would place such a mine then it goes off by itself, just to register the presence of the liberation army in the country.

CHAIRPERSON: But where the target of the attack would involve or may involve a killing, then you would seek your approval?

MR TOKA: Then you would seek approval from outside, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you, Mr Mohlaba?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. With regard to this Juicy Lucy bombing as it is know, do you have anything to add to that?

MR TOKA: Nothing at this stage.

MR MOHLABA: With the permission of the Chair, may I move over to the next incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly Mr Mohlaba.

MR MOHLABA: Mr Toka, there is also an application for amnesty in respect of a bomb blast at Proes Street. Is this the bomb which went under a Renault?

MR TOKA: Correctly.

MR MOHLABA: Do you know who was the owner of this motor vehicle?

MR TOKA: No, I don't know the owner.

MR MOHLABA: Can you explain to the Committee how this attack was planned and who carried it out and how it was carried out, if you know?

MR TOKA: This attack was planned in conjunction with the Juicy Lucy attack, and as I said it was quite an isolated place, and we felt that we should register our presence there.

It was planted in exactly the same way, with the same group that carried out the Juicy Lucy attack, that is why both attacks took place on the same day.

That one was a purely military propaganda attack like I said.

MR MOHLABA: So you did not personally carry out this attack?

MR TOKA: I did not.

MR MOHLABA: Do you carry a knowledge who was responsible for placing this device under this car?

MR TOKA: George Mathe.

MR MOHLABA: You say that the justification for such attacks, was to make a statement, that is military propaganda as you called it, and is it your case that such conduct enhanced the aims of the African National Congress?

MR TOKA: It did Your Worship, because it always kept what we at that time called the enemy, on its toes and such attacks were able to draw the enemy to a certain location, where we needed to draw them to.

For instance, if you look into the past history of MK attacks, they were normally in the townships, whatsoever, whatsoever, and drawing them into the cities like one of the orders of the ANC said that we should take the war into the suburbs, such attacks served as propaganda for the movement, and in that case, enhanced our aim of the liberation struggle.

MR MOHLABA: With the permission of the Chair, I am going to move over to the next incident.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Mohlaba, it would greatly assist us if you could link the incidents to for instance the charge sheet and the annexures to the charge sheet.

I see for instance as far as the Sterland one is concerned, where Mr Odirele was killed, there was in fact a person injured at the Sterland complex.

I think perhaps the present applicant, he told us that that was for military propaganda and you wouldn't get prior approval, it is not necessary if it is only for propaganda. But placing a bomb at Sterland, it is a theatre complex, bioscope complex where you've got continuous films being shown, wouldn't that be a sort of situation where you would foresee that people could be injured or killed?

MR TOKA: Okay, but let's get into Sterland, I think what we were discussing was Proes Street and the Juicy Lucy and I am sure, he hasn't gone into Sterland yet.

If that is the case, I would still say that you see, there can be intervals between the cinemas, how they operate, but within that interval, you would find that there is about 30 minutes of where there was no movement, everybody is in the complex at that time. You might find that during that 30 minutes, the device that was used there, a limpet mine, has got different lap plates. There is a lap plate for 30 minutes.

With our weather here in South Africa, it will take you for 30 minutes, there will be another lap plate that will take you for an hour and I think the last lap plate will take you for about 16 hours. It would depend on the man behind the bomb, which lap plate to put there. You might put it there at seven o'clock when the movies is still on, but it might go off at twelve o'clock, at midnight, when there is nobody there.

So you cannot at this stage guarantee that whoever placed that bomb at Sterland, had an intention to kill people there.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, well the evidence in that case was, you were not present yesterday, so you didn't hear the evidence, that they placed it for seven 'o clock, or they timed it for seven o'clock and there was half an hour time device fixed there.

MR TOKA: Yes, and it was clear at that time, that at that time, at half past seven, everybody will be in the movies, because the first movie, I think it was supposed to go out at 20H00, that was according to ...

ADV DE JAGER: And nobody queuing for the next movie?

MR TOKA: That is why even when it went off there, it only injured that man that you said was injured, and it killed my Commander, that is why.

At that time, there was nobody moving around that place?

ADV DE JAGER: Where was he killed, on the sidewalk or in the building?

MR TOKA: Not in the building, about 10), plus or minus 150 meters from the building, yes, on the parking lot.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Mohlaba, you can continue.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. I was trying to guide myself by the sequence in which the applicant has completed his application form, and it was our intention to deal with the Sterland explosion after this sequence in particular, so if the Chair would allow me.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think just carry on as you have been, the next one you are going to then deal with is a bomb blast at Atteridgeville municipality building?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. Mr Toka, this incident of the Atteridgeville municipality building, can you take the Committee through it? How was this planned, who carried out this blast and who gave orders for that?

MR TOKA: Yes, this attack on the municipality building was planned by my Commander, Mensday Maponya, myself and Johannes Maleka, who carried out the operation, and a limpet mine was given to him. I think it was a super limpet mine and it was given to him in Mamelodi.

It was carried over to Atteridgeville and placed in that building, I think in a dust bin if I can still remember well, in that building. It went off I think after an hour, an hour after everybody has knocked off there.

Approval as well was, in this case, we sought the approval from Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Was anyone injured that you know of?

MR TOKA: No, there were no injuries.

MR MOHLABA: So the building, the municipality building was identified as a legitimate target for the purpose of enhancing the objectives of your political organisation, is that correct?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR MOHLABA: With the permission of the Chair, I would want to move then to the next incident.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't have to get my permission Mr Mohlaba, you can proceed without it.

MR MOHLABA: As it pleases the Chair. Mr Toka, take us through the grenade attack at Mveke's place, if that is not a duplication of what you have already explained about the, or rather the grenade attack at Mveke's place, is that the place where the child was killed?

MR TOKA: No, it is a different place. Mveke, the owner of that house was a police officer and he was amongst those policemen that were targeted as our targets.

That is why his place was attacked. During the attack, no one was killed or injured and I think it only caused some damage to the house and in this case, this attack was carried by Reginald Legodi, James Kgase and Reuben Khotsa. They did it through the ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry is James Kgase and Alfred Kgase the same person?

MR TOKA: Yes Your Worship.

CHAIRPERSON: You say it was carried out by Reginald Legodi, James Kgase and Reuben Khotsa. I wouldn't specifically say who threw the grenade.

I am no longer certain of that Your Worship.

MR MOHLABA: Was this attack carried out pursuant to orders which were given to them by somebody or yourself?

MR TOKA: Yes, at that time I was the Commander. I mainly carried out the orders given by the command structure in Botswana.

ADV DE JAGER: Could you assist me, the spelling of the victim's name, is it Myeke?

MR TOKA: It is Mveke.

ADV DE JAGER: Was that in Block O in Mamelodi East?

MR TOKA: No, I think it is in Mamelodi West, I am not sure if it is after, I know the place where it is, but I cannot certainly say whether it is East or West.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, you don't know whether it was carried out on the 4th of June 1988?

MR TOKA: I think the charge sheet will help me on that, because I can't remember the dates now.

CHAIRPERSON: You see the charge sheet says that on the 4th of June a Russian F1 defensive hand grenade was thrown into the house of one Simon Myeke of Block O, 8414, Mamelodi East.

MR TOKA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So the charge sheet is wrong with Myeke?

MR TOKA: Yes, I suppose.

CHAIRPERSON: It is Mveke, it should be a "v" and not a "y"?

MR TOKA: I think according to my knowledge it is Mveke, but I don't know, I have never met him before.

CHAIRPERSON: So it might be Myeke?

MR TOKA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Myeke is the more common name, isn't it, certainly from whereabout I come.

MR TOKA: I am not clear on that Your Worship.

ADV DE JAGER: According to the charge sheet, he and his family were in the house at the time, but nobody was injured?

MR TOKA: All I know is that nobody was injured, Your Worship, I don't know whether he was in the house or not. I only know that nobody was injured in the attack.

MR MOHLABA: You have mentioned that this attack was sanctioned by ANC in Botswana. You were also given orders to pass them down to the operatives?

MR TOKA: Yes, on the ground, yes.

MR MOHLABA: Can you mention who gave you those orders?

MR TOKA: The orders from Botswana at that time were either given by Mr Joe Karre.

MR MOHLABA: Sorry to interrupt, I am not referring to the orders from Botswana, the person who communicated those orders to you, because the way I understood you is that you did not get it from Botswana personally, there was somebody in the middle, is that not so?

MR TOKA: Can you come again?

CHAIRPERSON: I think Mr Mohlaba, he said that either himself or his Commissar would personally go to Botswana and get the authority from Botswana, but he can't remember in which incidents he or the Commissar went.

MR TOKA: That is correct.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. So you are however certain that these met the sanctions of Botswana, is that correct?

MR TOKA: Yes, our headquarters in Botswana yes.

ADV DE JAGER: And the Commander in Botswana at that time, you said Joe?

MR TOKA: The Commander in Botswana at that time, it was one Joe Cheo...

CHAIRPERSON: Is this a battle name, (indistinct) type name?

MR TOKA: Yes.

MR MOHLABA: So you mentioned that the orders as they came from you to the operators, were given to the names you have mentioned. You are not certain who actually threw the grenade, is that correct?

MR TOKA: Yes, I think I knew at that time, but now, since it is a long time, I have forgotten that.

MR MOHLABA: May we now move over to, you talk of a grenade attack, that is in your application form, a grenade attack at a house in Mamelodi East (Ndala's house).

Can you take us through that incident?

MR TOKA: Yes, what happened is that in our intelligence, we received intelligence that Ndala was a police agent at that time, and that being an informer, an attack on him would enhance our revolutionary goals because if you look at most of the incidents on how our people got arrested, it was through these informers, whatsoever.

It was one of our objectives as operatives, to see to it that informers were attacked, as they were part of the system as we used to call it in the past.

The attack was planned by myself, my Commissar and the Unit that was involved, it was the same Unit that was involved in Mveke's house. We discussed it, we sought the permission for that house to be attacked and the permission was given to us. We passed it over to the Unit members, and they carried out that attack.

As I remember well, even in that attack, no one was injured. It is that the grenade actually did not even went into the house, it just blew up outside the house and no one was injured.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes according to the charge sheet, Mr Toka, I refer to page 85, paragraph (vii), it says that a hand grenade was thrown at the house of Mr Ndala in Mamelodi East and that his house, as well as a Toyota kombi was damaged.

MR TOKA: Exactly Your Worship.

ADV DE JAGER: This Unit, what was the name of the Unit or how did it become known, was it also known as the Maponya Unit?

MR TOKA: Actually all this structure was known as the Moses Mabida structure.

MR MOHLABA: May we now move over Mr Toka, to the grenade attack which you say, it looks like Ronald Molauzi.

MR TOKA: Molauzi, yes. That attack was carried out on Ronald Molauzi's property because Molauzi was amongst those policemen that we have targeted and he was known to be very notorious because at that time I think he was working in Mamelodi West at the police station there, and we felt that we have to carry this attack on him, and the same Unit that attacked the two houses, Mveke and Ndala's house, were given the orders to attack the Ronald Molauzi's house, and again in this operation, no one was injured or killed.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it the same Unit who carried out the attack as Mveke and Ndala attacks?

MR TOKA: Correctly Your Worship.

MR MOHLABA: And can you explain what happened, was a grenade thrown into his house, or can you explain the nature of the attack which was carried out here?

MR TOKA: I think the way the structure of that house was, it fell in between, there was a passage and it fell in be tween the two houses, there was like what people would normally term a (indistinct) house and the main house, and it fell somewhere there.

That is why it did not injure anybody.

CHAIRPERSON: These, if one just takes a look at all this evidence, these attacks on houses with grenades, were absolutely useless? I mean you killed a one year old baby, when I say you, the Unit. The Unit killed a one year old baby in four attacks, that is all they did? It didn't hit one target?

MR TOKA: You see Your Worship, it depends on how you look at them. Military one would say, yes, they were not good, but politically they made an impact. Because politically people were aware of the presence of an MK Unit in Mamelodi.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand that, but the objective of the attack was to remove nominated targets and they got nowhere near that?

MR TOKA: Normally that would be the objective, but you see when you carry out an objective, you have two goals into it.

You have normally what you would call your absolute goal and you will also have what will be a secondary goal. A secondary goal will be a political goal.

CHAIRPERSON: Just a propaganda type, we are here?

MR TOKA: Yes. Some people used to just stand on the road and start shooting an AK into the air, not trying to kill anybody, but just to remind the people that we are here.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I just mentioned that as an aside, they weren't successful, wholly successful operations.

MR TOKA: I think so Your Worship.

MR MOHLABA: Can we now move over Mr Toka to, you have mentioned a bomb blast (Lion Bridge Pretoria). Can you take the Committee through that incident?

MR TOKA: Yes, that is the bomb blast, I initially said that it was carried out as a military propaganda, that is why an isolated spot was chosen in town.

That one was carried by Peter Maluleka and after he dropped me and Mensday at Sterland, and he carried out that attack.

MR MOHLABA: We have already heard Mr Maluleka's evidence with regard thereto. I would like now to move to ...

ADV DE JAGER: Could we, before moving on there, was Lion Bridge targeted as a target by your committee?

MR TOKA: Your Worship, I have said it that there were some attacks that we did not need like for instance sanction from the military structure in Botswana.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, I am happy with that part.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr De Jager, before you proceed, not being a local person, Lion Bridge, is that the same as Van Aswegen? Is Van Aswegen at Lion Bridge?

MR TOKA: yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Lion Bridge, yes. But you have considered it and you have chosen it as a target locally?

MR TOKA: You see, what is happening is that, this is what we used to call reconnaissance on the spot, or reconnaissance by fire, where you go into a situation, you are carrying out a military propaganda structure, you find a place which is isolated, you immediately put that limpet there, then it goes off.

You do not sanction a specific place, you do not say go and bomb that house there, go and bomb what. You say get any isolated area, so long as it is in Pretoria, place it there for our propaganda's sake. That is what normally happens.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, so in this instance, Van Aswegen and Lion Bridge was not targeted beforehand, before you went down?

MR TOKA: No, it was just a thing that happened on the spot, it was not targeted, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: And you say you accompanied Mr Maponya?

MR TOKA: To Sterland, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: To Sterland?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

ADV DE JAGER: So you were present when the incident occurred?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR MOHLABA: May you Mr Toka, take us through the incident at Sterland where Mr Maponya died?

MR TOKA: Like I said in Sterland, like generally on that night, we said that we were simply on a mission of conducting reconnaissance on the spot mission.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, to interrupt Mr Toka, was this a Saturday night, or Friday night?

MR TOKA: It was a Friday night, Your Worship. That is why we went to place that bomb at Sterland and then in the process of that bomb being placed, Mr Maponya was killed there.

Normally, as I said before, we were generally on a mission to make the people aware, especially because Pretoria, at that time, was considered as the belly of the apartheid regime, we thought it was appropriate to have our propaganda carried out right in Pretoria, so that those who are in the hierarchy of apartheid, should know that we can also hit them where they don't expect us to hit them.

In the process, Mensday Maponya was killed in that attack.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you in his company?

MR TOKA: I was in his company.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you get injured?

MR TOKA: I did not get injured.

CHAIRPERSON: Did it go off while you were on your way to the target, because you said earlier you were about 150 meters from the complex?

MR TOKA: No, it didn't go on while we were on our way to the target, because where it went off, that is where we had decided to put it.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Toka, just for my clarity, this bomb, was it in the hands of Mr Maponya when it went off?

MR TOKA: Exactly Your Worship.

ADV SANDI: How far were you away from him?

MR TOKA: I was about five to six, plus minus ten meters from him. You see the problem is that the way that that parking area is, it is amongst some big trees there. There were trunks of trees.

Possibly, because during the process of placing that bomb there, there was like another person that was crossing by the street, and Maponya felt that I should disturb that person, so that he doesn't see what he is doing there, and while I was waiting with that guy, just behind the trunk of a tree, that is when it went off. I am sure that is why me and the guy that I was waiting with at that stage, we never got injured.

ADV SANDI: You have referred to this place as Sterland.

MR TOKA: The Sterland complex.

ADV SANDI: I must apologise, not being too familiar with Pretoria, what sort of place is this?

MR TOKA: It is on the corner of Beatrix and Pretorius Street.

ADV DE JAGER: It is a cinema complex, bioscope and shopping and restaurant and different shops?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR MOHLABA: So the area where this device was to be placed, is an isolated area and it was not intended for ...

MR TOKA: For movie goers, no.

MR MOHLABA: With regard to this very blast, Mr Toka, do you have anything to add?

MR TOKA: Nothing, except that I think there was a car that was damaged there.

MR MOHLABA: Were you ever arrested for these offences that you have mentioned?

MR TOKA: Yes.

MR MOHLABA: And did you stand trial?

MR TOKA: I did not stand trial, the trial was just in its initial stage, when we escaped from Modabi prison.

MR MOHLABA: Is that the reason why you are also applying for amnesty for escaping from lawful custody, is that correct?

MR TOKA: Correctly.

CHAIRPERSON: When did you escape?

MR TOKA: I think it was on the 18th of February 1990.

CHAIRPERSON: 1990?

MR TOKA: 18th of February.

CHAIRPERSON: 1998?

MR TOKA: 1990.

CHAIRPERSON: 1990?

MR TOKA: Yes.

MR MOHLABA: Were you the only person who escaped from lawful custody or did you have other people who escaped with you?

MR TOKA: I had other people who escaped with me, we escaped, the nine of us. It was myself, Francis Pitsi, Johannes Maleka, Ernest Ramadite, George Mathe, Joseph Nkosi, Reginald legodi, Reuben Khotsa and James Kgase and myself.

ADV DE JAGER: Were you assisted in the escape?

MR TOKA: Yes, we were assisted by our underground structures inside the country and the movement outside.

ADV DE JAGER: And the warders?

MR TOKA: No one from the prison authorities helped us to escape.

CHAIRPERSON: Was anybody killed or injured in the escape?

MR TOKA: According to my knowledge, no one was injured or killed in that escape, except, unless if one will call minor bruises, injuries. Because I think during the scuffle with the prison warders, all of them might have suffered minor bruises.

But there was not really a scuffle.

MR MOHLABA: Do you have anything to say to the Committee or the victims in conclusion, in reference to these applications?

MR TOKA: Firstly let me say to this Committee that I am very happy that I have been given the opportunity to come and explain my role in these attacks, and give my motivation and extend a hand of apology to the victims and their loved ones, and all those that have suffered through our attacks.

I think it has been a great moment for me to be here, because I always felt that there is a need in this country, a clear and genuine reconciliation. Given enough time, I think one will have time to sit with the victims and embrace them and that they should know that these attacks on them, were not personally against them specifically.

We did not have a single grudge against them, it was clearly a political thing. That is all I can say.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair, that will conclude the evidence of Mr Toka.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MOHLABA

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mohlaba. Mr Molefe, do you have any questions to ask the witness?

INTERPRETER: The speaker is too far from the microphone.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Molefe, the Interpreter has indicated that he is not picking you up. There is no microphone? I think we will have to try to make some sort of arrangement here, whereby people can have access to microphones. Thank you Ms Mtanga.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOLEFE: Thank you Mr Chair. Mr Toka, you explained that this whole structure was what you referred to as the Moses Mabida structure. Can you just elaborate on that.

This structure, were they Units, were the Cells, if so, how many were they and so forth?

MR TOKA: Yes, this structure was known as Moses Mabida, that was in dedication to comrade Moses Mabida who was a member of the Communist Party who have passed away sometime and the structure was named after him, and like I said from the beginning, this structure, our orders were recruit, train, arm and lead our people to battle.

It was true that order, that there had to be Cells, the people operated like Cells. There was first the command structure which consisted of me and Mensday, after Mensday it was me, Liverpool and Webster, that was the command structure.

From there you had a Unit like in Atteridgeville, that carried out the AK raid there, which was a Unit on its own, and we had a Unit that carried out the grenade attacks in Mamelodi, being a Unit on its own.

Having another Unit in Mamelodi that carried out the grenade attack on the house that killed the one year old baby, as a Unit on its own. You had Peter Maluleka, being a one man Unit, so it was all different Cells and different structures.

MR MOLEFE: The way you were operating, did one Unit for instance, let me see, Peter Maluleka's one man Unit, did it necessarily know what the other Units are doing or have done?

MR TOKA: These Units only came to know one another, after our arrest. Before our arrest, one Unit never knew what the other Unit was doing.

They worked as separate Units, it is only us in the command structure, that knew what different Units were doing.

They had never met each other, until during our detention. That is when they met each other and saw that they were all members of one structure.

MR MOLEFE: Thank you Mr Chair.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MOLEFE

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Have the legal representatives for the victims worked out or determined who is going to cross-examine first or is there any problem?

MR MOKONE: I only have one question.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that Mr Mokone?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOKONE: That is correct. Mr Toka, I am informed that ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I think before you cross-examine, Mr Toka, Mr Mokone is appearing for the Mope family, is that correct?

MR MOKONE: Mope and Mphahlele.

CHAIRPERSON: Mope and Mphahlele families.

MR TOKA: Okay.

MR MOKONE: I am informed that the applicant who executed this killing of the policemen, were known. The policemen and the applicants knew each other very well. Did you satisfy yourself that there was no any other motive for the killing, except a political motive?

MR TOKA: I did satisfy myself that there was no other motive except a political motive.

MR MOKONE: How did you do that?

MR TOKA: You see, normally it is like I said, when a Unit comes with a target, we look at that target, it goes through that stage of analysing the target, of assessing it, and of looking into the motivation why that target should be attacked.

Upon that, that is when we give our approval for that target to be, after we have contacted our leaders from outside, it is then that we give out an approval for the target. We would never at any stage, allow any member of our Unit to attack a target based on personal grudges or any other thing, except a target that will have, that will enhance our political struggle.

MR MOKONE: Are you very sure?

ADV DE JAGER: Just, before you leave, the persons who were targeted to kill these two policemen, were they the same people who brought the information to you that these two, should be considered as possible targets?

MR TOKA: I will say yes, and I will say it is because, you see, if you are a Commander, you are not directly involved in a situation.

You don't know who is notorious in this area, and who is notorious in that area. It depends on the people on the ground to say you know, there is a problem with the community here, that this policeman and this policeman are considered notorious, what do we do with them?

It is then that we look at it, and we start discussing it as a team, then you make recommendations and you wait for approval from outside.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but if I've got a grudge against Mr X, and I would come to you and say listen Mr X is an informer or a notorious policeman, and my reasons for saying this is I have seen him in the vicinity of the police station or whatever information I could give to you, would you independently investigate whether I am speaking the truth or not?

MR TOKA: Normally in that situation what would happen is that we would have contact with a few activists that are known in that area, who must confirm your story and you see, because if you look into the whole thing of the struggle, you know, if we were not careful of doing that, then a lot of people could have suffered falsely because somebody hates them.

That is why it was necessary that for any target that has been brought in, it is discussed thoroughly to see to it that no political grudges or any maybe religious grudges are involved in this. No personal grudges, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: So if Mr, say for instance Mr Pitsi would give you certain information, you will discuss it and you will ask other activists whether he is speaking the truth, whether he is telling the truth?

MR TOKA: Yes, normally it is proper that you gather some kind of opinion and yes, it will be proper to do that, because I wonder how many people came to me and told me that this one is an informer.

You say if we were operating in that fashion, then we would have a list of 200 houses bombed, because everybody will come and say that man is an informer and some people are not informers.

So you had to do your thorough investigation.

ADV DE JAGER: Now why didn't you corroborate Mr Webster's information?

MR TOKA: No Mr Webster's information, you see, it depends, here it is a Unit of people that has never been trained in intelligence who brings in the information, it is different when that information is brought by somebody who has specifically been trained in that.

Webster was specifically trained in intelligence. I was never, I did MCW, which was our basic intelligence training, but Webster went to a more advanced intelligence training in the Soviet Union.

That is why we all relied on him. You see, we all had our own speciality. This one is specialised in this, this one in this.

ADV DE JAGER: I understand it, I believe you had no reason to doubt Webster's ...

MR TOKA: Intelligence capacity.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes. What happened to Webster?

MR TOKA: Webster, I don't know what happened to him, because were arrested together, then the next thing, we were informed that he was placed under Section 31, which was at that time used for State witnesses.

At a later stage, after - by the time we escaped, we had never seen Webster, so we don't know what happened to Webster up to now, we haven't heard anything about him.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mokone, do you have any further questions?

MR MOKONE: (No audible reply)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MOKONE

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Monyane, do you have any questions to ask? Ms Monyane, appears for the victim, Mrs Phenyane, if the pronunciation is correct?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS MONYANE: Mr Toka, you mentioned that the foot soldiers will come to you with the name of the specific targets. In this instance, these three policemen, who specifically came to you with the names?

MR TOKA: That will be very difficult, because to say at this stage, because it was a Unit of three people.

MS MONYANE: So it could be the three, those three people came to you with the names?

MR TOKA: Yes.

MS MONYANE: Who are those people, are they the people who carried out the attack?

MR TOKA: Yes, I think I have mentioned the names of the people that carried out the attack, I said it was Francis Pitsi, Ernest Ramadite and George Mathe.

MS MONYANE: Thank you Chair, that is the only question I had.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS MONYANE

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Dreyer or Mr Joubert, are you going to cross-examine now.

MR JOUBERT: I am ready Mr Chairman. I don't know whether my colleague wants to proceed, I've got no problem.

MR DREYER: As the Court pleases, thank you Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Just for Mr Toka's knowledge, is it correct you are appearing for Ms Prinsloo, Mrs Ferreira and Mrs Claasen?

MR DREYER: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The victims in the Juicy Lucy bombing?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DREYER: That is correct Mr Chairman. Mr Toka, I am quite sure that you appreciate the gravity and the importance of this proceedings?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR DREYER: May I enquire whether you have been indemnified, applied or have been indemnified, in respect of any one of these acts that you described before the Committee?

MR TOKA: If I was not indemnified for any of these acts, I don't think I would still be in exile by now, because that was the only way you could be repatriated into the country. You had to be indemnified first, so I was indemnified for all of them.

MR DREYER: So you were indemnified for all of them?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR DREYER: Now once again, I suppose you appreciate that if you have been indemnified in respect of any one of these particular instances, you are then indemnified in respect of criminal and civil claims against yourself in respect of those incidents?

MR TOKA: You see, what normally an applicant does, he only applies for indemnity concerning the acts that he has committed and those people who indemnify him, whether criminal or civil liabilities, I don't know about that. I just know that my indemnity has been approved.

MR DREYER: The purpose of my question is simply this, if you have been indemnified in respect of any one or all these acts, criminally and civilly, what is the real purpose of your application for amnesty?

MR TOKA: I think the purpose of the application for amnesty was that we were advised by our organisation, that whether at one stage you were sentenced to prison for a certain act that was committed, you still have to appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission because you see, at the end of the day, there were victims in these attacks and it will be proper for those victims to know exactly what happened and why they were caught in the attacks.

That is why I applied for the TRC amnesty.

ADV SANDI: I am sorry Mr Dreyer, perhaps whilst you are there, sorry Mr Toka, this question you are asking, yesterday I had occasion to look at, it would seem that in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act, even if one was previously granted immunity or indemnity, he would still have to apply for amnesty?

MR DREYER: Mr Chairman, I merely requested the applicant to give us his viewpoint of the purpose of his application. I would direct legal argument if necessary, at the end of the proceedings in that regard, as the Court pleases.

Mr Toka, would you agree with me that the whole issue of disclosing as fully as possible, relevant facts, stand very central to the proceedings before this Committee in so far as even the legislative considered it and deemed it necessary to refer to that twice in the Act. First of all in Section 31(b) of the Act which spells out the objectives of the Commission, and states that it shall be to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past by and then specifically stating facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to the acts associated with a political objective and comply with the requirements of the Act.

And then once again, that is reiterated in Section 20(1)(c) of the Act, which says that if the Committee after considering an application for amnesty is satisfied that (a) application complies with the requirements of this Act, (b) the act, omission or offense to which the application relates, is an act associated with a political objective, committed in the course of the conflicts of the past, in accordance with the provision of subsections (2) and (3) and then (c) once again, the applicant has made a full disclosure of all relevant facts.

On that basis, would you agree with me, that the principle and the requirement of making a full disclosure, is important in these proceedings?

MR TOKA: Yes, that is important and I am also wondering if you are doubting my disclosure that I have done, because I think what I have done here, is a full disclosure as pertaining to what those two Acts are saying there.

MR DREYER: Yes, now in regard to what I have just said and with specific reference to your written application, as it transpires from pages 9 and onwards of the papers that I have been furnished with, would you consider the information contained in that, to be full disclosure of the relevant facts pertaining to these particular incidents?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dreyer, is there any point to that, because obviously and why I raise it, it happens in just about every single application we deal with, for instance if one takes a look at page 11, bomb blast, Proes Street. We don't expect and it doesn't happen ever, that you are going to get in the application form, that on such and such a date, I together with so and so, and so and so, got into a motor car, went to Proes Street, put it under a Renault car. Is that, are you suggesting that because they haven't got that, it is not full disclosure?

MR DREYER: Mr Chairman, I am merely putting the question, because it is part of my instruction that one of the two bases upon which the application for amnesty is being opposed by the particular victims that I represent, is specifically the point, as I have pointed out at the outset, that there was not full disclosure of the relevant facts.

I will not take ...

CHAIRPERSON: If we take a look at it now, with the evidence of the applicant, we don't just confine it to here and say well look, his application form only made reference to an incident, therefore despite, forget what he said here, we are not going to give him amnesty.

We have dealt with amnesty applications where applicants have literally been involved in three, four, five hundred incidents, and it is just impossible to put the full detail. You would have volumes and volumes on the application form. Anyway, you may proceed.

MR DREYER: I take note Mr Chairman, I will not proceed on that line. I merely put it on record as I said, in view of my instructions.

Mr Toka, if I take cognisance of your evidence, it is quite clear that you received extensive training outside of South Africa, in Botswana and so forth in respect of the activities as a member of MK and an operative and a Commander, is that correct?

MR TOKA: You see, in this case, I wouldn't understand what you really mean by extensive. What would it mean, what would it involve, because I simply said the training I received, I only went for a general Commander's course, which took about six months.

From there, I went for a drilling course in Engineering, which took about three months, and I think if you look into for instance the regular army, they go into training of two years. So will you consider my training an effective, quite an extensive training, that is where I don't get it really.

MR DREYER: Mr Toka, I am not suggesting that I consider your training to be extensive, I said that if I referred to your evidence, it is clear that you have been trained over a period of time, it is not as though you had been sent on a crash course over a weekend, because obviously you served as a Commander and a Commissar, so you must have been better trained than the normal foot soldier, or don't you agree with me?

MR TOKA: Yes, in that way I would agree with you.

CHAIRPERSON: Just on that, sorry Mr Dreyer, you said when you gave evidence, that when you went for training, your first course, the six months course, was a Commander's course?

MR TOKA: A general Commander's course.

CHAIRPERSON: Why were you selected for a Commander's course and not other people for instance?

MR TOKA: No, I was not specifically selected for a Commander's course. You see, generally all members of Umkhonto weSizwe, the first six months in the camp, they will undergo what we call the general Commander's course.

Because we believed that every member of Umkhonto weSizwe at the end of the day, is a Commander. The idea was based on the fact that if you look at the past armies like for example the British Army, where you find you have one Commander, immediately an attack is carried out and the Commander is killed, then the army goes into disarray and that was why it was decided that all members of Umkhonto weSizwe should be trained as Commanders.

That is why we had the general Commander's course so that if the Commander dies in battle, the next person next to him, takes over. That is exactly what I mean.

MR DREYER: Mr Toka, even if we accept the fact that everyone as you put it, is trained in this particular way, fashion, the point is that eventually you served in a commanding capacity, in a decision making capacity as a Commander and a Commissar, isn't that so?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR DREYER: Yes, and then obviously you were not on the level same as that of a normal foot soldier or operative?

MR TOKA: That is obvious, because I was the Commander.

MR DREYER: Yes.

MR TOKA: I wouldn't be on the same level with my foot soldiers.

MR DREYER: Yes. For the next couple of questions, I would like to direct them with reference to the August 1996 statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the African National Congress of which I have been furnished a copy of.

With reference thereto and more particularly page 9 thereof, it is indicated that at the CABO conference of 1985 which is prior to this particular incident which you refer to as the Juicy Lucy bombing, there was a consensus reached on the approach to military action, and it was reaffirmed that the ANC policy was clearly directed towards legitimate targets.

Then on page 9 thereof, it is indicated that during mid-1980 certain attacks on targets occurred with no apparent connection to the apartheid State. Once again, because of that occurring, the ANC took action to assert policy with regard to avoidance of civilian targets, which could have been confused with the need to intensify the struggle.

Do you take note of that, are you aware of that?

MR TOKA: I have, I think I have said in my submission that all orders to carry out attacks, some attacks like the Juicy Lucy, we received our orders from outside, from Botswana and Botswana would normally get an approval from Lusaka.

And that is what you said before you went to the second one, you talked about if it is legitimate, then it is not me to make the target legitimate, but upon approval by Lusaka, then it becomes clear that the target is legitimate.

MR DREYER: Mr Toka, would you agree that on page 8 of the very statement, it is specifically and expressly stated that even after the so-called Sharpville incident, there was a paper or a policy adopted under the heading Adoption of Armed Struggle, and at that stage already Umkhonto weSizwe emphasised the supremacy of politics over narrow military activity, in other words as you have always put it throughout your evidence, that all military actions were in fact carried out in accordance with a political and a prevailing policy, the political policy of the ANC?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR DREYER: Yes. On what I have said prior to before you gave the answer, I wanted to point out that on the 8th of January 1987, there was a public statement clearly on this very issue, by MK to the following effect that the members of the Umkhonto weSizwe, the military wing of the ANC, must continue to distinguish itself from the apartheid death forces by the bravery of its combatants, its dedication to the cause of liberation and peace and its refusal to act against civilians, both black and white.

MR TOKA: Yes.

MR DREYER: Now I want to stress that that was a statement by MK on the 8th of January 1987, the relevance of which is the following and I would like you to comment on that.

According to the own admission of the ANC, during the mid-1985's, certain attacks occurred which I have indicated, with no apparent connection to the apartheid State, as a result of which this statement was made on the 8th of January 1987 and the particular incident that we refer to here, namely the Juicy Lucy bombing, occurred in 1988, do you agree?

MR TOKA: I agree.

MR DREYER: So that was obviously subsequent to the very clear policy statement by MK?

MR TOKA: I think I have said in my submission that when we placed that, when that limpet mine was placed at Juicy Lucy, it was not aimed at the people that were injured there.

There is a military structure just next to Juicy Lucy and according to our intelligence, we were told that soldiers are eating in that place, and that explosive that was placed there, was mainly placed for those soldiers that are there.

Are you going to say if you, for instance, if you put a bomb blast into a restaurant where a lot of soldiers eat in there, are you going to say it was inappropriate because it was a restaurant, or are you going to say it was appropriate because soldiers died there? That is exactly what I am trying to say, the Juicy Lucy attack, it was not against those people that were injured there.

It was mainly against those army personnel that came from that military structure next to Juicy Lucy.

MR DREYER: Mr Toka, I am moving up to that point, if you would just be so kind as to just answer the question that I have raised, and that is simply the fact, nothing more and nothing less, that the so-called Juicy Lucy incident occurred after the very express policy statement by MK that was made, that I referred to.

That is the only question, you agree with that?

CHAIRPERSON: In other words do you agree that May 1988 comes after January 1987?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR DREYER: Thank you Mr Chair. In 1987, MK Commanders according to the ANC statement, were specifically instructed by Oliver Tambo and the National Executive Council of the ANC, to re-assert ANC policy to operational Units as to the avoidance of purely civilian targets, failure to comply with these orders, would be considered as violation of policy and action would be taken against offenders.

That is taken from page 9 of this statement. So once again, I would like you to put that into the clear perspective of what you have just testified.

MR TOKA: What is your question there?

MR DREYER: The question is, if the top structure of the ANC and the MK issues a very clear policy as to civilian targets and the avoidance of civilian deaths in 1987, why would you say that in 1988, that would not apply?

MR TOKA: If the same top structure approves of my attack that I sent for the approval in Botswana and Lusaka to attack that place, what should I say about it, because it is the same top structure that we are talking about, it is the same top structure that you are referring to, that gave us orders to do that.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but they were dependent on the information you gave them? You told us that either you or the Commander went to Botswana in order to get approval?

You were, either you or your Commander at that stage, informed the Commander in Botswana about the situation here. He had no means to check on what you have told him, he trusted you.

So, if you have given him information that would be wrong, he will make a decision based on that wrong information, isn't that so?

MR TOKA: Yes, but you see normally what will happen is that the Commander as well, as a responsible Commander, would like to know the location of that area, where is the area located? What type of an area is that before he can sanction such an order, before he can give you an approval of such an order.

He will have to know exactly where it is, is it right in town, why do you have to do that, what have you seen in that area, these are the questions that he will ask before he gives the approval.

From there with the information that you have given him, he will also get approval from higher up. Then, you know it is a line of command, it moves from up until to the last man on the ground. That is exactly what happens.

ADV DE JAGER: Unfortunately all the information are based on hearsay, you depend on what Webster told you, and you are conveying that to him, because you believe Webster, and if Webster had given you the wrong information, the unfortunate result would be that the wrong information would end up with the Commander over there.

MR TOKA: You see, it is not just a matter of one giving another wrong information. It is a matter of assessing exactly what political benefit will that target give us.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no but I think what Mr De Jager is saying is let's say just for example Webster came to you and said look, Juicy Lucy is a target because that is where the soldiers who work in the nearby building, they come for lunch there, and at lunch time there is soldiers there. But let's say that was wrong, they don't go to Juicy Lucy, they go to Wimpy instead, and also just ordinary civilians go to Juicy Lucy, so you then pass that info on to Botswana, who pass it on to Lusaka and it is the wrong information, then Lusaka will give the approval saying well, look soldiers are there, it is a legitimate target, etc, etc, we approve it.

But, they are making the approval on wrong information, I think that is what Mr De Jager is trying to convey to you.

Everything depended on that initial intelligence?

MR TOKA: I will say that Your Worship, but what I said during my submission is that, you see it depends on who comes with the information. In this case the people who came with the Juicy Lucy information, were not intelligence trained people, unlike if it came with Webster, it would be a different thing.

On the Juicy Lucy, it is somebody who is not trained in intelligence who comes with this information, and we also have to go there personally, witness whatever he is talking about, confirm it also with some people. You always have to have second opinions, before you take a decision on that, because at the end of the day, my mother passes at Juicy Lucy, my mother can go into Juicy Lucy and have a drink there, my sister can go there. So you might find that that limpet mine placed there, is not only on a specific person, it might also hurt my own mother, so you have to confirm on the information that comes in.

ADV DE JAGER: Then did you confirm on the Juicy Lucy information?

MR TOKA: That is correct Your Worship.

ADV DE JAGER: You went there yourself and confirmed it?

MR TOKA: And saw that place yes, and saw the military installation they were talking about.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Dreyer, this Juicy Lucy, is it - you walk through a door and it is between four walls, or is it one of these ones that have got a type of a - where the people sit outside, next to where people are walking in the shopping centre, or is it enclosed?

Mr Toka, the Juicy Lucy, that particular Juicy Lucy, is it enclosed, self-contained type of restaurant or is it in the open mall, in a shopping centre like some of them are?

MR TOKA: It is not right in the mall as I can say.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you go through a door to get into it, and it's got its own walls?

MR TOKA: Yes, I think it has doors to get into, because it is just along the street.

MR DREYER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Toka, I would respectfully in respect of the last question that I put to you and your answer to that, challenge you to point out to me where in either the August 1996 or the May 1997 supplement the statement of the ANC, there was a reversal or an amendment of the 1987 policy declaration on behalf of MK and the ANC, as to the avoidance of civilian targets and I would respectfully request you to point out to me, if so, where in this statement by the ANC to the TRC, was that stated, because obviously if there was a change of general policy in this regard, I would expect that to be contained in the statement, would you?

MR TOKA: You see, what I can say is that soldiers are not only contained in the barracks or police in the police stations, they go into shops as well. And like for instance, in Pointem Building next to Church Street, I think the larger community, it is an army community that lives there.

Are you going to say that because I put a limpet mine in a restaurant where soldiers come in to buy, will you say I hit a civilian target? You see, it depends on how you see it from your eyes. I see it from the eyes of a military man, that target was mainly for people who were eating there, and those were soldiers.

MR DREYER: All right, Mr Toka, we will get back to the Juicy Lucy bombing, as you refer to it, and I would like to reiterate as you refer to it, because I intend to come around to that very particular point, in contrary to your evidence.

Let me just in furtherance of this point state the following. It is also stated on page 8 of the August statement, that it is part of the political schooling of each and every MK combatant, that there is an insistence that the enemy should not be defined simply in racial terms and that is clearly manifested by the simple fact that the ANC became a signatory to the Geneva Convention on the conduct of war in 1997.

I still haven't received an answer. Do you maintain or do you infer that from 1987 specifically, towards 1988, there was a change in the express policy of the top structure of the ANC in regard to civilian targets? Forget the Juicy Lucy bombing for the moment, I just want to know whether you maintain that there was any kind of a change in the official top structure policy of the ANC in that regard?

MR TOKA: I think I can not answer that on the basis that it is true that the ANC never identified its enemy by race like you have just quoted there, on racial grounds, whatsoever.

Like I just said in my submission, if you put a target on an army truck, if you put something on an army truck, you don't know whether it is black soldiers or white soldiers that will die. At the end of the day, it is the enemy at that stage. Like we used to call it, it was the enemy that would be caught in that thing, and it is not based on racial bases.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, Mr Toka, but the essence of the question is, are you aware of any change of the policy or - okay, let's stop there, are you aware of any change of the policy?

MR TOKA: I am not aware of that.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes. So it may be that on the ground, you have interpreted it that because soldiers are eating at a place, that is a sort of target that can be approved by the ANC?

MR TOKA: Not that can be approved, that actually at the end of the day, was approved, that is why it was carried out.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Dreyer, if I can just come in here. Mr Toka, can I just ask a question here. I take it that you are still a member of the ANC, not so?

MR TOKA: I am a police officer, I am supposed to serve the government of the day, and I am supposed to be apolitical, but first before I became a police officer, I think I was a member of the ANC.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but let me ask, was any action taken by the ANC against yourself or anyone of you, for having been involved in this Juicy Lucy operation?

MR TOKA: No, there was no action taken against any one of us.

ADV SANDI: Was there any kind of warning given against yourself or one of your colleagues by the ANC for this Juicy Lucy operation?

MR TOKA: Yes, what the ANC would normally, it would normally caution you after maybe having missed the particular target. It will normally caution you to conduct proper intelligence, that is what it will do.

In that case it will be, let me say, a warning that such attacks of that nature, should be avoided in all costs.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but concerning this particular operation, did you get any warning that this was a wrong operation, and that in future you should not carry on a similar operation? Did you get such a warning from the ANC?

MR TOKA: You see, I cannot answer that in the positive, because you see, as a soldier, you get a warning once, or twice or thrice you know. You cannot remember exactly where you were warned.

CHAIRPERSON: Did the - do you remember whether or not your movement, the ANC or MK, or any structure within there, reacted at all to you or anybody else in your Unit or group about the Juicy Lucy operation? Can you remember, did they do that?

MR TOKA: I cannot remember that Your Worship.

ADV SANDI: Would one be correct to infer perhaps from what you have said, that if this operation was not in accordance with the policy of your organisation, you would have received some kind of caution from the ANC?

MR TOKA: I cannot say that, because I don't think that at, you see, I am not clear at this stage whether anything was said or not. You see, that is the problem. I have a problem in answering that question appropriately.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Dreyer?

MR DREYER: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Toka, can I please request you to detach yourself for the moment, from the so-called Juicy Lucy bombing, because the whole purpose of my questions that I have directed to you and still intend directing to you at this particular point, simply revolves around the prevailing policy.

I am not referring to the Juicy Lucy bombing, so please do not confuse yourself in answering my questions with that issue. I would merely like to ascertain what the exact policy according to you, as a Commissar and a Commander was, in the point in time, 1988. Do you understand what I am saying?

MR TOKA: Yes, I think I am getting exactly what you are saying.

ADV DE JAGER: He answered and said that there was no change in the policy as far as he is aware. I think we could accept that the policy was as stated in the document you have read to him, unless he wants to add something to it.

MR DREYER: Thank you Mr Chairman. And would you have considered, you had all relevant times, and more particularly during 1988, to be well acquainted with such policy of the ANC as a person in a commanding position?

MR TOKA: You see, let me come out clearly like this. You see, here we have a problem that the type of evidence one is adducing, is based on documents that are trying to separate the incident at Juicy Lucy, and make it a separate incident.

You see, if you quote documents, you are simply separating the two and I think Juicy Lucy and those documents should not be separated, because I am still holding to it that what was targeted in Juicy Lucy, was military personnel.

If you are pushing me to a change of policy, you are simply saying it was not military personnel that was targeted. That is why I am saying I have a problem with your kind of cross-examination, in that it wants to separate the two incidents, and these incidents cannot be separated because they carry one political motive.

Whether the ANC said in CABO conference or in (indistinct) conference, it will still lead us to the same answer. What was targeted in Juicy Lucy, was the military personnel and not those people who were injured.

If you are going to quote all the documents that the ANC have written since it started in 1912, we will have a problem that at the end of the day ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Toka, the problem is again, we are confusing facts now. Let's stay at the policy stage, the policy was that you shouldn't target civilian targets.

Now, turning that into practice, we could investigate whether that was a civilian target or a military target. I think you are ad idem that that was the policy. Now, I don't know whether the Advocate would enquire, I presume he would, and he would put facts to you to say but this wasn't a military target, or and you will bring facts and say it was a military target, so that is a dispute at this stage.

MR TOKA: Thank you Your Worship.

MR DREYER: Thank you Mr Chairman, that is indeed the whole purpose of the cross-examination.

Mr Toka, at some stage you endeavoured to justify the difference in targets like Sterland and the Juicy Lucy bombing as you referred to it, and so forth, from other types of attacks or incidents on the basis that there was a specific order that the struggle was to be taken to the white areas, or the so-called suburbs as you have pointed out, is that correct?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR DREYER: Now if the struggle was to be taken there, I suppose it was still to be done within the guidelines and the pillars of the ANC policy?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR DREYER: Right, now could I then on that particular point quote from this statement once again, what the policy was.

On page 52 it is stated as follows: by the end of 1985 an official ANC pamphlet, titled Take the Struggle to the White Areas, was distributed inside the country. Targets were identified as and I would like you to ...

ADV DE JAGER: 1995?

MR DREYER: 1985 Mr Chairman. Targets were identified as and I would like you to take cognisance of this, the racist army, police death squads, agents and stooges in our midst and the call to take the war to the white areas, is defined as follows, this is official policy and there is quite a few of which the most relevant one that I would like to point out to you, reads as follows: systematic attack against the army and police and the so-called area defence units in white areas.

What I would like to put to you Mr Toka, is even if there was official order or policy declared by the ANC that the war or the struggle should be taken to white areas, it was clearly as I understand the statement, not directed at civilian targets in white areas, but still military associated or policy associated targets within white areas, do you agree with me?

MR TOKA: I agree with you, that is why I said in my submission that the Juicy Lucy attack was mainly based on the fact that there was a military installation there, with army people having their lunch at Juicy Lucy, or the food at Juicy Lucy. That is what I said, and that bring us back to a document to say that it should be related to army personnel, police personnel, whatever yes.

MR DREYER: Right Mr Toka, now I would like to put the following factual bases to you in opposition to your inference that Juicy Lucy as you call it, was a military type of venue in the sense that it was frequently frequented or patronised by people that were either working at the Defence Force building that you referred to or police officers or whatever.

First of all, do you agree with me that the Juicy Lucy chain of stores, could loosely be referred to as a sort of health shop in the sense of that they serve healthy type of foods as opposed to your normal street cafe, that is their sort of image? They serve health type foods, do you agree with that, fruit juices and very healthy type of meals?

MR TOKA: Yes.

MR DREYER: Yes. Now would you also agree with me Mr Toka, that that is very specifically the type of eating place that would be frequented by women rather than men, which are far more attentive to being healthy living or don't you agree with me??

MR TOKA: I think that one is your own, yes, concept.

MR DREYER: Okay, well I will put to you that it is very strange that the five women that were injured in this blast, none of them, were working for any police department, any military department or anything like that. They were librarians, administrative type of employees and there was not a single man injured in this particular blast.

Can you give any sort of reflection on that?

MR TOKA: You see, when you place a bomb at any place, with a particular target, you mind find that the target at the end of the day, is your own uncle, because you do not know specifically who will it effect when it goes off.

You might even kill your father who happens to be in the army at that time. That is exactly what happens.

MR DREYER: Yes.

MR TOKA: So it is not specifically to say that that bomb was sexist or racist because it injured white women and it injured only female. I don't think so, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: But wouldn't the point then be, whenever you place a bomb in a public place, you are reckless about who may be injured or not?

It could be a baby laying in a pram, next to the mother, drinking fruit juice?

MR TOKA: You see Mr Chairman, I think I would explain that you see, in any war situation or in any battle situation, there will be those people that will be caught in the crossfire and who the attack is not aimed at. There are such situation.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Toka, when you went, you said you went yourself and did some surveillance there, what did you see, who were the patrons in the restaurant at that time?

MR TOKA: Well it was clear Your Worship, that it is true in my intelligence gathering, what I got, I saw there were soldiers who came to shop there, but again, I would still agree, that there will be one person coming in and out there who is not soldiers.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you see groups of soldiers in uniform, all sitting together at a table, eating, or would they come in and buy a grapefruit juice or a granadilla juice and walk out again with a plastic cup, be in there for 30 seconds, one minute maybe? Was it sit down stuff, what was it? Can you just explain what you saw?

MR TOKA: You see, it will be like, you see, people would come in and the soldiers would come in and go outside, some of them will be having their lunch, they have 20, 15 minutes, go out. Some will come, go, whatsoever, and that was the situation,

You could not say, and you know sometimes it also depends on, sometimes you might find that the man who places the bomb, places it five minutes later.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but when you looked at it, would you say it was predominantly soldiers, the majority of people there, or were a lot of soldiers and a lot of people who were just civilians?

MR TOKA: What I saw in my intelligence gathering when I was taken there, most of the people that I saw there, were soldiers.

I cannot say that it happened like that everyday, but when I was taken there, at that moment, the people that I saw there, the majority of people that I saw coming, going in there, were soldiers.

MR DREYER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, wouldn't it have been better to have put it in the foyer of the building where they worked which was only 400 meters away, the more exclusive target?

MR TOKA: You see, it depends on how easy you can get them. I think if you - one would prefer to attack soldiers on a skirmish than to attack them in the barracks.

I am simply trying to explain that where they can be easily found and that is much more easier.

MR DREYER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Toka, I suppose you would agree with me that during 1988, soldiers were probably not of the highest enumerated people in the community.

CHAIRPERSON: In 1988, you said 1998?

MR DREYER: My apology Mr Chairman, 1988? We all know that there have been considerable changes in the remuneration packages of military personnel and police personnel later years, but I am talking about 1988.

MR TOKA: I can't tell that.

MR DREYER: The point that I want to make Mr Toka is simply this, the Juicy Lucy chain of food stores, is generally viewed as being not a cheap type of eating place, because of the type of food they serve, and I want to put it to you and evidence to that effect will be led by the victims, that there are several places in the vicinity, where you could have had a meal far cheaper than at that particular point, that is the first thing I would like you to comment on.

MR TOKA: Is it your conclusion that everybody who earns a lower salary, cannot buy expensive shoes? You see, that is the problem that I have, because I don't earn that much, but if I have to go and eat in a Wimpy bar which is expensive, I will go and eat there.

MR DREYER: Mr Toka, all I am saying is, I am talking about evidence that will be led, that in that vicinity there are places where you can eat at a far lesser fee and I am putting it to you that those are the places that were frequently frequented by members of the Defence Force, and more particularly evidence will be led, sir, that that particular Juicy Lucy referred to in this incident, is not a place where there is a regular patronage of soldiers.

MR TOKA: I think that is your ...

MR DREYER: No, it is not my opinion, that is evidence that will be tendered.

MR TOKA: Yes, it is your opinion, because I am telling you that when I went there, I saw the soldiers, and in your submission you are saying it is a place which is not frequented by them, so I cannot disagree with you when you say that.

MR DREYER: Right, exactly.

MR TOKA: Because I have seen soldiers when they were there.

MR DREYER: I would like to follow up on that, because according to your own admissions sir, that when you clarified, apparently clarified, the reconnaissance information received by the intelligence operator that executed the reconnaissance in respect of this Juicy Lucy venue, you in fact saw a majority of soldiers or military personnel there that particular day? That was your evidence.

MR TOKA: You see in my evidence I said I saw soldiers going to that place.

MR DREYER: Yes.

MR TOKA: Yes, I have even said it now that soldiers were going, coming, sitting in that place. That is exactly what I said. I am not refuting that.

MR DREYER: Sir, you are currently serving as a commissioned officer in the South African Police Services?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR DREYER: So I suppose that you appreciate the fact that if you want to carry out a military or a military styled operation, your intelligence information in respect of the selected target, should obviously be as fresh as possible and obtained as shortly as possible before the actual attack, otherwise the information might no longer be relevant?

MR TOKA: Yes.

MR DREYER: Do you agree with you?

MR TOKA: I agree with you.

MR DREYER: Now exactly, can you explain to us sir, how long before, prior to this very attack, did you, yourself, ascertain whether or not the intelligence information that you have been provided with, were in fact true and correct in respect of this venue?

MR TOKA: You see what happens is that I am not going to say how long, because I cannot remember exactly how many days before that, but what I am going to say is you see, normally what happens is that after an approval has been sought from Lusaka, once more, there must be one person who goes and checks whether the situation hasn't changed like it used to be.

Then from there, the operation is carried out. That is normally what happens. You don't go and reconnoitre a place for six months and then go back and hit the place, because you don't know who will be there at that time. That is the whole thing.

So our information when Juicy Lucy attack was carried out, it was as fresh as possible.

MR DREYER: Right Mr Toka, tell me, are you still familiar with the vicinity of where this particular bomb blast occurred?

MR TOKA: I don't think I am familiar, no longer familiar, yes.

MR DREYER: You are not? Now would you be at all surprised sir, if I tell you that the bomb, or the limpet mine, was not at all placed in or at the Juicy Lucy, but that in fact it was placed in a flower box, a concrete flower box which forms part of the structure of this building, and more particularly sir, on the pavement side of that particular flower box? Would you be surprised at all?

MR TOKA: Exactly. That is why I was referring to it as a Juicy Lucy attack, because it has always, since our trial in 1988, been referred to as the Juicy Lucy attack.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Dreyer, before you proceed, was this bomb outside the - on the pavement, was it within the restaurant?

MR DREYER: Mr Chairman, I will deal with this a little bit more extensively, because this is at the very heart of my cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Will this be a convenient time to take a half an hour adjournment for the lunch break?

MR DREYER: As you please Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we will just take the lunch adjournment now, but if we could keep it down to half an hour if possible, to try to earn back some of the lost time. Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

RODNEY ABRAM MOEKETSI TOKA: (still under oath)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DREYER: (continued) Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Toka, just for the purposes of continuation, the last statement that I put to you was to the following extent that would you at all have been surprised if I would state that in fact the bomb was not placed inside or very close to the Juicy Lucy, but that it was in fact placed in a flower box, a concrete flower box, which is virtually situated on the very corner of Vermeulen and Andries Streets?

MR TOKA: I wouldn't be surprised, because as I said in my submission, I did not place it myself and I wouldn't know exactly where it was placed.

MR DREYER: I also put it to you Mr Toka, that in fact the bomb was placed at a distance of approximately 30 paces or meters from the entrance of the Juicy Lucy? You don't know?

MR TOKA: I cannot contest that, yes.

MR DREYER: In fact Mr Toka, the bomb and the flower box that I refer to, is situated at the very corner of those two streets and in fact, it is much more closer to the travel agency which is located in the same building, but at the corner of the building.

It could as well have been referred to as the travel agency bomb.

MR TOKA: I cannot contest that because you see, why is it termed the Juicy Lucy, I think it was because of how it was phrased in the charge sheet from the beginning.

MR DREYER: Yes, you see and the other point that I want to make is in fact Mr Toka, at the very beginning and at the time of this incident, if I am not mistaken, initially this bomb blast was referred to as the De Bruin Park bomb blast, whereas the De Bruin Park building is in actual fact situation across the street, on the opposite corner?

In the papers it was referred to at that stage, as the De Bruin Park bomb blast?

MR TOKA: You see the papers would call it the De Bruin Park bomb blast, the police would call it the Juicy Lucy bomb blast, you will call it South African Airways or what, bomb blast. So it depends on, it is a fact that we might read the same point, but we might give different analyses of that.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Dreyer, Mr Toka, did you give instructions as to where the bomb or the mine should be placed as part of your order? When I say where, I mean precisely where?

MR TOKA: I think what I did Your Worship, you see, I wouldn't say you would give a precise location of where it should be placed, because you might find that where you want it to be placed, the next thing somebody will be standing there, and they cannot put it there.

It will depend on the man on the situation.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Dreyer.

ADV DE JAGER: Could I, but if it was placed on the corner of the street, if I understand it correctly, it was there at the Receiver of Revenue's offices? Is that the corner of Andries and Vermeulen?

MR DREYER: Mr Chairman, if I may just put it a little bit more clearly. Diagonally across from the De Bruin Park shopping centre, there is this particular building where this Juicy Lucy inter alia is situated.

If I can describe it as follows, it is a big type of building. If I am not mistaken, in the very same building, but around the corner, there are offices of I think the Pretoria News for instance, but at the very corner, there is this travel agency and that is in other words on the corner of the two streets, whereas the Juicy Lucy is situated on the Andries Street portion of the building.

If you go around the corner, into Vermeulen Street, which is also a one way street, you would get eventually to the premises of the Pretoria News. But the point that I want to make is, and I would describe it as follows and I would ask Mr Toka to comment on that -

ADV DE JAGER: Could you kindly indicate to us, or the witness, could he indicate to us, was it the north-eastern, the south-western corner of, is it in fact on the corner of Andries and Vermeulen Streets?

MR DREYER: Mr Chairman, that would be on the, well, it depends on your point of vantage, I would say Andries Street is a one way street, which runs from north to south, Vermeulen is a one way street, which runs from west to east, so if I am standing in Andries Street, facing the intersection, in other words with my back towards the north, facing south, Juicy Lucy would be on my right hand side, very close to the corner of that building. On the corner itself, will be the travel agency.

CHAIRPERSON: But we are on the north-west corner of the four corners, we could call that the north-west corner?

MR DREYER: That is correct Mr Chairman. The point that I want to make is Mr Toka, and I would like to reiterate that, the exact location where this mine was placed in that flower box, was so close to the corner, the pavement corner of those two streets, that the blast when eventually it occurred, could have effected any person, any person, whether he was actually walking on the pavement of the Vermeulen Street side of the building, or whether he was walking on the Andries Street side of the building.

It was not at all exclusively limited to the entrance or the exit of the Juicy Lucy.

MR TOKA: You see, I think I will take you back to what I have just said now. I told you that I cannot comment on the placing of it, because I did not personally do it, and according to our reconnaissance, as I said, that place was frequented by military men and what the placer of the bomb had in mind, at the time when he placed it in the flower box, you don't know what might have influenced him in that situation.

ADV DE JAGER: But you have based your whole order on the basis that soldiers are having lunch between one and two, they are eating in Juicy Lucy?

MR TOKA: Mr Chairman, I am going back again to that area. That area, it is an area frequented by soldiers, whether they go into Juicy Lucy or out of Juicy Lucy, going northwards or southwards, whatsoever, it is an area frequented by the soldiers as I have seen it in my reconnaissance when I was taken there. It is an area frequented by soldiers and that is exactly ...

ADV DE JAGER: It is also an area where all Advocates would be walking to the Supreme Court, it is an area where people would visit the State library?

MR TOKA: That is what I am saying Your Worship, those people that were injured there, were caught in a crossfire because our aim, when the bomb was placed there, it was not placed for them.

It would still be the same if that Advocate you are talking about, was also caught in the crossfire.

ADV DE JAGER: And I want to put it to you from my own knowledge, I would put that to you, I could say, I have often walked that street, and there is more civilians in that street than soldiers?

MR TOKA: It is true Your Worship, if you were caught in that explosive, I will still say you were caught in a crossfire, because it would never have been placed for you there.

MR DREYER: Mr Chairman, if I may just follow that up. Mr Toka, do I understand correctly, that your interpretation of the policy of selecting targets inside the suburban area, it would be quite justifiable if there is a particular venue where the patronage is by far, in the majority, civilians, as long as there is a possibility of one or two people that might be there at a particular time, that might be in any way connected to a military or a police installation, and you would still proceed and set an explosive device, which would probably kill innocent civilians and miss the target, being the minority patron of that particular venue, is that what I have to understand from your viewpoint?

MR TOKA: Let me go back again, this time, let me address the policy issue. You see the leadership makes the policy. I am the man on the ground, I suggest on a target, I take my motivation on that target to the leadership.

It is they who must say this is against policy, but once it is approved, I do not know what is their thinking, and that is what happened. It was simply approved.

I am not saying I would do that because there is a minority civilians whatsoever, I cannot do that. Once I take my motivation, if it is approved, then it means their understanding of the policy.

MR DREYER: Mr Toka, may I explain it along the lines of the following analogy, analogous type of situation.

You want to tell us that if I am a motorist, and the Road Traffic Ordinance expect of me to make use of the indicator of my vehicle when I would like to turn, or I would like to move from one lane of traffic to another, that I can simply put to function my indicator, because that is what is expected of me, and then I can just move over to the next lane, because I have now done what was expected of me, and there is no need for me to ascertain that I am not putting other people to danger?

MR TOKA: I think when it comes to the road traffic, it is quite clear that when you look at the rules, they will tell you you can only overtake when it is safe to do so.

MR DREYER: Exactly Mr Toka.

MR TOKA: That is one of the rules. But in this case, I am saying if I have to make an application to have a certain target attacked, and if the people that made the policy, that study the policy, says that it is approved, you can go on, do I say, is it out of policy or what? That is the approval that I get.

MR DREYER: Right Mr Toka, I will put it more closer to the facts of this case. If there is the possibility of you succeeding in the killing or injuring of one or two military personnel at that venue, do you disregard the fact Mr Toka, that there could be 20 innocent civilians present at the same venue? That is the question that I want to put to you sir.

MR TOKA: You see, here you must be able to differentiate between missionaries and freedom fighters. You see, we were not missionaries in this case, and I don't think we would ever approve of any attack that would simply had civilians, we would never do that.

The attack on Juicy Lucy, it was based on the fact that the intelligence collected was that soldiers frequented that area. That is the intelligence that was collected.

And I still repeat it, that those that were caught in that blast, were simply caught in a crossfire, and we still say to them that it was not aimed at you.

MR DREYER: Mr Toka, I remind you that when you gave your evidence as to the attack on the house of a particular policeman, as a result of which an approximately one year old baby was killed and a mother injured, you clearly indicated that no man in his right mind, could ever really try and justify that.

Now on that very same basis sir, I would like to request you to explain to me, what was the difference between that incident and the incident at Juicy Lucy, whereas a member of the Committee clearly put it to you that out of his own experience, that particular vicinity around the Juicy Lucy and the travel agency, there is a shopping centre, the De Bruin Park centre, there is the library, there are several businesses, there are banks, what is the difference sir, in respect of, if I may just finish, what is the difference in respect of the risk of injuring or killing innocent civilians between the two incidents?

MR TOKA: I have, I think I have said in my submission that no right thinking man can every throw a grenade in a house where he knows that a baby might die because of that. That is what I said, and I still say with the similar incident, no rightful thinking man will plant a bomb with a clear intention of injuring people that were not targeted for. There is no difference between the two operations.

MR DREYER: Right, Mr Toka, in your present capacity as an officer, commissioned officer of the South African Police Service, have you received any legislative or criminal law, or criminal procedure law training as a member of the South African Police Services, subsequent to having become a member of it?

MR TOKA: Yes, but that will be very basic.

MR DREYER: Yes. Now even in your capacity as a previous Commander or Commissar of MK, are you aware or do you understand the principle that in the case of negligence, there are two basic elements involved, namely the foreseeability of risk, damage, injury and the avoidability thereof. Do you understand that principle?

MR TOKA: You see, there is a problem if we have to go into the question of foreseeabilities.

MR DREYER: Why is there a problem Mr Toka?

MR TOKA: No, I am not saying there is a problem per se, what I am simply trying to say is that you see, there might be, you weight the pros and cons in any operation and you look what side is more heavier than the other.

MR DREYER: Yes.

MR TOKA: And if you look into your reconnaissance or your intelligence gathering, you see that the question of people being injured, is nil, then you carry on with that operation.

But subsequently it comes after that innocent people that were not targeted for, were injured in the whole thing. It is not a question of having foresaw a thing and having continued with it and having maybe ...

MR DREYER: But how do you know Mr Toka, because you were not involved in the actual execution of the planting of this bomb? How can you look into the mind of the actual operative?

MR TOKA: You see, the test is subjective, rather than objective because I am telling you that that place was frequented by soldiers and it will depend on the mind of the man on the ground, what to do.

ADV SANDI: I am sorry Mr Dreyer, sorry Mr Dreyer, I don't know, maybe you can help me. I am not sure if at this stage, you want to enter into a legal argument with this witness about doctrines of foreseeability and all those things, those theories in criminal law?

MR DREYER: Mr Chairman, not at all. I am not expecting of the applicant to render a legally qualified definition or explanation of a doctrine or a principle.

I was merely requesting him or whether he understands the principles of foreseeability, not necessarily in its legal sense and avoidability and I would respectfully submit that due to the answer given by the applicant, and more particularly his own explanation of a weighing up of factors, I would respectfully submit that he clearly understands the principle. I am not expecting him, with respect, to give me a text book definition.

There is no other way that I can try to establish whether this applicant in his capacity as a officer, as a commanding officer, conveyed the correct message to the operatives, as to the exercise of the policy and the execution of certain military actions.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you can ask him, you can proceed.

MR DREYER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Toka, I would respectfully submit in view of your answer of the weighing up of factors, that you do in fact understand the principle of foreseeability and avoidability, and I am definitely not referring to the legal terms, simply human speaking foreseeability, avoidability. Do you agree that you understand what it entails in normal, human experience?

MR TOKA: Yes, in a layman's language, I think yes.

MR DREYER: Yes. Right, now let's proceed from that point. If you want to put yourself again back at the stage where you decided, first of all on the basis of some intelligence information, and briefing received from whoever, as well as your own actions taken to ascertain certain facts for yourself, prior to the giving of this order, to execute this particular attack, do you want to state sir, that you did not foresee on the facts that you observed at that very venue, that there was a very material possibility that a far greater number of innocent civilians could have been injured or killed, than the possibility of maybe one or two members of a military or police institution?

MR TOKA: I still take it back to my answer when I said, you see we were fighting a liberation struggle and the fact as well, as I told you that the order to carry out such an attack, as I said, the approval would have to be sought elsewhere.

Elsewhere where that approval is sought, that is exactly where those documents that you were reading, were done and understood better than me, and if the same command structure that has drafted that document, says it is okay, you can carry out this operation, then me as a soldier, it is not for me to say is it within policy or not. That is why I am saying on the question of foreseeability and avoidability, I am saying for any operation carried out, you weigh the pros and the cons and what we saw there, it was military men frequenting that place at that time.

What we thought was our target was this military men frequenting that place. That is simply my answer.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Dreyer, we are carrying on with this discussion, but in terms of the Act, morally they might have been blameworthy for killing civilians, but once they say my motive was associated with a political objective, would it matter whether they were killing civilians or military people?

MR DREYER: Mr Chairman, I would submit that there can only be a case of an act related to the political furtherance of a particular policy, if the target which eventually is decided upon, at least have a material relevance within the military or paramilitary system of a particular country or where the person or the organisation at which this attack is directed, has got the same sort of relevance. If eventually it transpires that there is no such relevance, I would respectfully submit that then the applicant fails to satisfy the test that it was an act that was related to a political policy.

ADV DE JAGER: If they wanted to overthrow the government?

CHAIRPERSON: I think, could we leave this perhaps until the stage of argument, I think let's proceed with the evidence, because we are now getting into the realms of argument.

ADV DE JAGER: I only think that we are asking about things that maybe irrelevant in the long run.

MR DREYER: As the Court pleases, I will leave it there Mr Chairman.

Mr Toka, may we move on to your particular evidence that was given here in this - supplementing of your written application. If I understand correctly, the actual operatives at the Juicy Lucy vicinity or this particular instance, were Pitsi, Mathe and I couldn't get the third name, it sounded like Marmalade.

MR TOKA: Ramadite.

MR DREYER: And Mr Ramadite I understand, is not one of the applicants for amnesty?

MR TOKA: Yes.

MR DREYER: So it is only Mr Pitsi and Mathe that is relevant to this?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR DREYER: Okay. Then you indicated that the purpose was to try and direct the blast to possible patrons of this place that were related to the military building that is in the vicinity?

MR TOKA: To army personnel yes.

MR DREYER: Army personnel yes. Now, according to my instruction, the blast occurred at approximately half past twelve?

MR TOKA: Yes, I said it was during lunch hour, either twelve to one, or one to two, that is what I said.

MR DREYER: Wouldn't you agree that the lunch hour, the normal lunch hour is rather between 13H00 and 14H00?

MR TOKA: I don't know, we have normally with Security Forces, you start at half past twelve or quarter to one.

MR DREYER: I just wanted to know was that part and parcel of the reconnaissance?

MR TOKA: If you do reconnaissance, you consider the time and other things.

MR DREYER: No, no, but maybe I am missing the point or you are missing the point. What I wanted to know is, if you say that the object of this whole incident was to try and aim it against a particular group of people, military personnel, all I want to know is did you in any way direct your reconnaissance to find out what the particular time of day is when the highest concentration then, if so, of military personnel would be in that vicinity or was it just a broad time, space of lunch hour, which could be anything between twelve and three or what was the exact reconnaissance carried out in respect of the time, the specific time, because I suppose that is very relevant?

MR TOKA: Yes, I think for now I cannot give an appropriate answer to that, because it is quite a long time and I could not remember what was the influence on that time.

MR DREYER: You indicated sir that the type of mine, landmine, limpet mine that was used there, was a mini limpet mine, is that correct?

MR TOKA: I think that is.

MR DREYER: That is what you testified, you said it was a mini limpet mine.

MR TOKA: Yes.

MR DREYER: Well, I put it to you that even in accordance with the papers that have been made available to me, on page 86 more particularly it is stated that the type of explosive device was an SPM mine, which is clearly not a mini limpet mine.

CHAIRPERSON: No, it is not clearly, because I've got no idea what an SPM limpet mine is.

MR DREYER: On page 86, at the top part it says on the 26th of May 1988, at approximately 13H00 at the vicinity of Juicy Lucy on the corner of Andries and Vermeulen Streets, a Russian mine exploded.

MR TOKA: It happened a long time ago, I cannot remember every hardware that was used in any single operation. You can see even in my application, about ten operations, you cannot expect ...

MR DREYER: No, that I understand, I am not asking you to remember, all I am saying is do you agree with me that the SPM mine, is not the same as a mini limpet mine?

MR TOKA: I agree with you, it is a fact.

CHAIRPERSON: Is the SPM mine stronger than a mini limpet mine?

MR TOKA: Yes, that is what we would refer to as a Super Limpet Mine.

CHAIRPERSON: A Super Limpet?

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Toka, did you personally supply the people who were going to be carrying out this operation, with this particular limpet mine?

MR TOKA: With the particular limpet mine?

ADV SANDI: Where did they get it from?

MR TOKA: Well you see, when the weapons were given to the Units, sometimes they were given in a bigger amount, maybe you wouldn't give them for a specific operation at that time, maybe you will give them let me say, about six limpets, which will be about three mini limpets and three super limpets, and it will depend maybe upon them, when they go to, after reconnaissance have been applied, which one would be appropriate for such a place.

I wouldn't exactly remember when were they given the mines, but what I know is that the order was carried out in accordance with the reconnaissance carried out. It is normal course that sometimes I might forget what type of a weapon was used.

ADV SANDI: Immediately before this operation was carried out, did you see Pitsi, Mathe and Ramadite immediately before the carrying out of the operation?

MR TOKA: Immediately before carrying the operation? Would it mean the same day?

CHAIRPERSON: When they were armed, ready, they've got the equipment?

MR TOKA: No, in that case I did not see them.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dreyer?

MR DREYER: Mr Toka, if I can just briefly refer back to the Act itself, in Section 20(3) of the Act, the criteria as mentioned that should be referred to in the consideration of the question of whether or not a particular act is an act associated with a political objective.

According to (a) the first criteria is the motive of the person. So in respect of this specific bomb blast, would you say that this was definitely an act aimed at a particular target as opposed to those other incidents which you described that was merely demonstration of a propaganda type of act, or something to that effect?

MR TOKA: I still obey what I said, that this act was mainly aimed at the army personnel that was frequenting that place, that was having their food in Juicy Lucy.

The act at the end of the day, had a political motive. It was not an act of terrorism which carried any other motive, except a politically motivated motive of saying that at the end of the day it would have to enhance our struggle for liberation.

MR DREYER: That is the point I want to get to. If your reconnaissance information that you received, was all wrong, that this is in fact not a venue frequented by South African soldiers at that time, and if for some reason you were mistaken about your own observations, and as it in fact transpired, the only people injured in that very blast were five women that were in no way connected or affiliated to the South African Defence Force, how would that then still be in the furtherance of the political aim of the organisation of which you were a member?

If it is clear that the information was wrong, and therefore that it was effected or executed upon the wrong premises?

MR TOKA: I think it is clear to every clear thinking person that in any war situation or in any conflict situation, some people that are not connected to the whole thing, might get effected.

Still, it would carry the political motive but the fact is that there will be a problem that those that were not targeted, were the ones that were hit and it is the most unfortunate part of it that people are caught in a crossfire.

MR DREYER: No, I am sorry, I am not quite clear with your answer. Do you mean to convey that if innocent people, and only innocent people is so-called caught in the crossfire, and there is absolutely no involvement of military or police affiliated persons in the whole act, it would still further the political aims?

MR TOKA: I think I will answer your question, by giving you another good example. In a raid in Botswana in 1988, when Naledi, my Commander was killed in an SADF raid, there were four people that were killed in that raid, it was Naledi,who was the only member of the African National Congress there, and three civilian Botswana women.

The SADF at that time, felt that it was pushing its political belief that they were fighting the ANC, so it is exactly what I am trying to say to you that at the end of the day, we should understand it that innocent people might be caught in a crossfire.

That does not say that one cannot say to those people I am sorry you were not a target, that is the point. It is not only that operation in Botswana where they killed innocent people. A lot of these operations, innocent people died and more than the people that they were looking for.

MR DREYER: Mr Toka, I understand the principle, but the difference in this very instance is exactly the fact that the incident that you have just referred to, one of the four victims at least, was clearly a member of the ANC, whereas in the so-called Juicy Lucy bombing, there were no military personnel even injured.

MR TOKA: I am simply taking you back to one of your questions where you said that would I risk the life of 20 people for one army man. I am simply taking you back to that question and answering your question on the only civilians having got injured.

I am still going back to a lot of operations that were carried out by the SADF in Botswana, innocent people, only Botswanas, not even South Africans were hurt, were injured there. Do you say they were not pushing a political thing, because they will also come here and say it was a political thing and that is why I am saying that the injured people in Juicy Lucy, were not the target.

We cannot and I am still repeating, no rightful or no right thinking man can ever target poor five women who will be going out of a shop and bomb there, no rightful thinking man can do that.

MR DREYER: Right, if I can just get back to the other element that we haven't dealt with as extensively as the foreseeability, in other words the avoidability. At the outset I quoted from the ANC statement and I would just like to go back to one point. On page 9 it is stated that from its inception, MK policy was to avoid unnecessary and I would like to stress the word unnecessary loss of life.

In connection with that policy and the principle of avoidability, the limpet mine as an explosive device, the mechanism of the detonation delay is the cutting through of a led slab, is that correct?

MR TOKA: It is correct.

MR DREYER: Yes. And that is the mechanism by which it is detonated, once the wire cuts through the led bar, there is the explosion, am I correct?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR DREYER: And once that explosive device is set to be detonated, there is virtually no way of avoiding the detonation, because then it is on its own, it is cutting through and at the end of that, there is the explosion?

That brings me back to the whole point of avoidability. The type of explosive device used on this very premises, where there is a very high concentration of civilians, would you say that that was the best way in the circumstances or the safest way to try and reach the object?

MR TOKA: You see the problem is I will always refer you back to my initial answer. Yes, it is true the process that you have explained, that is how a limpet mine works, but at the end of the day, the man who conducted the reconnaissance, me and the man behind the whole thing, is that in our intelligence, there was no, we did not see a way of poor women caught in this.

I am still taking you back, it was not aimed at them and avoidability there cannot, you can only possibly talk of avoidability if you see that there is a possibility of this thing happening, but in this case, in our reconnaissance, the possibility was nil, like I said when we have to weigh the whole thing.

I think I said that in answering one of your questions, that we weighed the pros and cons and the whole thing, and decided upon it that no way, the operation can be carried out after we got our orders from outside.

MR DREYER: I don't understand clearly, do you say that on your reconnaissance information, based on your reconnaissance, you calculated that the possibility of civilians injured in this incident, was nil?

MR TOKA: You know I am saying, I might have used the, I simply said that the possibility of anybody caught in a crossfire would be one to ninety nine percent, that is what I will say.

MR DREYER: With that high concentration of civilians in that area?

MR TOKA: You were just saying now when you argued the time, you said it went off at half past twelve, and you told me that lunch is at one o'clock, which means that at twelve o'clock everybody is locked up in his office?

Right now you want to tell me about the possibility of it being (indistinct). Do you understand, that is where I don't understand your ...

MR DREYER: Okay, the Chairman of the Committee put a similar question to you in respect of the grenade attack on the policeman's house where the small child was killed on the basis that could not that particular attack have been executed for instance, in another way? For instance by making use of another type of assault weapon, than the grenade because a grenade obviously poses a far greater risk of injury of other people, not targeted as opposed for instance to an assault weapon like a rifle.

On the same basis, all I am saying is you decided, you gave the order sir, in this particular instance, to make use of an explosive device of which there is no direct control of the time of detonation, because once it is set, there is nothing you can do about it, and if it transpired that at that very moment when the detonation took place, a whole school bus of school children stopped next to it, or got out from a vehicle, there was nothing that you could have done to avoid them being injured, isn't that so?

MR TOKA: Yes, I think when the Chairman of this forum asked that question, I think in my answer I said I think that happened because it was not clear from our intelligence that the baby and the mother was there, and that I continued by saying that no rightful thinking person can do that.

I am still answering the same question, your question, but the same way that I have answered this question, that I am still maintaining it to you that no rightful thinking person can just put a bomb there to injure five women, poor women, for what?

You see, that is why I am saying to you that the target was mainly a military target, it is just, you see, I understand your position that you simply want to say that the whole thing was targeted at these women, which we don't even personally know. I don't even know them.

How do I start putting there for such people, that is why I am saying to you that the target here is because that place was frequented by soldiers and that is why even when it was taken outside for a motivation, for an approval, it was approved.

MR DREYER: Mr Toka, I never indicated to you that, or it was never my instruction or indication of the opposition on instruction of the victims, that this particular device was set there particularly and purposefully to injure or kill anyone of them.

The point that was made throughout was, that this particular device was set there indiscriminately as to whom would be injured or killed and that it was not in fact targeted against something or someone that would fall within the definition of a legitimate target in terms of the policy of your organisation. That is the point that I wanted to bring to you.

MR TOKA: That is the point I am making, and that is the point I also make in that it was targeted at the military personnel which was along the policy of the movement, and I would also simply ask you a question.

What would be your position today if it hit five black women?

MR DREYER: Sir ...

MR TOKA: You see, that is the problem, because I am simply saying that when we put the device there, when you put the device there for the army, for the army personnel and amongst the soldiers, you get far more civilians within them, when it is there, it will also hit the civilians there.

That is normally what we call crossfire.

ADV DE JAGER: Wouldn't it have served your purpose, even if it was only civilians that has been killed, wouldn't that instill fear in the whole community and perhaps move the government to hand over the power?

MR TOKA: You see, like I explained, there were those operations where we wanted to put in fear, like for instance all these operations, like the Proes Street operation, the Van Aswegen's operation, where normally an isolated place will be chosen and a limpet mine blows at that place. That was purposefully for military propaganda.

But you also get those places that will specifically be targeted. In those cases, that is why the order has to go through the line of command, up to Lusaka and back, down to the man on the ground and that is exactly what used to happen.

ADV DE JAGER: You see, but it now turns out that in fact the Juicy Lucy wasn't targeted in the end?

MR TOKA: No, I never said that. I said that Juicy Lucy is not amongst this operations that I have talked about. I am saying that reconnaissance was conducted on Juicy Lucy, intelligence gathering was done on Juicy Lucy and after that, immediately you start doing that, then it becomes a target, there is a question mark on it.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, no that is all right, that is what you intended to do, but in fact, this bomb wasn't placed at the entrance of Juicy Lucy or in Juicy Lucy, it was put on the sidewalk in the street?

MR TOKA: Yes, that is what I said because I was not - who placed it there, I wouldn't know exactly where it was placed. But you see that area from Juicy Lucy until there, it was target area, because of these people frequenting there.

MR DREYER: Just to put into perspective what was just put to you Mr Toka, if I move out of the door of Juicy Lucy, if I can describe the vicinity around this place as follows, immediately I would be on a sort of a porch area in front of Juicy Lucy. If I turn to my right, I would go towards the corner where the travel agency is situated.

If I carry on straight, I go towards the pavement area of Andries Street, and if I cross Andries Street diagonally, and carry on along the pavement of Vermeulen Street, I would be moving towards the direction in which the South African Defence Force building was situated that you referred to. But the point that I want to make is sir, the five women that were injured in this incident, came out from the Juicy Lucy entrance and turned towards their right and towards the corner sir, and that is where the bomb was situated.

Even if there were South African Defence Force members there, the bomb was set at a point, a location which is not naturally on the line of travel towards and from the SADF building. That is the point.

It was not there, and a member of the Commission put it to you that although you might have had certain information gained from reconnaissance, eventually the bomb was not set at the venue that was targeted, as a result of which innocent civilians were injured.

Do you agree with that or not?

MR TOKA: I do not agree with that. I have said that I think you have to understand my submission clearly. I told you that that whole area is frequented by the army personnel and when I came back again, I told you that specifically because I was not the one that placed the bomb there, I wouldn't know exactly where it was placed and exactly I wouldn't know what influenced the man on the ground at that time, you understand, because it depends on the situation on hand, what happens.

For instance, as I have just explained, sometimes I will say, according to my intelligence I will say put the bomb just next to that suitcase there, then the next thing, you find a small child playing on that suitcase. You cannot put it there, you have to move it somewhere else.

At that stage, I am not there, but the man on the scene has got it. What does he do with it? He has to place it somewhere, and that is the point I am trying to make and that generally that place there, it is frequented by soldiers and I think you can also agree with me that there are soldiers moving, they were from the SADF building.

MR DREYER: Now Mr Toka, can I just enquire from you, why did he have to, the man on the ground level, the operative, why was it necessitated that he had to set the bomb that particular day? Why couldn't he wait another half an hour if it was not suitable at that stage to set it? Why couldn't he have moved it closer to the actual target, which is the South African Defence Force building, which is on your own accord only about 400 meters away?

Why was there this urgent necessity, he had to place it, he had to set it, then and there? Because of the fact that it was maybe unsuitable, he had to move it away from the place where it was supposed to be set, in other words closer or within the Juicy Lucy, why? What necessitated that?

MR TOKA: You see firstly I would say that I cannot be expected to answer what is in the mind of the other person. I mean that is quite subjective.

The other thing is, you see on that day when the bomb was planted, if I remember well, I think one other objective as I stated, the National Party was celebrating its 40 years in power, 40 years of tyranny in power.

That is why possibly it had to be placed on that day, because it had to go along with the celebration.

MR DREYER: Yes, then it wasn't actually the South African Defence Force personnel that was the target, it was rather the National Party that was the target. Why was for instance the bomb not set an office of the National Party, wouldn't that have made a more bold statement to the National Party, to tell them that you are not the type of government that this country needs, for instance?

Wouldn't that be a more suitable ...

MR TOKA: If you fight the ruling party, you fight the soldiers, you fight the police, you fight whoever supports that system.

ADV SANDI: My apology to both yourself Mr Toka and Mr Dreyer, my understanding is that at some stage of these proceedings, Mr Pitsi and Mr Mathe who were part of the group who went there to place this limpet mine, that they will be testifying.

Perhaps they would be the best people to answer some of these questions as to what was the reasoning for placing the limpet mine at that particular point where it was placed. I don't think this witness is capable of speaking on their behalf.

MR DREYER: Mr Chairman, in accordance with the applicant's own version, his involvement in this particular incident is limited to the fact he was a Commander of a certain group of operatives and the official order came from him, to execute a particular action, which according to him, was ratified by the Botswana command structure.

Obviously he would be, I would submit, in the best position to explain why this particular venue was chosen. I agree that as far as the actual actions on just prior to the explosion, the actual operatives would be in a better position. The only thing that I wanted to put to this applicant is him being the person that selected and approved of this particular venue, where the explosion was to take place, to explain why it was so necessitated on that very day to have the explosion take place.

ADV SANDI: I thought it is not part of his evidence as to where exactly, where precisely ...

CHAIRPERSON: No I don't think we are talking whether it was in the flower box or on the porch or whatever, that corner. But I think we have heard also 20 or 30 times the reason why Mr Toka chose that corner as a target area.

MR DREYER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Then lastly Mr Toka, would you say that the mere fact that your involvement in this particular incident and the other incidents that you described in your evidence, is that less because of the fact that you were not personally involved on the basis that you have only been part of the chain of command, or do you seek amnesty on the same level of accountability as would for instance the very operative that set the explosive device?

MR TOKA: I think military, as we talk mainly about the chain of command, I think everybody in that chain of command, up to the last man, is accountable for whatever happens. I am seeking this amnesty on the basis that whether physically or not physically, at the end of the day the charge sheet as it was placed, it was put in as a charge of conspiracy, which means that the one was also held responsible for this.

That is why I feel I must apply for, I applied for the amnesty on the basis that as part of the command structure.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you accept responsibility for the actions of the people you gave orders to?

MR TOKA: I do Your Worship.

MR DREYER: Lastly and in conclusion of cross-examination and on behalf of the victims, Mr Toka, it is on the premises of the questions put to you and statements made to you, it is maintained by the victims that I represent as will also transpire from their evidence, that this was in fact not a blast that was directed to a particular group of people.

It could not have been directed against any military personnel and that is the evidence that would be tendered on behalf of the victims, so that in the end it fails on the definition of furtherance as you based, not that I am saying and I am taking cognisance of the fact that you also indicated that sometimes certain actions are taken for a purely propagandistic purpose. That I accept, but as I understand the basis of your application, in respect of this very incident, it is based upon the fact that you say that it was clearly an action that was directed against military personnel and that is denied by the applicants and on that basis, they oppose your application specifically.

MR TOKA: You have the right to it.

MR DREYER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DREYER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Dreyer. Is it Mr Joubert? Mr Joubert, would you mind going to the microphone next to Mr Dreyer please? Mr Toka, Mr Joubert represents the Kalele family who were victims in one of the incidents.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JOUBERT: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Toka, in your evidence you said as a Commissar your aim was to recruit and to give orders to attack targets that is appropriate, is that correct?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR JOUBERT: At that time of the attack on the Kalele's house, what targets were appropriate for attacks?

MR TOKA: What targets?

MR JOUBERT: Yes?

MR TOKA: Like policemen's houses, informers' houses, soldiers' houses, military barracks, police stations.

MR JOUBERT: Right, if I may ask you, who gave the authorization, the final authorization for the attack on Mr Kalele's house?

MR TOKA: The final authorization?

MR JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR TOKA: It was given from Lusaka by the military High Command in Lusaka, mainly by ...

MR JOUBERT: Well, I will put it to you Mr Toka that no house is appropriate target, where a mother and a baby sleeps, that is not acceptable.

MR TOKA: I think I have said it in my submission, that the reconnaissance conducted and the intelligence gathered on specifically Mr Kalele's house, was totally inappropriate, in a way that that is why I even said that no man in his good senses, can rather throw a grenade when he knows that there is only a baby and a mother in the house.

The target was not the mother and the baby, the target was actually the father there, and something terribly wrong happened on the intelligence side of it.

ADV DE JAGER: That is all right, it couldn't have been the target if there was only the mother and a baby, but suppose the mother and the baby and the father was there, would it then be an appropriate target?

MR TOKA: The reconnaissance, if the man who carries out the reconnaissance, says by this time, it is safe to hit that target, you simply do that, and you only hope that at the end of the day, people who are not targeted are not caught in that thing.

That is why for some people it would be appropriate to challenge the target in the street, and shoot him, because he would be alone by then, but you know, it depends which type of operation would you like to carry out.

ADV DE JAGER: But if a man is married or he is staying with a wife and a child, would there ever be a time when you would consider the child and the wife not present in the house, except if you see them walking out of the house for instance?

MR TOKA: You see Your Worship, I will say that you see the most appropriate person in military operations, is the man who gathers the information on the target, and once the man who gathers the information on the target says the target is safe, you simply don't go back to him and say why, you will ask him why do you say it is safe? He says that guy will be in there, do you understand?

ADV DE JAGER: That I can understand. That I can understand, but he can't say whether there would be a woman or a child or a visitor or the priest present at seven o'clock tomorrow night?

MR TOKA: I think if I remember well, in my submission I said that normally before a target it attacked, we will normally go into an exercise of asking one fellow whether there are other occupants in the houses, and if it does not appear on our reconnaissance that there is anybody in the house, then the operation is carried out.

Like I said especially on this house, the reconnaissance was carried by an experienced man like Webster, who we have never doubted.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we have heard that but it is also quite clear, or it would seem to be clear that the person who threw the hand grenade into the house, just did it blindly? He didn't see if there was anybody in the house, he didn't look in through the window and see that there was a baby and its mother?

He must have just thrown the hand grenade in without even himself satisfying himself, that the target was there, let alone a baby and its mother? Would you say that the actual carrying out of the operation was proper?

MR TOKA: Your Worship, you see the process in the whole way is that normally in some operations, the man on the ground is just giving a weapon that the target has been reconnoitred, this is an appropriate time to attack that place and this is the room where you should attack.

And immediately he reaches the scene, normally if it is dark, like it was at night, the man on the ground, wouldn't start to say let me peep in and see who is there, because by the time he peeps in, the same person is attacking, he can shoot him, do you understand?

That is why it will happen so abruptly that at the end of the day when he comes back, a little baby and a mother was injured.

ADV DE JAGER: Then surely Mr Toka, when you gave that order, you were totally reckless because you didn't know whether at the stage, if you have ordered this man to throw the bomb at seven o'clock, or the grenade, you have done nothing to make sure that at seven o'clock that night, there wouldn't be a visitor at least, leave alone his own wife and child?

MR TOKA: Your Worship, let me drive you back to my evidence in chief. What I said was I said that given the man who is conducting the reconnaissance at that place, given the nature of the training that he has underwent, it was not for me or for anybody to doubt his intelligence capacity.

That is why an order normally would be given based on intelligence capacity. It is proper that any army before it goes to attack, the Minister of Defence who must give the order, he is not there in the situation, it is the intelligence men who is there on the situation, comes back with a report and the Minister of Defence is the one who will say attack that place, based on the report of the intelligence officer.

That is exactly how we also operated, based on the information of what the intelligence officer says, then you carry out the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: But then the Minister would accept that somebody could be killed, that is a mere visitor there, because he cannot exclude people visiting a place?

MR TOKA: Yes, but you see the example that I am using here is in relation to a Commander and the intelligence gatherers, that is what I was just referring to. In this case, I am also saying that if I knew in that reconnaissance that the baby and the mother might have been hurt, I don't think that operation could have been sanctioned in any way.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Joubert.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Toka, in the AK47 attack in which three police officers were killed, you answered a question put to you by the Chairman that you did not attack any policemen, but only specific policemen which had been identified because they have attacked ANC targets and stuff like that, if I can put it that way, is that correct?

MR TOKA: In relation to the attack on the AK47 raid, that is what I said.

MR JOUBERT: I just want to make it clear, no policemen was just attacked? He was attacked and this was in your evidence, that they committed some acts against the ANC or investigating them or petrol bombing them, but they were identified before the time?

CHAIRPERSON: Specifically identified, personally, we are going to kill Constable X?

MR TOKA: You see, let me draw you back to the situation in 1985 when there were rudimentary organs of people's power, when there were people's courts, people operating in the townships when there were street committees, whatsoever.

There were even some parks in the townships where it was clearly written by the people, the location in the township that police and dogs are not allowed. I am just giving you a brief synopsis of the situation.

In this case, it also takes a reasonable man to say all policemen are not bad policemen, and which policemen can be targeted, do you understand?

And you get people who will say this policeman was involved in this and this and this, and you get somebody else who will say this policeman is known, he is notorious and he becomes a target. That is exactly how it happens.

MR JOUBERT: Mr Toka, I am afraid, you don't really answer my question, because - all right, let me put it this way to you, why was Mr Toka's house, or Mr Toka ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kalele.

MR JOUBERT: Excuse me Mr Chairman, Mr Kalele, being targeted?

MR TOKA: Mr Kalele's house was targeted because according to our source of information, it is that he was in that community regarded as one of the notorious policemen.

I think he was at one stage, working in a train where you know people were harassed in this train, whatsoever, whatsoever, and it became clear to us that he was very notorious according to the information that we got from local people on the ground.

That is why at the end of the day, he was targeted

MR JOUBERT: Well, I will put it to you that there was no reason to identify Mr Kalele, because Mr Kalele did not attack any ANC structure. He was merely a police officer, based in the uniform branch at the Silverton branch here in Pretoria.

MR TOKA: I have said you mustn't mix the submission that I gave in relation to the three policemen that died in Atteridgeville and the submission that I gave in the case of Mr Kalele.

What I said in relation to the three policemen in Atteridgeville is that the information that we got is that they were attacking our comrades' houses and that they were known to be quite notorious, they were petrol bombing the comrades' houses in Atteridgeville and other areas.

I did not say Mr Kalele per se was also doing that.

CHAIRPERSON: But you say that he was targeted because of information received about how he used to harass people on the trains and you received information from the local community that he was maltreating them or not treating them well.

MR TOKA: Yes, that is the information that we had, not that he was involved in any petrol bombing, he was not involved in that. I don't know of that.

ADV DE JAGER: His way of handling people, was it against the ANC in particular or against all the passengers on the train in general?

MR TOKA: Okay, it shall be remembered that as from the situation in 1985 up to maybe 1994 during the election, is that mainly there was a war between the community and the police.

The community saw the police in another fashion then when they see the police now, generally it would happen that if the community comes and say this policeman is ill-treating us, he is doing whatsoever, immediately he becomes a target either of MK or of the community itself.

That was the position.

ADV DE JAGER: He might not have been a political opponent, he might have been a harsh policeman or a policeman ill-treating the public in general and that is why they hated him?

MR TOKA: You see the problem is it depends on one's, at that time the police, all the police were viewed as supporters of the system.

Whether you slap a person or whatsoever, whether you as a policeman you did not do it with a political motive whatsoever, but at the end of the day, when it comes to the broader community, it comes in as yes, well, he is part of the system, that is why he is ill-treating us because of the system, the situation in the townships.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Joubert?

MR JOUBERT: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Toka, so in general policemen were attacked because they were part of the system at that time?

Further evidence, or furthermore we will lead evidence that in the vicinity where Mr Kalele stayed, in a radius of 100 meters, there were six or seven other policemen staying in the same vicinity in houses. Why weren't there houses being attacked?

MR TOKA: I don't think you expected all policemen's houses to be attacked at the same time. Who knows, if I was not arrested in 1988 one other policeman's house in that place would be attacked. You see the problem is I have just said it in my submission that you know, it depends on how the community view the second policeman.

All policemen were not bad, even if they were part of the system. You will still find amongst the same policemen, good and bad policemen, that is why I am saying some of them may not have been targeted because the community at that stage did not have anything against them.

MR JOUBERT: I am saying to you that you are changing your evidence as far as the questions concerning this matter. Firstly there was that the policemen were identified, now they are not identified, they are in general and then in the same scenario you say to me no, not all policemen were bad people, but in the vicinity of 100 meter radius, one policeman's house was attacked.

I can't really see what was the policy to identify or to attack a policeman's house.

CHAIRPERSON: He said Mr Joubert, the witness said that Kalele's house was not attacked merely because he was a policeman. His house was attacked because they had received information from the community that he was harassing people, and therefore he became a target.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you Mr Chairman. I just want to put it to you that there will be evidence led that Mr Nkosi which committed the attack as well, applicant 7 in this hearing, and Kalele was at the same school and they had known each other quite well, and that Mr Nkosi had a personal vendetta against him. Can you comment on that?

MR TOKA: I wonder if it can appear to you that, does it mean that if you were at the same school together and tomorrow you have ...

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, what is being put to you is that they were at school together, in other words they knew each other and that applicant 7 had a personal vendetta against Mr Kalele, Mr Joubert's client. Do you know anything about that?

MR TOKA: Well, having been at school together, that one I cannot answer, but on - I still go back, on the question of personal vendettas, I do not think any military operation would be sanctioned on the basis of a personal vendetta.

It would simply be refuted to be carried out. I cannot comment on that, but once a personal vendetta is realised, normally the operation can never be carried out.

MR JOUBERT: Mr Toka, did you verify at any stage that Mr Kalele was a so-called bad policeman that harassed people on the trains, according to the information that you received? Did you try to establish any correctness in that info?

MR TOKA: You see, when you get information from the local community, you don't get it from a single person. You get it from a few people who will always be - but this policeman, you know this policeman.

CHAIRPERSON: No but the question was, did you personally take steps to verify, to observe him for instance, trail him for a while or whatever?

MR TOKA: Yes, we did verify that.

MR JOUBERT: What steps did you take?

MR TOKA: Normally the steps that we take is that we will try to get the feeling of the community about a certain person, and that is normally what we will do to verify the information that we get.

MR JOUBERT: But you agree that you can make a fault in your verifying this info?

MR TOKA: You see if it would be one person or let me say five persons from the same group who will answer that question, I think a mistake might take place there, because they might influence one another, but if you get four, five different people from five different groupings, you might - it is unlikely that they can all lie about it.

MR JOUBERT: Mr Toka, what was the ANC policy in 1988 towards women and children, babies?

MR TOKA: 1988?

MR JOUBERT: In 1988, what was the ANC policy towards women and children?

MR TOKA: I think if you have that policy then you can take me through it. I don't think I can remember what the ANC thought about women and children in 1988.

MR JOUBERT: Would the ANC approve attacks on women and children at that time?

MR TOKA: Not only the ANC, but I have said ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think if we could just qualify that, on innocent women and children, you know.

MR TOKA: No, they would never do that, yes.

MR JOUBERT: Innocent, no ways? Why did you approve an attack on this house, when you could foresee that there could be a woman and a baby in this house?

MR TOKA: Using the word foresee, it would be quite wrong, because at no stage did I ever say that I foresaw that there would be a woman and a child. I have simply said if there was a woman and a child, that operation I am sure, if I knew that there was a woman and a child there, that operation could not have been carried out, because the target was the policeman staying in that house, and not the woman and the child.

MR JOUBERT: And the political benefit or objectives to kill a policeman at that time?

MR TOKA: It has always been amongst the political objectives to fight the enemy at all fields, whether it is a policeman or a soldier, but I mean, they were part of the system and that carried a political objective.

MR JOUBERT: I put it to you that this attack on this house, did not benefit or support any of your objectives, but only to cause a long life grief and pain to the parents of Patience Kalele, a 14 month old baby.

I think that was according to the facts being presented here, it was a cowardice attack on that house. We will leave it there.

Would you say that there was a difference in the gathering of intelligence, planning and executing the attack on the house in Mamelodi Gardens and the attack on the three policemen?

MR TOKA: Can you rephrase your question?

MR JOUBERT: All right.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was, would you say that the gathering of intelligence in the incident involving the shooting of the three policemen and the bombing of Mr Kalele's house, was the same? Was the same procedure followed, was the same methods adopted, was the same people used, etc, in the gathering of the intelligence in the two different incidents, and if there were any differences, what were they?

MR TOKA: I think every military operation, depending on its size of the operation and the people involved, differs according to its own merits and in no way will any intelligence gathering be the same with the other. That is what will happen.

You cannot reconnoitre this hall like compare it to reconnoitring a car, a person who is going to the car.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but you may use the same methods, you may say okay I am reconnoitring this hall, I will sit outside for half an hour until such and such time, count the people who are coming in and go out, that sort of thing.

MR TOKA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I mean obviously they are not the same because you are at different places?

MR TOKA: Yes.

MR JOUBERT: In this case there was a vast difference because in the one scenario AK47's were used. In this scenario a hand grenade was thrown bluntly into a house, do you agree with me?

MR TOKA: That is why I say it depends on the merits of any case. It will, it has to be different, it cannot be the same.

MR JOUBERT: And especially at this time of the night, or the morning? I think it was late night when the attack took place?

MR TOKA: Then what about the time, what was wrong with the timing? If the attack takes place in the night, what is the question?

MR JOUBERT: What I am trying to say to you Mr Toka is that this attack was not being planned, it was an attack being decided in an instant moment, and a hand grenade was used to throw bluntly into a house where your people could foresee that there was other innocent people in the house. That is what I am trying to put to you.

There was a vast difference between the planning in the AK47 attack and the planning in the attack on Mr Kalele's house.

MR TOKA: You see, I will answer you by saying that I don't know of any military operation on this earth, that was not planned. Even those military propaganda operations, you sit down and say you are going to look for an isolated area and that in itself, is planning.

MR JOUBERT: Why did you execute this attack with AK47's eliminating the possibility of killing innocent people?

MR TOKA: Each attack depends on the nature of the target and the nature of the target, that is the one that will decide the type of weapon that has got to be used.

If the target is inside the house, then it would be proper for a grenade to be used, and I am still maintaining that if it was known that there was a child and a woman in that house, that attack couldn't have taken place.

Not just the grenade would not be used, but the attack would not have happened.

ADV DE JAGER: The other three policemen who were killed, weren't they killed in the house?

MR TOKA: They were not in the house as I understand.

ADV DE JAGER: Where were the three?

MR TOKA: They were outside the house like in an open space.

ADV DE JAGER: Well, if you wanted to kill Mr Kalele, couldn't there be somebody waiting for him to come back that night, and shoot him, or wait for him to leave the house in the morning?

MR TOKA: Your Worship, that would be proper if the intelligence man came with such a plan that, no, I think the best way of doing it, would be for us to wait for this guy. We depend on him, he is the man who is having the whole situation in his hands, and if he says it will be proper for you to hit from this direction or it will be proper for you to use a mortar and artillery gun, that is what you do.

It solely depends on the intelligence that has been gathered around the target.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Joubert?

MR JOUBERT: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Toka, in your evidence it was not clear out of the intelligence, you said it, it was not clear out of the intelligence received from Webster, that Mrs Kalele and the baby could be in the house, is that correct?

MR TOKA: That is what I said, yes.

MR JOUBERT: Why didn't you do the same surveillance yourself to eliminate the possibility to injure or kill innocent people?

MR TOKA: I think I have explained the position of Webster, he was a well trained intelligence officer and that at no stage did we or any of my command structure, ever doubted his intelligence capacity.

MR JOUBERT: You see, I've got a problem with that, because the whole morning we heard that Webster was the intelligence man, he was being trained to gather intelligence and to put it through to the command structure, or to the foot soldiers, and the whole morning there was a lack of intelligence and every time it is going back to Webster. I put it to you that today it is easy to say that intelligence indicated that it was correct and acceptable to attack a target, resulting in a murderous, senseless attack on a woman and a baby, because Webster has disappeared, he has totally disappeared, and now it is easy to shift this non-political act or liberation objective to support the struggle, on the lack of intelligence.

MR TOKA: Sir, are you blaming me that Webster has disappeared so that I should not say it was Webster if it was Webster?

Webster was our intelligence officer and I think all the rest of the applicants that will come in, will still submit it to you that Webster was our intelligence officer and it, that is how we do it.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know what Webster's other name was? His real name?

MR TOKA: Real name? I don't know. I don't know his real name.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you only know him as Webster?

MR TOKA: Just Webster, yes.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you Mr Chairman. What is also strange is that during these years of struggle, people know who died when and where, but Webster has just disappeared, gone. No one can get hold of him?

MR TOKA: I just said it to you that after our arrest, when we were prepared to go to court, Webster was already placed in Section 31, which was a State witness and I think you know the implications of a State witness.

I don't think because he was supposed to be a State witness, I would know where he is today. If he was charged with me, I would know where he is because I would have an interest to know where is my other comrade.

In that case, Webster had to be in Section 31, possibly the Security Branch are the ones who will give us a clear answer what happened to Webster. I cannot give that answer.

MR JOUBERT: Well Mr Toka, I will put it to you that this was a senseless, non-political attack on a house where unfortunately a baby f 14 months died, and a mother being injured for the rest of her life.

MR TOKA: That is your submission.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JOUBERT

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Mtanga, do you have any questions that you would like to put to the witness?

MS MTANGA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Joubert, if you could just swop seats again. Mr Toka, Ms Mtanga doesn't represent any victim or any other person, she is the Evidence Leader for the Commission.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS MTANGA: Thank you Chairperson, I would like to state that I would be putting some of the questions on behalf of the victims who don't have legal representatives.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Okay, she does represent some victims.

MR TOKA: Okay.

MS MTANGA: In the three murders of the policemen in Atteridgeville, the people that were caught up in the crossfire according to your evidence, do you know who they are?

MR TOKA: I don't know them, I can't even point at them.

MS MTANGA: Okay. The first person is Tickey Maleka.

CHAIRPERSON: Tickey Maleka, page 73.

MS MTANGA: The first one is Tickey Maleka and the second one is Ananias Nkoane.

MR TOKA: Okay.

MS MTANGA: Tickey Maleka was the owner of that place, and she was running a shibeen at that time. Were you aware of that information?

MR TOKA: Yes, I only became aware of it - actually I knew that place was a shibeen, but I did not know the owner at that time. I only became aware when we were attending trial that this woman by the name of Tickey was the owner.

MS MTANGA: All right. Can you explain to this Committee what was the nature of the reports of reconnaissance that you received in regard to the place where these police were hanging around, hanging out?

MR TOKA: Just, what we received is that these policemen were frequenting that place and they were normally seen drinking there and that was actually their hang out and this policemen were amongst those policemen that were said to be petrol bombing the houses of political activists, whatsoever, around Atteridgeville and that the only way to get them, it was at that place.

That was the nature of the intelligence gathering that we got.

MS MTANGA: Okay. You as a Commander, having the knowledge that this was a shibeen that they were frequenting and that is where they were going to be targeted, what precautions did you take to ensure that civilians who would be at the shibeen at the same time as the police, wouldn't be hurt?

MR TOKA: Okay, at that time my Commander was Mensday Maponya, I was just the Commissar.

I think that was why the AK rifle was used because you see, when you fire a cartridge, it will simply go to the target unless there is some callousness that meets the target, then it may go somewhere else, and it would be proper.

That is why in that attack, because it was in an open place, in a shibeen, a grenade could not be used, but an Ak. Those were precautions taken.

MS MTANGA: Okay.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Ms Mtanga, Mr Toka, just to get a bit of information about these three police from Mamelodi. Which branch of the Police Force did they belong to, were they uniform, detective, security branch, which one?

MR TOKA: At this moment, I cannot say but you see, it is at that time, not only these three policemen were known to be involved in the petrol bombing of political activists' houses, there were a few of them.

Some of them luckily survived this type of an attack.

MS MTANGA: Generally in the operations that your Unit carried out, did your operatives have a discretion to decide in a situation whether to go ahead with an order or not to go ahead, looking at the situation at that time?

MR TOKA: Yes, the discretion will work in a case where maybe you go to a reconnoitred place and you find that the situation is not like it was when you left it. Do you understand, then you may use a discretion there.

But in a situation where you find that a situation is still the same like you have left it, that is not a discretion that you can use. You know, a soldier, once he has been given an order, he carries out that order.

MS MTANGA: It will be put to you by Ms Tickey Maleka, that at the time she was attacked together with a policeman who died, she was inside the house and the police were sitting outside, far away from the door where she was standing.

She was visible enough, it was at night she admits, but she was visible because the light in the room, there was a light at the door and a light at the gate, and your operatives would have seen her that she was a woman and they still shot at her. The first person who was shot at, was herself. What would have been the discretion, or what discretion would they have applied there in your opinion?

MR TOKA: You see, when you plan an attack, and you plan it specifically for a certain target, but you see like in an AK raid where immediately you fire first, first two, three shots, then there is a pandemonium. It is a shibeen, everybody starts running, the man with the gun also panics somehow and in that way, some people are caught in the crossfire.

But not having been the aim of the whole attack for these people to be caught there. Even if she was visible, I am sure she was hit by a stray bullet and the bullet was not aimed at her at that time.

MS MTANGA: Mr Toka, Ms Maleka will lead evidence to the fact that she was standing far away from the police, standing at the door of her house, and the first shot that was fired, was fired at her.

What I am asking you is, as a Commander and with your operatives caught up in that kind of a situation, what would have been, how would they have exercised their discretion in that instance?

Was there need to shoot at her if the police were sitting on the other side?

MR TOKA: No, I don't think for her to say that the first shot was fired at her, is correct. You see the problem is how do you determine out of six bullets?

CHAIRPERSON: I think it is difficult for Mr Toka to answer, seeing he wasn't there, but let's just I think put it another way.

Assume, don't accept, assume that an operative came in and aimed at the lady who was standing at the door and before anything else, he fired at her. What would you as Commander, what would you regard the actions of that operative to be? Would they be proper or would that be incorrect for him to behave that way?

Would he have been following orders if he aimed at the woman?

MR TOKA: If he aimed directly at the woman, then that would not be the order, because the order would be to eliminate the target as chosen.

MS MTANGA: Thank you Mr Toka. I will now move on to the attack on Mr Mveke's house. Was that at Mamelodi?

MR TOKA: Yes, Mamelodi.

MS MTANGA: Okay, thank you. What information did you have against Mr Mveke, what information did you have, what activities was he involved in which necessitated the attack of his house?

MR TOKA: Mr Mveke was a policeman and as I said, it has always been the policy of the movement to carry out operations against policemen and informers.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he have any specific allegations made against him, Mveke, that made him a target, or was he a target merely because he was a policeman and for no other reason?

MR TOKA: No for now Your Worship, I cannot remember what allegations were levelled against him, but I think at that time, when that attack was carried out, there must have been something against him, because we normally don't just do it against any policeman.

We had to have a reason why we have to do it. Even though normally it would never make any difference if you shoot a policeman in a political struggle, because he is part of the system. Nobody would like to do that, you would like to weigh the two sides.

MS MTANGA: Mr Toka, if I am to refer to your earlier evidence, you have stated that you would attack a policeman where there are specific allegations against him. In Mr Mveke's case I would like to put forward that he was only working with criminal matters and he was never involved in political activities, and that is the evidence that is going to be put before this Commission.

MR TOKA: Yes, you see the problem with policemen is that it is not only the Security Branch that was targeted. What was targeted was generally the policemen were part of the system, whether he is in uniform, whether he is Security Branch, whether he opens the doors in the police cells whatsoever, so long as he was part of the system, that was the whole system.

CHAIRPERSON: But I think you would agree Mr Toka, that if he had a very good policeman who was a very good criminal investigator, who was very effective in his arresting of criminals, car thieves and petty thieves, etc, the word could quite easily be spread to you people that this policeman was harassing the community and he is a bad man, because they had a great interest to get him out of the way, because he was interfering with their criminal activities?

MR TOKA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So you could get false information fed to you?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

CHAIRPERSON: By people wanting to get a good policeman out of the system?

MR TOKA: Exactly Your Worship, but some precautions were normally taken in those instances. That is why at this stage I cannot say exactly what the allegations against Mr Mveke were.

MS MTANGA: In your earlier evidence you have said, you have clearly emphasised that there wasn't just, there wouldn't just be an attack against a person because he is a policeman, there would have to be specific allegations against a person, and now what you have just said is that because you were a policeman, you were wearing a uniform, you could be a target in such attacks? What exactly is the position?

MR TOKA: No. What I was simply saying now was that the discretion to attack the police, was mainly with the man on the scene. I would have categorised which one is a bad and which one is a good policeman, I would have done that.

But still it wouldn't make a difference if one attacks the policeman, or he was a policeman, because he was part of the system that we were fighting against, and that we wanted to destroy. That is what I am trying to say.

MS MTANGA: Okay thank you. I will now move to the attack on Mr Ndala's house. You have said in your evidence Mr Ndala, you alleged that there was a police informer in the house. Can you tell this Committee who was the informer in the house, according to your information from the intelligence?

MR TOKA: No, I never said there was an informer in the house. I said the information that we received, Mr Ndala himself was a police informer.

CHAIRPERSON: The evidence was that Ndala himself was a police agent, in the sense that he was an informer and that is why he was chosen as a target, and that info was received by the intelligence.

MS MTANGA: Okay.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Ms Mtanga, just about this Mr Ndala, can you tell us more about this Mr Ndala, what was he doing, what was his occupation?

MR TOKA: I wouldn't say what was his occupation, because actually you see the problem is, it is quite a long time and I wouldn't remember exactly what he was doing at that time, but the only information that came in hand at that time, was that he was collaborating with the police. That was the only information that came to us and you see, I wouldn't exactly know what occupation he was occupying at that time.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Mtanga?

MS MTANGA: Again earlier on in your evidence, you have testified that some of the operatives would come up with the information or would come up with, or would identify who the targets would be and then you would check that out and then you would get an approval on that.

Was this the case in Mr Ndala's situation?

MR TOKA: You see what happened in Mr Ndala's situation was that you see, here there was, you have to look at the situation like for instance at Ndala's place, that is why what happened is that the grenade was mainly thrown out of the house, because it served as a warning, you see.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but I think the question asked was where did you get the information that he was an informer from? Was it from one of your own people or Webster or who, was it gathered, common knowledge in the community, what?

MR TOKA: Yes, it was mainly based on common knowledge in the community.

CHAIRPERSON: A rumour, a rumour that he was an informer?

MR TOKA: You see once it is said in the community, it becomes a rumour when it starts, then at the end of the day it becomes real, because you will find that it is amongst everybody, it is no longer something that belongs to a single person.

CHAIRPERSON: Did somebody suggest to you, how did it come about that he was chosen as a target? Did somebody come to you and say look, this Mr Ndala is an informer and then you decided he is a target or did somebody tell you that he should be shot at or attacked?

MR TOKA: No, normally what would happen is, it will be depend on, you see information comes in many ways. Sometimes you can't even go back to the person who gave you the information, and say this is the person who gave me the information because you will find that it starts from somewhere.

CHAIRPERSON: It spreads?

MR TOKA: Yes, it spreads and at the end of the day you find that it is right in its highest stage you see, and that is the problem, I cannot say at this stage exactly who came with that, but it was common knowledge that this was the information that was spread and something had to be done against and about it.

MS MTANGA: Mr Ndala used to run a taxi business, he owned a taxi. The kombi that was attacked or damaged outside his house, was the kombi he was using for taxing around Pretoria and do you know the daughter, there was a woman who used to live with Mr Ndala by the name of Tsedi Mahlala, do you know her?

MR TOKA: At one stage I heard that one of the daughters were in exile as well. I don't know the Tsedi Mahlala that you are talking about, possibly it should be the one, she should be the one.

MS MTANGA: Against the background of Mr Ndala's house having had a person who was out on exile in Lusaka, that is where Ms Mahlala was, what was the, was this checked out and thoroughly investigated to corroborate the fact that Mr Ndala himself could have been involved in informing?

MR TOKA: You see the problem is that the police at one stage, were also using like for instance, those people that there were kids that were outside of the country, because you know, with our parents, most of our parents did not have the same political understanding that the kids had at the end of the day.

Most of the parents saw the other kids as if these were the kids who have spoilt my child until he decided to leave my home, do you understand? That was the position.

In that way, because there was not much political work done on such people, at the end of the day the policemen turned them and used them against the other activists, do you understand?

That is why in that case I still say that that is why that grenade that was thrown there, it was only ... (tape ends) ...

MS MTANGA: ... surrounding the information on what he informed on, is that if you are such an informer for you to even warn him, then there must have been concrete evidence from your side to decide that he was a danger to you, and you needed to do something. I would like to believe that it is something that you would have remembered, what it was that he was informing on.

MR TOKA: You see the problem is that in the case of a struggle, the danger is not eminent to you as a person, it might be eminent to the society, but not not directly eminent to you and you take an action on the basis of such dangers.

In that case, I wouldn't say he has informed about me. He has never informed about me, possibly he might not even have informed about, against one of the guys that was in that attack, but the problem was that there was that common thing in the township that he was informing.

MS MTANGA: You have testified that the Unit members who carried out the operation against Mr Ndala, were Legodi, Kgase and Khotsa, right?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MS MTANGA: Are you aware that they all lived in the same vicinity as Mr Ndala and that they knew him?

MR TOKA: Exactly, yes.

MS MTANGA: So was any of them involved or did anyone of them have such knowledge that Mr Ndala was an informer if it was such common knowledge?

MR TOKA: Yes, I think they had that knowledge, that is why they carried out the operation. It was based mainly on that knowledge.

MS MTANGA: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS MTANGA

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Mtanga. Mr Mohlaba, do you have any re-examination?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair, I've got none, no re-examination.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR MOHLABA

CHAIRPERSON: Mr De Jager, do you have any questions?

ADV DE JAGER: I haven't got.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sandi?

ADV SANDI: Mr Toka, just one question. Did you take any caution against the possibility that perhaps even the Security Police themselves could spread a rumour, that they could spread rumours about someone, that he was an informer, so that this person could get attacked and injured or even killed in the township?

MR TOKA: Yes, that was very clear, but you see the problem sometimes, it would be how would you verify that it was spread by the Security Branch members because you know sometimes possibly it would start being spread by them, but it becomes so sophisticated that you don't know the roots of it.

Some people, it is true, some people were caught in these actions unfortunately because of such situations.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Chair.

ADV DE JAGER: May I just ask one question, sorry. Can you remember any specific trips that you had taken to Botswana where you informed the Commander there and asked permission to carry out any of these targets?

MR TOKA: I think I will have a problem because I think during my operations in the country, I have gone to Botswana about six or seven times.

ADV DE JAGER: Can't you remember for instance you went there, and you said listen, I want to attack Juicy Lucy or I want to attack Mr Ndala?

MR TOKA: No, I cannot remember on any specific offence.

ADV DE JAGER: You see, I find that strange, because you've got all the information, you have been briefed on this very one you want to inform your Commander fully on, so that he could make a decision, and yet you can't remember any specific case?

MR TOKA: You see, there was some days on one's life that cannot be forgotten and there are some incidents that one cannot forget, but incidents of this nature, where you go for a command or an order or something, I am sure it is common knowledge that such an incident can be forgotten.

Unless something specific happens that can always remind you of that incident. That is why I am saying I cannot at this stage say on any specific offence I went to Botswana, and this I did, this and this is what I got.

ADV DE JAGER: This last case, we had the specific thing such as a small child being killed in the operation? Wouldn't that, oh, I've gone, I've asked for permission, but I never asked permission for this? I have informed them in fact that there is no children in the house?

Can't you recollect anything of that kind?

MR TOKA: I think Mr Chairman, I have said it in my submission that if I knew there was a child and a mother there, I wouldn't have allowed anybody to carry out that operation, for me as a human being.

I still take it, it will be very inhuman for anybody to carry an attack against a baby and her mother, and its mother. That is my submission.

ADV DE JAGER: That is exactly my point. You have mentioned it, this is a very outstanding event that the child was killed. Did you in fact gain the permission to attack that specific house?

MR TOKA: I cannot remember specifically on which of all these offences, I personally went and asked for an order to do it.

ADV DE JAGER: You in fact can't remember a single one?

MR TOKA: I do not want to bind myself on this matter, that is why I am saying I cannot remember any specific offence on that.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Do any of the legal representatives have any questions arising out of the questions that have been put by the panel?

Just questions arising out of questions from what Mr Sandi and Mr De Jager put? Mr Molefe?

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOLEFE: Mr Toka, is it correct that within MK circles at that time, you were also known as Bomba?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR MOLEFE: And you were also known as Baduza?

MR TOKA: Exactly.

MR MOLEFE: Now the Juicy Lucy incident, or what is referred to as the Juicy Lucy incident, are you aware that besides the military, there were other important government installations within that area?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Molefe, are these questions arising from the last two questions?

MR MOLEFE: Yes Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: About Mr Sandi asking that the Security Branch, this is not re-examination, the only person entitled to re-examination, is Mr Mohlaba. I am not going to allow everybody, we will never finish the proceedings.

MR MOLEFE: I am not going to re-examine, it is just an important fact that I think should be placed on record.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, but please be quickly because it is not matters arising out of what Mr De Jager has been asking now about going to Botswana and what Mr Sandi asked about the Security Branch spreading rumours.

MR MOLEFE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I am sure it is not, anyway I will let you do it quickly. I don't want to open up now a whole new thing and now everybody has got the right to cross-examine on new matters, we have been here all day with this witness.

MR MOLEFE: Yes, in actual fact, I will be very short. Are you aware that besides the military, the besides the SADF, there were other important government installations, some of whom were damaged during that limpet mine explosion on the corner of Andries and Vermeulen Streets?

MR TOKA: You see, it is quite a long time, unless you take me through the buildings that were damaged.

MR MOLEFE: Yes, for instance on page 92 of the bundle, you will see that it is mentioned that the State library, the Magistrate's court building, I am not sure if this is right, that

some military vehicles were also damaged? Were you also aware that also, besides what I have already read, that for instance, the Head Office of the Department of Finance, where the Minister of Finance had his offices, are also just at that corner?

CHAIRPERSON: I think Mr Molefe, we can't start again with this witness again, you know, we've got to keep some sort of procedure. Can't you bring this evidence in with your client later?

MR MOLEFE: I will leave it at that, I just wanted to find out if he was aware of these other important government installations.

CHAIRPERSON: On page 92 in our documentation, but I think I must stop this because it is not on matters arising out of questions put by the panel.

MR MOLEFE: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Toka, that then concludes your testimony. Thank you, you may stand down.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: We are of the view that we should sit until half past four today, but perhaps we could take a ten minute or five minute adjournment and then resume later, thank you. We will take a short adjournment now.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS