ON RESUMPTION
MS LOCKHAT: We call on Gen Joubert.
MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, you will find Gen Joubert's applications, both of them, in Volume 4, page 7 - 16 and then pages 16.1 - 16.28.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
ABRAHAM JOHANNES MOUTON JOUBERT: (still under oath)
CHAIRPERSON: Please proceed.
EXAMINATION BY MR GROBLER: General, you will recall that the previous time, we dealt with what was identified as the Joubert plan, this was the plan which in terms of where Commandant Naude and Colonel Verster, were deployed to different Units, do you recall that?
MR JOUBERT: I do Chairperson.
MR GROBLER: You will also recall that you said that there was a meeting where you were present, Brigadier Cronje and Gen Moller were there as well, where targets were identified and that the Ribeiro's, Piet Ntuli and persons who wished to leave the country for instant training, were identified as targets, do you recall that?
MR JOUBERT: I do recall that Chairperson.
MR GROBLER: General, just to pick up the thread from here, at a stage when you deployed Charl Naude to the Northern Transvaal Commandment, did Charl have any information as to who and what had to be identified as targets?
MR JOUBERT: I don't believe that he knew at that stage. Let me say it in the following manner Chairperson, during that meeting with Gen Moller and with Brigadier Cronje and myself, of the Security Police, I cannot recall if anybody else was present, I am not entirely certain, I was told that Dr and Mrs Ribeiro were providing active assistance to the ANC activists by transferring activists between Mamelodi, Botswana and Swaziland, that they themselves were training activists, that they were providing financial assistance to activists and fighters and that they were causing situations of unrest in Mamelodi.
MR GROBLER: From who did you get that information, can you recall?
MR JOUBERT: This information was discussed during the meeting between me and Gen Moller and Brigadier Cronje.
CHAIRPERSON: You were not asked whether it was discussed, you were asked who told you about this.
MR JOUBERT: The people that told me, were Gen Moller and Brigadier Cronje from the Security Police.
MR GROBLER: At this stage, Mr Chairperson, if it is convenient for you, we are at paragraph 4.4.2, on the basis of what was told to you, did you formulate a perspective regarding what the role of the Ribeiro's was in the struggle?
MR JOUBERT: The perspective that I had was that which I obtained and that was that they were ANC activists, that they themselves trained activists, that they provided financial assistance to the activists and fighters and that incidents of unrest in Mamelodi were caused by them.
MR GROBLER: So if I were to ask you the question today, what purpose would it have served if they had been eliminated, you can refer to your statement. I am asking you to refresh your memory from paragraph 4.4.2.
MR JOUBERT: My perception of their role was that they played a very formidable role in the struggle and that it would it have largely disrupted the ANC should they be eliminated. According to what I was told, they and one Ntuli were largely responsible for the unrest and chaos which ruled in Mamelodi.
MR GROBLER: General, we will return to Ntuli at a later occasion, but I would also like to ask you, since then you have received more information and would it be correct to say that Ntuli was not associated or was not to be associated with Mamelodi but rather with KwaNdebele?
MR JOUBERT: That is correct.
MR GROBLER: Then I would like to ask you if you will continue with your affidavit on paragraph 4.4.4. There the statement is made that during that meeting, it was already decided that the Ribeiro's and we may include Ntuli in this, would be eliminated, is that correct, do you confirm this?
MR JOUBERT: That is correct.
MR GROBLER: Can we just achieve more clarity regarding that. When we speak about the Ribeiro's that were to be eliminated, would that have been only Dr Ribeiro or would that have included his wife as well?
MR JOUBERT: At no stage was it stated that only Dr Ribeiro would be eliminated, his wife was always included.
MR GROBLER: Then there is an aspect of your affidavit which deals with Ntuli and then in paragraph 4.4.8 you return to the Ribeiro's.
MR JOUBERT: That is correct Chairperson.
MR GROBLER: Then from paragraph 4.4.8 can you pick up the thread once again and inform the Committee how the matter took further course regarding yourself?
MR JOUBERT: Eventually Commandant Charl Naude submitted the plan according to which the Ribeiro's would be eliminated. He submitted this to me.
ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon for interrupting, but how did Charl Naude come to hear about anything? Who informed him about what was going on? We have just read that he informed you. Did somebody tell him anything, how did he fit into the picture?
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, according to the plan which I had devised, Charl Naude was deployed to the Northern Transvaal area in support of the Security Police and during that appointment, I would definitely have informed him that a target which had already been identified, would be the Ribeiro's.
Further information which he obtained, he may have obtained from Brigadier Cronje and the others. That is where he would have obtained it.
ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.
MR GROBLER: Now General, would it be correct to say that if Charl Naude had received the information that the Ribeiro's had been identified as targets, the practical execution of the order, would have been his baby? He would have to devise a detailed plan which would explain how he would go about this, how he would execute it and ultimately, he would have to report back to you with regard to the results?
MR JOUBERT: The plan which he would devise, or would have devised, would have to be discussed with either Hechter or Brigadier Cronje at some stage.
After that, he would briefly inform me regarding what the plan was about. If I had not been satisfied, I would have told him, I don't agree, change this and that and that and if I had been satisfied, then he would have continued and further executed the plan.
However, I put it as a very clear requisite, with every operation to him, that the operation be approved by the Police and I would ask whether or not he was working with the support or for the support of the Police and every time, this was confirmed Mr Chairperson.
MR GROBLER: Then General, we can move over to the following page, paragraph 4.4.9 of your affidavit.
Did Commandant Naude then approach you at a certain stage and informed you that they were now going ahead with the elimination of the Ribeiro's, and did he provide you with a basic plan?
MR JOUBERT: That is correct. He informed me that they were in a state of readiness and that when the time was appropriate, they would go ahead with the operation.
MR GROBLER: And did you give him permission to go ahead with the operation?
MR JOUBERT: I gave him permission, however, once again, upon the precondition that it enjoy the approval of the Police and that this be in support of the Police.
On those grounds, I then granted him permission.
MR GROBLER: Very well. Now General, did you later receive feedback that the operation had indeed been executed?
MR JOUBERT: I did receive feedback that the operation had been executed, and it was told to me that the operation had been successful.
MR GROBLER: Other than granting permission, you yourself were not physically involved in the execution thereof?
MR JOUBERT: No, under no circumstances.
The reason for that being simple, I had much other work to do.
MR GROBLER: General, this is perhaps a question which others may also have asked, but if one thinks of persons like Charl Naude and Mr Robey and Mr Vlietstra as well as the others that have testified before them, would you say that that which they did was within the ambit of what your order to them was?
MR JOUBERT: Definitely.
MR GROBLER: From there on General, you have included pieces of information regarding how exactly and what exactly happened at the Ribeiro's, is that correct?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.
MR GROBLER: Would it be correct to say that today would be the first day that you have heard a full version of what happened?
MR JOUBERT: Yes. Since Charl Naude began his evidence, until after Mr Vlietstra, was when I first heard the precise detail of exactly what took place.
MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, as far as Gen Joubert's evidence is concerned, regarding the actual incident, that concludes it. There are some facts coming after the event, which are important and relevant to the whole application.
I would like at this stage, some direction from you as to whether I should now deal with those facts which are really part of the aftermath, or whether I should limit his evidence in chief, simply to his involvement in the operation itself.
CHAIRPERSON: Give me some idea as to what they deal with.
MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, now after this, you will hear evidence about a meeting which took place with Gen Geldenhuys, what took place there, you will hear evidence about the existence of a certain Minute, but all of that came some time afterwards. Oh yes, you will also hear evidence about a discussion between Gen Joubert and Gen Coetzee of the Police.
As far as the direct members of the family and the direct victims are concerned, perhaps they are not all that interested in that part and you have indicated from time to time, that we should deal with the matters which concern those people first of all.
I am therefore in your hand Mr Chairman. If you wish me to complete all of this, I will do so, but otherwise, I don't want to overstep the bounds.
CHAIRPERSON: No, it is only necessary to the extent that it impinges on whether he gets amnesty or not, for this particular, for his part in this particular operation.
MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, it certainly is relevant to the question which you ultimately have to answer, whether or not there should be amnesty.
CHAIRPERSON: For this particular operation?
MR GROBLER: Even for this operation Mr Chairman, it goes to all three operations. But it is a set of facts which can conveniently be dealt with separately, I will submit to you.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Grobler, is there not an aspect of that evidence to which you are referring, which specifically has to do with the Ribeiro's conduct? There was evidence during the Cronje matter, when it emerged about Robey's registration number on the vehicle, there were discussions among the Generals or the Brigadiers, regarding how this matter of the leakage of Robey's vehicle number, should be dealt with, and perhaps this is only relevant for this matter and not for the others.
Will there be evidence to that effect?
MR GROBLER: It is exactly that aspect of the evidence which I had in mind. I did not regard it as relevant only for the Ribeiro matter.
If it is your decision that I should handle that now, I will do so with the greatest of pleasure. However, I do not wish to overstep the boundaries of what we have decided it would be.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Grobler, I think it does impinge on the incident that we are dealing with, then it will be convenient for you to deal with that aspect of his evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: Strictly in so far as it is relevant.
MR GROBLER: I will endeavour to restrict it to relevance. General, can we continue then somewhat.
CHAIRPERSON: I think that we may adjourn now, it is one o'clock and we will resume at a quarter to two in the hope ...
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ABRAHAM JOHANNES MOUTON JOUBERT: (still under oath)
EXAMINATION BY MR GROBLER: (continued) Thank you Chairperson. General, would you please have a look at your application, paragraph 4.4.13.
MR JOUBERT: I have that.
MR GROBLER: From paragraph 4.4.13, you discuss once again the course of the Ribeiro incident and would you please proceed with that?
MR JOUBERT: From Intelligence reports which I received after the death of the Ribeiro's, it appeared that their death did indeed disrupt the ANC in Mamelodi. In fact after their death, Mamelodi destabilised or indeed, it stabilised and law and order could once again be maintained.
At a stage while the planning of a nation wide operation in co-operation with the SAP was under way in Wachthuis, it was a very big operation, Gen Coetzee of the SAP called me aside and asked why the South African Defence Force did not state that they were going to take out the Ribeiro's.
MR GROBLER: Might I just pause there for a moment General. Was this the first time that you and Gen Coetzee met or did you know each other already?
MR JOUBERT: I beg your pardon, no, we had met at previous occasions.
MR GROBLER: Now, I would like to ask you this, when you initially submitted the initial plan to Geldenhuys, you recall the function at which he told you that it sounded good, what did you think would Gen Geldenhuys do about that plan which you had submitted to him? Would he have discussed it with anybody?
MR JOUBERT: Well, I was under the impression that the idea for such a plan at that stage, would be discussed by the Head of the Army and the Head of the Police. And Gen Coetzee also knew about the matter.
MR GROBLER: However, you never received any feedback from Gen Geldenhuys that he had discussed this with the Police?
MR JOUBERT: No, I did not receive any feedback.
MR GROBLER: Then Gen Coetzee comes to you and says might I just ask you this, was he the Commissioner of Police at that stage?
MR JOUBERT: He was the Commissioner of Police, yes.
MR GROBLER: And he asked you this question, why didn't you tell me you were going to take out the Ribeiro's, and then you can continue.
MR JOUBERT: The question surprised me seeing as Brigadier Cronje was present when the Ribeiro's were identified as targets.
And Commandant Naude assured me that the operation was approved by the SAP. I also assumed that the approval would have taken place at the highest level in the SAP and that Gen Coetzee would have been aware of it. In retrospect I realise that the question was also posed as if he was under the impression that the murder of the Ribeiro's, was executed at the request of the South African Defence Force.
MR GROBLER: I am going to interrupt you once more, General. You alluded to the fact that Cronje was present when the Ribeiro's were identified as targets.
Did you think that Cronje and Coetzee would have had any liaison regarding that plan?
MR JOUBERT: I cannot confirm that. I cannot confirm that, but I believe as it functioned in all departments, that there would be chains of command and that there would be communication and it would have been very strange to me if he had not been informed.
MR GROBLER: So you had the expectation that Brigadier Cronje would have informed Gen Coetzee?
MR JOUBERT: I was under that impression.
MR GROBLER: Then you may proceed to paragraph 4.4.15 of your affidavit.
MR JOUBERT: I asked Gen Coetzee whether his people had not informed him. I also stated that I thought that Brigadier Jack Cronje had informed him or one of his seniors then, and mentioned that Captain Hechter was also part of the plan and that I had previously requested whether the plan had been approved by the SAP.
This morning we have it on record, that Captain Hechter indeed was part of the execution of the plan.
MR GROBLER: Very well.
MR JOUBERT: Gen Coetzee said after that that we should not be concerned, and that I should leave it to him.
MR GROBLER: General, I would just like to pause there once again. Although it does not appear in this application, he also said something else to you regarding an investigation?
MR JOUBERT: Yes. He said that he would lodge a formal enquiry into the Ribeiro incident.
MR GROBLER: General, the impression which you then received, was that this was news to Gen Coetzee or rather that he hadn't known about the Ribeiro plan beforehand?
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, he definitely did not know about the plan beforehand.
MR GROBLER: And now he tells you that he is going to lodge an enquiry. What did you do? You may go to paragraph 4.4.17.
MR JOUBERT: That very same evening, I told Gen Gleeson who was acting as HSAW, and told him that Gen Coetzee had said that we should not be concerned.
Gen Gleeson must have taken it up with Gen Geldenhuys, although not at the same function, seeing as Gen Geldenhuys called a special meeting after that, wherein he once again set down the procedures for this sort of operation, with just one difference, he now demanded that every operation of this nature, be cleared with him first.
MR GROBLER: Then I would like to go to the special meeting with Gen Geldenhuys. Chairperson, if I might ask you to consult Bundle 2(I), the document marked M on pages 164 - 165.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we have it.
MR GROBLER: General, you have a copy of an extract of the minutes, because that is all that we had when we were preparing.
I would like for you to consult your copy of it - on page 164 Chairperson. General, this document, I have referred to it as a minute because it has been written in the form of minutes.
It is dated the 28th of April 1987 with the heading, Submission CCB to Chief of the South African Defence Force and Chief of South African Defence Force Commentary, is that correct? Do you see the heading?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, I do.
MR GROBLER: Chairperson, I think that we should just clear this up. This presentation which the CCB did to HSADF at that stage was Gen Geldenhuys.
MR GROBLER: Who was CCB?
MR JOUBERT: That was the Civil Co-operation Bureau.
MR GROBLER: Represented by who?
MR JOUBERT: We were a very small group of people, because this sort of thing, was very sensitive and one did not want to make too much of it.
MR GROBLER: My question is the following, were you involved in this presentation?
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, it happened like this. Once a year I took the Head of the South African Defence Force to a special place, where I informed him about the activities and the planning around operations of the CCB.
Indeed, this cannot really be branded as a minute, it is more a confirmation of notes which were made during that meeting. As I have told you, it was a planning session as well as an information session which we had with the HSADF in order to keep him informed on a continual basis.
It did not mean that things were only discussed with him, when planning was under way, about operations in general. When a specific operation was to be undertaken, then I and I am speaking of external operations, I would have to obtain authorisation from him to go ahead with the operation, but this was only of application to external operations.
MR GROBLER: Now if one studies this document, and I am going to ask you to peruse this document, I am going to show you the following page which you allegedly have not yet seen because we have not had it yet, but this document if I have it correctly, is a document which was prepared by Corrie Meerholtz?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.
MR GROBLER: Was it practice that documents were kept regarding these sessions which you held with the HSADF, regarding Special Forces activities?
In other words, was there always documentation regarding this or was this an exception?
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, this specific document was used at various occasions, it was used in the Eastern Cape, they used it with the kwaMakutha hearing, so it was not an unknown document to those who participated in this sort of thing.
However, I was extremely surprised when I saw this document because the arrangement was that nothing should be recorded regarding these meetings.
MR GROBLER: General, this elimination or this murder of the Ribeiro's, was it discussed during these negotiations between you and the HSADF?
MR JOUBERT: No, not at all.
MR GROBLER: You will see that there is a paragraph 7 about methods to be applied. Can you please look at paragraph 7, I will read it out loud.
HSADF regards the actions not as murder and defines it as follows: An assault on an individual, enemy target with non-standard issue weapons on an unconventional manner in order not to reach innocents. There has been much debate about the meaning of that paragraph.
How do you see it, what did that paragraph mean?
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, there has been much discussion about elimination and people who applied unconventional methods and whether it is murder or not, when a man is eliminated, you remove him permanently from society by murdering him, and everything that goes along with that.
I think that Gen Geldenhuys wanted to place perspective on the issue that it should not be seen as murder, but rather as people with unconventional weapons, people who are removed with unconventional weapons.
MR GROBLER: Then can we make the statement, or would it be correct to say that the general principle thereof ...
MR COETZEE: If I may interpose at this stage, I don't know what the relevance of this document is. During the Forces Hearing, Gen Joubert denied the contents of this document, denied that it is an authentic document, now his evidence is being led on a document that he denies. I do have a bit of a problem with that, specifically in light of the same witness' evidence in the Forces Hearing.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, perhaps it can be cleared up. What is the relevance of this document if he says, if he denies its existence?
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I didn't understand Gen Joubert ever to deny the existence of this document. Please, perhaps my learned friend can point me to the record where Gen Joubert denied the existence of this document.
CHAIRPERSON: All right, let's just talk about its relevance then. What is the relevance of this document?
MR GROBLER: I was leading to that Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Please carry on.
MR COETZEE: My objection is not on the basis that he denies the existence of a document, he denies the contents of the document and the contents of the document, is a true reflection of the meeting. In other words, he says that this does not reflect what transpired at the meeting, and he cannot confirm the contents on previous occasions, that that is what transpired at the meeting. I don't know what the relevance of this document is also to the Ribeiro incident. That is my objection, if you want me to refer to the witness' evidence, the applicant's evidence, I can quickly get it and show it to you during the Forces Hearing, where he testified in this regard.
ADV DE JAGER: If you cannot see the relevance thereof, can I tell you how I see it? We are speaking of murder and it is said that it should not be called murder when the Army or the Police takes out somebody. That is why there was never spoken about go and kill the guy, they said eliminate him.
Other words were used in order to disguise it. This was an example of how killing was defined in other terms, so that it would not appear to be a purposeful killing.
MR COETZEE: He has previously denied the content of this document and has done so during the so-called Armed Forces Hearings in Cape Town. On a previous occasion he has denied this document.
ADV DE JAGER: But your client also denied it?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR GROBLER: Chairperson, perhaps I have misread something. Might I ask for a moment, perhaps Mr Coetzee is correct and I could be leaving the track. I would just like to peruse it.
CHAIRPERSON: I see. I think that you should satisfy yourself as to the relevance of all this information in so far as these applications are concerned, and if you are satisfied that there is relevance, then please proceed.
MR GROBLER: Yes, if you could grant me a moment please Chairperson.
MR COETZEE: Mr Chairman, this is of utmost importance for both the applicant and Gen Geldenhuys, may I ask for a short adjournment of five minutes to find all the relevant sections and place them on record.
I don't need longer than five minutes.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well.
MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, perhaps the, it seems that Mr Coetzee's objection is well founded, it seems that I was barking up a wrong tree. What I had in mind, Gen Joubert says it is not leading to that.
So, may I withdraw this for the moment?
CHAIRPERSON: Very well.
MR GROBLER: General, I would like to return to paragraph 4.4.17 of your affidavit in your amnesty application, 4.4.17.
You have mentioned that you told Gen Gleeson and that he had to convey this to Gen Geldenhuys and that Gen Geldenhuys after that, called a special meeting during which he redefined the procedures for this type of operation, are you with me?
MR JOUBERT: Yes.
MR GROBLER: General, can you tell the Committee more or less when this new procedure was stipulated by Gen Geldenhuys, in other words approximately when that special meeting took place? You do not have to provide the day and date?
Let us put it like this first, was it after the Ribeiro incident?
MR JOUBERT: It was after the Ribeiro incident. Chairperson, I must just make something clear here, at the time of the Ribeiro incident, Gen Geldenhuys was not available. He was abroad or he had taken leave, I am not sure.
After Gen Geldenhuys returned, Gen Gleeson directly informed him. I would accept that it would have been approximately during the middle of January 1987 or perhaps at the end of January 1987.
MR GROBLER: In what regard did a change in the procedures or the principles, take place which was different to what your original plan had been?
MR JOUBERT: According to the original plan, there was no definite stipulated, written procedure.
MR GROBLER: That would be a written procedure to identify and take out targets?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.
MR GROBLER: And then?
MR JOUBERT: I began to doubt that as a result of the fact that Gen Coetzee had not known of the operations and what had been done, I became concerned, and in effect, I was the one who insisted that a new procedure be written so that there would be a mechanism which would force both parties to obtain authorisation for actions on the highest level. That was on the side of the Police as well as the Defence Force.
MR GROBLER: Is that for internal operations for which targets have been identified and people eliminated?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, for internal operations.
MR GROBLER: And was such a change of procedure stipulated?
MR JOUBERT: Yes.
MR GROBLER: And was that changed procedure that authorisation be obtained from the highest level?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: May I just interrupt, did it involve that the operations had to be approved in writing, or was it going to be quite all right if it was merely oral?
MR JOUBERT: Mr Chairman, that procedures was in writing.
MR GROBLER: My next question General, was there after the Ribeiro's as far as you know, any similar incidents which was executed while you were in command of Special Forces?
MR JOUBERT: As long as I was in Special Forces, there was never again this type of operation. But let us not misunderstand the thing, the Defence Force went ahead and I am not speaking of the broader Defence Force, I am not speaking about Special Forces per se.
The broader Defence Force continued to provide assistance to help protect townships, to do border patrols. What I am trying to say is that the assistance was not ceased entirely, it was simply about special operations internally.
MR GROBLER: General, do I understand you correctly, that there was a changed procedure that was established, but that such operations did not take place again under that new procedure regarding Special Forces?
MR JOUBERT: That is correct.
MR GROBLER: Very well. General, you spoke of the fact that certain aspects would be in writing, would that be the approvals or would the amended plan also be placed in writing?
MR JOUBERT: No, the procedure worked as follows, the target would be identified on the levels on which people had been deployed. Then targets would be identified, planning would be undertaken and it would then be submitted, I would approve it on my level. I think it was Gen Schutte from the Police who would approve it on his level, and then we had to clear it with the Head of the Defence Force and with the Commissioner of Police, and they would then have to approve it on their levels, and that is how the process worked.
MR GROBLER: But my question was which part of that would be in writing?
MR JOUBERT: I doubt whether anything would take place in writing.
MR GROBLER: The amended procedure itself, which enjoyed a very high measure of security, was that procedure ever put in writing?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, it was.
MR GROBLER: Do you know whether such documents are still in existence today?
MR JOUBERT: I don't know.
MR GROBLER: Thank you Mr Chairman, that is the evidence in chief.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR GROBLER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. I certainly do have questions, but I must tell you at this stage, evidence that has now been led, portions of it, it is the first time that we have heard of it, and I have no instructions from Gen Coetzee on how to react to it. I find myself in a difficult position. I can do, I can ask some questions, but I cannot conclude my questioning, and I am just wondering whether it wouldn't be more convenient if my learned friend, acting for Gen Geldenhuys shouldn't kick off Mr Chairman, and it may be that I don't have to waste any of the time of the Commission, by asking for an adjournment.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, if we can do that, let us proceed.
MR COETZEE: Mr Chairman, I act on behalf of Gen Geldenhuys. Any questioning of Gen Joubert would be on a very limited basis, if at all, and I request that the limited questions that I am going to ask, I will with the Committee's permission, ask after he has led his evidence relating to the Ntuli incident.
At this stage, I would prefer not to ask questions.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR COETZEE
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it is becoming a bit difficult with respect. I hear what my learned friend says, and he must have good reason for that, but we are breaking up the evidence of Gen Joubert now and I would have thought that the issues which have now been clarified by him, should now be dealt with before we go on to incidents.
I don't want to put pressure on my learned friend at all. It just makes it very difficult for us to understand where we slot in. We certainly don't want to make it more difficult for you.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I think it will make it very difficult for me to understand the flow of evidence if questions in relation to the Ribeiro incident, in so far as Mr Coetzee is concerned on behalf of his clients, are not put to him at this stage. It certainly will do a little bit of havoc with our record if we were to jump, instead of dealing with the issues and wrapping them up whilst we can. I would really appreciate if we can proceed, if there are any questions to be put to you, Mr Coetzee.
MR COETZEE: My questions will be on a very limited basis, and will be on a more general basis if at all, relating to authorisation. Every time the witness testifies, he adds something about his plan or something about authorisation as which has happened from the previous incident to this incident.
My cross-examination of this witness is going to be severely limited, if at all. It is not appropriate for me at this stage to ask any questions. I don't wish to ask any questions at this stage. Any questions I ask at a later stage, I will ask the Committee's permission, and as I say, it is going to be on a very limited basis.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Will they be general questions and they will not specifically refer to this incident that we are currently dealing with?
MR COETZEE: That is what I am placing on record at this stage.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so you have no questions at this stage that will throw any light on the Ribeiro incident?
MR COETZEE: Sorry, is that once again a question addressed to me, Mr Chairman?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR COETZEE: At this stage, I don't have any questions relating to the Ribeiro incident, at this stage.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I suggest that I bat on, up to the point where the new evidence is, where I have to address the new evidence and I can tell you what it is, it is the very last portion of the evidence, about the procedures Mr Chairman.
Perhaps, let me bat on and see how far I get. If needs be, then I might have to ask you just to allow me to talk to Gen Coetzee, he is en route to Pretoria I understand, so I don't know whether I will be able to contact him, but then just talk to him and put a brief statement to the General about that.
MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, may I interrupt at this stage. Both my learned friends, Mr Coetzee and Mr Visser, have in their addresses to you, made comments about the witness' evidence to the extent that he is adding on and that he is adding new evidence all the time. Those comments are improper to be made, while the witness is present. If they wish to make those comments, they should ask you to let the witness be excused, then tell you what it is.
I do not believe that it is proper whilst the witness is present, to make that sort of objection or put that argument to you. If they have questions relating to what he has said, then that is what they should put to him at this moment. If they have arguments about his evidence, that is to be dealt with at a later stage, with due respect.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes well certainly, we are not talking about argument at this stage at all.
MR COETZEE: Mr Chairman, sorry to interrupt, I managed not to say too much during these proceedings, and now I seem to be involved all the time.
The statement I made was not any attack on Gen Joubert's evidence, all I meant is the manner in which the evidence is being led, some new information is added during each incident. It was not a criticism of his evidence at all.
CHAIRPERSON: I understand.
MR GROBLER: I accept, thank you Mr Chairman.
ADV DE JAGER: Anybody else wants to ask questions?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: General, you have heard the evidence of Mr Naude, that he was asked or that he requested two operatives to come to the operational area. He does not know who he directed this request to, can you recall if he directed it at you?
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, there are two possibilities, or not two possibilities, one possibility.
He would have asked a Senior Staff Officer of covert operations that he wants these two persons. The SSO covert operation would definitely not have sent for those two people if he did not consult with me.
MR WESSELS: Can you remember this, that he consulted with you or can you not recall?
MR JOUBERT: I cannot remember how many meetings and interviews have I had, but I would just like to say that that is what the procedure was.
MR WESSELS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS
CHAIRPERSON: But I would imagine that a request such as this, that two people should be brought in from outside the country to carry out a particular operation, is not something that happened so frequently, this must be a rare occasion and if it did happen, you ought to know about it, is that no so?
MR JOUBERT: Yes Mr Chairman. I would have know of it, but one has to keep in mind that at that stage it was our operatives and it was our military aeroplanes, so we could clandestinely transport two persons into the country.
ADV DE JAGER: General, if I understand your answer correctly, you say that there was just possibility. Even if he went to the SSO, that SSO before he arranged it, he would have come to you?
MR JOUBERT: Yes.
ADV DE JAGER: So you accept then, the question was directed at you and you gave the authorisation?
MR JOUBERT: Yes Chairperson.
ADV DE JAGER: It could not have happened in any other way, they could not have gone via any other person, but it had to come passed you?
MR JOUBERT: Yes Chairperson, because I had to authorise it. I cannot say that it was that guy or that guy or that guy.
ADV DE JAGER: But that is not what is asked of you if you could say who came in, but can you recall that you had said that I give authorisation that you fly two persons in?
MR JOUBERT: I would have given that authorisation Chairperson.
ADV DE JAGER: We accept that you would have given it or should have given it, but can you recall actually giving it?
MR JOUBERT: The two operatives did arrive yes, so I must have given it.
ADV DE JAGER: I understand that, and I understand that you...
CHAIRPERSON: That answer is not a satisfactory answer to say that because the two operatives arrived, therefore you must have given authority.
I have just said earlier that this is not a common occurrence, it isn't every day that you ask for special permission to get outsiders to come into the country, for an operation, this must be an unique operation, so you must remember this occasion before they came in?
MR JOUBERT: Yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: You agreed with the idea that these operatives be brought in from outside the country?
MR JOUBERT: Yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: All right. You did not know the identity of the operatives?
MR JOUBERT: No, I do not know the identity of the operatives.
CHAIRPERSON: And you don't know who the person was at the other end, who selected the operatives?
MR JOUBERT: No, at that point in time, it must have been the Officer Commanding of that unit in Namibia.
CHAIRPERSON: And you won't know his name?
MR JOUBERT: Mr Chairman, no, I won't know, I can't remember his name.
ADV DE JAGER: Can you find out who it was at that stage?
MR JOUBERT: We can probably find out, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, all right.
MR VISSER: Is it only myself that is left Mr Chairman?
MR DU PLESSIS: I have one or two questions as well, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Please do.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I won't be long.
General, you have said that your information was that the Ribeiro's trained other persons, the only thing that I would like to ask you is, is it possible that this perception of yours was wrong, and that you were under the wrong impression?
MR JOUBERT: I was not under the wrong impression, because the information indicated that they did indeed train persons and helped with instant training, whether it was at home or abroad.
MR DU PLESSIS: Can I just put it to you and I won't take it any further, the evidence of Brigadier Cronje was that he did not have the details of such information, but that persons who worked on a monthly basis with the file, namely Colonel Loots and Captain Hechter, did not say once that what the Ribeiro's did, was specifically training or that they were trained personnel themselves.
ADV DE JAGER: Can you tell us the reference to where they speak of the videos that were showing?
MR DU PLESSIS: I am talking of military training, is that what you understand under the term training?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, but I think it is clear, I cannot recall - it is on record, but I think it was Mr Naude who said that he knew that they had received proper military training.
MR DU PLESSIS: But Mr Naude said that he received his information from the Police, and the Police had not said that the Police trained anybody or that they had indeed received training themselves. I am just putting that to you. Would you like to comment?
MR JOUBERT: No, I stick to the comment that I made earlier, and the information that was given to me at that meeting where there was a General, a Brigadier and another General and it was decided that these are the activities with which they ...
MR DU PLESSIS: And then on page 469 of Bundle 2(E), Captain Hechter says that after the operation, he was contacted by Brigadier Cronje who told him that you wished to meet with them, that they went to you at Special Forces Headquarters, and where Mr Joe Verster was present. He was not sure that Mr Naude was there himself, but it would seem that Brigadier Cronje was there as well.
There was a meeting where the fact that Basie Smit investigated the Landrover and found out that it was, it belonged to the Defence Force.
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, there was indeed a meeting afterwards. I know that Brigadier Cronje was there, I am not sure if Captain Hechter was there. About Basie Smit who identified the vehicle, I do not have any knowledge of that.
MR DU PLESSIS: Is it possible that you cannot remember it?
MR JOUBERT: It is possible, yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: And then General, then Captain Hechter also said that the decision was taken that the issue would not be discussed with Gen Coetzee, but apparently that evening you had contact with Gen Coetzee and you did indeed discuss the matter with him?
Do you remember this?
MR JOUBERT: I don't recall anything of this, the only discussion I had with regard to the Ribeiro's with Gen Coetzee, was the one where Gen Coetzee approached me and told me why did you take these people out.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
ADV DE JAGER: I wanted to know if you could help me with the reference of Loots' evidence with regard to the video?
MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, it seems nobody else is questioning at the moment, may I ask one question coming from what you, yourself, asked, at this stage?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairperson, Van Zyl on record, I have questions that I want to put to him, I think my learned colleague would allow me to ask my questions first before he puts his questions.
MR GROBLER: Indeed.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN ZYL: Thank you, I appear for Gen Gleeson Chairperson. Another aspect which I would like to put on record, my colleague, Mr Cilliers at the start of these proceedings, he was not here, he appears for Gen Moller, he is not present today, but indicated that he will be present tomorrow, had asked that I have to give an indication that in the light of the fact that his questions does not have regard to a specific incident, but more with the identification of targets which is more general, he requested that his cross-examination be held over till after the General had given his evidence with regard to the Piet Ntuli incident. I will continue with my questioning.
CHAIRPERSON: Your questions are on behalf of Gen Gleeson, is that it?
MR VAN ZYL: That is so, Mr Chairman. Gen Gleeson was Chief of Army Staff at that stage, and part of his responsibilities was he would act as the Head of the SADF?
MR JOUBERT: That is correct.
MR VAN ZYL: And that is the only reason why you reported to him with regard to this incident, because he was the Acting Head at that stage?
MR JOUBERT: That is correct.
MR VAN ZYL: ... given evidence today that when you met with Gen Coetzee, or this one meeting that you had, and you spoke to him, you had the impression that he did not know that the Police was involved with this operation?
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, he told me. I did not tell him, he told me why did you do it. I was quite surprised.
MR VAN ZYL: But your impression was that he said or you understood that he did not know of it, he did not know of it and you were convinced that whatever investigation to be launched, would be done properly so that he would be safeguarded?
MR JOUBERT: That is correct.
MR VAN ZYL: And you probably conveyed it in these terms to Gen Gleeson, that Gen Coetzee was not aware thereof, and he would launch an investigation to the incident, can you recall if you visited Gen Coetzee with Gen Gleeson with regards to this incident?
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, I could or I would like to say and I mentioned it in my application as well, at that stage we were involved with a major planning session at Wachthuis with regards to an operation that would be launched country wide and outside the borders of the country as well.
We met in the evenings at Wachthuis and that is when we did our planning and it was at one of these meetings when Gen Coetzee called me aside and told me. Many people attended these planning sessions, many of them. I know that Gen Gleeson, I know that Gen Gleeson also attended these meetings.
MR VAN ZYL: Excuse me for interrupting you, can I just reformulate my question. Can you recall if you were in the presence of Gen Gleeson and Gen Coetzee when they discussed the issue?
MR JOUBERT: I don't remember.
MR VAN ZYL: Do you have knowledge that Gen Gleeson discussed it with Gen Coetzee?
MR JOUBERT: I am convinced that he would.
CHAIRPERSON: How would he know that?
MR VAN ZYL: Well, he might have been told by Gen Gleeson or even by Gen Coetzee that they had a discussion in this regard, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: He doesn't even know whether there was any discussion at all?
MR VAN ZYL: As it pleases you Mr Chairman. My instruction is that he indeed did discuss this matter with Gen Coetzee after you told him that an Army members was involved with this incident. You probably cannot confirm it today but you can confirm it if you did tell him that an Army members was involved in this incident, this is now to Gen Gleeson?
MR JOUBERT: An Army member, in which sense?
MR VAN ZYL: Involved with the Ribeiro murder?
MR JOUBERT: Yes.
MR VAN ZYL: And my instructions furthermore was that one person's name was mentioned, the name of Mr Robey being the person who was involved, does this concur with your recollection of what you had said?
MR JOUBERT: I cannot recall that.
MR VAN ZYL: And with regards to the investigation that Gen Coetzee made to you with reference to the investigation, and informed you Suiker Britz handled the matter, was it conveyed to you as such?
MR JOUBERT: No, it was not conveyed to me as such, but I had knowledge thereof.
MR VAN ZYL: And a final aspect, I do not want to suggest that you have given such evidence, but already in the report of the TRC, such a finding was made that Gen Gleeson did not give the information that he had, to the relevant authorities. Did you have the impression at any stage that Gen Gleeson, that he at any stage wanted to undermine that investigation and to make sure that the truth was not uncovered or anything in that respect?
MR JOUBERT: Do you refer to Gen Gleeson? No, he would not have done any such thing.
MR VAN ZYL: Thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN ZYL
CHAIRPERSON: Can I just interrupt, I have been listening carefully to what has been carrying on now and I have been trying my best to try and find out what bearing all this has on the applicant's application in relation to the killing of the Ribeiro's.
All I am left with is a misunderstanding between the Armed Forces on the one hand, and the Police on the other, I was led to believe that none of these activities were carried out without the co-operation of the Police, as far as the Armed Forces were concerned and now it emerges that certain high ranking people in the Police Force, were not consulted.
Now, whether they were consulted or whether they were not consulted, is a matter that must be debated in some other venue. If any decisions have to be taken on who was right or who was wrong, that must be taken elsewhere, but it can hardly be a matter for this Committee to delve into and I want to know now, whether we can devote more time to a discussion of this issue.
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, with due respect, I happen to agree substantially with what you are saying, there is however the question of full disclosure and unfortunately no incident can be labelled as one where full disclosure has taken place, unless one starts it at the beginning and takes it right through to the end.
Up to now, this evidence which largely has no bearing perhaps on political motive, or even on the exact manner in which the operation was carried out, is given in the end to argue to you and hopefully to convince you that a full disclosure has been made, not only of what we perceive to be absolutely relevant, but of everything which we know.
It is to that extent that much of this evidence is produced to you and hopefully you will receive it as such. But I do agree with you that there should not be a debate about the details at this stage, it doesn't take it anywhere.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there is no doubt that high ranking Policemen and high ranking people in the Army worked together to achieve a particular objective. That evidence emerged quite clearly. We, my Committee has no doubt on that issue. As to whether certain top, high ranking officials were kept informed or not, strictly speaking, doesn't affect the issue here as to whether amnesty should be granted or not.
I appeal to you gentlemen, that in the name of full disclosure you don't have to traverse issues which are side issues, which are merely tangentially related to the real issues. By full disclosure, I mean full disclosure of all that is relevant for the purposes of this amnesty application.
In other words, precisely what was planned, precisely who planned it, precisely how it was carried out, who was instrumental in carrying it out. Now, we will make much more progress if we concentrate on the essentials.
The other issues may be very, very interesting, sometimes I think they may be of academic interest at this stage, considering so many years have elapsed since that time, and the dramatis personae have changed, so please gentlemen and ladies, if ladies are involved, let us try and see if we can confine ourselves not to the side issues, but to the main issues in this application.
MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, Visser, may I be allowed to say something Mr Chairman?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes please Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we heartily agree with what you say about side issues being raised, but unfortunately the process of amnesty has brought along with it, the baggage of implicated persons.
CHAIRPERSON: Implicated on matters that are relevant for the purposes of the amnesty application?
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Not on side issues.
MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, it is certainly relevant if there would have been evidence as there was suggested to have been in the past, that Gen Coetzee, being the Commissioner of Police, ought to have known about a plan to eliminate people, that Gen Coetzee when the Ribeiro's were murdered, knew about it and involved himself by replacing Officers investigating the matter, so that certain facts could be concealed.
For example the registration number of the Landrover which Mr Robey drove, all of those issues, Mr Chairman, most of them have now fortunately sorted themselves out. On behalf of Gen Coetzee, I am left only with one aspect basically, basically two.
The one is that he would have had a discussion with Gen Joubert and the last one is the new evidence, I repeat new evidence, of what the procedure was that was decided upon at the latest meeting.
CHAIRPERSON: The procedure relating to future action?
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Now is that relevant?
MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, it may or may not be, I don't know, because I haven't discussed this with Gen Coetzee, and certainly I am not going to take up your time with anything that is irrelevant.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, our problem is that we understand that an implicated person's name could be hurt, and I do not think that in any of the judgements that we have made, we gave judgement and said that this guy is definitely implicated or not.
If we say whether he is implicated or if we say he is guilty or not, would not bind any Court. If he was to be prosecuted, the Court will decide whether he is guilty or not. If we, here, today say that Gen Coetzee gave the instruction for this incident, he will not be guilty in a higher Court, but it has an influence on his name out there, that is why I understand your concern, to clean his name, to keep his name clean or to try to keep clean his name, but we wish to request that if you go as far as to say that he denies it, then whether he speaks the truth, shall have to be decided on later, in another forum. It is not going to help us deciding on that.
As far as it concerns an implicated person, it might be relevant for an applicant if he went on an experiment of his own, whether he acted within the capacity that he was allowed to, but we like to bring to you is that we are not a forum that has to decide that whoever's name is mentioned here, we have to decide whether that person is guilty or not, and if we make such a finding, it would be in the context of whether this person acted without authorisation or not, but not whether the person is guilty or not.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I appreciate Mr De Jager's observation and certainly we fully agree with it. If you were a fly on the wall in the London bomb hearings, this is exactly the point which we made probably 50 times during that hearing, so we absolutely agree.
There is just one other aspect Mr Chairman, and that is that if it comes to pass one day, that Gen Coetzee is charged in a criminal court, it may be held against him if no effort at all was made to cross-examine a witness and to place his position on record.
Now with the remarks having been made by Mr De Jager now ...
CHAIRPERSON: We are really not here to try that as a sub-issue.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, can I just finish my submission?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: With the remarks having been made by Mr De Jager, it takes care of that problem as well, because we can then tell the Court this was the position of the Amnesty Committee, with which we incidentally agree, Mr Chairman.
So all that we need to do is to place before you references to the record for in case you may think that whatever the evidence is, that has implicated Gen Coetzee, is relevant to the amnesty applications, you can look at the evidence.
I am not going to go through it, but if you don't want the evidence Mr Chairman, then I don't have to do that either. All that I have to do, is to put to Gen Joubert, what the evidence of Gen Coetzee is.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you are entitled to that.
MR VISSER: That is all I am going to do, but can I ask you Mr Chairman, are you interested to be referred to the passages on the records of the papers before you, which are relevant to the issues that have been raised? If you are not, well, that saves a lot of time Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Passages relating to the issues about what, Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: About the issue of the implication of Gen Coetzee, because Mr Chairman, this has been dealt with before, before the Armed Forces hearing. I want to refer you to those passages and tell you there it has been, again we simply put to the witness at the time, we didn't cross-examine him at all.
In fact my cross-examination at the Armed Forces hearing of Gen Joubert, is one and a half pages. It really is not going to waste your time, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, carry on.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Gen Joubert, may I put it to you, you have already conceded this, but I would like to put to you what Gen Coetzee has said to me, and if it is necessary he will say this in any court of law, he said that nobody ever informed him of the so-called Joubert Plan, to involve Special Forces and Police activities, especially if it led to the elimination of people.
I want to be fair with you, you have already conceded this and you have said that you believe that he was never informed as a result of the conversation that you had with him at a later date, is that correct, do you agree?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, I agree.
MR VISSER: Furthermore, it is also clear from the evidence of Geldenhuys and well as Coetzee, that Geldenhuys never mentioned this to him, this is the evidence from the Armed Forces hearing. Do you accept that? That is Bundle 2(K) Mr Chairman, page 132.
I don't wish to waste any time, do you accept that Gen Geldenhuys did not discuss your plan with Gen Coetzee?
MR JOUBERT: I must accept that.
MR VISSER: Just one aspect which has created some confusion, at a stage you said that you would have expected that Gen Geldenhuys would have discussed this aspect with the Chief of Security, can you recall that?
MR JOUBERT: No, I stand corrected, but if I recall my words correctly, I said that the Head of the Security Police should at least on his level, have gone to Gen Coetzee.
ADV DE JAGER: You expected that the top guy from the Army and the top guy from the Police, would approve this matter from above, so that all of you to the bottom, would have the authorisation, is that what you thought was going to happen?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: General, I would like to continue by putting it to you and I have already put this at a previous occasion during this hearing, that there was a broad co-operation agreement between the Army and the Police, and that this continued?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Indeed you have repeated this today?
MR JOUBERT: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Now where our roads diverge is that Gen Coetzee says to me, and I also put it to you at the Armed Forces hearing, Bundle 2(I), page - I beg your pardon Chairperson, I have two references here, just to join my learned friend who referred to Gen Gleeson's discussion that has been confirmed, Bundle 2(I), page 225 if you would like to consult that.
Chairperson in the evidence of my cross-examination of Gen Joubert, yes, that is page 133 of Bundle 2(K), you will recall that, I referred you to this discussion which occurred according to you, and I put it to you because there was an objection and then we continued, and that is on page 134, where I put it to you that what you said in paragraph 4.4.13 and 4.4.16, is according to Gen Joubert, something which did not happen, in other words, he did not have this discussion with you as you have given evidence about it here, so as to say why didn't you tell me that the Defence Force was involved in the murder of the Ribeiro's, he denies it. But that is not news to you, because you knew that from the Armed Forces hearing?
MR JOUBERT: Well Chairperson ...
MR VISSER: Well, this is evidence which I put to you, you would recall that. You said that that is how you remember it, and that would be your answer today, would it not? That is how you remember the situation. I don't wish to confuse you.
ADV DE JAGER: General, you differ from Gen Coetzee when he says that he did not ask you, or do you agree with him? He says he never put such questions to you and you testified that he did indeed.
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, if we will just look at the situation. I said a few moments ago that we were busy with a tremendously major planning session for operations over South Africa and abroad.
First Gen Coetzee made submissions and after that, it was Gen Vlok. At one of those occasions, Gen Coetzee called me and the words which appear in this application are the words which he spoke to me.
ADV DE JAGER: (Microphone not on)
MR JOUBERT: That is correct, and upon certain occasions, the Minister of Defence, sorry the Minister of Law and Order, was present when this matter was discussed.
MR VISSER: You see General, that is what I mean, every time you give evidence, something new is added.
MR JOUBERT: That is correct Mr Visser, but I don't think that we realise the circumstances under which these things took place.
MR VISSER: Well, I can't understand why you didn't in the first place, put this evidence in your amnesty application when you had the opportunity. Where does this business with Minister Vlok come from?
MR JOUBERT: What you must understand Mr Visser, is that Gen Coetzee spoke to me.
MR VISSER: No, what I want to know is where does Mr Vlok come from?
MR JOUBERT: Well, that is what I am trying to tell you.
MR VISSER: Let me put this to you, Gen Coetzee according to you in 4.4.16 said don't worry and that you should leave it up to him, is that correct?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: What did that mean?
MR JOUBERT: That meant that he would call an investigation.
MR VISSER: But then you would have to be worried, because you knew that members of Special Forces were involved?
MR JOUBERT: No but it is not me that said that, he told me that. He told me not to worry, because he would lodge an investigation.
MR VISSER: Well Coetzee's evidence was that this was a normal, criminal investigation which would take place among the Investigators and he would not exercise any influence on any side and this ultimately led to a post-mortem inquest, the law took its course and he did not do anything to prevent it, he didn't do anything extraordinary or special in order to make any sort of difference to that enquiry, would you agree with that?
MR JOUBERT: Yes, I do agree with that.
MR VISSER: Thank you General. Thank you Mr Chairman. Sorry Mr Chairman, just one last question.
With this amended procedure, was Gen Johan Coetzee involved in the establishment of this procedure of which you have spoken towards the end of your evidence, or was it only Gen Geldenhuys and the Defence Force who was involved?
MR JOUBERT: No, I am convinced that members of the Police would also have been involved.
MR VISSER: But you don't recall that Gen Coetzee was present or involved in that?
MR JOUBERT: No.
MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, that takes care of the last problem I had.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
ADV DE JAGER: (Microphone not on)
MR VISSER: (Microphone not on)
MS LOCKHAT: No questions Chairperson.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT
CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination?
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR GROBLER: Just very briefly Mr Chairman. General, the Honourable Chairperson has taken up the point with you during which he stated that this situation where two operatives were brought in from abroad, was not the sort of thing that would happen on a daily basis and that ultimately you should remember it, and in the light thereof, you made certain concessions and said yes, that happened and that happened.
My question is simply, do you recall, do you really recall that it happened or have you simply made concessions because it is logical that such things would have taken place? In other words are you speaking out of recollection or speaking because this is what should have happened?
MR JOUBERT: I would ultimately have been the final person who had to say I give permission, they can go ahead.
MR GROBLER: But you have no specific recollection thereof?
MR JOUBERT: No. I remember it, but I don't remember the day or the date.
MR GROBLER: But apart from the permission which you granted, did you have any other information about those operatives, who they would be?
MR JOUBERT: No.
MR GROBLER: Thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR GROBLER
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser again, please allow me one last innings Mr Chairman. I forgot to refer you to the fact that Gen Coetzee made an affidavit which serves before you and I just want to refer you to volume 2(I), pages 123 - 126 where he deals with most of these issues, Mr Chairman. Pages 123 - 126 of Bundle 2(I). Thank you Mr Chairman.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Joubert, I have one question, can you hear me? You have testified that it was an important requirement that any execution plan by Mr Naude, had to gather approval of the Security Police before being carried out. Do you recall saying that?
MR JOUBERT: Yes Mr Chairman.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. We obviously know that it is your testimony that the Ribeiro's were identified at a meeting attended by you, Mr Moller and Brigadier Cronje.
MR JOUBERT: I recall that Chairperson.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And that subsequent to that meeting, you then deployed Mr Naude to the Security Police as part of your plan?
MR JOUBERT: That is correct Chairperson.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. Now if the Ribeiro's had been identified at a meeting attended by Brigadier Cronje on behalf of the Security Police, why would it still be necessary for his execution plan to get the approval of the Security Police before being carried out?
I have a problem with that, if you could just clear that issue for me.
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, I don't know whether I understand the question completely. If you can ...
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: The question is, you, Brigadier Cronje, Mr Moller identified the Ribeiro's as targets for elimination, as a result of that, you deployed Mr Charl Naude to the Security Police as part of the Joubert Plan, after the Ribeiro's had been identified.
You have also testified that it was an important requirement that before any execution of the elimination could be carried out, it had to gather approval of the Security Police. In the instance of the Ribeiro's, the identification is made by you and Brigadier Cronje, yet you still required Mr Charl Naude to get the approval of Brigadier Cronje in order to execute his plan, why was it necessary to do that?
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, the situation was as follows: I deployed Mr Naude to the Police in support of the Police. Thus in effect, Brigadier Cronje and I did not work out the finer detail of the operation, that was on Naude's level.
I simply told Naude from the side of Special Forces, that once they had completed the planning, he should discuss it with me, so that I could be satisfied that the plan would work, or could not work. After we had identified the targets, there was a next level and that is where the planning was undertaken.
Then there would be a certain procedure to be followed in order to obtain approval. That is how it functioned. I am not certain whether this answers your question.
ADV DE JAGER: I think what the problem is, is the fact that there has been approval for this target as a target and that these people could be killed. Why was it then necessary to obtain a second approval if the plan had been put into action?
MR JOUBERT: The targets were identified, however, they were not finally approved. In other words, let me put it this way, there was principle approval which was given, but the final approval still had to be granted.
ADV DE JAGER: Before they could be killed?
MR JOUBERT: Before they could be killed.
ADV DE JAGER: And did the plan also had to be approved before they were killed, and should the Police have known that they were to be known on that particular evening? Did those particulars also have to be made known to the Police?
MR JOUBERT: Well, the Police were indeed the chief role players when it came to the authorisation of the operation.
ADV DE JAGER: So, let's say the Police did not know, and the operatives went in that night, and they were apprehended by the Police, would it be to co-ordinate the matter, so that there would be enough planning to ensure that all relevant parties would know that an operation was to be executed that night?
MR JOUBERT: That is correct, and that is why Captain Hechter had been directly involved, so that should any problems arise, a policeman would be present to handle the matter on ground level.
CHAIRPERSON: Where do we go from here?
MS LOCKHAT: We call on the next amnesty applicant, Mr P.J. Verster.
WITNESS EXCUSED
