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Amnesty Hearings

Type AMNESTY HEARINGS

Starting Date 12 July 1999

Location PRETORIA

Day 1

Names EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK

Case Number AM0066/96

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, I know that you have an appointment you say at half past 4. Are you going to be calling Mr de Kock now?

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman I will be calling Mr de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: If we stop at quarter to 4 would that....?

MR HATTINGH: I doubt it, I'll just ask my attorney staff to phone the doctor and tell him I won't be able to keep my appointment.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you're going to call Mr de Kock?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR VISSER: Sorry Mr Visser, do you have any other witnesses to call in your application regarding General le Roux?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we don't intend calling any other witnesses thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh?

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, I call Mr de Kock.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, you are an applicant with regard to this matter?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR HATTINGH: You have at previous instances given evidence before other Committees with regard to amnesty, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And at one such opportunity you gave evidence with regard to a supplementary affidavit which was prepared on your behalf and is now bundle 1(d) in this matter, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And there you deal in general with Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm the correctness of that document?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I do, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You have also as a general introduction to all your amnesty applications, you have given background to your career in the South African Police, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And this is also embodied in bundle 1(a) I think?

CHAIRPERSON: It comes as a separate bundle, perhaps we can call it 1(e), I think. Is this the testimony?

MR HATTINGH: No, that's not what I'm referring to Mr Chairman, no. May I just enquire from you, Mr Chairman, should we mark this document that is just referred to, the supplementary affidavit, should it become an affidavit or can ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think we keep it as bundle 1(d), it's got the number already.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman. Now I'm referring actually, Mr Chairman, to - I had it in front of me just now, 1(a), pages 49 to 105 and then the annexures 120 - 278, Mr Chairman. Thank you.

The general introduction and background to your career is embodied in bundle 1(a), do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I do, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then there was also many other documents attached to that which also form part of this bundle?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And for purposes of these proceedings, Mr de Kock, I would just like you to give the Committee a very brief summary as to when you joined Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with the end of my period of service at the end of May 1983 at Oshakati in Ovamboland in the north of South West, I was transferred to Vlakplaas Section C1, attached to head office and I worked there under Brigadier Cronje right up to the end of July 1985 whereafter I became the commander of Vlakplaas and I was the commander up to the end of March or end of April 1993.

MR HATTINGH: So when the Maponya incident took place you were only the commander of Vlakplaas for a few months?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And what was your rank then?

MR DE KOCK: I was a captain then, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And your immediate commander to whom you had to report was who?

MR DE KOCK: It was Brigadier Schoon from security head office.

MR HATTINGH: He was at head office?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Now as the commander of Vlakplaas, did you in the morning directly go to Vlakplaas or did you have to pass by head office first?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in the mornings at 6.30 you had to be at the commander's office, this is Brigadier Schoon's office, to discuss certain aspects which may have come about or which have been concluded and this was continuous and thereafter, after this meeting, one could move to Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Depending on the meeting and this would depend on the time that the meeting took there?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: With regard to the Maponya incident you were approached by the Security Branch of Krugersdorp to be of assistance in this instance?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, in 1985 during one of our deployments, Captain Kleynhans whom I met the first time and Lieutenant Dunkley, I think he was a Warrant Officer then, whom I'd already met in Ovamboland, he was attached to the security branch, they indeed arrived at Vlakplaas and they were in possession of photos, it might have been between 10 and 15 photos of MK members and suspects for the purposes of identification which would have been done by the askaris and amongst others during that meeting Captain Kleynhans asked for askaris for a group and I informed that I could not give him a group.

MR HATTINGH: For what purpose did he want a group?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he did not have a specific purpose, he asked for a group, he said that they had a need, there were terrorists in the vicinity and that is the essence. There was not specific reference made by him but what I did not have was a telex from his commander which had to go to Brigadier Schoon for approval that I could send a group to the West Rand. I informed him, this is to Captain Kleynhans, that I have already drawn up my deployment list and I did not have a group available for him.

MR HATTINGH: Did you tell him that you might possibly be of assistance later to him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I did him tell him that at a later stage I would be able to be of assistance to him but not with that deployment.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall, Mr De Kock, how long before the Maponya incident did he visit you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was just before we deployed and if I cast my mind back, it must have been a day or two before, it was not a week before the time, it was a day or two before we deployed.

MR HATTINGH: If you are referring to deployed, who was deployed where?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it depends on the needs of the different regions, people would be deployed to Mafikeng or Zeerust so that they could cover the Botswana border. We had a permanent group around the Swaziland border, that was the Eastern border, we sent groups for example to Durban and there was a dire need at that stage to deploy a group in the area of northern Zululand because of terrorist activities or rural terrorist activities and close to Josini and Dumu and close to Kwasi Bay.

MR HATTINGH: Were people deployed there to the last mentioned area?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I sent a reasonably large group there.

MR HATTINGH: And you as commander, did you accompany any of the groups whom you sent? What was the position?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, these groups were deployed and the method that was followed was that the group leader, the people who were in command of these groups, would report to the commander of the region and if it's too far from the regional head office they would go to the branch commander of the Security Branch who had requested them and then they received instructions there as to what the nature was of their work that they want, whether it's observation or whether they have to search for somebody or whether it was an infiltration and usually the branches would arrange accommodation and then the members would be taken to places where they would be accommodated and they would be informed with regard to the security and social structure so that it would not interfere with the existing security structure.

MR HATTINGH: Can we just diverge from what we are busy with now Chairperson, I'm just afraid that I might forget about it. Exhibit A which was handed up by Mr Visser this morning, General Background to Amnesty Application, you have already studied this beforehand, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson

MR HATTINGH: And do you confirm it insofar as it has relevance to you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I do, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: To return to what you were busy with, you had deployed people. Where did you go after these groups were deployed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, after this deployment I moved to Mafikeng where I had a group who worked in the Boputhatswana area. They moved in co-operation with the Boputhatswana Internal Intelligence Service and we assisted them and they liaised with the Security Branch at Zeerust and at Potchefstroom.

MR HATTINGH: Did any of your members contact you while you were there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was contacted by Warrant Officer Willie Nortje who asked me to come to Krugersdorp to the Security Branch of Krugersdorp. They wanted to launch an operation, they needed me there.

MR HATTINGH: Did he call you from Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson and I then enquired from him what they wanted there. He mentioned to me that he had received a call from security head office who rescheduled their deployment there and then moved them to Krugersdorp.

MR HATTINGH: And as far as you were concerned, where was he supposed to be at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: He should have been a Josini, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Such a request for assistance, you say this had to be asked by the commander and the request had to be directed at your commander?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson. What would happen is that the officer or the investigator who wants askaris would draw up such a telex or he would direct such a request at the regional commander who will send it on his part to the commander who will give it to Brigadier Schoon who was the commander of C1 and this would be sent down to the commander of Section C1 and from there I will do the deployment as quickly as possible depending on how they needed the deployment.

MR HATTINGH: Did you see such a telex with regard to the request from Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, but after the deployment was concluded for that month, I received the telex from Captain Martin Naude, the commander of Section C2, he made an entry there or a note there on the telex that he had discussed the matter with Brigadier Schoon and that he had made the call to Josini for the redeployment of the group at Josini.

MR HATTINGH: What happened to the telex, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the telex was among the Vlakplaas documents, it was the original telex as it had arrived at head office and in 1990 with the Harms Commission's enquiry many documents arrived at Vlakplaas when we cleaned out the storerooms and at that stage I thought that we had destroyed all our documents but this particular day two metal containers, we refer to it as police containers, was there and there were sensitive documents in there and source reports and we burned all these reports and we burned them in a 44 gallon drum and one of these people, I don't know whether it was Bellingan or somebody else, showed me this document and told me "look at this" and this was the telex where a request was directed at us for askaris to be sent to Krugersdorp and that was the cause of the redeployment of the Vlakplaas group.

MR HATTINGH: And the document, what happened to it? Was it burned?

MR DE KOCK: Yes but it was first shown to General Engelbrecht. He was at Vlakplaas that day, if I recall correctly, there was a social event there, it was a Friday afternoon. We were not very far from the area where we socialised and we were busy burning the documents.

MR HATTINGH: And you say that you showed it to General Engelbrecht first?

MR DE KOCK: Yes it was shown to him because the Japie Maponya matter was related to me and at that stage it was a very sensitive situation.

MR HATTINGH: You received a call from Mr Nortje to go to Krugersdorp. Did you go there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I did not go there immediately. The next morning Sergeant Fourie and I departed and we went to Krugersdorp from Mafikeng.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall more or less at what time you arrived there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have to judge it very broadly but it must have been around 10 o'clock.

MR HATTINGH: And where did you go when you arrived in Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: I met with Warrant Officer Nortje, he went and introduced me to Captain Kleynhans and from there Captain Kleynhans and I and Nortje went to Colonel Johan le Roux.

MR HATTINGH: This was there at the security offices of Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, we went to his office to Colonel le Roux's office.

MR HATTINGH: And what happened there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a discussion there that the brother of Ordereli Maponya, Ordereli Maponya's name was mentioned and it was mentioned that his brother was working as a security guard at a bank and the information was to the effect as far as I can recall was that he was aware of his brother Ordereli's activities and that he was involved or had given assistance in some or other manner to Ordereli Maponya and that Japie Maponya was withholding this information and that this information had to be obtained from him.

MR HATTINGH: Did they know where Ordereli Maponya was?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I did not know and I don't think anybody else knew where he was at that stage.

MR HATTINGH: But did they think that Japie knew where he was?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that was the information that we had, the information was that Japie Maponya knew where Ordereli was.

MR HATTINGH: And was any information given to you with regard to Ordereli's activities, what he was sought for?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was mentioned that he was involved with acts of terrorism, a member of the force was shot, I don't recall Warrant Officer Tswane, with my trial this came about and that he was a trained member of MK, he was a trained member of the ANC's military wing.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall anything else which was told to you in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it was a long time ago, I would like to recall things that were said verbatim but I cannot recall right now.

MR HATTINGH: Did you accept that Japie Maponya knew where his brother was?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I accepted it.

MR HATTINGH: On what grounds?

MR DE KOCK: On the grounds of the information that they gave to me.

MR HATTINGH: And what was the request which was directed at you in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the discussion was to the effect that there was no other information to find Ordereli and the information had to be obtained from Japie Maponya. It seemed very clear to me and I think also for the rest of my members was the only manner to obtain this information from him would be in an unnatural manner or in other words an illegal manner.

MR HATTINGH: And in which manner would that be, in which manner would this be illegal?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the discussion led to the fact that we had to steal Japie Maponya, abduct him, this was the terminology, some people refer to it as a grabbing operation but here we refer to the fact that he had to be stolen.

MR HATTINGH: And this is equal to abduction. Yes and what happened then?

MR DE KOCK: Then we would take him to Vlakplaas where we would interrogate him.

MR HATTINGH: What was the understanding with regard to the term "interrogate"?

MR DE KOCK: It would mean that we would assault him and not assault him in the manner that you would slap, hit or kick him but this would include torture as well.

MR HATTINGH: These members of Krugersdorp, did they tell you that they had previously attempted to obtain information about Ordereli from Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall now that they had approached Japie, they had indeed said that they have sources but they did not get the information from the sources which could find Ordereli.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, what was your reaction when it was made clear to you that Japie had to be abducted and be interrogated and questioned by means of torture and so forth?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, my reaction was that seeing that everything else had failed, not by means of information, not by means of interceptions by radio or telephone or post or infiltration with friends and family, that this would be the only solution and I agreed with it, I did not have a problem that they wanted us to execute such an action and have us assist them, then I was prepared to do it.

MR HATTINGH: Was Mr Maponya the very same afternoon abducted?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, he was.

MR HATTINGH: Were you in the vicinity when the abduction took place?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I was in control of it, on the ground itself, I sat in a vehicle and if I recall correctly Captain Kleynhans and Sergeant Fourie was with me. There was another vehicle where Warrant Officer Nortje and another person, I'm not sure who it was, but it would have been one of the Vlakplaas members. And then there was a vehicle with three Black members of whom Nofomela was one, another person was Nsimande. I cannot recall the third person.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall whether Mr Mbelo was there?

MR DE KOCK: If he was there I would concede to that, if he says so. I have read his statement but I cannot recall him in my mind there but I would not dispute it.

And then there was a fourth vehicle which was a Volkswagen Minibus with a raised roof. This was waiting outside Krugersdorp on the Krugersdorp/Pretoria Road. I am not too familiar with that area so I just refer to it as the Krugersdorp/Pretoria Road and just for clarity, the persons who would pick up or steal or abduct Japie would drive up to that point. I think there was an exit which turned off to the left, in other words in a westerly direction, if one drove along that road, they would turn in there and they would transfer Japie to this kombi and the abductors would drive back to Pretoria on their own. If anybody followed them or cut them off they would not find Japie in that vehicle. There was additional members from Vlakplaas at this Kombi, some Black members, and interrogation already took place in the Kombi when they left from that rendezvous point on their way to Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: So I would assume this was what was told to you, you were not in the Kombi?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson but later I understood that at the scene where we assaulted Japie there at Vlakplaas the interrogation had already started in the Kombi.

MR HATTINGH: Was it a normal Kombi with windows right around or was it a panel van?

MR DE KOCK: It was a panel van, there were no windows.

MR HATTINGH: So one could not see who was sitting in the back?

MR DE KOCK: No, one could not.

MR HATTINGH: Did you see the real abduction from where you were observing the whole thing?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, two persons climbed out of the vehicle, I can recall Nofomela specifically, I am not sure of the second vehicle and if I had it correctly, Nofomela showed him an appointment certificate similar to the ones that police used.

MR HATTINGH: This appointment certificate which you refer to, does this contain the person's name?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it's a photo, your name, your force number and then there's also a police star on it.

And then Japie climbed into the vehicle, the members took him by his arms and took him to the vehicle and he climbed in.

MR HATTINGH: And did you see from there what happened to him?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, they departed then and they would join up with this panel van, this Volkswagen Kombi.

MR HATTINGH: You did not observe that rendezvous?

MR DE KOCK: No I did not.

MR HATTINGH: Did you go to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I went to the Security Branch there at Krugersdorp. We dropped off Captain Kleynhans so that he could collect his vehicle because they also had to come to Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Now why did they have to come to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they had all the questions which they wanted to put to Japie, they would amongst others have questions which would solve any troublesome points or would join up with any other questions that was asked. We did not have all the information which was gathered with regard to Maponya.

MR HATTINGH: And you departed thereafter to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I did, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And when you arrived there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I arrived there and from there I moved to the part next to the river which was about 8 or 900 metres away from the buildings where I found the Kombi and the members of Vlakplaas.

Not long after my arrival, shortly thereafter if my memory serves me correctly, Dunkley and Kleynhans arrived there as well.

MR HATTINGH: And what ensued then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Japie Maponya was questioned and with my arrival questions were already put to him, he had already been assaulted, he was slapped, he was hit with a fist, he was kicked, questions were asked.

MR HATTINGH: Did you participate in the assault?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I did, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And what did you do?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, amongst others I hit him with a clenched fist and at some stage I sprayed teargas into the Kombi and placed him in the Kombi and I gave it some time to reach the desired effect and we opened the doors again.

MR HATTINGH: May I just ask you with regard to the effect of the teargas, how strong is it, if one is in an enclosed area, if it is sprayed into an enclosed area, what would be the effect thereof?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would have a tremendous limiting effect on breathing and in restricted area like the Kombi it would nauseate him, his eyes would burn, anywhere where it is moist, it would burn, a feeling of burning, one coughs and one sneezes and one starts drooling and your eyes tear and if you take it in, in a high concentration, it could be fatal.

MR HATTINGH: It is not a very pleasant experience?

MR DE KOCK: No it isn't.

MR HATTINGH: So you used it so that he would give you the information?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Somewhere somebody said that you sprayed teargas into his mouth?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, that may be the persons perception but that would be fatal because the gas would go directly into the lungs and the mucous membranes would burn very seriously. That is my experience of concentrated teargas.

MR HATTINGH: This assault, how long did it take place in all it's different forms?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would say it was between 30 and 45 minutes, it may have been a little bit longer but it was no less than that.

MR HATTINGH: And was it very serious?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it was indeed serious.

MR HATTINGH: So why did you discontinue?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Japie Maponya refused to say any word, he refused to answer any question, not only in Afrikaans, in English, but indeed to bring it home to him and to ensure that he understand us, some of the Black members also spoke to him. They spoke in his home language, the most of the Black members at Vlakplaas were multi-lingual, they could speak two or three of the Black languages and at the end I decided that there would be no purpose in interrogating him further, we could kill him right there.

MR HATTINGH: Was that your conviction?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I also realised that and I thought back to what Nortje had told me. They sent in Mosiane, they tried to lure him by means of an askari. An askari is not a person who presents himself as a terrorist, he is a person who is a terrorist, he was a terrorist before, and Japie Maponya refused to refer to the askari who approached him and showed the gun to him.

MR HATTINGH: Did you give any instruction then?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Before you continue, why would he have to refer to the askari?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with this interrogation and I was present at many interrogations, hard interrogations and proper interrogations like this one, is that if he received a hiding as he did there, he could have referred and said "two or three days earlier I was approached by a terrorist but it was not my brother, he even showed a gun to me but it was not my brother, I don't know where my brother was." He did not even use that, he just refused to say anything, to say a single word. It just pointed out to me one aspect that he would be prepared to die before he rats on his brother.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR HATTINGH: So you decided that there would be no purpose to continue the assault on him, you would not get any information from him, so you gave instruction that the assault be stopped?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And what were your further instructions?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we went to the house, to the facilities that we had there. I told the members - we had a storeroom there before we developed the farm and I told them to give him a mattress there. There was a steel bed there and he was cuffed to this steel bed and he was given a blanket and I think they took him food, if I recall correctly, and as I far as I know he did not even eat the food.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, did you give any further instructions to the members who were present there, working with Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the door was locked, we had guards at Vlakplaas and I cannot recall specifically that he had to be taken out during the night, he had to be kept secure and the following morning we did not take him out immediately but later that day I have a recollection that we brought him out to have a shower. There were shower facilities. He did have a shower but he dressed himself in the same clothes he was wearing the previous day, we didn't have any clothes for him.

MR HATTINGH: Did you already decide what would happen to him then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I already knew in Krugersdorp what would happen to him because after the first discussion with Krugersdorp's members and the colonel, the commander. There was a second discussion where Warrant Officer Nortje and I went to General le Roux's office and I mentioned to General le Roux that we can abduct this person, we can steal him but I want to know what we have to do then and this does not mean that I did not know that we would assault him, we all knew we were going to assault him but General le Roux's attitude was that, and he also said that he does not want to see this man in Krugersdorp.

MR HATTINGH: And what was your attitude with this regard, would you be able to simply release him once it seemed that he would not disclose the information that you wanted?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. Despite the identification of the Vlakplaas members, the askaris which would necessarily have happened and we realised before, this was realised before the abduction, we knew that we were guilty of a capital crime, before that you would receive the death penalty and we knew what would happen there if it did come out that there was a reference to the security police and in particular to Vlakplaas. It would not be a serious embarrassment to the force.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr de Kock, are you saying that the abduction you realised - the kidnapping was a capital crime?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Couldn't you have got away with an unlawful arrest? I mean you were policemen, hundreds and hundreds of people in history have been arrested without a proper warrant or without proper cause, they don't think of the death sentence? It's just an unlawful arrest? Okay, it's not nice, it's not good, but it's hardly a capital crime?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, an unlawful arrest is where I take a man, I identify him or I identify myself to him and I choke him and I give him a hiding and one tries to treat him and then you just deny it afterwards. In this instance we went out and we stole a man from the street in broad daylight in Krugersdorp.

CHAIRPERSON: And is there any reason why you used askaris for the abduction and thereby risk exposure of their identity? Couldn't you have just used regular members of the unit who were not askaris?

MR DE KOCK: Two of the persons who executed the abduction they were not askaris, Chairperson, the one was, this was Moses Nsimandi, the other members were members of the SAP. They were properly recruited by Hammanskraal. These were normal members of the SAP.

CHAIRPERSON: So there you weren't worried about askaris being exposed, the identity of askaris being exposed?

MR DE KOCK: No I was also concerned about that but that was a risk one ran with such an operation and with the first meeting at Krugersdorp where this operation was discussed it was clear that we would abduct him and there were specific risks attached to that.

MR MALAN: May I just make a follow up question? You have already said that you knew at Krugersdorp already what would happen to him, meaning that he would not come back alive?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the instant when one begins to abduct people and it is within circumstances as was in Krugersdorp, I don't know how we will release this man and get away with it. This was not a matter that we went at night and wore Balaclavas where nobody was close to him, not a woman or a child and then he disappeared and beat him up and then just drop him somewhere, a kilometre from there.

MR MALAN: I just want to ensure, do I understand you correctly, when you planned to grab him, did you then know that eventually he will disappear, he will be killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that was the essence of the discussion to qualify. After the first discussion and we did the reconnaissance and to find out whether it was possible to take the man from his workplace and we went to Colonel le Roux. It was clear to me that I want to know what does Colonel le Roux want us to do with this man? What does he want us to do with this man after he was abducted. He wants us to abduct him but what must we do afterwards and he says that he does not want to see this man again and I had no doubt in my mind, that I drive from a place from Mafikeng to Krugersdorp where I had never been before, where I never worked before, I hear of a man who is to be abducted whom I have never heard of and I don't know him personally, and by nature of the type of work that we did, I had no doubt that this person would eventually be killed.

MR MALAN: Excuse me?

MR DE KOCK: That this person would be killed.

MR MALAN: Before any discussion with Le Roux?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, this was during the first and second discussions with Le Roux, that is where I had no doubt that Japie Maponya will not survive this.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask whether he gave you the information or not, you knew he was not going to survive? Help me with that?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I come from Mafikeng, I go to Krugersdorp, I have no information with regard to this person. There I am informed that a submission was already made, it was already decided that this person will be kidnapped. I am brought in to arrange the abduction. I have to execute the abduction.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes but then you had the two meetings which confirmed to you that the man would have to be eliminated, now ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson and that is why I went and I wanted to be convinced. I went to Colonel le Roux and I asked him after we have abducted this person, what must we do with him?

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, this is my question, did you know he had to be eliminated even if he gave you all the answers that you required from him, that's the question, because there's been talk of turning him and recruiting him and him being an askari, but what was your understanding after the second meeting with Mr le Roux?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at that stage we did not know whether we would get any answers from him and afterwards I asked myself the question "if he gives us all the answers, would we be able to release him" and I thought about an example, if he gives us the information to where his brother is, we fetch his brother or we abduct his brother, will we take him to court? There's a myriad of combinations in this situation.

ADV GCABASHE: Which combinations you did not discuss with Mr le Roux as such?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the situation with the abduction with regard to Japie Maponya was not a long situation, long discussion. With my arrival in Krugersdorp, the very same day, the abduction was executed. I arrived at about 10 o'clock and about 4 o'clock we abduct this person, there was no long planning session, three, five day planning sessions that we have to lie around and wait, it was something that they needed urgently and they wanted immediately.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just one question while we're dealing with this, Mr de Kock. Did you go and ask General le Roux when you went the second time, just out of courtesy or respect because he's your senior, what should we do with him when we've finished? Because if he said "oh well, look, if you're finished with him whether you're successful or not, please just drop him off at his work at the bank in the morning", would you have done that?

MR DE KOCK: If the general had said to me that we were supposed to drop him off we would have done this as well and the assault would probably have taken place in a different manner but at that stage I fell under the command of Colonel le Roux, it was in his area, he was the divisional or area commander. The written instructions from head office to all regions was that a member would report to the regional commander of a specific region and for the purposes of work and discipline, they fell under the command of that commander. That was the line of command. There was no way that I could drive into Krugersdorp, abduct a man and simply disappear with him. There was no such a possibility, it never existed.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, when it's convenient we can adjourn for the day. I don't know if you want to carry on now?

MR HATTINGH: It would be convenient to take the adjournment now, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We'll now adjourn until tomorrow morning. At 9 o'clock? We'll try 9 o'clock, start 9 o'clock in the morning, tomorrow morning at the same venue when we will continue with the hearing. Thank you.

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