Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Right, we can carry on, I think.

J D POTGIETER: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr Potgieter, I would just like to discuss the period after the handing over of Mr Mabotha, the meeting with Mr de Kock there at Wachthuis, was a coincidence you said.

MR POTGIETER: (s.u.o) That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you cannot recall whether you were still tasked with the case of Mrs Winnie Mandela.

MR POTGIETER: Chairperson, I said I will not say that I was not involved in the incident any more, although I was involved with another component. And I cannot exactly remember when it was, but if there were any other developments, it is only logical that I would have been contacted and would become involved again.

MR HATTINGH: But you cannot recall whether this was after you had been transferred to the Intelligence Component?

MR POTGIETER: I can really not recall the day and date.

MR HATTINGH: I assume that when Mr de Kock told you that Mr Mabotha was gone you must have asked for some details.

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR HATTINGH: You did not ask him when he had gone, when was the last time you saw him and so forth?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR HATTINGH: Was it not important for you to know how long this man had been outside, possibly at his home and running the risk of being exposed to the ANC?

MR POTGIETER: No, this is why I sent a telex.

MR HATTINGH: So you showed no reaction whatsoever with regard to this conveyance.

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR HATTINGH: You also did not ask Mr de Kock why he did not tell you that the man was gone?

MR POTGIETER: No. Because at a previous instance he also told me that a man was gone, this is Mr Dlomo whom I mentioned yesterday.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, but you had interest here. You were afraid that Mr Mabotha could possibly be caught by the ANC and possibly be injured or killed. Isn't that true?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that is why I made the enquiries.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you ask Mr Kritzinger if he had reported to him?

MR POTGIETER: Chairperson, I cannot specifically remember that I did so, but with the sending of the telex I made enquiries.

CHAIRPERSON: My question was, did you ask Mr Kritzinger, the man who had taken over your post from you? Not whether you sent a fax to Pietersburg.

MR POTGIETER: I cannot specifically recall if I spoke to him.

CHAIRPERSON: But wouldn't that be the proper thing to do? If this vital witness was no longer in custody, to find out from the new investigating officer if he knew where the witness was?

MR POTGIETER: That would be the logical step, yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And specifically in the light of the fact that you asked Mr Mabotha to contact you and he knew that you were not available any more at the Component where you had been previously.

MR POTGIETER: Please repeat that.

MR HATTINGH: I said that it is specifically important to ask Mr Kritzinger if he had liaised with Mr Mabotha, whether Mabotha has contacted him, because of the fact that you knew that Mabotha would not be able to contact you at your new Component.

MR POTGIETER: Yes. I must have made some enquiries.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall?

MR POTGIETER: No, I just cannot recall.

MR HATTINGH: You cannot recall what the message was if you did indeed make enquiries?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR HATTINGH: But to return to my point here, Mr Potgieter, was it not important for you to know how long the man had been gone away from Vlakplaas? To assess this situation?

MR POTGIETER: The fact of the matter was that the man was gone and how long he was gone and when he had disappeared was not of great import to me. The fact was that he was gone and that is why I made some enquiries.

MR HATTINGH: Would you not, Mr Potgieter, in light of your version and the undertaking of Mr de Kock that he house Mr Mabotha and keep him and detain him, not detain him in the sense of limit his movements, but to offer shelter to him from the ANC, would you not expect him to contact you if Mr Mabotha had disappeared?

MR POTGIETER: I would have expected it, yes.

MR HATTINGH: And I would have expected that you would ask him, but why did you not let me know that he had disappeared?

MR POTGIETER: But I cannot recall that I asked him that.

ADV SANDI: Excuse me, Mr Hattingh. Mr Potgieter, was Mr Mabotha supposed to just disappear or was he supposed to leave Vlakplaas in a formal way. Did Mr de Kock know that he has given a train ticket to Mr Mabotha?

MR POTGIETER: Mr de Kock did not know the train tickets and specific manner in which he was supposed to leave Vlakplaas was not cleared with him. I left it to his own judgement.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Potgieter, now you have heard that Mr Mabotha has gone and now you make enquiries and you liaise with Pietersburg, firstly, is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Whom did you speak to there?

MR POTGIETER: I imagine that I spoke to Mr Charles van Wyk and that is why I went to see him as well about a month ago.

MR HATTINGH: Can you not recall that it was him?

MR POTGIETER: No, I cannot specifically remember, but I would imagine that I spoke to him. That would have been the logical step because he was the Investigative Chief at Pietersburg.

MR HATTINGH: And what exactly was the request which you directed at him?

MR POTGIETER: I told him what the position was with regard to Mr Mabotha and asked him to follow it, and I followed it up with a telex where the address was given to him and asked him to do some undercover enquiries for me.

MR HATTINGH: Let's get to this aspect. When you made the enquiries, was it because you were concerned because of the fact that your important witness was not available any more? Or was it because you concerned about the safety of Mr Mabotha?

MR POTGIETER: I think both.

MR HATTINGH: So can you then say is first mentioned included with, was Mr Mabotha still a potential witness and would there be a possibility that there might be some prosecution against Mrs Mandela?

MR POTGIETER: I believe so, yes.

MR HATTINGH: But at that stage, did you not realise that the political development had moved to such an extent that there would probably be no prosecution against Mrs Mandela?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, the hope did dissipate but at that stage there was no definite indications.

MR HATTINGH: So there was just a possibility, is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And why do you ask Mr van Wyk to make some undercover enquiries? With undercover enquiries I assume you said that enquiries had to be made in such a manner that the family would not know that it was the police who want to know whether Mr Mabotha had arrived or not. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: Not only the family, but the persons in the vicinity.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, but why undercover enquiries?

MR POTGIETER: This is the manner in which we always worked. One did not just go up to people and ask them and made enquiries because they might have kept some information back. But when you do some undercover enquiries you get much better results.

MR HATTINGH: Is it not because the statement from the sister, you had read the statement from the sister of Mr Mabotha, and this is why you make this undercover enquiries. This is the first time we hear about these enquiries. We do not read of it anywhere.

MR POTGIETER: I have only heard of the existence of that statement last year with the investigations.

MR HATTINGH: Please repeat the last part of your answer.

MR POTGIETER: The first time I heard of that statement was last year, was with the Mandela investigation.

MR HATTINGH: But then you said nothing at the Mandela investigations. You said nothing about the undercover enquiries.

MR POTGIETER: I don't think I was asked about that detail.

MR HATTINGH: And yesterday you were also not asked here about the detail, you mentioned it from your own, the fact that there were undercover enquiries.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that was a spontaneous answer. That was our terminology.

MR HATTINGH: But if it was so spontaneous, and this was your, the manner in which you usually go to work, why did it not come to the fore so spontaneously at the Mandela enquiry?

MR POTGIETER: I don't know. I don't have, I have not studied the records of those procedures there.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, Mr Potgieter, in the statement of Mr Mabotha's sister, one Helen Kasago, she makes no mention that enquiries were made by the police with regard to Mr Mabotha. Are you aware of that?

MR POTGIETER: No, but I would accept, I accept your statement.

MR HATTINGH: And I would like to mention to you that one would have expected that she would have mentioned something like that ....

MR POTGIETER: If she was aware of it, yes.

MR HATTINGH: Because she says in the statement that she was informed that Mr Mabotha was arrested and would have been taken to Soweto and that she was informed that she cannot visit him, that only their parents would be allowed to visit him. And then in the following paragraph she says, "I read from the Sunday Times dated 22nd September '96, that my brother Johannes Mabotha has been killed by Colonel Eugene de Kock". No mention whatsoever of enquiries and I want to put it to you that that was the reason why all of a sudden you mentioned these undercover enquiries.

MR POTGIETER: I deny that.

MR HATTINGH: And what I also find strange is that family of Mr Mabotha was represented and it was never put to Mr de Kock that enquiries were indeed made shortly after his release in terms of Section 29.

MR POTGIETER: I am not sure of the correctness of that statement. I think Mr de Kock I know will excuse me. I cannot tell you in which manner the enquiries were executed and I also did not ask who made the enquiries and how it was made. So I cannot answer you there.

MR HATTINGH: The telex that you sent, I've forgotten how a telex works. Is a copy kept at your offices.

MR POTGIETER: That's correct. And I would just like to make a correction which slipped me yesterday is that all correspondence with regard to a detainee is filed into his file and that telex must be contained in that file as well. And therefore there would be a record as to where he was and where he would possibly go.

MR HATTINGH: But did you have access to his file at this stage of developments?

MR POTGIETER: I believe I did.

MR HATTINGH: And what happened to that file, Mr Potgieter?

MR POTGIETER: I think it is the same as with the other files, destroyed after the great fright. I was not involved myself, at that time I was at the Intelligence Component and we did not have personal files in those stacks of files there.

MR HATTINGH: Did you ask Director van Wyk to have a look in their files if such a telex existed?

MR POTGIETER: I spoke, I did speak to Mr van Wyk. He said that when they received that instruction and he could not prevent it, so I assume that that file ... (intervention)

MR HATTINGH: He could not what, you said?

MR POTGIETER: He could not prevent it.

MR HATTINGH: He could not?

MR POTGIETER: He could not prevent the destruction of the files because it was an instruction of Head Office.

MR HATTINGH: Yes. But is that what you said about Mr van Wyk yesterday?

MR POTGIETER: Not as complete as now.

CHAIRPERSON: Yesterday you said that Mr van Wyk told you he couldn't recall such a telex, didn't you?

MR POTGIETER: We are speaking of the destruction of the files, Chairperson. It is correct that he did say he could not recall the telex.

MR HATTINGH: Did you discuss the destruction of files with him?

MR POTGIETER: That was our general discussion, because this is the first place where he would be able to refresh his memory to determine whether the telex had arrived there or not.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have any feedback from them after you sent the telex?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, I did.

MR HATTINGH: In which manner did you get the feedback?

MR POTGIETER: It was telephonically. He said that according to their information, the man never arrived at his home.

MR HATTINGH: And what did you do then, about the whole situation?

MR POTGIETER: I didn't do anything else.

MR HATTINGH: But why not, Mr Potgieter? You had two reasons why you made enquiries. Firstly, you were looking for your important witness, and secondly, you were concerned about Mr Mabotha's safety.

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And now you are told that he did not arrive there and you just leave it at that.

MR POTGIETER: I would not say, or that I, I cannot recall that I did anything else.

CHAIRPERSON: Once again, wasn't the obvious thing to do, to go and see Mr de Kock and say when did he leave? Where was he going to? Did he speak to any of the other askaris here before he left?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall that I had any further dealings with Mr de Kock about this.

CHAIRPERSON: But you had had some dealings. You must have, must recall it, surely?

MR POTGIETER: My contact with Mr de Kock. at that stage, or I can really not recall what the nature of our contact was. I cannot recall how many times I saw Mr de Kock after this and whether I visited Vlakplaas again. I cannot recall that I even visited Vlakplaas during those times.

CHAIRPERSON: If this was one, going by what you have told us, one of the most important witnesses against possibly the most important person who was not subject to detention in the country at that time. It was a most important case, wasn't it?

MR POTGIETER: It would have been a controversial case as I have said that every witness in such a case is important.

CHAIRPERSON: But it seems from what we have heard that once you had handed this potential witness over to Mr de Kock, you really didn't bother very much about what happened to him.

MR POTGIETER: No. I believed that the person would be in some or other capacity and because I was transferred my focus and interests had shifted.

CHAIRPERSON: You were now in Intelligence which was also interested in the safety of the country.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And as you've told us, you handed this man over, you didn't phone Vlakplaas once to say, to find out how he was getting on there, you did nothing. You weren't interested. Why is that?

MR POTGIETER: I believed that he was safe.

CHAIRPERSON: Why not find out? It takes two minutes to make a phone call.

MR POTGIETER: Chairperson, I told you that I did meet Mr de Kock. He said that the man was gone. I did make enquiries ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You met him, by chance, at Headquarters, more than a month after you'd handed over this man. You told us it was in November you met him.

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall the time, but it must have been during that time ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, November.

MR POTGIETER: I can really not tell you or recall when it was.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, yesterday you said November.

MR POTGIETER: I tried to anchor it to the release of the Rivonia Seven, but I was not sure how long before ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Some weeks. It was some weeks after you'd handed this very important witness over, with whom you had this secret arrangement that he could leave if he wanted to. And yet you made no enquiries. Was it because you knew there was no need to make enquiries?

MR POTGIETER: No.

ADV SANDI: Can I just ask one thing? In the event of a criminal prosecution against Mrs Winnie Mandela, in what manner would this gentleman have been helpful? What valuable evidence against Winnie would he have given?

MR POTGIETER: It would have been determined according to the charge sheet. As we discussed yesterday, it would have been around her activities in Soweto and her housing and accommodation of MK members, as well as the attitude against the State.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but her attitude against the State was well known.

MR POTGIETER: That is definitely so, the fact that she voiced her attitude towards the State in public is not necessarily evidence in the sense one has tremendous problems to get the media to give such evidence. So one investigates all possibilities.

ADV SANDI: The good relationship you say you had with Mabotha was that known to Mr de Kock?

MR POTGIETER: I would not be able to say whether the depth of the relationship was known to Mr de Kock.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Potgieter, then, I want to put it to you, that the Security Police was then quite a mighty machine. Would you agree with me?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Extremely sophisticated and with many sources, or informers, countrywide. Is that not true?

MR POTGIETER: Yes. But I don't think we must exaggerate it. If I had listened to the Section 29 investigations last year about the information capabilities of the Security Branch surrounding the activities of Mrs Mandela, then I will not agree with you there, because it might have been put that we were so good.

MR HATTINGH: But you had the capacity to launch a proper investigation into the activities or the whereabouts of Mr Mabotha.

MR POTGIETER: I believe that we had the capacity.

MR HATTINGH: If you had said to the Commander in Pietersburg, look this is of cardinal importance, Head Office has given an order that a high treason investigation against Mrs Mandela be continued, this man will be a witness in that case, should she be charged, then they would have done everything in their power to assist you in attempting to determine where Mr Mabotha was.

MR POTGIETER: I cannot tell you right now, what emphasis I put on Mr Mabotha. The disappearance of witnesses and the misplacement of witnesses was not such a strange occurrence. Many witnesses left the country and it was an essential problem to us throughout the years.

MR HATTINGH: But you're not answering my question. I'm putting it to you that should you have said to the Commander there, this is an important witness and in a possible high treason case against Mrs Mandela, please help me to find the man, he would have done everything in his power to assist you.

MR POTGIETER: I have no doubt that the enquiries which were made were thorough. I don't doubt that.

MR HATTINGH: You still haven't answered my question. The question is should you have said to this person, and this is a hypothetical question, should you have said to him, here is a witness who could be an important witness against Mrs Mandela in a high treason case, and we're looking for him, we can't find him, please help me, he would have done everything in his power to help you.

MR POTGIETER: I believe so.

MR HATTINGH: And even if he didn't want to help me you could have gone to Head Office and asked them to give him an order to help you.

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And you didn't do anything. You simply left it at that. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: No, you're making it sound incredibly simple. You ask a man to make enquiries. He does so and returns to you and says that it appears that the man never arrived there.

MR HATTINGH: Yes. Now you have to look for him, you have to find him. And furthermore, time wasn't standing still. And as time went by, this man realised all this would be a waste of time to continue this search, because people were being released and the hope diminished that there would be any kind of prosecution. Many pressures were placed upon you, demands were increasing, and your focus would shift to something completely different. But before the time began to go by, you would receive telephonic information that the man did not arrive and upon that occasion, you could have said to the Director, look, this is the position, please do everything in your power and find this man. Time hadn't started going by yet.

MR POTGIETER: Perhaps I did tell him that.

MR HATTINGH: But you cannot remember it.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, I cannot remember it.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Potgieter, as I understand your evidence, you had already been told by Mr Mabotha that the ANC or people representing the ANC, had visited his home to make enquiries as to where he was, and that he was frightened of us. He thought he was in danger. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: That is correct. He told me that.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, isn't it almost inevitable that if, after his release, he had gone back home, he would have told his family, don't tell anyone that you have seen me or that you know where I am.

MR POTGIETER: That may be so.

CHAIRPERSON: So your enquiries through the Pietersburg Police Force would not have very much effect, would they?

MR POTGIETER: I don't know what methods they would have applied.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Potgieter, you had the particulars of his family, not so? Their addresses and so forth?

MR POTGIETER: I think that the address appears on the statement which is marked as Mabotha B. There may be more ...

MR HATTINGH: Didn't you yourself attempt to make contact with his family?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR HATTINGH: And you also didn't go to Mr de Kock and say, listen I asked you to look after this man and to keep him available. Now he's gone. Now you and your Vlakplaas men and your great number of askaris which you have at your disposal have to come and help me.

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Potgieter, I want to put it to you that if one studies Mabotha D, that would be the Section 29 statement of Mr Mabotha as we have referred to it thus far, it would appear that you made this statement with regard to this investigation, you could remember just about everything which had been important to you with regard to this statement, although you said that you had last seen it, I don't know when. Would you agree with me?

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And I want to put it to you that if Mr Mabotha could have given any further evidence as that which is contained in this document, you would also have remembered it. Especially if it was important with regard to the high treason case against Mrs Mandela. Isn't that true?

MR POTGIETER: No. The reason why I have answered no is because the aspects embodied in this document are factual matters which took place and the further section which I spoke of yesterday has more to do with your, or at least let me say it wasn't as tangible as physical events. I'm not sure whether I'm expressing myself clearly.

MR HATTINGH: I think what you're trying to say is that you may have given evidence about abstract matters such as her negative attitude towards the State.

MR POTGIETER: Among others, yes.

MR HATTINGH: And what else?

MR POTGIETER: Contact with the outside world, with ANC members, because you must remember he was at her house.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, but those are factual events. Those are facts you're speaking of.

MR POTGIETER: Well, I'm trying to think back to what could possible still have been of application in that application, in that statement. It wouldn't be a tremendous elaboration of this.

MR HATTINGH: Not much more than what is contained in the original document.

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR HATTINGH: I want to put it to you that this being the position, he would not have been any kind of important witness in a high treason case against Mrs Mandela.

MR POTGIETER: Any witness in a high treason case is an important witness, however small the role may be or appear to be in the appearance of the matter.

MR HATTINGH: I want to put it to you that you knew this and that furthermore you knew that you did not possess any evidence upon which you could prosecute him successfully, except perhaps the fact that he was a member of the ANC. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: Not physical offences or crimes that couldn't link him to any physical crimes. However, I think that if one really wanted to analyse the matter the measure of assistance to Mrs Mandela, I think if one really wanted to, then one could have prosecuted him at a stage.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, sorry to interrupt, may I just enquire from my learned colleague to indicate whether the statement that he's put to my client right now, indicates that Mr de Kock did not receive any information from my client that Mr Mabotha was involved in attacks on policemen?

CHAIRPERSON: This is the statement you've got in front of you. This is the statement he's talking about, the statement Exhibit D. This has been handed in. What you want to ask him about it, that you can't read yourself?

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, the, it was put to Mr Potgieter that he had no evidence to successfully prosecute Mr Mabotha.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. In this Exhibit D. Or are you saying it in general?

MR HATTINGH: In general as well, Mr Chairman.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, the question is whether that indicates that my client did not inform Mr de Kock then that Mr Mabotha was involved in attacks on policemen.

MR HATTINGH: No. That doesn't follow at all, Mr Chairperson. What I am putting to the witness is that he didn't have any evidence. He may have had information which was based upon hearsay and so forth, but he didn't have any evidence based upon which he could prosecute Mr Mabotha. Is that correct, Mr Potgieter?

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: But I want to put it to you, that you did indeed have information that he was involved in attacks on police.

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR HATTINGH: In the Security Police policy was that information which was received from informers would not be used as evidence because then the identity of the informer would have to be exposed, isn't that so?

MR POTGIETER: That may be part of the reason, but I must just qualify that when one received a report and there was an informer number written on it, one would immediately regard it with suspicion. We experienced this from interrogations which we undertook, not only of Mabotha, but various other persons, that one's information reports which were received from informers, were not always very accurate. So that wasn't the only reason. Yes, it may be that a very well placed sensitive informer would sometimes provide facts to you, but for administrative purposes, it could only be used for administrative purposes otherwise the informer would have to be exposed.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, I am thoroughly aware of the grading of informers within the Security Police. They were classified according to the reliability of their information, isn't that correct?

MR POTGIETER: That is correct. And that is what my evidence was during the hearing.

MR HATTINGH: But even an informer with a relatively low reliability classification would be able to provide you with reliable information should it be substantiated by other informers, even though they were also of low reliability classification.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: I want to put it to you, you mentioned yesterday, I can't remember your precise words, but you said something to the effect that the possibility was investigated or considered that Mabotha may be involved in attacks on police. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: If I recall my evidence correctly, it was about the application of the Section 29 detention. I believe that although this was a hypothetical example, I believe that something like that may appear in the Section 29 application to have said that it was information regarding his involvement or his knowledge of attacks on police, because at that stage it was open season on policemen. And the circle in which he moved would have led one to expect that he would possess such information.

MR HATTINGH: And I want to put it to you that you would probably have had such information, if you present the possibility that in the motivation for his Section 29 application it was mentioned.

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall that I was provided with such information and that is why I said yesterday that I think that it came from Mr Grobbelaar and/or Mr Klopper. I cannot recall that I had any personal knowledge or information from informers who said that this man was involved ...

MR HATTINGH: You say that you cannot recall it. Could you exclude the possibility that you possess such information?

MR POTGIETER: No. I suppose one couldn't exclude the possibility.

MR HATTINGH: As Mr Sandi put to you, correctly, Mrs Mandela's negative attitude towards the former government was a question of public record, I would almost like to put to you ...

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You possessed more than enough evidence to substantiate that fact, not so?

MR POTGIETER: There was evidence, but one would consistently have to supplement it and obtain support for that evidence.

MR HATTINGH: Among others, you possessed a video recording of her well-known "matches and necklaces" speech.

MR POTGIETER: I didn't have that. That was on the West Rand. But I could have obtained it. I knew about it.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, you knew about the fact that such a video existed in which she stood on a public platform and where one could clearly see her image and hear her voice when she uttered these words, not so?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: So you didn't need Mr Mabotha in order to build a high treason case against Mrs Mandela, if that was the reason why you wanted to use him, the malicious attitude towards the State.

MR POTGIETER: I think that the malicious attitude towards the State could have been proven in various manners, among others in that fashion, but I am not certain that I didn't need him. I think that all of us realised that criminal trials could go horribly wrong at times and that the investigation would only be concluded once the State closed the case. So one would consistently look for additional and supportive evidence.

MR HATTINGH: I want to put it to you that you could not have used him as a witness at all and that you had information or believed or suspected, at least, that he was involved in attacks on the police. And that you were of the opinion for that reason that this person could not be released again.

MR POTGIETER: I deny that, and if you will just grant me a moment. The two boys who were abducted, Tshabalala and the other boy, Sono, he knew about those persons. And this would be part of the high treason case, the fact that Mrs Mandela allegedly sent youths out to obtain military training abroad. This would also correlate with the tapes which I handed over to the AG.

MR HATTINGH: You knew, and you conceded yesterday, that although Mr Mabotha was, according to the information that you possessed, abducted, he did indeed once again rejoin the activities of Mrs Mandela.

MR POTGIETER: What I wanted to convey yesterday afternoon, was that I realised that when one had control over a man, he would work for you. And when he ended up with Mrs Mandela in some or other manner, one would accept that he was once again participating full steam, so to speak, in the ANC's activities, because your influence over him had diminished. And that is why when we once again found him, and went through such a lengthy process to prepare him, the idea was to retain a certain measure of control over him, even though it was not by means of physical detention at Vlakplaas.

CHAIRPERSON: That had failed already. You knew that, didn't you? He had gone through nine months of this, had been released as an askari, had been abducted and then rejoined the ANC. So the so-called control that you had over him on the first occasion had collapsed completely.

MR POTGIETER: I wouldn't say completely. Because he gave evidence in certain matters before the State apparently. So as far as I was concerned, he was complimented and after that, after his arrest, if we listened to Grobbelaar's version, this man said that he wanted to work at Vlakplaas again. So perhaps he was gullible, I don't know. I cannot say. But my relationship with him was about repairing his attitude so that he could give evidence in the case of Mrs Mandela and/or any other high profile politician's prosecution. So that he would bee able to appear in court and give evidence against such a person.

CHAIRPERSON: But he was abducted while he was in the process of giving evidence for the State.

MR POTGIETER: That is how I understand it.

CHAIRPERSON: And within a short time, he had been turned and was now working with Winnie Mandela.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, well I cannot tell you everything that happened to him after his alleged abduction and whether they tortured him, I have no recollection of that. But if I recall correctly, he said that he had been interrogated and a report would have gone to Zambia and so forth, but in either event, he re-established a relationship of trust, how he managed to do that, we will have to see.

CHAIRPERSON: But you took a Section 29 statement from him, Exhibit D which has been handed in, where he purports to deal with his, how he was treated. And you now say you cannot recall if they tortured him.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, I cannot remember whether he said that he had been tortured.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you suggesting that if he had said he had been tortured, you wouldn't have put in the statement?

MR POTGIETER: I would have included it, ten to one.

CHAIRPERSON: But it's not in the statement.

MR POTGIETER: Then they didn't torture him.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, why do you speculate like that, Mr Potgieter? You've seen this statement. You must have consulted your lawyer about it.

MR POTGIETER: I did not analyse the statement for the finer detail.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Could I refer you to page 2 of the Section 29 statement of Mr Mabotha? At the very top of the page he provides particulars regarding the training which he underwent.

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: So you knew that he was a man who was trained in the handling of weapons of terror and explosives.

MR POTGIETER: That is correct. However, I cannot say how thoroughly trained he was.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, but he told you that he was trained. Did you know that the askaris who found themselves at Vlakplaas had been further trained in weaponry?

MR POTGIETER: Not personally, but I would accept this, yes, because the work and the situations in which they were employed required that they be capable of defending themselves.

MR HATTINGH: So here you had to deal with a man who handled weapons of terror, and landmines and was trained in sabotage or the art of sabotage, if it could be called that, isn't that true?

MR POTGIETER: According to his version, yes.

MR HATTINGH: Now, you also knew, where you refer to paragraph 18 on page 4 of the statement, that Mr Mabotha alleged that he denied towards those person who had abducted him that he had been arrested or had collaborated with the so-called "system" as it was put in quotation marks in the document. You knew that.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that is how he put it.

MR HATTINGH: And you also knew, if we can look at paragraph 19, that he had been given the order by the ANC people of Mrs Mandela, "upon instructions I was compelled to write down my autobiography. This according to W Mandela would be given to an attorney by the name of Chris Naidoo to deliver to the ANC in Lusaka. Instructions as to what should be done to me would then, would then - daar staan "came", seker "come from Lusaka. In the meantime, I had to wait." So you knew that he had tried his best to present himself to the ANC as a loyal follower of the ANC and somebody who had never betrayed them. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: That is the impression which one gains from this, yes.

MR HATTINGH: And if you were to release him, without accommodating him at Vlakplaas or something of that nature, then there was only one way out for him and that would be to go back to them and to persevere in his denial as he did here, because he knew that if it came out that he had co-operated with you, it would bee a death sentence for him. Isn't that true? Would you agree?

MR POTGIETER: I don't want to say yes or no. I don't know whether they believed him. It's very difficult to say, because it would have been the ideal option to say that he was going back to Winnie Mandela, that he had been well prepared and that he would re-infiltrate her ranks. It is very difficult to say this would have happened or that would have happened.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Potgieter, once again, it was a hypothetical question. Let us just suppose for a moment that at the end of his Section 29 period of detention, you had no further grounds to detain him, that you had no evidence upon which you could prosecute him and you decided, well, I'll have to leave this man. Isn't it highly probable that he would necessarily have rejoined the ranks of the ANC in order to protect his own interests and his own safety?

MR POTGIETER: No. We had other persons who had been arrested and whom we had released. He didn't necessarily have to return to their organisation.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have information that those persons had not rejoined the ANC?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot say that.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, so you don't know. So for all that you know they may have done precisely what I have just put to you what Mr Mabotha would probably have felt obliged to do, namely, I'm going back to my people, because if I don't do this, then they would realise that I had indeed collaborated with the system in the past. And this would create a great situation of danger for me. Isn't that true?

MR POTGIETER: I gave evidence yesterday that Mr Mabotha felt safer within the structure than outside it. So that is the option which was followed.

MR HATTINGH: He could have returned to them with great ease and said, "look, I was arrested by the Security Police, they questioned me and I gave no information to them. Here I am, I'm back." Because they wouldn't know what information he could have given to you, isn't that true?

MR POTGIETER: Let me put it to you like this. Well, we are not using the record of the Section 29 investigation, but there was some form of hysteria surrounding the informers of that time. And persons who had been detained, who had contact with Mrs Mandela, that would be her soccer club, were regarded with great suspicion with regard to the danger of these persons being recruited while in detention. As I have already stated before, there was a stream of letters from attorneys at that stage which prevented us from having further contact with the person. So he wouldn't, after such a long period of detention, have rejoined the activities of especially Mrs Mandela and her team. It wouldn't have been that easy for him. Perhaps somewhere else in the country where he wasn't as well known, but we must recall that the ANC at that stage possessed an increasing capacity in the country and that it would have been very easy for them to trace him.

MR HATTINGH: That is just the point I'd like to put to you. That you were well aware thereof that if you had released this man who was very well trained in terrorism, he would have turned to the ANC and would become involved in acts of terror, which you knew would include attacks on members of the police. And this was the reason why you made the suggestion to Mr de Kock that this man could not just be released.

MR POTGIETER: No. I deny that statement. At that stage my mind was, or the idea was not that this man held a threat for us which you have just put to me now. As I have said, that the fact that he had been trained, I've spoken to many, many trained persons, he comes with the story that he is trained in this art and that art, but it is so elementary that he is a threat to himself, not for other people. Then you also get the one who is well-trained, so I cannot tell you what was this man's level of training. I was not an explosives expert, I did not test his capabilities.

MR HATTINGH: How much training does one need to know how to handle a firearm?

MR POTGIETER: I don't refer to those elementary things. I think any person can learn this within a half-an-hour or an hour.

MR HATTINGH: So you say he said that he was trained, so he could at least fire shots on police personnel.

MR POTGIETER: If he wanted to, yes.

MR HATTINGH: And another aspect, did he ever tell you or did any of the Security Branch members in Soweto tell you that Mr Mabotha, shortly his arrest and shortly after he was transferred to Soweto, that he pointed out houses where weapons were allegedly hidden?

MR POTGIETER: It came to my knowledge for the first time here with the Commission. I cannot recall any information that Mr Mabotha did indeed point out such houses.

MR HATTINGH: And nothing happened when he pointed out these houses. No weapons were found at these houses and I don't have any evidence that there was any indication that the person who lived in those houses that were pointed out were involved with acts of terror at all.

MR POTGIETER: Let me tell you that at that stage, if he, at that stage of his interrogation with the Tracing Unit and Mr du Toit who can unfortunately not remember anything, but if he said at that stage that he was abducted by Zondwabo, who was a trained MK man, I believe that they would follow up those statements from him and that he would point out certain houses to them. Our experience was also that when a person is arrested, he points out a neighbour's house because it sends a subtle message to the others to say that, "listen I have been caught." Other times they point out the correct houses. I am just speculating. It is not possible to tell you here what the position was with regard to Mr Mabotha and the houses which he pointed out.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, may I ask you to assist me if you can in this regard. I seem to have a recollection that Mr Klopper's evidence was that Grobbelaar, I forget what his rank was at that time, that he accompanied them when they, when Mr Mabotha went out to, was taken out to point out these houses.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, it's Jan Wagener. Mr Grobbelaar indeed said that in his affidavit that he went along. It is in the exhibit, the affidavit of Mr Grobbelaar.

MS PATEL: It's Exhibit B, honourable Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, it is Mabotha, B's the affidavit of Mr Grobbelaar. It's in paragraph 8, from paragraph 8.4, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I am indebted to Mr Wagener. Mr Grobbelaar, can you tell me what his rank was at that time, Mr Potgieter?

MR POTGIETER: I think he was a senior major.

MR HATTINGH: And to which component was he attached.

MR POTGIETER: He was the Chief of the Tracing Unit.

MR HATTINGH: And as the chief of that unit he would surely sit in on the meetings where security matters were discussed? Isn't that true?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR HATTINGH: And did he never tell you at such a meeting that this man took us to a house and pointed out a house and no weapons were found?

MR POTGIETER: Not that I can recall. He may have mentioned it.

MR HATTINGH: But would you not have taken this up with Mr Mabotha and tell him that "listen, you are playing with us the fool here. You pretend to work with us, but you are leading us on a wild goose chase here."

MR POTGIETER: But these pointings out may have happened the day after his arrest. I have no recollection of these events and I have to rely on my memory. And I only received him in April, so I cannot recall whether I confronted him with these statements or these facts.

MR HATTINGH: Would it not have been important for you to know that this man had pretended to have knowledge of where weapons were hidden?

MR POTGIETER: I think if he was serious he would have repeated it to me. He might have done it, not to receive any more assaults, so I cannot tell you what his motivation was.

MR HATTINGH: So it would also be an indication to you that this man's so-called co-operation has to be regarded with caution.

MR POTGIETER: One regards everybody's co-operation with caution, Chairperson. One spends months and months and believing that the man at the end of the day will co-operate and so on and then suddenly he does not co-operate. We've experienced it before, so it's correct. One regards everything with caution and suspicion.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have the capacity to decide yourself about the release of a Section 29 detainee?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR HATTINGH: Who had to take that decision?

MR POTGIETER: It would be the command structure. Persons with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or higher.

MR HATTINGH: Who took the decision in this instance?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall now. It might be retired General Tokkie Nienaber who was in command. I cannot recall which senior officer were there. I can really not tell you who gave the command here, but it would have been in co-operation with Head Office. One cannot just release people, one needs to get authorisation from Head Office to release someone.

MR HATTINGH: Do you have to submit a motivation to receive such authorisation?

MR POTGIETER: No, I would not say a motivation but one must supply reasons.

MR HATTINGH: In writing?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Did you do this?

MR POTGIETER: Yes. This was done with every detainee.

MR HATTINGH: And in those written reasons did you indicate that he would be released but that Mr de Kock said that he would keep him at Vlakplaas and have him made available as a witness?

MR POTGIETER: I would not have said that he would go to Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Why not?

MR POTGIETER: It was an arrangement between Mr de Kock and myself and you have to remember that the situation, not only at grass roots level but at Head Office level, there were certain precautionary measures which one had to apply.

MR HATTINGH: Because you were afraid of moles, you do not tell Head Office that you, amongst others, after their written instruction that askaris had to be sent to Vlakplaas, that you arranged that Mr Mabotha go to Vlakplaas, then you did not tell them this.

MR POTGIETER: I cannot tell you now that I did not say it, but if I recall now, I make the inference that I would not have said so in such detail.

MR HATTINGH: And the motivation therefore was that you were afraid of moles?

MR POTGIETER: Amongst others, yes.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: I'm afraid I'm completely confused yet again. I understood the position was that the six month period had now lapsed and that you were obliged to release him.

MR POTGIETER: The options which I had at my disposal was to extend with statements. Secondly, an Attorney-General's letter which I could not get. And thirdly, the option which I had chosen was to approach Mr de Kock to help me in that sense.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't read, as I understand it, a letter from a Lieutenant Colonel or above when the time had lapsed?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And what happened if you didn't get a letter from a Lieutenant Colonel? Do you just ignore the law that said you couldn't detain someone for more than six months? Because that was the law, wasn't it?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall the stipulations of the act now, but any detention or transferral and/or release had to get the signature of a Lieutenant Colonel at the facility where the person was detained or released. It gives that Station Commander to release that person, the authorisation to release that person and another person to take that man into acceptance. So everything was arranged in that way.

CHAIRPERSON: Authority to release and another person to take that man into acceptance? What do you mean by that?

MR POTGIETER: The release was the official, how can I say, was, the letter to relieve this person had to be sanctioned by Head Quarters. The Lieutenant Colonel gives this letter of release, he gets authorisation to release that person. We could not just, I think the reason for that, was you gave some person a hiding and to cover up any evidence you release him. This is not what happened. There was absolute control around the detention and release of detainees.

ADV SIBANYONI: Was there a, what usually happens when a criminal is discharged, a warrant of liberation signed or what was the process?

MR POTGIETER: A warrant for release. Can you please repeat the question?

ADV SIBANYONI: I'm saying, at the end of the detention period, was there any warrant of liberation, "vrylatingslasbrief" signed like when it is done when an ordinary criminal is released?

MR POTGIETER: Your common criminal is released on an SAP number, I think 328. We had special warrants of release and detention warrants, so those documentation if you take the file then you have the detention, the letter of detention, and if he had gone to another point there would be other warrants and there would also be a warrant of release. This is for reasons of control that accountability should be given from the time that a person is detained till the time which he is released. There has to be a complete journal of doctors' visits and attorneys' visits and everything in there.

ADV SIBANYONI: What was the normal procedure when a person was detained under Section 29 is released? Do you always arrange transport for him to go home or do you just open the door and say, "go home?"

MR POTGIETER: No, it depends on which stage he is released, or at what time he is released. If he has given evidence and he gives evidence in court and then he is still detained until the court gives him Section 204 indemnity and after that he is handed over to his family or to wherever he wants to go, if he wants to go to Vlakplaas. Many people were handed over to Vlakplaas in this manner. There was no written guideline as to you have to do this and you have to do that, because the circumstances surrounding releases differed in all the cases.

ADV SIBANYONI: Thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Wim Cornelius on behalf of David Britz, Daniel Snyman, Nicholas Vermeulen and Leon Flores. Did you have regular security meetings, Mr Potgieter.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, management meetings.

MR CORNELIUS: And did these take place on a weekly basis, monthly basis, daily basis?

MR POTGIETER: Let me tell you, the Commanders, the Unit Commanders met daily with the Commander. Then there were weekly officers meetings where the officers of the Components or of the Branch would be present. And then every Head of the Unit had meetings with his staff.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you have similar meetings like the Sanhedrins at Head Office? Did you ever attend a Sanhedrin?

MR POTGIETER: No. I knew there were Sanhedrin meetings, but I never attended any. Only in later years when I was stationed at Head Office, but this was in a whole different set-up.

MR CORNELIUS: But at the security meetings did you report to higher ranking officers within the security set-up? Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Between your Security Branch and C1 was there close liaison and co-operation?

MR POTGIETER: Let me tell you, C1 was a source of assistance because they supplied us with evidence. They helped us in identifications and although, as far as I can recall, there were no regular deployments in Soweto, there were at times, I don't know if it was on special request or whatever, but C1 people were there. But how close the relationship was, it must have been a very close relationship. Persons who undertook the identification and tracing with C1, but we maintained a court orientated relationship.

MR CORNELIUS: So C1 was an operational unit and only worked when requested?

MR POTGIETER: I would assume that.

MR CORNELIUS: No, that's a fact. Security would direct a request at C1 and they would execute it. Is that not so?

MR POTGIETER: I would assume so. I never performed any tasks in that capacity where I had to call them in to help me with an investigation. This would have been Colonel Grobbelaar in liaison with the Commander.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you also work on a need to know basis?

MR POTGIETER: I believe so, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Not believe so, did you?

MR POTGIETER: Yes. We worked on a need to know basis.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, that's all I wanted to know. It's important that when you give an instruction or you direct a request at C1 that this has to be carried out, because on a need to know basis you have a purpose for giving this instruction.

MR POTGIETER: If one gives it to C1, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, but you work on a need to know basis, you must have reason why you direct a request and according to your own evidence, you request an extraordinary request to Colonel de Kock.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, it was not something as far as I know, it was not something that had happened previously.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, but that's the point, on a need to know basis you were directed an extraordinary request to C1 to do something for you. So we can almost regard it as an agreement that was reached with C1 that certain events should take place, is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: And now Colonel de Kock does not listen to you.

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Is this not a serious, serious break in this need to know basis and this specific instruction that you give to the specialist unit?

MR POTGIETER: No, I did not regard it as an instruction. It was assistance that they gave.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well, let's put it in the following manner. You don't regard it as an instruction, but you say, "keep Johannes Mabotha safe because he is a witness". This is your request or your instruction.

MR POTGIETER: This was my agreement with Mr de Kock.

MR CORNELIUS: So now you go into an agreement with Mr de Kock to keep him safe. Do you agree?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: So now he breaks this agreement.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, and that is why I made enquiries at Pietersburg.

MR CORNELIUS: No, that's not my question. He breaks this agreement.

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: And the following security meeting, did you discuss it with him?

MR POTGIETER: No, I did not attend meetings with Mr de Kock.

MR CORNELIUS: No, that's not the question. The next meeting within your unit, within your branch, did you not say that "I have an extremely grave problem. De Kock broke his agreement with me."

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR CORNELIUS: Why not?

MR POTGIETER: It was not common knowledge and for public consumption that the man would be at Vlakplaas.

MR CORNELIUS: That is not the question. De Kock's agreement, him breaking the agreement, that was the problem. Why did you not discuss it at the meeting?

MR POTGIETER: I did not deem it necessary.

MR CORNELIUS: But why not?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot answer you there. I just did not deem it necessary.

MR CORNELIUS: But here is one of the most important witnesses which you give to a unit of the police for safekeeping that just disappears and you do not deem it necessary to discuss it at a security meeting?

MR POTGIETER: I think the comprehension that you have of a security meeting is not there to be used as a platform for complaints of your colleagues. I cannot also say that De Kock broke the agreement. He did not tell me that he had chased the man away. He just said that the man was gone. So as far as I was concerned, there was no break in the agreement.

MR CORNELIUS: Please, Mr Potgieter, you arranged that Mr de Kock keep him for safekeeping and the next moment, he is gone. This is a serious break in the agreement.

MR POTGIETER: Well, not my, Mr de Kock, if he is gone. But how can I accuse him at a meeting?

MR CORNELIUS: No, sir, if he's gone, he is not in safekeeping any more.

MR POTGIETER: But he was not in safekeeping, Chairperson. The request was that he be accommodated there, ...(intervention)

MR CORNELIUS: Are you saying that he had to be taken up as an askari? Are you now changing your version?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR CORNELIUS: So what are you telling the Committee now?

MR POTGIETER: My evidence was that he had to be kept available and not, definitely not be put in safekeeping.

MR CORNELIUS: But now, let's take your evidence. You said that they had to keep him safe. Now it was still break because he was not available.

MR POTGIETER: No, I did not say that it was a break in the agreement, or the agreement was broken by Mr de Kock. The fact that he might have run away himself and that we had the alternative, this had nothing to do with Mr de Kock.

MR CORNELIUS: So, now you are saying you did not deem it necessary to discuss this action by Mr de Kock in a, at a security meeting. You did not need to go to a senior officer and say, 'my witness has disappeared?"

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall whether I shared this with Kritzinger. Well, he was not my senior, but I cannot recall if I discussed it with him. And you also must remember that to send a telex to the Commander of another Component, I did not have the capacity to sign that telex. All the telexes are sent from the office of the Commander, so it is quite possible that even General Nienaber was aware of this telex and the enquiries about this man, that this man had disappeared, but I cannot tell you now.

COURT ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

J D POTGIETER: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: (cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Potgieter, you gave evidence to the Committee that you established a relationship of trust with Johannes Mabotha. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You became his so-called confidante.

MR POTGIETER: That was so, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you find that he trusted you completely and told you everything?

MR POTGIETER: It would be difficult to say that he told me everything, but that he trusted me, yes. That is the impression which I gained.

MR CORNELIUS: But he would have told you what his feelings were regarding C1 and the section?

MR POTGIETER: I would assume that.

MR CORNELIUS: And did he tell you anything about the brutal torture which took place at Marble Hall?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR CORNELIUS: Don't you find that strange?

MR POTGIETER: I only came to hear of this assault with Mr de Kock's hearing.

MR CORNELIUS: I suppose one could say that it is strange why didn't this man tell me. I don't know how he experienced that.

MR POTGIETER: I would agree, it is strange.

MR CORNELIUS: You discussed with Johannes Mabotha what he could expect to find when he went back to C1, but nothing was said about the fact that he was brutally assaulted and that ice blocks were anally inserted?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR CORNELIUS: So it would appear that he did not regard you as his confidante.

MR POTGIETER: Well, as I said a few moments ago, I don't know whether he told me everything. Clearly, he didn't tell me about the assault, because then I would definitely have taken note of that. I was totally unaware of it.

MR CORNELIUS: But you would agree that it would be probable that should you tell any person that he was to return to C Section he would say, "no, I'm not going back. These people want to kill me."

MR POTGIETER: In certain cases, I would assume that you would be correct.

MR CORNELIUS: A further improbability which bothers me is that when you took the statement in terms of Section 29 from Johannes Mabotha, did you ever think of contacting Head Office and asking them, what statements do you have from this man on record?

MR POTGIETER: Chairperson, I have already told you yesterday that I do not have that statement. You must remember that we had computer access to the Blue System, which we called it at that stage, and all information regarding an alleged terrorist would appear on that computer. As C2 undertook the research, they would supplement the database and one would have immediate access to that information. So that when you were interrogating a person you would have his entire profile and his entire history. Not the finer details, but his history abroad, you would have on computer and at your disposal. So I could have that. That facility was available to us. So it wasn't such a tremendous necessity for me to have a physical statement from Head Office.

MR CORNELIUS: Can you recall whether you obtained it or not? Can you not recall?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall. But I do know that with interrogations we normally withdrew that record before we commenced with interrogation so that we could have a record of the person which would facilitate the interrogation. Because you could then put to the person that at Kibosh Camp you did this and that. At Pongo Camp you did this and that, and there you were a guard and so forth. It would take the wind out of anybody's sails to know that his enemy or his adversary would know more about him than he knew about himself. So I cannot tell you that I did do it, but I would assume that I had his history from the computer source.

MR CORNELIUS: Now I would just like to clear up something which is bothering me. What was your precise request to De Kock? Was it for the safeguarding of Mabotha? Was it to reinstate him as an askari or what was the precise request?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot give you the precise words, but the basic idea was that I wanted to use him as a witness and that I was experiencing a dilemma with his release, and that he could accommodate me. Whether he would be re-applied later or retrusted later, I cannot comment on that.

MR CORNELIUS: But your precise request was for him to be kept in safekeeping as a State witness.

MR POTGIETER: Not in safekeeping so that he would be detained or locked up, or anything like that.

MR CORNELIUS: So your request was not for him to be reinstated in C Section?

MR POTGIETER: I did not discuss the circular with Mr de Kock. I did not want to underestimate his intelligence.

MR CORNELIUS: No, I am asking what your request was?

MR POTGIETER: My request was that he, at a certain stage, should the necessity for secrecy fall away, he once again use the man.

MR CORNELIUS: You didn't hand him over for interrogation by Colonel de Kock?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. And what did you mean in your evidence in chief when you said that De Kock would have to measure the climate?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, that's not what Mr Potgieter testified.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well, let me put it like this. You said that the climate had to be measured. Who were you referring to?

MR POTGIETER: Mr Mabotha.

MR CORNELIUS: Would he have to measure the climate?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. When you undertook your investigation into the matter, you arrived at a certain perception, is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: I don't know exactly what you mean by perception.

MR CORNELIUS: Well, let me assist you. You arrived at a perception that information could possibly have been conveyed to Mrs Mandela or to the ANC about C Section. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: Yes. Let us say that there was a perception. It was logical to make that inference of the possibility of such information having been conveyed. One had to guard against it at all times and it could even have been conveyed by Moller at Vlakplaas. That is also very possible. So one had to be cautious at all times.

MR CORNELIUS: Well, I'm interested in your perception. You, who were involved in the investigation, you arrived at the perception that information could possibly have been conveyed to Winnie Mandela and the ANC.

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall that, but I cannot deny it either.

MR CORNELIUS: So what's your answer?

MR POTGIETER: It's possible.

MR CORNELIUS: But you were in charge of the investigation. You can refresh your memory in the light of all these statements, did you have the perception that information was conveyed.

MR POTGIETER: I cannot tell you. Possibly it was so.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. And then it's logical that when you had the discussion with Mr de Kock you would have discussed that information with him.

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR CORNELIUS: Not?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall that I mentioned this to him.

MR CORNELIUS: So you don't know whether you conveyed this perception?

MR POTGIETER: No. I cannot recall that.

ADV SANDI: Mr Cornelius, you're asking the witness about perceptions. Yesterday you expressed a concern that when Mr Mabotha goes back to Vlakplaas he would be exposed to negative perceptions, from the fact that he had defected from Vlakplaas, he went over to join the Winnie Mandela Football Club. Did you discuss that with Mr de Kock?

MR POTGIETER: I did not discuss it with Mr de Kock. It was part of my counselling with Mr Mabotha regarding the perception that he, and I think that I said that he could possibly have given information, that he could be regarded with suspicion. That was the general discussion which we held in order to prepare him. And also so that he would be able to read the climate and be aware of these matters.

ADV SANDI: In other words, you had no discussion whatsoever with Mr de Kock as to how he should assist this gentleman to overcome the negative perceptions he was going to be exposed to?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall that Mr de Kock was requested to be involved in the further preparation.

ADV SANDI: By the way, how long was this discussion of yours with Mr de Kock? How long did it take?

MR POTGIETER: It was a telephonic discussion. And I don't believe that it was an exhaustive discussion. I cannot tell you how long it lasted, but it wouldn't have been very long.

ADV SANDI: Are we talking about two minutes, three minutes, five minutes, half-an-hour?

MR POTGIETER: No, I cannot tell you. I cannot give you an indication because one doesn't know everything that was discussed. I said yesterday that colleagues would discuss their problems with one another and that may also have formed part of the discussion. That a man could have complained about the system which didn't provide the necessary facilities when one had a dilemma like this. We may have spoken of a variety of subjects, but I don't believe that it would have been an exhaustive discussion.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, Mr Cornelius.

MR CORNELIUS: I'm sorry, Mr Chairman.

ADV SIBANYONI: I'm sorry, just one question. Mr Potgieter, can you just refresh our memory. When was Vlakplaas, when did Vlakplaas become known to the public in general, in which year?

MR POTGIETER: I would assume that it was during that same year. Somebody, somewhere I read that Nofomela's revelations came to be later that year, but I'm not entirely certain. My legal representative tells me that it was the 19th of October upon which Mr Nofomela made his allegations known. So before that time, it was not generally known among the public that Vlakplaas existed, as far as I know.

ADV SIBANYONI: Would you say if Johannes Mabotha had spoken to Winnie Mandela or to the ANC about Vlakplaas, would it have been known earlier than when Nofomela made the revelations?

MR POTGIETER: Yes. I think the ANC was already aware of Vlakplaas. I think that Mr de Kock gave evidence to that effect. And you see, during criminal trials where we used MK and Apla members as witnesses, this was not held in open court, because we let them give evidence in terms of Section 153 in camera and they were examined regarding where they worked, what sort of work they did and so forth. So Vlakplaas was known, but I wouldn't say that the public knew about it, but those who wanted to know, certainly did know. And for those for whom it was necessary to know, they did indeed know about it.

ADV SIBANYONI: Thank you.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Sibanyoni. Mr Potgieter, according to your perception, information was conveyed to the so-called enemy, the ANC, regarding C Section. Don't you think it's logical that you would have told Mr de Kock, "but look, this man has given information?"

MR POTGIETER: Chairperson, there was a special counter-intelligence component in the Security Branch, which would undertake this sort of investigation, in order to protect the structures and activities. If there really had been such a perception, or such evidence, or information, then it would have been conveyed to that component through the channels for investigation.

MR CORNELIUS: Mr Potgieter, I just want to interrupt you here. That's not the question. The question is whether you conveyed that perception of yours to Mr de Kock or not. It's a simple question. I'm not asking about counter-intelligence.

MR POTGIETER: Well, I can't recall that I conveyed it to him.

MR CORNELIUS: Well then, your answer is simple. Just tell the Committee that you don't remember. Regarding the arrest of Johannes Mabotha, did you question Johannes Mabotha about his arrest?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall that I questioned him about the details.

MR CORNELIUS: But isn't it logical, Mr Potgieter, you would have asked him, "where were you arrested? Who arrested you? What happened?"

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that is the logical inference, but regarding the finer detail, I didn't ask him anything.

MR CORNELIUS: And did you know who arrested him?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, I knew that Colonel Grobbelaar and the others had gone there, whether I knew this before or after the time, I cannot tell you.

MR CORNELIUS: And logically speaking, during your investigation you must have conducted interviews with the persons who had arrested him.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, I believe that I did consult with them.

MR CORNELIUS: Were you informed that he had been tortured?

MR POTGIETER: No, absolutely not.

MR CORNELIUS: So, are you trying to say that your fellow officers that worked with you withheld information from you?

MR POTGIETER: I wouldn't say that they withheld information from me, but they didn't give me all the facts.

MR CORNELIUS: Well, they withheld it from you. The man was brutally assaulted and tortured, ice cubes were inserted into his anus, and this information was never conveyed to you.

MR POTGIETER: Absolutely not.

MR CORNELIUS: Why not?

MR POTGIETER: I wouldn't know why. If the man had resisted, then they would have said, "yes, during an altercation or a struggle he was injured ...(intervention)"

MR CORNELIUS: But Mr Potgieter ...

MR POTGIETER: It was never said to me that this man was interrogated or tortured ...(intervention)

MR CORNELIUS: He was tortured for hours on end, he was suspended upside down under brutal circumstances and all this information from various people who were there, according to the evidence before this Committee, was withheld from you. Do you want the Committee to believe that this information was withheld from you?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that is my evidence.

MR CORNELIUS: And then, coincidentally, Johannes Mabotha meets with his confidante and he doesn't say anything about it.

MR POTGIETER: No, because I didn't ask him about it.

ADV SANDI: Mr Potgieter, where did you, how did it come about that you met Mabotha for the first time?

MR POTGIETER: Mr Chairperson, I cannot recall when I met him for the first time. I would have to rely on my records and it would indicate that I met him two months later on the 4th of April. I cannot recall that I had seen him or spoken to him before the time. I don't know. According to reasonable inferences which I have drawn, according to the journal, it was that he spent time in Soweto first.

ADV SANDI: Who was there, who was there when you met him for the first time?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall. I see that the detention register contains Mr Hume du Toit's name, so I would assume ...(intervention)

ADV SANDI: But, was he brought to you or did you have to go to the place where he was being held?

MR POTGIETER: The place of detention is indicated as Soweto or Protea Cells which would then form part of my office complex, so I would assume that he was there. It wasn't that I had to drive anywhere in order to conduct an interview with him.

ADV SANDI: How did you know that his name was Mabotha? Who told you? Did someone else tell you or did he tell you?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot tell you. I remembered him as a man by the name of George. I have also mentioned it like that in my statement, but that appears to be incorrect, because I knew him as George, but the other persons who have given evidence surrounding the tapping, spoke of Themba. And I cannot explain that discrepancy.

ADV SANDI: In other words, you don't know where you got this name George from?

MR POTGIETER: No, I cannot recall. When I made my statements, I recalled him as one George.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, Mr Cornelius.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Adv Sandi. Did you know that with the arrest of Mabotha, Mr de Kock was in Marble Hall?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR CORNELIUS: When did you find out about this for the first time?

MR POTGIETER: I don't know. I have no record of that. I don't know.

MR CORNELIUS: So you didn't know that C Section was in Marble Hall upon the arrest of Mr Mabotha?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR CORNELIUS: Now, when you telephoned Colonel de Kock and referred to the Marble Hall incident, how was he supposed to know what you referring to?

MR POTGIETER: But this was quite some time after the fact. And you must recall that he had to have been informed about the arrest because it was his man, or a former man of his.

MR CORNELIUS: No, sir, how can you draw that inference?

MR POTGIETER: No, I think that's a very logical inference which one can draw. It had been one of his men and he had to be informed.

MR CORNELIUS: Well, who was going to inform him?

MR POTGIETER: In his statement he said that he had been at Vlakplaas or had been a member of that component. That's on page 4 of Mabotha D.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, I know that. But you telephoned him and referred to the Marble Hall as if he has intimate knowledge about it.

MR POTGIETER: No, that was just a reference, in order to bring him back telephonically to the individual. As I've said, you've seen for yourself, I spoke of George. If I was speaking to him about George, he wouldn't have known who I was talking about. I don't know whether he knew Mr Mabotha by his real name or his MK name, and I believe that Marble Hall would have been the phrase to take his thoughts back to the man who had been arrested there.

MR CORNELIUS: No, Mr Potgieter, the facts are that you knew that C Section had been at Marble Hall and you knew about the torture and that is why you referred to Marble Hall.

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR CORNELIUS: But that is the probability, Mr Potgieter.

MR ROSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman, may I just enquire if my learned colleague is also acting for Mr de Kock here? On which basis is he putting these questions and how does it differ from his client's version?

MR CORNELIUS: The answer is easy, Mr Chairman. Colonel Eugene de Kock was the Commanding Officer of the Unit, and through vicarious liability and obviously through implied authority, we undertake, we run at risk here. So I'm entitled, if, to ask these questions. If Mr de Kock is refused amnesty, it might have an effect on my clients through vicarious liability. So I'm entitled to ask these questions, with due respect to my colleague.

Let me take you back to the railway ticket. You said to me that you purchased a railway ticket and that should Johannes Mabotha find the situation at Vlakplaas unbearable, or unacceptable, he could excuse himself from there and return home. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: That was the general gist of my discussion with him.

MR CORNELIUS: You knew the operations of C Section. Do you expect the Committee to expect, accept on probability that Mabotha would decide that he didn't like the circumstances there, take the railway ticket and go home?

MR POTGIETER: To whom would he say this?

MR CORNELIUS: Colonel de Kock.

MR POTGIETER: That was not my arrangement with him. The arrangement was that if the conditions there were unacceptable to him, he could go to his parents' home. I didn't tell him to excuse himself.

MR CORNELIUS: Let me take you back to the day at De Deur Police Station. What was your arrangement with Colonel de Kock? Would you have met each other there at a certain time, or what?

MR POTGIETER: It would have been shortly after 5 o'clock, 1700 hours, that afternoon.

MR CORNELIUS: And did you make arrangements for him for a place where you were going to rendezvous because you knew that C Section could not be exposed to the normal SAP with all its moles?

MR POTGIETER: As I have given evidence, I would have parked next to the police station.

MR CORNELIUS: And then where would Colonel de Kock and his team be?

MR POTGIETER: I didn't speak of his team at all. I was totally unaware of his team. The arrangement was for me to park there and then he would drive past me from left to right in front of me and he would stop a short distance away from there. I cannot say exactly how far, but as I have given evidence earlier, it would be out of the sight of the Charge Office. And I was parked next to the police station.

MR CORNELIUS: Because, what bothers me is that there has been evidence from various statements that there was a prior rendezvous with three vehicles and don't you think it would have been logical for the three of you to meet and to decide where you were going to go with the action?

MR POTGIETER: Well, this was not a combat situation, it was simply a delivery of a man who was going to be released and I cannot see that any thorough planning was necessary in this regard, because it was simply a delivery.

MR CORNELIUS: Are you saying that the evidence which has been put before the Committee that there was such a meeting is to be disputed?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, I disputed it yesterday.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, I know you have, but why do you think that the other statements would contain evidence about a prior meeting?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot offer any explanation in that regard.

MR CORNELIUS: Can you just clear up this improbability for me, because it really bothers me. You contact Colonel de Kock so that he can fetch Mabotha and safeguard him and Colonel de Kock takes him from De Deur Police Station to Penge Mine and murders him. Does that make any sense?

MR POTGIETER: To me it doesn't make sense, but I don't know what his plan was surrounding this aspect.

MR CORNELIUS: It could only be as my learned colleague, Mr Hattingh, confirmed yesterday. It can only make sense when we look at Colonel de Kock's version, because the others are improbable.

MR POTGIETER: Well, I wasn't aware of his planning with his people and his actions.

MR CORNELIUS: You see, after the telephonic discussion that you had with Mr de Kock, he sent Vermeulen and Snyman with weaponry and explosives to go and prepare the scene. Isn't that strange?

MR POTGIETER: I wasn't aware of that.

MR CORNELIUS: But that is the evidence before the Committee. We are making a full disclosure of the facts and that is the evidence which has been put before the Committee, that after the telephonic discussion with you, a murder scene was prepared.

MR POTGIETER: It would appear to be so.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes.

MR POTGIETER: But I wasn't aware of that.

MR CORNELIUS: You weren't aware of it, sir, but the fact remains. something had to have happened during that telephone conversation which led to the preparation of a murder scene. Would you agree?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, something had to have happened.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you. Thank you very much. I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Roelof du Plessis on record for Wouter Mentz. Mr Potgieter, just one question. You had no discussion with Captain Wouter Mentz when Mabotha was delivered to Mr de Kock?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. No further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

ADV SANDI: In your, Mr Potgieter, in your evidence in chief, I understood you say that you did not even see Mr Mentz, Mr Wouter Mentz, in the scene of the delivery. Did you?

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman, just one or two questions. Mr Potgieter - Lamey on behalf of Klopper - Mr Potgieter, I would just like to find out something from you for clarity sake. I hear in your evidence in chief you said that when mention was made of the role of askaris, you made the statement that it was highly improbable that the askaris would be involved with an assault on Mabotha. If I put the following to you, we accept that the evidence in this instance is correct, because you were not involved there yourself. That Mabotha on a certain day, for the period of a day, was assaulted at Marble Hall, where members of the Soweto Security Branch, the terrorist tracing unit, were involved amongst others, let's call it under the command of Major Grobbelaar. It is being disputed whether he was, during the assault, that he was there, but the evidence of Mr Klopper was that the same day, from Marble Hall, Mabotha was taken back to Soweto and the same evening, after his arrival at Soweto. And it is also confirmed by the statement of Major Grobbelaar he was taken to make certain pointings out and the evidence of Mr Klopper is that there were certain askaris from Vlakplaas in general, in the vicinity of Soweto, with regard to identification of terrorists. And the evidence, if I recall it correctly, was that the assault took place the same evening during or before these pointings out of certain safe houses by Mabotha. You cannot dispute it?

MR POTGIETER: I would accept.

MR LAMEY: You were not present there.

MR POTGIETER: No I cannot dispute it.

MR LAMEY: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

MR BOOYENS: Booyens on record for Bellinghan, Mr Chairman. No questions, thank you.

MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairman. I have no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARIBANA: Jason Maribana for Mabotha family. Mr Potgieter, I just want to find out from you whether you have ever met with Mr de Kock personally prior to the hand-over of Mr Mabotha?

MR POTGIETER: We did meet at times. At some stage we served together, but I would assume the question is with regard to the Mabotha incident. I cannot recall that before the handing over I had met with Mr de Kock. But at Vlakplaas at times and we had worked together in the past. The question is a little bit broad with regard to the time period.

MR MARIBANA: Mr Potgieter, let me just help you for a while here. I'm just referring after you have telephoned him to help you to keep Mr Mabotha. Have you ever met personally?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall that I met with Mr de Kock after I telephoned him, no.

CHAIRPERSON: So you say you can't recall if you met Mr de Kock after you telephoned him?

MR POTGIETER: That was between the first and the second call.

MR MARIBANA: And during the two telephone calls, excuse me, during the two telephone calls, did you, let me say, more particularly on the second call, was that a follow-up of the first call or did you discuss something new?

MR POTGIETER: No, it was just a follow-up on the first call.

MR MARIBANA: And from the two calls, were you satisfied that Mr de Kock understand what you're saying or what type of help actually do you want from him?

MR POTGIETER: The first call was with regard to the assistance and my problem. And the second call was with regard to the day of his release and the time.

MR MARIBANA: Okay. If I understand you correctly, on the second call, you didn't actually discuss with Mr de Kock as to how actually must he help you? Is that so?

MR POTGIETER: It was already with the first discussion, I had taken this up with him during the first discussion already.

MR MARIBANA: And I understand that on that first discussion you are not sure as to how many time did you spend when you're communicating with him about that help. Is that so?

MR POTGIETER: No, I cannot recall. I can also not recall that Mr de Kock and I frequently communicated. So, unfortunately, I cannot tell you how long that discussion was and how comprehensive the discussion was. We can just speculate about it that's all.

MR MARIBANA: And, Mr Potgieter, do you still remember the exact wording you've used, let us say, there is evidence before this Committee that there was some words like "I have a plan" or "we cannot let him to go free". Do you still remember the exact words, or what the likely words that you might have used when you were discussing this thing with Mr de Kock?

MR POTGIETER: No, I cannot recall what my specific words were. It was about my problem, my dilemma. I did not take note of the choice of words and that type of things. It just, it was about the conveyance of a message of my dilemma and whether he could be of assistance to me.

MR MARIBANA: And, if I understand you correctly, Mr Potgieter, you cannot be in a position to dispute Mr de Kock's version that the conversation goes like "I have a plan, we can’t let this man to go free"? You can't dispute that?

MR POTGIETER: Seen in the light of the fact that I cannot recall my words, I can also not say that Mr de Kock's words are incorrect.

MR MARIBANA: Mr Potgieter, you keep on saying you have a dilemma for releasing Mr Mabotha. Will you please just expatiate on that? What was your problem actually?

MR POTGIETER: My problem was to keep him safe and to keep him available if it was necessary for him to have interviews with the Attorney-General or his advocates. That was my dilemma.

MR MARIBANA: But, Mr Potgieter, isn't it that you had far much better options than to request Mr de Kock to keep Mr Mabotha at Vlakplaas?

MR POTGIETER: No, the safekeeping of witnesses was continually a big problem for us up to now. I am not in the Police Service any more, but right up to today, they still experience problems in keeping witnesses safe and having them available to give evidence.

MR MARIBANA: But Mr Potgieter, here is a man who, there was this information that he ran away from Vlakplaas and he returned back to the ANC or to the liberation movement. Didn't you think that under the circumstances it won't be possible for him to be kept at Vlakplaas?

MR POTGIETER: My information was not that he had deserted. My information was that he was abducted and this came from him himself. And this was continually the statements that he did not desert but that he was abducted and because there had been abductions in the past, there was nothing to indicate to me that the man had deserted.

MR MARIBANA: So, you believed him when he say he was abducted. Is that so?

MR POTGIETER: I believed him, yes.

MR MARIBANA: And if I may just ask you, Mr Potgieter, beside what you've heard from Mr Mabotha, didn't you hear from members of the Security Branch at that stage that Mr Mabotha did turn to the ANC or liberation movement? Didn't you hear anything about it?

MR POTGIETER: No, in his own statement, which he made at that time, he said that he was with Mrs Winnie Mandela, and that he did not become involved in crime per se. That is in his statements. There was no other information surrounding his presence except for the telephone discussions which led to his arrest. It was actually the telephone discussions which led to his arrest, but those telephone discussions, as far as I can recall, if I knew it beforehand or afterwards, I cannot tell you, did not indicate any crime. And there was no other intelligence available with regard to this person. Not before his arrest, and also not after his arrest.

CHAIRPERSON: Does that mean there was no evidence on which he could have been charged with anything? You've just told us there was no evidence that he'd involved in any crime.

MR POTGIETER: At that stage, Chairperson, there was no information with regard to crime activities. These were the telephone discussions. Telephone discussions which were monitored had no information about crime.

CHAIRPERSON: And you then went on to say, "and there was no information available then or later" that indicated that he was involved in any crime.

MR POTGIETER: Information. If one wanted to, one could have applied Section 54 to say that he helped this one or he helped that terrorist, so if one wanted to I could have prosecuted him, or have had him prosecuted.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, does that mean there was evidence that he had committed a crime, or does it not? Mr Potgieter, you have said there was no indication that he had, now you say you could have prosecuted him? Had you got some evidence?

MR POTGIETER: What I meant, Chairperson, with crime, was that he did not commit any crime physically, meaning violent crimes, those type of things, but the mere fact that he could have assisted ANC terrorists while he was with Mrs Mandela is an offence in terms of internal security.

CHAIRPERSON: It was a serious crime in those days, wasn't it?

MR POTGIETER: It is so. But I would also like to tell you that there were many of the askaris who had received military training who we did not charge and they were handed over to Vlakplaas for services there.

ADV SANDI: My understanding with Exhibit D, that is the statement that was taken from him, there's no suggestion there whatsoever that he assisted any ...(indistinct) trained of the ANC.

MR POTGIETER: No. The statement was not meant as, was not meant to be a confession about his assistance to Zodwabo and Sepweng, Toboga and the other man. That was not the purpose of the statement to be used as evidence against him.

ADV SANDI: What was the ...(indistinct) of the statement then?

MR POTGIETER: Can you repeat, please?

ADV SANDI: This Exhibit D statement, what was its purpose?

MR POTGIETER: This would be of assistance especially for the prosecutor in the Stompie Sepei matter.

ADV SANDI: As I read the statement, he seems to be talking about hearsay, the things he has heard people saying. He had no, he had no direct knowledge of what had happened to Sepei.

MR POTGIETER: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, there is a paragraph that says Gerry Richardson told him that he had killed Stompie Sepei.

CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 30.

ADV SANDI: Thank you. Mr Mohlaba?

MR MARIBANA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. Mr Potgieter, tell me, when you phoned Mr de Kock, didn't he tell you about the role Mr Mabotha was, has allegedly played in killing of policemen?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR MARIBANA: And now, let us go back to the handing over of Mr Mabotha. How many motor vehicles were there in the vicinity? Can you still remember?

MR POTGIETER: As far as I can recall, it was my Mazda 626 and Mr de Kock's Landcruiser.

MR MARIBANA: So according to you, only two motor vehicles were there? And you considered that you might have a mistake about the ...(indistinct) of Mr de Kock when Mr Mabotha was handed over to his unit?

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

MR MARIBANA: And if I understand you correctly, are you, are you speculating or you've got a faint recollection of who was there and who was not there?

MR POTGIETER: Chairperson, as I have explained, in my mind's eye I still see Mr de Kock. It was not the arrangement that he would necessarily receive the man himself, but my, it was his vehicle there. My attention was focused on Louw van Niekerk, but in my mind's eye, I see Mr de Kock. But I have to concede that I might have made a mistake.

MR MARIBANA: So if I understand you correctly, what you are saying is he might be there, he might not be there. Is that so?

MR POTGIETER: Yes. As I say, I see him in my mind's eye, but I have to say that one's memory is not infallible.

MR MARIBANA: And beside Mr de Kock and Mr van Niekerk, you can't remember who else was there?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall that I saw anybody else there.

MR MARIBANA: And ...(indistinct) did you tell Mr Mabotha that he'll go with Mr de Kock or, actually, okay, let me just say, when actually did you buy him a ticket train?

MR POTGIETER: I did not buy the ticket myself. One of my staff members bought the tickets, and I cannot recall at which stage, but it must have been in the preparatory stage of the release. Let us say, oh, I'm speculating now, let's say two weeks before the time.

MR MARIBANA: And after Mr Mabotha is gone with Vlakplaas members, when did you first try to contact him? If I can put it in that way.

MR POTGIETER: As I have said, at some stage not long afterwards, I met with Mr de Kock at Head Office. I asked about Mr Mabotha and the answer was that the man was gone. And then directly afterwards, I contacted Pietersburg to make enquiries.

MR MARIBANA: At that point of meeting Mr de Kock you made an enquiry. Tell me, Mr Potgieter, if you didn't coincidentally met with Mr de Kock, would you still try to find out where Mr Mabotha is? Or you just have to leave like that?

MR POTGIETER: I would definitely not have left it there. I cannot tell you now. It's easy now, I can tell you well a week afterwards or two weeks later, but I do not want to say it because the logical step would be that I would have kept my finger on the pulse. But I cannot tell you that I would drive to Vlakplaas the next day or the following week. Circumstances would have made it, would have dominated as to when the enquiries would be made, the first enquiry. You have to remember that the agreement was, or not the agreement, but my discussion with him was that he had to read the climate and this you cannot do in one day. It will take a little longer than that. A few days, or a week, or even longer would have taken.

CHAIRPERSON: But we're now talking about a month, aren't we, Mr Potgieter? You met him in November, you have told us.

MR POTGIETER: It was, Chairperson, as I have said earlier, I cannot connect it. I have tried to connect it with incidents to try and remember, but I can really not tell you when it was. Really, I cannot recall when it was.

CHAIRPERSON: So how can you say it was a week or so? You can't recall?

MR POTGIETER: No, this the logical step that one would follow it up.

CHAIRPERSON: And you did nothing till you met him casually at Head Office?

MR POTGIETER: The meeting, this casual meeting, if we did not meet then, I would have visited Vlakplaas during that time, or maybe I might have visited Vlakplaas, but I don't know. I don't know what our frequency of visits were during those times.

MR MARIBANA: Mr Potgieter, when, let me correct to say, if you didn't ... met with Mr de Kock, you were not going to make enquiries about Mr Mabotha. What is your comment on that?

MR POTGIETER: No, I would have make enquiries. I've just said now that If I did not coincidentally meet Mr de Kock, then ten to one, I would have shortly afterwards made enquiries. I cannot tell you now.

ADV SANDI: What would have made you, you say if you had not met Mr de Kock by chance in the passage, you'd have made enquiries, but would it have caused you to such enquiries?

MR POTGIETER: To find out, to find out how things were going there and to enquire how he experienced the situation and to enquire after his well-being.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but I am asking what would have induced you, what would have made you to make enquiries, had you not met Mr de Kock in the passage by chance?

MR POTGIETER: If I understand the question correctly, it is illogical that I would, a man who would give evidence for me, I would place at a place and ignore him afterwards. You spend six months interrogating the man and you place a measure of control over him, then it would only be logical that one would continue to monitor the situation and to see in what direction he is moving. Otherwise it would be a futile exercise.

ADV SANDI: But you had, at that stage, I understand it was about a month after you had handed over Mabotha to De Kock and his group, and you had made no enquiries from Mr de Kock as to what was the situation with Mr Mabotha?

MR POTGIETER: I have tried, or I am trying to connect the time to an incident, otherwise one cannot recall that long back. As I have said, I cannot recall whether it was before or after the release of the Rivonia people, or how long before or how long after it was, because it must have been within a reasonable time.

ADV SANDI: But, put very briefly, is it not the situation here that until you met Mr de Kock in the passage, you had made no enquiries as to what had happened to Mr Mabotha?

MR POTGIETER: No, I wanted the situation to go its own way for some time, so that afterwards one could make a thorough inference as to how the thing is going on.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, Mr Mohlaba.

MR MARIBANA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. And, Mr Potgieter, you indicated that you managed a good relationship with Mr Mabotha. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that is correct.

MR MARIBANA: And I assume, during that relationship, he told you about his parents or members of his family and girlfriends, and so on? Is that not so?

MR POTGIETER: I assume that this would be part of the discussion, yes. Or of the discussions. It is logical if one has regard for a man's well-being, specifically because if you do not show any interest in his friends or his people, it conveys the wrong message. So one has to show interest and discuss it. But this is how you build up relationships

MR MARIBANA: And after you were told by Mr de Kock that the man is gone, I understand you didn't try, or you didn't personally contact members of his family or friends, etc. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

MR MARIBANA: And, under the circumstances, or more in particular, after you were told by Mr van Wyk that the man didn't arrive at home, didn't you think that it is very much important it is to contact members of his family or friends, personally?

MR POTGIETER: One would expect it to be important, but I didn't do that.

MR MARIBANA: And, Mr Potgieter, I've got instructions from Mr Mabotha's sister, Helen Kgasane, who told me that actually he did come to Soweto to see Mr Mabotha before his release. And you refused to give her permission to see Mr Mabotha. What can you say on that one?

MR POTGIETER: I have no recollection of that.

MR MARIBANA: But you can't dispute that?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot deny it.

MR MARIBANA: Thank you, Mr Chairman. I've got no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS FROM MR MARIBANA

ADV SANDI: Mr Maribana, just one thing. I've been reminded that I've mispronounced your name. I kept on saying Mr Mohlaba, and you're actually Mr Maribana, so ...

MR MARIBANA: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, honourable Chairperson, Ramula Patel on record. Sir, just a couple of questions. Can you recall when exactly you commenced the investigation into Ms Mandela and the Football Club, or people who'd been involved with her?

MR POTGIETER: Chairperson, the investigation into Mrs Mandela's activities, let me tell you this, the investigation into Mrs Mandela and her activities had already begun during 1987. I discussed the aspect with the then Commissioner-General van der Merwe, the date is in my journal which is at the disposal of the Committee, or at least it was submitted during the Section 29 investigation. And the decision was taken to proceed with the investigation and it was only in 1989, I think, if I recall correctly, that the order came that a high treason case had to be prepared.

MS PATEL: Would this have been prior to the initial arrest of Mr Mabotha?

MR POTGIETER: Yes. Mr Mabotha was, according to all indications, arrested in February and I believe this order came before then.

MS PATEL: Okay, so that ...

MR POTGIETER: I cannot recall exactly, but I would assume that it was before then.

MS PATEL: So by that stage, you would've already had an interest in any information that would have come in regarding Mr Mabotha, I mean regarding Mrs Mandela, regardless how inconsequential that information might have been. But you would have had an interest in it.

MR POTGIETER: We would have had an interest in it. However, I must just mention again, as earlier, that we didn't mix evidence and information, so information was good if it could be followed up, so that it could be transformed into evidence.

MS PATEL: Did Mr Grobbelaar, at that stage, know that you were involved in the investigation into Mrs Mandela's activities?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, Mr Chairperson. If my memory serves me correctly, there was an information note which was sent out to all the branches in the RSA, all the security branches, to inform them regarding the investigation so that evidence which had been obtained elsewhere, or could be obtained elsewhere, would be made available for handling by me and my staff at Soweto. I would imagine that there was a circular to that effect.

MS PATEL: So it would seem more probable than not, that when Mr Mabotha was arrested, given his connection with Mrs Mandela, that you would have been informed of that.

MR POTGIETER: Yes. But I cannot tell you at exactly which stage. I do not wish to remove the situation from the two months for which there is no accounting, but I travelled around a great deal at that stage, and I cannot tell you, in the absence of my journals, I cannot tell you whether at that stage in time I was in Soweto or whether I was here in Pretoria busy with an appeal, or something of that nature. It is impossible for me to say.

MS PATEL: Regarding the investigation docket that you eventually handed over to Mr von Lieres, was your source of information in that docket only Mr Mabotha, or were you involved in, were you involved with other witnesses, potential witnesses for this docket?

MR POTGIETER: There were other witnesses who were not in detention who'd already been at Vlakplaas. One Mr Billy, about whom we have already given evidence. But now I must tell you that Billy went to Vlakplaas in 1988, I think, in other words before, I think it was before the order came from the dossier. So I don't believe that Mr de Kock would have been aware of the fact that Billy would also give evidence in the matter. Then there were various other statements made by persons who were not in detention and a great deal of other documents and statements.

MS PATEL: So, do I understand that Mr Mabotha was the only person who was in detention ...

MR POTGIETER: At that stage.

MS PATEL: In respect of that particular docket.

MR POTGIETER: Yes. I gave evidence that the investigation into that dossier was not complete. If we had received the green light, further Section 29 detention would have to be executed of identified persons in Soweto, naturally elsewhere as well. So the investigation and the dossier which I handed over, it was approximately 500 to 1 000 pages in length, there would have to be more arrests and more detentions.

MS PATEL: Okay. Just to give us an indication as to the kind of attention you would have paid to the different witnesses that you were dealing with at the time, would you say that Mr Mabotha was your most important witness in respect of the docket?

MR POTGIETER: No. I cannot say that.

MS PATEL: Okay, was he one of the most important witnesses, if you were to rank the different witnesses in that, for that docket?

MR POTGIETER: I cannot tell you, because the type of arrests which would have had to be executed, would have delivered much more sensitive and important information and evidence. So I wouldn't say he was of such cardinal importance. If you look at documents which were submitted during the Section 29 investigation, the statements which were submitted then, which also formed part of the dossier, you will see that there is evidence which is much more important.

CHAIRPERSON: If one looks at your affidavit, at page 139, where you say "he would have been the key witness" that is not true.

MR POTGIETER: That is an error. I have amended it here in this statement as important witness. As I have already given evidence, Mr Chairperson, all witnesses were important to us.

MS PATEL: Sir, can you tell us. The impression I tend to get from the way in which you managed this case, was that you, to a large extent, operated independently, and that there wasn't a great deal of co-operation between yourself, Mr Grobbelaar and the rest of the members at Security Branch. Would I be correct in this impression?

MR POTGIETER: Let me tell you that the composition and the construction of the dossier was my responsibility. I had officers and members who assisted me and when this thing would obtain momentum, when we received the green light, an investigating team would be compiled in order to see to the exhibits and the interrogations and the witnesses. It was ready. We could go to court, but once things got underway, much more members would be involved. But because Mr Mabotha was the only witness in detention at that stage, I was involved in it and the other men went on with their own investigations.

MS PATEL: I'm sorry, I don't understand, sir. My impression was that initially a docket or what was it, a report was handed over to Mr von Lieres. Subsequent to that, you received an instruction from Head Office saying that you must conclude the investigation regardless of the attitude of the AG's office at that stage. And then, during that period Mr Mabotha was kept for the six month period and you then finalised the investigation.

MR POTGIETER: The investigation was never finalised. As I have given evidence earlier, the investigation would be concluded once the State concluded its case with regard to these matters. Just to put the sequence to you again. I received the order to compile the dossier. Then, while busy with the dossier, I compiled a report for Mr von Lieres, because it was my custom to notify him before the time that things were coming, so that he could select his advocates because they worked on a six week cycle with the prosecutions. And so that he would be able to allocate an advocate to me in time, so that we could work together with these matters. That is how it worked. You received an advocate from the AG's offices, then the report went to Mr von Lieres and he went to Cape Town. He returned with his order or, I don't know if it was his opinion, that the political situation was not quite suitable. I reported that to Head Office and they said, "you go ahead. You will submit a dossier to Klaus von Lieres and you will paint into a corner, so that he will say he will prosecute." That was the impression that I gained. No one told me that, but that was the impression that I was under as a result of the continuous activities of Mrs Winnie Mandela and the fact that nobody wanted to address it. There was a great deal of criticism against the police because steps were not being taken and we wanted to use little guys to say, "it isn't us, it's the Department of Justice".

MS PATEL: All right. Let me ask you directly then. During the period that Mr Mabotha was held, in terms of Section 29 when you were investigating, did you receive any co-operation from Mr Grobbelaar and from Mr du Toit, during that period?

MR POTGIETER: With regards to the investigation?

MS PATEL: That's correct.

MR POTGIETER: It was a continuous action of the Security Branch at Soweto. Mrs Winnie Mandela and her team enjoyed the continued attention of the intelligence people, the investigating people, some of her soccer players or her gang members were arrested, and detained. Statements were taken and they were released. So we did enjoy support from them.

MS PATEL: Once again, sir, did you receive co-operation from Mr Grobbelaar during this period? Whilst you were investigating...

MR POTGIETER: I must have, because we co-operated, but I cannot tell you exactly what I received.

MS PATEL: Did it take you a full six months to build up this relationship of trust with Mr Mabotha? Or did you feel that at some stage before the six months had expired, you know, that it wasn't really necessary for him to be kept in detention for the purpose of making him ready in a sense to be a witness in this matter?

MR POTGIETER: No, I would concede that the entire period of six months would not have been necessary. There was always the hope that I would be able to obtain Section 31 warrant which would then have him detained as a witness, then of course, with the accompanying privileges such as more visits, newspapers and so forth. So I cannot tell you exactly when the preparation for this began, although it was continuous, I cannot tell you whether it was two to three or four months.

MS PATEL: Okay. But it would have been, I guess, given that your intention was that he was to be transferred for purposes of safekeeping, I think is what you said, it would have been open to you at least some months before the six month period had expired, to make, to ensure that there was other options available, rather than keeping him in detention in terms of Section 29, because your work, to a large extent, had been completed with him.

MR POTGIETER: Actually, yes.

MS PATEL: Can I ask you why did you keep him for the six month period?

MR POTGIETER: As I have already explained. In the hope that before the time, I would be able to obtain a Section 31 warrant.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can I just, from your application I note that you've been a member of the Security Branch since 1973.

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

MS PATEL: And during that period, between 1973 and 1989, were you involved in meetings that would have taken place at the Security Branch, in which matters would have been discussed of a general nature, or the general operation of the Security Branch is discussed?

MR POTGIETER: I believe so, yes.

MS PATEL: Okay. And the language that is used by Security Branch and Vlakplaas in respect of, well the veiled language that is used in terms of how certain people were to be dealt with in respect of whether they needed to be killed or eliminated. Was that kind of language never, ever used during that 16 year period at those meetings that you attended?

MR POTGIETER: Let me tell you that I think that every career or category of work, has its language that it uses. There are clichés which are frequently used by individuals. And that which I have said to you here, that when somebody told me that somebody had to be taken out or go to the tall trees, I would accept it. Or, as we had the case of somebody who had to be removed from society permanently, one would know what it meant. Or the brouhaha around the word "elimination". Because to me, elimination means "kill". That's that. Regardless of any other meaning that somebody else may attach to it.

MS PATEL: And you, at that stage, during 1989, would have understood the meaning of those clichés.

MR POTGIETER: That which I have mentioned to you now? Yes.

MS PATEL: Okay. The reason I asked you this, is because Mr de Kock has pertinently put into his application that during the conversation with you around whether Mr Mabotha was to be killed or not, around the discussion on this, was that words specifically from you were that "'n plan moet gemaak word" and you would have understood. If that is correct, if what he says is correct, you would have understood what those words would have meant, sir. That Mr Mabotha was to be killed.

MR POTGIETER: If there had been a code language between me and another person as a result of our specific shared work and what we had to do every day or every week, it could be that words would achieve a mutual significance. To make a plan or to make a plan with somebody is not necessarily the same thing or the same word.

MS PATEL: Are you now saying to us, sir, that the words "maak 'n plan" in Security Branch lingo, had various different meanings?

MR POTGIETER: Make a plan did not mean to me that people had to be killed. Definitely not.

MS PATEL: In Security Branch lingo, would it not have had only one meaning?

MR POTGIETER: But it wasn't a general discussion in the Security Branch, at meetings, especially, to kill people.

ADV SANDI: Then you met Mr de Kock later in the passage and he tells you that "daardie persoon is nou weg" and you don't ask "wanneer het dit gebeur?" You're not interested in that at all.

MR POTGIETER: That must have happened in the time that he was received at De Deur and the time that I ran into Mr de Kock.

ADV SANDI: I'm sorry, I don't follow you.

MR POTGIETER: Mr de Kock didn't tell me when the man had left. He simply told me the man was gone.

ADV SANDI: Yes, that's what I mean. You didn't ask him when did he go. You just accepted that.

MR POTGIETER: I just accepted it as that, knowing that I was going to make enquiries and that is what I did.

ADV SANDI: You did not even want to know in what sort of circumstances he had disappeared. What was happening when he disappeared, when he went "weg".

MR POTGIETER: No, but I had an arrangement with Mr Mabotha. I had an arrangement with Mr Mabotha. That should the conditions at Vlakplaas be unacceptable to him, he could go t Pietersburg. So the moment that I heard that the man had left, I didn't think about anything else, I thought that he must be there and that I was going to make enquiries, and that is why I made the telephone calls and sent the telex.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you tell Mr de Kock that?

MR POTGIETER: No, I didn't tell him.

CHAIRPERSON: So he might still have been making enquiries to find out where this man was, that he was supposed to be looking after?

MR POTGIETER: He could probably have.

CHAIRPERSON: And you didn't think to tell him, "oh, I arranged he could go home, if he wanted to."

MR POTGIETER: No, I didn't tell him.

CHAIRPERSON: Why was this complete silence between you and Mr de Kock? You didn't tell him anything about this man. You didn't ask him what the reaction to this man would be at Vlakplaas. You only enquired about the man when you met him casually and even then you didn't tell him about the arrangements you'd made. Why, Mr Potgieter? Didn't you trust him?

MR POTGIETER: It's not a question of mistrust. It's just that our working methods differed completely. Our characters differed completely. Mr de Kock and I didn't have an issue with each other, but there wasn't a close friendship in which we would ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But it's not friendship we're talking about, this is working together. You asked him, as member of the Police Force, to assist you by keeping an important witness in safe custody. Not custody. It was a working relationship, not a friendship.

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You then made a secret arrangement with this man if he didn't like it, he could just ignore anything arranged by Mr de Kock and leave.

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You never told Mr de Kock a word about any of this.

MR POTGIETER: No.

ADV SANDI: And when you commenced your own investigation as to the whereabouts of Mr Mabotha, you did not even have the basic information as to when he had disappeared, and what sort of treatment he may have been subjected to by askaris and other people at Vlakplaas? Which may have caused him to run away?

MR POTGIETER: Well, that is what I wanted to determine, with the telex that I sent to the Pietersburg people, for them to trace him. Then I would have met with him and I would have spoken to him.

ADV SANDI: But you could have commenced your preliminary investigation with Mr de Kock and asked, "tell me, what happened to the man? When did it happen?"

MR POTGIETER: I cannot tell you what the circumstances of our meeting was. I do believe that if there had been time, we would probably have been able to discuss it, but I cannot tell you when I met him what the circumstances were.

CHAIRPERSON: But you never did discuss it with him, Mr Potgieter.

MR POTGIETER: No, I didn't.

CHAIRPERSON: So that is a useless explanation. After you were told from Pietersburg that he'd never come there, you didn't go back to ask Mr de Kock for further help and assistance.

MR POTGIETER: By the time that I received that answer, as I have told you earlier, my inference was that nothing else was going to come of the story.

CHAIRPERSON: What do you mean by that?

MR POTGIETER: You must remember that at a stage, things began happening very quickly. The persons who, for example, were released, we on ground level at the Security Branch, certainly didn't know they were going to be released. We were simply informed that today you're going to Diepkloof Prison, you're going to receive Walter Sisulu and others. We were caught completely unawares. And when this happened, the ANC had been effectively unbanned, because although the unbanning only took place in 1990, upon those releases the ANC had effectively been unbanned and the pressure became tremendous for us to obtain information surrounding plannings and so forth. It was a very hectic time.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Potgieter, you told us this was a man with whom you had a special relationship, built up over six months. A man whose life was at risk from the ANC. And you now say you didn't bother to go and ask a single question to find out when he had left, how he had left, where he had gone to and matters of that nature.

MR POTGIETER: Yesterday, I attempted to explain to you that the shift in emphasis was completely different. Things which were important today were no longer important tomorrow. It was a very chaotic time and that is just the way that things happened.

CHAIRPERSON: So the life of Mr Mabotha was no longer of importance.

MR POTGIETER: No, I wouldn't say that. I think that is unfair.

ADV SANDI: Just tell me, Mr Potgieter, save for contacting the Pietersburg Security Police to enquire about Mr Mabotha, what other steps, what other steps, did you take any other steps to enquire as to his whereabouts?

MR POTGIETER: No, I didn't take any other steps at that stage. Also not later.

ADV SANDI: But, I thought it was known to you that at some stage before, Mr Mabotha had interacted, joined members of the Football Club. Did you not make any enquiries to find out if he had not perhaps gone back there?

MR POTGIETER: You must remember that shortly after this time, I joined the Intelligence Component and I was no longer involved in the Interrogation and Detention Component.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but having joined the Intelligence Component, wouldn't that mean you were well placed, you were well placed to find anyone, to find out about what was happening in formations like the Football Club, who was there and who were the new recruits?

MR POTGIETER: I agree with you, the focus was on Mrs Mandela and naturally, of course, the Soccer Club as well. I cannot recall any specific tasking of informers, although there weren't any informers, with the exception of Mr Richardson. But the period that I spent at the Intelligence Component, we had informers who, did not have informers who were infiltrated in the milieu of Mrs Mandela. And there were no arrests within that group, so my capacity was somewhat restricted and as I have said, my focus was also completely different.

ADV SANDI: Can I take it that you did not even make enquiries from the ANC in exile, maybe the guy had gone back there to join the ANC in exile? You did not make any enquiries there either?

MR POTGIETER: I did not have that capacity.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

COURT ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

J D POTGIETER: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: (cont)

Thank you, honourable Chairperson. Mr Potgieter, just to follow on the last questions that you were asked by Adv Sandi regarding the follow-ups that you would have done after your conversation with Mr de Kock. The conversation where you met him by chance and you asked him, you know, where you asked him about Mr Mabotha. What I want to know is that after that, you knew that Mr Mabotha had your details, as a contact person after he, if he was to leave Vlakplaas, he was to contact you. Given that you'd moved to Intelligence, people who would call to the police station looking for you would simply be told that you're no longer there. That was your evidence to us. Did you not make any arrangements then with at least Mr Kritzinger, that if calls were to come in for you, that he was to take your calls and address queries that might come in for you? And also to keep an ear out for whether Mr Mabotha would in fact call there looking for you.

MR POTGIETER: Chairperson, it was surely not necessary to make special arrangements seen in the light of the fact that the Reception at Soweto Security Branch serves as a nodal point, for, specifically for the Intelligence Unit's people. And if messages did come which were meant for you, one could get those messages there. And because of the fact that the telephone numbers of the Intelligence Component were classified as secret and could not be given out, we were aware that if calls for one, messages will kept at Reception for you. I cannot tell you whether there was a register. I know there was an Incidents Register which was kept at Reception. I did, from time to time, receive messages, because you worked so long with investigations that it is logical that enquiries and messages would come to you. So, but I did not specifically tell them, "listen here, if Mr Mabotha contacts, tries to contact me, you must inform me." It was an obvious aspect to me.

MS PATEL: Okay. And then, just one final aspect. You've stated to us that it took you, conservatively speaking, about three to four months during that Section 29 period within which to get all the information that you required and to build up the relationship of trust.

MR POTGIETER: I do not want to bind myself to a time period, but I can concede that it was possible that it took that time, yes.

MS PATEL: All right. And that's quite a considerable period, you will concede?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that is so.

MS PATEL: Did you then not question how it was possible for the other members of the Security Branch to obtain such a detailed statement as we see with the Section 29 statement that is handed to us? To get so much information within a period of one or two days? Did you not find that strange? That it's taking you four months to get where you want to be, and yet they got a whole lot of information within a couple of days, or a day at least? A day or two?

MR POTGIETER: I am not with you completely. Was this, this is Mabotha C that you're referring to?

MS PATEL: Mabotha D, sir. That's the Section 29 statement.

CHAIRPERSON: That's the one he took.

MS PATEL: Oh, sorry, sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: The other statement is Mabotha C.

MS PATEL: Sorry, okay, no, I've marked them incorrectly. Sorry, honourable Chairperson. Okay, no, then I, then I withdraw that question, honourable Chairperson. Can I just ask you generally, if an activist or so-called terrorist is picked up and you need information from him and he doesn't co-operate willingly, what would happen? Would it be standard practice for him to be assaulted during an interrogation if there was no co-operation? In terms of your knowledge and experience?

MR POTGIETER: It did happen, yes. One gets persons who apply violence as an option and then one gets the other man who is not willing to apply violence, but goes through proper questioning and try to gain his favour. So, yes, it did happen. But it was not, in my eyes, official policy, it was not authorised, there were many complaints about it and members who were prosecuted because of it. So, yes, it did happen.

MS PATEL: Okay. But during your time with him there was no reason for you to assault Mr Mabotha?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MS PATEL: Okay. The reason I ask you this, is because we've heard evidence here that Mr Mabotha had been seriously assaulted for an extended period, or for most of the day in fact when he was first arrested. And despite that, Mr de Kock had stated that he didn't really give any information over to him during that period.

MR POTGIETER: I heard that, yes.

MS PATEL: All right. Thank you, honourable Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL

ADV SANDI: Just one thing, Mr Potgieter. In the event of Mr Mabotha calling you by telephone, in what manner was he supposed to identify himself to you?

MR POTGIETER: I did not decide on a code or a pseudonym. I would assume that he would have used his own name.

ADV SANDI: Thank you. Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: What name would you have assumed that would have been?

MR POTGIETER: Themba Mabotha.

CHAIRPERSON: Not George?

MR POTGIETER: Chairperson, I don't know where I heard this name, George. But George is stuck in my mind. But nobody else refers to George, they refer to Themba, so I don't know. If there was a message that a George from Pietersburg had called, then I would assume that I would knew who it was, or if Themba from Pietersburg had called, I would have also known. But I cannot tell you that it was George, that that name would be used.

ADV SANDI: Did you, did you know that according to, I think that's Exhibit D, I cannot find the exact paragraph at this stage, according to Mr Mabotha, Mrs Winnie Mandela had said to him he should identify himself with the same name whenever he is calling her?

MR POTGIETER: It is paragraph 20 of the statement. Chairperson, can I just, I do not want to give a long explanation. But briefly, if a man goes to the ANC, then he gets what we call an MK name or an Apla name. And then he returned and in Soweto, he gets his Soweto MK name. That strategy was to confuse the Security Police, because from research from C2 one could determine that Piet, Koos and Jan are on the point of infiltrating, but you know them as Piet, Jan and Koos because those were their MK names. But the moment they infiltrate, then they get a new name. And if there was a telephone discussion, or informers who mentioned a new name, it just, then we lose the trail and we wouldn't know who it was. So it was totally acceptable that Mrs Mandela would have given him the name Themba. In other instances, she gave other people also names Junior Mandela, Junior Thambo and so forth.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Potgieter, can we first deal with detention in terms of Section 29. The perception was created here that it was a procedure which you would have controlled exclusively. Was that the situation?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Is it correct under Section 29 detention, the detainee would be examined by a medical doctor once every 14 days?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, by the District Surgeon and also if there were any complications, by another private practitioner.

MR ROSSOUW: And is it also correct that besides that, a detainee would at least, once every 14 days, be visited by a magistrate in the district where he is detained.

MR POTGIETER: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And would such a magistrate have an interview with him?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Would he be able voice his complaints towards the magistrate?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Would he be able to say that he was assaulted at this stage?

MR POTGIETER: Definitely.

MR ROSSOUW: And is it also correct that the Inspector of detainees, who was usually a judge, would visit detainees in terms of Section 29 at any stage?

MR POTGIETER: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: So these persons would have known if Mr Mabotha had been assaulted during his detention?

MR POTGIETER: If he mentioned it to them.

MR ROSSOUW: And if he came to them after his detention in terms of Section 29, and he had bruises, what would they do?

MR POTGIETER: They would make notes and ask for explanations.

MR ROSSOUW: Do you know if there were any such notes?

MR POTGIETER: Not as far as I know.

MR ROSSOUW: And you have already said that Mr Mabotha did not mention to you that he was assaulted.

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And then you say the official in control of the detention centre visits the detainees daily.

MR POTGIETER: That's correct. It is the procedure that the Station Commander visit these cells every day and enquire about the well-being, specifically security detainees.

MR ROSSOUW: And this official in control of the detention centre, who would this be at Soweto Security Branch?

MR POTGIETER: The Soweto Detention Cells, the Protea Cells, resorted under the control of the Station Commander, the uniform branch.

MR ROSSOUW: It was not yourself?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR ROSSOUW: And then the same procedure would be applicable at Jan Coetzee Police Station?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And the same at De Deur Police Station?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And then is it also correct that every 14 days, Security Head Office would be provided with a report?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And if this appeared from the progress report that Mr Mabotha's interrogation had been finished, could they say from their side that he could be released?

MR POTGIETER: Yes. But from those progress reports, it was a fortnightly progress report with regard to all the investigations of all the stations for every Security Branch, and then it is embodied in one report for the Minister so that he received a monthly report with regard to detentions, court cases or, which serves in court cases which are being investigated. So every 14 days in the month one compiled a report and one had to say how far the investigation has progressed, what is the objective for this part of it. It is to have better control because of the criteria of the past.

MR ROSSOUW: Is it also correct that senior officials could regularly visit detainees?

MR POTGIETER: Not that they could. They were obliged. Officers who rendered service on weekends, one of their tasks was to visit places of detention where we had detainees, because it was so distributed and during their weekend service they had to visit those people. And if there were any irregularities or any complaints or any requests, then they had to bring it to the attention of the Commander.

MR ROSSOUW: So it was not a case that you had detained a person here and had worked with him on your own and had access to him and had control over him by yourself?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR ROSSOUW: And this Section 29 statement which you took from him, the one which serves as Mabotha D, this you said would be the one which comes from the Stompie Sepei dossier?

MR POTGIETER: That's correct. I don't know where the Commission found it, but I think with a Section 29 hearing of this year, it was handed up. I don't know, but I think it comes from the Sepei dossier.

MR ROSSOUW: And would the same statement be filed in the high treason dossier?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, it would be in there for the attention of the particular advocate.

MR ROSSOUW: Now the aspects in that statement which deals with the proving the case of Mrs Winnie Mandela, so you say a court statement was also prepared?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, this could also serve as a court statement in the Sepei matter, although there are aspects which are not relevant to the Sepei matter. And I think that is why Du Toit had compiled Mabotha C. I don't know that statement but I think it was also for the court. But so what happens here is that the statements, when the Attorney-General or the advocate has interviews with the witness, he makes his own notes as to how he wants to lead the witness and what he wants to offer.

MR ROSSOUW: So other statements would also be available?

MR POTGIETER: Most probably.

MR ROSSOUW: And in the high treason matter, it would be the court statements which would more specifically deal with Mrs Mandela's assistance to terrorists?

MR POTGIETER: Yes. Why it is important, Chairperson, that all the statements are available, is to prevent that it is said that a person made five statements and only the first one was acceptable for the investigative official. So it comes down to coaching and to prevent this you keep all the statements and if the court wants to study these, it is not a matter of telling a person what to say, the one contains more information than another one. Otherwise it would seem as if a man was questioned until he gave the perfect statement which suits the case.

MR ROSSOUW: And this investigation, this high treason investigation against Mrs Mandela, you say that that case was never, the investigation was never concluded until the State concluded its case. So it was not like a normal motor vehicle accident where the evidence is taken and testimony is taken and it just goes to court.

MR POTGIETER: Definitely not. One has the problem where, if the indictment contains certain facts and the person has already pleaded, then one cannot bring in any other facts against the person. But your supplementary evidence would be in support of what you have already put in the indictment.

MR ROSSOUW: Did you say now that when you experienced this dilemma with Mr Mabotha's release, you said that you cannot recall, but it is possible that you might have discussed it with the other members at Soweto, amongst others possibly Mr Nienaber.

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: What was Mr Nienaber's rank at that stage?

MR POTGIETER: He was a Brigadier and he was the Commander of the Security Branch at Soweto.

MR ROSSOUW: I would like to refer you to Mabotha B, Exhibit Mabotha B, the statement of Mr Grobbelaar, where in paragraph 10.2 he says, 10.2, page six, Mr Chairman. There Mr Grobbelaar says that even later he was informed by Brigadier Nienaber that Mabotha will return to Vlakplaas where he would work again for them. Is it possible that you told Mr Nienaber this?

MR POTGIETER: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: So what you are saying that you cannot independently recall it, but it does not mean that you might have possibly discussed it with the other officers?

MR POTGIETER: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You have said now that the dilemma that Mr Mabotha could not be trusted at Vlakplaas was foreseen or it was a perception. You discussed it with him and he indicates that he would feel much safer in the system.

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that is correct, in the structures.

MR ROSSOUW: And now he is released and he returns to Vlakplaas where statements are made that it is clear that he cannot be trusted there again and he does not resist.

MR POTGIETER: No, he did not resist, because he agreed to go back there.

MR ROSSOUW: And he went out of his own, he did not say that I do not want to go with Mr van Niekerk?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Nor Mr Britz?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Or Mr de Kock?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR ROSSOUW: And on the assumption that you had indeed given an instruction or requested that Mr Mabotha be killed, did Mr de Kock tell you the following day and say, "I have executed your request"?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Did he say that "I have killed Mabotha in this manner"?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR ROSSOUW: He didn't report back to you?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Would you have expected that he would have at least inform you that your request had been executed, if you did request such a thing?

MR POTGIETER: I believe so.

MR ROSSOUW: When he told you that he was gone, he didn't come and look for you. This was a coincidental meeting at Security Head Offices?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And he does not tell you there that this is, this and that is what we did to the man?

MR POTGIETER: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I've no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ROSSOUW

ADV SIBANYONI: Mr Potgieter, the Committee has had an opportunity of visiting Vlakplaas and it would seem it would have been difficult for Mabotha to leave that area without any assistance from the Vlakplaas members for transport, and you are saying you didn't tell Intelligence Corps that he should leave when he found the place to be unacceptable. What is your comment?

MR POTGIETER: I did not foresee a problem as to how he would leave Vlakplaas. I know it is a remote place and alongside a road that is not very busy. But the idea was not that he would be in detention there. In other words, he had some measure of freedom of movement and he could certainly have seen his way open to leave there.

ADV SIBANYONI: Would you agree, Mr de Kock would be surprised if Mabotha just walks away from Vlakplaas without De Kock knowing what was taking place?

MR POTGIETER: Yes, the manner of how and the time was not discussed with him. I assumed that he will use his own initiative.

ADV SIBANYONI: You are saying at that stage Mr de Kock was a Major, you were also a Major and he was sort of your senior, because he became an officer before you. In other words, if I understand you well, he didn't need any instructions from you or any suggestion or opinion what should be done by, with Mr Mabotha?

MR POTGIETER: Yes.

ADV SIBANYONI: May I just ask you this question. Initially, you wanted to make an application for amnesty for this incident. Is that correct?

MR POTGIETER: No.

ADV SIBANYONI: What happened first? Did you hear for the first time during Eugene de Kock's trial that Mabotha was killed or did you hear when Captain Mike Holmes wanted to take a statement from you saying that you are a possible accomplice?

MR POTGIETER: During the hearing of the trial of Mr de Kock.

ADV SIBANYONI: On, in response to a question by Mr Wagener, De Kock said something to the effect that if a person comes before the Amnesty Committee, or before the TRC and deny knowledge of any wrongdoing, De Kock is not surprised because you people were told to deny any wrongdoing. Denials were made before the Harms Commission, the Goldstone Commission. What is your comment about that? Or let me rephrase the question. Are you not persisting in the denials you people were told to maintain?

MR POTGIETER: No, definitely not.

ADV SIBANYONI: Are you saying Mr de Kock is telling this Committee lies when he said he discussed with you and there was some consensus, agreement that Mabotha should be eliminated?

MR POTGIETER: I think we have made the concession, Chairperson, to say that Mr de Kock was not lying, but he attaches another meaning to the words "as I intended it". This is what I say.

ADV SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

ADV SANDI: Just one or two. When you were in Namibia with Mr de Kock, you were in a different section. Did you say that was the section where you dealt with analysing information?

MR POTGIETER: That is correct. I was the Information or Intelligence Officer of the Koevoet Unit.

ADV SANDI: I see that in one of the documents here, Mr de Kock describes you as a - he says you are very good analyst of information. Do you consider that to be a fair or correct description of your capabilities?

MR POTGIETER: I think over the years with the work one does, one develops certain capabilities and I feel good that Mr de Kock says this about me, yes.

ADV SANDI: Did you at any stage have a discussion with Mr de Kock to ask him how it could have happened that he interpreted what you had said to him, that you meant Mr Mabotha should be killed?

MR POTGIETER: No.

ADV SANDI: Have you had an opportunity to do that?

MR POTGIETER: I must have had the opportunity to ask, but I didn't.

ADV SANDI: Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: One matter I'd like you to assist me in, and I'm not sure if it's you who should assist me, or your legal adviser. Early on in the evidence, we have had Exhibit F, and I'm not sure if your legal adviser read it out to you, or you read it.

MR ROSSOUW: Yes, Mr Chairman, Mr Potgieter read it out.

CHAIRPERSON: Could you read it out again? I'm afraid I didn't manage to note it down and I cannot read this handwriting.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, we'll attempt to do so. That was also what Mr Potgieter testified. He had a problem in deciphering the, ja.

MR POTGIETER: Chairperson, it is on page 39 of Exhibit F. It is the entry dated the 20th of the 3rd. Then he reads "Lt du Toit from the Soweto Security called. Has arrested Themba. Informs that Themba is busy giving evidence at Pietersburg. As soon as he is finished there, he will be transferred to Johannesburg. He will then be addressed with regard to this case. The background statement of Themba" and it would be appear "expire, will expire" if that is correct, "or will be given by Mr de Kock. Telephone (012) 78-3302 or 78-3410". And then it appears to be signed by the investigating officer.

The second entry that I referred to is on page 41, the entry dated 28th of March, and it reads as follows: "The statement from Lt du Toit as per A48. Notes found in possession of Themba as per A49. Statements of Johannes Roglade Mabotha alias Themba as per A50." Chairperson, then the following two lines have been scratched out. It has to do with the lines above that, but I cannot make it out. It looks like "Documents found in Themba's possession as per A51. Documents found in Themba's possession as per A51." But that has been scratched out and below that appears "Statement of black man S/M Edwin Makoenya". It looks like it's m i h g a n as per A51." I don't know what the relation is between A51 and the above mentioned. And then the entry is once again undersigned by the person who appears to have been Lt Dempsey.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are you calling any further witnesses?

MR ROSSOUW: No, Mr Chairman. May Mr Potgieter be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: Just wait a moment. Does anyone else propose to call or recall any witnesses?

NO FURTHER WITNESSES TO BE RECALLED

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, he can go now.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Well, as I recollect, that concludes the evidence that we're going to hear in this application. I don't know whether you gentlemen would like to commence your addresses now, or whether we should do that tomorrow morning? Or are you able to do it tomorrow morning?

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, it was discussed with us by Ms Patel. I am prepared to start now, but I wouldn't like to start now, provided we can finish today and I don't have to come back tomorrow. If we have to come back tomorrow in any event, then I'd much rather do it tomorrow, Mr Chairman. I don't think I'll be

much longer than 15, 20 minutes, maybe, if I can give an indication.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps optimistic. What do the rest of you feel? I feel on that basis, it would be safer to start and finish tomorrow? Very well, we'll take the adjournment now and start addresses at 9.30 tomorrow morning. That suit you gentlemen?

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS