Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: I haven't read the affidavit, obviously. Does it deal only with this incident or is it a general affidavit?

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, it is slightly more general than only this incident. You will see I have attached to it a statement made by Mr Engelbrecht when he appeared before the TRC, during 1996. So the two documents combined takes it further than merely this incident, but it deals in my opinion, with the matters raised the last week as well, by Mr de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I don't think we'll give it an exhibit number in this hearing, I think we keep it - I haven't got the original papers with me, I don't know what we did there. We've got also Snyman.

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Lamey, on behalf of Willemse, Nortje and Bosch. The next applicant is Willem Albertus Nortje.

WILLEM ALBERTUS NORTJE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: For the sake of the transcriber, I have been turning on the machine when I have been swearing in the witnesses, but they have all been sworn in.

EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Nortje, you have made an application to the Amnesty Committee for various incidents in which you as a member of Vlakplaas, were involved during your career in the Security Police, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Your application, or your initial application for amnesty was submitted and this was completed in Form 1, and this can be found on page 34 up to and including page 43 of the bundle, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: This was at the stage before you obtained legal representation. And that first affidavit of yours was dated the 19th of November 1996.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And the form was completed in your own handwriting.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Attached to that initial form you provided particulars regarding incidents, specifically then also the incident which you describe as the Botswana Attack (Mr Khan), which can be found on page 40, and which we all know was actually Chand.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Is it correct that the particulars which you provided with regard to the incident and which can be found from page 40 to 43, form part of affidavits which you made before the Goldstone Commission?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: Is it correct to say that that affidavit, specifically this affidavit with regard to the Chand incident, contained information which you had at that stage, which consisted of holistically information which you obtained by means of admissions or hearsay which were made to you? This also then has to do with your own observations in general?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: I would also like to prepare your supplementary application which appears on page 44 and is part of the bundle with regard to this incident, and this goes to page 62.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And this was done after you obtained legal representation?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Let us discuss then the Botswana incident, or the Chand incident. With regard to this you refer to this in your supplementary affidavit, or application on page 59, where you are asked to give nature and particulars. You referred back to the particulars which you have already provided in your initial application.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore and more specifically you dealt with specific questions which were put in the original form, and we will return to that later in greater detail.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: Your reference with regard to those particulars is specifically to this incident.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: At the stage when this incident took place you occupied the rank of Sergeant.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You were promoted to Warrant Officer, according to that which you stated in your supplementary application, page 47, in January 1991.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You also confirm that background which is given in the supplementary application.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: That is contained on page 50 to 58 of the bundle, and you request that the Committee would consider this insofar as it may be relevant with regard to this incident?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: If you could please return to page 40. It would appear from your application that at a certain stage before the group as such was compiled for the operation, the group of which you were a member, it came to your knowledge that Ras was busy with planning and the collection of information.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Were you at all times aware of the progress with regard to this, or how did it come to your knowledge?

MR NORTJE: Chairperson, I can say that I was aware of certain bits of information as time went by and I knew that Ras was busy with the collection of information. I wasn't kept up to date with all the information, but I did know that there was a planned operation underway.

MR LAMEY: And that he was busy with preparation, planning, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: According to your knowledge, to who did Ras report?

MR NORTJE: According to me he reported everything back to Mr de Kock.

MR LAMEY: Who was the Commander of Vlakplaas?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: If we can just look at paragraph 1 on page 40, the information that came to you was that there was a transit base in Botswana which was being used for the purposes of PAC infiltration, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: And in particular there was the home of a man by the name of Khan, whose residence was then also used as a facility for this.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: It would appear from this statement that you came to know of Mr Chand, and that he was also a source for DCC.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that also came to my knowledge.

MR LAMEY: And that it was his residence which was used to accommodate PAC infiltrators to the RSA, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You mentioned that it came to your knowledge that before the operation was launched, approximately 70 PAC members infiltrated the RSA via this route.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Something which you did not mention in your affidavit and which came to light during consultation is the following; were you present at a roadblock where PAC members were arrested?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct, I was present when the four PAC members were arrested near Magaliesburg and from there I also obtained the information about the infiltration route which they had used, that Tony Oosthuizen was involved and everything that went along with that. I was fully informed about that.

MR LAMEY: Was it also true then that these four members became Askaris for Vlakplaas?

MR NORTJE: Yes, they were used for that.

MR LAMEY: According to your understanding at that stage about the operation, Chand was the informer for DCC, and you refer specifically to Tony Oosthuizen from DCC, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Was there a problem in this regard, with regard to the informer's handling of the infiltration of PAC terrorists according to your understanding from the opinion of the Security Police?

MR NORTJE: Yes, it was a problem because we couldn't understand how Oosthuizen could allow that so many people were coming through, so many armed PAC members, without any measure of control over this. And this in itself became a problem for us because Martiens worked in that area and the information was that these persons would come into the country, and - I recall that we were approached by Oosthuizen to assist him in the apprehension and arrest of these persons, as far as I can recall.

MR LAMEY: However, when you speak of the 70 members who infiltrated, were these persons people who had infiltrated into the RSA and who could no longer be controlled, or was there still contact with them, were they still being monitored?

MR NORTJE: That was the problem, that there was no more control over them once they had infiltrated the RSA.

MR LAMEY: Very well. And during the process it came to your knowledge that an operation was being planned to attack the Chand residence, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct. The route which they followed had already been identified there and I suspect that Chand's name had already mentioned with regard to the residence that was being used as a transit house.

MR LAMEY: You mention in the second paragraph a so-called information note which was provided via General Engelbrecht to General Basie Smit. Do you have specific knowledge about that, or upon which grounds has this section of your affidavit been declared?

MR NORTJE: General Engelbrecht's name may have been erroneously put into this, but it's just that I assumed that the information would have flowed from van Rensburg up to Smit.

MR LAMEY: Was Smit the Head of Security at that stage?

MR NORTJE: Yes, I assume that.

MR LAMEY: And who was the overall Commander of Vlakplaas?

MR NORTJE: Van Rensburg.

MR LAMEY: General Engelbrecht did assume command later on?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And was it correct that when a group-leader like Martiens Ras worked in a certain area - during your time at Vlakplaas you also worked in other areas and also took the lead of groups.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And the usual procedure would be that information reports would be compiled and sent to Security Head Offices.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And because that was the usual procedure, you also mentioned here by inference, that you accepted that Martiens Ras would have sent information through.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: But that is not your direct evidence.

MR NORTJE: No.

MR LAMEY: And you say that that was the normal procedure that would have been followed?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore you state that you knew that preparations were under way for the operation and you knew beforehand that this was a house which was near the border post, on the Botswana side of the border.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: You also state that this operation, that no information about this operation could be leaked out in any way.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Why?

MR NORTJE: In the first place the plans which we had made to attack the house, could not be made known in any way with the Defence Force, because we basically acted behind their backs. And I assume that they would not have allowed it if they had known about the plans which we had.

MR LAMEY: Very well. You also mention a group that was compiled and you then also give the names of the members of this group, at the bottom of page 40.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: During consultation, due to the fact that he is not a specific applicant, is it correct that you specifically were questioned about the memory of Hoffie Hoffman?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: What do you have to say about that?

MR NORTJE: The reason why I may have mentioned his name is because he accompanied us with other operations and that is why I may have assumed that he was present during that operation, because I could not remember everybody who participated in that operation when I made the affidavit.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore you state that it was part of the plan to disguise your presence there and that the impression was to be created that at the stage when the operation took place the Vlakplaas members were in the Richards Bay vicinity.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And that is also due to the close connection with DCC and the fact that DCC was not to know about this operation.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: May I ask you whether other Vlakplaas members knew about this operation, other than those members who participated in it?

MR NORTJE: No, as far as I can recall the information was confined to those members who were involved.

MR LAMEY: Let's proceed to the next page, page 41. You say that certain preparations were made for the weapons which would be used. You mention that every member of the group had a Scorpion hand machine-gun with a silencer and that every member also had an AK47.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore you state that you knew that an explosive device was prepared by Martiens Ras, and that the idea behind the explosive device would be to damage or destroy the house, by means of an explosive device.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that was part of the plan.

MR LAMEY: And this was also to create confusion between the Botswana Government and the South African Defence Force, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Let us just pause for a moment with the question of the weaponry. Can you recall which specific weapons you were provided with during preparation for this operation?

MR NORTJE: During the preparation we made provision for any possible contingency, any possible opposition that we could experience, for example, from the Botswana Government or any persons who may have been in the house.

MR LAMEY: When you speak of persons in the house and the preparations which were specifically made for that, what according to your recollection was the expectation with regard to the occupants of the house?

MR NORTJE: Well the expectation was that there would be armed PAC members in the house. That is what we provided for, because according to the information that we had it was a known infiltration route, so anything was possible and we made provision for that and that is why we were rather heavily armed. I had the AK and the Scorpion and I had a 40mm grenade launcher with approximately 40 rounds. I also had two handgrenades. So we were reasonably prepared for any possibility during which we had to defend ourselves.

MR LAMEY: Can you tell us what a grenade launcher is, a 40mm grenade launcher, the one that you had.

MR NORTJE: It is a gun which fired single shots, which had a 40mm round, which basically exploded like a handgrenade.

MR LAMEY: So it was a type of weapon which would fire an explosive projectile?

MR NORTJE: Yes, at a distance.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore you declare that you went to the Zeerust vicinity where you launched the operation from a farm. That is where you convened and that is where you launched the operation from, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Before you eventually began with the operation you recall that further reconnaissance was undertaken.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And that you crossed the border at night, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: You further state that you arrived at the place, the target house - if we might mention it as such, you saw that it was fenced in by wire fencing and that there was also a guard on the premises.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore you state that when you walked along the fence, the guard emerged from a zinc house.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct. I don't think that we expected the guard. We walked up there in single file. Precisely who was supposed to do what I can no longer recall, however I was a member of the penetration group.

MR LAMEY: When you say "penetration group", were you then a member of the group that was going to enter the house?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct. At a stage - I cannot recall who walked ahead or in front, the guard came out and the dogs were barking. I think he may have heard our footsteps. He came out and he said something to us and at that stage Mr de Kock came around and shot him with the Scorpion. It wasn't light, it was reasonably dark but one could make out a person. From that point, or at that point, just after he had shot him, Mr de Kock stepped back and fell down the embankment. I saw then that he was out of action and we continued.

MR LAMEY: What happened after de Kock shot the guard which you describe, with the Scorpion?

MR NORTJE: He basically ran back, away from the fence.

MR LAMEY: Who was that?

MR NORTJE: The guard. Well he must have fallen because he began screaming, and it was at that stage that the tension began to mount because things began to spin out of control at that point because this wasn't part of the plan, that there would be an alarm. The fact that we were at a very sensitive stage of the operation during which the occupants of the house could have heard what was going on, although we didn't know who exactly was in the house, it was at that point that we had to start acting quickly in order to continue the operation.

MR LAMEY: So you say that you didn't know exactly who would be in the house, but that you expected that PAC guerrillas would be in the house?

MR NORTJE: Well that is what we provided for.

MR LAMEY: So you expected any contingency at that point when the alarm was sounded?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore you state that the idea was to fit the Scorpions with silencers.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And then the guard would actually not have screamed, you didn't foresee that he would scream after having been shot?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore you state that you warned de Kock beforehand about the Scorpions, that you had your doubts about those Scorpions.

MR NORTJE: Yes, I didn't have much faith in Scorpions as a weapon, and before we went on the operation I did mention it to him at a certain stage. However, we had to use the weapons due to the circumstances and the impression that we wanted to create.

MR LAMEY: Was a Scorpion a very light calibre weapon?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore you state that de Kock fell down an embankment and injured his knee and was therefore out of action. You continued with the operation and you recall that Douw Willemse managed to open the gate by breaking the lock.

MR NORTJE: Yes, he managed to enter the premises and put the guard out of action. He shot him. The guard stopped screaming and we continued.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall, with regard to the events outside, what was happening inside the house?

MR NORTJE: After Douw had shot the guard I can recall that somebody came out of the house with a torch and shone the torchlight to the outside and he also shouted something. I can't recall exactly what.

MR LAMEY: But at that stage you was still outside when this happened?

MR NORTJE: Yes. And then Martiens shot him with the Makarov.

MR LAMEY: Where was Martiens at that stage?

MR NORTJE: I cannot recall whether he was on the veranda or whether he was about to enter the veranda ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: But he was walking from the outside in?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: And you mention Khan here, at that stage did you know who it was that was shining the torch?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR LAMEY: And this is something that you only realised by inference?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore on page 42 you state that the door was kicked open and that the members entered the house.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Who, according to your recollection, entered the house first?

MR NORTJE: As far as I can recall Martiens went in first, then Douw and John. But that's how I recall it.

MR LAMEY: It may have been incorrect?

MR NORTJE: I lingered for a moment outside because there were certain factors which determined that I should look around, because we had already fired shots and anything could happen.

MR LAMEY: But you're trying to say is that you waited for a short while and then you went in after them?

MR NORTJE: Yes, I waited and then I heard the shots in the house and once I'd entered the room basically, I didn't see the person on the left-hand side who they had shot and I came in and shot the person through the head because the person stood in a bent over kind of fashion and they had already shot him and when he fell over I realised that it was a woman. At that stage I hadn't realised that it was Mrs Chand, I only realised that later. I immediately moved out and went further into the house.

MR LAMEY: You state further in your affidavit that they were busy shooting Khan's wife, and what you mean by that is that it was Mrs Chand.

MR NORTJE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Your reference to Douw Willemse specifically, could it have been anybody else or can you specifically place him there?

MR NORTJE: It may have been Ras, but my recollection is that they shot her.

MR LAMEY: But you recall that it was Martiens Ras and somebody else who had been in the room before you, and who were busy firing shots.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore you state that Martiens took the explosive device out of the rucksack and began to prepare it and upon that you moved through the rest of the house to see if there were anymore people.

MR NORTJE: I cannot say with certainty that he did that at that stage. He did have the rucksack with him, but I moved ahead into the house because we were afraid of who else could be in the house, whether anybody else had woken. I ran down the passage of the house - well, I didn't run but I moved swiftly. It was dark. I saw that somebody was lying on the bed, I moved past and shot and proceeded.

I cannot recall whether John was in front of me or behind me. I imagine that he was in front of me. He also shot. Then we moved back. I cannot recall that we searched the rest of the house. I returned to the main bedroom.

MR LAMEY: I would just like to take you back to the person who you found as you walked through the house. Can you tell the Committee what you could have observed at that stage in the house. Where was the person, how did it appear to you?

MR NORTJE: The person who was lying there, the person that I shot was a person of a large frame.

MR LAMEY: Was this person lying on the bed or on the floor?

MR NORTJE: As far as I can recall it was on a bed. He was under a blanket and his head was covered by the blanket but I could clearly see that it was a large person lying underneath the blanket, and that is when I fired the shots.

MR LAMEY: You say then that you moved back to the main bedroom and you saw that Martiens had placed the body of the woman on the bed and put the explosive device under the bed and pulled the pin of the bomb.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: Did this bomb have a delay mechanism?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall the time of it?

MR NORTJE: It was approximately between 30 and 45 minutes, it would have been in that vicinity.

MR LAMEY: What was the idea behind the delay mechanism?

MR NORTJE: To give us a chance to get away.

MR LAMEY: Where to?

MR NORTJE: Well basically we planned to return to the vehicles across the border.

MR LAMEY: Do you mean across the border back into the RSA?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore you explain that you moved back out of the house. From the point that the guard was shot outside until everything was completed inside the house, can you recall what this time-period was?

MR NORTJE: It cannot have been longer than two minutes, if it took that long. The shooting in itself was very brief, it took place very quickly. I don't think that it was even 20 to 30 seconds.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Furthermore you confirm how you returned to the border and how you had to assist Eugene de Kock, due to the fact that he had injured his leg.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: And when you arrived at the vehicles you heard the explosion.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: You then returned to the farm where you had stayed previously and left for Richards Bay the next morning, for which your alibi had been created.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore you explain that de Kock ultimately managed to get to a doctor and came back to Pretoria eventually.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: You also state on page 43, that Brigadier Nick van Rensburg was informed by de Kock with regard to the course of the operation and the injury that he had incurred and that van Rensburg on his part would inform the higher authorities. Can you recall how you heard about this and where it happened?

MR NORTJE: I recall that this took place once we had arrived in Richards Bay, that he informed van Rensburg about the entire situation. I cannot recall that he made contact with him before that. I wasn't present specifically, but I can recall that he reported back.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, did he report back to you, or how do you know that he reported back to Brigadier van Rensburg, if you weren't present?

MR NORTJE: Mr de Kock told me that he informed Brigadier van Rensburg.

MR LAMEY: Can you please go to page 60. With regard to question 9(a) - this is specific offences which you apply for, you say you apply for amnesty for murder as far as it is necessary, attempted murder and any other offences that might emanate from the facts. Is it correct to say more specifically that - well it is not specifically mentioned here, but what you want to ask amnesty for is the matter of the damage to property and the destruction of the house because you knew beforehand that the house would be destroyed by explosives, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And as such it could come down to a conspiracy to the offences and to the Act on explosives, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And then at a stage when you completed the supplementary application you said that according to your knowledge four persons were killed. It seems that more persons were killed there, including the guard and it seems that six people were killed there.

MR NORTJE: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: You do not dispute that?

MR NORTJE: No, I don't.

MR LAMEY: And according to the report you said it was Mr Khan, his wife and two children. Were these particulars filled in with regard to information that you received later?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And then with regard to the political objective, on page 61, you say the action was within the framework of the task of Vlakplaas, to find insurgents of the ANC or PAC. This refers to the general objective of Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And the overhead objective was as previously mentioned, to protect the civilians and the government against the liberation movements, such as the ANC and the PAC, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And then you say the specific objective with the operation was to eliminate one, Khan, who according to information was using his house to help infiltrate PAC insurgents and to eliminate him and the people who were with him in the house.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And these people would have been PAC insurgents.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And then you further say that the presence of his wife and children in the house at that stage was unfortunate and that you did not know they would be there beforehand and you also say that there were some complications with the operation. You refer to the complications which went along beforehand.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: ... with regard to the guard and the unexpected happenings which took place.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And you also say that the information was that the other person - you say ANC insurgents, but it should be PAC, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes, it should be PAC.

MR LAMEY: And you also mention that afterwards you established that there were children in the house, the Khan's children were in the house.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct. This emanated from, I think afterwards all the reports that were in the newspapers and information which came about afterwards, but I can only say that at no stage were children ever mentioned, in the form of small children.

MR LAMEY: You did not know this before the operation?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR LAMEY: It would also seem that afterwards the information was that there were children but they were grown-up children.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And this is what you saw in the person whom you saw there on your way back.

MR NORTJE: That is correct. At no stage did I have the idea that there were children in the house.

MR LAMEY: Is it also correct that at a stage when you had to give attention to this particular ..., you did not have the benefit of the statement of Martiens Ras or Willemse?

MR NORTJE: No, I did not.

MR LAMEY: And then you had to go and sit down and think as to where the woman and children came in?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And at the stage when you made this statement you did not know the role of the bigger children or the wife, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: No, when I made this statement before Judge Goldstone, I could not place the role of the wife and the children. That was my problem. But later I worked it out for myself, that I did not see any children there. So I think that there was definitely no children in the house, but I could not recall what Mrs Khan and the sons' roles were. And right up till today, or until this week I only realised that - I had had discussions with some of the members, specifically with Willemse and he mentions the fact that Martiens Ras mentioned that the children, the two sons were used to take or to help the persons to get to the border and that Mrs Khan knew about everything.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, Mr Lamey, can I ...

When did Mr Ras tell you that Mrs Khan and the children were involved in this?

MR NORTJE: If I can tell you, I think it's because of the fact that right from the start I was involved or I knew about the attack and then at some stage he must have told it to me because when Willemse mentioned it to me, I recalled the whole situation.

MR LAMEY: Willemse mentioned it here?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, just one question related to this, Mr Nortje. Are you saying that when you made your testimony, when you made your statement to the Goldstone Commission, you did not know that the children and the wife were also assisting with the infiltration of PAC cadres?

MR NORTJE: I could not specifically recall it at that stage. I would assume it was not - I can really not recall why I did not mention it there, because if I recalled it I would have mentioned it. I had no reason not to mention it. I have a problem with it. I don't remember why I did not remember it there, it only came to me later, but it must have been mentioned there. That is why we acted in the way we did.

MR LAMEY: And the preparations that you made.

MR NORTJE: Pardon?

MR LAMEY: The specific preparations that you made.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And at a stage when you completed your supplementary application you could also not recall it?

MR NORTJE: No, I could not.

MR LAMEY: And with regard to paragraph 10(b), your motivation, you say that specifically you recall that Mr Khan was the problem and the insurgents.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And you say that the assistance to the PAC guerrillas was a great problem, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And you refer to the 70 insurgents and you had information that PAC members were involved with bank robberies and other acts of terror.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: You also believed that your actions were justified because you were in the service of the police and Vlakplaas, who was a special unit of the police, to perform a task after information was gathered, and it is with that knowledge that you participated in the operation?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And you say the operation was authorised by higher persons.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And with regard to this higher authority, to what do you refer? - authorised from higher up

MR NORTJE: Well I was aware of the fact that Brigadier van Rensburg knew about the circumstances and furthermore, I just assumed that the persons above would have known about this because a foreign operation could not be launched without any permission.

MR LAMEY: From a higher authority?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR LAMEY: Because of the sensitiveness, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You are also an applicant in other amnesty applications in other cross-border operations, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: What was the instance there with the higher authorisation?

MR NORTJE: In all instances there would not have been an operation launched without any higher authorisation from Security Head Office.

MR LAMEY: Or at least Security Head Office?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And then with regard to financial gain, you say that you cannot remember that you received any specific financial gain that was connected to this operation.

MR NORTJE: No, I cannot recall that I received any benefit for this operation, financial benefit.

MR LAMEY: And with regard to order and authorisation you say yes, you received instructions from Mr de Kock.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje, I would like to arrive at an aspect, and this is with regard to the evidence of Mr Wouter Mentz.

Mr Chairman, I'm just going to refer to the relevant portions of the record of his evidence.

It's page 84. I would like to read his transcribed evidence to you:

"Quite a while after the operation, I will say approximately three or four weeks afterwards, Willie Nortje came to me and handed me an envelope. All the other people involved also received such an envelope. If I can remember correctly there was R6 000 in that envelope. He said that it was for that operation ..."

And if he refers to "for that operation" and in that context he refers to the Chand operation.

"... and that the main branch congratulated us on it."

Here are several aspects in this paragraph. I would just like to pause here. Can you recall whether you handed an envelope to Wouter Mentz, where there was about R6 000 in?

MR NORTJE: No, I cannot recall it. I don't believe that I would have done so. If somebody had given out money it would have been Mr de Kock, and as he has done previously he would have given it privately to them. So I cannot agree with that.

MR LAMEY: And he also says that you would have said that it was for this operation and that the Security Head Office - or this is what is implied here, had congratulated you.

MR NORTJE: No, I would not have done that, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And then on page 86 he says on a question of one of the Committee Members

"That is correct, Mr Chair, Willie Nortje. For example we never stood in a long queue to receive our envelopes, we were called to the side one by one. I for example had to go to Nortje's office. He also closed the door and then he gave the envelope to me, but I know that other people also received money."

When he says that - it seems as if he's saying:

"We never stood in long queues to receive our envelopes."

It would seem that is the general procedure when such additional payment was given to the members, but specifically he says:

"I had to go to Mr Nortje's office."

Did you have an office at Vlakplaas?

MR NORTJE: No, I did not have an office.

CHAIRPERSON: Well did you have an office anywhere else?

MR NORTJE: We had a collective - in one house there's a room where all the safes are, but we are a whole group of people who shared this place.

MR LAMEY: So it's a room that you shared?

MR NORTJE: Yes, it was a room where our equipment was.

MR LAMEY: Well if we refer to an office, who had offices at Vlakplaas? - if you think back.

MR NORTJE: At that stage I think it was only the officers, Mr de Kock and Mr Baker. That is all I can remember who had offices there. And whether they were still constructing the other premises there I can't remember.

MR LAMEY: Is it possible that a request was directed to you from for example Colonel de Kock, to hand over envelopes to the members? Or do you exclude that possibility, or don't you recall?

MR NORTJE: It could be that at some stage it could have happened, but I cannot specifically recall that I gave Wouter any money or gave him an envelope as he says. I cannot recall that. I don't believe that I would have done it even.

MR LAMEY: Was it part of your general task at Vlakplaas to handle money and to make up small packages?

MR NORTJE: No, I cannot say that I specifically had the instruction. I wrote out claims, but I did not fetch the money afterwards, that was Mr de Kock's task. He usually fetched the money when the claims had to be collected.

MR LAMEY: And when the money was to be paid out?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Specifically for bonuses?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that is the evidence-in-chief.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Hattingh, on behalf of Mr de Kock, Mr Chairman.

Mr Nortje, just a few aspects. You say you were aware that Mr Ras was involved with an investigation with regard to the Chands before you launched the operation.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And we have received some of the record with regard to a Section 29 Hearing, with regard to Mr Christo Nel. I want to read some extracts to you and ask you if you have any knowledge of this or to comment on this. On page 2 thereof, hand-written number 2, the following is stated in the last paragraph

"Now I knew Tony Oosthuizen quite well and by the time I learnt from the police in the Western Transvaal about this operation, they were angry and they sent a message via me to Tony Oosthuizen, that he should come to Zeerust or to Potchefstroom and talk to them because he is now creating a monster. He is going to allow PAC guys to infiltrate, APLA guys to infiltrate, because they will not be able to arrest every group that comes in. They would have to let one go, arrest others and they won't be able to take action on the border because then it won't be long before the source will be exposed."

Then the evidence goes further.

"Tony Oosthuizen then arranged with NIS, for a surveillance team to let the infiltrating groups come into Soweto, into the heartland of South Africa, and surveil them and then arrest them while they are here and not near the border, but that thing didn't work, guys got away."

And a bit lower down on page 3, the hand-written page 3, the following appears - this is after the Lichtenburg incident:

"The police in the Western Transvaal were furious about the fact that these people were in fact infiltrated by the help of Military Intelligence, and it resulted in a number of policemen being injured at a roadblock and people being killed there. There was a Colonel Wikus Loots who felt that this should be stopped, but they could not get Tony Oosthuizen under control. He continued with his operations."

The impression that this creates with me, Mr Nortje, is that indeed from the police' side the police did speak to this Mr Oosthuizen and they attempted to stop his operation with the infiltration of PAC insurgents. Did you receive any information with regard to that from Mr Ras?

MR NORTJE: I knew of the situation. I did not have the detail with regard to everything, but I knew that he was infiltrating people and he was going out of control. That is so.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know that the police were not satisfied or dissatisfied with this action of his and apparently they had spoken to him?

MR NORTJE: No, I don't specifically have any knowledge of that.

MR HATTINGH: And then to return to the Chand matter. I cannot recall what the evidence was, if you can refresh my memory. Were you with Mr Ras earlier that day to do the final reconnaissance before you crossed the border?

MR NORTJE: No, I was not.

MR HATTINGH: Can you give the Committee an idea as to how large the community was there where the Chand house and shop was? Was it a large settlement or what was it?

MR NORTJE: No, it was not a large settlement. As I can recall it now - I only saw the place during the night, but it's a rural area, it's a typical Botswana set-up, where the house are quite apart from each other and there were some trees, but there was not a concentration of people like in a squatter camp.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether there was a school in the immediate vicinity that went up to matric?

MR NORTJE: No, I don't know.

MR HATTINGH: Yesterday questions were asked as to what your instruction was, and I think some of the witnesses, I think Mr de Kock himself said that the instruction was to kill all the persons in the house, do you remember that?

MR NORTJE: Yes, I do.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know what the position would have been if it was known that there were small children, 4/5 year old children in the house? Would the instruction still have been that everybody had to be killed in the house?

MR NORTJE: It would definitely not have been the instruction to shoot any children. The instruction to shoot everybody in the house was based on the information that everybody who would have been in the house were involved with the PAC.

MR NORTJE: That's correct, yes.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I'm going onto another topic now, I don't know whether this would perhaps be a convenient moment to take the adjournment.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR SIBANYONI: Maybe just one question. Why then would you say the killing of the wife and children was unfortunate?

MR NORTJE: The reason why I mentioned it there was - you have to remember that with regard to the time period that had elapsed and the time when I made this application, I could not remember what the two children and the wife's participation was in this whole incident. At some stage I thought that we must have made a big mistake here, but I did not enquire to find out what exactly happened and that is why I stated it as such. In the planning it could have been said specifically, but I cannot remember that with the planning at the house. I think that is where I must have heard it, or on the farm, but I assume that it must have been there. It was not a big problem for me at that stage I assume, because the people who were in the house, according to the information, were all involved and we had instructions which we had to act upon, but afterwards I came to the realisation that what was the children's participation here, were they really involved. I was not sure.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

ADV SANDI: About how many days, Mr Nortje, about how many days before the actual attack did you become aware that a plan was under way to attack Mr Chand and his family?

MR NORTJE: No, I won't say I was informed a day before the time, I would say I became aware during the month that Ras was busy with the planning. I did not ask him anything, I received bits and pieces of information which came to my attention.

ADV SANDI: Was that the time when you became aware that members of your team also knew that there was going to be this attack?

MR NORTJE: All of them were not brought up to date because the reason being because I was moving close to Mr de Kock, and I would assume that was the reason why I knew what would possibly happen or what the part of the planning was that I knew of.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take the short adjournment now.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

WILLEM ALBERTUS NORTJE: (s.u.o.)

MR JANSEN: Jansen on record, Mr Chairman. As discussed with you after the adjournment, with your and your Committee Members' approval, may I interrupt the cross-examination at this stage, put my questions on behalf of Mr Ras and excuse myself for a short while?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly, if you think ...(indistinct)

MR HATTINGH STANDS CROSS-EXAMINATION OVER FOR MR JANSEN TO CROSS-EXAMINE

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Yes, I have arranged it with Mr Hattingh. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Nortje, there are two aspects that I want to discuss with you, both relating to the manner in which you recall these incidents. Can one accept that when you compiled your amnesty application and served your submissions or your statements to the Goldstone Commission, that you had no external sources to refresh your recollection or to substantiate your statements?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: Would you also then concur that in terms of your application and most of the other applications, at a certain point the impression was created with you, or at least the impression originated within you that young children had been killed during the incident?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: And that the assumption was that the children were of such an age that they could not have been politically active?

MR NORTJE: That was a concern, yes.

MR JANSEN: It also appears from the evidence of Mr Mentz that he was under that impression.

MR NORTJE: Yes, it would appear in vein.

MR JANSEN: Do you know where this impression originated, was it from media reports or newspaper reports after the incident, or do you have any idea about that?

MR NORTJE: As far as I can recall it was after the incident that this came to discussion.

MR JANSEN: Furthermore, with regard to the incident itself, you would surely be able to accept that some of your allegations regarding who played what role on that night could be subject to faulty recollection.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: And were for example you ascribe certain information to Mr Ras, you would accept Mr Ras' version regarding where he obtained that information and how he went about collecting that information?

MR NORTJE: Yes, I'm not entirely certain or I wasn't entirely certain from where he obtained his information.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (Cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman. Hattingh, on behalf of de Kock again.

Mr Nortje, I would just like to embroider on one of the aspects which you have been examined on. You were under a great deal of pressure and you left the country in a great deal of haste and left for Denmark because you feared for your life.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: It must have been a very traumatic experience for you.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Not only did you find yourself in a strange country but you declared yourself willing to give evidence against friends and colleagues of yours.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And that also upset you.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: You must have made statements about a tremendous amount of incidents and facts.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And during the trial of Mr de Kock it emerged that these statements were taken under pressure because some of the persons who were involved when these statements were made, had to return to South Africa urgently for some or other reason and they clearly wanted to finish these statements before they returned to South Africa.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Not only did you not have material at hand according to which you could refresh your recollection, but it was also about incidents which took place numerous years before.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: I would just like to deal with one impression in particular. We know that there are a great number of incidents for which Mr de Kock has applied for amnesty which involve crime. Vlakplaas was not only involved in criminal activities, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You were involved in a great deal of incidents during which you acted legitimately and within the scope of your duties as policemen.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And during which you also achieved a great deal of success in combating crime.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Were you combating crime in the ordinary sense of crime or were these politically connected acts?

MR NORTJE: Chairperson, when we began to work with crime we focused on weapon smuggling in the RSA, from the neighbouring countries and we achieved a great deal of success through that.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Nortje, you also achieved success in thwarting robberies, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have information that these robberies would be planned and undertaken by political activists or some or other political organisation?

MR NORTJE: That is the information which we had.

MR HATTINGH: That for example, it would ANC supporters or members who were involved in these activities for the sake of the ANC coffers, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Thus, you were involved in a great deal of incidents and all of a sudden you had to recall things which took place several years ago.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Is it also correct, Mr Nortje, with regard to your evidence during Mr de Kock's trial - and I'm sure that this would still be the position today, that one could forget certain things but that when someone else reminded one of one's involvement, one could once again achieve an independent recollection of these matters.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Then I would like to come to General Engelbrecht. An affidavit has been handed in to us. I've studied it briefly and I'm sure that it will be argued that Mr de Kock's evidence will rejected as discreditable as a result of that affidavit. I would just like to clear up a few aspects with regard to this. Was General Engelbrecht according to your personal knowledge, involved in covering up criminal actions in which you were involved?

MR NORTJE: According to what I knew he was placed there in order to do such actions. He was known as "the cleaner" among us, that should we become involved in things he would assist in covering up these matters. That is the impression that I had about him.

MR HATTINGH: "The cleaner", by that do you mean the person who had to clean or rectify things that may have gone wrong?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: In other words, with the example of Maponya the evidence was that a petrol register was fetched at the Krugersdorp Police Station.

MR NORTJE: Yes, he sent me to fetch it.

MR HATTINGH: He sent you to fetch it?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And then you fetched that register?

MR NORTJE: Yes, and I gave it to him.

MR HATTINGH: Why was it important to obtain that register, Mr Nortje?

MR NORTJE: We wanted to avoid or prevent that they would discover that we were at Krugersdorp at that stage, because we obtained petrol at the police station and at that stage we didn't expect what was going to happen. However, later we remembered or realised that we had obtained petrol there and we had to destroy the evidence of that.

MR HATTINGH: So the impression was created that you were on duty at Josini during the Maponya incident, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes, I was at Josini.

MR HATTINGH: But the travel and accommodation claims were adjusted in order to create the impression that you were all there during the Maponya incident?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And this would have created a great deal of problems, should it later appear from the petrol register at the Krugersdorp Police Station, that one or more of your vehicles had on that particular day received petrol from the Krugersdorp Police Station?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And the fact that petrol was used at that police station was recorded in the official register?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: You then fetched the register and you gave it to General Engelbrecht?

MR NORTJE: Yes, in his office.

MR HATTINGH: And do you know what happened to it?

MR NORTJE: No, I never heard about it again.

MR HATTINGH: The Nelspruit incident. I'm not going to refer to all the incidents but just as a manner of example. When did you make your affidavit with regard to the Nelspruit incident?

MR NORTJE: I don't believe that I made an initial affidavit because my role was very inferior with regard to the Nelspruit incident. I mentioned this later, but I can't recall that I specifically made an affidavit in that relation.

MR HATTINGH: Well then let me ask you the following. Do you know when the other members who were involved in that operation made their affidavits with regard to the incident?

MR NORTJE: It was a few days after the incident.

MR HATTINGH: And where were these affidavits made?

MR NORTJE: As far as I can recall it was at our security premises.

MR HATTINGH: The place which was known as "Die Grasdak"?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And was General Engelbrecht present?

MR NORTJE: Yes, he was there at a stage.

MR HATTINGH: Did he study the affidavits?

MR NORTJE: Yes, as far as I know.

MR HATTINGH: So you say that he was generally known as the person who had to correct what had gone wrong, that he had to cover it up?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is how I understood it.

MR HATTINGH: Let us discuss the false claims for example. We have heard on numerous occasions of all the functions that took place at Vlakplaas.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: During which a great deal of alcohol was consumed.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: We also know for example that General Smit insisted upon only Chivas Regal for him.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: It was a very expensive whisky.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And then there would also be meat and other eats, which would be served during such functions, expensive items.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And how were these functions paid for?

MR NORTJE: Well I managed the purchases in most cases, the purchases of the alcohol and everything was done by means of false claims.

MR HATTINGH: And was General Engelbrecht present during any of these functions?

MR NORTJE: Yes, he was there quite often.

MR HATTINGH: He was there often. And in this affidavit which he made, paragraph 3. - actually it's on page 22 of the attached affidavit, he says firstly

"I was only responsible for the expenses of Group C, and upon my appointment as Head of Crime Intelligence Services, I was responsible for the expenses for Crime Intelligence Services."

MR HATTINGH: If an official request was put in for funds in order to cover the expenses of these functions, who would have had to approve such a claim?

MR NORTJE: General Engelbrecht always appeared at the bottom of the claim.

MR HATTINGH: In other words, if it was an official claim it would have been undersigned by him?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And there was never an official claim in which it was declared that these expenses were incurred for the recreation of police members at Vlakplaas?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: It was always a false claim?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: I understand that the prescription was that if an informer was registered under a false name, a document would have to be placed somewhere in a safe, in which his real identity and his real signature would appear, along with his fictitious identity and his fictitious signature with regard to that specific identity.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Was that prescription obeyed in all cases?

MR NORTJE: No. The documentation which was kept, as far as I can recall, because I also registered a number of false source who did not exist, we would have to create an alibi or a legend for the person by means of a false identity numbers. Any number would do. At that stage any number which would suit the person. There were forms that we would have to fill in for that, but they were false documents.

MR HATTINGH: Also false. The usual manner in which funds would be obtained in this manner would be to pretend that there was a source who had provided certain information for which he was supposed to receive some kind of remuneration, but in actuality this person never existed and the funds which were obtained in this manner were used to cover the expenses for the functions which you held?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: In paragraph 3.11 of the affidavit made by General Engelbrecht, he states

"I further note that Mr de Kock alleges that he was suspended from official duties during the latter-mentioned operation (and that's the Chand operation) because this took place when the Harms Commission was busy investigating the activities of Vlakplaas. I find it highly improbable that even Brigadier van Rensburg would have authorised this operation, and this was probably once again a case during which Mr de Kock acted upon his own initiative and purely upon the request of friends of his who were connected to the DCC, and for this reason gave the members of his unit orders and launched the operation."

Might I just ask you the following question. According to your knowledge, it had to come to light that you were involved in this operation insofar as it involved DCC.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: I don't think you understand my question correctly, let me put it to you again. Did you wish for it to become known among DCC members that you were involved in the Chand matter?

MR NORTJE: No, that is what we wanted to conceal from them.

MR HATTINGH: And that was the whole idea behind the creation of the legend that you were in Natal?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: To the extent that they had to know about it, it cannot be said that DCC requested you to launch this operation?

MR NORTJE: No, I don't believe it would have happened that way.

MR HATTINGH: Such cross-border operations usually created a great deal of uproar in the media?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And there was always a rumour about who could be responsible for it?

MR NORTJE: Correct.

MR HATTINGH: And the rumour would always be that it was the Security Forces, whether it be the South African Defence Force or the South African Police who were involved in the incident?

MR NORTJE: That is correct, there weren't many organisations who launched such operations.

MR HATTINGH: Would you have been involved in such an incident on your own initiative?

MR NORTJE: I must say that under no circumstances would we have been involved in a foreign operation with the consequences that it could possibly have held if it went wrong for example, being detained there or a shooting incident. Thus, I don't believe that there was any possibility that we had the necessary authorisation.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chairman, Cornelius on behalf of Britz and Vermeulen.

Just two aspects, Mr Nortje. You would agree that Mr Vermeulen the seventh applicant, was not involved in the operation itself in Botswana, he helped with the packing of equipment before the time?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And he was then a member of the so-called cover-group in Richards Bay?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And as far as Mr Britz is concerned, he did not enter the house itself, he assisted Mr de Kock after he had injured his knee.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And he went with the rest of the group to Richards Bay, where he later obtained medical treatment?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairman.

Mr Nortje, during this incident, that would be April 1990, had you also been expelled?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR WAGENER: Do you know whether any other members - we heard that Mr de Kock had been expelled, do you know whether any other members had been expelled?

MR NORTJE: It was Paul van Dyk and Koos Vermeulen who had also been expelled.

MR WAGENER: So only those three?

MR NORTJE: As far as I can recall.

MR WAGENER: Then, during your evidence-in-chief you gave an answer at a stage when I made a note, and I'm not entirely certain whether I had your answer correctly, so I'm going to put this question to you and if you've answered it, please forgive me. This has to do with the issue of the information note which you referred to on page 40 of the bundle, where you say that Mr Ras submitted an information note, which ultimately went to General Smit.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR WAGENER: I'm not entirely certain, was the question whether you saw the information note itself?

MR NORTJE: No, I didn't see it myself, I assumed that that would have been the procedure which was followed.

MR WAGENER: So this is a pure assumption and nothing else?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR WAGENER: Then you were examined by Mr Hattingh with regard to General Engelbrecht, specifically regarding the Japie Maponya matter and the Nelspruit matter. I accept that these will later be the subjects of amnesty hearings and I understand the process, we will deal with it then. So at this stage I would just like to put it to you that these two, or with regard to these two incidents, Mr Engelbrecht denies that he covered any evidence or manipulated any evidence. I'm simply putting it to you, do you wish to comment?

MR NORTJE: No, I will stand by what I have said.

MR WAGENER: And in fact with those matters more particulars will be forwarded, which will indicate that he was in no position to cover up any evidence. Do you wish to comment on that?

MR NORTJE: No, that is how I understood it, that is why he was there.

MR WAGENER: Then with regard to the false claims I would just like to put it to you that General Engelbrecht denies that at any stage, even during cases where he signed claims in the final instance, he denies that these were indeed false claims and that you and other members of Vlakplaas were in the process busy stealing the State's money by means of fraud. He denies that as well.

MR NORTJE: He can deny it if he wants to, that is his right, but I know that sometimes he sent some of the claims back if they had not been worded correctly and we had rewrite them.

MR WAGENER: Yes, but the point is that he denies that he was aware that you were busy with fraud.

MR NORTJE: No, I cannot agree with that.

MR WAGENER: Then just a final point. Your evidence was that according to you at least Security Head Office was always aware, or at least you used words to that effect, aware of operations such as this matter. Do you recall that evidence of yours?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR WAGENER: What do you say when I put it to you that I studied Mr de Kock's application and saw that there were many incidents for which he has applied for amnesty, which he apparently did not request authorisation for from Head Office.

MR NORTJE: Well I was under the impression that he always had the authorisation. I don't know about the cases when he acted on his own, without any notification.

MR WAGENER: So that is purely your impression?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR WAGENER: No further questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Nortje, just one thing that has been covered. When Mr Engelbrecht sent you to - where was this place, Krugersdorp?

MR NORTJE: Krugersdorp.

ADV SANDI: ... to fetch the petrol register, did he tell what he wanted that petrol register for?

MR NORTJE: That's correct. Because I knew which vehicles had obtained petrol, he asked me to seek out those vehicles specifically. I think that there were two vehicles involved. He first telephone someone at Krugersdorp.

We were certain of the month, but apparently there were three books which had been filled in for that month and I studied the books while I was standing there with the person and the specific book in which our SAP numbers were recorded for our vehicles, that is the book that I removed. I recall that I gave the other two books back to him, but I took that specific book with me.

ADV SANDI: Did he specifically say to you he wanted this petrol register so that a cover-up could be worked out?

MR NORTJE: Yes, well that was the objective with the book.

ADV SANDI: Is that what he said to you when he sent you to go and fetch this petrol register?

MR NORTJE: Yes, the petrol was a problem, the petrol registers and he told me: "We will have to get hold of these petrol registers because it's going to clearly prove that we were there", and that is the impression under which I went to Krugersdorp to fetch the book to bring to him, the impression that this book had to removed from the system or be destroyed.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: So there was now going to be a missing book in the Krugersdorp records? When they wanted to check up their use of petrol, they would find the book was missing?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And wouldn't they enquire as to where it had gone?

MR NORTJE: Apparently there was a system that after a certain number of years - I can't recall whether it was three to five years, these books had to be destroyed and I think that it was during that period of time. So if a book were to have gone missing, it wouldn't have attracted that much attention.

CHAIRPERSON: Well how long after the incident was it that you went there?

MR NORTJE: Four years.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, it's Jan Wagener, if you will just allow me one further issue. I was under the impression that I need not cross-examine on these specific issues now being raised by Mr Sandi, as this will be done when the Maponya matter is to be heard, but perhaps for completeness then, if you would allow me to put one further issue to this witness.

Mr Nortje, General Engelbrecht denies that he sent you to fetch the register at Krugersdorp, and he also denies that he was involved in any way in this action.

MR NORTJE: I'm dead certain that he sent me. I have no doubt about that.

MR WAGENER: Furthermore, it is my instruction that although I could not obtain the prescription right away, but I should have it by the time we deal with the Maponya matter, the prescription was that those books would be destroyed after three to five years. Those are my current instructions.

MR NORTJE: Yes, well it was supposed to have been destroyed, but it wasn't because we obtained it.

MR WAGENER: Mr Nortje, I will accept that for the moment. We will discuss this later during the hearing of the Maponya incident. Thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Roelof du Plessis on record on behalf of Wouter Mentz.

Mr Nortje, could I just understand your evidence correctly, do you say that you obtained funds for this operation or did you not obtain funds for this operation?

MR NORTJE: As far as I recall I did not obtain funds for this operation. I cannot recall that I received any money for this operation.

MR DU PLESSIS: Let us refer to these so-called bonuses that were paid out now and then. Certain bonuses were paid out from time to time?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Were they ever connected to an operation or was this just something which was paid out from time to time for a period of service during which certain operations could have taken place? How was it approached, were these bonuses paid for specific operations or after a certain period of time?

MR NORTJE: No, these bonuses were not allocated for specific service in a specific incident. No-one ever came to you and said: "Here's money for that incident", it didn't happen that way. Mr de Kock handled every person as an individual, if he felt that this person had earned the money he would give it to them, but I cannot recall that he said at any stage: "This money is for that person and that person". As it occurred after the ex-calibre operation, everyone of us received a bonus, but this was about the weapons and everybody knew what it was about and it was Mr de Kock's decision because we worked long hours and those were very difficult times. However, I cannot recall that he came to the members at any stage and said: "Listen, here's money for that specific operation".

MR DU PLESSIS: And that counts for you as well, you cannot recall that he gave you any money for a specific operation?

MR NORTJE: This was the only time that he gave me money, that I realised that it was with regard to the Greytown incident, after the time.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you state that he gave the money to every person individually?

MR NORTJE: Yes, as far as I can recall.

MR DU PLESSIS: And it would have been between him and that person. When it came to the reception of the money, he would have gone and approached Mr X, and given him an amount and said something to him, separately, while no-one else was present?

MR NORTJE: Yes, it would have depended upon circumstances.

MR DU PLESSIS: Upon what?

MR NORTJE: Circumstances.

MR DU PLESSIS: But that doesn't help me at all. I want to know whether the money was given by Mr de Kock separately to every person individually in the absence of other persons, or what was the normal procedure?

MR NORTJE: Sometimes, - and I cannot recall the specific incident but sometimes, especially for the black members, he would give each one of them an envelope, but I cannot recall that he lined the whites up and gave money to them in that fashion. I can't recall that that ever happened.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I'm not talking about lining them up and handing out money, I'm just asking a certain question. If he gave the members money, did he give them money individually or did he call them all together and give every one of them an amount of money, yes or no? Which one is correct? Did he do it collectively?

MR NORTJE: Sometimes he did it individually and sometimes collectively, it depended upon circumstances.

MR DU PLESSIS: So you say sometimes it took place in a group and sometimes it took place on an individual basis?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And what would he then have said when he handed out this money?

MR NORTJE: I don't know, he was very unpredictable.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well what I mean is, would he have said: "Here's money for you, be glad, here's money for you"? Or would he have said: "This money is for what you have done thus far", or would he have said: "This money is for this operation or that operation"?

MR NORTJE: After a time he would have handed out this money and the members would have assumed that this was for services rendered. He didn't say specifically that this was for that operation or another operation.

MR DU PLESSIS: And it was always Mr de Kock who gave you the money?

MR NORTJE: As far as I know, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: You were Mr de Kock's right-hand man on the farm.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: To such an extent that officers would sometimes have to take orders from you or obey you in practice.

MR NORTJE: No, I wouldn't say that, I would have told them: "Mr de Kock said this or that". I wouldn't have given them orders.

MR DU PLESSIS: I've studied your evidence with regard to the evidence of Wouter Mentz, with regard to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going onto something different now?

MR DU PLESSIS: I'm building up to this, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: These payments, have you finished with them?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, this was the background. I'm going to go over to the payments, ja.

CHAIRPERSON: These payments you got, do you know where they came from, were they also false claims made?

MR NORTJE: Sometimes it would be a false claim, sometimes it would be a source claim, a false source claim. Sometimes it would be a claim that was submitted for weapons and then the claim would return and he would have the money on him and give it to whoever. However, it came from Head Office.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but there would be no record of you having been paid this amount?

MR NORTJE: No, we didn't sign for the money.

CHAIRPERSON: And I presume that also means you never told the Receiver of Revenue that you received it?

MR NORTJE: No, we wouldn't have done that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Nortje, it must have happened sometimes that one of the other persons or you were requested by Mr de Kock to hand over money to some of those persons who were to receive such an amount.

MR NORTJE: If I were to say no, it would not be the truth, but I cannot recall anything specific. He would have said to me: "Take the money and give it to him". It is possible.

MR DU PLESSIS: So you would concede to a possibility?

MR NORTJE: Yes, it is possible, but what Wouter says about specifically being called in to the office by me and receiving R6 000 is something that I cannot recall.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well then let's leave the office aspect out of it and look at the question, being that Wouter Mentz gave evidence that you gave him the money. And according to your evidence of a few moments ago, you conceded that there was a possibility.

MR NORTJE: Yes, but it's improbable.

MR DU PLESSIS: But you concede to a possibility.

MR NORTJE: If I had given Wouter money or if I had given him the envelope, I wouldn't believe that he would have received money on numerous occasions under those circumstances. I cannot recall that I gave him the money.

MR DU PLESSIS: Look you must understand what he is saying. He says that you gave him an envelope, he's not saying that you gave him the money, he states that you gave him an envelope.

MR NORTJE: Yes, but I would have known that there was money inside.

MR DU PLESSIS: How would you have known that, couldn't Mr de Kock just have asked you to give him the envelope and then you gave him the envelope? Isn't that a possibility?

MR NORTJE: Yes, it may be a possibility, but I cannot recall that, I can really not recall that I gave him anything.

MR DU PLESSIS: To convey a mere envelope isn't something that you can recall.

MR NORTJE: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: In the light of that then, would you concede that the possibility exists that you gave Wouter Mentz and envelope? He never said that you knew that there was R6 000 inside, he just says that you gave him an envelope.

MR NORTJE: Yes, I would concede to that.

MR DU PLESSIS: And your evidence is that you never received any money for this operation.

MR NORTJE: I cannot recall that I received any money.

MR DU PLESSIS: You see Mr Nortje, if I could take you to page 62 of the bundle, there is the answer that you have just given to this question, paragraph 10(c) and (d). You state

"I cannot recall that any specific benefits or financial remuneration were received by me for this incident."

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now I have summarised the applicants with regard to this matter and perhaps I could just briefly discuss this summary with you. Willemse and Britz maintain that they did not receive money. Bosch states in his affidavit, on page 67, that he did receive a bonus. And we will examine him when he gives evidence about this. Ras states on page 120, that he received money. Mr Tait states in his application that he did not receive any money, but he was not questioned about this during his evidence. So we have various versions here ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: May I just come in regarding Bosch. What my learned friend perhaps must look at is the page that was omitted regarding this specific incident, which is page 50, it must now just be after page 73, paginated page 73. His reply to this specific incident is

"Not applicable"

As I pointed out further - perhaps my learned friend - is that page 67 is the general form that was completed and it relates to, not to specific incidents but generally that bonuses in cash were received. I just want to put that on record.

MR DU PLESSIS: May I just understand, Mr Chairman. Is my learned friend saying that what is on page 67 refers to other operations, not this specific one?

MR LAMEY: It was replied in general to that question on that form. In general to - he made mention of bonuses received.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, I accept that, Mr Chairman.

Mr Nortje, then we have the answer here that you don't recall specifically, but I want to take you to page 47. On page 47 you refer to Annexure A, that's the general form. Was Annexure A, was it just a set-out of all your actions? Is this Annexure A which is attached to this amnesty application which begins on page 44, a summary of all your actions or has it just to do with this specific incident?

MR NORTJE: I assume it would be all the actions.

MR DU PLESSIS: And can I refer you to page 36. There you answer on that form, at paragraph (c) and (d) at the top of the page, to a question "Did you receive anything financially or otherwise?" and you said

"Yes"

And then you say:

"Financial remuneration"

Is this with regard to this operation or with all the operations?

MR NORTJE: I think it's with regard to all the operations.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I may just point out that I thought that page 36 referred to this specific incident and that would have been contradictory to what he stated later in his application, but he has answered it now. Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Booyens for the applicant, Tait, Chairperson.

Mr Nortje, please go to page 40, the last paragraph. You have already said that you have made a mistake, that Hoffman was present with this operation, but you might have been thinking of another operation. Just to identify this, can you tell us where this operation was and approximately when? - the one which you say that Hoffman was definitely present. We know it was in Botswana, but you have to be more specific please.

MR NORTJE: I imagine it was after this incident, approximately 20 kilometres south of Ramatlhabana.

MR BOOYENS: So after this incident - in other words this would have been after April 1990, in Ramatlhabana?

MR NORTJE: Yes, if I remember correctly.

MR BOOYENS: Can you please page to page 41, you make the statement there that Martiens and John Tait kicked the door down. You've already heard that Douw Willemse said that he kicked the door open, and you heard the evidence of Mr Tait in which he said he did not do it. Do you have any problems with that, that you might be mistaken there?

MR NORTJE: No, I don't have a problem, it's possible that it might have happened in that way.

MR BOOYENS: And you have also heard that Mr Tait said that he, on short notice, received notice of this operation and that he did not know of the DCC connection. You cannot dispute that?

MR NORTJE: No, I cannot.

MR BOOYENS: And then on page 42 - now I know these things took place very quickly. You heard Mr Tait saying that as far as his recollection goes, he and Mr Ras passed each other and he recalls that he shot a person and his weapon stalled after one shot. You are not in a position to deny that, that John Tait only fired one shot? And the only reason why he didn't shoot any further was because his weapon was stuck.

MR NORTJE: I gave my version as I recalled it.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. Thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Chairperson, Ramula Patel on record.

Mr Nortje, during the month before when you became aware of the planning into this operation, did you at any stage assist Mr Ras in the planning?

MR NORTJE: No, Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Were you aware of the fact that he was interviewing Askaris at the time, to collect information?

MR NORTJE: I know he would have used them because they were the persons who knew best what had happened in the house.

MS PATEL: Do you have knowledge on which Askaris specifically he would have used to get his information?

MR NORTJE: It was definitely the four that we had arrested at Magaliesburg, that he had these interviews with.

MS PATEL: During this period at Vlakplaas, were you also in charge of some of the Askaris?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MS PATEL: Alright. Now at the time that you would have become encharged with - and this is a general question, with any of the Askaris, would you at least as their handler, know where they had come from and what their general background would have been and how they landed at Vlakplaas?

MR NORTJE: I did not specifically go into that, but I had an idea as to where they came from but I did not have that much detail. Some of them I knew quite well, some of them I did not know exactly where they came from or what their background was.

MS PATEL: Mr Ras made mention of a specific Askari by the name of Howard, who was arrested at the Lichtenburg roadblock, did you know him?

MR NORTJE: Yes, I did know him.

MS PATEL: Now he'd also passed through the Chand house on his way into the country, were you aware of that?

MR NORTJE: Not at that stage I did not know it, I've only received the information now. I did not know that he also moved through that house, because he never worked with me.

MS PATEL: Alright. Do you have any idea how many of the Askaris that were present at Vlakplaas had come into the country through this specific infiltration route?

MR NORTJE: According to the knowledge that I had, it was only the four which we arrested at Magaliesburg.

MS PATEL: Okay.

MR NORTJE: As I said I did not go into any details and I did not know Howard also came through there.

MS PATEL: Where would the information about the 70, or the approximate number of the 70 PAC members having come into the country, how would that information have been collected?

MR NORTJE: I did not specifically receive the information, I assumed this was discussion that Ras had with the other members. And it came to my knowledge that a large amount of PAC members had already moved through the transit house.

MS PATEL: You were questioned about the information that Christo Nel had given to the Truth Commission regarding the infiltration of PAC members into the country and Tony Oosthuizen's specific position within that scenario. I'm not sure what your response was, I can't recollect clearly, but if you could just refresh my memory. Was your information - was your response to Mr Hattingh's question that you were not aware of anybody having tried to discipline Tony Oosthuizen regarding this specific infiltration route that he had set up?

MR NORTJE: I did not have that information. The information that I had was that there was a problem with Tony Oosthuizen's manner in which he allows the people to come inside the country and they go out of his control. I had no detail as to when they came in or where they went to, or where they disappeared to. I did not have that information.

MS PATEL: There seems to be consensus that it was in fact Tony Oosthuizen who had set up Mr Chand and the infiltration route, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that's how I understood it.

MS PATEL: Okay. So on what basis is it then said that Mr Chand acted as a double-agent, given that it was in fact Mr Tony Oosthuizen who had set him up?

MR NORTJE: I did not know he was a double-agent, I think this was an inference that I drew. I did not have the detail of that information.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can you give us an indication of what time-period we're looking at in which it had become evident that Tony Oosthuizen had set up the infiltration route and had lost control over, or the perception that he had lost control over the PAC persons who were being infiltrated into the country?

MR NORTJE: I cannot help you with that, I don't have that information.

MS PATEL: Are we looking at months or years, just a rough ...(intervention)

MR NORTJE: It had to be a reasonable time. I assume it would have been more than a year, because they would not have infiltrated so many people in such a short period of time.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can you give us an indication, just from your knowledge, of how many people would generally be infiltrated, say per month? - through the PAC channels specifically.

MR NORTJE: It is very difficult to say. I would say approximately 5, 6, 8 a month. I can't say, I don't know. It's very difficult.

MS PATEL: What specific knowledge did you have on the Chand family, during the preparation period?

MR NORTJE: After I had heard everything, I was under the impression that the whole family was involved with this assistance. And as I said, it was information that I picked up and the bits and pieces that I picked up. The fact that the wife and the sons were involved, at that stage - how can I say, it did not matter to me that they were of assistance because I would believe that our actions were right. I cannot say now that I knew. It must have been mentioned because it sounded familiar, the fact that the sons were helping the people get to the border. But I just knew that they were indeed involved. As I have said, these things came up when I spoke to the people again.

MS PATEL: Okay. Two things that need clarifying. How did you know that the sons were involved?

MR NORTJE: Well that is what was told to me, or it was said at some stage.

MS PATEL: By who?

MR NORTJE: I assume Martiens Ras. He was the only one who would have had that information.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can you remember how many sons he would have mentioned?

MR NORTJE: I had two in mind, I did not know the third one.

MS PATEL: Okay. And that information could only have come from Ras, is that correct, the fact that you thought there were only two?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MS PATEL: Okay. And the wife's involvement?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that she was also involved with the assistance.

MS PATEL: Can you recall exactly how she would have been?

MR NORTJE: No, it was not mentioned to me.

MS PATEL: Okay. And the security guard?

MR NORTJE: I imagine that he said that there was a guard, but we did not know whether he was armed or whether he was trained, or any of that information.

MS PATEL: Can you possibly then explain why you and other members of your group were surprised by him, by his presence there? - if it was known beforehand?

MR NORTJE: I can't that we were so much - look we expected anything. It might have been that we expected him, but I would not say that we were so much surprised because we were ready for anything. The dogs were also a factor, the guard was a factor and I don't think any specific person was told to shoot the guard, not that I can remember. This just happened on the spur of the moment. When the guard came out he was shot.

MS PATEL: Just for clarity, Sir, are you saying that you expected the guard, in the sense that you generally expected unexpected things to happen, or that the guard was mentioned at the planning stage and no specific instructions were given in regard to him?

MR NORTJE: I assume that the guard was mentioned at the briefing.

MS PATEL: And there was no instruction given in regard to what was to be done to the guard?

MR NORTJE: Everything assumed that he would be shot, there's nothing else that we could have done. But I cannot specifically remember that somebody said that: "You will shoot the guard", or who would shoot the guard. I cannot remember that we discussed that.

MS PATEL: Would that not have been part of your planning? Because as I understand your application you're saying that things sort of went wrong when the guards - not the guards, the guard had alerted the occupants of the house to your presence. So given that you say you knew that he was there, it seems odd to me that specific planning wasn't made around what was to be done to him. Surely he would have been the first person that you would have planning around?

MR NORTJE: We did not know at which stage - if we did encounter him, the fact that when he was shot he started screaming and this made the whole situation more difficult.

MS PATEL: I accept that it made the situation more difficult, I - was it not foreseen though?

MR NORTJE: It must have been foreseen.

MS PATEL: Okay. You stated in your application - if I can just find the reference, you stated in your application on page 61, that complications had set in and then you state that

"Complications during this preparation added to the suspense, and the decisions which were taken in the heat of the moment."

Which decisions are you referring to specifically that were taken in the heat of the moment, that weren't foreseen or planned? What is that a reference to?

MR NORTJE: As I have already said, this statement, when I made this statement I doubted about - the children were a problem, and I made this statement with the, and I tried to give the explanation here because I cannot remember what the role of the children and the wife was. What happened there and afterwards did not happen as we had foreseen it - in my mind I expected that we will encounter resistance and what we encountered there and what we expected there was, it did not - how can I say, it was a surprise. I did not go in with the idea, or I did not think that I would shoot the woman, I did not think that I would have to shoot the child. You have to see it in that light. There were complications, and the fact that things started going wrong.

All that I can say is that I did not expect that we would find the wife and children there, I expected that we would find the insurgents there. Because I mean we were ready if we had to encounter any resistance.

MS PATEL: Sir, I put it to you that you were surprised by the presence of the wife and the children there, because it was never part of the planning.

MR NORTJE: No, that is exactly where I have the problem. When I made this statement I could not place the role of the woman and the two sons and at some stage I thought that we might have shot these people unnecessarily. That is what my concern was, until the moment when I started talking about it. They said that this was our objective, they were involved. I did not go with the object of, or I did not think that I would be in this situation where I have to shoot the children or the son or the wife. That is what was my concern.

MS PATEL: But Sir, you were closely involved in this operation. You stated that you were, to a large extent, Mr de Kock's right-hand man, that you had - you were privy to information from the start of the assembling of information for the planning of this operation because of your position. How is it now that you are surprised by your specific involvement in this operation regarding, especially the wife and the children?

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think that's a fair question, is it? He didn't say he was involved in the planning because of his position, he said because of his relationship with de Kock, he picked up bits of information which made him understand what Ras was doing. Isn't that what you said?

MR NORTJE: That is right, Sir.

MS PATEL: I'm sorry, Sir, my understanding was also that you had spoken to Ras from time to time and that he was aware that Mr Ras was planning this operation, and that information didn't come to him from de Kock only, but that it had come to him from Mr Ras as well.

Was my understanding incorrect, Sir?

MR NORTJE: I can possibly say that in the information which I received from Ras, the involvement of the wife and children was not set out or pertinently set out or voiced. I might have just heard it. It was not that it was a problem, we did not foresee - and I assume that is what we thought, or I assume what I thought, that this would be a problem at the scene.

What I had in mind was that we knew that the wife - but we assumed that they might be there, but in my mind I thought that we will encounter resistance from the members who might be there. And later I realised that - this is in my own mind, that the information was not correct, or whatever the case may be, but it had happened already. The situation took place, so what could we do about it?

MS PATEL: Okay. Just for clarity, are you saying it's the media, the information that was gained after the operation had been finalised, that confused you regarding the children itself?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MS PATEL: Okay. You've stated also - I don't recollect that Mr Ras said this, but you've stated in your application, on page 42, the second paragraph, that - and this is: after people had been killed you left Mr Ras with the explosives, you went through the house and then came back and you saw Mr Ras put Mrs Chand on the bed again and thereafter put the explosives under the mattress, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MS PATEL: Now my instructions are that Mrs Chand's body was found in the kitchen, can ...(intervention)

MR NORTJE: That is what I heard.

MS PATEL: You're certain of your recollection though, that Mr Ras put Mrs ...

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MS PATEL: Okay, alright. Can I just ask you, if the instruction in terms - or if the objective, in terms of the explosives, was to damage the building so that it can't be used again, do you have any idea why Mrs Chand's body should be put back on the bed on which the explosives were put, if the intention was to damage the building?

MR NORTJE: I didn't take that decision, but I assume that this was done in order to disguise any evidence or proof. That may have been one of the objectives behind that.

MS PATEL: Disguise what evidence, Sir? Could you perhaps elaborate?

MR NORTJE: It's difficult to say what exactly we thought or what exactly Mr Ras thought. That was a decision that was taken in the heat of the moment. Perhaps he had it in mind to conceal evidence or to try and make it appear as an accident, that the explosion was to look like an accident. It's very difficult to say.

MS PATEL: Okay. If I can just backtrack slightly as well. Was it your evidence-in-chief that Mr Chand - after the guard had been shot and the occupants had been alerted, that Mr Chand came out of the house onto the porch and was then shot?

MR NORTJE: No, he didn't come out of the house, he was still in the house. Ras shot from outside, from beyond the veranda. There was a window. I don't know if he went onto the veranda or whether he stood in front of the veranda, but the person emerged from the bedroom and shone the torchlight. The dog was with him and the door was still closed.

MS PATEL: Okay. And then just, the other person that you shot in the house, were you the first person to shoot whoever you had killed?

MR NORTJE: Yes, I assume that I was the first one.

MS PATEL: Was the person awake when you entered the room?

MR NORTJE: No.

MS PATEL: I take it then that there was no reaction?

MR NORTJE: No.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can I ask you, at the meeting, at the briefing session on the farm in Zeerust, were people specifically informed that this was a PAC operation, that it was against the PAC?

MR NORTJE: I must tell you I cannot recall whether or not I attended that briefing session. I cannot recall that I sat in on it, because I probably already had information. I can't explain it, but I can't recall that I attended that meeting. I assume that that is what the session was about. They were not briefed before the time, they were briefed there on the farm, Tait, Louw and the others. That is who I am referring to.

MS PATEL: I find it strange Sir, that all members to an operation that had so many risks, especially given that it was a cross-border operation, would not be present together at a briefing session.

MR NORTJE: Yes, it may sound strange. I'm not saying that I wasn't there, I probably wasn't listening to what was said, but I can't recall it pertinently because I can't remember anything about the map, I can't recall looking at the map, the map that Ras has spoken of which was sketched and represented the premises.

MS PATEL: You probably weren't listening, is that what you said, Sir?

MR NORTJE: Yes, it is possible that I wasn't paying attention.

MS PATEL: This was a high-risk operation.

MR NORTJE: Well I can't explain that. I would like to, but I cannot.

MS PATEL: Was the instruction to kill everyone regardless of who you found there?

MR NORTJE: I assume that that is what was said, because as I have said, when I went I was under the impression that we may experience resistance and that is what I had in mind. Because we knew that we couldn't enter a place if we weren't prepared, that's why I prepared for resistance. And it must have been said that everybody was to be shot because that's why we did it.

MS PATEL: Chairperson, would you grant me a moment please. Sir, can you recollect whether you would have known or been informed at some stage that the sons of Mr Chand were deaf and dumb, that two of his sons were deaf and dumb?

MR NORTJE: No, I didn't know it at that time. I cannot recall that it was ever mentioned to me. This is something which emerged later with the reports which appeared in the media.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can you possibly explain Sir, why this operation was so urgent, given that the problems had existed for quite some time?

MR NORTJE: I cannot recall, or I cannot think of any reason why it was urgent. There was probably a reason, but I wasn't informed about it. There's is nothing that I can recall.

MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL

CHAIRPERSON: When were you told that you were a member of the penetration unit?

MR NORTJE: I assume that the decision was taken on the farm, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: At the meeting that you can't remember being at?

MR NORTJE: I assume that that was when those decisions were taken, because as I've said I had the grenade-launcher with me and at a stage we discussed the possibility of resistance from the Botswana Defence Force, and the fact that we would act in that case. These were just precautionary measures that we took. At that stage it may have been during the briefing that I cannot recall or it may have been on the way there, but I can't recall specifically. - because I assume that I must have done this.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje, I infer that before the other members were informed about the issue, or the order that was issued for specific members to prepare for an operation, that you anticipated an operation at that stage, you knew before the others, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: However, you were not involved on a continuous basis with that which Martiens Ras was involved with?

MR NORTJE: No, I wasn't.

MR LAMEY: As you gave evidence you began to understand what was going to happen, through bits of information which you accumulated. These bits of information which came to your knowledge, can you recall whether or not they came from Martiens Ras, or specifically from de Kock?

MR NORTJE: It must have been from both I assume.

MR LAMEY: Before the other members were involved in the operation, at that stage you had already assumed or known that you were going to be part of this operation?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Your evidence was that you cannot recall the specific briefing session, you do however know that you would have been involved as a member of the penetration group that was to enter the house?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: I don't want you to speculate about this and I don't want you to guess, but is it possible that instructions to involve you within a specific penetration group may have come to you via another route, anything other than the briefing session, that someone else could have said to you: "Listen you're going to be part of the penetration group. You and this member and that member will all be members of the penetration group"?

MR NORTJE: Yes, I assume that Martiens must have told me, because he would have led the operation.

MR LAMEY: I assume that that information session on the farm was specifically geared for those members who had not known before, like Martinus Ras and Eugene de Kock and yourself?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Just to return to the unforeseen circumstance with the guard, what was the element of surprise surrounding the guard? Where did the moment begin where something else occurred which was not expected at that point?

MR NORTJE: When we came walking up along the fence, one behind the other, and the guard emerged from the structure was the first, what followed after that was the great surprise.

MR LAMEY: So you say what followed after that was the big surprise, what was that, please spell it out.

MR NORTJE: The moment that the guard was shot and he began to scream. We must have foreseen that there would have been a guard, I have no doubt of that. We must have discussed it. But the big surprise ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: If I could just interrupt you. That after he had been shot with the Scorpion, he began to scream?

MR NORTJE: Yes, in my mind the weapon that Mr de Kock used, the one that I had warned him about - he fired five or six shots and the person was still alive. And that is also something which made everything go wrong in my opinion. That was the beginning of the way things went wrong.

MR LAMEY: You've already said that what ensued was the report with regard to the children and that confused you because when you made your amnesty application you couldn't bring the role of the wife and children into the whole story.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Persons that you encountered during the penetration of the house and specifically the person that you encountered on the way out, did they not create the image of a young child, in your mind?

MR NORTJE: No, not at all.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

MR SIBANYONI: No questions, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We haven't seen any plans. As I understand from you, when you entered the house you went into what was a bedroom, there was someone sleeping in the bed with a blanket over him.

MR NORTJE: No, it wasn't a bedroom, Chairperson, as I recall it was in a passage where I found the person. I cannot recall that I went into a room, apart from the main bedroom.

CHAIRPERSON: And did that open off the passage?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And do you know where the other two people were?

MR NORTJE: No, I didn't see them.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand it you wanted to get out of there as quickly as possible, you all rushed in, shot everything you saw and went?

MR NORTJE: That's basically how it happened.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman, if the question is completed, then I'm ready - subject to Mr Cornelius, I believe he's got a problem, but I am ready to proceed with the next applicant.

MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chairman, I've got a plane to catch to Cape Town at twenty to four. If I don't make it, it's not the end of the problem. I represent Vermeulen who was erroneously implicated, which has all been correct, so I'll be fast with his application, and then I've got David Britz, but I'm subject to your time.

CHAIRPERSON: Well do you want to interpose and call Britz now?

MR CORNELIUS: I'll appreciate that, Mr Chairman. I have arranged it with my learned colleague.

MR LAMEY: I've got no objection, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: How long do you think you'll be?

MR CORNELIUS: I'm known for my brevity. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

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