MR VISSER: The next and last witness in this incident is Superintendent Isak Johannes Marais, who is present with his own tie today. That would be Exhibit L. They have apparently been circulated by my attorney.
CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)
MR VISSER: Yes, they would not be marked at this stage. They follow K, so it would be L.
ADV DE JAGER: Your full names please.
ISAK JOHANNES MARAIS: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, the application of this applicant you will find in bundle 11 at page 32 to 37. The actual incident is dealt with from page 33 onwards. It again is very brief and also refers to the application of Du Preez Smit.
Mr Marais, you have compiled an affidavit and signed the affidavit, is that correct?
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: And in that affidavit you discuss your personal circumstances, your police career and so forth as well as the struggle of the past and the political considerations, from page 1 up to and including page 9, is that correct?
MR MARAIS: Yes, that's correct.
MR VISSER: And do you confirm the truth and correctness thereof, of that Exhibit L, as far as your knowledge goes?
MR MARAIS: Yes, that's correct.
MR VISSER: At the time of the incident on the 4th of May, what was your rank?
MR MARAIS: I was a Sergeant.
MR VISSER: You and van Zyl were apparently Sergeants. I think that was on the lower level of the rank order.
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: If we could just page to page 19. You have heard what van Zyl testified according to that which you were busy with when you received the radio message, do you recall this, do you agree with this?
MR MARAIS: Yes, I agree with that.
MR VISSER: And that which was said to you at the scene about the persons who were coming in, as his evidence went?
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Regarding Andries Moatshe you were later informed about his status, what was it?
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.
MR MARAIS: Only at a later stage.
MR VISSER: And what did you hear?
MR MARAIS: I heard that he was an ANC collaborator.
MR VISSER: Now on that evening there were a number of members at the place to which you were called.
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: And according to your recollection you have given the names of those persons that you recall.
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: You say in 71 what you were told, that there would be armed MK members and in paragraph 73 you explain what happened when you arrived at the scene and the order which you received when you arrived there.
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: Who was in command when you arrived at the scene?
MR MARAIS: At that stage it was General Steyn, who was the most senior member at the scene.
MR VISSER: Yes, and what was your order?
MR MARAIS: Our order was that as soon as the persons arrived there in their vehicle we were to arrest them.
MR VISSER: And branches and stands and a gate were placed across the road in order to apprehend the vehicle.
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: What did Steyn do then?
MR MARAIS: Colonel Steyn and the Branch Commander left he area at that stage.
MR VISSER: Who was the commander?
MR MARAIS: Jan Truter. They went to undertake observations, to monitor the movement of the vehicle to be able to determine when it would arrive at the place where we had set up the roadblock.
MR VISSER: And what did you do?
MR MARAIS: In the meantime we practised the exercise of arresting the persons when the vehicle was to have stopped there and how to arrest these person.
MR VISSER: Yes. And at that stage you would have been divided into two groups on either side of the road, west and east?
MR MARAIS: Yes, that's correct.
MR VISSER: And what did you then realise when you began to practise the exercise?
MR MARAIS: Sergeant Nieuwenhuis and van Zyl objected and said that this was a very dangerous operation because should a shooting incident take place we could be casualties of this shooting incident.
MR VISSER: And over and above this you were also on both sides of the road, what would happen once you started firing at the vehicle?
MR MARAIS: We would have fired at each other and we may have killed each other during the process.
MR VISSER: We know that there was a discussion and that a change of order took place, Brigadier Loots said that everybody was to move over to the one side of the road and leave the arrest and simply open fire as soon as the vehicle stopped.
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: And what did you feel about that order?
MR MARAIS: I was grateful because I felt that my own life was more important and it was not placed in as much jeopardy.
MR VISSER: To which side of the road did you move?
MR MARAIS: Initially I would have participated in the arrest on the passenger's side, but we all moved over to the western side so that all of us would be on the driver's side of the vehicle.
MR VISSER: Was there any reason that you recall, for the fact that you were not positioned on the other side of the road, in other words on the eastern side of the road?
MR MARAIS: Not specifically, but if remember correctly regarding the environment there was too little shelter on the opposite side of the road and if we had become involved in that shooting incident we all would have been injured.
MR VISSER: The vehicle arrived, it stopped and you opened fire?
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: Did you yourself fire any shots?
MR MARAIS: Yes.
MR VISSER: Do you know how many shots you fired?
MR MARAIS: No, not exactly, but quite a few shots.
MR VISSER: There were three persons in the bakkie, according to paragraph 80.
MR MARAIS: Yes, that's correct.
MR VISSER: And they were killed there?
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: Did you investigate the presence of any weapons in the bakkie?
MR MARAIS: No, we had to withdraw first and after the demolitions experts had cleared the area we were allowed to return to the scene.
MR VISSER: And what did you see?
MR MARAIS: I saw a bag with hand-grenades and a firearm.
MR VISSER: Why type of firearm?
MR MARAIS: I'm not certain what sort of weapon it was, but it was a hand weapon.
MR VISSER: Did you receive any order to take any Russian weapons to the scene to plant on the deceased?
MR MARAIS: Negative, at no stage.
MR VISSER: Did you see any other Russian weapons in the vicinity?
MR MARAIS: No.
MR VISSER: Apart from those which you saw in the bakkie.
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: With regard to the deceased, with which vehicle did you travel there?
MR MARAIS: I had a Toyota 4X4 bakkie, which was my official state vehicle which I used to undertake my investigations with.
MR VISSER: Can you say how the bodies of the deceased were removed from the scene?
MR MARAIS: After the bodies had been removed from the red Toyota bakkie they were loaded onto the back of my bakkie. I can't recall exactly who loaded the bodies onto the bakkie, but they left in my bakkie.
MR VISSER: You didn't drive the bakkie?
MR MARAIS: No.
MR VISSER: And you can't recall who was the person who drove your bakkie away from the scene?
MR MARAIS: No.
MR VISSER: What did you hear later with regard to the further transport of the bodies?
MR MARAIS: I recall that they struggled to get the state mortuary vehicle and they would have met each other halfway and carried over the bodies.
MR VISSER: You can remember that, that the hearse, the state hearse would have met the bakkie halfway and at that point they would have loaded the bodies over into the state hearse?
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: You heard that there was a post-mortem inquest, but you know nothing further about it?
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: Was it Rustenburg or Thabazimbi?
MR MARAIS: Rustenburg.
MR VISSER: And we know now who the persons were, we know what the identification of all the persons is and you are applying for amnesty for your share in these events?
MR MARAIS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: That concludes the evidence-in-chief, thank you, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr du Plessis, do you have any questions to put?
MR DU PLESSIS: I have no questions.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: I just have one question, Chairperson.
Did you see the hand-grenades in the bag? Was that after the demolitions experts were there?
MR MARAIS: Yes, after they had cleared the area and removed the bodies or after we had been removed from the scene I moved closer and saw the bag of hand-grenades with the passenger on the extreme left of the vehicle.
MS LOCKHAT: So after the incident you didn't look at the bakkie, it was just the bag of weapons that you saw after the incident, is that correct?
MR MARAIS: I myself was not permitted to work with the vehicle because I was not suitably trained to undertake this work.
MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Lockhat. Mr Visser, that should conclude your applications.
MR VISSER: Indeed it does, thank you, Chairperson. May this witness be excused?
CHAIRPERSON: He may be excused. Mr Marais, you are excused.
MR MARAIS: Thank you, Chairperson.
WITNESS EXCUSED
MR VISSER: As far as the continuation is concerned, would you like me to argue straight away?
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, you have earlier on advised the Committee that there was no indication from the victims of wanting to address us, is that so?
MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson, but I think I should just check again with them after they've heard all the evidence. I just feel a bit ...
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you may do so. We'll give you a second to do so. We will not adjourn.
MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: May I be excused for a moment while she does that?
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?
MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, Ms Swartbooi, the mother of Kruschev would just like to address the Commission, just to say a few words as to what she feels.
CHAIRPERSON: The mother of Solomon Mlonsi?
MS LOCKHAT: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Who is referred to in our documents as Kruschev?
MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson.
Ms Swartbooi, can you just tell the Commission what you want to tell us today?
MS SWARTBOOI: I want to ask these people who were testifying here today as to whether for them to be able to identify Moatshe. How were they able to get in contact with Moatshe? I want to know again as to whether the place where these children were killed, where were they taken to, which place because I need the remains of my child. I want the remains to be exhumed so that we will be able to give them a decent funeral.
Secondly, when the police are on duty why was it possible that they should kill these people, because they were supposed to arrest them not kill them. Do they know that they killed my child, the only child whom God blessed me with.
WITNESS DISTRESSED
CHAIRPERSON: We will take a short adjournment for 10 minutes.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: I've already in my opening remarks before opening these hearings to proceed today, already alluded to the fact that as soon as we became aware that you could be traced we made a ruling in the interest of reconciliation because we are also required by our Act to be compassionate, particularly to the victims, to ensure that your attendance is secured before these proceedings in respect of these of these applications could be concluded.
It is most unfortunate that you were not here from the beginning because maybe you may have been in a better picture to know exactly what happened to your loved ones.
We nevertheless hope that even though you are coming now, the fact that you are able to see the people who are accepting responsibility for the killing of your child, will help you in assuaging your pain that you have been suffering for all these many years. The fact that you will now know where his soul was taken and you will be in a position to go and conduct what I know to be a very important requirement, the traditional ritual to go and reclaim his soul, so that you can bring it back to your home, you will be able to also rest in peace.
We cannot do much about your pain, but we hope that this truth that has now been uncovered, that we have established will enable you to take the most difficult step in dealing with your pain. You have our empathy. We will now give an opportunity to Ms Makubela to also say something to the Committee.
MS MAKUBELA: What I wanted to ask is that as Steyn has taken them to where they were supposed to be killed, I learnt that Marais said that it was a dangerous operation. I don't know how to ask them as to why that even to these children it was dangerous to them. They don't know as to whether they were going to their homes or not. For them to use guns, why was it for them to kill ...(end of side A of tape)
... I'm directing my question to Mr Marais that he shot many times, though he doesn't know how many times he shot. And again he was afraid to come closer to these children because he said they were dangerous. Were these children not in danger at the time? And then again the car which they were in was used again to transport the corpses. Why does he say he doesn't know where these corpses were taken to?
And then, how did they contact the mortuary? They knew that when they were going to kill them which mortuary they were going to be taken to. They knew everything about this plan. How are we able to forgive them if they don't show us where they killed then and again where they were buried, so that we will be able to do our ritual so that we'll be able to collect their spirits and bring them home. How would we know where they are? We want them to explain to us because nobody, all of them don't know how many times they shot, but they know that they shot.
These people were three and they were eight. Why they did not try to arrest these people I want to know, why should they kill? They received information how many people were coming, why was it possible for them to kill, because the Lord doesn't allow you to kill.
I don't believe that among them, meaning the police, one of them was injured or killed and we don't know where our sons are.
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Makubela, you have expressed a need to know about the remains of your child, the remains of your brother. This Committee had laboured under the impression that Ms Lockhat had already advised you that the Investigative Unit of the Commission has already established where these remains are and we had actually laboured under the impression that you had already been contacted to be informed that the process of exhuming the remains of your loved ones were about to take place. The person who is sitting next to you is our Investigator, who is charged exclusively with a duty of establishing the remains of people such as your loved ones and after having established that information, to inform you of his findings and make arrangements with you with a view to enable you to go and take the remains of your loved ones.
I know that in our custom - and I say this as an African, until a ritual of having to reclaim the soul of your loved ones has been performed, you as relatives can never find peace. And I had hoped that at least with regard to this issue that you have been contacted. If you have been so contacted, may it be my duty to tell you that in due course the Investigator will be coming to you and arrangements will be made that you accompany them to exhume the bones of your loved ones and conduct the necessary ritual.
The remarks I've expressed before after Ms Swartbooi addressed this Committee, I would like them to apply to you. We hope that somehow through God's strength you will be able to assuage your pain. It is a difficult process. We cannot by coming here expect you to be reconciled to all these difficult problems.
Unfortunately we cannot answer the questions that you have posed, those questions have already been answered when the other applicants who really had a major role in the decision to kill your sons and the method of operation that would be used to so kill them. When they gave evidence they advanced reasons why they had to decide to do so.
A record will be made available to you so that you yourselves can look at the record and satisfy yourself as to the reasons already advanced. We also hope that Ms Lockhat will again take her time to go through that record with a view to answering the questions that you have pertinently posed relating to the killing of your sons.
You are going to be here until this matter finally gets concluded. It will be so concluded once we hear argument from the legal representatives of the applicants. Without suggesting what they should be saying, I think it's common cause that as they argue the law they will touch upon some of the issues that you have raised in their arguments.
We trust that somehow that will also enable you to be in a better position than you are now. Thank you very much for your presence, we appreciate it very much. We will take a tea adjournment and we'll come back at twenty five to twelve. Thank you.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, are you going to start first?
MR VISSER ADDRESSES COMMITTEE: I will commence, Chairperson. Chairperson, this is an application in regard to the Silent Valley incident. We are not in the fortunate position to know exactly what the identity of the victims, all three of them, were and we know that Carl Marx was a person by the name of Schoeman Skhwiri: S-K-H-W-I-R-I Ramokgopa
R-A-M-O-K-G-O-P-A and that Kruschev was a person by the name of Kelvin Khakasa - have I got this right? -
K-H-A-K-A-S-A.
MR LAX: Mr Visser, in fact his name was Solomon Mlonsi.
MR VISSER: Sorry, I thought I was wrong. It's Solomon Mlonsi. And that is in accordance with what was published in Dawn, which was attached to Exhibit C, the affidavit of Brigadier Loots.
There are eight applicants. We appear for seven, but you could probably conveniently group all eight together, their versions are virtually identical.
For the sake of the families, family relations of the deceased, and I'm not talking about Mr Moatshe now, about the others, we will very briefly repeat some of the evidence, but if I may - perhaps I should just do that first.
Very briefly, what happened was on the 4th of May, Mr Crause was contacted by an official at the Derdepoort border post and he was told that there was a person who wished to speak to him.
He went to the Derdepoort border post together with du Preez Smit and he there met Mr Venter, who already obtained amnesty in this matter, a client of my learned friend, Mr du Plessis, as well as the person, Andries Moatshe. He explained that Moatshe was not a previous informer of the Security Police, but that Crause himself had previously warned Moatshe that he was aware from what he had been told by other informers, that Moatshe was supportive of cadres and thereby also of the ANC/SACP alliance.
On that day, Moatshe told Crause that he was asked by members of the ANC to assist in the infiltration of two armed MK cadres who were going to infiltrate on that particular evening. I see that one of the family relations has a problem with ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I'm aware of that, I thought my secretary had attended to that. You may proceed, Mr Visser, we've been assured that there is no problem.
MR VISSER: ... that two MK cadres were going to infiltrate and that he was asked to assist them in the RSA to transport them to a certain destination.
Leaving aside side issues, what happened then was Crause contacted the Divisional Commander of the Western Transvaal, Mr Steyn, Steyn and Loots then went to the Derdepoort border post where they spoke to Crause and where they were informed. It was then decided by Steyn that a roadblock had to be set up at a convenient spot and that the Security Police had to arrest all three the people who came in into the RSA.
Du Preez Smit was then asked on a radio to choose a spot which would be convenient to erect a roadblock. He chose a spot. This spot is on the road from Derdepoort border post in the direction of Mariko, where that road joins with the Dwaalboom Road. There appears to be a bend in the road and just after the bend in the road there was a gate, an old gate, which they used to erect a barricade.
We were told by one of the witnesses who had been to the scene later after the event, that the road there has been altered, so that we don't know at this stage whether that gate might still be there as a point of reference for anyone who wants to go there now, but it should be fairly easy to find the exact spot.
On the scene - various other members, comprising of inter alia the other applicants before you, Madam Chairperson, who were then summoned to go to this particular point where General Steyn ordered that those present had to be divided into two groups, one on each side of the road, so that when the vehicle came to a stop as it had to do in front of the gate, an arrest could be effected.
He then left together with Jan Truter in order to go closer to the border to monitor the movement of the vehicle which they knew would be a red Toyota LDV.
After Steyn had left, the person left behind at the scene practised in order to ascertain whether there are any problems with the plan to arrest the infiltrators and in the process of the exercises they realised that for various reasons the plan to arrest could not be practically executed because of the danger, which was inherent in the plan, to the members of the Security Force, of the Security Police.
There were complaints by some of the subordinates and four people, Loots, Venter, Crause and du Preez Smit, who were the most senior officers on the scene discussed the matter and they together decided that to arrest was not a proposition and it was too dangerous and therefore Loots as the senior officer on the scene gave the instruction that once the vehicle transporting the two MK cadres stopped at the gate they had to open fire and shoot to kill.
The group on the eastern side was moved over to the western side, that would be on the side where the driver of the vehicle would have been, as we now know was Mr Moatshe, and that was done in order to avoid that when they started firing that policemen would not fire at each other and get caught in the crossfire.
The reason why it was dangerous was that at that particular spot there was insufficient cover for them to hide in order to attempt an arrest while hiding behind, for example trees or whatever. And you've heard, Chairperson and Members of the Committee, from one of the witnesses to say that all that there was a little furrow on the inside of the road, that will be on the western side, which was created by the graders when they graded the dirt road.
The other problem was that the only hiding place being on the side of the road, brought them very close to the vehicle itself after it had stopped and it was foreseen that if a hand-grenade was thrown out of the vehicle one or more of the Security Police would either be injured and probably killed.
Broadly speaking, those are the reasons why it was then decided to eliminate them. They were also aware of the fact that the two people who came in were going to be armed. As it turned out, the LDV arrived, the occupants were shot and killed and after the incident there was evidence that inside the bakkie, on the laps of the two MK cadres, there were three hand-grenades each, two defensive and one offensive hand-grenade and that some of the hand-grenades or all of them, we're not sure, were already primed for use.
CHAIRPERSON: Does it really matter what was discovered? The basis of the decision was on the information from the informant.
MR VISSER: That is correct, but ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: That he was bringing in armed insurgents.
MR VISSER: Yes, but you will recall that Ms Makubela asked the specific question: why if there eight policemen did they kill the three people in the motorcar? And Ms Swartbooi specifically asked why had these insurgents to be killed an not arrested, what possible danger could they have been? And it's from that point of view that I just mentioned that.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but Captain Loots had been informed, or Mr Crause had already been informed.
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: ... that Mr Moatshe was bringing in armed insurgents. So when the decision was taken it was taken on the basis of that information, it didn't really matter what was later discovered in the car.
MR VISSER: Quite correct, yes. Quite correct, Chairperson, I'm just busy with, for the benefit of the family relations, just to mention these facts and then I'll go on to address you.
They were then killed and they were transported to Rustenburg and there was a legal inquest held in Thabazimbi. And that would conclude the facts broadly speaking.
MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: If I may then address myself to the Committee. Chairperson, we submit that the best argument which we could put forward to you lies in the strength of the evidence which you've heard. We submit that you heard witnesses who went out of their way to try to recall and to try to assist in all possible ways, with a view of making a full and frank disclosure. There can be no doubt that all the witnesses that you heard, including Mr Smith, made a full disclosure to you.
There are two issues really in the matter and we will submit in a moment that they take the matter no further, one or the other way. And that concerns first of all the question of whether Moatshe was an informer or not and secondly, the issue of the possibility that there may have been Russian-made firearms to be planted on the insurgents.
As far as the first is concerned Chairperson, it really isn't an issue. The only person who was under that impression was Mr Venter. And really, in the light of Crause's evidence we submit with respect, that that evidence of Crause ought to be accepted, that he wasn't an informer, that this was the first occasion upon which Moatshe ever gave them information.
Crause, on the question by yourself, Chairperson, on why he would have done that, Crause related that back to the fact that he spoke to him and warned him before and he speculated as to why he might have done that. The fact of the matter is that the information of Moatshe was correct as it turned out, with hindsight.
The other aspect ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, if he wasn't an informer and had been warned before about his activities, why would the Security Police make elaborate plans and act on the information of somebody who they had no reason to believe?
MR VISSER: Well common sense would dictate the obvious answer, they could never take a chance of ignoring it. Security Policemen will tell you that they had been sent on wild goose chases more often than in terms of accurate information, for various reasons, but they could never dare ignore it.
CHAIRPERSON: But now here is a person who doesn't know Crause, as an informant asks for Mr Crause particularly, discloses an information that would be disclosed by an informer, not an ordinary Botswana citizen, but an informer.
MR VISSER: Madam Chair, how do we know what motivated him? The fact is he knew Crause, he knew Crause, Crause spoke to him before, he warned him. And Crause suggested to you that there was a possibility that he might have done so in order to protect himself against arrest once next he comes into the Republic of South Africa. That's a feasible explanation.
CHAIRPERSON: That's right, his explanation was that he probably was going to ask a favour of some kind. He was expecting some kind of a benefit.
MR VISSER: Precisely, it could also be, one doesn't know. He may have decided to turn his back on the ANC and become an informer and this might have happened later, how will we know?
CHAIRPERSON: But in such circumstances isn't it probably therefore for Mr Venter to believe that a person who comes with this kind of an information must be an informer.
MR VISSER: Yes, but we don't argue about that, in fact our witnesses have all conceded that he may have thought so and that's why I say that really isn't an issue, it's not an issue which should concern you.
CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)
MR VISSER: Yes. The last submission on the evidence really relates to yet another aspect which Mr Venter mentioned, and his words were that they were given weapons to plant on the insurgents if necessary. He didn't tell you in his evidence at the time - I believe it was 1996 or 1997, who might have given them the firearms.
We submit with respect, that none of the witnesses who gave evidence before you knew of such an order although in honesty, Brigadier Loots told you that he did in fact see one. So you must assume that there was an AK47. And again, if that is so we are not able to say that Venter was entirely wrong in perhaps making an assumption that there was an order, because he probably also saw the AK47. And Loots wouldn't tell you that he saw an AK47 if there wasn't one, he actually explained to you where it was.
So apart from that, Chairperson, we would respectfully submit that there is no discrepancy in the evidence, none whatsoever. All that we have to show really is that there wasn't any material discrepancy, but we want to say that there wasn't any discrepancies in the evidence and that you will be safe to assume that what you heard here during these hearings was the full truth and nothing but the truth for so far as they could remember the issues.
Chairperson, I refer you to the written argument which I have already placed before you, from page 14 onwards we deal with general submissions ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)
MR VISSER: Pardon?
CHAIRPERSON: Let's try and locate our documents, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: I'm not going to go through it.
CHAIRPERSON: Oh.
MR VISSER: I'm not going to go through it at all. I've done so before and ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: We would prefer you to just make a reference, give us a page reference.
MR VISSER: Yes, from page 14 onwards. And Commissioner Lax has given the assurance through you that he will come up to speed, we assume that he has.
CHAIRPERSON: He definitely has. You don't know Mr Lax, it takes him a second ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Yes, yes, we know Mr Lax and he didn't disappoint us in that regard.
Chairperson, so we submit that what we have submitted in the written argument as far as general submissions has been submitted over and over again and although no decision has been handed down by the Amnesty Committee either confirming or rejecting any of the submissions which we made, particularly in regard to the conflict of the past and the legal requirements, the Amnesty Committee has in effect and in practice acted in accordance with those submissions and really there's no point in us repeating them yet again before you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: We heard you just two days ago, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Correct, except that Mr Lax didn't, but as you said he's up to speed.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, other than that you have already in bundle 1, the Amnesty Committee has given Mr Venter his amnesty. It was on the basis of the evidence stated in the paragraph at page 52. We submit that apart from the two aspects which we have raised and which we believe can easily be discounted, it is identical and with submission we say to you that if you had given Venter amnesty, then there is no reason why the present applicants, all eight of them, should not be granted amnesty. And we would ask you to grant such amnesty.
The form of the amnesty which we ask is for any act, omission or offence which could constitute a crime in regard to this incident, it would include murder or any other competent verdict and any other commission, or omission or offence committed after, either prior, during or after the incident. We don't believe that it is correct to try and set up a list as long as you grant amnesty in regard to that incident, which is properly identified as an incident on the 4th of May at a particular spot and we know who the victims were, there should be no problem at all if you gave amnesty in that form. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: So the only offence which has seemed to be clearly explained by your evidence is murder?
MR VISSER: Murder, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: In respect of all the applicants?
MR VISSER: Yes, or any competent ...
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Yes. Thank you Chairperson, that concludes my argument. If there is anything you wish to hear me on specifically I'll gladly address you, but with respect, this is not an involved application in any sense and we would ask you to grant amnesty.
CHAIRPERSON: Would you just address us with regard to the order that was given by Captain Loots, in view of the fact that there had been an earlier order by General Steyn only to arrest.
MR VISSER: Yes, certainly.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm interested only in respect of that argument.
MR VISSER: Yes, certainly. I believe perhaps what you might be referring to are the requirements set out in Section 20(2)(b) read with Section 20(2)(f).
CHAIRPERSON: Precisely, (b) and (f).
MR VISSER: Yes. The situation here is that Steyn gave an order, as we know Loots changed that order. The immediate result or consequence of that would be no more than a departmental inquiry. If one however says no, but it goes further than that, it entails where previously people would have been arrested, them now being killed and one wishes to extract from that some sinister motive.
Our submissions are that no such sinister motive appears in the light his explanation to you about the danger to his men. Once you believe him, and there's no reason not to believe him as he was corroborated by even his junior officer, in particular van Zyl and Marais and Nieuwenhuis, that he acted reasonably, well then all ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: I don't think we're thinking it's sinister or whatever, it's only contrary to an express order of his senior, without consulting his senior he is changing the order. So that I think is the - did he have any authority to do so?
CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed, let's go even further and put our problems pointedly. Did he have any authority to change a specific order to the order that he later took or issued?
MR VISSER: Well the answer to that would be twofold. The first argument would be that if a commanding officer in the field realises that an order which he has to carry out will in all probability lead to the death or injury of his men, with great respect we submit that it would be expected from him to do the right thing. We say that Loots did the right thing. But in the alternative if you say or if you think that he did not do the right thing for the reasons advanced by him, then the question that Commissioner de Jager has put to me becomes relevant because now the question is, what authority did you act under? The answer to that, Chairperson, is that in the whole of the amnesty process, as far as members of the Security Forces are concerned, you deal solely with situations where they acted outside authority, nobody had authority, as has been pointed out on many occasions. No member of the Security Force ever had authority to kill anyone, he acted outside the authority, but he believed reasonably that that was the way he had to act. And the principle applies equally as far as they apply to all amnesty applications, also to this incident.
CHAIRPERSON: That's not entirely true. With regard to the Cronje matters people were acting in terms of a general order given allegedly by people like Brigadier Viktor and Brigadier Schoon. That's the evidence that we have heard.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, I don't want to get into Jack Cronje and his applicants, but if you accept if that is true, what possible authority could Viktor or Schoon have to give such an order? ...(indistinct) they can't have that authority.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, if I as a General put X in command of a certain situation, I'm instructing him to do this but to handle this situation, wouldn't it be implied that he would have the authority to change the procedures or, the only question would be whether it would also be implied that he could sort of take it quite a different line than that which he was expected to do?
MR VISSER: Yes, that ...(intervention)
MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Visser, if I could just come in for one sec before you answer. My difficulty hedges around what Mr de Jager has alluded to and that is there is a fundamental difference between everything connected with an arrest, which is a perfectly lawful normal operation in the normal course of any kind of implied or other explicit authority. Now that was the specific instruction, not eliminate, arrest, which has a whole range of implications that would follow that and which, in terms of the rational for it would be perfectly justifiable etc.
MR VISSER: ...(inaudible)
MR LAX: Absolutely. Now that authority was the authority that was given to Colonel Loots, as he then was at the time, to be in command of, that authority then shifted to an elimination and the issue is then, and I think this is where it's being raised, on what basis do we find the authority for the elimination from the original order to take charge of an arrest?
MR VISSER: The answer is on the basis of what Commissioner de Jager has just put to me. May I give you an example? The General in the field sends his second-in-command to go and torch a town, suspecting that in that in that town there are members of the enemy, of enemy personnel hiding in the houses. The subordinate goes, now being in command of this operation, and he enters the town, takes the town and now he's got to execute his order to burn the town, but before he starts torching the town he finds out that there are woman and children hiding in the houses, being kept for example as hostages by the enemy, and he decides I'm not going to burn the town, wouldn't that be as Commissioner de Jager - this is the mirror side of our situation, but the principle must be the same, isn't that in reality the truth of the situation as put by Commissioner de Jager?
When you have authority to deal with a situation on the ground, it can't be narrowly interpreted when things start happening. For example, Loots was ordered to arrest, let's assume for a moment the occupants of the car started firing, what then, wouldn't Loots then have the authority to say fire, shoot, shoot to kill? - obviously he would. So really, the differentiation between deciding beforehand we're not going to even try, and waiting, as was suggesting to some of the witnesses, to see whether they fire first, with the accompanying danger to the men. We submit with great respect that what Loots did was the correct thing and that he was acting within the bounds of his authority. But that's in terms of Section 22(b).
ADV DE JAGER: But isn't the facts of the case that whatever he did was condoned by the very General who gave him the order?
MR VISSER: That's the fourth point.
ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct) full knowledge ...(indistinct).
MR VISSER: That's the fourth argument.
CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that the crux, shouldn't that be the crux of your argument?
MR VISSER: Well there are four arguments, Chairperson. I was dealing with 22(b) and I was trying to explain to you that the reality on the ground gave them the authority, which is sufficient for 22(b). If you're not satisfied with that, then with great respect, he told you that he genuinely believed that he had that authority because of those facts on the ground. That's the second argument.
The third argument I've now forgotten. But certainly, at the end of the day back comes Steyn, he's confronted what has happened, but he immediately talks to Loots and Loots tells him what has happened and he says; you know if I let my mind go, if I had more time I would probably have come to the same conclusion, and I fully agree with what Loots did. Which brings us back to the question, isn't what Loots did at best to disobey an order which would have an internal consequence and not the consequence of an offence in public law?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Indeed from the evidence we heard coming from General Steyn, he approved.
MR VISSER: Yes, yes.
MR VISSER: And all his men said thank goodness. Certainly it's very difficult for us to site in the calmness of a room years later, 14 years later or whatever, and try to assimilate the situation which was there on the ground. But one must know that with hindsight, people in the bakkie had primed hand-grenades. So with hindsight, he made the correct decision, that much is clear.
CHAIRPERSON: But that's not important.
MR VISSER: But it's not important as you say.
CHAIRPERSON: And I keep on reminding you of that, that that aspect of evidence is not important for purposes of deciding whether he reasonably believed that he had authority, implied authority at least, to change the order. And your submission is that he reasonably believed that he such implied authority, for the reasons that you have already submitted.
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: And further that in any event the whole operation was approved, his decision was approved by General Steyn and that's his evidence.
MR VISSER: And just to conclude that portion of the argument, Chairperson, the fact of authority to give an order, can either be given before or after by way of approval. So clearly you're correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, in terms of Section 23(e), that certainly, there is no suggestion that an approval has to be before or after, an approval is an approval.
MR VISSER: Sure, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: In this case it happened ex post facto.
MR VISSER: Yes.
MR LAX: Just one other aspect which occurs to me and which would in a sense strengthen your argument, and that was the issue of alternatives. They didn't see any other alternatives. In fact the evidence was quite clear that the alternative of, for example, postponing the operation just didn't occur to anybody. So their only alternative that they saw was the elimination alternative.
MR VISSER: I'm indebted to Commissioner Lax because actually I was going to mention that and I forgot, because the fact is that is was suggested by a Member of the Panel to one of the witnesses
"When you realised that you could not safely arrest, why didn't you just leave the whole operation?"
Well of course there was just never such a possibility because if you left those people, we know from what we know of the conflict of the past, what would have happened, people would have been killed in this country or maimed, damage to property. As MK commanders, we know that they were actually sent into the country to train others internally and there was no, it just wasn't an option just to let it go. As Commissioner Lax points out, there was also no way of postponing it because if they had to postpone it, if one had to speculate, assuming they took the gate away and they waited until this car passed, what would they then have done, they would have had to follow them and try to stop them with sirens etc. What happens then in that situation where people are ready with firearms and hand-grenades is there would have been a shoot-out, without a shadow of a doubt. So correct, it is our submission and a submission strongly made that there wasn't any other option, with respect.
CHAIRPERSON: And then what Commissioner Lax is suggesting is that there was no alternative to abandon the whole operation altogether.
MR VISSER: Well he's suggesting something different, he's suggesting that perhaps it should have been, could have been postponed or moved to another location, but we know that that wasn't on. But I'm taking it a bit further, I'm saying that you couldn't just let go and let these people move in and hope that you might arrest them later.
CHAIRPERSON: But the evidence before us is that they had no option, they did not want to exercise any option at all.
MR VISSER: That's right.
CHAIRPERSON: So that was hardly an issue. That is the evidence before us.
MR VISSER: That's right, yes.
MR LAX: Just to emphasise, I am saying that on the evidence before us, it never even occurred to any one of the applicants that there may be an alternative, there just was no alternative in their minds. So I'm not saying they should have thought of one, I'm ...(inaudible). On the evidence before us it's incontestable that there was any other alternative.
MR VISSER: No, no I did understand you correctly, Commissioner Lax and I'm trying to agree and I don't seem to be so correctly, but it wouldn't have occurred to them because there wasn't an option. You put it quite correctly, yes. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat do you wish to make - oh, Mr du Plessis, do you wish to make any submissions?
MR DU PLESSIS IN ARGUMENT: Yes please, Chairperson, on a few issues. May I perhaps just hand up to you copies of the, it's part of the Heads of Argument which I handed to the Committee which heard the amnesty application of Colonel Venter. Now I've made copies of those Heads of Argument and it's the extract of those Heads of Argument in relation to Colonel Venter's application, which I'm handing to you and I have drawn a line through those parts which are not relevant for purposes of Mr Smith's application at this hearing.
...(end of side B of tape)
... Heads of Argument, they make the points clearly and they deal mostly with the political motive. You will see that on the first page, it's paragraph 254, you will see the acts for which amnesty is sought and then on the next page, page 400, paragraph 254.2.1 - I just want to give you the page references to Mr Smith's application, if you could just include there, it's page 38 to 62 of the bundle which we are dealing with.
MR LAX: It's bundle 11.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Lax. Bundle 11 and page 68 to 71. Now as I said I'm not going to deal with each and every requirement of the Act, I just want to deal with some of the issues which have been raised by my learned friend, Mr Visser in respect of this matter.
My client, Mr Smith, testified that he did not have any knowledge of the question of Moatshe having been an informer or not and I submit that he was of such a low rank that that would not have been something that he would have known of.
And then in respect of the planting of weapons he also made common cause with Mr Visser's applicants in that regard, he testified that he didn't know anything about it. And I submit that he was of such a rank that he would not have in any event known about it.
In respect of the last mentioned issue, the question of weapons having been planted, Colonel Venter testified in his application only once to that as far as I can determine, and he said:
"We were given weapons to plant on them if necessary."
Now one ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Smith doesn't anything about it.
MR DU PLESSIS: No, Smith doesn't know anything about it, Mr Chairman. I just want to make one submission pertaining to Colonel Venter's evidence in that regard as against Mr Visser's applicants, if I may.
One must remember that when Colonel Venter testified, and I know he received amnesty, I just want to make this one point, when he testified he testified in respect of this application alone. He did not, as far as I am aware, and I was involved when the preparation was done, have contact with the other applicants which you've heard and he did not have the benefit of his memory being ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: Isn't that a sort of dangerous argument now? We could then say that they've all sat together and worked out a story?
MR DU PLESSIS: No, Mr Chairman, the only point that I'm making is that one must bear in mind that Colonel Venter did not have the benefit of reading anybody else's application or anybody else's version before he testified, neither did he have the benefit of listening to other versions.
CHAIRPERSON: But he testified to facts which were within his personal knowledge.
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: What more do you need other than that? You don't need to consult somebody to refresh your memory about something that resides within you, do you?
MR DU PLESSIS: No, I'm not advancing the argument that Colonel Venter's testimony was wrong, I'm not advancing that argument.
CHAIRPERSON: We don't like the line of argument that you are taking now, it's taking us nowhere.
MR DU PLESSIS: Then I will leave it, Chairperson.
The last point that I wanted to raise - I wanted to come to the submission I wanted to make, but I'm going to leave it, Chairperson, I'm going to leave it there. The last point that I wanted to raise relates to the question of the order and there was reference by Mr Visser to the situation pertaining to the order.
Now I just want to make this submission and because it will arise in future again, I want to deal with it now.
CHAIRPERSON: Will it arise in future with regard to Mr Smith, Mr du Plessis? Because we'd like you to confine yourself to the evidence that's before us with regard to this incident, insofar as your client is concerned.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. So you give me an indication, Chairperson, that in respect of Brigadier Viktor's order and everything flowing from that, that I mustn't address you on that.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he didn't act on anything that had to do with Brigadier Viktor or anyone.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright.
CHAIRPERSON: The evidence before us is that he acted on the order of Captain Loots.
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. I however, Chairperson, was of the view that it may be something that I have to address at this hearing and maybe one will have to address it at a future stage, but I will leave it at that if you give me the indication that I shouldn't deal with that.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you shouldn't deal with it unless you think it's of particular relevance and you are able to give us an indication of that relevance.
MR DU PLESSIS: The only possible relevance that it may have, and perhaps I can have an indication if I then should elaborate on that, is in respect of Mr Smith's participation in this operation. Mr Smith obviously accepted the orders that he received and in any event accepted that the actions, or that such orders would have been authorised from above, it wasn't in the mouth, and he testified to that, that he accepted the orders, was that any objection couldn't have been taken by him in that regard.
The only point that I want to make in respect of that, and perhaps that relates to the question of him having been reasonable under the circumstances, that there was an authority and with reference to Section 20(2)(f) ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Would that apply to a person of the rank of Mr Smith? Certainly that would apply to Captain Loots, in having to give an order.
MR DU PLESSIS: Well Chairperson, if you have regard to the Act, if you regard to the Act and you have regard to Section 20(2)(b) ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Only? I thought you ...(intervention)
MR DU PLESSIS: 20(2)(b).
CHAIRPERSON: 20(2)(b), yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: (b). It refers to a person who acted in the course and scope of his or her duties, specifically. Now the question arises, did the shooting of these terrorists under these circumstances, did that fall within the scope of Mr Smith's express or implied authority?
Now it is so that he received an order and that he had to execute the order, but if you come for instance to a finding that the order was tainted, if I can put it like that, in the sense that it wasn't an order that fell within the scope, ag it wasn't an action that fell within the scope of Colonel Loots' express or implied authority, the only questions that remains, would that have an influence on Mr Smith's situation?
Now one can argue on the one had that it will not, because it could still have fallen under his express or implied authority, but on the other hand one could then say that well, if the order is tainted right at the top, it stays tainted right down to the bottom and then Mr Smith has to rely on Section 20(2)(f). The question then becomes, did he have reasonable grounds to believe that he was acting in the course and scope of his duties.
And then if one arrives at that point it becomes important to ask the question, was the fact that he believed that the order was authorised and that he was acting within the course and scope of his duties, was that reasonable under the circumstances? And then the whole situation arises what was the position the Security Police found themselves in? Did they find themselves in a situation where there was strict lines of orders, strict ways of orders coming down from the top to the bottom, or was there this atmosphere created within the Security Police that under certain circumstances fighting the liberation movements, elimination was regarded as necessary and within if not express implied authority.
And in that regard - and that is where I come to the point of Brigadier Viktor's order. Brigadier Viktor's order, and Mr Smith wasn't involved in that section, so Brigadier Viktor's order doesn't relate there, but it relates to the submission I want to make now.
Brigadier Viktor's order was given at a specific stage, for certain people to act in a certain way. And my submission is that ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: There's no evidence that he was even aware of Viktor's order.
MR DU PLESSIS: Smith?
ADV DE JAGER: Ja.
MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, no, I'm trying to get to the final submission I want to make. The final submission I want to make is that although you do not have evidence of similar orders like Brigadier Viktor's orders, for some reason or another, which we can debate, the submission I'm trying to make is that in all probability there were various different, similar kinds or orders in the Security Police Force, existing in the Security Police, alternative lines of authority, alternatives lines or orders which created in the minds of the people on the ground a view that this kind of action is authorised, maybe not in every instance specifically, but in any event implied, by way of things that happened, orders that were given and alternative lines of authority that existed. And that is the only point I'm trying to make, and I make that point that the probabilities are overwhelming that that was the case, and therefore Mr Smith would have acted reasonably to believe that he had authority.
CHAIRPERSON: In terms of Section 20(2)(f)?
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further submissions.
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?
MS LOCKHAT IN ARGUMENT: Chairperson, there's basically three issues relating to this matter. The first one was whether Moatshe was an informant, the second one is whether - an informant of Crause that is. The second one is whether Loots had the capacity and the authority to authorise the elimination of the youths and the third one relates to the weapons that were brought into the application by Venter, which relates to an issue of full disclosure.
Firstly, Chairperson, the fact that Moatshe came to the border post requesting to see Crause, you can get an assumption from that that he knew Crause, that he could have been an informer, but then we also have evidence from Crause stating that he was not an informer, that he had met him on a previous occasion, where he was actually infiltrating MKs and he warned him, but he was definitely not his informer.
Then on the other hand you have Venter's evidence, which unfortunately is not here, we can't gather exactly where he found, got to the knowledge that Moatshe was actually according to him, an informer of Crause. So we'll - well that's just as it is. And then all the other applicants never believed that Moatshe was actually an informer of Crause, so the evidence of Crause would then stand in that respect, Chairperson.
The second issue relates to the authority of Loots instructing the other applicants to pursue and eliminate the targets. Firstly, there was General Steyn that authorised just a simple arrest, the situation changed in that the place where this incident was to occur was not suitable and Loots felt that the officers would put themselves in danger. He, on the other hand, had radio contact with General Steyn, he never contacted him to inform him of the change of plan. So in that respect he acted on his own accord and he went against the instructions of General Steyn. The other evidence relating ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: What about the fact that when General Steyn was brought up to speed with what had happened, nothing came out of what Captain Loots had done. Doesn't that amount o an approval?
MS LOCKHAT: No, definitely Chairperson, I was coming to that.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MS LOCKHAT: The fact that after the incident when Steyn got there, Loots informed him that this would actually endanger his men and General Steyn actually said well he would have done the same in the circumstances and that he did the right thing. That is the evidence before us, Chairperson.
The issues is relating to just the radio contact between General Loots and Steyn. He just felt - he never contacted them. The reasons also provided was that he was far away, they didn't know exactly where they were and that they also could have been in close distance behind the MK soldiers and that it was possible that they could have heard them relating that there was a change in plan and that they were actually going to eliminate them.
CHAIRPERSON: But wasn't the evidence pointedly on this issue that there was an inherent risk in having to convey an information of this nature to General Steyn?
MS LOCKHAT: That was delivered by Crause, that everybody was in radio contact and that people would then come to know about it and then the operation would have just failed. Yes, Chairperson, that is before the Committee as well.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you find that to be a plausible reason, what's your submission?
MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, the only problem about that is, from the first instance all of this was actually done by radio contact and in essence informing Steyn about it, Crause and all the rest they made radio contact and it worked perfectly fine, but on the other had as well they could have also used code - I mean surely they have codes you know, instead of change of plan, they could have thought of another way, that if there was a change of plan they could have worked out a code strategy. I mean that they're always busy working out strategies, so this is one where they could have planned for that as well, for those circumstances because operations do fail, operations do go wrong. So reasonably, they could have also worked out that kind of a strategy, where maybe, and in that way General Steyn would then have been aware of all of this.
CHAIRPERSON: Unfortunately we don't have evidence in that regard.
MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson. The issue relating to the weapons, well the evidence before us is Venter's evidence, saying that they had to have weapons in order to plant this onto the operatives. There is no evidence before the Commission by the applicants, that they indeed took weapons with them to plant these weapons. The only evidence that we have is Loots' evidence that there was an AK47 found there.
We also know that there were lots of other people involved in this incident, which people can't remember, so it is possible that these other persons had, because it was supposed to be a normal arrest, that they actually brought these weapons with them because it was standard procedure to plant weapons on people, especially in arrests situations. So it was possible that other persons also involved in this operation could have planted that AK47 there. And the applicants in their evidence said that they didn't plan any weapons and they didn't take any weapons with them. So that is the evidence before the ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: And the junior applicants, as I could call them, they were called straight away while they were on an inspection or a investigation, straight away from there, so they wouldn't have gone back to the station in order to get weapons. So it seems as if they ...(indistinct)
MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: With regard to this issue, should we be exploring it any further than it has been, because really, having to rely heavily on the evidence already tendered by Mr Venter doesn't take us anywhere. His evidence is not pointed, he doesn't say so and so told me to plant weapons. So we are left in the dark, even with the evidence of Mr Venter. So to have reliance on that aspect of his evidence doesn't help this Committee.
MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed so, Chairperson. And then just the next issue relating to proportionality, whether it was fair in actually killing the youths. That is also another issue we have to consider and look at. The fact that the intention was to actually arrest these people, circumstances changed.
Then you have the other issue that, yes, these MKs came to the border post, stopped at the roadblock, they didn't fire, they didn't fire any shots, was there a duty on the police then to attempt to arrest them without ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Why should there be a duty on the policemen to do anything other than to execute an order given by a senior policeman? They were there to eliminate, an order had already been taken, that's why they were at Silent Valley, to execute an order. Why should they actually disobey an order from Captain Loots and attempt to effect an arrest?
MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed correct, Chairperson, but we also must take into consideration that these were also policemen and ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, who were acting under orders.
MS LOCKHAT: That is so, Chairperson, but the issue is just whether it was proportional to eliminate them in the circumstances.
ADV DE JAGER: And every policeman was a legitimate target to the MK.
MS LOCKHAT: That is correct. I can take it no further, Chairperson. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, do you have any reply?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, I wasn't going to reply, but I do want to remind you of the Breslow(?) case, which you were part of in Pietersburg, Commissioner Lax wasn't there, but what happened there was an elaborate plan was set up to arrest six people who came in and in fact the road was blocked by a Buffalo vehicle and an officer of the army got up and said: "You are surrounded, you are under arrest", and he was shot, shot right there. On the point that my learned friend is making, we submit that once it was decided, as you've just put to her, we say quite correctly, to eliminate, that was it. We know and we may perhaps at this stage frown on how many bullets were fired yes, but you also remember that evidence that once there's a fight you keep on firing until there's no further reaction.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: So it takes the matter no further, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: You may not address us further on that.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, do you have any reply?
MR DU PLESSIS: I have nothing to say, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We wish to express our gratitude to the legal representatives involved in this incident, for the assistance rendered to this Committee. I think we will be able to make our decision in respect of this particular incident in due course. We are however aware that we still have a host of other incidents to deal with, so we might as well not make our decision known at this stage, until we've concluded all the incidents which are set down for this week.
MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson, the Thibedi matter and the McKenzie car bomb incident.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Is it an appropriate time to take a lunch adjournment so that we can commence at half past one with the Thibedi matter.?
MS LOCKHAT: In order, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
