CHAIRPERSON: Where are we now?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, we've now reached Brigadier Wickus Loots, Exhibit C, he is ready to take the oath, he will give his evidence in Afrikaans.
WICKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Loots, you have already previously given evidence in this matter, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: I refer to it as a case I would have seen, should have said in the Nietverdiendt incident and that evidence of yours you want to repeat it here. For the benefit of Commissioner Lax your introduction except for your personal circumstances is for all practical reasons identical to that of which was already put forward this morning by Mr Crause, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Then we commence with the incident for which we appear here today in Exhibit C. Page 27, paragraph 67. Just to save us some time we know already that on the 4th May there was a telephone call to General Steyn and that the two of you left for Derdepoort border post?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And you received information from Crause there which he had received from the person called Andries Moatshe, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And this entailed the fact that two armed MK members would be transferred into or transported into South Africa and it would then entail that Crause went to the Swartklip Mine and after he had dropped his person off and he would let Crause know so that Crause can act against these persons. Steyn had also given evidence that he was not satisfied with this plan because of the reasons which he advanced. Do you agree with those?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And it was decided a roadblock would be set up closer to the border?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Before I forget, you have made an affidavit that served before the original Amnesty Committee which is found in bundle 2I on pages 130 to 133, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: We will eventually refer to that. I would like you to focus on the circumstances from the time that you arrived at the place where the roadblock was set up. Is it correct that General Steyn told you and your men that the insurgents had to be apprehended?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Very well, you knew from the information from Moatshe that they would arrive in a red Toyota van?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: We can then continue on page 28 or rather on page 29, those facts speak for themselves, do you confirm those?
MR LOOTS: Yes I do, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And then we arrive at paragraph 77 where Colonel Steyn or the then Colonel Steyn told you to arrest them, this is where the roadblock was set up?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Can you continue with paragraph 78 to inform us as to that part of the evidence?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I gave instruction to Colonel du Preez Smit by means of the radio to find a suitable place where we could stop the vehicle after the MK members had been picked up. Lieutenant Smit later took us to a point where the Marukal bend is and the Dwaalboom Roads met each other. A steel gate, it was a narrow road in the past but there was a gate hanging onto a pole there that if one would put it over the road it would only close three-quarters of the road and the remaining part of the road was blocked with branches and stones. If I could take you to paragraph 80 you had referred to a generator where two members of counter-insurgence unit had manned this generator, it was their generator?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And according to your recollection it was yourself that was there, Steyn, Jan Truter, Crause, Du Preez Smit, Venter, who was already given evidence, Van Zyl, Marais, Mr Smith and who is represented by my learned friend Mr du Plessis and possibly other members who you cannot recall but later recall one person who was also there. Who was this?
MR LOOTS: It was Captain Wehrmann.
MR VISSER: Where is he?
MR LOOTS: He is deceased Chairperson.
MR VISSER: He was also at the scene?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And then you refer in paragraph 82 on page 30 to a Lieutenant Colonel Mike Truter and what was he?
MR LOOTS: He was an explosives expert for the area Rustenburg.
MR VISSER: He was not at the scene as I understand you during the incident but he arrived at a later stage?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: How did it come about that he arrived there?
MR LOOTS: After such an incident it is usually the function of demolitions expert to clear up such an area.
MR VISSER: He was not there at the incident because the idea was to apprehend these persons?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And in paragraph 83 if you could read that?
MR LOOTS: After deliberation General Steyn decided that we would divide into two groups, that is East and West of the gate that we had placed over the road, to wait for these MK members and where we would attempt to arrest them. Commissaris Jan Truter and he then departed to monitor the movements of the MK members from the Botswana border as a senior member who was at the scene had in the light of the following circumstances, the manner in which General Steyn had decided, discussed again with Colonel Crause, Senior Superintendent Smit and Colonel Venter and he was then a Lieutenant and Lieutenant Wehrmann, I had discussed it with them and in the light of arrested MK members, Chairperson, in my time I had questioned plus minus 50 of them and without exception I had reiterated the fact that infiltrating MK members as well as APLA members were very tense, that they would make maximum preparations for the smallest incident that might happen as to protect themselves seeing that the infiltrating members who were commanders I accepted that they would be armed and Colonel Crause was also informed by Moatshe that they would be armed.
If shooting would break out then members would be firing on each other from East to West and this could lead to the death or injury of some of our members. The place which was chosen by Colonel Smit was a good choice because of the gate but it was difficult or because of the reason that there was no cover for the members, there was no cover at all in the immediate vicinity where members could conceal themselves. Time aspect was also important in case of crossfire. The members would be exposed.
MR VISSER: In fairness to Smit the place was chosen, in other words if a car would arrive around the bend he would have seen the gate and he would be able to turn around or make some preparations.
MR LOOTS: We had one instance, Chairperson, of a vehicle that arrived there and there was just one choice and it had to stop.
MR VISSER: In paragraph 85 you mention the exercises, just tell us of the exercises that you had?
MR LOOTS: The incident according to the information that we had that they would infiltrate around 9 o'clock and therefore with a light delivery vehicle we used to stop before the gate and switch on the lights and then some of the younger members, Van Zyl and Marais and Nieuwenhuis would jump on the back of the vehicle and practised how they would possibly execute the arrest and indeed, accept for the fact that we were East and West of the road and that we did not know who would be where inside the vehicle. I realised that it was half and half an exercise that could not be executed.
MR VISSER: What was the viewpoint of the junior officers?
MR LOOTS: I called them aside and told them listen people, my viewpoint was Chairperson that I never expected of anybody else to do something that I would not do myself and I put it to them pertinently that I did not in the light of the fact that according to the information that armed commanders would be there to execute that instruction. They agreed with me and some of the younger members voiced their opinions and said that it would be dangerous.
MR VISSER: This was a general feeling when you started with the practice runs, that you decided that this plan could not be executed, you just gave an instruction that if this was the situation, if the bakkie appeared and it stopped you would fire on it immediately to stop the possibility that the members of yours would be shot at?
MR LOOTS: Some of the members had then moved and three of them went to the front of the gate.
MR VISSER: And you say on page 32, paragraph 86, at approximately 9 o'clock you received a radio report from Steyn that the bakkie was on it's way?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Before we get there, we know that Steyn and Truter had a radio in their vehicle and we know that you had radios available at the scene, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: A question might arise that when you decided to change the plan and not to follow Steyn's orders did you think of contacting him and the radio and telling him or asking permission for your amendment of the plan?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, we did not know how far they were behind the bakkie of the persons who would climb through the gate or through the fence. A further aspect ...[intervention]
MR VISSER: Sorry Brigadier why do you say that?
CHAIRPERSON: Has he understood your question Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: Yes I think so Chairperson, thank you.
What is the relevancy thereof as to how far the persons would be from the bakkie or rather how far they would be from Steyn's vehicle?
MR LOOTS: Can I explain it in this manner, I did not know, the vehicle with which the insurgents would travel was at a certain point and I did not know how far or how close General Steyn's vehicle would be to this vehicle and if I had contacted him by radio then the insurgents would have heard that there's a radio conversation and that would have thrown a spanner in the works.
MR VISSER: Excuse me, we are still at the point where I asked you to tell the Committee why you did not contact Steyn if you then did make the radio contact with him would you have told him that I would assume that I have changed the plan. I think an arrest cannot be executed, we must eliminate them, did you think of doing that?
MR LOOTS: If I had radio contact with him I would have informed him of the amendment of the plan.
MR VISSER: Actually Crause said that the radios that you used were not limited to your vehicles, is it true that it would broadcast, this was a general channel that other persons also used? Well the bakkie was on it's way and what happened then?
MR LOOTS: My instruction to the men was that as soon as the bakkie stops, persons in charge of the generator should switch on the lights and immediately thereafter we would fire on the insurgents.
MR VISSER: And that is what happened?
MR LOOTS: That is what happened, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Do you know how many shots were fired?
MR LOOTS: Many shots were fired, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Did you fire yourself?
MR LOOTS: No I did not.
MR VISSER: After the incident Steyn and Truter arrived at the scene?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Do you have an idea as to how long after the incident?
MR LOOTS: It was a few minutes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Are you an demolitions expert?
MR LOOTS: Yes I did complete a course in explosives, That is correct.
MR VISSER: And is it true that the scene was cleared up afterwards?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Who did this?
MR LOOTS: It was myself and Colonel Mike Truter.
MR VISSER: And you say he arrived afterwards?
MR LOOTS: At that stage there was the investigation under way of a PAC infiltration and that is why Truter was in the area.
MR VISSER: But he was not at the scene?
MR LOOTS: No he was not.
MR VISSER: What did you find according to your memory with regard to weapons in this vehicle?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I was in front of the gate, in other words I was in front of the vehicle to the left. I was to the left of Colonel Venter and Warrant Officer Smit and immediately after the shooting incident I moved around to the left front door of the bakkie and it was clear to me then that there were hand grenades in the vehicle in between or on the lap of the passenger on the left hand side. There was two hand grenades in a bag that was open, that was clear.
MR VISSER: I think somebody referred to it as a shaving bag and there were two hand grenades in there, on whose lap?
MR LOOTS: On the passenger left, that was Kruschev, he was later identified as Kruschev. I can also mention, Chairperson, that it was defensive hand grenades that was already armed and by that I mean usually when a safety pin is put in it is open and when you arm it you bend it, you close it, in other words you just had to pull it out.
MR VISSER: Continue please?
MR LOOTS: In total we found four, both members had two defensive hand grenades and they were also in possession of a Makarov pistol with a round in the barrel, it was with the safety on and half cocked.
MR VISSER: What does half cocked mean.
MR LOOTS: I'm not a weapons expert, Chairperson, but it would seem that if you take the safety off you fire immediately. Immediately.
MR VISSER: From your inspection was your impression that these persons were ready to defend themselves against any possible arrest?
MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson, no doubt.
MR VISSER: You have indicated while you were giving evidence that the pistols were - you indicated under your left arm, what do you mean be that?
MR LOOTS: We called it windbreakers at that stage, it was the month of May, it was just on the left side, that's where they had the pistols.
MR VISSER: So from what you saw of the vehicle you saw 6 hand grenades, 4 defensive hand grenades and 2 offensive hand grenades and 2 Makarov pistols and if we could pause here did you later that evening also see other weapons at the scene?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I repeat, I was the first person and this is usually the instruction that members who were not experienced in explosives had to leave the scene. I don't know but initially I saw these two hand grenades on his lap and Colonel Mike Truter approached because he would drag such a person from the car in case some of them could explode, you do not injure yourself and when I approached the vehicle there was an AK47 in the vehicle.
MR VISSER: Where exactly in the vehicle?
MR LOOTS: It was in between the legs of the left hand side passenger in front, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Was it with the butt facing downwards and the barrel sticking up?
MR LOOTS: That is correct. And that was not part of the weapons which those people had arrived with?
MR VISSER: You can say this because you were the first person to arrive at the bakkie and you only noticed the hand grenades and the pistols?
MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: What was the plan according to your knowledge that weapons would be planted on these insurgents?
MR LOOTS: Not from my own knowledge Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Did you give any instruction to anybody that weapons should be planted on these persons?
MR LOOTS: Definitely not, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Was there any reason why weapons had to be planted?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the initial plan was to arrest the persons but as I have explained we changed the plan but there was no such plan to plant weapons on them.
MR VISSER: Was there a reason to do it because they were in possession of their own weapons?
MR LOOTS: The information that they were MK commanders was that I had no doubt that they would be armed.
MR VISSER: But you knew they would be armed. Afterwards, was there another reason to plant the weapon afterwards?
MR LOOTS: No Chairperson.
MR VISSER: But you can recall then in your statement, in your affidavit, before the original Committee in bundle 2I, in paragraph 4.3 you referred to the version of Mr Venter?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And you say that
"in particular I note that Roelof Venter in his version mentions weapons which were planted or were to be planted on the terrorists. From this aspect and that is the planning, I can only mention that there was indeed an AK47 gun but I cannot remember how it arrived on the scene."
Is that what you are referring to today in your evidence?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: Please assist me, Mr Visser, this is in bundle 2I?
MR VISSER: 2I on page 131 and you'll see Commissioner it's 4.3, if you will just look at the middle sentence and the next sentence says
"From this aspect I can mention that there was indeed an AK47 gun."
That is what was maintained originally in 1997 when he received notice of Section 4 in terms of the Amnesty application of Roelof Venter.
MR VISSER: Well Mr Loots perhaps we should ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, so his evidence would accord with what appears at paragraph 91 in the middle, that would accord with what he evidenced then, that there was indeed an AK47 that he noticed, here appearing in his present applications?
MR VISSER: Oh yes, this witness has no doubt that there was an AK47 and he remembers it because he saw the hand grenades and pistols initially and thereafter when they cleared the area, if that's the right term to use, then he saw the AK47. That's why he remembers it.
And you say that on your own knowledge you do not know where the firearm came from or what happened to it but you would accept that it would have been removed for some or other reason later?
MR LOOTS: Yes that is possible.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, Du Preez Smit might shed some more light on this AK47 into his evidence.
Is it correct that you made an affidavit under oath which was served in the post-mortem inquest into the deaths of these three persons before the magistrate in Thabazimbi? Did you say anything about the AK47 in that affidavit?
MR LOOTS: No, I remained silent about it.
MR VISSER: Why did you do that?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the fact is that that weapon was definitely not part of the weapons with which those persons had travelled.
MR VISSER: So you were not prepared to say that under oath?
MR LOOTS: No.
MR VISSER: You refer in paragraph 93 to the post-mortem inquest numbers, 1983 1,2 and 3 and what the findings of the magistrate were?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: In your application form you have referred and that's bundle 11, I think you may have mine, I seem to have lost my bundle 11, Chairperson. I'm not certain of the page number but you refer to a report in Mayabuwa or Sitchaba. We know that that was the report which you traced and comes out Dawn, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: I can only say that we obtained this report only seven or eight days before.
MR VISSER: We have already referred to it, so you were aware of it?
MR LOOTS: Yes, we were aware of it shortly after the incident but we didn't keep any copies of it and only later did we manage to trace it.
MR VISSER: And that report maintains that there was a shooting incident between these persons ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: That's page 5 Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, thank you.
It maintains that there was a shooting incident during which policemen were killed is that correct?
MR LOOTS: Yes that is correct. Actually soldiers, if I have it correctly, the reference was to soldiers.
MR VISSER: That's on page F26 of the first paragraph, the last sentence it says, Chairperson
"It is with this attitude of mind that we will revisit the example and deeds of two fearless tigers who fell in battle on 4th May in the Western Transvaal during which they killed 4 racist soldiers on the spot."
That didn't really happen?
MR LOOTS: No.
CHAIRPERSON: Can you just - 27 are you not reading from page 27?
MR LOOTS: 26.
CHAIRPERSON: 26?
MR VISSER: Yes, it's the first ...[intervention]
ADV DE JAGER: Towards the end of that paragraph.
MR VISSER: I'm sorry, the first reference was to 26 and then the next one is in the first, second, third paragraph, the second last line I think is the one Commissioner de Jager is referring to.
"A long battle ensued but since the enemy was by far superior in number and arms"
CHAIRPERSON: Is that still on page 26?
MR VISSER: That's 27. The first, second, fourth paragraph, second last sentence.
CHAIRPERSON: I have located it Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson and it says
"A long battle ensued but since the enemy was by far superior in number and arms, the two tigers were overpowered, they died heroically taking with them four of the enemy."
Anyway, ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: You obviously are not making anything of it.
MR VISSER: No, no, no, for as far as it may be considered to be a contradiction of the evidence, we simply refer to it and say that that is not what happened. We take it no further than that at all.
You are aware that the MK members were identified by means of fingerprints?
MR LOOTS: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: And during the investigation of Steyn it came to light that contact was made with some of the next-of-kin and you meant to indicate that you did make contact with one of the next-of-kin. Can you inform us about that?
MR LOOTS: I succeeded in contacting the Ramakoba family, if I recall correctly, they lived in Diepkloof and that is where I traced them.
MR VISSER: And what did you do once you had traced them?
MR LOOTS: I showed a recent photograph of him to them and they positively identified him as their son.
MR VISSER: I'm sorry.
CHAIRPERSON: When was this ...[indistinct]
MR LOOTS: That was approximately three to four months after the incident or two to three months, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: With regard to the post-mortem inquest, was that a formal enquiry in which evidence was led or is it one of those investigations that was finished off by means of affidavits?
MR LOOTS: No it was informal by means of affidavits.
MR VISSER: And it was your affidavit along with the autopsy report which was placed before the magistrate?
MR LOOTS: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: I refer to paragraph 97.
MR LOOTS: The body of Moatshe, there were certain prerequisites, his body was placed in a lead coffin and handed over to his next-of-kin or the Botswana authority. With regard to his vehicle, I'm not entirely sure what happened but it was handed over to his next-of-kin.
MR VISSER: Were you present with either of these events, with the handing over of Moatshe?
MR LOOTS: Yes.
MR VISSER: Because as I understand according to our consultation I don't know whether or not it was next-of-kin or the Botswana authority, it may have been the Botswana authority as well but this is quite some time ago so I can't recall everything quite clearly.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, that is the evidence from Mr Loots.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Does that conclude your evidence in chief Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: Indeed it does, thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Du Plessis?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson, just one or two short questions.
Brigadier Loots, Colonel Venter testified that he was under the impression that Moatshe was an informer. Would you agree with previous evidence that there is a possibility that Colonel Venter may well have thought so?
MR LOOTS: I think that there was a possibility.
MR DU PLESSIS: Colonel Venter also testified that weapons were taken along to plant on the members should it become necessary. Do you know of that evidence?
MR LOOTS: I have been informed about that through his amnesty application and because he lived in Louis Trichardt at that stage we met in Rustenburg and we asked him about this case and he couldn't tell us who or what, he couldn't give us a positive answer regarding who gave the order and so forth.
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but let's just look at his evidence. His evidence was so that it was done like that and now you have given evidence that an AK47 came from somewhere. Do you have any other explanations which you could offer us with regards to the AK47? Is it possible that this had to do with Colonel Venter's evidence with regard to the planting of weapons?
MR LOOTS: There were so many infiltrations and incidents during which there was contact with terrorists and during which weapons were possessed. In 1981 with the Piet Pogaai incident there were numerous containers filled with pistols, hand grenades and AK's which were handed over.
ADV DE JAGER: I don't know if you understand the question, it's very simple. Venter says that members had weapons which they wanted to plant. Later you found a weapon that had been planted?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: So it would appear that Venter is correct when he says that somebody had a weapon or weapons which they wanted to plant?
MR LOOTS: I will accept that, Chairperson.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Advocate de Jager. I have no further questions. Chairperson, I'm sorry.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat?
MS LOCKAT: No questions Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lax do you have any questions to put?
MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson.
Brigadier, you indicated that one of the reasons why you were concerned about making radio contact was that this was a shared radio channel in the sense that it was of general use. Did I understand you correctly?
MR LOOTS: Yes that is correct.
MR LAX: You see, what puzzles me about that answer was a piece of evidence that only came to light during your testimony which puts a different slant on the previous evidence of this kind and that is that for example the instruction to locate a suitable place for an ambush was given over the radio?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR LAX: Well then everybody listening to that channel would have known that there was going to be an ambush at some point in that time because the instruction given was given clearly over the radio which then in turn makes that explanation absolutely of no relevance at all?
MR LOOTS: I will concede that. If I might just explain with regard to the Botswana border where the vehicle was parked upon which or with which the two persons would cross illegally in relation to Steyn's vehicle and the distance between the vehicles. We were not certain about the time and if at that stage of the evening we'd entered into radio contact the possibility may have existed that this entire operation could have fallen through as a result of that, that the persons coming from Botswana may have heard the discussion. That is the only reasonable explanation that I can offer.
MR LAX: Look I hear that but of course if General Steyn, who is a very experienced policeman from his record, it's pretty clear, if he had parked in a place where that possibility existed he would have switched his radio off. He wouldn't have left it on because I know those radios, there's constant communication on those channels, everyone who is using it is busy contacting each other about something or other.
MR LOOTS: That is one of the reasons why radio communication at that stage was almost a zero as a possibility
MR LAX: You see the point is this and I don't want to belabour it, either the idea of getting hold of him occurred to you or it didn't occur to you, it's really as simple as that and if it occurred to you, you would have either tried to get hold of him or you would have decided it's not worth getting hold of him in which case it becomes an irrelevant issue. Do you agree?
MR LOOTS: I would have remained with my decision as we decided later to act.
MR LAX: I have no doubt of that, the issue is whether you would have reported that decision to General Steyn, that's really the issue.
MR LOOTS: If I could have I would have but it was impossible.
MR LAX: The fact is though that you didn't even try.
MR LOOTS: Everything happened so quickly with all these arrangements, that I didn't even know exactly where he was.
CHAIRPERSON: But surely that's not according to the evidence we've already heard?
MR LOOTS: No but what I mean is the specific point where he was located, if his radio had been switched off I wouldn't know where he was.
MR LAX: The point is and I want to repeat my point again, it didn't matter whether he knew where he was, he didn't try and get hold of him at all?
MR LOOTS: No we didn't.
CHAIRPERSON: But is it not your evidence that you did not have any radio contact, you didn't have a radio. Was it not your evidence?
MR LOOTS: No, the radios were definitely available.
MR LAX: It was the evidence of an earlier witness Chairperson, who said he wasn't near a radio at the time. There might have been radio contact.
MS LOCKAT: The applicant was Crause.
MR LAX: That's right. This question of this AK47 puzzles me somewhat, you told us that it was common practice that after an incident of this nature, everyone would leave the scene except those whose job it would be to make the place safe. Is that correct, did I hear you correctly in that regard?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR LAX: And yet many people clearly didn't leave the scene because lots of the people went and looked at the vehicle and they saw the firearms and they saw a whole lot of things before doing that?
MR LOOTS: Yes that is correct, because it was very, very traumatic and it's one of the cases that has been the most difficult for me to handle. The fact that both windows had been shot out contributes to this, for somebody to put something in through the window was very easy. I don't wish to accuse my subordinates of anything whatsoever but I'm just trying to place the true facts before this Committee. We have no reason to lie.
ADV DE JAGER: The fact is that you were certain that there wasn't an AK47 when you arrived on the scene and you were there first?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: Or at least when you arrived at the bakkie?
MR LOOTS: Yes, I would have seen it very clearly, it was on the left hand side between the man's legs.
ADV DE JAGER: And when you arrived there again it was there?
MR LOOTS: Yes.
ADV DE JAGER: So it definitely wasn't placed there by one of the deceased, it was placed there by one of your men?
MR LOOTS: That's my suspicion.
ADV DE JAGER: Well it couldn't have been one of the passengers it had to be somebody else.
MR LAX: Well you see I'm getting to the point in a slightly more subtle and slow way and really you are telling us that this was quite a traumatic event, you were quite shocked by what had happened, people didn't leave the scene as one would expect and in fact within a few minutes of the shooting stopping, General Steyn and Mr Truter arrived on the scene, is that correct?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR LAX: And you would have been involved in a discussion with him about what had happened?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR LAX: So there would have been a great deal going on that you wouldn't even seen or noticed while that was happening?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
MR LAX: Now you seem to be unsure about a number of issues from just my perception of your testimony. Your memory is not a hundred percent perfect and what I'm going to ask you is this, are you a hundred percent sure that you might have missed that AK47 being there when you first looked in?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the AK or the two hand grenades lay very clearly between the legs of the left passenger and the AK which I saw later on was definitely not there.
MR LAX: Now just another issue that again puzzles me completely about this, is I'm very familiar with what should or shouldn't be done in this sort of situation, having been trained extensively in roadblocks and ambushes and things of that nature, to put a firearm between that persons legs where there was a hand grenade sitting there was looking for trouble in the most serious, you'd agree with me, that could have been very easily booby trapped, they could have had it there, in his dying moments that person might have done something, there was numerous occasions where people who'd been shot at in that sort of way have somehow been able to leave a booby trap and in dealing with it, people have been maimed and injured and even killed. As an explosives expert you'd be familiar with that?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, all that I can say is that this incident took place very quickly. General Steyn asked me later on whether I changed my mind or not because as you know I couldn't inform him before the time and what happened there I cannot explain to you from my own knowledge. I would like to be very honest with the Committee and say that there was definitely an AK47 in that bakkie which was not there when I looked in the first time. I don't wish to place an incident out of context and say that people who infiltrated had more weapons that what they really had in their possession.
MR LAX: You see the other possibility that immediately springs to mind is that none of these people were armed and that in fact this issue of the AK47 is simply a way of explaining something that was planted there that everyone forgot about that somehow came out in Mr Venter's evidence?
MR VISSER: Sorry, that's an unfair question, Chairperson. Venter never spoke of an AK47.
MR LAX: You're quite correct, Venter spoke about weapons being planted.
CHAIRPERSON: Then you went further to say weapons were found with the insurgents. He did concede to that. Shouldn't you be springing to your client's defence Mr Visser because you must remember that evidence by Mr Venter?
MR VISSER: I'm not sure that I'm following the line of questioning now, I thought the point was being made that because you now say there was an AK47, this fits in with the evidence of Venter which seems to indicate that they had no weapons at all and all of them, the hand grenades and the pistols and everything was planted on them, I thought that was the question.
CHAIRPERSON: No but I think Mr Lax was taking it further than that. Doesn't there exist the possibility that there were no weapons at all?
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Which were found with the insurgents?
MR VISSER: That's right.
CHAIRPERSON: Weapons that we are now being advised were found with the insurgents are the weapons that were planted just like an AK47 was planted?
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: I thought you would come to your client's defence and say Mr Venter doesn't go that far, in fact Mr Venter said that inasmuch it was the intention to plant weapons, in this instance they did discover weapons after they had killed the insurgents.
MR VISSER: Yes I assumed perhaps and I think correctly I would have assumed that that's not what Mr Lax meant. If I misunderstood it then well obviously I should have come to his defence. The point is that what Venter said in his evidence was that they were given weapons to take to the scene to plant if necessary, that he goes not further than that, but I didn't think for a moment that Mr Lax was deviating from that evidence. The only thing that I objected to, if it is an objection, it's not really an objection but to clarify, was that Sidney Venter didn't speak of an AK47 and that was part of the question that was put and I thought that was perhaps a little bit misleading.
CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed Mr Lax.
MR LAX: Thanks Chairperson, I confirm I'm not implying that - I'm not going as far as the Chairperson's implying I am although of course that is another possibility that the whole thing is a fabrication but there's no evidence of that at that stage. My only other concern Brigadier is this, in spite of the fact that we have been pointed out to some passages in Mr Venter's evidence where he gives the impression that there was a change of plan. The other portions of his evidence and maybe the later portions were efforts to explain the earlier parts of his evidence, but it's clear as you will recall from the questions I put to an earlier witness, that in an early part of his testimony he places General Steyn on the scene and he implied that it was the intention from the beginning was to eliminate people. Now ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: May I for purposes of clarity find out in what respect is it alleged that Mr Venter places General Steyn at the scene? Was it at the scene of the shooting?
MR LAX: No. No, no. At the scene of the roadblock prior to it at a point in which a decision is taken to eliminate.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR LAX: And that is in the beginning of his testimony in that annexure that we have here. If you like I'll give you the page reference.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, we would particularly be interested to see the part that he says that the intention was to always eliminate and never to arrest.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes because there the portion where he makes it patently clear that General Steyn's instructions was to arrest and not to eliminate and that's a page reference that you continuously draw attention to.
MR LAX: Yes, it's 871 I think. If I could just help you, I know the other passages later that you've referred us to already but under this section, this paragraph which has a sort of quasi heading in parenthesis or rather in quotations "nature and particulars" he says
"Captain Crause and myself were under the command of Colonel Steyn the commanding officer of Western Transvaal and currently General Steyn. We discussed the matter with Colonel Steyn and Brigadier Loots and then Colonel Loots was also in the area. We discussed this matter, we decided that we would ambush them to intercept these trained terrorists."
Now ambushing is not a roadblock. Ambushing implies an attack and to that extent that may have been clarified in the later evidence but certainly when I originally read that portion that was an impression that I got, however wrongly or rightly.
CHAIRPERSON: I think it was clarified though Mr Lax, you do not concede?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes okay, I'll leave the issue, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: That he just jumbles everything as he was giving his evidence. He was not clear.
MR VISSER: With great respect, this is translated evidence, it's not even in his mother tongue, with respect.
MR LAX: I'm going to leave that point and move on to - the one aspect that again concerns me is that there is no mention expect in your testimony and I think one other person of this AK47 in anyone else's testimony. Why was it necessary to hide that AK47 or to not disclose it in any way whatsoever at the time?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the only explanation that I can offer is that within the security branch the rule was need to know and after so many years of involvement in South West and in the current Zimbabwe it was so that members not only of the police but also of the Defence Force came into possession of Makarovs and Tokarevs and AK's and not everybody always knew about it. Although at certain security branches it was so that it was officially available for the simple reason that should you find something like this you practice the use of it so that you can familiarise yourself with the usage of such a weapon and for that reason I could offer the only reasonable explanation and that is that someone was in possession of that AK and placed it there in order to protect me as the person who had given the order to shoot but I made sure that those hand grenades were there and upon further investigation I saw the AK and Makarov pistols.
MR LAX: You see, as a senior officer that was in fact an attempt to defeat the ends of justice by one of your members.
MR LOOTS: That is so.
MR LAX: And you did nothing about it? You did nothing about it.
MR LOOTS: I don't understand your question.
MR LAX: You didn't do anything about that attempt to defeat the ends of justice?
MR LOOTS: No.
ADV DE JAGER: But in fact you prevented that attempt to succeed by stating the truth?
MR LOOTS: That is so. I do not wish to create any wrong impressions for this Committee, we have decided to tell the truth, the full truth.
MR LAX: There was just one other aspect I wanted you to clear up for me, you were asked about Truter being on the scene and you gave an answer which I found a bit puzzling, you said he wasn't on the scene because he was busy with another operation, a PAC operation. Do you remember you didn't ...[intervention]
ADV DE JAGER: He didn't say he was busy with another one, he said they expected or they suspected that there might be another one that he was in the vicinity.
MR LOOTS: And for that reason the people were in the vicinity.
MR LAX: But in fact he was part of this whole process, he even in fact went with General Steyn to keep an eye on the vehicle.
MR LOOTS: There were two Truters, Chairperson. The one was ...[intervention]
MR LAX: Thank you, that explains it for me.
CHAIRPERSON: General - Captain Loots, I just wanted to clear an issue which was raised by my colleague with regard to the evidence that was given by Mr Venter which is in your favour. I think at the time when Mr Venter was giving evidence he just put everything together, the paragraph, that is the page that you've referred to which is 861 which would suggest that - would could suggest that General Steyn was present when the decision to eliminate the insurgents was taken must be read in conjunction with the application of Mr Venter wherein it is quite clear that General Steyn was not present when that decision was taken and that appears on page 14C of your own application which is bundle 11 and that's the second paragraph wherein it states quite clearly that the General had given a decision that the insurgents were to be intercepted.
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Then he goes on to indicate that there was then a later decision taken and he then mentions the people who were present and the name of General Steyn does not appear amongst the people stated by Mr Venter in his application.
MR LOOTS: That is absolutely correct, Madame Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there is just one aspect that I wanted to clear with you and that is with regard to the authority that you had to take a decision that you did and that is to eliminate the insurgents. You already had been given a decision by General Steyn who was your superior. Did you have any authority to counter a decision given by a superior we found discussing the problems that you had identified with him and to proceed on your own to take a different position which was counter the decision that he had given you?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I have comprehension for what you say, I can repeat that to change that decision was one of the most difficult of my life and all I can add was it was either I or Crause or my other juniors or the enemy. There was no other solution. That is the only explanation that I can tender to you. It was not pleasant.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes I can appreciate that but the pertinent question is did you believe that you had the right to take the decision that you did taking into account that a superior officer had already put you in command and had given you an order that you had to carry?
MR LOOTS: Chairperson, in my heart and in my soul I am convinced that General Steyn would not have expected of us to commit suicide, suicide in the sense that later he explained that this happened very quickly and by means of reevaluation we came to another decision. I can only say that it was very difficult.
CHAIRPERSON: Would you therefore say that you bona fide believe that by your appointment as a commander which appointment was effected by General Steyn, that appointment gave you some measure of authority to take a decision that you did and that was to eliminate the insurgents?
MR LOOTS: Can I just illustrate that I did this after I deliberated with all the men, with all the senior men first, and then a man like Van Zyl who still has to give evidence, that he protested that it was expected of him to catch people under these circumstances knowing that they were armed insurgents.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes I understand that. I'm probably not being pointed in how I'm putting this question to you. You are appointed by General Steyn to be in command, is that not so?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Now did you believe that as a commander part of your duty would be to evaluate the efficacy of the operation that you had been given by General Steyn to carry out and to decide on a different plan if you thought the operation which was to intercept the insurgents would not be successfully carried out? Did you believe you had that authority because whether you discussed this with other officers, these are junior officers, it is neither here nor there, did you believe that you had authority as a commander to take a decision to eliminate?
MR LOOTS: This was part of my police duties at that stage given the atmosphere that reigned in this country. Derdepoort I can just mention, the 1st November 1978 a farmer was murdered there, we've never found his body yet and the 19th January is Alti Mosarewa was shot at Derdepoort. Colonel Ras is here, these are the people who were almost killed there. In 1982 my colleague was shot, 25 shots were fired at him, ...[intervention].
ADV DE JAGER: I think that you and the Honourable Chairperson are speaking past each other. She puts it to you that General Steyn gave the instruction to you. If you receive an instruction and you see for some or other reason that it would not work, do you have the capacity to amend this instruction according to what you think is the best under the circumstances?
MR LOOTS: According to my conscience yes.
ADV DE JAGER: So you do have a discretion there to amend the plan.
MR LOOTS: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: So would I therefore be correct, sir, that you reasonably believed then that you had such authority to take the decision that you did?
MR LOOTS: That is what I believed, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes and that decision you would have taken whether you had consulted with other junior officers or not?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: That certainly couldn't have enabled you to have such authority?
MR LOOTS: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: It has taken me quite some time to get you to where I wanted you to get to, Mr Loots.
MR LOOTS: Sorry Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you wish to re-examine? I hope you wont?
MR VISSER: I do have a question Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I hope it wont be too many questions, I will confine you to one question.
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: It will not be as many questions as the witness has received Madame Chair.
Commissioner Lax put it to you that you did not have a problem to tell Du Preez Smit or to leave a message that he had to find a place and he spoke of a place for an ambush. What exactly did you ask of Du Preez Smit to do, what kind of a place did he ask you to find?
MR LOOTS: To find a suitable place where we could intercept the persons who came into the country.
MR VISSER: To do what.
MR LOOTS: To arrest them.
MR VISSER: At that stage when you spoke to Du Preez Smit what was the plan, what would you do with these insurgents, to eliminate them?
MR LOOTS: No to question them.
MR VISSER: To what?
MR LOOTS: To arrest them and to question them.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Before you are excused Captain Loots, are you in a position to give an indication to this Committee of how long the shooting lasted?
MR LOOTS: Not more than a minute, a few seconds, it was very quick.
CHAIRPERSON: And did each of your officers report to you how many rounds of ammunition they had each used in the shooting?
MR LOOTS: We counted 34 holes in the vehicle, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Where they armed with their official firearms?
MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: To your knowledge and recollection were they all armed in R1 rifles?
MR LOOTS: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You are excused.
MR LOOTS: Thank you.
WITNESS EXCUSED
MR VISSER: Chairperson, you did mention to me that you would appreciate it if we could adjourn a little early, I'm not certain Chairperson whether you wanted to adjourn earlier than 4 o'clock. I should have asked you. We're certainly not going to finish today, not at this rate so whenever, if you wish to adjourn, we can continue tomorrow. We'll finish during the course of the morning.
CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]
MR VISSER: So we can continue? Yes well I hope I didn't give you any cause of complaint so far, Chairperson, but if I may ask you this ...[inaudible]
