Amnesty Hearings

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: ... however, on the way to the hearing this morning, at about twenty to nine, I was phoned by somebody who told me that she was representing the victims and that she was feeling very ill and was on the way to the doctor. I understand that she spoke to the Leader of Evidence and asked that the matter be adjourned for a week. When she spoke to me she asked whether it could be adjourned. She was no longer asking for a week's adjournment. I told her that I would consider adjourning the matter till 12 o'clock and arrangements could be made, but I asked her to telephone me after she had been to her doctor, so one has some idea of what her condition was.

It is now ten past ten and I understand the Leader of Evidence has just phoned her office and was told that she had phoned to say she was still at the doctor and nothing further. The secretary also doesn't know how to contact, or the telephone numbers of the victims. They, I am told are not here today although they indicated they wished to. I can only believe that they must have been told by their legal advisor not to bother to come here, which is a most regrettable decision on her part. I discussed it with some of you and the opinion advanced was that if we did not sit for part of today at least, we would not finish during the course of this week, that there were a number of applicants. Do you all agree with that?

So my feeling is we cannot start later than 12 o'clock, that that will give the legal advisor ample time, if she took any steps to do so, to engage the services of some other lawyer to represent her clients. There are a number of you who have set aside the rest of the week for this hearing and it would certainly be, in my view, not in the interests of justice to adjourn the matter because one lawyer who is appearing, not for an applicant but for the victim, is unwell.

I propose accordingly to allow a little more time. I did say in the telephone conversation earlier that the most I was prepared to do was adjourn till 12 o'clock. She may have accepted that as some undertaking. I thought that she would have phoned by now, but if she does phone I will then enquire further as to whether she is coming or going to do anything and if she isn't, we'll just start earlier than twelve. Twelve will be the latest.

I know that this is inconvenient for all of you that have to hang around here for another hour and three-quarters, but I think that would be better than telling you, you can all go away and come back at twelve if she phones me in five minutes and says I'm not coming, I've briefed somebody else. Do you agree, gentlemen? Lady? So if you can just go and have tea or any other form of refreshment that you find available. If you don't hear from me further, we will start at 12 o'clock.

I apologise to the members of the public who are here today to hear this hearing, that they have had to sit here twiddling their thumbs, not knowing what was happening, but I think that you realise the problems we have, and you can also go and get some tea or something and we will start at the latest at 12 o'clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: ... arrived. The Leader of Evidence has had an opportunity of having some discussion with them but not of taking full instructions, but we have decided that we will start with the evidence now, that if she is not ready to cross-examine this afternoon her cross-examination can stand over till tomorrow and she can instructions then. Does that suit you?

MS PATEL: That suits me, thank you Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And I hope you will make it clear that we will not wait for anybody to arrive tomorrow.

MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, in their defence I might add that it wasn't their fault that they hadn't arrived, it's in fact their legal representative's fault that they hadn't arrived on time today, thank you.

MR HATTINGH: Shall I call Mr de Kock, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do that.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, if I might interrupt, the parties haven't placed themselves on record as yet.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the Committee remains unchanged. Could the representatives please put themselves on record.

MR HATTINGH: P A Hattingh on the instruction of Schalk Hugo from ...(indistinct) and de Kock.

MR BOOYENS: J A Booyens, Mr Chairman, on behalf of the applicant Tait and implicated parties Hoffman, which is mentioned at page 40, and Baker, which is mentioned at page 120.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Advocate Jansen on behalf of applicant Ras, on instructions of Mr Julian Knight Attorneys.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, Jan Wagener, I appear on behalf of General I J Engelbrecht.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, Roelof du Plessis of the Pretoria Bar, instructed by Strydom Britz Attorneys. I'm acting for Wouter Mentz.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, Lamey. I represent applicants Nortje, Willemse and Bosch and as far as it may be necessary also Klopper, who was implicated by Mentz. Thank you.

MS PATEL: Ramula Patel, Leader of Evidence. Victims present here today are Phosia Beg(?), eldest daughter of Mr Chand, Amid Desai, his brother-in-law, then also on behalf of the deceased guard whose name was Matekwena Phule, is his cousin Joe Mokwetsi. Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Try again.

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, you are the applicant or an applicant in this matter, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You have submitted a written application with regard to this incident.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Have you studied once more and do you confirm the correctness of the allegations contained therein?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Then briefly, just for the sake of background, which information about the Chands did you have before you decided to launch this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the information which I had was that the Chands acted as double-agents, particularly as agents for the Directorate of Covert Collections, a covert unit of Military Intelligence Services of the former South African Defence Force.

MR HATTINGH: While that was so, why did you as the police decide to become involved in this matter?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, our initial involvement originated when I was approached by the Head of the PAC Desk of DCC, to assist in the prevention of a group of PAC terrorists who would infiltrate from Rhamatlabana through the Western Transvaal, from there to Koster and Magaliesburg to the Western Rand, and C1 became involved on that basis.

MR HATTINGH: Who was the person who requested your assistance in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: It was Mr Tony Oosthuizen, he was the of the PAC Desk at DCC. There was a written contract of agreement between C1 and DCC, and upon that basis we became involved.

MR HATTINGH: And did you assist as he requested?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. After I had cleared it with Brigadier Schoon, who at that stage was the Commander of C1.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. What was the nature of the assistance which you gave?

MR DE KOCK: The request from Tony Oosthuizen was that the driver of the vehicle, which was a 4X4 bakkie, and four trained armed members of the PAC had to be shot out.

MR HATTINGH: Do you mean they had to be killed?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct. In my approach from Brigadier Schoon, surrounding our co-operation, he and I both agreed that these person should be arrested and not shot. However, I did not tell this to Tony Oosthuizen. The reason for that being that he may not make use of our services.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then take steps to arrest these four persons?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I co-opted members of the SAP's Task Force and a reasonably large component of C1, and not far from the police station in Magaliesburg we erected a proper roadblock and it was then possible to arrest all these persons.

MR HATTINGH: And what happened to them after they were arrested?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr Tony Oosthuizen's manager and source we released. The four PAC terrorists were handed over to the Krugersdorp Security Branch and a short while thereafter, I can't give you the precise date, it approximately a month, all four of them found themselves at Vlakplaas and they joined C1.

MR HATTINGH: So they became Askaris?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: When they were arrested did they have any weapons in their possession?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they a Sten-gun, a 9mm Sten-gun, which originated from the second world war but was still very operational and if I can recall further, they had three Scorpion machine pistols, furthermore they had handgrenades in their possession, the specific type of which I cannot recall.

MR HATTINGH: What was Mr Oosthuizen's understanding of what you had done in this relation, was he brought under some or other impression?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he wasn't very satisfied with the fact that these persons were still alive. This led to somewhat of friction between him and me, but it was left at that.

MR HATTINGH: And how does this incident ultimately bring us to the Chand family?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was informed by Mr Oosthuizen that the Chands or the Chand family was involved in the infiltration of PAC members from Botswana to the RSA, but that this was a controlled operation by DCC.

MR HATTINGH: What do you mean when you say "controlled operation"?

MR DE KOCK: That Mr Oosthuizen and his group which he had, could monitor this person. However, I was not informed regarding the strategic planning surrounding why they brought the PAC members in.

MR HATTINGH: Do I understand you correctly, that it was his policy to allow these so-called terrorists to enter the country but that he would then monitor them and by monitoring them he would be able to collect further information about their activities here in the Republic?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. He then told you that the Chands were assisting these persons in entering the country and that they were also giving assistance to persons who were so-called terrorists in exiting the country to Botswana.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did any of your men, the policemen under your command at Vlakplaas, launch any investigation into this relation?

MR DE KOCK: No, we simply provided that assistance, that which was expected of us by DCC. However, I just want to clarify that after the arrest of these four PAC members at Magaliesburg, we were once again co-opted by Tony Oosthuizen to assist in the Kokstad environment because there was a loss of control over a group of PAC terrorists. The size of this group is unknown to me. Not insofar as searching for these persons, but trying to locate the arms that they brought in.

One evening from a DCC facility in Kokstad, I sent some of my members into the Transkei to the Lesikisiki vicinity. They were dressed in some of the Transkei Military uniforms and they search a premises which was identified by Tony Oosthuizen. They searched the premises for weapons but they couldn't find anything. This premises had not been used for some time.

MR HATTINGH: What was your impression regarding the measure of control which Mr Oosthuizen exerted over his operation in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: My impression was that there was no control and that the nature of the control which he would have liked to maintain simply never manifested itself.

MR HATTINGH: Did this fact become known among the Security Police in Pretoria?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain about the Pretoria Security Branch, we simply dealt with Vlakplaas and in that regard I knew about the fact that there were infiltrations and that these infiltrations were giving problems as a result of weak or no control.

MR HATTINGH: Did any of your members launch an investigation into this matter?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, at a later stage, but I cannot give you a specific time period. Mr Oosthuizen once again requested our assistance with an infiltration which would come from the Potgietersrus or Pietersburg area and I sent Warrant Officer Ras, and once again no person arrived or there was no form of action or monitoring from our side because nobody arrived.

MR HATTINGH: Did your men at Vlakplaas investigate the activities of the Chands?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. After that last situation during which Ras had been sent, General Nick van Rensburg approached me while General Engelbrecht was with him, and requested that this transit facility be destroyed and in particular he mentioned the man and the woman, upon which I appointed Warrant Officer Ras to begin an investigation.

MR HATTINGH: The order which you received from General van Rensburg, was he then a General?

MR DE KOCK: No, I think he was a Brigadier at that stage.

MR HATTINGH: Can you give an approximate date upon which that order was given?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, unfortunately I cannot, however it was after he accepted control or took over control from Brigadier Schoon. It was during the Harms Commission in 1990. It was after February. If my memory serves me correctly, it was after the 2nd of February 1990 and after the unbanning of the ANC and the PAC and the signing of the Peace Accord. At that stage I was still on special leave, which was basically a covered suspension and I was involved in the Harms Commission and I was still awaiting evidence before the Commission.

MR HATTINGH: This investigation which Mr Ras undertook, did it produce any information?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. His task was to investigate the Chand residence or the facility and then destroy it, after the request from General van Rensburg.

MR HATTINGH: And did he report back to you in regard to this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he did report to me.

MR HATTINGH: May we just find out from you, you were there, this house, how far away from the nearest border point was this house?

MR DE KOCK: I would say between a kilometre and a kilometre and a half. My recollection of that is rather vague, but that would be my estimate.

MR HATTINGH: And the terrain between the house and the border point, what kind of terrain was it?

MR DE KOCK: The border area between the RSA and Botswana was reasonable bushy but once one had crossed the Botswana border in the direction of the city that was close to that, it was relatively open with low shrubbery, it was a semi-desert area.

MR HATTINGH: And the border there, what was the nature of the border in that area?

MR DE KOCK: It was a river. It was the official or international border as I have it. On the Botswana side however, there was a fence that we climbed over on that night.

MR HATTINGH: Was it a regular fence or ...?

MR DE KOCK: It was a regular cattle fence.

MR HATTINGH: Which information did you have when you ultimately decided to go over into action with regard to the Chand residence and its inhabitants?

MR DE KOCK: According to my recollection, the Chand family consisted of the husband and the wife, however I have no independent recollection that there were children involved, such as small children. And I don't have any independent recollection that there was a permanent night guard or a guard that would wonder around there during the day. This information may have been available, however I don't have any independent recollection thereof.

MR HATTINGH: And was there any talk of the possibility that during this particular incident during which you launched the attack, that terrorists may be in the residence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the possibility in my opinion would have been 99,5% that there may have been members of the PAC, either in infiltration or in ex-filtration. On that very same day I made enquiries after van Rensburg had given me the order.

I enquired from Mr Martin Naude, the Head of Section C2, which was responsible for interrogation and the analysis of information reports, and I heard that there was already a group of 76 heavily armed members of the PAC at that point and residents of the Chands, who were going to infiltrate into the RSA, that these persons were in the RSA and that control had been lost over that operation.

MR HATTINGH: Was there any urgency to the execution of the operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. The request was that it be finished off as quickly as possible. The reason for the being to avoid any further infiltrations and to prevent the infiltration of more weapons into the country. The nature of the urgency was as such that there was a restriction on our term of preparation and observation.

MR HATTINGH: Upon which weapons did you decide on your side?

MR DE KOCK: On our side I decided to take AK47 guns with, we also had handgrenades of communist or east-block origin. General van Rensburg's request however was that we use Scorpion machine pistols because they were standard weapons which were used by the PAC particularly, so that it would create the impression that it was probably or possibly members of the PAC who had performed these actions.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then take the Scorpion pistols with you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we did.

MR HATTINGH: The Scorpions were furnished with silencers. The ammunition which was used was either Chinese or Russian or Red Chinese and Russian. We had a supply of that as well.

MR HATTINGH: Why did you decide to take AKs along as well?

MR DE KOCK: One of the problems that we experienced was that the border post at Rhamatlabana was very close to this residence and the settlement and the Botswana Defence Force was an effective Defence Force and the type of Defence Force that one would have to reckon with in the event of us running into one of their border patrols or in the event that we be followed by them after the operation. Furthermore, there was the expectation that we would run into trained members of the PAC at this premises or in this residence.

MR HATTINGH: And that they would be armed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that they would be armed.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then depart from Vlakplaas in the direction of the area where you were to execute the operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And where were you based before you went to the border itself?

MR DE KOCK: There was a farm, and I cannot tell you precisely how far away it was from that section of the border, however it was an empty farm. There was a farmhouse which was no longer in use and we made use of that farmhouse and we operated from there.

MR HATTINGH: Did you send out any reconnaissance parties before and after you arrived there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, when we arrived there on that day, I can't recall whether it was during the morning or precisely what time, but during the afternoon before the attack, I once again sent out three persons and I can recall that specifically. Among others, it was Mr Ras, Mr Louw van Niekerk and somebody else. I sent them in the direction of the border once again, so that they could determine what the situation at the border was, whether or not there were border patrols and whether there was a fixed group of the Botswana Defence Force that was station there.

Furthermore, they were to determine if there had any other developments in the area or at the Chand residence, insofar as we could determine.

MR HATTINGH: And at this patrol report back to you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Did any significant information come to light?

MR DE KOCK: There was no change in the status of the target house and the target persons and the situation at the border itself.

MR HATTINGH: Did they monitor this house from the Republic side of the border, with the assistance of binoculars?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, inasfar as they could.

MR HATTINGH: And wasn't it possible to approach even further?

MR DE KOCK: The area was open and the daylight would have rendered it impossible. At night it was also rather limited and one's vision would also be limited.

MR HATTINGH: In your evidence last week regarding Vlakplaas, you stated that it was the policy to try not to involve the Askaris in such sensitive operations.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, we used them as little as possible, in an internal capacity.

MR HATTINGH: Were any of them involved in this operation?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: Were any black police members involved in this incident?

MR DE KOCK: No. We kept this action as small and limited as possible. We also had a problem in this regard, knowing that the Chands worked for DCC we couldn't make enquiries with the other intelligence services and we could not obtain any further details from their operatives or computers. It was handled with the utmost sensitivity.

MR HATTINGH: Was the idea that DCC was not to know about the fact that you were going to act against these persons?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, they were to have no knowledge whatsoever about this.

MR HATTINGH: When you testified about Vlakplaas you also mentioned that it was not Vlakplaas policy to act against children. You expressed that rather emphatically, saying that members of your unit would have been killed should they have acted against your orders with regard to children.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You said that you would sentence them.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have any information that there were children, and when I say children I mean small children, I'm not speaking of adult children as such. Were there any toddlers or small children in the house?

MR DE KOCK: There were no little ones, if I might put it that way.

MR HATTINGH: And if you had possessed such information, which measures would you have taken if any?

MR DE KOCK: If it had been necessary to attack the house, because this would have resulted in a change of approach, one would have to determine which changes one could make in the arrangements and then perhaps take two of the black members along to take the children out of the house and leave them at another premises. We have done this in the past. We could have taken another approach to the operation, for example by using a landmine which one could activate by means of remote control, planting this somewhere near the house or in a path which was frequently used. We would then have adopted a more comprehensive method in order to destroy a target.

MR HATTINGH: Would you have given specific instruction that the members ensure that no children be injured or killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And you state that you had acted in the past at premises where there were children, what did you do in such cases with the children who had been present?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in the case of an operation in Lesotho for example, the child-minder was left with the baby. And in the case in Swaziland, a man lay on one side of the room, a man with an AK47, he was my opposition and I was on the other side in the passage with a handgun and there was a little one running up and down in the passage. We left it at that, we didn't shoot and I left the house.

In another case we locked the child and the minder of the child in the bathroom. In fact this happened more than once.

CHAIRPERSON: Have we been told how old these children were?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, up until 10 days ago I was under the impression that these children were 11, 12 or 13 years old because that is the impression which I gained from a newspaper article after the incident, however I have been informed by my legal representatives that the children 17, 23 and 26. And I have only heard about this 10 days ago.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, Mr de Kock. After you had received feedback from the reconnaissance patrol you undertook your final planning and during the course of that night you went to the home of the Chands.

MR HATTINGH: Yes. The idea was to kill everybody in the house.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And then to destroy the house with explosives.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Please tell us in your own words what took place when you approached the house.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in single file we moved up in the direction of the front gate of this house, we moved in an east-westerly direction. There was a night guard or a guard who worked there, who was on the premises and he suddenly came out of an A-frame type house and addressed up. I did not understand his language, none of us understood or spoke his language. For a second time he spoke to us in a loud and harsh voice and I inferred that what he said was: "Who are you, what are you doing here?" The group stood still.

I was right at the back and I came through until I was in front of the guard and shot him in the head with the Scorpion. I fired three shots. I shot three or four times in the head at least and while I moved back in order to obtain a better silhouette, I fell down an embankment of approximately two metres and injured my knee and after that I was no longer part of the operation.

MR HATTINGH: After you fired the shots at the night guard, did he collapse, was he dead, did he speak, did he scream, what did he do?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know whether he collapsed then because I had already fallen, however I was later informed that one of my members jumped over the fence and then shot him with a Makarov pistol which was also fitted with a silencer.

MR HATTINGH: Did any of the members that were with you go ahead with the operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. Once I had fallen they were already moving ahead and they were already busy moving through the structures like the gate and the door.

MR HATTINGH: Did any of them remain with you to assist you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, a member by the name of Andreovitch and Mr Britz, or Warrant Officer Britz remained behind with me and began to help me away from the house at that stage.

MR HATTINGH: Could you hear that shots were being fired by the rest of the group within the house?

MR DE KOCK: No, I couldn't hear the shots because it was difficult to hear shots that were fired from a gun fitted with a silencer, however there were abnormal noises coming from the house. I can recall that the door, there was of something bashing against the door, but I cannot recall how many shots were fired and which guns were used.

MR HATTINGH: And all the while you were busy moving away from the house, with the assistance of the two person whose names you mentioned.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, my leg was seriously injured. They couldn't lift me because it would just be further injured. They just took me a short while away so that we could wait there for the rest of the group.

MR HATTINGH: Did the rest of the group then rejoin you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and from there we moved back to the Botswana border.

MR HATTINGH: Last week you have already given evidence about Vlakplaas and maintained that all attempts were made to ensure that no operations could be traced back to you. Were any such precautions taken in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. By nature of the use of the weapons was one of the main factors and then secondly that it would be very difficult or at least impossible to say that it was the PAC that attacked but there are eight whites involved in such a situation.

MR HATTINGH: Where did you go from there?

MR DE KOCK: From there me and the entire group moved in the direction of Richards Bay. The alibi would be that we had worked in the Midlands in Natal. At the same time that my unit and I were moving to Western Transvaal, I sent two other people down to Richards Bay to make reservations at the hotel there in my name and also to stay there and when we arrived there they would withdraw and whoever made enquiries would find me there.

MR HATTINGH: And in this manner you would attempt to create the impression that you were busy with an operation in Natal when this incident in Botswana had taken place?

MR DE KOCK: That is entirely correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any medical treatment for your injured leg while you were in Natal?

MR DE KOCK: I remained like that for a day and upon the second day I managed to get hold of a physician, he was a specialist. I told him that I had seriously injured my leg. He asked me where and I told him that I had fallen on a stone.

MR HATTINGH: There in Natal?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, in Zululand itself. And he left it at that, he was simply there to treat my injury.

MR HATTINGH: And when you returned to Pretoria, were you then admitted to hospital?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I returned a day or two before the other members. I first went to General van Rensburg and informed him completely surrounding the operation and the injury to my knee, and from his office I went straight to hospital for a knee operation.

MR HATTINGH: When did you determine that children had allegedly been killed during the incident?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't have a fixed date but I heard about this in the press. I didn't know about children, or in this case as I thought little ones, however I heard about this in the press.

MR HATTINGH: Did you discuss this matter with the members who had been involved in the operation?

MR DE KOCK: All the members were shocked or unhappy about the situation. At that stage the unit could not say that they had ever injured children particularly and for me it was the only blemish on our operational existence, while it was under my command.

MR HATTINGH: How did you feel about that?

MR DE KOCK: With regard to the fact that they were children or little ones, I was haunted until 10 days ago. There was no way in which I could get over it and keep it away from the unit or not associate the unit with it. However, I am not relieved that people were killed in this regard.

CHAIRPERSON: Did everybody believe that young children had been killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And yet they all got a bonus for the operation, is that not so?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, there was no amount of money that was connected to this operation. No amount of money was paid out for this operation itself.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you sure?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You see we have affidavits from a number of other people who were there, Mr Ras tells us about a "prestasie bonus" of R5 000, a few months later.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that would have been an accumulation of actions where exceptional remuneration was provided for exceptional circumstance, but that would not have been specifically for this operation. That may have been their perception, however that was not the actual case.

CHAIRPERSON: Well it's clearly his, he says

"It is a further indication to me that as a result of the R5 000 which I received, the entire operation was approved by General Nick van Rensburg."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct. I must once again say that that must have been their perception because those funds, as I have already testified last Monday, could be obtained by means of false claims and could only take place if a senior person, in this case the General then, had approved it.

CHAIRPERSON: And I think other people also. Mr Bosch ...(intervention)

MS PATEL: It's page 67 of the bundle, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ... talks about a bonus "in kontant". Was that wrong?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I won't say that they did not receive an amount of money, but it will be incorrect if they say that that was for this specific operation. I believe that it was their perception. But there wasn't payment made per operation or for a specific operation. That would then have led to difficult situation.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just come in on this point, just to clarify. I represent Mr Bosch. Page 63 to 69 is a general initial form that was completed and the bonus there does not refer to this particular incident. And I've just obtained instructions that he didn't receive any bonus regarding this specific incident. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, carry on.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, let's just put this whole situation in perspective. Last week Monday you testified that from time to time cash amounts were paid to members for exceptional services rendered.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you now also confirm that this money was obtained by false claims.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You also testified that these payments were not linked to a specific operation, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: As far as I can now refer to the affidavits of the people applying for amnesty for these incidents. As far as I can remember they all say - I think ...

...(intervention)

... If I understand your evidence correctly, there wasn't for example there were actions or a few actions and then they received remuneration for all those actions combined?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. One could perhaps compare it sometimes with the giving of a decoration or a medal.

MR HATTINGH: Do I understand you then correctly that this incident would then also for example, be considered for exceptional service but it would be for example for this instance plus others as well?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is how would see it.

MR HATTINGH: As far as I can remember I think one of the applicants do not make mention of the fact that he received remuneration. Is it the case that when there was a payment made, that everyone who was for example involved in this operation, that they would receive money or perhaps the member did not receive anything because he was not involved in enough actions or operations?

MR DE KOCK: In other words, that there wasn't accumulation of such operations, yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Because Mentz also says at page 163

"Some time after the operation, Willie Nortje came to me and he gave me an envelope in which there was R5 000 R6 000. He said that is for the operation and I saw that as an additional separate payment that is an addition to my salary. There was nothing irregular in that regard."

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that would have been how he would have perceived it, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So he would have been correct, that it would have been inter alia for this operation, but not only for this operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, not only for this one.

MR HATTINGH: Last week you also testified that these remunerations were paid on an ad hoc basis and there wasn't an expectation created by the people that they would be paid for each and every operation that they were involved with.

MR DE KOCK: No, there was never an expectation.

MR HATTINGH: Were the members involved in operations where they never received any remuneration?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, many.

MR HATTINGH: You yourself, did you receive any remuneration for this incident?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: When money was paid to these persons as they indicate in their applications, did you also make an amount available for yourself?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You have already said that General Nick van Rensburg, who in the presence of General Engelbrecht, gave you the order to execute this operation, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is.

MR HATTINGH: And was he very specific what the operation had to entail?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that the Chands and that the facility had to be destroyed and that is why we also took explosives along. There were no instructions that the Chands had to be chased away or warned or that they had to be brought back to the RSA, or that they only had to be scared. It was a very specific instruction that the Chands and this transit facility had to be destroyed.

MR HATTINGH: And what was the intention, what was the objective?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was to stop the infiltration and expatriation of members of the PAC and the weapons, to stop that and to put and end to that.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Well shall we follow the procedure we have been and work down the line?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairperson, Booyens on record.

Mr de Kock, just in addition to what you have said regarding the ages of the children. In my possession I have a report which was on the 26th of April, it appeared in Die Beeld, where it was said that:

"Sam Chand, his wife Hajira and their three sons, Riedwaan 26, Armien 23 and Imran 17."

Those were the ages according to the report in the newspaper. But this is information you only recently obtained. When you referred to children you thought of children 6, 7, 8, 10 years old, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: An aspect that you have not touched upon and perhaps we should just quickly deal with it. My client, Mr Tait, tells me that as far as he can remember, he does not say that he remembers the detail, that you informed him regarding the motivation for the operation and that it was a PAC transit house where people went through and that the instruction was given that the house had to be destroyed and the people of the house had to be killed.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And I also asked him specifically and he then says that he can't remember that the DCC connection had been explained, but that was not something was not necessary, to explain that to the lower ranks?

MR DE KOCK: No, the nature of the sensitivity, I would not have explained that to Mr Tait. It is very sensitive to, especially in the case of a friendly country, to destroy the sources there.

MR BOOYENS: And then another aspect, Mr de Kock. There was reference made to the remuneration. My client is one of the people who said that he didn't receive any remuneration and he will also testify at a later stage that he receive an amount of money in his bank account but it was months later as far as he can remember and he didn't relate specifically to this operation. I just want some clarity, you said that the payment would be linked to this operation and other operations, would that imply not only the killing of people but other operations, for example where they had been away, where they for example then also traced freedom fighters and insurgents?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: So in other words, as he understand it, it is correct, it doesn't necessarily link head money, to use that word. That would be for example for people who had been away from home for a long time under difficult circumstances and for whom extra money had then been given for work that they had done?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct Chairperson, it wasn't head money, or more blatantly, it wasn't blood money.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Chairperson. Cornelius for Britz and Vermeulen.

Colonel, there was a cover-group sent to Richards Bay and the operation was executed in Botswana, can you remember who was part of that cover-up?

MR DE KOCK: I can remember Mr Bosch. I don't know who accompanied him, I can't remember and I don't want to include anyone by just mentioning a name.

MR CORNELIUS: Now N J Vermeulen will testify by saying that he had instructions and he was part of this cover-group who accompanied Martiens Ras.

MR DE KOCK: I would accord with that.

MR CORNELIUS: Who accompanied Bosch to Richards Bay, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would concede that.

MR CORNELIUS: The idea was that when you arrive in Richards Bay, they would withdraw and that would then be your cover.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: The applicant, Willemse, Douw Willemse testifies and he says that Snor Vermeulen was part of the group who went to Botswana, so obviously that is not correct.

MR DE KOCK: No, he was not in Botswana.

MR CORNELIUS: Can you perhaps remember whether Vermeulen helped you with the procedure before you left South Africa?

MR DE KOCK: I can't remember specifically but I would have made that request to him. Most of us weren't all experts with explosives, but if I had to ask someone I would have asked Vermeulen or Snyman and I think in this instance it was Vermeulen.

MR CORNELIUS: He says in his application, he helped with packing the equipment before he you left.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I concede that.

MR CORNELIUS: And you can remember that the other applicant, Britz, also assisted you after you injured your knee to cross the river to get out of Botswana, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I can remember that.

MR CORNELIUS: Now from the moment you injured your knee he didn't actively help with the operation but helped you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but a question that you have to now protect people to get them out.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Jansen on record, on behalf of Ras.

Mr de Kock, only a few points. Firstly, the PAC members that were arrested in a roadblock, which then leads to this whole incident, they then eventually joined at Vlakplaas as Askaris, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Mr Ras cannot remember all their names, but he knows that the one was known as "Vietnam".

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that would have been his pseudonym.

MR JANSEN: Yes, his pseudonym. Do you have any ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can you repeat that?

MR JANSEN: Vietnam was his code name or his pseudonym.

Do you have any recollection of any of the other names?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, unfortunately we destroyed the documentation with regard to these people. I will be able to identify them if I see them, but I can't remember their names.

MR JANSEN: Mr Ras also says that when he received instruction from you to obtain information for the preparation of this operation, that his most important source was the Askaris themselves.

MR DE KOCK: I would accept that, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Were you also aware of the fact that they were, that they knew the Chand home and the activities there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. By means of the Chand house they actually infiltrated two the Republic and we then also arrested them on the same day.

MR JANSEN: Mr Ras also says that when he was sent by you just before the operation, to make the final observations that the intention was to get the latest information with regard to the house, but also to ensure that on the RSA's side there weren't any roadblocks by the South African Defence Force. Would that be correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. The observation of that nature is regarding everything on your side as well as the other side that you would need to move without being monitored by other Forces.

MR JANSEN: So that would then have been part of such final operational observations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, just bear with me for a moment. And then for completion's sake, it is also so that Mr Ras informed the group from Vlakplaas regarding the operational information on the farm.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Mr Ras says, and he doesn't specifically recall what he said there, but as far as he can remember he knew that there were two sons of Mr Chand in the house and he accepts that he would have mentioned that.

MR DE KOCK: I would accept that, Chairperson, but I cannot individually recollect that but that doesn't mean it wasn't said.

MR JANSEN: Now his information at that stage was that there were two sons, two adults, and that they were also involved with the infiltration of the PAC members as guides, so he would not have described them as children.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further question.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, Jan Wagener. My colleagues on my right-hand side, on behalf of certain co-applicants, have indicated they will cross-question first and thereafter I will get an opportunity.

CHAIRPERSON: Right.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, let's just stand still for a moment regarding the allegations concerning the children. As you know I am acting for Wouter Mentz, and he testified that afterwards he found out about the death of two children. Do you know if two children were killed or three children?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I only heard 10 days ago that there was a third person. Up to that point I had not known of a third child or son, I only knew of the two because that was the indication that I got from the press.

MR DU PLESSIS: So you were also under the impression that two had been killed? We're referring to children, we know what their ages are but this is just for clarity.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the ages, you say that you only heard about it 10 days ago.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the real ages.

MR DU PLESSIS: Where did you obtain that from?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I obtained that from my legal advisors.

MR DU PLESSIS: You don't know where that information comes from?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I'm not quite sure. I don't know whether that was an additional statement, I'm not quite sure.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the information that you obtained was that all three were dead?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: In this specific attack?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. In other words the impression that Captain Mentz was under that two children had been killed and that they had been children, would then tally with the impression that you had had up till 10 days ago, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you have any idea where that impression came from?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the impression that I had formed, came from the press. I don't know whether their ages had been given, I can't remember that, but I know that they referred to children and also to the fact that these two children were deaf-mute.

MR DU PLESSIS: You refer to press reports you read afterwards, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Let's get back to the information that was gathered before you went on this operation. If I understand you correctly, you say that you cannot remember that mention was made of children beforehand, but you don't contest it if Mr Ras says that during the information session it was mentioned, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, not at all, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: And could I ask you the following, if we then accept that Mr Ras is correct regarding his recollection of what you had been informed about, who would have had knowledge of this before the operation? Who would have knowledge before the operation that it was Mr and Mrs Chand and two or three children in the house? Would it have been everyone or only some, who would it have been?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would firstly say that the best information that could have been gathered would have been the former PAC members. The information, when such a group got together and the information had been discussed, everyone would have been included and others would also have had the opportunity to make an input.

And I would then say in all likelihood that the point would have been raised regarding who would be in the house or how many people would be there because that is one of the biggest problems, to observe four people at a house and then when the house is attacked there is now 14 people and you have 14 guns aimed at you. In all likelihood I would have told my people that we must accept that whoever is in the house with the Chands, are members of the PAC terrorist movement in ex-filtration or in infiltration.

MR DU PLESSIS: In other words, if I understand you correctly, everyone who would have been part of the operation would have been aware of what you had been aware of and what Mr Ras had been aware of, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson, and it would also have been emphasised that we had to do with a transit facility for armed terrorists.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do I understand you correctly with the information that we all now have afterwards, that the emphasis would have been that the people in the house, that includes the children, that they had been involved in the liberation movement and that they would have been considered to be terrorists?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot say this and I can't really remember it, that the children had been involved by the liberation movement. What I can accept or assume is that they would have seen such operations or ... but that is speculation from my side.

MR DU PLESSIS: What I'm trying to determine is, to what extent Captain Mentz could have been aware of this, and when he testified that he could not perhaps remember it. Could I just refer you to Captain Mentz' testimony, page 75 of the record of his evidence. Mr Chairman, I don't know if you have that record available. I'm not referring to this bundle, I'm referring to the record of his evidence. If you do not have it, then I will make it available to the Evidence Leader and perhaps we can present you with copies thereof. I thought that that would have been made available.

MS PATEL: With respect, Honourable Chairperson, parties were requested at the pre-hearing conference to inform me what sections of which previous hearings they were going to refer to, and I would have made those specific pages available to you had I been informed, but in any event I will make it available to you later.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman, clearly I didn't know if I was going to use this at all. In previous hearings ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: So you can't say you would have expected it to be available if you didn't tell anybody you were going to use it.

MR DU PLESSIS: But Mr Chairman, in my experience with these kind of hearings, where evidence was given in the Cronje matters, that evidence was made available every time, Mr Chairman. And obviously it's evidence which was given before this Committee, it's clearly relevant in these hearings and I'm quite surprised that I should have mentioned that that evidence should be relevant or not clearly it is relevant, with respect Mr Chairman. But I'm going to refer to that and then I will - my I just have an indication if there is an, do I have to present you with the evidence, Mr Chairman, or am I not going to refer you to that at all?

CHAIRPERSON: Just ask him about it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. What I'm trying to enquire from you, Mr Chairman, if you are interested at all in that evidence and if I should make copies available.

CHAIRPERSON: If you are just going to read a few sentences from that evidence, I don't think we want copies.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is what I intend doing, Mr Chairman. Alright.

Mr de Kock, his evidence was that they expected to get terrorists at the house and nothing other than terrorists.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we would have expected the Chand family there and then in particular the man and the woman. And this is how I saw it, and in the approach to such an operation was that the rest of the people would be members of the PAC or members of another liberation movement in ex or infiltration.

MR DU PLESSIS: Okay right, perhaps the man and woman could have been considered to be terrorists.

MR DE KOCK: Well they were the targets right from the beginning.

MR DU PLESSIS: What I want to get at is that his evidence was that no-one besides Lieutenant Ras, whom he refers to, knew exactly who was in the house. He testified that it was Ras' information and the Security Branch Zeerust' information as to who were in the house, or would have been in the house.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would not only have been Mr Ras. It was such an operation, it was a team operation, a team effort, it was not only one person who had the information, it would have been discussed in a group.

What I want to concede however, is that not only one person's perception or not all persons' perception would have been the same before or after such an operation, it is brutal and all the people involved then also have different perceptions and they also experience in different ways.

MR DU PLESSIS: Let me put it to you in this way, would you agree with the following statement, and that is that it would not be strange that Wouter Mentz can't remember anything regarding the fact that children had been involved or that it had been discussed, mentioned, only because of the fact that you also can't remember it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, children were never an issue ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: No, you don't understand me correctly. Information that had been given to you concerning this family and the children who would have been present at the house, you now testified that you can't remember whether the information had been given to you, before the operation. Do you agree that if you can't remember it, that it is also not strange that Wouter Mentz can't remember it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the picture that I'm trying to give is that there was no mention made of children such as little ones, and I refer to 8, 12 year old children. In other words, there was no reference made of children at any stage. If reference had been made to people, in other words we had seen nine people, then it would have been nine adults.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is in fact what I asked you and that is what I wanted to obtain from you.

Mr de Kock, what role did Mentz play in this operation? It was a small role in the operation, not so?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, his role is just as important as anyone else's. I can't say that it's not important. It could be that you attack the house but there are six people sitting under a tree 50 metres from where you are, and that is where Wouter Mentz was, so the risk is just as great as it is for the leader of the operation.

MR DU PLESSIS: Let me ask you this, what was his rank at that stage? It was Warrant Officer, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: It was Warrant Officer, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And was he one of the lower ranks of the people involved in the operation?

MR DE KOCK: I think I was the only person there with an officers rank.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr de Kock, his evidence was that he and Andreovitch were members of the so-called backup team who had to walk behind in the beginning of the operation and after that, with the return, they had to walk at the back as well to make sure that no-one was following you, can you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: No, just after we had crossed the border, I was just behind Ras I think, and after that when we arrived on the Botswana side I stepped out and counted the persons as they came past to ensure that the numbers were correct, and I was the one who walked behind. Mr Ras was in control of the operation and during a previous operation before this one, he was also in control and we were preparing him for operational activities so that he would be able to take my place.

MR DU PLESSIS: In other words, if Captain Mentz' evidence was that he was a member of the backup team and that he walked behind to ensure that nobody was following them and when you returned after the operation, he gave evidence that he was once again a member of the backup team, with reference to this you say that he is not correct?

MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't say that he is incorrect, I would think that that is his perception of the matter.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you recall what his precise instruction was with regard to this operation, what was he supposed to do?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was a member of the attack group. I suspect that, and I have a vague recollection of this, that his duties involved external security. He wouldn't be a member of the penetration group that went into the house but he would be responsible for external security. In other words, during the house penetration his group would be responsible for the external security to ensure that the internal group not be surprised.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well then in that relation his evidence correlates with yours. Let's just return to the fact of the backup team. You say that you walked behind at the beginning, before you arrived at the house, at the beginning of the operation so to speak.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I walked at the back.

MR DU PLESSIS: And can you recall who was there at the back with you, isn't it possible that it was Mentz?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with such an operation there would only be one person walking behind, and that was me.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did all the other members walk next to each other?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they walked in single file, one after the other.

MR DU PLESSIS: Who was in front of you?

MR DE KOCK: The person directly in front was Mr Ras, or the person in front of the group was Mr Ras and the person in front of me was Mr Britz or Mr Andreovitch.

MR DU PLESSIS: And in front of him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can't remember but ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: Is it possible that it could have been Mentz?

MR DE KOCK: I would concede that, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Just to get to the next point, and that being the matter of the money. Mr Mentz's evidence was that Willie Nortje gave him an envelope containing

R6 000 and that Nortje had told him that it was for that specific operation. You say that that may have been the impression that some of those persons had, and probably among them, Mentz as well?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, probably.

MR DU PLESSIS: But you say today that it wasn't for that specific operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, they were not paid per operation or for an operation.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. So you are saying the impression that Mr Mentz had was incorrect?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that may have been the way that he saw it, or there could be an element of confusion.

MR DU PLESSIS: With regard to this particular operation, can you recall whether or not an explosion took place when you departed?

MR DE KOCK: Not when we walked away, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: When did the explosion occur?

MR DE KOCK: After we had already arrived at the vehicles and we were busy changing our clothes and storing the weapons there was a heavy explosion on the Botswana side of the border.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Mr de Kock, let us just return to the briefing session. Can you recall what other information with regard to the house you had before you commenced with this operation, the people living in the house, who was there, who would have been there upon that evening, can you recall anything in that regard?

MR DE KOCK: I can recall that the Chand family was there, that they would have been there. The attack was launched late at night or in the early morning hours, approximately between 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock in the morning, and that would exclude the possibility of guests or probable guests or visitors. It would eliminate the possibility of people coming home late or being in transit from one point to another, it would be a low point at border posts because the guards who were working there would probably be sleeping and wouldn't suspect anything, it would also ensure that the Chands will be at home and we reckoned that those people that we would find there would probably be armed members of the PAC.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you recall whether any reconnaissance steps were taken on the other side of the border, in other words the day before the time or the morning before the operation took place, with regard to the house and its inhabitants?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I recall that Mr Ras did undertake observation before the operation was launched. I know and I can recall that in the house where we stayed and from where we launched the operation, a sketch was drawn, a rough sketch upon which there were indications of where the border would be, where the settlement would be, where the hospital was, where the border post was. And then upon approach, without the inclusion of other houses in this sketch, we indicated the Chand residence.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I understand that. And you also say that the house was observed by means of binoculars, is that right?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: What I'm trying to determine is whether or not anybody was sent on the morning or the day before the time, whether anybody was sent over the border to the house at night. You said that it was very difficult to do so during the day.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it's correct, we wouldn't have been able to send anybody over because if they had run into a Botswana border patrol or police patrol, we would have one man missing in action, who I would have to go and fetch.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you recall whether there was permanent observation by means of binoculars on the house the day before the time or on the very day of the operation?

MR DE KOCK: On the day of the operation I sent Ras and the others. They were gone for quite some time, and they reported back that they had undertaken observation, that they had determined the status surrounding the house of the Chands, and that it was the same as the status that we had determined upon previous observations, that no changes had taken place. They would report that ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: They would report that there were people who had arrived suddenly, anything in that line?

MR DE KOCK: They reported that there was nothing that we could observe which would indicate any development that was different to what the situation had been before.

MR DU PLESSIS: The reason why I'm asking you this question is because I want to determine whether it was in any way possible for you, the day before the time or on that very day, to take any further steps in order to obtain further detail or information regarding who would have been in that particular house on that evening.

MR DE KOCK: No, it would have been too risky to send people in to get closer to the house or the people. I was about identification and it was about a strange face which would appear in a small community and I couldn't get closer in that regard.

MR DU PLESSIS: The reason why I'm asking you this question is because the Committee that has heard Captain Mentz' application posed this question to him numerous times and Captain Mentz responded inasfar as his recollection could take him, but you were the commander in this matter and that is why I am asking you. Wasn't it possible to send someone at night, perhaps on the previous evening, to attempt to determine who would be in the house? Why was it not possible?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I could have sent somebody in. On the contrary, I myself could have taken a walk to go and see what was going on at this house. I would have found a house that was locked up and it wouldn't have been possible for me to shine a torchlight through the windows. I wouldn't have seen anything more than that which we have seen on the evening that we arrived there.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Ras when he undertook observation on previous occasions, and I think that this will come to light with the Committee, had always performed his work thoroughly.

In other cases we had a time period of approximately two months within which we could undertake all our observations, however with this particular case we had a very short time to complete our observations because it was a very urgent case and this also restricted us somewhat.

I couldn't necessarily send my Askaris in because if I was going to send an Askari member in, he would have to be a PAC member and he would be identified by the PAC. The Botswana border patrol or police patrol residing in that community would have arrested this foreign person.

If we had been noticed by any other person, such as a night guard or a person moving about late at night, it may have served as a warning the following day for the Chands or somebody else, that there was something irregular going on in their environment. And those are the reasons.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then just one final question with regard to this aspect and that is, are you satisfied that with regard to this type of operation, you could not have done anything else in order to determine who would have been in that house on that night?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am satisfied that we did what we could without losing any of my members of jeopardising any of my members in any way. Operations of such nature were very sensitive. One could try to take precautions for any possible situation, but one of the nightmares with regard to this sort of work was that while one is in transit from the border that you have just crossed to the target that you want to reach, there could be various impromptu obstacles and you would have to take decisions on ground level, and ultimately those decisions had to managed on ground level. If one went through with an operation, one had to complete it and then you would have to bear the burden that went along with that operation, after you had completed it.

MR DU PLESSIS: If I can just return to the issue of the children. The information which is known today about the children, do you know as you sit here today, whether they were in any way involved in the PAC?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I cannot confirm that, however I would accept, should there be other evidence regarding that, that the possibility would be very strong. It is impossible for somebody of 23 or 26 years of age or even younger, to not see that there would be armed persons staying overnight or that there would be other border traffic which was different to the usual border patrol, which would be in the vicinity of the South Africa/Botswana border. That in itself was a problem for the South African Security Forces.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you know that some of the children were deaf?

MR DE KOCK: That I read in the papers. We would not have known that at that stage, not me or any of the other members of the team.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then just for the purposes of the following few questions after which I will be complete, let us just accept that these children stayed in the house with their parents because they were deaf, we don't know whether all of them were deaf, but let's just accept that they were not at all involved in the bringing in of terrorists, let us just accept that they are assuming the position of innocent civilians. From a military perspective, can you tell us what your opinion was as the Commander in this specific operation and as the Commander of Vlakplaas, with regard to the death of innocent civilians in operations? How did you approach it, which steps did you take to prevent it, what was your approach to this matter?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, during such an operation and during the collection of information and when the opportunity for observation of whichever nature presented itself, one would attempt to avoid any kind of civilian crossfire situation, one would take any preventative measure. And that is why one would find that there would be operations during the evening, because it would be more quiet than in the morning when people were on their way to work.

In every area and every situation there was a different approach. Unfortunately it was so that we had the script, but that the opposition didn't have the script and that the people living in that area didn't have the script either. And there was no operation which would run as you had planned it, as a result of external factors beyond one's control.

Situations were never constant, one had to be flexible and that is why when one was on ground level, one needed persons who could take a decision within a ...(indistinct) second.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do I understand you correctly, that if you had possessed the information that these were children living with their parents in the house, who were deaf and not involved in the liberation movements, you would have approached this operation from a completely different perspective?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes we would have used a completely different approach. We would have attempted to formulate another approach at least.

MR DU PLESSIS: Am I correct in saying that insofar as we accept, according to this line of examination, that there are three innocent persons who were killed in this operation, would it be correct of me to say this, and I know it sounds harsh, but is it correct for me to say that the death of these three persons should be regarded as something which necessarily had to happen from time to time within the situation of conflict that reigned in our country at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, one of the problems was that persons by means of association would be in the wrong place at the wrong time and as a result of that may have been killed. For example, the army bombs a jam factory near Maputo, they say that it's a military facility but there are only civilians there. I don't mean to be sarcastic, I'm just trying to create an impression. A farmer may be a target living near the border and step on a landmine, but on that particular day there were two families who visited him on the farm and they were blown up with him.

This type of situation was part of the dirty business and everything would always go according to plan, according to how you had planned it. That was an unfortunate reality.

MR DU PLESSIS: Am I correct when I say that your approach at that time would have been that the death of such persons, if it had occurred and you had taken all the steps that you could, could be justified in the name of the cause and the struggle that you fought at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know whether the death of any person could be justified unless that person had attacked you, and then I'm speaking of you as a person who is a direct physical opponent, but in the spirit of those times with regard to organisations which were battling each other and had zero tolerance for one another and wanted to do things by means of weapons and not on diplomatic terms, I would not say that it is justifiable but that it was foreseeable.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, if you will just bear with me for a moment.

CHAIRPERSON: While you're doing that can I clarify one point. You told us earlier on in your evidence that it would have been very difficult to use Askaris there because the border patrol, if they had seen them, would have arrested them.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that possibility existed.

CHAIRPERSON: Would the border patrol also have arrested PAC infiltrators if they had seen them in the area?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, if they had had weapons, definitely and they would then probably have taken them into custody and detained them, but if they didn't have weapons they would have been detained as the usual immigrants and would have been deported, but not so South Africa, to Harare or one of the other countries.

CHAIRPERSON: So does that mean that the Chand family would try to conceal the fact that they had these people staying in their house.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, definitely.

CHAIRPERSON: So they wouldn't have been visible. If you were watching the house you wouldn't have seen, in the ordinary course of events, if there were PAC people sheltering in the house or not?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because just in the same way that my people were strangers these people were also strangers and they had no business at that place, there were no places of business, there were no employment opportunities for them.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, I am almost finished, I would just like to take one aspect a bit further.

CHAIRPERSON: You said that some time ago, Mr du Plessis.

MR DU PLESSIS: I know, Mr Chairman, but you will know that this issue is a very tense issue, not just necessarily in this hearing but in other hearings too.

Mr de Kock, let us return to Vlakplaas' perspective regarding the issue of innocent people. Am I correct when I say that the approach was, as it would be in any situation of war in any other place in the world, that sometimes there would be the situation where for the sake of the cause for which you were fighting, innocent people were caught in the crossfire, who were actually sacrificed for the cause? Isn't that the approach that Vlakplaas held?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, one couldn't simply sacrifice innocent people for the cause. That would have happened where by nature of the situation and the action and the circumstances beyond one's control, there would someone who would become involved and then be shot. As I have said association, the person being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

However, I maintained a policy and I repeatedly indicated this to my people, that my members, Security Force members would enjoy preference and that I would not allow any of my men to be shot for any reason. Vlakplaas came first, the enemy came second, and in such a case it could occur that people would be injured or killed.

I want to emphasise today that in contradiction to other units, it wasn't necessary for my members to be drunk when they went out on an operation or killed anybody. I had a 48 hour period during which it was compulsory that no alcohol be used and if I found anybody who smelt of alcohol during the last 24 hours, they would be suspended.

What I did allow as prescribed medication which I could not deprive a man of if it had been prescribed by a physician. My members had to take decisions on ground level and for that purpose they had to be in full possession of all their faculties.

CHAIRPERSON: Well what we heard last week, Mr de Kock, was clearly that your members did not abide by these rules of yours. At least two of them told us how they had drunk all night, how drunk they were.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr de Kock, I don't know whether you wish to comment on that.

CHAIRPERSON: That was away from Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: I think that that case at Komatiepoort must be seen in the light of the fact that people had completed their work for the day and that they had withdrawn and that they didn't think that there would be anything further to do and had begun to relax for that evening - that is my opinion, and that something took place and that they had to become involved. However, I wasn't there and I can't really comment on the matter, I'm simply speculating.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Mr de Kock, can I just ask you one question with regard to this subject. You say that that was your approach, however you couldn't always be present every day when people were operating, so it is possible that some of them may have used alcohol while you weren't present?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is correct, but when we went across the border I was very strict about it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Let us return to innocent persons. I know I'm asking you very difficult questions, I just want to put a hypothesis to you. If you had information for example, that Mr Oliver Tambo was going to be transported in a vehicle through Swaziland with three other persons about who you had definite information and knew that they had nothing to do with the ANC, and you had the opportunity to plant a landmine in order to blow up that vehicle, what would your approach have been?

You see this question connects with the question of whether in your approach, your subjective approach, there would ever have been the approach that; if we could eliminate this person, it would justify eliminating innocent people along with him. Can you answer that question?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, usually one's target would allow one, and it is unfortunate that one would have to dehumanise the target, but the target would in general determine one's approach to him and how one would take such a person into detention. There were no prescribed rules that stated; if there are three persons or three members of the public present we should take them out with out with him, one had to try and prepare for as many scenarios as possible.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then can I summarise your response for you. Within a determined situation you would reach a point where you would have to say that it was justifiable, was that your approach? Within a specific set of facts and a specific situation, you would reach the point where you would have to say that the end is justified by the means and for that reason you would be able to kill innocent people.

MR DE KOCK: I cannot say that. Let me rather put it like this; if Mr Oliver Tambo was following the same road every day for two years and his bodyguard was with him, I would plant the landmine. But now we would have the situation where on the morning after I had planted the landmine, Oliver Tambo, his bodyguard and three other members would take that route and it would be too late for me to prevent what was going to happen, then I would have to take responsibility for that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Sorry to return to this again, Mr de Kock, but would you have ever reached the point where you would have said that it was justifiable that an innocent person be killed as a result of this objective? Would you have said that every time an innocent person was killed as a result of being involved in this?

MR DE KOCK: I couldn't go and kill six civilians just because I had one target, that is something that we really tried to avoid. If I think back, we didn't necessarily kill civilians in order to achieve an objective, our primary goal was to achieve our objective and to avoid the incidents of death amongst civilians.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I will leave it here. Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I want to take it a little bit further. But surely Mr de Kock, from the evidence we have heard and from our knowledge of war, you would at times attack targets because they are legitimate targets, knowing that it is possible that there might be people there, other people?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because one would have to foresee this because it was a possibility.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Are we going backwards?

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman, may I proceed?

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going before Mr Wagener? Right, carry on.

MR LAMEY: Unless Mr Wagener wants to continue.

CHAIRPERSON: He looks perfectly happy.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, just to follow up on what was last mentioned, the sort of target one would have expected it to be an indication of the probability or non-probability of the presence of innocent civilians.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, a person foresees that, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: For example in the case of a transit house -tell me where I am incorrect because I'm going to make certain assumptions, a transit house by definition, was a place usually near the border of a neighbouring country, which served as a point where insurgents and terrorists could converge, usually before they infiltrated the RSA, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, a transit house doesn't only indicate a house in or near the border, it could have been in any place, it was simply a question of how these people moved. It wasn't necessarily adjacent to a border or near a border.

MR LAMEY: But in many cases during the past it was also a place situated near the Botswana border, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was a case of a transit house being near a border.

MR LAMEY: Would that be the case of the Rhamatlabana matter?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: It's not really about its proximity to the border, it is more about its status as a safe place for terrorists who were moving across the border in order to infiltrate the RSA, and that this place served as a place of shelter or a point where they could receive final instructions, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, in that case one could define it as a starting point.

MR LAMEY: And the inhabitants of such a house would then usually know what they were doing when they were assisting these insurgents or terrorists, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: This was also in general with regard to this particular operation, the information which existed with regard to the Chand family and that is what you expected and that is why it was a target, the house which was then made available?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And you expected that upon that particular time for which the attack had been planned, there would also be PAC members in the house, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And the precautions which you took by obtaining heavy artillery, the AK47s, the Scorpion pistols with the silencers, the handgrenades and so forth, were also aimed at arming yourself against that type of contingency?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, if one was involved in such an attach and one experienced resistance, one would never turn and run, one would attempt to confront that resistance and continue with your objective.

MR LAMEY: My inference from what you have said is that it appears to me that the image of young children and their presence there in that house, never emerged with anyone of you.

MR DE KOCK: Well it wouldn't have because no mention was made of young children and there was no information regarding young children.

MR LAMEY: It is possible, as you have already stated, that Martinus Ras may have spoken of the involvement of children with regard to assistance, but in general it was not important in the scenario that you created because it was not about innocent young children who were present.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it would have been about children in the adult sense.

MR LAMEY: It would appear to me that we have a situation here of different recollections among the various applicants with regard to details about this matter. For example, Mr Willemse recalls that there was mention of children who were used as guides in assistance to infiltration. Mr Nortje on the other hand, has no recollection of that. And Mr Nortje's recollection is also not specific with regard to the woman as such, but in the same breath he does not dispute the other evidence, it is simply that his recollection was that Chand was the informer for the DCC and that this transit house was used as a transit facility for the infiltration of terrorists and that you had to provide for the contingency of PAC terrorists being in that house and that this was a potentially dangerous operation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would concede that.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, can you recall who was the Head of Security at that stage, that would be above General van Rensburg or the then Brigadier van Rensburg?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can't recall but I think it was General Basie Smit at that stage, because the recollection that I have was that he one day complained about inheriting all the problems of the Security Branch, and that would include the problems running all the way from the Eastern Cape through to Vlakplaas.

MR LAMEY: I know that this was not your evidence, but could there have been the inference in your mind that Basie Smit may have known of the operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, I had no such information and it would be incorrect of me to involved him in a matter with regard to which he had no information.

MR LAMEY: No, I'm not referring to direct information, but because it was approved by Brigadier van Rensburg on an overall command level, could you in your mind have drawn the inference that Smit may have known about it, because it was such a sensitive operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. Just for clarification's sake, after the attack no enquiries were ever made as to whether Vlakplaas knew about the operation, no enquiries were directed at me and I never again heard anything about this attack.

I know that Western Transvaal Security Branch was very sensitive regarding their structures in the Western Transvaal and it was noticeable to me that there was no sort of witch hunt as a result of this operation.

MR LAMEY: I beg you pardon, I don't really understand what you're saying, are you saying that the inference is that he may have known about it because there was no enquiry?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the possibility that Western Transvaal may have known that it was us.

MR LAMEY: I'm just mentioning this because Mr Nortje's recollection is that you mentioned General Smit to him at a certain stage and that this implicated that he may have known about it.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, and I don't wish to place the client in any disadvantage, however I cannot concede to that because I don't even have a vague recollection of that.

MR LAMEY: Very well, that's not important. It may have been his perception yes, but this brings me back to the subordinates, those persons under your command. With regard to such a cross-border operation and due to the sensitive nature thereof, is it correct to say that in their minds there might have at least been the inference or the belief that this operation went further than you, on a level of command?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, in many respects, because in the first place one would not only foresee the possibility of one's target or opposition being killed or taken prisoner, one would also foresee one's own death or the death of one's members. There would also be the situation of funding, vehicles, weapons that had to be prepared, one would be away from home for some time, and this was not a caper of one's own.

MR LAMEY: With regard to this specific operation everything that took place there on the scene of the incident, for example in the beginning, a dog that begins to bark, a guard emerging, a guard that screams after you have shot him, you falling off an embankment, as an experienced militarist, might I say, in your experience and in the experience of the other members who were involved in this operation, is it so that such factors complicated an operation in terms of the possible creation of an alarm, especially when it was imperative that this operation be carried out as quickly as possible, along with the fact that it was dark, all those factors would complicate an operation and place enormous pressure on those people involved to finish it off as quickly as possible.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct. And the fact that we were less than a kilometre away from a border would have enhanced that pressure.

MR LAMEY: Thus one also had the situation that the particular circumstances did not create a good clinical opportunity in the heat of the moment to evaluate everything thoroughly.

MR DE KOCK: Could you please repeat that?

MR LAMEY: During the execution of the operation, and by that I mean after these complications had arisen with regard to the dog barking, the possibility of an alarm, the darkness, when the operatives penetrated the house, those would not be circumstances which were conducive to a clinical evaluation? One would expect that the people inside the house would be involved, that there would be PAC terrorists in that house who were armed, there were already previous complications, so there wasn't really enough time for a steadily clinical action?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, all these complicating factors would contribute to an increased level of tension and aggression and a higher instinct for survival among your members.

MR LAMEY: Is it also correct that none of those who were in the house at any stage identified that there were young children in the house and then reported it as such?

CHAIRPERSON: Were there any young children in the house?

MR LAMEY: No, Mr Chairman, that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well why put it to him: "Did any of them identify that there were young children in the house?" We know there weren't any young children in the house, as I understand it.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, I would be able to testify according to that because at that stage I had been removed from the operation and the only indication that we had was from newspaper reports where reference was made to children.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

I would just like to return to another aspect and that is with regard to the evidence of Mr Mentz regarding the remuneration.

Mr Chairman, I'm referring also to the record of the evidence which I'm also in possession of. I will just quote from the relevant portions. If you would just bear with me. It is on page 86, round about the line 20, where Mr Mentz states the following:

"That is correct, Mr Chair, Willie Nortje for example. We never stood in a long queue to receive our envelopes, we were called to the side one by one. I for example had to go to Nortje's office. He closed the door and then he gave the envelope to me, but I know that other people also received money."

Mr de Kock, my instructions from Mr Nortje are firstly, that he didn't have an office at Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Mr Nortje is entirely correct, he did not have an office at Vlakplaas.

MR LAMEY: Then Mentz also says on page 84, also approximately line 20 to 30

"Quite a while after the operation, I will say approximately three or four weeks afterwards, Willie Nortje came to me and handed me an envelope. All the other people who were involved also received such an envelope. If I can remember correctly there was R6 000 in that envelope. He said that it was for that operation and that the main branch congratulated us on it."

My instructions from Mr Nortje are firstly, that he has no recollection that he gave money to Mentz at a certain stage, however he would definitely not have been a mouthpiece on behalf of the main branch of the Security Head Office, as it appears in this document, he was also a subordinate officer. And Wouter Mentz - it was not his duty to congratulate Wouter Mentz with the operation and if anybody were to have done it, it would have been you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I have no recollection whatsoever be it independent or other, that I gave Nortje money to give to Mentz. If it had been given to persons it would have been me who gave them the money.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, from within the perspective of your subordinate members you have given evidence during previous hearings that with operations of a sensitive nature, with regard to the teams and the individuals involved, every person involved would be very carefully selected for their participation in an operation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And I'm inferring that this would have been the same situation with regard to this operation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Is it also correct that members serving below you could entrench their confidence or trust in other persons that were used by you, such as Mr Ras with regard to the collection of information which was done before the time and that which was conveyed, for example that the house was a transit house serving PAC members and so forth. In other words, the man on ground level could, due to the selection process of persons involved in operations, with reasonable confidence rely on that which you had conveyed and that which other persons like Ras had conveyed.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because our lives at risk.

MR LAMEY: Lastly Mr de Kock, the name of Lieutenant Klopper is mentioned by Mr Mentz, he was not involved in this operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, not at all.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would just like to add, and this has been cleared with my legal representatives, that for this operation I accept full responsibility for myself and for all members serving below me. However, I accept no responsibility on behalf of General Engelbrecht or General van Rensburg and their orders. But with regard to me and every member serving below me and their actions on the scene, which they performed as part of their duties, I accept full responsibility.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, during your trial you testified under oath in mitigation and you were also taken under cross-examination by Advocate Ackerman. Can you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Can you also remember that he referred you to a whole lot of court cases and commissions of inquiry where you had testified under oath earlier?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And you referred you to these incidents and you conceded every time that at those commissions of inquiry and cases you had lied under oath.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: In fact he referred you to certain commentary by presiding officers, including Judge Harms, who at the end of the proceedings were impressed by the way in which you had testified, do you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. May I perhaps just qualify? We were well prepared, Chairperson, we referred schooling. The General would be a devil's advocate and then we would answer the questions and that would then be part of your evidence.

MR WAGENER: It was put to you, Mr de Kock, that you are a well accomplished liar and manipulator of evidence in courts and commissions of inquiry. Can you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I can Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Did you admit to that?

MR DE KOCK: I think so, Chairperson, I can't recollect that.

MR WAGENER: I put it to you that you did admit it.

MR DE KOCK: Well I would accept it then, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Now this long discussion between you and Advocate Ackerman let to a statement by him, on page 13128 of your trial, where he puts it to you, Mr de Kock

"I want to say to you that I read your evidence in the different court cases from 1985 or '87, and I have to say to you that you improve with each court case."

And your answer to that was:

"I think that a person grades after each court case."

Can you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, especially when you have the help of all police institutions and also then from the Attorney-General's office.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I want to put it to you that also now at this hearing you gave impressive evidence, but also at this hearing you have impressed the Presiding Officer and Members of the Committee by the way in which you testify, but that in this process you are still not telling the whole truth. Do you want to comment on that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. In the one case, and I refer to the Motherwell bomb, where people such as General Nick van Rensburg, where the court case was in process, where they had an interdict in the High Court where his name may not be mentioned and then he comes to the Truth Commission and says that he had lied. So here I sit with the masters of lying, who taught us how to do it.

And I am not here at the Commission to lie and I'll tell you why. I need amnesty just as everyone who sits here needs oxygen and in the same way that each of the member under me also need amnesty. And these Generals would have been here to declare their innocence if they were innocent, but they are not here.

MR WAGENER: Mr - excuse me, have you finished?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, for the moment.

MR WAGENER: I interrupted you, did you want to say something?

MR DE KOCK: No, never mind, perhaps you will refresh my memory.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, during 1990 you were the commander of Vlakplaas. I think at that stage it was C1 or C10, the name changed at some stage, I don't know whether it was in 1990, is it correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: Just for clarity, was it C1 or C10?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was ordinarily known as C1, but what had happened, it had something to do with the change to computerising and the computer could not cope the 1. I never really enquired because it wasn't really important.

MR WAGENER: Who was your commander?

MR DE KOCK: It was Brigadier Schoon, still during the Harms Commission, but during the Harms Commission, if I'm not incorrect, he then went off and then it was Brigadier Nick van Rensburg who took over.

MR WAGENER: I think, Mr de Kock, you're making an error, Schoon retired in '91.

MR DE KOCK: No, I won't disagree, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And the Harms Commission was in 1990.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but the Harms Commission and the Vryeweekblad had already in 1989, I think it was in September 1989, the first exposures came of Dirk Coetzee and Nofomela and Brigadier Schoon and myself sat that morning and we discussed the whole issue.

MR WAGENER: So who was your commander in 1990?

MR DE KOCK: In 1990, as far as I know, it was General van Rensburg.

MR WAGENER: And who was his commander?

MR DE KOCK: I think that was General Smit, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And who was General Smit's commander?

MR DE KOCK: That would have been the Commissioner of Police, Chairperson. And I think that was General Johan van der Merwe, but I speak under correction, I'm not quite sure.

MR WAGENER: So Mr de Kock, the names that you have mentioned now, does that represent your chain-of-command?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: If I can use an example, the Commanding Officer of the Special Task Force, was he your commander?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Could he give you any operational instructions?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. I could co-opt some of their services though.

MR WAGENER: Was the Head of the Detective Branch your Head?

MR DE KOCK: He would have been my commander if he had a higher rank and if perhaps we had been on a crime scene. The only time when I could tell a General or a Minister to leave a scene is where I had to defuse a bomb, but that could also be done by a Constable and a Sergeant who were explosive experts, then he had absolute control over the scene.

MR WAGENER: I understand what you're saying. I just want to get clarity on the chain of command and it is against that background that I asked you. Could the Head of Detective Services give you operational instructions?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, he would not have told me to do something specifically, but I could have been able to do it if he had made such a request to the Head of Security.

MR WAGENER: That's correct. So he could have given you an instruction via your direct operational command chain? - if I understand you correctly.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, the last few years I have heard at various amnesty hearings, I don't know whether I can refer to it as a rule, that is the need-to-know principle and I'll refer to it as a principle, which has been applied strictly within the Security Branch. Do you agree?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, and if one wants to qualify, that was one of my greatest problems. Because of that I don't have enough witnesses who can support me with regard to who gave the instruction. Here and there, there were certain leaks and I could lean on that testimony.

MR WAGENER: What would you say, Mr de Kock, what does this need-to-know principle imply in reality for the Forces of the past?

MR DE KOCK: Well it has to do with the compartmentalisation of the different services, so that there aren't any unnecessary leakages or then that would lead to jeopardising the members and their lives.

MR WAGENER: Would it then for example mean that sensitive information with which you had to do in the Security Branch, on a political level, that it was only conveyed to the minimum of people?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is how would have accepted it, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Would the need-to-know principle also be applied where you, for example in the Security Branch and we now know, I saw your amnesty application, where you committed various crimes in the Security Branch, would the facts regarding such crimes be limited in terms of the need-to-know principle?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, between me and the General, but I don't know who the General gave the information to. I did not have access to that information. That was also a part of the need-to-know principle.

MR WAGENER: Would that then also not mean that you would, for example not tell other people in other branches what you were busy doing?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it could have happened that you on a very limited scale would then give information to someone else. For example, Mr Pretorius of Soweto Intelligence Service, he might perhaps have a source in a neighbouring country, he just wanted to know whether they are safe. That would be part of the information, but it would be on a one-to-one basis. So if there would be leakage you would know where it came from.

MR WAGENER: But we also know that this Mr Pretorius to whom you are referring was also a member of the Security Branch.

MR DE KOCK: I just used this name as an example, but there were people by the name of Pretorius in the Security Branch, yes.

MR WAGENER: Did the application of the need-to-know principle mean in practice that other branches of the police, that they weren't aware of the detail of what you were busy with in the Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I also just want to put the following point for clarity. With the explosion of Khotso House the next morning there was the fax report from Special Forces Headquarters in Pretoria, which only stated congratulations and referred to the Khotso House bomb. Now I didn't tell them and I don't know who told them. So somewhere up there, there would have been cross-pollination.

MR WAGENER: So in that regard, perhaps not even up there but down there, could have broken the need-to-know principle.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, to use the same example, I don't think someone like Mr Nortje would have gone to General Liebenberg at Special Forces and told him that they had been involved with Khotso House, it would just not have happened.

MR WAGENER: But in my example, Mr de Kock, it is not suggested that he would have talked to General Liebenberg, but someone, perhaps he would have said something to someone on his level.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not easily. Mr Nortje, although he knew members of Special Forces, he would not have dealt with them on that basis. This whole situation now is quite hypothetical.

MR WAGENER: Now referring to Special Forces, Mr de Kock, and I'm still busy with 1990 and that particular time, what was the operational relationship between you unit, Vlakplaas and Special Forces?

MR DE KOCK: It was very good, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And if we refer to Special Forces, I accept that DCC was not part of Special Forces.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not in an operational way, but as part of intelligence.

MR WAGENER: Now as part of Intelligence of the Defence Force, what was your relationship with DCC?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the exchange of information because we had the Askaris and DCC used them for determining targets. DCC had a good ability with regard to foreign issues, with air photos, determining of important operational people, not only for killing but also for recruiting. We also assisted them with regard to the destruction of caches. It was a very good covert working relationship.

MR WAGENER: You refer in your testimony, Mr de Kock, to a written agreement, an Agreement of Co-operation between Vlakplaas and DCC.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: Did you ever see this agreement?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not only see it, I was present when this agreement was signed.

...(end of tape, no English interpretation - transcriber's typed in Afrikaans)

In die geval van Brigadier Schoon was Kolonel At Nel, die tweede in bevel van DKE, was daar en met Brigadier Schoon se pensioenering was daardie samewerkingsooreenkoms herhaal en was dit geteken deur Generaal Nick van Rensburg en dan Kolonel At Nel.

MR WAGENER: Now this co-operation in this agreement, did it deal with information or the execution of operations or both?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it dealt with all facets of the gathering of intelligence. Where we could assist we would have done it and where they could assist, they would do it.

MR WAGENER: It also gave permission that it did not necessarily have to be cleared out between the different Generals or the Commander of the DCC or the Commander of Vlakplaas, but it was left to me as the Operational Commander.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, my instruction is that this agreement had to do with the exchange of information.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I cleared it with General Nick van Rensburg. I know of three caches in Swaziland, where it had to be destroyed by means of explosives. I prepared it here, took it through and then destroyed the cashes. It also led to the fact that DCC used us in the case of Lesikisiki, where we had to look for it. So it was not only a question of information.

MR WAGENER: So Mr de Kock, do you say that DCC could give instructions to you?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. It was a question of co-operation and that is cleared then with Brigadier Nick van Rensburg.

MR WAGENER: Could DCC direct requests to you and then you clear it with your commander and if he gives the instruction, then you could proceed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they could make requests, but we did however have a measure of, we didn't have carte blanche but we were given some space, some leeway, we could use our own discretion.

MR WAGENER: I'm not quite sure if I understand you correctly. Who gave you a free hand?

MR DE KOCK: No, I never said carte blanche, I referred to leeway.

MR WAGENER: Who gave that leeway to you, to do what?

MR DE KOCK: That was one of the clauses in the Agreement of Co-operation, that there could be contact between the lower ranks, between DCC and Vlakplaas. In other words, between Colonel At Nel and myself or ...(indistinct) Oosthuizen and myself.

MR WAGENER: Now before you proceed with the execution of the operation, did you have to clear that with your own commander?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, if it was of a serious nature, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, in your capacity as police office at Vlakplaas, did you ever commit crimes on your own initiative?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, there are cases where I'm applying for amnesty where I say that I acted on my own initiative within the framework of my perceptions.

MR WAGENER: In other words, without an instruction from above you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: I received your amnesty application last week from your legal representatives and I counted 29 to 30 incidents where you are applying for amnesty for acts committed out of your initiative. Would you agree?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, I did not count them. I was also not removed from the unit, I was in fact promoted.

MR WAGENER: I also saw that there are six incidents where you out of your own initiative committed crimes on request of certain individuals from DCC. Do you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't count the incidents, but if you can read it I can confirm it.

MR WAGENER: Those are cases where you allege that people such as Mr Anton Nieuwoudt or Mr Henry van der Westhuizen of DCC, would have requested you to do something and then you react on the request and you do it.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. But it is also possible that I could have cleared some of those cases. One will have to look at them.

MR WAGENER: Well I put it to you I counted six incidents where you didn't clear it but that you acted out of own initiative, where you assisted DCC.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have already explained what the agreement was and based on the nature of our services it was expected of you to also act on your own initiative.

MR WAGENER: Now in this case it seems to me, if I understand you correctly, that DCC had a problem here or Mr Oosthuizen of DCC had a problem and he asked you for assistance.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't whether he had a problem then. The initial co-operation that existed was the arrest of these people that he wanted killed. I discussed it with Brigadier Schoon, and the problem that there was, was not only for me but for the country as a whole, but it would also then have been a problem for the police.

MR WAGENER: Why didn't you want DCC to know that you were executing this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was their source. It almost resulted in war when you only tried to recruit someone else's source. And then on high level there would have been great problems, and here we go along and we destroy a source.

MR WAGENER: You also said last week that for purposes of cross-border operations, Botswana was assigned to ... what precisely did you mean?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was at a conference where the commanders of Eastern Transvaal, that was Schalk Visser, where he complained that members of the Defence Force were operating in his area, that was Swaziland, and there were also complaints that some of the police were active in Botswana and more specifically the Intelligence Group of Soweto and the Security Police of Zeerust complained that they didn't have knowledge of the people of Soweto working in Botswana. Now this meeting was held at Rustenburg, there was a holiday resort there and guidelines were then given that the police would take responsibility for Swaziland, the Defence Force for Lesotho and Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and also further on.

MR WAGENER: Did that then mean that in the countries that you have mentioned now, including Botswana, that you were not allowed to operate there?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that would not mean that you were prohibited from operating there, but in this instance you would have to clear it that you wanted to operated there, or for example if you then had direct instruction to go there you could.

MR WAGENER: Do I understand you correctly, and we confine ourselves now to Botswana, you say that Botswana was the responsibility of the Defence Force, not the police?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson, but it wasn't as rigid that a policeman could not put his feet there.

MR WAGENER: Could you just explain once again, to operation there, that is Botswana, it had to be cleared, where did it have to be cleared, with the Defence Force?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I wanted to execute an operation there I had to clear it with my commanding officer and then I had to clear it with Western Transvaal and that would be the commander, let's say Brigadier Loots, because they then contacted the Special Forces component, the CCB. And the reason was that we did not want to jeopardise an operation, an existing operation because ours could have perhaps have been tactical, so I'm destroying a facility of infiltration and perhaps they had a more broader strategic objective, which would perhaps have been part of a four/five year project. So that kind of clearance one had to do in those areas.

MR WAGENER: Now this operation, Mr de Kock, it seems to me was directly opposed to the interests of the South African Defence Force.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes it would. The nature of our work then went against the constitution of the country and the regulations.

MR WAGENER: I just want to make sure that you understood me correctly. Botswana as I understand it was the interest of the Defence Force, as opposed to Swaziland, which was the interest of the police?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Now against that backdrop I put it to you that it seems to me that this operation to enter Botswana and to destroy a source of the Defence Force, was opposed to the interests of the Defence Force.

MR DE KOCK: No, I would not say that, Chairperson, it was opposed to the interests of DCC, and I also want to qualify this. Someone like Tony Oosthuizen, who was the desk officer of ... he could never give the authority for the funds, the vehicles and the manpower and in a case like this which would have been very sensitive and highly secretive, he would have cleared that with the Head of the Defence Force.

MR WAGENER: Now this Oosthuizen that you're referring to, what was his rank in 1990?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they didn't have military ranks. I think it was Staff Officer 1st or 2nd Class or Senior Officer.

MR WAGENER: Was he your junior?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson. He was younger than me, but I don't know whether he was a junior in rank. Where people are appointed as liaison officers, seniority would not necessarily have been a problem there.

MR WAGENER: Perhaps just to clear any uncertainty, on page 10 of your application you say paragraph 11(b) of the prescribed amnesty application form, where the particulars are asked with regard to the instruction approval and so forth, on which the operation was executed, you mention three names, Brigadier van Rensburg, Brigadier Engelbrecht and Brigadier Oosthuizen. Is the Oosthuizen that you refer to here, is that Mr Tony Oosthuizen of DCC?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I think this, I won't say it's a millennium problem but I think is not correctly stated here.

MR WAGENER: So it is not Brigadier Alfred Oosthuizen of the South African Police?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he would appear in another application.

MR WAGENER: So we can then delete Oosthuizen here?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Can we briefly look at General Engelbrecht. When did you meet him for the first time?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, during the Harms Commission, not very long after, or at least not during the Harms Commission, but during the investigation because first it was General Alwyn Conradie and then Mr McNally, after that it was General Joubert and then very briefly, General Engelbrecht, who was appointed to the investigation of the allegations made by Nofomela and Coetzee.

MR WAGENER: Is it correct that General Engelbrecht was a detective?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR WAGENER: In fact up and including 1990, for a period of approximately 25 to 30 years he had been a detective?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know the time period for which he was a detective.

MR WAGENER: But he was not a member of the Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Which position did General Engelbrecht occupy at the end of 1989, when the first revelations were made by Nofomela and Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain, I know that he was the Commander of the Murder and Robbery units in the country. That was the definition of his position as I had it.

MR WAGENER: That's correct, he was connected to the Investigations Branch of Head Office as the Nationwide Head of the Murder and Robbery Units. You're perfectly correct. His instructions are that he up to and including October 1989, throughout his entire career had very little to do with the Security Branch.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't know.

MR WAGENER: He says furthermore that up to and including October 1989, he basically wasn't even aware of the existence of Vlakplaas and what took place there.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot understand how that could be true, because after the explosion at Khotso House, I'm not certain of the date, it was definitely before 1989, General Engelbrecht arrived at Vlakplaas with a Warrant Officer, I can't recall the surname of that person, it was I think Warrant Officer Mostert, and he wanted to know from me who bombed Khotso House and who all the members were that had been involved in that. I reported to him that I didn't know, that I didn't know those persons.

I went to contact Brigadier Schoon, I telephoned him from Vlakplaas and told him that there was a strange Colonel here looking for those who had blown up Khotso House, and he told me that I could talk to General Engelbrecht. I think at that stage he was a Colonel. The discussion that followed was brief. He asked me for a list of names of those people who had been involved and I refused to furnish him with such a list, saying that I had hired soldiers for this task.

Later he brought two identikit photos or drawings to Vlakplaas and said that these two persons had been involved in the arson at Khanya House, and I once again denied that my members had been involved in that. The entire situation was that he knew precisely what was going on, otherwise Brigadier Schoon would not have referred him to Vlakplaas and he wouldn't have come to Vlakplaas in the first place.

MR WAGENER: He will deny these statements that you have made, that he would have known about the exact scope and facts of these incidents that you have just referred to and that he was simply maintaining contact with you in the usual course of his detective work.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, he would drive to Vlakplaas, a place that he didn't know and ask who had planted the bombs and request a list of names of those people who had planted the bombs, from me. However, I will not belabour this point any further, I expect of him to deny it and I have respect for that.

MR WAGENER: With the appointment of the Harms Commission, that would be after the investigation led by McNally and General Conradie, if I recall correctly that would also have been approximately February 1990, do you know what General Engelbrecht's role was?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he was the officially appointed person who covered up the entire Harms Commission situation, a position which I certainly didn't envy.

MR WAGENER: Who appointed him with these tasks?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know. I was on the receiving end of this business, I don't know who appointed him.

MR WAGENER: And upon what do you base this statement that you have just made?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by nature of the affidavits which were taken and retaken, registers which disappeared. In certain cases he himself withdrew the travel and accommodation claims surrounding the Maponya situation. He made sure that everything would fit together perfectly. There was a myriad of such situations.

MR WAGENER: So your statement that he was the officially appointed person to cover up the situation, is that a sensationalistic inference that you are drawing?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he could not be unofficially appointed, he couldn't just walk into the Security Branch and say: "I'll investigate the Harms Commission for you", it had to have been on a much higher level than Brigadier Engelbrecht and Brigadier van Rensburg.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, do you deny that the investigative offices of the Harms Commission were General van der Westhuizen and previously Brigadier Wright and not General Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't have any interview with Brigadier Wright and I didn't have any discussion or interview with Brigadier van der Westhuizen either. At a certain stage I liaised with General Joubert, but this didn't last for very long. I also understand that he is deceased today. And I saw General Conradie, not even for half an hour. After that it was only General Engelbrecht.

MR WAGENER: Who did what?

MR DE KOCK: Who helped to cover up the story and take affidavits and push fingers into the holes in the dyke.

MR WAGENER: Did you have a legal team?

MR DE KOCK: No, we first spent some time at Head Office and then we went to the legal team.

MR WAGENER: What was Colonel Herman du Plessis' role?

MR DE KOCK: I would say that he was the assistant person who covered up the matter. He was transferred from the Eastern Cape to Head Office. I think that that was also about aspects that we heard about, aspects which had taken place in the past.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, this attack in Botswana, which your application is about, do you know the date of that attack?

MR DE KOCK: I don't have an exact date, but I do know that it was in 1990. In one of these affidavits you will find the date. I haven't seen of these affidavits myself.

MR WAGENER: Advocate Booyens has shown us a report this morning, which appeared in Die Beeld newspaper of 26 April 1990, could I accept that the attack - unless Mr Booyens wishes to correct me, that the attack took place a few days before that date?

MR DE KOCK: I can tell you that it took place in April and that it was in 1990, but I can't give you the exact date upon which it took place.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, maybe I can ask Mr Booyens to show me the article, whether there's a date. I'm not sure whether anyone here can help me with this specific date.

MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, if I may. My instructions are that it's the 21st of April 1990.

MR WAGENER: You gave evidence Mr de Kock, that there was an urgency attached to this operation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Urgency in the sense that you have given evidence that when van Rensburg gave the order he told you to hurry up, that there wasn't a lot of time. - urgent in that sense.

MR DE KOCK: No, he didn't say that there wasn't enough time and that he wanted it finished off the next day, it was simply that is was a situation of clear and present danger, that we have a problem here.

MR WAGENER: After you received the order, did you then prepare on a basis or urgency for the operation and did you also then on that basis prepare to go ahead with the operation?

MR DE KOCK: Well I wouldn't say that it was a 24 hour preparation and deployment. Among others, I requested Ras to collect information and I myself was also busy with my own preparations to give evidence before the Harms Commission. I had been suspended in-between and in the middle of all that chaos we still prepared for this operation.

MR WAGENER: Is it possible to give us a time frame regarding the period of time that elapsed between the order and the execution of the order?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Is it a week, is it a month, is it a day? Can you help us?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, unfortunately I cannot help, although I would like to.

MR WAGENER: Not even in terms of estimation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: The information which according to you came from van Rensburg, with regard to the Chand family, where would he have obtained this information?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know, but this would lead to speculation. He may have obtained this from a higher authority or from the head of the Western Transvaal Security Police. I don't know. We will have to ask van Rensburg himself to tell us at some or other time.

MR WAGENER: Was it not your evidence that this information came from Mr Ras?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I appointed him to collect information and then to use that information to brief us for the operation later, but van Rensburg did not give this information to me, and Ras did not give this information to van Rensburg.

MR WAGENER: This information which you received, about this house in Botswana, did you obtain this from Mr Oosthuizen from DCC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. And let me put it like this, with the information surrounding the infiltration of the four PAC terrorists and the source, he told me that Chands had been his sources and that there would be total control over this infiltration up to and including the Kopfontein Road or Zeerust. Some of my members would have waited. They would then have followed them to the turnoff at Koster and then from Koster through to the Magaliesburg.

MR WAGENER: If I had it correctly, Mr van Rensburg was sitting in an office here in Pretoria?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, they were always sitting in the offices when we were in danger.

MR WAGENER: He didn't act directly with informers?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson. I know that very sensitive informers, especially from other States, or persons who occupied sensitive positions were managed by senior Generals.

MR WAGENER: Isn't it the probability that Mr van Rensburg may have obtained this information by means of the structures of your unit?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. The only thing I know is that Mr Ras was upset after he had assisted Mr Oosthuizen in the Pietersburg area and that that which Mr Oosthuizen had given him did not realise. Especially with regard to the post-Lesikisiki situation, there was an element of dishonesty, we had the feeling that Mr Oosthuizen was trying to disguise something and this did not go from us on ground level to Mr van Rensburg.

MR WAGENER: When you received the order from Mr van Rensburg, did he request you to come to his office from Vlakplaas, or how did it occur that you ended up in his office?

MR DE KOCK: I have no clear recollection thereof. I may have been there, he may have called me in, I could have been in the vicinity. Every morning, apart from the fact that some of us had been expelled or were on special leave, we reported every morning at Head Office.

MR WAGENER: Can we then accept that this incident, this event when you received the order, took place - I don't know if we can accept this, perhaps we can, but this took place during April 1990, or is April incorrect?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot provide you with a day or a time. As much as I would like to do so for the sake of correctness and accuracy, I cannot do so.

MR WAGENER: In any event it was before the 21st of April 1990, we can accept that.

MR DE KOCK: I think that the examiner can accept that, I cannot accept that because I cannot tell you.

MR WAGENER: Is it your evidence that you arrived in Mr van Rensburg's office, van Rensburg was there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And can you recall whether the discussion was only about this operation, or were any other matters discussed?

MR DE KOCK: No, it also had to do with Mr Brian Ncqgulunga, who had already given evidence before the Harms Commission, who had become a risk for the Security Police, as a result of the fact that he had put out feelers to the African National Congress.

MR WAGENER: And was this the same event upon which you received an order to kill Brain Ncqgulunga?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And that will still be the subject forum of a later amnesty hearing during this current session?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: At that stage, was General Engelbrecht a Brigadier?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, according to my recollection.

MR WAGENER: And he was a detective?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And he had never been connected to the Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, never.

MR WAGENER: And you have told us about how the chain of command ran.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And you have also informed us about the need-to-know principle and how important that was within the security structure.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And at that stage did you - or at that stage you didn't really know General Engelbrecht very well.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I had already met him at Head Office. We had already been involved in the Harmse Commission. I had met him before at Vlakplaas. He was quite an impressive figure, someone that one wouldn't easily forget.

MR WAGENER: So despite all these aspects that I have just mentioned, you maintain that van Rensburg went ahead and gave you an order, two orders in fact, one to conduct a covert cross-border operation in Botswana, during which people were to be killed, and secondly, to kill one of your own people, Brian Ncqgulunga, and this all in the presence of General Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: In fact you continue in your amnesty application and state that General Engelbrecht wanted to go along with you on this Botswana operation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he asked to accompany us, he wanted to see how these things worked.

MR WAGENER: He was a Brigadier in the Investigative Branch, he was the National Commander of the Murder and Robbery Units, he was a Brigadier at that stage, and he wanted to accompany a number of Vlakplaas operatives to execute an unlawful operation over the borders of the country?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that was my evidence. I told him that this sort of work wasn't an African safari, that there were many problems surrounding such actions, especially if those participating in it hadn't been trained specifically for night movements. However, I just want to add this for further clarifications, we arrived back in Pretoria and reported to General van Rensburg and I told him that the operation had been finished off. I went to hospital. I saw General Engelbrecht approximately 10 to 14 after this and he said to me: "Why didn't you wait until I had returned?". I had no answer for that, I didn't answer him.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, can you recall that during your evidence during the criminal trial, you testified about the "glittering" or "illustrious" career which Engelbrecht had until that stage, in approximately 1990, but how he was gruesomely abused by the Security Branch afterwards?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: What did you mean by that?

MR DE KOCK: That if Engelbrecht had not been deployed to the Security Branch and become involved in the Harms Commission, he would probably still be in the Force today and would probably have been able to make a phenomenal contribution with regard to training and combating crime.

MR WAGENER: When was he sent to the Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it's very difficult to estimate, I think it was in 1989, and I'm saying that I think it was in 1989, because I don't have any fixed dates.

MR WAGENER: What do you mean by "deploy"?

MR DE KOCK: Well with regard to his involvement in the Harms Commission, he was permanently visiting the Security Offices. Every morning he would report to General van Rensburg's office and he was there during the day as well.

On the contrary, to such an extent that when General van Rensburg wasn't there we would report to him or make enquiries from him. And after General van Rensburg left, he became the commander of Section C1. I don't know if he was then transferred to the Security Branch or if he was simply deployed.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, perhaps I should just take this step by step. General Engelbrecht took over from Brigadier van Rensburg, officially on the 1st of January 1991, as the Head of Section C1, do you agree, or can you dispute this?

MR DE KOCK: I am relieved that you have supported me in that regard.

MR WAGENER: Well with the exception of that, I don't support you in any other way. General Engelbrecht will deny that he was permanently deployed, as you put it, to the Security Branch, since the end of 1989.

MR DE KOCK: As I have put it to you, I cannot give you the precise date. He was the Investigative Officer with the Harms Commission situation. On the contrary, he didn't only carry the dossiers of Vlakplaas, but also those of the CCB. He was also involved in that investigation.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, he will deny that he was the Investigative Officer for the Harms Commission. I've already put to you who was, he was not.

MR DE KOCK: Well then he was definitely the officer for Vlakplaas, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, he will deny that he held that office.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in that case I can only tell you what I know. Perhaps it would be preferable if General Engelbrecht could explain these matters to us.

MR WAGENER: In fact his task, Mr de Kock, during the Harms Commission was to assist the legal teams insofar as it involved matters which were not directly connected to the Security Branch, because that task was given to Colonel Herman du Plessis.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Colonel Herman du Plessis was his assistant. There are aspects surrounding the Security Police and Security Policing which General Engelbrecht would not have known about at that stage. Colonel Herman du Plessis was his assistant, he had an office just next door to General Nick van Rensburg.

MR WAGENER: Just to return to an aspect which we began and then left, the alleged request of General Engelbrecht to accompany you on the Botswana operation. I put it to you that it is highly unlikely that a senior officer of his position would have proposed something as foolish as that.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if it is so, it cannot be so. What I am telling you is the truth. I'm completely prepared to go as far as saying that Engelbrecht and I could be seated before this Commission and undertake polygraph tests in order to determine who would be the person that walks out of here with the truth behind his name. In fact I would pay for those polygraph tests.

MR WAGENER: You, the great and well-known liar and manipulator of evidence, would you do that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if it will bring us to the point of truth, I would have to borrow the money, but I would do it.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, while we are speaking of money, you've given comprehensive evidence regarding the issue of what you termed false claims.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: During your residence at Vlakplaas. And that portions thereof took place with the knowledge and approval of General Engelbrecht.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And so I remember that you testified that you learnt it at Vlakplaas how to put in false claims.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson. It is not something that I knew about, not to mention the format and the method.

MR WAGENER: But when you arrived at Vlakplaas, you were already an old hand at false claims, weren't you, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. One of the reasons being that I had a problem with nepotism, which was actually a form of incest so to speak. And there are some of the Koevoet members who would support me in this. The withdrawal of funds, the construction of weapons stockpiling locations where funds would be taken to people such as Potgieter, where these funds would be used for the purchasing of a farm in the Magaliesburg, where members could go and rest after having returned from operational duty, the use of funds to purchase food supplies which people were not entitled to, the fact that some Ovambo members did not receive full compensation. And this led to conflict between me and certain members and ultimately with General Dreyer.

MR WAGENER: But the question was, Mr de Kock, weren't you involved with false claims in the former South West Africa?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that was probably one of the problems.

MR WAGENER: Did I misunderstand your amnesty application, that you applied at a certain stage for amnesty for false claims which you would have put in during your term of service in South West?

MR DE KOCK: Among others there was a case that I can tell you about, during which I was taken one afternoon by Captain Eddie Winter, who had the receipts for equipment which they had purchased, it was construction material. I think I rewrote that claim twice or three times before it was in a satisfactory format. The claim then read that it was not for construction material and the claim was submitted. I don't know why this was done or what objective they sought to achieve. I'm not trying to present myself as some or other clean and healthy person, but with regard to false claims and those aspects, they had to teach you how to do it. I'm not trying to use this as an excuse, I'm simply trying to tell you.

MR WAGENER: Well all that I put to you is that when you arrived at Vlakplaas, you already knew in all probability, of this practice of false claims, that you had already been exposed to it and that you knew how it worked.

MR DE KOCK: Upon two or three occasions I had been exposed to it, Chairperson. And upon my arrival here I was initially not exposed to it, but after that I had to make out false claims for someone who had mistaken a cow for a kudu and accidentally shot it or fired a shot through the roof of a vehicle, and various other incidents.

MR WAGENER: The R250 000 which you stole in order to purchase a house, you say you stole these funds upon the recommendation or the request or suggestion of General Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I stole money for the Security Head Office's financial units and I'd been doing so since 1985, with the exception of the vehicles which I did not know to whom they belonged, and had to write off. Perhaps the receiver could explain where this money is today, because I would also very much like to know.

MR WAGENER: But this money was not stolen by you for the Security Branch or any other noble objective, you stole this for yourself.

MR DE KOCK: Can you please tell me how one steals money for a noble motive?

MR WAGENER: But you are creating the impression that you stole money for volk and vaderland.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it wasn't for a noble motive. How can you steal for a noble motive?

MR WAGENER: This R250 000, you stole it for yourself, correct?

MR DE KOCK: Please explain to me how you can steal money for a noble intention. Would you regard persons working in the Security Branch, or at the Security Branch's financial services, as noble persons?

MR WAGENER: My job here is to ask you the questions. I want to know, did you steal that R250 000 for yourself?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And that was, if I understood you correctly, in supplementation, if I understand it correctly, of the severance package or settlement amount when you left the Police Service.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Will you please tell me again why you stole this money.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, General Engelbrecht mentioned that I would probably not receive my full, or the full severance package that I was supposed to receive and that I was going to have to look after myself and that they would endeavour in this manner to supplement this amount, which would then be short on the severance package.

MR WAGENER: Now where, Mr de Kock, did you arrive at the figure which would have been the full package, or was supposed to have been the full package?

MR DE KOCK: General Engelbrecht took me to the coffee shop at the Security Head Office, the coffee shop was called Pebbles, and this was a few months before I was going to leave, and discussed the situation of my severance with me. He then mentioned an amount of R1,45-million, but that I wasn't to set my heart on it because it could end up being less. And that is where I received the knowledge of that amount.

MR WAGENER: Are you aware of the fact that the amount which was ultimately paid out to you was professionally calculated by an actuary, who had been appointed by the State?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, appointed by the State, Chairperson. I believe that if I had had my own actuary, it would have been more than R1,45-million. But let's just leave that at that.

MR WAGENER: Are you saying that you received too little?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I'm not saying that I received too little, I'm just saying that we would probably have arrived at a different amount.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, are you aware of the fact that at that stage there had been a Cabinet decision, in terms of which the Askaris were financially retrenched?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, and that the amount which had been allocated was doubled and that there were a great deal of other people who were not Vlakplaas members or Askaris, who were paid out. I will give you an example of when I was informed by a Captain of the Intelligence Unit in Johannesburg, that an agent of the South African Security Police who was living in London, had threatened to expose information if he did not receive a package as well. That is after he had been paid and had received his package according to his contract.

He flew to Jan Smuts, and was given R500 000 in a case and returned back to England on the following flight. Thus, I think with healthy inference, that many people received packages, but on Vlakplaas' back.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, unfortunately I must correct you. It would appear to me that you listened to a great deal of stories and hearsay, I don't even know where all these stories came from, however I must take you directly and indicate how incorrect you are in these beliefs.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if someone gave me information I would listen to it. It would have to be tested and then we would see about it after that.

MR WAGENER: Just to begin, Mr de Kock, the person abroad that you have just spoken about, put in a claim against the police - and I hope I'm not giving evidence, Mr Chairman, I was the attorney in that matter and that amount was not at all paid out in terms of the amount of money that was allocated for the Askaris.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, well then we are dealing with an even further offence, because where does that

R500 000 come from?

MR WAGENER: I'm not going to discuss the legitimacy of payments made by the State, with you, suffice to say that you have listened to gossip which was incorrect.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is not correct.

MR WAGENER: How did it occur, Mr de Kock, that your own retrenchment package also served before the police, and specifically the committee who was busy with the retrenchment of the Askaris?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have no knowledge of the internal activities of how these packages were calculated or negotiated.

MR WAGENER: And perhaps I also have to correct you there.

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: It was a Committee, Mr de Kock, consisting of representatives of the Office of the Auditor-General, the Department of State Expenditure, your old department and even as State Attorney myself, I was also present. Do you have any knowledge of that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, but if I listen to that and if one looks at the past, then nothing good could have come from that.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this all relevant to the hearing we have, which is an amnesty application for a killing in Botswana?

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, we sat here last week listening for two days how Mr de Kock gave evidence in general, on his career and Vlakplaas, and in doing so he referred to a large number of specific incidents and in the process he implicated clients of mine. You will remember ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Your clients were not part of this committee, were they, that you've just been talking about?

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, General Engelbrecht was in fact a member.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he? You didn't put that though.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, I'm sorry, I'm still in the process. All I'm saying is that I was under the impression that I would be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the applicant ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You are limited to a certain time for cross-examination. If they are relevant to your clients' case, continue. A great deal of your cross-examination has been extremely relevant to instructions he says he got from General Engelbrecht, but I just don't see what this thing about monies paid to Askaris, or somebody from England, or what relevance that has to the present application.

MR WAGENER: Except, Mr Chairman, in all fairness, it was evidence tendered by the applicant, not by me. May I proceed?

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on. While I'm talking, can I clarify something which I regret I overlooked and I had a note about it. The present questioner is Mr Wagener, he was preceded by Mr Lamey, who was preceded by Mr du Plessis. I think all those before gave their names when they were questioning, but if we could all try to remember. I've been asked by those preparing the record.

MR WAGENER: I apologise, Mr Chairman. I'm not sure, I see it's past four, I'm not sure what time you intend to adjourn. I still have some ground to cover.

CHAIRPERSON: How long do you think you'll be?

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, ....(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It's a difficult question to answer at two minutes past four, isn't it?

MR WAGENER: It may be another hour.

CHAIRPERSON: We won't sit here for another hour. What time tomorrow, gentlemen?

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, may I suggest 09H30.

CHAIRPERSON: And we will start tomorrow at nine thirty, no matter who is not here.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS