Amnesty Hearings

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: (cont)

Yesterday afternoon at the adjournment we were discussing the command structure of Vlakplaas at Security Head Office and how the structure appeared. Can you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: You went to Head Office on the morning of the day before Japie Maponya was eventually killed in Swaziland, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I went to Head Office on the same day that he was killed.

MR LAMEY: Yes. What I mean is, the morning before he was killed, later that day or at least that night in Swaziland.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: The purpose, as I understand your evidence, was to obtain final approval from Brigadier Schoon, regarding the question of whether Japie Maponya was to be killed or not.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it was more a question of confirmation, but I will concede to that.

MR LAMEY: But until that confirmation was given one could not describe this as a final decision?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Is it also your recollection that Nortje was already at the farm that morning, when you went to Head Office, or can you not recall this?

MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot recall, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Is it correct that after you returned from Head Office, you then issued instructions to prepare certain arrangements for the killing of Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, there wasn't much to do, but there were orders.

MR LAMEY: You sent black employees who arrived at the farm for duty that day, you sent them home?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: So ultimately, who was present on the farm when you departed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with the exception of me and the members who travelled with me, as far as I can recall there were two guards and I think that there were one or two of the former Zimbabwean liberation members who performed service for us, who were at Vlakplaas at that stage, or would have been there at that stage. They slept there.

MR LAMEY: Were they in the vicinity of Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, but they did move on that section between the residence and the main residential house.

MR LAMEY: My instructions are that everybody was sent away from the farm.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not have sent the guards away, definitely not, because that would have left the farm unguarded. And in that specific case I could not send the former Zimbabweans back because they had no other place to stay.

MR LAMEY: Where were the guards?

MR DE KOCK: The guards were guards who moved around on the premises. They were armed with R1's and they were roving guards so to speak, they had no fixed guard post where they were clustered.

MR LAMEY: These were not the guards that guarded Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. He was cuffed and in a room which was locked and if he had escaped from there, the probability would have been very high that he would have encountered the guards.

MR LAMEY: Is it correct that the previous day, after the interrogation of Japie Maponya had been concluded, you told the black members who were involved in the interrogation there, not to report for duty the following day.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall this, but I will not dispute it.

MR LAMEY: Well if that is the evidence of the applicants whom I represent, would you dispute it or not?

MR DE KOCK: I would not dispute it.

MR LAMEY: And you specifically told Nortje, Fourie and van der Walt to report for duty the next day?

MR DE KOCK: Well I wouldn't say specifically, but they would have reported. There was no instruction for them to stay away.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon. Who did you speak of in your last answer? What was the question? Which members the orders not to stay away?

MR DE KOCK: That was Fourie, van der Walt and Nortje.

MR LAMEY: You gave evidence that you wanted to obtain final approval from Brigadier Schoon, because it was not an easy decision to make when one had to kill someone, it had to be cleared with Head Office first?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And that is also how the members, subordinate to you understand the position and that was the objective with your visit to Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And when you returned and gave instructions to make preparations, they had every reason to believe that the murder of Japie Maponya had been cleared out with Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Lamey, a minute.

Mr de Kock, would they have been in doubt about that before you went to Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the situation surrounding Maponya's death had already been established before his abduction.

ADV GCABASHE: And this was communicated to them, to specifically Nortje, van der Walt and Fourie, who were the people who accompanied you on the 26th?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, I could have told them that we had final clearance, that we could go ahead. I can't recall my exact choice of words, but they would not have been under the wrong impression. In their minds they would have been satisfied that the necessary clearance had indeed been obtained.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MR MALAN: Mr de Kock, if ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR MALAN: If I understand the question correctly it was Nortje, van der Walt and Fourie, if you had not gone to Head Office, who would have had any doubt that there was no final authorisation for the operation to kill Japie Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it was just a question of him wanting to discuss it with Brigadier Schoon. He was my direct commander. I believe that even if we had gone ahead, it would have been upon the basis of authorisation that we had from le Roux.

MR MALAN: But the question surrounds the understanding of Fourie, van der Walt and Nortje. They wouldn't have expected of you to obtain clearance and then notify them of having obtained this clearance from Schoon, they would have carried out your orders and accepted that this was within the scope of their duties?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I apologise, I did not attempt to evade your question, I just misunderstood it. Yes, they would have accepted it as that.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR LAMEY: But they would also, because you had visited Head Office that morning, have understood that it had been specifically cleared with Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: Just another aspect. Can you recall that a group from Vlakplaas had previously, approximately a month or two beforehand, before a group went to Josini, that they were also in the Krugersdorp/Kagiso area, where they had been searching for Ondereli Maponya. Can you recall anything like that? Because that is Mr Chris Mosiane's recollection, that he was a member of such a group.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. If it had been a month or longer, then I still hadn't taken command of the unit.

MR LAMEY: Yes, but you cannot deny that this was the case, that there had been a previous search led by a group of askaris, in the Kagiso area for Ondereli Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as I've said, I would not have been in command at that stage. I cannot confirm or deny this, because I really don't know.

MR MALAN: Sorry, Mr de Kock. On this point, would askaris have been sent out without approval?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in the beginning of July 1985, I took over, or at least in the beginning of May or June 1985. If it was anytime before then, I wouldn't have been in command of Vlakplaas at that time.

MR LAMEY: My instructions are not very clear as to what it was, but it was indeed before, say a month or two before the time. I just want to know whether or not you know about this.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: But it would appear to me, Mr de Kock, and you gave evidence to this effect, that there had been previous attempts by the Krugersdorp branch itself to obtain this information. And it would also appear to me that they had every reason to believe that this information could be obtained from Japie Maponya and that it was being withheld from them.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And that they eventually resorted to Vlakplaas to obtain this information from him.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Would it be incorrect to infer from that that everyone had the idea due to that reason that Maponya - due to the fact that Krugersdorp consistently attempted to obtain this information, that this created every reason to believe among you and your members, that Maponya did not want to co-operate in providing this information and that in that regard he could at least have been regarded as a sympathiser for the ANC/MK activities and then also specifically have been a sympathiser - if we want to call it that, with his brother and his activities?

MR DE KOCK: I would concede to that, because the entire concentration of Krugersdorp surrounding the Maponya incident boiled down to Japie Maponya. The searchlight was on Japie Maponya, on a permanent basis.

MR LAMEY: I just want to ask you whether you recall anything about the following. Mr van der Walt's recollection is that he understood that Japie had obtained a so-called crash course from his brother. Did you hear anything about that?

MR DE KOCK: I will not dispute it because this is not something that Mr van der Walt would be able to make up, then a person from Krugersdorp must have told him this. In other words, that was information which was conveyed. However, I cannot confirm it.

MR MALAN: Why would you say that he couldn't make it up?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr van der Walt did not know Japie, he came from a place like Josini and he wouldn't have been able to go in and make up something like this and say that Japie Maponya had obtained a crash course. In other words, somebody at Krugersdorp must have given him that information.

MR MALAN: It isn't possible that he may have said this just to fortify his own case?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, Mr van der Walt is not that type of person. That is not the way that I came to know him.

MR MALAN: In other words what you're saying is that Mr van der Walt is not a liar?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Mr van der Walt, shortly before these incidents he joined Vlakplaas from Security Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: I want to put it to you that Mr van der Walt made this statement about this crash course during his A-G statement to the Attorney-General, long before there was any talk of an amnesty application and long before there was any reason to compile a political objective.

MR DE KOCK: Well I will not dispute that, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Mr van der Walt's recollection is also that there was talk Maponya had previously laid an assault charge against Krugersdorp ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, which Maponya are you talking about?

MR LAMEY: It's Japie Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: I'm not aware of that, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Let us move over to another aspect. Just to conclude this point, the members on ground level, the operatives, were usually - and one could also say in this case, in the position where action had to be taken and they were not always in the position to verify information. They were in the position where they had to act according to liaison on a higher level and they were not always in the position to verify information that was conveyed to them, or to question such information. They simply executed orders. That was what was expected of them and they believed that this was in the interests of the security of the State.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I will concede to that. Perhaps one could also put this in a broader context. If one looks at the security reports which were sent through to Head Office on a national basis, we would read those reports and we believed unequivocally in the information which appeared in those reports. Some of those reports had to do with terrorism which was being committed in neighbouring States. And without those statements in those reports being sworn, so that one could believe it unequivocally, we accepted those reports as truthful.

So whatever the source of that information may have been, whether it came from a sub-source, or wherever, as soon as that report had a serial number at Head Office, we on ground level accepted it as the absolute correct truth.

MR LAMEY: But what I mean is that when for example, telexes and other pieces of information were sent through to Head Office, which suggested certain information, didn't every ground member have insight into those documents and have the opportunity to verify it? Orders would be issued from Head Office and something about that would be communicated down to the members on ground level, but it isn't as if they the entire scope of information and movement and thus had the opportunity to make their own decision about the verification of that information.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would concede to that, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, I want to move over to the aspects as it has emerged in your evidence and submission and has apparently indicated differences between your version and the versions of the applicants whom I am representing.

And the objective of my examination will be to investigate in your evidence, to what extent you differ from them and to examine whether the differences between you and them regarding these aspects are still of essential importance today.

Mr de Kock, as has been stated so many times in evidence before the Amnesty Committees, you are probably the person who can be isolated as having been involved in the greatest number of deeds and illegitimate acts with regard to Vlakplaas. There may be other Security Branch members who are implicated in many incidents, but from all the Vlakplaas members your application is the most comprehensive out of all the other members I might say and your involvement was by far the most.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Could one accept from that position, that it must be extremely difficult for you with regard to each and every incident in which you were involved, to recall the sequence of events, the persons involved and everything else with one hundred percent preciseness?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would concede to that. I must just qualify it. ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: I am not saying through that, that one can disregard your version for that reason, but one should then expect, especially of someone in your position who was so involved in so many incidents, even though you believe on a bona fide level that that was the position and that what you recall is bona fide correct, that with regard to many matters of fact your version might not be precisely correct.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would concede to that, but I must just qualify by saying that certain incidents or certain clauses from certain incidents will always remain with one even if you grow to be a billion years old. That is something that you are involved with as a person. You develop psychological associations on the basis of clothing, smells and so forth.

And then with regard to other commanders, I think Dirk Coetzee was the Commander of Vlakplaas for five to six months, Jack Cronje was the Commander of a year-and-a-half, and I spent 10 years at Vlakplaas. And Vlakplaas was the operationally executive wing of the Security Branch. And I've answered this question as I did, in order to break it up and respond to certain aspects.

MR LAMEY: I would accept that there are certain aspects which are completely unforgettable, but that is also of application to the other members who were involved.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: You had the opportunity during your own trail, to listen thoroughly to the evidence about the Maponya incident, given Fourie, van der Walt and Nortje, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And there was comprehensive cross-examination of everyone of them with regard to this incident.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Would you say today - without going into too many aspects, I would like to know from you, would say today that there are drastic differences between your version and their versions?

MR DE KOCK: In certain regards, Chairperson, but not within the entire context.

MR LAMEY: In which regard would you find drastic differences between your version and their versions?

MR DE KOCK: It would be regarding the issue of how Mr Maponya was killed there at that very moment.

MR LAMEY: Yes, and are there any other aspects?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that would be the most drastic aspect.

MR LAMEY: Is that the only aspect that you can isolate? I'm referring here to the entire incident, from the beginning to the end.

MR DE KOCK: There are various aspects surrounding the entire incident, but with particular reference to his death. It may be somebody else's perception, but the sequence of events there is not true, as it was reflected during my Court case.

MR LAMEY: Is that a drastic difference?

MR MALAN: Mr Lamey, wouldn't you abandon the drastic nature of things for argument's sake and just put the question to the applicant.

MR LAMEY: I will get to that. Is that something that stands out today for you, as a drastic element?

MR DE KOCK: Today and at that time.

MR LAMEY: Isn't it more the case that there are differences in certain aspects, but not such drastic differences?

MR DE KOCK: Well any difference in an incident where you've killed somebody and in another manner than a clinical manner would be drastic.

MR LAMEY: So your problem is that there are differences regarding the way in which Maponya was killed, that's the drastic difference for you.

MR DE KOCK: Well it's not necessarily a question of difference. The fact remains that Japie Maponya was not killed because he was beaten to death with a spade, he was shot to death and that is a drastic difference. And I must just add that if I had beaten Japie to death with the spade I would have said so before this Committee. And I'm going to place it in context of you.

When I was 17 years old and had merely begun with my service, the first thing they taught us was how to stab people with bayonets and how to take your opponent out with a pickaxe or a fork if there was no other way out, how to fight with your steel helmet. This was all in infantry. And I must just add that this was not strange.

While we are here today, speaking here, just 10 kilometres away there are young men being trained in exactly those activities, still today. And I have seen just as many gruesome incidents as those in the first world war and the second world war, perhaps not in such a massive scale.

But if I had stabbed him to death with the garden fork, I would have said so. If I had beaten him to death with the spade, I would have said so, but that is not the case. Japie Maponya was shot to death and after he had been shot, I beat him twice with the spade, with two severe blows to the head. I am not prepared to create an untruth and leave it there for history's sake.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, in your evidence you said that there was a gruesome story about this that was sent into the world, what did you mean by that?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, what could be more gruesome than beating a person with a spade?

MR LAMEY: Perhaps I misunderstood you. So you don't have a problem with the fact that a gruesome story was sent into the world?

MR DE KOCK: That entire set-up, the whole Japie Maponya situation of his death in Swaziland - and I'm not even referring to the other aspects of his abduction and his assault, is a nightmarish, gruesome fiasco. There is no other way to describe this.

MR LAMEY: Yes, in every aspect it is extremely gruesome and nobody wants to deny that, but I half and half understood your evidence in that you said that a gruesome story was sent into the world, as if you had a problem with the manner in which the story became known and that you were linked to a gruesome deed.

Maybe I misunderstood you and then that would be my incorrect inference and I will not deal with that any further, but I'm just trying to determine what exactly you meant when you said that a gruesome story was sent into the world.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if one examines in our world the degrees of clinically killing someone, it would be more clinical for someone to launch a bomb on you from 20 000 feet away and not see what happened. In this case, Japie Maponya was not beaten to death with a spade while he was still alive, it is an untruth that was created, and in that regard if an injustice was committed, then an injustice was committed against me because the truth was not made known.

MR LAMEY: And who is the source of that untruth?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we accept that it's the State and the State's witnesses.

MR LAMEY: Very well, in other words it's Mr Nortje?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Very well, I will deal with this aspect further. In your evidence in mitigation - I refer to page 230, and I will read it to you, you are specifically asked about ...(intervention)

MS LOCKHAT: 3B.

MR LAMEY: It's bundle 3B, Mr Chairman, page 230.

Mr de Kock, you are in cross-examination and this is your evidence in mitigation. You are questioned by the State advocate, and I will read it to you.

"I don't want to go through the whole story, but there at Nersden in the bush he was killed. Can you just tell us in your words how you saw it? Let me put it to you in the following. You've heard the versions of Fourie and Nortje, does your version drastically differ from theirs?"

- "I would not say drastically, but in certain aspects, but it would make no difference to the finding at all. The only thing that is totally false, and it is absolutely false, is the fact that Freek Pienaar accompanied us."

Now I would just like to take you step by step through this passage. You were given an opportunity here in mitigation, to give your version of the whole story and you said here that there was no drastic difference, you said in certain instances there are certain differences and you tender the evidence yourself that it would make no difference in the finding.

And I would like to put it to you that when one gives evidence in mitigation it is important with mitigating aspects, the question whether you in an act of brutality had hit somebody over the head with the sharp edge of a spade, not true?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that would be so.

MR LAMEY: And you do not use the opportunity of mentioning it there.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And what you point out other than today, is the untruth as to whether Freek Pienaar was with you. That is what you see as the untruth there, and not the spade or the killing of Japie Maponya, with the spade.

MR DE KOCK: The question of the falseness of Pienaar, this was emphasised there and the fact surrounding the events at Nersden I did mention there and that there were some differences. And I mentioned that by nature of the situation it would not make any difference in the judgment or the sentence.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, I shall later return to the events there. Let us just turn to Pienaar. If you think back carefully today and you think back to all the opportunities you've had to think back, is it still your evidence that Freek Pienaar remained at his house and did not accompany you to the place where Japie was killed, or might you be mistaken about that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there is no mistake. I may add that I believe that if Mr Pienaar had accompanied us, because of his knowledge of the area, he would have taken us to a much better spot.

MR LAMEY: But exactly. I would like to tell you that previously in your evidence you said that once right up to that stage you were in Swaziland and in the border area. You did not know that area, you wanted to find a suitable place where Japie could be killed. The appointed person with whom you would have found a suitable and safe place, was nobody else than the Commander of the Security Branch Piet Retief, who knew that area very well and that is why he accompanied you.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that was definitely not a suitable place.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, why do you say that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not know the border area very well and on two or three occasions we crossed over at that part of the border, but not through the border post, about 500 metres from the border post is a place where one could just flatten the fence and one could cross over. That is the place that I knew and the place that I thought of.

MR LAMEY: Did you know before the time that it would not be a suitable place?

MR DE KOCK: Well it would have been the most suitable place that I could think of.

MR LAMEY: Well why do you say today that it was not a suitable place?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, while we were busy in the bush with this murder, there was this situation where dogs barked. It was a sign that there are people in the vicinity and by the time you hear the dog barking, there are people in the vicinity.

MR LAMEY: But that is something that you didn't expect.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, that is what happened at that time and I got to know the place better later one and I worked more and more closer in the area or vicinity and I found thousands of other places that would have been better.

MR LAMEY: Now you say that at that stage you worked much in that area, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Well, I did ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: He said later.

MR LAMEY: In other words, this is what you established later?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. And just to supplement Mr Lamey's situation about Mr Pienaar, I implicate Mr Pienaar at many other instances and events and two or three specifically there are murders involved. And I implicate him in cross-border operations in Swaziland. I assure you that this is the truth, this is not something where I would let the opportunity pass, where Mr Pienaar could apply for amnesty and speak the truth about it.

I would not want to defend Mr Pienaar in this instance and say that he was not there. And as we move forward there will be another incident that Mr Fourie has told me about at a stage and where the indications were that Mr Pienaar was involved there. And even this information I gave to the Attorney-General's investigative team and I have never had feedback from them again.

Maybe this will be the forum for Mr Fourie to confirm or deny it. So I am not defending Mr Pienaar at all, I assure you.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, at that stage you had all the reason that it would be a suitable place, otherwise you would not have taken Japie Maponya there.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because this is what I thought of as a suitable place with regard to my knowledge about the vicinity there.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, the plan was to shoot him with a pistol fitted with a silencer, as silently as possible.

MR DE KOCK: No, with a submachinegun, as quietly as possible.

MR LAMEY: It doesn't matter what weapon it was, Mr de Kock, with a silencer. He had to be killed quietly.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And if he was killed quietly, it would still have been a suitable place.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I thought that place to be a suitable place at that stage.

MR LAMEY: If you keep in mind that he still had to be killed.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, among others.

MR LAMEY: But now we know that it did not happen so quietly.

MR DE KOCK: No, it did not, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, we know - well we don't know at all whether the body was found. We don't know at all whether anybody heard the shot, who was not involved in the killing.

So I don't know what this argument is, whether it is an unsuitable or suitable spot. The actual place where the killing took place was never discovered by anyone, as far as we know. So what - we seem to be just going around in circles. And one doesn't know whether you have to a ground study of the soil etc., whether you can dig a hole or not, to determine whether it's a suitable spot beforehand.

I think even a person who comes from the area might thing the spot is suitable and hasn't dug in that spot before. So I don't know if we need to waste time on whether it was a suitable spot or not. We do know that the killing took place. The body was never recovered, or so far as we know. And they weren't disturbed during the activity.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, but Mr Lamey, unless I got it wrong, I thought this was all tied into whether Freek Pienaar was there or not. That was my understanding of your ...

MR LAMEY: Ja, that is the peripheral aspect relating to the role and the reason of Pienaar.

What I would just like to put to you is that at that stage in all aspects which your regarded as a suitable place, but the surprising aspect was the dogs that started barking and you did not foresee this.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, with my knowledge at that stage, it was a suitable place, however limited it was of the vicinity of the border, Chairperson. If there were other suitable places, then we most probably would have gone there.

MR LAMEY: You did contact Pienaar beforehand from Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did.

MR LAMEY: And what did you communicate with him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the situation was about the border patrols. I knew that the South African Police and the army did patrols there and had counter-insurgency bases and they undertook night patrols along the border. And Mr Pienaar, because he was the Security Commander of that area, he was up to date, if I recall correctly, by means of daily or weekly meetings about where patrols would be deployed.

MR LAMEY: Is that the only thing you discussed with him?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I told him that I would visit his house and I would like to collect some equipment from him, but I did not go much further than that because we were talking on a telephone.

MR LAMEY: Did he tell you on the telephone that there were no army patrols?

MR DE KOCK: He said not that he was aware of, but that he would find out.

MR LAMEY: And did he find out?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because when I arrived at his house I asked him whether the area was clean and he said yes.

MR LAMEY: Why did you go to his house?

MR DE KOCK: It was to get that information and also to get the pickaxe and a spade.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, the equipment to dig a grave, a spade was available at Vlakplaas, not so?

MR DE KOCK: We did have spades at Vlakplaas, but we did not use it to dig any graves.

MR LAMEY: But Mr de Kock, the point is that there are spades with which one could dig a grave.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was.

MR LAMEY: So why did you not load up that equipment as part of the planning to bury Japie?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was not necessary. I was already aware that I would visit Mr Pienaar and that I would get the equipment from him, a pickaxe and a spade and amongst others I also took a garden fork.

MR LAMEY: You see because Mr Nortje will say that the spade was already taken from Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: That might be his evidence, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Do you differ with that?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Lamey, does Mr Nortje say there was a pick present at the site where the killing took place?

MR LAMEY: No his recollection is only a spade.

CHAIRPERSON: Only a spade.

MR LAMEY: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR LAMEY: Are you saying that his evidence is mistaken?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: So it's not a matter of you possibly had taken the equipment from Vlakplaas ...

...(end of side A of tape)

... was to get clarity about the patrols, but you say that the other reason was also to get the equipment from him?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson. the equipment that was loaded up at Vlakplaas were the four containers with petrol and then the Uzzi with the silencer.

MR LAMEY: Would Pienaar have known what you were up to?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not tell him, he could have formed his own thoughts there. I did not want to think for him or on his behalf, but he is a thinking person, he could have expected anything.

MR MALAN: Excuse me, Mr de Kock, you say that Pienaar was involved with two other murders where you were involved and where he applied for amnesty.

MR DE KOCK: It is more than that, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Was it before or after this incident?

MR DE KOCK: It was after this incident, Chairperson. Excuse me, there was one before this incident and this was the shooting in Swaziland, of Zwelibanzi Nyanda.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, you say you didn't tell Pienaar what your objective was, why you were there, what you were going to do. Why then, if you wanted to keep it away from him, did you in those circumstances borrow a pick and a spade and a fork to go out in the dead of night to the border, when you could have brought a spade from Vlakplaas?

Because if you go to him and say "Look we're going, tell us how to get to the border, but also lend me a spade and a fork and a pick", it would lead one to the irresistible inference that you going to dig a grave. Whereas if you just go there and ask info about border patrols on the border and how to get close to the fence, it doesn't necessarily mean that you're going there to kill somebody.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr Pienaar was not unfamiliar with covert operations. I could have loaded a spade at Vlakplaas, but I did not. And I don't differ because I want to differ, if it is then I would have said so. I believe he would have drawn his own inferences about it, but it did not happen in that way.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr de Kock, but with regard to the previous question, isn't it crystal clear to Pienaar that you were going to either kill and bury somebody, or bury a corpse? Isn't it absolutely obvious to him, in your mind, if you asked him at 1 o'clock in the morning for a pickaxe, a spade and a garden fork?

MR DE KOCK: I do believe that he may have accepted that.

MR LAMEY: So it wasn't as if he stood beyond the need-to-know principle with regard to this method of operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we had a very good understanding and Mr Pienaar was a very good security person and he was also active in that area, in Piet Retief. The need-to-know situation should not be misinterpreted to indicate that Vlakplaas operated within a vacuum, because that was not the case.

MR LAMEY: In other words, there wasn't any particular reason to withhold this covert operation from Pienaar?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I trusted Pienaar and he trusted me. He was one of those persons that if he was ever arrested and found himself in a place like Zambia, in one of the ANC's murder camps, I believe that I would have gone to fetch him there and I still would have succeeded in it as well. That was my level of trust in him.

MR LAMEY: That being so, Mr de Kock, he could have gone along.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, this was a Vlakplaas situation.

MR LAMEY: So the reason why he did not accompany you was because it was not an Eastern Transvaal operation, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Well that is so, Chairperson, but on the other hand, it wasn't necessary to involve him in the operation because we were enough. I already had a place in mind. All that I wanted to know was whether there were any people near the border and then I also required certain pieces of garden equipment.

Just to give you an idea of the nature of the relationship of trust that existed, and this took place at a later stage, was when a murder was committed in Johannesburg, during which Stanza Bopape was killed and the Johannesburg Security Branch people were looking for me to get rid of the body. They couldn't find me and they contacted Eastern Transvaal.

And so these members of Eastern Transvaal later notified me that they assisted Johannesburg Security Branch. So there was the sort of cross-assistance situation which did indeed exist. But I'm simply using this as an example.

MR MALAN: Might I just find out from you, how far was Nersden border post from Piet Retief, or from Pienaar's home?

MR DE KOCK: In the Land Cruiser, it would be an hour's drive.

MR MALAN: So Pienaar expected that you would reawaken him at 3 o'clock or half past three, having woken him at 1 o'clock?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, in Vlakplaas, time was never an issue, whether it was day or night, there was no difference.

MR MALAN: But for him in terms of his night's rest and any disturbance, it would have made no difference whether he accompanied you or remained at home?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because he disturbed me a lot. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, we all know now - and we will return later to the sequence of events, but we all know that your spade was used, or Pienaar's spade was used.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: The spade must have had remnants of human tissue on it.

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson, I didn't inspect the spade or look at it. I think if one had examined it forensically one would have found traces of human tissue.

MR LAMEY: And you returned this spade to him like that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: There may have been blood or tissue on the spade.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: But Mr de Kock, if it is so that Mr Pienaar probably knew and in this manner, by providing the spade to you, knowing what you were going to do with it and as a result, having been in the position to foresee what was going on, he is implicated, why didn't you take him with, even if it was to assist in reconnoitring the area?

MR DE KOCK: It wasn't necessary. If I deemed it necessary, I would have taken him along. And I assure you once again unequivocally, that if Mr Pienaar had accompanied us his name would have been given up here and there would have been a Court case. I can assure you of that.

MR LAMEY: Are you saying that you, from within your own evidence, knew that area so well that you could travel 80 kilometres from Piet Retief and somewhat more than three kilometres from the Nersden border post could find a suitable spot where you could kill a man at the Swazi border, whose body would never be uncovered later? From within your own knowledge of that area at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with my later knowledge, after 1985 and the more work I did in that area on both sides of the border, our side and the Swazi's side, I found hundreds of spots which were more suitable and this was within a very short distance of Piet Retief, but I didn't know the area at that stage. That area near Nersden was the area that I knew best, and we did that, we went to that trouble.

MR LAMEY: Previously, in your evidence-in-chief, you gave evidence and you could not even recall the total number of incidents in which you later became involved, and which will be the subject of your amnesty application with regard to cross-border operations, in which the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch and Piet Retief branch specifically were involved. You could not recall this.

MR DE KOCK: No, well there was a myriad of incidents and some of them were very complicated.

MR LAMEY: Well if you cannot recall it, Mr de Kock, then it may also have taken place, that in certain aspects you may accidentally have implicated or not implicated Pienaar in certain incidents.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, Mr Pienaar, as I knew him from our working relationship, it is just as good as attempting to draw a comparison and saying that there isn't a Voortrekker Monument.

Mr Pienaar in that regard was an exceptionally good source handler and policeman. He was a man for whom I had a great deal of time and I would not attempt to protect him here today for any reason, because it could only be to his detriment. He would have applied for

amnesty if he had been involved.

MR MALAN: It would appear as if Mr Lamey is moving over to Pienaar. I just want to return to the spade.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Just to take it back to Pienaar, did you tell him "There may be blood on this spade, don't just put it back in your shed or your equipment room"?

MR DE KOCK: No, I didn't tell him, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Didn't you think that you were placing him at risk, if the gardener were to find the spade and see tissue or blood on the spade?

MR DE KOCK: No, I believe that Mr Pienaar would have inspected those aspects himself.

MR MALAN: Well why would he have looked?

MR DE KOCK: Operationally speaking, I can refer to Mr Pienaar as one of the "old cats". He is one of those men who can think for himself.

MR MALAN: But in your evidence you say that you did not clear the spade.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And you didn't think of cleaning the spade, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: You also didn't think that Pienaar may not think about cleaning the spade.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I accepted that he would definitely inspect the situation and sort it out if necessary. However, I didn't tell him anything.

MR MALAN: Did you accept it, or did you just not think about it?

MR DE KOCK: No, I accepted it, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: That on that night at 3 o'clock or half past three, after you had left, he would inspect the spade and clean it himself before it was stored in his toolroom?

MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't say that, Chairperson, but one could have been assured that Pienaar would have wondered what was done with his gardening equipment, and if he had seen any blood or tissue on his equipment he would definitely have washed it off.

MR MALAN: But he would have gone to inspect his equipment that very same night, he wouldn't have gone back to bed, and he would have cleaned it then.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can only think that he would have done that.

MR MALAN: But Mr de Kock, aren't you placing this man whom you trusted so implicitly and for whom you would have done anything, including going to fetch him out of a death camp in Zambia, aren't you placing him at a tremendous risk by giving him equipment that could probably have had human tissue or blood on it and not telling him to clean this equipment?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I believe that he would have done this himself. There is no question that Mr Pienaar would not have inspected his equipment. I didn't do it and the reason for that being that Mr Pienaar would probably have sorted that situation out himself.

MR MALAN: But Mr de Kock, ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: If I had felt insecure - I beg your pardon for interrupting you, if I felt insecure about something I would have told him to dispose of the spade completely or to destroy it.

MR MALAN: I'm thinking about the other scenario, that's why I'm asking you the question. If he had been with you, if he had accompanied you on the operation, it would not have been necessary to inform him, but because he had not been with you I find it very difficult to understand that you would not have warned him, because you were just as meticulous when it came to covering up information.

When you made certain of climbing out of the Land Cruiser, not taking anything with you, anything that you could drop accidentally, returning, undertaking a search for the certificate of appointment, you were very meticulous, but you didn't even think about telling Pienaar about the possibility surrounding the equipment.

MR DE KOCK: There was nothing, or there was no attention which was fixed upon us regarding the situation which had taken place, which would point directly at Mr Pienaar.

MR MALAN: And you are convinced that you just didn't make a mistake regarding this incident, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, And I'm entirely prepared to leave myself open before this Committee, to undertake a technical test by means of a polygraph machine or something.

MR MALAN: No, well I'm not saying that you are telling lies, but you are just so convinced of the situation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, well I'm just trying to indicate to you that I am fully prepared, no matter what the situation or ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Thank you, Mr Lamey.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, I don't wish to speak on behalf of all the legal representatives, but sometimes it happens that one bona fide - and you know what this term means, that one believes bona fide that a given fact exists. For example, that Pienaar did not accompany you and that you will swear by that, that he did not accompany you, but that in retrospect, when one examines all the relevant aspects, he could have accompanied you on that operation.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Are you saying, despite everything that I've put to you, are you still saying no?

MR DE KOCK: I will repeat this until the day I die, he was not there. I had no reason whatsoever to protect Pienaar here. There are no secrets about me which he knows about, we have no agreement to keep quiet under certain circumstances.

MR LAMEY: But in the light of what you have just testified, Mr Pienaar in all probability had every reason to know what was going on. You were making enquiries as to whether or not there were army patrols and that would indicate a reason that you did not want to encounter those persons in the first place.

Secondly, you asked him for a spade and the other equipment. However, you say in your statement categorically - paragraph 3, page 111 of your amnesty application:

"Pienaar didn't know what it was about."

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. And I must mention that when I asked Pienaar for his pickaxe and fork he didn't ask me "Gene, what are you going to do with my spade and my pick?, he didn't ask me anything like that. There was only one idea that he could have had, he knew that something was going to happen, which was beyond the order.

MR LAMEY: But then why do you say in your statement, paragraph 3

"Pienaar didn't know what it was about."

One would have accepted then that you said that you didn't know whether Pienaar knew, but you believe that he had every reason to know what you were going to do.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I didn't tell him I was going to kill anybody and Pienaar didn't ask me what I was going to do at that particular time at night, with his gardening equipment and I have a good idea that he must have believed that something underhanded was under way and that if you came to request a spade and a pickaxe at that time of the night, there was only one thing you could do or could be doing and that would be to dig a grave.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, I think the lines have been clearly drawn now regarding Mr Pienaar. Can we move onto another topic? We know that Mr de Kock is adamant that he wasn't there, we know that your clients, well certainly Mr Nortje, as far as we know, say that he was there and the rest you can leave for argument I think.

MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

I just want to put it to you, Mr de Kock, that if there is someone out of the three applicants that I represent, who knew Mr Pienaar very well, someone who in fact visited him at his home quite often and who was at Vlakplaas before you arrived at Vlakplaas, it is Mr Fourie, and I want to put it to you that Mr Fourie will also testify that Pienaar was with you in the bush at Nersden and that out of all persons, Fourie had no reason to involve Pienaar in anything that Pienaar had not been involved in.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, then that will be his evidence. That may be his perception of the matter, but it will be incorrect.

MR LAMEY: Now let us return to what took place there with Japie Maponya. Who was in the plantation near the Swazi border?

MR DE KOCK: It was me, Nortje, Maponya and Mr Fourie. Mr van der Walt did climb through the fence, and I would say that he stood approximately five to ten paces away on the Swazi side of the border.

MR LAMEY: So Fourie also accompanied you and Maponya into the plantation where you wished to find this specific point to kill him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. We actually wanted to move even further in, when Nortje hit him with the Uzzi.

MR LAMEY: Before this took place, was Nortje perhaps on his knees, before he was struck over the head?

MR DE KOCK: Japie Maponya ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before what took place?

MR LAMEY: Before he was hit over the head.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: You probably mean Maponya.

CHAIRPERSON: Was Nortje on his knees?

MR LAMEY: I beg your pardon.

Was Maponya made to stand on his knees before Nortje struck him over the head with the Uzzi?

MR DE KOCK: No, we were still moving further into the plantation when I heard the sound behind me and it was a sound similar to the sound that an Uzzi would make if you fired a subsonic round with it. We were still moving, we hadn't come to a standstill and said "This is the place". He was definitely not on his knees.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, just to move somewhat ahead regarding the incident there. Was Fourie also present when Japie was killed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when he was shot he stood away, Nortje and I were with Japie. We requested that Fourie stand away and he took five to ten paces away from the place, so that there could be no deflected bullet moving in his direction. My experience is that you may fire a bullet away from somebody, but as a result of a bone or tissue being struck, the bullet could be deflected.

MR LAMEY: So you say that it was only at that stage that Fourie stood some distance away?

MR DE KOCK: He stood some distance away upon my request, Chairperson. I don't want to ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: But at that stage, that was after you had caught Japie Maponya and brought him back?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And at that stage you told Fourie to stand away?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, because we were going to shoot him.

MR LAMEY: And how far away did he stand?

MR DE KOCK: Approximately ten paces.

MR LAMEY: But he was still within the immediate vicinity?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: I want to quote to you from page 111, what you stated in your - page ...

CHAIRPERSON: Bundle?

MR LAMEY: It's bundle 1A, Mr Chairman, page 111.

And I want to put it to you that that which you stated there differs directly from your evidence. You say there:

"After that, Willie Nortje and I climbed through the Swazi border fence with the cuffed Maponya. We were followed by Eugene Fourie and David van der Walt, but both of them remained behind after a short distance. The reason for that was that we didn't want any other person to be injured during the shooting.

There was a weak moon, but bad weather was building up. Warrant Officer Nortje and I walked into the bush for approximately 80 to 100 metres and Warrant Officer Nortje had an Uzzi machine pistol with a silencer on him."

MR DE KOCK: I'm sorry, I cannot find this passage.

CHAIRPERSON: It's page 111 of bundle 1A, and it's in the last paragraph. It starts with the second sentence of the last paragraph on that page.

MR DE KOCK: I beg your pardon, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Page 415, last paragraph, second sentence.

MR LAMEY: And what appears on page 112 is

"The following moment I heard a sound such as a soft shot coming from the Uzzi and Maponya collapsed on the ground."

That differs from what your evidence has been, Mr de Kock.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but it did sound like a muffled shot.

MR LAMEY: No, Mr de Kock, regarding the presence of Fourie. In your statement you say that Fourie and van der Walt remained behind and that was before Maponya, according to your version, was struck by Nortje over the head. Your evidence now is that Fourie was first told to stand away and later when you captured Maponya and Nortje then shot him.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is so.

MR LAMEY: But that differs from your statement, isn't that so?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know if it is such a radical difference, because van der Walt was not present when Nortje and I shot Maponya.

MR LAMEY: No, I'm speaking of Fourie.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes. And it sounds like that here as well, but what I have told you is what took place.

MR LAMEY: You see in your statement you say that the reason why Fourie and van der Walt remained behind is that you didn't want any other person to be injured during the shooting. Now that would be at the stage before Maponya attempted to escape, according to your version. That was while you were still on your way into the bushes.

MR DE KOCK: But Chairperson, van der Walt did remain behind at the vehicle, as I've said, he stood approximately 10 paces away. And here there appears to be a difference, but it is not a difference over which I will break my head.

CHAIRPERSON: You see here, Mr de Kock, what Mr Lamey is getting at, if you look at the sentence - just let's leave out Mr van der Walt's name

"After that, Willie Nortje and I climbed through the Swazi border fence with the cuffed Maponya."

So it was just the two of you.

"We were followed by Fourie (we're leaving out Mr van der Walt now) and van der Walt, but both of them remained behind after a distance."

And then go to the last sentence:

"Nortje and I walked approximately 80 to 100 metres into the bush."

So once again it's just the two of you. And what Mr Lamey is saying is that this isn't what you said today, because today you said that the three of you walked in and that Fourie was with you and that he stood approximately 10 paces away, just before the shooting.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But this version ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I can see the differences in that regard, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And you see there's another aspect, Mr de Kock, and that is that the reason why someone was not supposed to be present, you place here in the context that no person should be injured during the shooting. But that's senseless, Mr de Kock, how could somebody be injured during the shooting if you were going to be shooting Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, someone could be standing at an incorrect angle. If you fire a head shot, it doesn't mean that the bullet will go right through the head, there could be a deflection. I know of one specific case during which something like that happened, and the reason why I did this was for that exact reason.

MR LAMEY: At that stage, Mr de Kock, you didn't know that Nortje was going to shoot him in the head, he could have shot him in the heart.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. In such cases one used head shots. It was a certain shot.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, you fired one shot into the heart and the chest of Mabotha.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: It's not that there necessarily had to be a head shot at that stage.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he would have been shot in the head, there is no doubt about that. As I've given evidence before, there were instances in which our members shot an MK or an Apla and even though you knew he was dead you'd still fire two extra shots to the head to make sure that he was dead.

MR LAMEY: But your evidence is further that Fourie, at the stage when Nortje shot him, he was already in the immediate vicinity.

MR DE KOCK: He was about 10 or 15 steps away from there.

MR LAMEY: Is it now 15 steps?

MR DE KOCK: No, I say 10 or 15 steps, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: But he was present in the immediate vicinity?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Let us just see what you say on page 113. You say here

"I want to put it clearly that Fourie ..."

Mr Chairman, it's the same bundle, page 113, the second paragraph from the top.

"I want to put it clearly that Fourie was not present when Nortje and I killed Maponya."

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson. He was not standing with us, he was not part of the murder group standing there, who killed Maponya.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr de Kock, this place that you went into, you've referred to it as a plantation.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now 10 metres, if somebody had to stand 10 metres away, it's approximately the distance between myself and let's say Mr Visser there.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there trees in-between Mr Fourie and where the shooting took place.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It would have been out of sight.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, there was some undergrowth there as well. That was one of the reasons why it took so long to get Maponya when he tried to run away, because I was afraid of stumbling myself. There was some undergrowth there.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR MALAN: Excuse me. In terms of the order, you climbed through the fence, you left Fourie, or Fourie and van der Walt there, you walked in with Nortje, Maponya was hit with a pistol, you wanted to shoot him, the pistol did not function, you went back to the vehicle and then you had to pass van der Walt again, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson. Because the back doors of the vehicle, I climbed in where the containers were and that's where the toolbox was and that's where I worked with the gun.

MR MALAN: What did van der Walt do when you walked past him?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know what he was doing, I also did not speak to him, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And when you returned, did you not talk to him?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Was he just standing there?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, yes, because he did not speak to me either. The whole thing was developing into a fiasco.

MR MALAN: But he did not know that, he was just standing there and waiting for you. As far as he was concerned you went into the bush, you passed him, you passed him again, after a while I presume, because you wanted to try to first fix the pistol?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is quite correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: How long did it take you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I must have struggled for about five or six minutes with the firearm. I removed the casing, I tried to push the working parts forward because they got stuck in the back, I investigated the magazine to see whether the magazine was not bent, or maybe the lips of the magazine were not folded over and that was the reason why the weapon did not want to feed. I wanted to determine if we could not at the scene fix the weapon for further use.

MR MALAN: And if one has to say you had walked in 80 to 100 metres and climbed through the fence from the vehicle, you spent 5/6 minutes working on the firearm, you twice walked 100 metres and you say then you were away very near to 10 minutes from Nortje where he stood by Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would concede that.

MR MALAN: And did give him any instructions when you left?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. By nature of the situation he would remain there with Maponya, he would not walk away.

MR MALAN: Did you tell him that you were going back to the vehicle to fix the firearm?

MR DE KOCK: I can't remember whether I told him, Chairperson, but I took the firearm with the magazine back to the vehicle.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR LAMEY: Just by the way, Mr de Kock, who remained with Mr Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: I left Mr Nortje there and I believe that Mr Fourie also remained, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, with regard to this aspect, that you went back to the vehicle, could you be mistaken with this or is this quite clear in your mind?

MR DE KOCK: It's definitely not a mistake, Chairperson. From the time that Japie Maponya was hit with the firearm it just developed into a mess.

MR LAMEY: But how do you specifically remember this? Was there no haste to conclude this matter, because there was a crisis here?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the crisis was not foreseen when we took the Uzzi with us and now the crisis was mine.

MR LAMEY: And it seems that you blame Nortje for developing this crisis.

MR DE KOCK: I have not blamed Nortje for anything, Chairperson, because in no operation anything goes as you had planned it.

MR LAMEY: You see Mr de Kock, van der Walt will testify that you did not return to the vehicle at that stage to have a look at the firearm, while he waited there.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did go back to the vehicle and I did go and work on the firearm.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, my instructions are that what happened there was that Nortje accepted that he would be the person who had to shoot Maponya, he made him kneel, and Mr Fourie will also testify to that, and at some given moment when he had to pull the trigger, he could not move himself to do so and he then hit him over the head with the Uzzi, to render him unconscious.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the only part of that statement that is true is that Nortje was the man who was to shoot him, the rest is incorrect. That is not what happened and that was not the order.

MR LAMEY: And afterwards, after Japie had fallen he then tried to shoot him, the weapon stalled and he tried to get the weapon going again and then you grabbed the spade and then hit Maponya over the head with the spade - excuse me, I just want to put it to you, his recollection is that after the weapon stalled, Maponya came upright to an extent and at that stage you hit him with the sharp edge of the spade over the head.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is not so. And if I recall correctly he said at the trial that it was the fatal blow, and that is not so.

MR LAMEY: And afterwards there were signs of life. I just want to put it to you that Nortje's evidence will be that the blows with the sharp edge of the spade split Japie Maponya's head open and afterwards there were signs of life and then he removed one of the subsonic rounds from the Uzzi’s magazine and placed it into his service pistol and then shot Maponya through the head.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is not the order of the events, the order of the events is as I have put them here and I will stand by that. I have also said that in the trial he said that the blow I gave was the fatal blow.

And what was the point of shooting a man after he was already killed with a spade, because there would be noise. Because I was the one who removed the subsonic round from the magazine, because I had the magazine and the firearm with me and I gave him the round to put into his firearm.

MR LAMEY: Please tell us, you say Japie Maponya got up and started to run away at some stage.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Then you caught him?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Then you brought him.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: To Nortje.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: In what position was - how did you bring him to Nortje?

MR DE KOCK: I held him at the back by his hands, by the handcuffs, Chairperson. If one could lift up the cuffs high enough then there was nothing else he could do.

MR LAMEY: Now in which position was he when Nortje shot him? Was he standing or was he held up?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, if my recollection is correct his face pointed to the vehicle, that was in a westerly direction, and he was shot from left to right through the head.

MR LAMEY: You were not afraid that there would be a ricochet of that shot through his head?

MR DE KOCK: No, because Nortje and I were on his left-hand side and Fourie was away from there, about 10 to 15 paces from there.

MR LAMEY: But you were holding onto Maponya while this happened.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but we were shooting from left to right, away from us. The bullet would not hit the right-hand side and then come back to Nortje and myself. On that short distance we have tested it, a subsonic round can go through a door of a vehicle and there was not doubt that it would go through his head.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje, if that - ag, Mr de Kock, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Lamey.

Was there an exit wound? Did the bullet go out the other side of the head? Do you know?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe so, because I did not go and found out whether it was so.

CHAIRPERSON: After the event, did you have any bloodstains on your clothing, or Mr Nortje, did he have any bloodstains on his clothes?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the shot was point blank, it was not a shot where you stood two paces away. The gun was put against his head and he was shot.

MR LAMEY: But if it happened as you have told us, Mr de Kock, then that situation could have been established beforehand and there would have been no reason for Fourie to be standing apart from you.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, one wants to ensure whatever you can ensure. It was a precaution at that stage. It didn't help to kill Maponya and somebody else, one of my own men was killed in the process.

MR LAMEY: But Mr de Kock, these people were trained people.

MR DE KOCK: But Mr Chairperson, you can be trained as well as possible, but mistakes can happen, things can happen.

MR LAMEY: But they would know where to position themselves if there was a shooting.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but I told them to remove themselves from there.

MR LAMEY: Now you have testified - now was Maponya dead after Nortje had shot him, according to your version?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he was dead.

MR LAMEY: Were there any signs of life?

MR DE KOCK: Not at all, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: No signs, no sounds, nothing at all.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: So why did you hit him with the spade?

MR DE KOCK: To make sure, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: But why, Mr de Kock, according to you he was dead.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: You don't flog a dead horse.

MR DE KOCK: Well Maponya wasn't a horse, Chairperson ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: No, that is a by way of a saying that I say it.

MR DE KOCK: Not only here in Swaziland, not only in Botswana and Lesotho, even in the north of South West, after a skirmish, on several occasions you would have heard one shot, but continuous. It was not part of the skirmish, you go and make sure. The English have a word, they call it "topping off". You give the guy one or two shots through the head to make certain.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, there was another way to make sure whether a person is dead or not. If he falls and there is no sign of life and you want to ascertain whether he's dead, then you just try to feel his pulse.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not in the operational world, not the SAS, not the Green Beret, not the Seals, not the Navy Seals of the Americans. You will get other instances where people will go and cut a person's throat instead of hitting him with a spade or firing another shot through his head.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, you were also armed with a pistol, is that not so?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: So why did also not fire another shot through his head, why did you take the spade?

MR DE KOCK: Because we had already made too much noise, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: But exactly, what would another shot matter?

MR DE KOCK: I have explained it yesterday, Chairperson, and this comes from experience. If a shot goes off unexpectedly and a person hears it, who might be five or six hundred metres from there or a kilometre, then he would get an indication. He can say that it was 40 degrees from the direction of where he heard the shot, and if you fire a second or third shot he would be able to pinpoint exactly where the shot was fired from, and that was the reason why I went and I used the spade and I hit him two hard blows over his head.

MR LAMEY: So you wanted to avoid too much noise at all times?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, there was already too much of a mess in that bush as it was.

MR LAMEY: And you say the spade would have had a softer effect?

MR DE KOCK: Well there would have been no noise, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: But it would have had a softer effect than the shooting of a firearm?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, if you ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think we can accept that we will find that hitting somebody with a spade makes less noise than shooting a person.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask. The original plan was to shoot him in the head once and then again, as you normally do?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I can assure you, after the first shot we would have shot him again in his head.

ADV GCABASHE: Using a gun with a silencer?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we would definitely have done it.

ADV GCABASHE: And you had a gun with a silencer?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but this was broken, it was not working, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: But that is the same gun that fired the first shot.

CHAIRPERSON: No.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: The 9mm did not have a silencer?

MR DE KOCK: No, the silenced firearm was out of commission.

ADV GCABASHE: It was the Uzzi. The 9mm didn't have a silencer.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, no.

ADV GCABASHE: Okay, thank you.

MR DE KOCK: Let me put it this way, the only advantage that the pistol had was that it would not eject the empty shell.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, at a stage after this situation became a mess and you were afraid for too much noise, why did you allow Nortje to shoot Maponya with a weapon that would make a lost of noise?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not any of my members at Vlakplaas would go and cut a person's throat. I would not say it was a matter of what we liked. Not any of my members chose to use a panga on a person. We kept the distance between us that a firearm allows you. And I don't know of any of my members who walked around slitting throats and all those types of things. The whole started going wrong when the Uzzi broke. For me it was a cleaner way of doing it, it was clinical. And that is the manner in which I had it done.

MR MALAN: May I just ask, why was the 9mm loaded with subsonic rounds for the purpose of that shot?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there would be less of a sound because the load of gunpowder would be less.

MR MALAN: But that's marginal, because it's the explosion of the powder, while the breaking of the sound barrier would be the most noise, for people in the vicinity to hear.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but in this instance the sound barrier would not be broken with a subsonic round because the gunpowder load is much less.

MR MALAN: Yes, but that is over a distance, not when you shoot a man right here and the bullets stops right here, because the breaking of the sound barrier and the sound at another place is with the travelling of the bullet.

MR DE KOCK: The lower amount of gun powder makes the velocity slower of the round and with a larger load the round would move much quicker than with a smaller load. In other words ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: But you say now that the barrel is pushed against his head.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: In other words, the moment that the bullet leaves the barrel it goes straight into the head.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, well ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: There's no sound barrier outside the barrel.

MR DE KOCK: Well there would be less of a loud noise.

MR MALAN: Yes, but that's marginal.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: So why couldn't it have been one of the ordinary bullets?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Does it make such a big difference, is that what you are saying? Is there such a large difference when the round is fired?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, but it does make a difference, it makes a definite difference.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, is the other important reason for a subsonic round is that it would not eject the shell?

MR DE KOCK: If the weapons doesn't have a silencer on it, Chairperson, then it won't throw the shell out.

MR LAMEY: So it was important that the shell is not ejected with the subsonic round?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it depends where you find yourself.

CHAIRPERSON: It's common cause on both versions, that a subsonic bullet was used.

MR LAMEY: Ja, the reason is not ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I know, but how it got into the gun is different, but I mean it's common cause that a subsonic bullet was used. So ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: Ja, but the reason for the sound, it doesn't make a difference, according to our version. There is another reason, that it doesn't discard the shell.

CHAIRPERSON: The shell, yes. There were a couple of advantages of using it.

MR LAMEY: Yes. Mr de Kock, I want to put it to you and I will simply put it to you that it was late in the evening, it was quiet, the whole planning of this act was to execute it as quietly as possible. And I would like to put it to you that that was the reason why you on the spur of the moment also decided, when the crisis arose, to hit Japie with the spade.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is as false as a seven rand note, that is not so.

MR LAMEY: May I just have a moment, Mr Chairman. My instructions are also that at a stage dogs started barking and there was a haste to finish what you were busy with.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, dogs started barking and it was a disturbing factor.

MR LAMEY: And that was after Japie was hit over the head with the Uzzi.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is when the shot was fired.

MR LAMEY: Was this after the shot was fired, very well. Mr de Kock, is it correct that this was the first time that you give evidence here today that you had hit Japie with the sharp edge of the spade over his head?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct. Although - and I would like to qualify this, I explained it like this to General Engelbrecht in discussion where Captain Kloppers was present.

MR LAMEY: Very well. I mean - when was that?

MR DE KOCK: It was in about '92, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: This was before your evidence in the de Kock trial?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And in the trial you did not say this and also not in mitigation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: You also did not mention it in your initial amnesty application?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, but I did mention there that this man was not hacked to death before he was shot to death.

MR LAMEY: I speak of the evidence that you had indeed hacked him with the sharp edge of the spade, you did not mention that?

MR DE KOCK: That is not in my application, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: It's also not in your book?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, I would like to continue with another aspect. Are you certain that, if you look back today, that you did not request Nortje, before he went to Josini, to at a specified time later on the 25th of September, to go to Krugersdorp Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because the request from Kleynhans and Dunkley, I did not listen to their request and I did not give Nortje that instruction to leave Josini.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, you have testified here in your evidence that when Kleynhans and Dunkley came with the request to the farm, you could not at that stage - that was two days before the departure of the groups for deployment, you could not at that stage accede to the request, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson, and I also did not have a written request from the Divisional Commander.

MR LAMEY: Could you not tell Dunkley and Kleynhans that they could do it when they came back from their deployment?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there was an existing formula that had to be followed, and that did not happen.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I see it is now 11 o'clock. I am not completely through, but I'm not far from the end. Will this be an opportune moment?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you, we'll now take the short tea adjournment.

MS LOCKHAT: All rise.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: (cont)

... Commander of C Section, was Brigadier Schoon.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: You said that it was Captain Naude who was the Commander of C2.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Who decided to shift Nortje.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: But it wasn't Brigadier Schoon who shifted Nortje?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the signature indicated that it had been discussed with Brigadier Schoon. In other words, Naude must have taken it up with Schoon and the decision had been made there, that Nortje was to be shifted.

MR LAMEY: But why would Naude do this if Schoon could do it himself?

MR DE KOCK: I suppose it's a question of delegation, Chairperson. I wasn't there and he would delegate it to the next officer in C.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know of any reason why you weren't brought into the picture at that stage and asked?

MR DE KOCK: I'd already gone to Western Transvaal, to Mafikeng and Mr Naude later told me that he couldn't get hold of me in order to clear it with me, upon which I mentioned that it couldn't be because in the deployment register we would provide all the telephone numbers where members could be found, should somebody require them.

CHAIRPERSON: But there was no - you're unaware of any particular reason why they should cut you out of that decision? Or do you perceive that there was some sort of malice?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because I simply wasn't there at that stage and he could not get hold of me. So I wouldn't say that there was some kind of conspiracy or underhanded conduct. It wasn't like that.

MR LAMEY: But Brigadier Schoon would have known how to get hold of you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if he'd consulted the deployment register, then he would have known.

MR LAMEY: And if he could not contact you and he specifically had to get Naude in Krugersdorp, then Schoon could have contacted Nortje?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but the way the hierarchy worked is that the subordinates would do the work and he would have told Naude "Gather a group of people together or liaise with a group of people and shift them".

MR LAMEY: But this was not in the usual course of the command structure in C1, because C2 was paramount to C1. You were responsible for C1.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but when we attended meetings in the mornings at Head Office, I sat in and Major Naude sat in. And if I wasn't there, then Captain Baker would sit in. And in the case of Naude from C2, if he wasn't there, then Captain Jan Meyer would sit in.

MR LAMEY: When you were contacted - my instructions are that it was in Zeerust, that you were in Zeerust at that stage, you were contacted by Nortje. At that stage, were you taken aback that you did not know anything about it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I had been in Mafikeng when they telephoned me, or when Nortje contacted me. I was in the offices of the Commander of the Boputhatswana Intelligence Service, to such an extent that I asked Nortje to give me a telephone number and that I would contact him from another telephone because I knew that all the telephones within that organisation were tapped on cassette. That was for incoming and for outgoing calls.

I was somewhat upset. I was a bit upset by the idea that people were being shifted without my knowledge and that I was busy with a direct line of thought in collecting a group of people who would work in that area ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, were you at any stage on that trip in Zeerust?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, you would drive through Zeerust, but we didn't work in Zeerust at that stage, there was a dividing line between the Boputhatswana and the South African side. We could cross the border, but if I for example, wanted to work in Zeerust, I would first have to notify the Commander in Zeerust, but at that stage we were working in the Mafikeng area in order to counter direct infiltrations from the Botswana side to Mafikeng.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Lamey?

MR LAMEY: The point isn't of such grave importance, but Mr Fourie says that he has never been in Mafikeng and that he was in Zeerust when you received the order or the telephone call.

MR DE KOCK: No, we were in Mafikeng specifically.

MR LAMEY: Fourie was your driver at that stage, your car driver.

MR DE KOCK: Well he wasn't the appointed driver, we moved in groups of two or three and sometimes I drove and sometimes he drove.

MR LAMEY: Did you express your dissatisfaction to Fourie with regard to the fact that you had not been notified about these arrangements?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: If he gives evidence to the effect that you did not mention anything about it, would you accept it as that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would.

MR LAMEY: Is it not correct that the groups would be deployed for approximately two to three weeks in a certain area?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was a period of three weeks.

MR LAMEY: And Nortje was, from the beginning of September to shortly before the 25th of September, that's where he was?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson, I would have to rely on Mr Lamey's statement regarding that. I'm not going to dispute it.

MR LAMEY: For that reason, would you not have told Nortje that you received a request from Dunkley, saying "First go and do your work in Josini", or something like that, "but when you're finished there, please report to Krugersdorp in order to address the need that they had expressed"?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because then I would have made specific arrangements and that would have been indicated in the deployment register.

MR LAMEY: Are you saying that Nortje told you over the telephone that he had received a request from Security Head Office, to be shifted to Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, when I asked them what they were doing there, he said that Head Office had requested them to go there, that the request had come from there.

MR LAMEY: Nortje will testify that he said nothing of the sort and that indeed he never received any such instruction from Head Office.

MR DE KOCK: Well I can assure you that I definitely did not shift him to Krugersdorp.

MR LAMEY: But Nortje consistently maintained contact with you while you were in Josini, in order to keep you up to date with the work that was being performed, as it usually would be with group leaders who were deployed to a certain area.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it could be like that.

MR LAMEY: And he never mentioned anything to you that he had received a request while he was in Josini, to go to Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the next that I heard from him was when he was already in Krugersdorp.

MR LAMEY: For what reason, in our opinion, do you think that Nortje would not have informed you, seeing as you were his direct Commander?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when he spoke to me he informed me that he was in Krugersdorp.

MR LAMEY: No, I mean when he was in Josini.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know what the nature of the time was when he was precisely informed. I would have no problem with it if Head Office had shifted him there, with the exception that I would have liked to be notified about it and I would also want to know why he was being shifted.

MR LAMEY: Would you have discussed this aspect with Brigadier Schoon when you went to Security Head Office on the morning before Japie was taken away from Vlakplaas? Would you have discussed this aspect with him?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it was something that had already occurred.

MR LAMEY: Now if Nortje had said to you that he received the request from Head Office, why did you want to know from Martin Naude who shifted your group to Josini, why didn't you just accept that this was a request from Head Office and that was that and what's the problem?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, if nobody wanted to inform me about where my people were, they may as well just have removed me as Commander of the Unit, because what's the use for me to attempt to compile a group to counter rural guerrilla warfare on a long-term basis, and I am deploying people and when I'm not there the people are redeployed. So they might just as well removed me as Commander of the Unit.

MR LAMEY: Well with the exception that Nortje will testify that you gave him that instruction before you went to Josini. He will also testify that he would never, if he had received such a request, not have informed you or notified you.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if he received such an order from Head Office, it would probably have meant that this was a more senior command, in his opinion. And I have no reason to run circles around this situation.

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Lamey, can I just get the proposition right. Mr Nortje is going to say that Mr de Kock gave him the instruction before Nortje left for Josini?

MR LAMEY: Yes.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MR LAMEY: After - soon after Kleynhans and Dunkley were on the farm.

Mr de Kock, the question of the teargas, did you possibly spray teargas on Japie, possibly not in the mouth, but on the face?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible. I would not have sprayed it directly onto his eyes or into his nose or into his mouth, but it may have been from a distance.

MR LAMEY: Was the teargas used more than once? I'm not speaking of you specifically.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not as far as I know, because the teargas would not only concentrate in the area directly surrounding the person on whom it was use, but the persons in the near vicinity would also be affected by its distribution.

MR LAMEY: Wasn't there a case that teargas was sprayed into the vehicle once and that at a stage the members had to stand back and Japie was removed from the vehicle and more teargas was subsequently sprayed onto his face?

MR DE KOCK: That may be. I don't believe that I'm the only person who used teargas.

MR LAMEY: No, I'm not saying that, I'm just asking you, isn't it possible that that could have happened, according to your recollection?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr de Kock, did I understand you correctly, you were asked whether the teargas was used more than once and you said "No, not as far as I know", and now you say that you don't believe that you were the only one who made use of teargas.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, for example teargas was sprayed into the minibus and also outside the minibus, when Japie was outside the minibus.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, after you had arrived at Krugersdorp, is it correct to say that from there you assumed further command, for all intents and purposes?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: That was before the abduction?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, over my own members.

MR LAMEY: But when you arrived at Krugersdorp, it was also the situation that the possibility of abduction was already under discussion?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it had already been tabled. It was a situation which had already been discussed.

MR LAMEY: Now with regard to the discussion at Krugersdorp, it is my instructions from Nortje, that before you were there this matter was discussed with General le Roux and Nortje, in the presence of le Roux, said "Remember..." - it is something in this regard, I don't want to put words in your mouth or anything like that, but the crux of it was that they should bear in mind that when they abduct the man he would be seriously assaulted and that during interrogation, or perhaps thereafter should they not obtain any information from him he would have to be killed. Or that that possibility was discussed before you arrived there.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I will not dispute that, but Mr Nortje can give evidence about that, with regard to the discussion between him and le Roux.

MR LAMEY: But his further evidence is that that possibility was discussed as a possibility when you were there as well.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that did happen.

MR LAMEY: But Nortje says is that it was not a necessity for him to be killed, at least not at that stage yet. Ultimately it would depend on circumstances and on whether or not information had been obtained from him and what the situation would unfold as in later stages. What would you say in that regard?

MR DE KOCK: I think that Warrant Officer Nortje would be the appropriate person to give evidence about this, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: But I mean when you were there.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I've already given evidence about what was said there, and I will stand by my evidence. Mr Nortje will have to put his own version before the Committee.

MR LAMEY: And it was only after the interrogation of Japie Maponya, on that day at Vlakplaas, after he had been abducted and taken there and the interrogation was underway, that the discussion once again led to "Well, what are we going to do with this man"? And the discussion re-emerged that the man had to be taken out, meaning that he had to be killed.

MR DE KOCK: That discussion had already been held when Nortje and I went to General le Roux's office, when I asked him "We can abduct the man, but what must we do with him?" And Nortje was present during that discussion.

MR LAMEY: Yes, but Nortje's evidence and his recollection are not that there was a definite request or order from le Roux, at that stage, that the man should necessarily be killed. That which was discussed as a possibility was received with a measure of silence.

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson, how that section operates, but I'm sure that Nortje will be able to explain it all to us.

MR LAMEY: And I don't wish to dwell upon this again, but Mr Visser examined you about something that Nortje said, and I want to put it to you that it is exactly the way that the reference to Nortje's evidence is and that is that if information had been obtained from him, if he had given his co-operation, he would not have been killed.

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson. The circumstances subsequent to the occurrence would have determined what was going to happen.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, regarding the aspect of the assault on the farm, I just want to put it to you, and I will not dwell upon all the detail pertaining to that, because from our opinion there is a measure of an essential difference from what you say and what my client says. The version is that you sprayed teargas into Maponya's mouth and Mr Fourie remembers this because you specifically lifted the Balaclava cap and sprayed the teargas onto his face.

MR DE KOCK: I have no recollection of that.

MR LAMEY: Sorry, Mr de Kock, how was this teargas sprayed, did it come in little bombs, or did you have a sort of gas cylinder with a nozzle?

MR DE KOCK: It was similar to a spray canister that you would use for insecticide or something like that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR LAMEY: So what took place there, according to your evidence, is essentially what the applicants that I represent say.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but the essential difference here is that I sprayed down his throat.

MR LAMEY: No, that you sprayed the teargas directly down his throat, but that you sprayed it into his mouth.

MR DE KOCK: No, there is an essential difference between my version and Fourie's version, especially during the Court case. It is not correct.

MR LAMEY: Then Mr de Kock, did you have an independent recollection regarding the removal of the petrol registers at Krugersdorp, which Mr Nortje did, or are you not certain about this? Would you leave it over to his version?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with his evidence in Court, it peaked my memory. There was a situation during which the registers were fetched. I don't know which person went to fetch the registers.

MR LAMEY: Well do you know upon whose request this took place? Can you recall?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall, and I don't wish to put a version similar to that of what appeared in Court.

MR LAMEY: Very well, I will not put it to you then, because Mr Nortje will give his own evidence that this was upon the request of General Engelbrecht.

Mr Chairman, before I complete my cross-examination, may I just get instructions?

There is just one aspect. Can you recall that on the previous evening, after the completion of the interrogation of Japie Maponya, that you also requested Fourie to come to the farm the following day?

MR DE KOCK: Could you repeat that please?

MR LAMEY: On the previous evening, after the completion of Maponya's interrogation, you told Fourie and van der Walt to come to the farm on the following morning. That is after the conclusion of the interrogation of Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: So that would be the evening which followed, shortly after the interrogation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: You specifically requested them to come to the farm the following day?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that may be so. I will concede to that.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, would this be at the same time when you told the rest not to come?

MR LAMEY: Can I just get some clarity on that please? Yes, that was after you told the black members, or some of the black members not to report the following day, but you told Nortje, Fourie and van der Walt to be there the following day.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I will concede to that.

MR LAMEY: And Fourie's evidence will be that in his mind he came to the conclusion at that stage that a place was going to be made about Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I'm sure he will give evidence to that effect.

MR LAMEY: And by "a plan" I mean that he was possibly going to be killed.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that will be Fourie's version. We shall hear about that.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that's my cross-examination.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Lamey. Ms Bridjlall, do you have any questions you'd like to ask Mr de Kock?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS BRIDJLALL: Yes, thank you.

Mr de Kock, it is your evidence that on the morning of the murder you went to Brigadier Schoon's office, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MS BRIDJLALL: And that he was not there?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MS BRIDJLALL: Naude then discussed a certain telex with you, a telex requesting the assistance of your unit.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he did not discuss it with me. When I could not find Brigadier Schoon, I went to Naude, because I wanted to know who had shifted my people and it was then that Naude showed me this telex.

MS BRIDJLALL: Did you discuss with Naude that Maponya had been kidnapped?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: Did you make any attempt to find Brigadier Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I made enquiries at his office, but there was no reference pointing out where he had gone and when he would be back.

MS BRIDJLALL: Why then did you not discuss the situation with Naude? From what I understand from you evidence, at the meetings in the morning, Naude would have been present in any event. Why did you not think that it was necessary that you inform him?

MR DE KOCK: My work and that of Naude was not the same when it came to covert operations, or operations of that nature, so I would not have informed him about it.

MS BRIDJLALL: But Mr de Kock, Mr Naude shows you a telex, or discusses the contents of a telex with you, in which the assistance of the unit is requested in Krugersdorp, and as a result of that, according to your evidence, Nortje was in Krugersdorp, the entire operation had occurred and you were now sitting with Mr Maponya at Vlakplaas and you had come to Brigadier Schoon's office to inter alia, discuss with him the situation. Why then did you not think it was an opportunity for you to discuss with Naude, why didn't you take that opportunity and tell him what was going on?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was nothing in that regard to discuss it with Mr Naude. If I may put it this way, if Brigadier Schoon had been there and Major Naude had been sitting there, I would have requested Major Naude to leave the office so that I could discuss the situation in private with Brigadier Schoon. That would be if such a situation had arisen at that stage.

MS BRIDJLALL: Why would you have done that? Was Naude not part of, not privy to all of this? He obviously knew your unit was in Krugersdorp.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he did not operate on that level, it was about a compartmentalisation and it wasn't necessary for him to know about the abduction, it was also not necessary for him to know that there was a imminently potential murder.

MS BRIDJLALL: Was Naude your senior?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: How did he rank in comparison to Schoon, were the of the same rank?

MR DE KOCK: He was even more junior. Mr Naude had been my junior by approximately eight months. We had always been Majors or Captains, but in this case he was eight to nine months my junior.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, to move on to the abduction, when did you brief the askaris, when did you brief your members as to what was to happen, which vehicle was to be used, who was to abduct, that Mr Maponya was to be taken to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this would have been in Krugersdorp, but I cannot recall the specific place where it occurred. I think that it may have been about two to three hours before the time.

MS BRIDJLALL: Who would have been present at such a briefing?

MR DE KOCK: It would have been the persons who were going to conduct the abduction and then also the persons who would undertake the observations in the environment and then there would also be members of the Krugersdorp Security Branch.

MS BRIDJLALL: Why would members of the Krugersdorp Security Branch be there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was their target, it was their person whom they wanted abducted, it was also their area, they knew the area, they knew the people, they were also aware of the circumstances in town, they also knew the entries and the exits.

MS BRIDJLALL: Whose decision was it to take him to Vlakplaas? Were there any other alternatives that you could have used? Why was he taken to Vlakplaas in particular?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall specifically who suggested that he be taken to Vlakplaas. If it had been necessary, then I will assume that responsibility. Let me put it this way, it was a place where one could assault somebody in security, without any intervention from another person.

MS BRIDJLALL: Okay. We're now at Vlakplaas. You arrive at Vlakplaas, what do you see, where is Mr Maponya? Is he inside the kombi, is he outside?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this is very difficult for me, I will have to rely on a very vague recollection. But at that stage when I arrived there, I think he was outside the vehicle, outside the kombi.

MS BRIDJLALL: In your evidence, at some point in time, you mentioned that teargas was sprayed into the kombi, was Mr Maponya then put back into the kombi?

MR DE KOCK: He was fist placed into the kombi and then the teargas was sprayed.

MS BRIDJLALL: And when did you spray teargas in his face?

MR DE KOCK: I think at a stage when he was outside the vehicle.

MS BRIDJLALL: You removed a balaclava cap from his head, is that correct? In order to spray teargas on his face.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I cannot recall this independently, because I could just as well have sprayed the teargas just like that onto the balaclava, the effect would not differ greatly.

ADV GCABASHE: Was he in fact wearing a balaclava, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I can recall, yes, Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: Do you know when this cap was put onto his head? Was it before - do you know when the cap was put onto his head?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: When you arrived at Vlakplaas, was his head already covered?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, I recall that his eyes were closed, or that his face was covered.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, your evidence was that one of your concerns was that Mr Maponya would be able to identify, the askaris would be able to identify the location of Vlakplaas, and that was one of the reasons that it was eventually decided that he had to be murdered, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No the situation of Vlakplaas, but the members who had abducted him, could have been identified.

MS BRIDJLALL: So that is one of the reasons that the decision was taken to murder Mr Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't say that it was a decision that was made, but it was a consequence of his abduction.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, I'm not following you. What was the consequence of his abduction?

MR DE KOCK: Well that the identification of Vlakplaas members could take place, among others, former members of the ANC.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, did you not foresee at the time your members approached Mr Maponya, at the time the abduction was being planned, that this would have been a consequence, that he would be able to identify? Why were steps not taken at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would not have been possible for my askaris and policemen to walk around wearing balaclavas in a main street in Krugersdorp, to go to the United Bank to show a man a certificate and then load him into a vehicle. It had to look as normal as possible, so that members of the public who saw this, would regard it as a usual arrest.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, I then put it to you that at the time the members of your unit approached Mr Maponya, from that moment onwards, there was no probability that you would be released. That from that moment there was the danger that he would be able to identify your members and therefore - although it is your evidence that if Brigadier Schoon said "Let him go" or if le Roux said "Let him go", that you actually couldn't do that because from that moment he would be able to identify your members and it would have posed a danger.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I will repeat what I said yesterday afternoon, and that is that I went to Colonel le Roux and said to him "We can abduct the man, but what must we do with him them?" He said he never again wanted to see him in Krugersdorp. So from that point onwards the possibility arose.

MS BRIDJLALL: From that point onwards, Mr de Kock, was it not that at the initial stage of abduction the danger arose that Mr Maponya would be able to identify your members?

MR DE KOCK: Not necessarily, Chairperson, because one could have tried to examine the possibility of abducting him in a different manner, but according to the information that we had at our disposal, which Dunkley and Kleynhans provided, there was no other manner in which we could abduct him.

MS BRIDJLALL: But that's why I put it to you, Mr de Kock, that at the time of the abduction, from there onwards there was no turning back, you had to murder Mr Maponya, is that correct? What alternative would there have been if Brigadier Schoon said, or General le Roux said "Let him go", what would you have done? What would have happened to the danger that he would have posed to you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that would then have been discussed. If it occur, it would have been discussed with Brigadier Schoon and if he had any other ideas, I believe we would have examined those options, but he was not available. I was satisfied with the fact with the information from that Commander in Krugersdorp and the section under which we served. And I went the next day to obtain information to see if the sentiments were still the same with regard to Japie Maponya and those sentiments were still the same and I was satisfied with that information and that order and that command structure.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, to move on to another point. Why did you require - you said that you requested that Kleynhans and Dunkley accompany you to Swaziland, but that later on they were not available, or they intimated to you that they were not available and therefore they were not, the did not accompany you to Swaziland, why did you require their presence?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I feel that it was their operation and it was the operation of the Krugersdorp Security Police, it was their initiative and if they wanted this dirty work done, they would have to accompany. It was a question of sharing the responsibility. It was not only a question of us being mercenaries, who could be shifted on a random basis just to go and kill people, they had to understand the gravity of the situation and how serious it was.

MS BRIDJLALL: If going to Swaziland to murder Mr Maponya was to be a joint operation and Mr Kleynhans, or Mr Dunkley were not available to accompany you and it was a joint operation, why then did you go ahead on your own?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, it was a question of us doing the dirty work.

MS BRIDJLALL: But if I understand you correctly, you just said that the reason you wanted them to accompany you was because you didn't want to be the one just doing the dirty work, it was a joint operation.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they had to realise that when they authorise such operations or requested such operations, what the inherent responsibilities, effects and consequences of such operations could be. We did not need Dunkley and Kleynhans to kill Maponya, but people want other people abducted or killed and then they want somebody else to do the dirty work and people had to realise what it involved and they had to be prepared to live with it.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, if I can take you back to Vlakplaas, when Mr Maponya was being assaulted. We heard for the first time yesterday that he was also strangled. Please tell the Committee exactly what sort of attack was, how he was attacked. How was Mr Maponya assaulted, what was done to him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot give you a blow for blow, or kick by kick account of what took place, but he was thoroughly assaulted in all facets with regard to physical assault.

MS BRIDJLALL: But you mentioned in particular yesterday, that he was strangled, or that you attempted to strangle him. What else did you do?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as far as I can recall, I hit him with a balled fist and I believe that I may also have kicked him, although I don't recall that precisely, but I may have.

MS BRIDJLALL: And what about the strangulation?

MR DE KOCK: He was not strangled, a cloth was pulled over his mouth, with the object of cutting off his oxygen supply and in that way attempting to obtain some answer from him. So it was a question of suffocation and not strangulation.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, did Kleynhans and Dunkley participate in the assault?

MR DE KOCK: I don't recall Dunkley, but Kleynhans was with me in the kombi at one stage when we pulled the cloth over his mouth for the suffocation. In that regard he actively participated.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, when Mr Maponya - we're now in Swaziland and Mr Maponya is being assaulted again, why didn't he scream out?

MR DE KOCK: I think, Chairperson, that it was simply a case of his decision not to co-operate and that it was a particular form of loyalty and perseverance.

MS BRIDJLALL: So he was not prevented in any way from screaming out, he was not, there was nothing in his mouth, you didn't ...?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he could have spoken at any time. He could have screamed at any time if he wanted to, but he didn't do anything.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just get clarity on this. You were talking about Swaziland now, the last two questions. I don't know if Mr de Kock understood that.

MR DE KOCK: No, I understood it to be the assault at ... No, in Swaziland there was nothing placed in his mouth.

MS BRIDJLALL: So he didn't scream out even when he heard the dogs bark?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, Mr Lamey dealt with this at great length, but I need to ask you this. Your testimony was that Mr Maponya was dead after the first shot to his head.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it was, in his opinion he was dead.

MS BRIDJLALL: He said that he was certain, if I remember.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MS BRIDJLALL: And you then said that you assaulted him, or you hit him on the head with the spade in order to make sure that he was dead.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MS BRIDJLALL: But I don't understand that, Mr de Kock. If you were certain that he was dead, why did you need to hit him to make sure? Isn't it the same thing?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. As I have already stated upon previous occasions, it was a standard procedure. I had the spade and I made certain that he was dead. I may just as well have used the garden fork, which had four or five sharp prongs, and stabbed him with that, but I had the spade in my hands and I used it to strike him over the head with it, using the sharp point. As I said, it was standard procedure that even though people had been shot with six or seven shots to the body, all of them would be shot again in the head with two shots. And I had seen enough dead people since 1968 to 1985, as many others had seen, whether it was in car accidents or the result of a suicide, but particularly people with gunshot wounds. If I tell you he was dead, he was definitely dead.

MR MALAN: Sorry, for interrupting.

You say you had the spade in your hands and that is strange, because it was at the stage after Nortje shot Maponya, while he was on his knees.

MR DE KOCK: No, he was standing straight up when he was shot.

MR MALAN: I beg you pardon. You held him and you stood next to each other when he was shot. That was after you went to the car to try and fix the firearm, you could not succeed, you came back, you gave him the subsonic round, he loaded his weapon with it and you stood with him, you were busy holding Japie back and he shot him through the head from left to right.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at that stage ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: And you say - I just want to get to the point, and you say with this answer that you had the spade in your hands at that point. Now please explain to us how you got the spade there.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at that moment, when Nortje was busy loading his firearm with that round, Japie took the gap and attempted to escape and that is when I caught up with him and hit him with the spade and he collapsed to the ground, and at that stage I still had the spade in my hands.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Bridjlall.

MS BRIDJLALL: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

When was Mr Maponya's clothes removed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was after he was shot and after he had been struck with the spade.

MS BRIDJLALL: Who removed his clothes?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, I think it was Nortje and Fourie.

MS BRIDJLALL: Did you not participate in the removal of his clothes?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: Who ordered that it should be done?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know. I would accept that I was the one who said "Well remove his clothes and remove the handcuffs". I have no independent recollection that I said "Disrobe him now", but I will accept that I may said it and I will accept it as that.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, your evidence was that you removed Mr Maponya's clothes so that it would be difficult to identify him, that his family would not be able to identify him by his clothes if his body was ever discovered.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, what would prevent his family from being able to identify him by his face? Why was it necessary to remove his clothes?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was a just a question of making it more difficult and one didn't know how soon a body would be discovered there. One could accept that if a month later the body was to be discovered, the degradation of the corpse would be to such an extent that you could no longer recognise the face, but you could recognise the clothing.

MS BRIDJLALL: What was the nature of the injuries that Mr Maponya had suffered?

MR DE KOCK: Was that with the assault, or in Swaziland?

MS BRIDJLALL: At the end, when he was murdered, what sort of injuries did he have?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he would have had a shot from left to right through his head and he may also have had two, if not indentations, then two deep slashes to his head, which may have cut the skull bone.

MR MALAN: And with regard to the assault injuries? I think that the question is about everything.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe that there would have been swelling, abrasions and bruising.

MS BRIDJLALL: Was he disfigured? Would you be ..(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: He said there were two slash marks on the face and maybe a broken skull and a bullet wound in the head.

MR DE KOCK: There wouldn't have been any slash to his face, I don't recall that.

CHAIRPERSON: Where about on the head?

MR DE KOCK: I would have said that it was in the centre of the skull, between the crown and the forehead.

CHAIRPERSON: But didn't you say that you were standing between the knees and ankles of the deceased, as he was lying down?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he lay on his back and I struck him from above.

CHAIRPERSON: But he was lying on his back - correct me if I'm wrong, I thought you said you stood between his knees and his feet.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So he must have been about five foot something tall?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would estimate that he was about five foot ten, five foot eleven.

CHAIRPERSON: So then when you hit him, how did you manage not to injure his face and just the top of his head? If he was lying down the top of his head would be facing away from you, wouldn't it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I didn't see any cut marks on his face or facial slash marks as such, however, I cannot say what the effect of the blow to his head with the gun had had.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, you said that as part of your cover-up, after the murder of Mr Maponya, that you made subtle enquiries as to whether anybody found the body. What did you exactly, what do you mean by that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, approximately two to three months later, I asked Warrant Officer Pienaar if he knew anything about a corpse, whether the army units or the patrol units had found anything, whether there had been any queries from the Swazi Police about a corpse, or whether there was any information, and he told me that he had heard nothing, that there had been no report or enquiry.

MS BRIDJLALL: So you discussed the Maponya incident with Mr Pienaar?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not discuss it with him. It was by the way, with the objective of not providing a reference. I did not refer to a specific place or border post or anything of that nature, I simply asked him whether he had heard any reports about bodies that had been found in the vicinity or near the South African border, whether there was anything strange. But it was not a general discussion at all.

MS BRIDJLALL: Did Mr Pienaar not ask you "But why are you asking me these questions?" Did he not put the two incidents together? The first, when you say that you went to his house to pick up the spade and now you're asking questions about a body.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, you said that you sent away the black members from Vlakplaas, either on the day of the assault or the day before you set out to murder Mr Maponya, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, well I conceded to it, I don't have an independent recollection thereof, but I have conceded to it.

MS BRIDJLALL: Why would you have done that, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was no longer necessary to have their services and if it had come to the execution of the death of Japie Maponya, then they would not have been in the area.

MS BRIDJLALL: Why would you not want them in the area, why would not have - were there - if I understand you correctly, some of those black members were members of your unit.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MS BRIDJLALL: Why would you keep this away from them?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, you wouldn't announce the fact that you were going to murder somebody or that you were in the process of murdering somebody.

ADV GCABASHE: But Mr de Kock, you involved all the other white officers who had been part of your team, for this incident.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Including the two Krugersdorp chaps, who eventually did not pitch up.

MR DE KOCK: That is entirely correct, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: And yet you exclude the black members who are permanent members of your team.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: And you say the reason is you wouldn't want them to know what you were doing?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, one would want to keep it as confined as possible, or keep the group as limited as possible.

ADV GCABASHE: But this is the point. You were not keeping the group down to, or the information down to one or two people, you essentially had three plus two who you wanted to involve, that's five already.

MR DE KOCK: Ja, that is correct. One could probably for some or other reason have said that you were taking two or three black members and only two white members, but the operation had been initiated and there was also a situation of trust. For example, I trusted Fourie and Nortje much more than what I trusted some of the black members, with regard to such an incident. It would be the normal pattern of thought in such a situation.

ADV GCABASHE: The ultimate point of course being that they would know anyway once they came back, be it on the 27th or the 28th, that you had done something with Maponya, because he was no longer in that little shed that you'd put him into.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, every person can formulate his own idea, but all that they could have known we may have released him. It wasn't for us to inform them and we certainly would not have informed them any further about it.

MR MALAN: Did you ever interrogate other people there and release them?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think there were two or three events upon which we captured three members from MK, and in the one case we sent the person back to Soweto, where we had captured him and the other case was an MK commander who was handed over to the military, who came to fetch him there with a helicopter. So yes, it did occur, there was no request to kill them.

MR MALAN: And you say it was a question of trust, that you trusted Nortje and Fourie. But you would have also have taken Dunkley along, but you didn't know him at all.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I'd already known Dunkley from Ovamboland and even in Ovamboland we had a few horrific situations.

MS BRIDJLALL: Thank you. Mr de Kock, you said in response to a question put to you by Mr Lamey, that you would accept information irrespective of where it came from. This was with regards to the fact that it was alleged that Mr Maponya had received training from his brother. You said that you would accept that information and believe unequivocally, irrespective of where that information came from, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I have heard about that this morning, but if it was given to me at that stage there in Krugersdorp, I would have accepted it as correct, as the truth.

MS BRIDJLALL: You would accept that as a basis for abduction? You would accept it as the truth. If you were abducting somebody and you were acting on information, you would accept that information to be true?

MR DE KOCK: Well I would have found the information correct. I wouldn't say that it constituted a basis for abduction. The basis for abduction I think is a far broader situation, which was established before the decision to act illegally.

MS BRIDJLALL: Let me rephrase that question. You would have acted on that information, accepting that information to be correct, in order to abduct, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Well it would not only have relied on that information, the persons who would have decided about the abduction, would be the persons dealing with this specific file, who had this load of information and believed that only Japie Maponya could provide information. And I was satisfied with the information that they had, which led them to bring us in for the abduction.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, I'm not dealing with the decision to abduct, I'm dealing with your reliance on that information that was given to you and your reliance on it as being correct.

MR DE KOCK: I would not have doubted the truth thereof.

MS BRIDJLALL: Would it not - would the truth or otherwise of that information, not be a matter to be considered before you decide to murder?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, this information had already been confirmed by the Divisional Commander of Krugersdorp and his team and it was presented as the problem which they wanted to solve and that only Japie could solve. I wouldn't have had a problem and independently have launched my own investigation in order to confirm this information. I was entirely satisfied with the integrity of that information which was provided by Krugersdorp.

ADV GCABASHE: Mr de Kock, can I just get this right, I'm a little confused. This information about the crash course you only heard about here this morning, is that ..(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: So all the questions that you heard being asked of Japie Maponya during his interrogation, had nothing to do with the crash course.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there was no mention of any crash course there.

ADV GCABASHE: They had solely to do with where his brother might be.

MR DE KOCK: Where his brother might be. Yes, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MS BRIDJLALL: Mr de Kock, my final question to you is the following. Would you be able to identify the place at which Mr Maponya was buried or covered with leaves or ...?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I ought to be able to find the place. Members of the TRC visited me about the same situation. One of their investigating officers - he and I served together in the police at a stage, I just can't remember his name at the moment, he's a Captain, and I told him that I would try to identify the place, that I ought to be able to find it if they take me there, but I was never taken there. I was also not taken there by the A-G's personnel after may case, to identify the place. However, I did express my willingness to do so on both occasions, and I stated it clearly.

CHAIRPERSON: And would you still be willing to do that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I've never had a problem with assisted in any of the problems.

MS BRIDJLALL: Thank you, Mr de Kock. I think Mr Maponya's family would be grateful. Before I end up there's one more question. Mr de Kock, do you have any knowledge about the detention of members of Mr Japie Maponya's family, after his abduction or after his murder?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, none whatsoever. I must also mention that after Japie Maponya's murder, Vlakplaas was never again requested to go and work in the West Rand. In other words, what I can deduce from that today, is that the West Rand's problem surrounding Japie Maponya had been solved.

ADV GCABASHE: No, but it couldn't have been, Mr de Kock, you got no information from Japie Maponya. That was the brief "We need the information from Japie Maponya". So they still had the problem, on the 27th, 28th, until Ondereli got killed.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but they didn't use us again to go and find Ondereli.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, I'm just de-linking the problem continuing to exist, from the reason why they might not have used you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I understand that, Chairperson.

MS BRIDJLALL: Thank you, Mr de Kock, I do not have any further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS BRIDJLALL

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Bridjlall. Ms Lockhat, do you have any questions?

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Sorry, just before Ms Lockhat ... The question, if I understood it correctly, after the Maponya killing, your answer was that - I beg your pardon, I suppose I can speak Afrikaans to you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, please.

MR MALAN: You said that Vlakplaas was never again requested to go and work in the West Rand.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, at no stage did I receive a request again to go and work there, and I did not deploy any of my units to that area.

MR MALAN: Isn't it possible that they decided not to request your assistance, because Maponya had been murdered?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they wanted him dead.

MR MALAN: But they never again made use of your services, as far as you know?

MR DE KOCK: Not in the tracing of Ondereli.

MR MALAN: Or anything else?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: For the interrogation of any other person?

MR DE KOCK: No. There was one case during which Colonel le Roux wanted us to blow up a building in Krugersdorp and after this Maponya situation I discussed it with Brigadier Schoon and Colonel le Roux and Kleynhans arrived there, both of them sat there in the office with Schoon and me, and Schoon refused. I told him that I refused, that they had their own experts and I later gave four kilograms of Russian explosives and two MIF switches to Dunkley.

MR MALAN: But you never again worked in the West Rand?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: There was never any further request?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Let me just take you back to General le Roux. You said there was a request directly to C1, to get C1 to co-operate with their branch, is that correct?

CHAIRPERSON: Directly to Section C?

MS LOCKHAT: To C1. That is Mr de Kock's unit, to help the Krugersdorp. General le Roux requested that, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. There was a Captain Kleynhans and a Lieutenant Dunkley - I think he may have been a Warrant Officer, who came with photos for the identification of suspects and terrorists, upon which they asked us whether we could provide people for them and I answered no, the procedure was for them to send a telex report to Head Office to request a group of C1 members.

MS LOCKHAT: Okay. Just to get back again. You said that General le Roux gave you the instruction to kill Japie Maponya, is that right?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is how I understood it.

MS LOCKHAT: Did General le Roux work with you previously?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. When I arrived in Krugersdorp and was introduced to him, it was the first time that I had seen him or met him.

MS LOCKHAT: Was General le Roux aware of the tactics of Vlakplaas and C1?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Was your unit very well known for covert operations?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know, definitely not in public and among the security ranks there was an acquaintance thereof, or with it. There may have been other people who knew about it. But I will refer to you the Griffiths Mxenge incident, which found resonance among many security ranks.

MS LOCKHAT: Is it possible that General le Roux actually knew about this. Seeing that he was so high up in the ranks, is it possible that he knew about Vlakplaas and your operations and Eugene de Kock, and therefore calling in your unit?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, he must have known about the unit, because the later telex specifically requested the unit. And I also believe that he must have known because his members came to Vlakplaas for the identification of terrorists who appeared on photographs along with collaborators.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask. But you see the members who came were chaps whom you knew from your Koevoet days, yes?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

ADV GCABASHE: So it's quite possible that they were coming, knowing you and the type of outfit you ran, not because they'd actually consulted with their boss first?

MR DE KOCK: I don't believe that any of the investigators or their members would have left his ward without the permission of his commander and gone to Vlakplaas. There were circulars which were sent out, publicising the purpose of Vlakplaas in the identification of terrorists and that such a unit did indeed exist.

MS LOCKHAT: Do you this that because Kleynhans knew you and knew exactly what type of person you were and what type of operations you were in, seeing that you were in Ovamboland together, that he actually informed General le Roux that this was the right person, this was the right unit to come in and call in and get rid of this Maponya guy.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was also the first time upon which I met Captain Kleynhans, when he came to Vlakplaas on that day. I knew Warrant Officer Dunkley, from Ovamboland. But I believe that at that stage it was already known among security ranks that Vlakplaas could execute such operations, because with the attack in Swaziland and the shooting of Zwelibanzi Nyanda it went as far as decorating the members with the second or the third highest decoration that could be awarded to a policeman. So that sort of news would travel in the security ranks.

MS LOCKHAT: Do you think that it was possible for General le Roux's members to actually question and interrogate Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they could have done it themselves.

MS LOCKHAT: So you don't think that is was necessary for Kleynhans and Dunkley to participate and ask for your help in this instance, unless they wanted to eliminate him?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I believe that this abduction was directly relevant to Japie's death, because Kleynhans and Dunkley could have arrested him and they could have given him exactly the same beating that we gave him. They had enough members, they could have done exactly the same.

CHAIRPERSON: Or else he could even have been detained in terms of Section 29 and been interrogated in terms of the existing law?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. The impression which is created, that Vlakplaas had a special capacity to beat someone up is incorrect, policemen throughout all the ranks, whether it was in Murder and Robbery or in any other unit, were all seasoned beaters.

MS LOCKHAT: Do you think that even General le Roux says that he did not give you the instruction to eliminate Japie Maponya, but that once he called in your unit and once he had communicated with you, that he could have foreseen the possibility of Japie Maponya dying?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because when I asked him what we were supposed to do with the man, he said to me "I never again want to see him in Krugersdorp".

MS LOCKHAT: After you killed Japie Maponya, why didn't you go back to le Roux and report that the incident was completed, mission accomplished?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I don't think that he had any doubt regarding the completion thereof.

MS LOCKHAT: Did General le Roux ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: These things would just never be discussed again.

MS LOCKHAT: Did he not come back to you and ask you what happened to Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: No, he never again asked me what happened to Japie Maponya, and he never made any enquiries with us as to what had happened to Japie Maponya.

MS LOCKHAT: Is it true that General le Roux's nickname was "Maponya le Roux", is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that nickname is a nickname which he obtained after the Harms Commission, or these revelations which appeared in the newspapers and his reaction to these revelations and the fact that the Generals withdrew themselves and shirked away from the general ranks. It's a name that I gave him.

MS LOCKHAT: In your evidence-in-chief you said that it was very strange that Japie Maponya never spoke, he never said anything, but Nofomela - in bundle 2A, page 24, the third last sentence of that page says - shall I continue, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please.

MS LOCKHAT

"At some stage he spoke about his relatives, saying that some of his relatives lived at a certain place, and at that stage de Kock said that I should start writing down what he was saying."

You were speaking Afrikaans. I shall turn over to the next page, page 25.

"When he was being assaulted he was speaking in seTswana and between Mbelo and myself, one of us had to interpret what he was saying."

So that is actually in direct conflict with what you said, that Japie Maponya never said anything. Can you comment on that.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he did not provide any information, nor did he make any statements.

MS LOCKHAT: Because this is the information that Nofomela had given to the Amnesty Committee, under oath. What do you say about that?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, this did not take place, and I am also under oath.

CHAIRPERSON: When you were interrogating Mr Maponya, did you have notebooks and pens to hand?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to read a passage of what Fourie says, in bundle 1B, page 483. This also goes into just the fact that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Just give us that reference again please, Ms Lockhat.

MS LOCKHAT: It's bundle 1B, page 483. This just goes to the question as to, that Maponya obviously must have spoken to you, he must have said things also, but according to your evidence he never said anything, it was so unusual for you that he hand this deep strength. He states

"There were stages where he didn't want to, where he just remained completely silent, when he didn't want to speak, or anything like that."

So surely we can interpret it that at some stages he was quiet, some stages he didn't want to say anything and that is exactly what Fourie says.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, if he had provided any information of any nature, it would have been noted. That is why Kleynhans and Dunkley were there. Because that information would immediately have been conveyed by them per telephone, because they were in charge of the file and they knew why it was important.

MS LOCKHAT: Just to get back to the members that were so close to you. Mr Fourie, van der Walt, Nortje, were they all previous members, Koevoet members, Ovambo members?

MR DE KOCK: Nortje and van der Walt were Koevoet members, Fourie had not been a Koevoet member, but had seen similar service when he was a member of the Security Branch and Oshakati. They moved in the same area and were exposed to the same dangers.

MS LOCKHAT: Is it not true that all of you lived in the same house at one stage?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. In the same house?

MS LOCKHAT: Same complex in a sense.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, when they began allocating subsidies to unmarried members, we acquired accommodation for ourselves in the apartment blocks, but that wasn't because we wanted to live near to each other, it was the most inexpensive accommodation that was available.

MS LOCKHAT: But wouldn't you say that you were great buddies, best of friends, loyal to one another?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we were very good friends.

MS LOCKHAT: Isn't that why you used them in this operation? Isn't that why you told the Askaris to leave? So that they wouldn't report this incident? Because you had your close buddies with you, they would inform anybody of this mission, this illegal act of yours?

MR DE KOCK: Well if you were going to execute such an action, you would try to confine it as much as possible. Where it was operationally possible, you would try to keep as small as possible.

MS LOCKHAT: Just to get back to the assault again. I'm jumping around a bit, please excuse me, Chairperson. Van der Walt said that before you went to Vlakplaas and before you assaulted him, before you assaulted Japie Maponya, that you first went to a tavern, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we did not go to a bar.

MS LOCKHAT: Because in his criminal trial he said that before all of you went to go and assault Maponya close to the river, you were all in a tavern first, you all went there to go and look for other members.

MR DE KOCK: No, we didn't go to any hotel or bar facility.

MR MALAN: Wasn't there a canteen on the farm?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was a club facility there, but ...(intervention)

MS LOCKHAT: That's the word he used "the kantien", and I interpreted it as a tavern. Sorry.

MR DE KOCK: When I arrived at the farm, I went through directly to the river where Japie Maponya was. So I didn't visit the canteen, and I can't say whether anybody else visited the canteen. But I myself didn't go there.

MS LOCKHAT: So Mr de Kock, you didn't actually get authority and authorisation from your commander, Brigadier Schoon, is that correct?

CHAIRPERSON: For what?

MS LOCKHAT: For the killing of Japie Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I was however completely satisfied with the person under whose command I then served, for orders and discipline, and that was then General le Roux.

ADV GCABASHE: Excuse me. Mr de Kock, in how many other matters similar to this, where you killed persons, did your commander, be it Schoon as in this instance, not know about what you had done? Quite a number, or is this one of the few?

MR DE KOCK: No, it's one of a few.

ADV GCABASHE: So the regular, the standard behaviour was, he would know about whatever you were doing?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. However, I must just mention that Vlakplaas was different to other branches, was also an operational unit and if it came down to that, the Commander could also take such a decision, but this was something which happened very seldom.

ADV GCABASHE: Even though you were relatively new at being Commander of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MS LOCKHAT: So procedurally you had to inform your commander? If you'll accept that, procedurally.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the procedure was just thwarted by the fact that Brigadier Schoon was not there.

MS LOCKHAT: And when you saw Brigadier Schoon, you said to him that Krugersdorp....

...(tape ends) exactly what happened to Japie Maponya, isn't that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I did not explain to him how he had been shot dead and struck with a spade. The manner in which these discussions took place, was a one on one situation. If there was more members there, we would wait until they left and then I would discuss it with Brigadier Schoon, but one would refer to it in obscure terms.

MS LOCKHAT: And only later on in the 1990's that you actually told him about this incident, isn't it correct?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it was not during the 1990's, it was in 1989.

MS LOCKHAT: Years later nonetheless?

ADV GCABASHE : That you mentioned Maponya's name, Japie Maponya, this particular incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that was when Gen Le Roux came and sat down then and chatted to us and wished us strength for the forthcoming time.

MS LOCKHAT: I just thought I would put it to you Mr De Kock, there is one other aspect you also mentioned, all the incidents regarding the spade incident, the teargas incident, all of those gruesome and horrific parts to your amnesty application form, you did not include, why not?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have so many things that I had to incorporate in this, among others I also had to be cautious to not wrongly implicate people. These are not aspects which I purposefully neglected, I did not attempt to be purposefully obstructive, one must understand that some aspects are very important, but the volume of my application, created tremendous problems for me with regard to detail and for the sake of completion, I have had no compunction to be supplementary with any of my evidence at any point. The volume was simply too great. I spent 10 years as the Commander of an incredibly active Unit and it was not always easy to give the precise detail about everything.

MS LOCKHAT: I put it to you Mr De Kock, that you wanted to portray a very clinical death of Mr Japie Maponya in your amnesty application and that the issue that you raised previously, that there wasn't time because of the cut-off date, etc, etc, you had sufficient time to supplement this application, you had sufficient time to supplement all your applications, you even handed in supplementary affidavits to the Amnesty Committee, so I put it to you that that is really just another story of yours, that you had sufficient time, you could supplement all of this, but because you want to keep these deaths clean, clinical looking types deaths, to present to the Amnesty Committee?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if that was the case, then I could have adapted my evidence here and I could simply just have left the whole spade episode right there. The Japie Maponya incident or the death of Japie Maponya, as it was planned, was supposed to be clinical in that regard and it wasn't. I did not hesitate in exposing the details connected to the incident, I am also not trying to cover up anything regarding this. And even with regard to cases that I am not certain of, if it was probable, I have conceded to it as for example with the assaults.

MS LOCKHAT: Just one last aspect relating to Freek Pienaar. You said that you have implicated him in a number of incidents and that he has also applied for amnesty for all of those incidents, but for this incident he did not apply for amnesty, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, because he was not involved in the matter, and one might mention later and perhaps Mr Fourie would be able to assist us in this later, but Mr Fourie gave me an indication one day that Mr Pienaar had been involved with a person whose throat had been slit with a pocket knife and whose body had been covered with stones near a river near Amsterdam, I don't know whether Mr Pienaar has applied for any such case and I don't know whether Mr Fourie gave that information, but I made that information which was conveyed to me by Mr Fourie, to the Investigating Team of the Attorney General, but I don't know what they had done about it. Any allegation that I am attempting to create a different impression than that which really took place in the past, is false.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to put to you that because Freek Pienaar didn't apply for amnesty for this matter and therefore you don't want to implicate him. Thank you Chairperson, I've got no more questions.

MR DE KOCK: I did not hear you, could you please repeat that?

MS LOCKHAT: I want to put it to you, because Freek Pienaar did not apply for amnesty for this matter, therefore you are not implicating him, because he is a loyal friend of yours as you well said. That is just my submission.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I will reserve my answer, but that is not the truth.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Lockhat. Mr Hattingh, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: I have quite a number of questions, Mr Chairman, I guess I will be some time, I am ready to start now, I see it is five to one, if you want me to start now.

CHAIRPERSON: I think this will probably be a convenient time to take the lunch adjournment, and then we will reconvene at two o'clock again.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I just place on record that some matters have arisen from cross-examination of my learned friends, which will necessitate me just visiting very briefly with your, it is a new matter, with your permission.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps if you could speak to Mr Hattingh, that it should come before the re-examination, otherwise we will have ...

MR VISSER: That is why I mention it now, yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to do it now?

MR VISSER: It is very brief, I can ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, if you could do it now, then we will adjourn, thank you, and then we can get into the re-examination.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr De Kock, you know I am constantly amazed by the evidence which emerges here, you say that when Stanza Bopape was killed in Johannesburg, they were looking for you to do what?

MR DE KOCK: To get rid of his body.

MR VISSER: Where did you hear that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at that stage I was busy with a group of mine in Swaziland, in Manzini, we were trying to ambush a group of four MK members in an apartment block. When we came back, I contacted my residence where my spouse told me that someone was looking for me very urgently.

MR VISSER: In order to get rid of Stanza Bopape's body?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't know about that yet, I will finish in a minute. I did not call him back, we were busy with another operation and approximately a week later, Colonel Chris Deetliefs informed me that Colonel At van Niekerk had requested them to assist him with a body, or with a person who had been killed during interrogation and that they, who were Eastern Transvaal, had assisted Colonel At van Niekerk. During this time with Stanza Bopape and the search when his father was asking all these questions, Colonel Engelbrecht wanted to know what I knew about it and I told him that Stanza Bopape was no longer alive, and that he had gone to the Eastern Transvaal side. Upon that Colonel Engelbrecht and all the rest could have dug up the Western Transvaal where they searched for him. I informed him that Stanza Bopape had been taken to the Eastern Transvaal and I mentioned the name of Chris Deetliefs as one of the persons who had helped to get rid of the body. I had that position of confidence with Gen Engelbrecht.

MR VISSER: When did you have this discussion with him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was during the period, I cannot give you the precise dates, but it was shortly before they went to the Western Transvaal with soil moving machinery, Deetliefs was afraid that they would dig up the body there.

MR VISSER: Are you speaking of 1996/1997 when this Commission began?

MR DE KOCK: No, I am speaking of the time when they were looking for Stanza Bopape's father, when his father alleged that he had been killed and that the Police denied it and maintained that he had escaped with handcuffs and leg irons.

MR VISSER: Do you know when Stanza Bopape died?

MR DE KOCK: I don't recall specifically.

MR VISSER: So you don't even know that and you are placing this and connecting it with an incident where you were in Swaziland and you recall a telephone call from your spouse, but you don't even know when it happened?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, let me put it like this, I can tell you where we sat when Colonel Deetliefs and I had the discussion, there was a temporary caravan house at the border post there at Oshoek, he and I sat against one side and he explained this to me.

MR VISSER: I just want to put it to you that this Chairperson and Commissioner Gcabashe were members of the Amnesty Committee with regard to Stanza Bopape and I believe that the hearing lasted for approximately three weeks and this evidence is surprising, because nobody ever uttered a word about that, and you probably also never offered to submit this to that Committee.

MR DE KOCK: I submitted it thoroughly to the AG's office, they couldn't make any statements from me, they didn't want to know anything else, there was also another murder in which Engelbrecht had almost directly been involved and they told me that there was insufficient evidence, even though three members of Vlakplaas had been involved there, as well as a member of the Murder and Robbery Unit, all the time, it has been covered up consistently. You will be surprised at the further details, but we will get to that later.

MR VISSER: But you knew that Stanza Bopape or the amnesty hearing for Stanza Bopape was taking place?

MR DE KOCK: I provided this information 1996, 1997.

MR VISSER: Why are you evading the question?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, nobody subpoenaed me.

MR VISSER: No, but you knew that the Stanza Bopape amnesty hearing was taking place, didn't you know that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I saw on television that such a hearing was under way.

MR VISSER: Did you tell the AG I have evidence that I can offer for that hearing?

MR DE KOCK: But the AG was present when I gave Ms De Jager the entire list of this information and it was that information and that list which led to my appearance at the Motherwell hearings. That is how I have also given evidence about other murders, but we have never heard anything further about it.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, we will now take the lunch adjournment, and we will reconvene at two o'clock.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (still under oath)

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WILLIAMS: Mr Chairman, before we proceed, there is just one statement I would like to put to the witness with your permission?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Williams.

MR WILLIAMS: Mr De Kock, Mr Mbelo says that as far as he can recall, he was already told at Vlakplaas that he would abduct Japie and that on the 25th of September they did not go to Krugersdorp Police, Security Branch and that they went straight from Vlakplaas to the bank where Japie was employed, what is your answer to that?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I don't have any recollection of that.

MR WILLIAMS: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLIAMS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Williams. Mr Hattingh?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr De Kock, several questions were put to you about your evidence that you gave in your own trial, why you did not mention some things there and so forth, I would like to refer you to the record of the evidence. Mr Chairman, this doesn't form part of the Bundles before you, it hasn't been included. I refer to page 12708 of the record of your trial where I told you, or I say to you that

"... thirdly you were also advised Mr De Kock that His Lordship and the other assessors had found certain factual findings on the charges to which you were found guilty and that those findings cannot be changed, are you aware thereof?"

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Excuse me, that was still part of the quotation, were you aware of it and you said that it was correct and I put to you that

"... in so far as your version of the incidents of which you were found guilty, may possibly differ in certain instances from the factual findings, do you accept that the factual findings of the Court will remain and you said that that is correct."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So it was clearly put to you that it would serve no purpose to for example, to give evidence in contrast with Mr Nortje's evidence with what happened in the bush because the Court had already made its findings and nothing could be done to change those findings?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Hattingh, what was that page number?

MR HATTINGH: The page number is 12709, Mr Chairman, sorry 12708 over on to 09. And then in your evidence, this would be your evidence in chief, once again this does not form part of the papers, Mr Chairman, page 12856, we then arrived at this page and I told you very well, let us come closer to home. We will once again not touch upon the Maponya incident, but you have also liaised with other incidents with the Security Police at Krugersdorp so it would seem from there, that in your evidence in chief, you did not deal with the Maponya incident?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that in so far as you did give evidence about the Maponya incident, you answered questions which were put to you by the State Advocate in cross-examination, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You were also asked as to why if you did not have time to set out certain allegations in your amnesty application, that you did not submit these later on, but in your first amnesty application where you were involved with, were you allowed to elaborate on the written version that you submitted in the application?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I just dealt with it in general.

MR HATTINGH: And then you were involved, that a meeting was held where all the representatives of the Security Forces who applied for amnesty, were present and where the legal representatives were informed that the applications for amnesty would be completed by the end of the year and there is less time available and then it would not be allowed that people would verbally elaborate, if they wanted to submit any verbal elaborations, that it had to be done in writing, were you informed about that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And in terms of the first group of incidents, affidavits were submitted on your behalf to elaborate on those incident?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: In terms of the first cluster as it is referred to, were you by means of your legal representatives, requested to deal with Vlakplaas as a political institution?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: The document which forms part of the proceedings here, Bundle 1(d) was then compiled?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did this take a lot of time?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it did Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did it also happen that your legal representatives sometimes arrived there to consult with you with regard to this, after an appointment was made with you and the Correctional Officials, that you were not there?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that without the knowledge of your legal representatives, you had been removed from Correctional Services where you had to assist other instances, to assist them?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And I think you would know much better than I do, for about two days you were taken to Natal to assist with regard to the weapons which were provided to Inkatha and a large amount of it was found?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: For how long were you taken there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we were there for two days, but my total period of absence was between three or four days, or my unavailability.

MR HATTINGH: And locally, were you also consulted with with regard to that instance?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And an impression was made upon the time which you had to consult with your legal representatives, without informing them?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And at another occasion when we arrived at the prison, another instance and I understand that you do not want to mention the name, but it is a government instance, where you were asked to assist?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And once again, we were not informed about this?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And we could not consult with you on that day?

MR DE KOCK: No, I was absent for two days.

MR HATTINGH: That is correct, you were not only there for that day, but later the following day, you were also out of town?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And I would like to put it to you that during a pre-trial conference I mentioned to His Lordship Wilson that we wanted to draw up a supplementary affidavit with regard, because of the limitation of access that we had to you, that we were not able to submit these supplementary affidavits?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Along with that, we are also and I am not criticising anybody, we are all under pressure because of the decision that the proceedings have to be concluded by the end of the year, our volumes, we received volumes of documents often on dates later than the date that was arranged, with which we had to deal?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that is why we from the one Cluster to the other Cluster, we find the documents on very short notice?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And in any case, Mr De Kock, it seems that despite the decision that was taken at this meeting that in your applications, that was brought in under Cluster 1, that you were allowed to elaborate on your sworn affidavit, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And indeed in this instance, you were also allowed to do so?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: When you drew up the application for indemnity or for amnesty, did you think it was important to supply the finest detail as to how a person was killed?

MR DE KOCK: No, you just mention it in general.

MR HATTINGH: Your involvement with the killing of the person, you disclosed information with regard to the persons who were present with you?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You have also - at some stage it was put to you that you started making revelations after you were found guilty during your trial and you also gave evidence in the Motherwell incident, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Was this before you were found guilty in your own trial?

MR DE KOCK: That was before Chairperson, it was in March or April of 1995.

MR HATTINGH: So it is not correct what you said there, you had already co-operated with the Attorney General and had given evidence on behalf of the State?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did members of that team of the Attorney General, thereafter regularly consult with you while your own trial was ongoing?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, there was, I would not say daily, but it could be regarded as regular.

MR HATTINGH: During those consultations, you provided information to which you gave evidence later in your own trial?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Excuse me Chairperson, I must make a correction, because of my ignorance, let me put it in the following way, the fact that you co-operated with that team of the Attorney General and that you were a State witness in the Motherwell trial, it is from me and as the Senior Advocate and from Mr Du Preez as a junior, it was withheld?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: But your Attorney, you asked your Attorney, Mr Hugo to be of assistance to you in this regard and he informs me that I am incorrect when I say that they were also informed about incidents to which you were charged with, they undertook initially not to discuss the matters to which you were charged with, but you informed them about other incidents?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: I am jumping around, but that is how the cross-examination proceeded with regard to Mr Pienaar's alleged involvement with the Maponya incident. You have already said in your trial, you heard the evidence of Mr Nortje, Fourie and Mr Van der Walt?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that was a long time before you applied for amnesty?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Were you told that it was of utmost importance that you make a full disclosure with regard to all information that you had in regard to the incidents for which you are applying for amnesty?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Do you realise that if you are not believed here and you do not receive amnesty here, that the sentence of life imprisonment for Maponya will still stand?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that for all practical purposes, all other applications for amnesty, you may just cease or withdraw them?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And even if you receive amnesty for all the others, you still have to serve your life sentence?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And by that I mean if you want to protect somebody here and you are not believed, that it would be to your disadvantage?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would be the end of me, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You were also asked questions with regard to the conversation that you had with Brigadier Schoon after Mr Nofomela’s revelations and it was put to you that Brigadier Schoon retired at the end of October 1989?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: The statement that you made with regard to the Maponya incident and reference was made to it in cross-examination. Mr Chairman, I refer to Bundle 2(a) at page 261, there you deal with Mr Nofomela’s allegations that you would have killed Mr Maponya there at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: I don't know whether these paragraphs are numbered, no they are not numbered, you say there that in the fourth paragraph

"... I deny that I had questioned anybody in the presence of Mr Nofomela and had shot a person with a pistol fitted with a silencer. I have never owned a pistol with a silencer."

That was an allegation made by Mr Nofomela?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And the date of that statement, if I may show it to you, at the bottom of the left hand corner, it would be the 26th of October 1989?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: It is also printed there at the top of the page

"... 26th of October 1989, at 12H22 I appeared in the presence of Adv McNally."

So these allegations were already made, it was done before Brigadier Schoon had retired from the Service?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Can we just deal with the alleged or not the alleged, the visit by Mr Dunkley and the allegation that during that visit, you agreed that a group of Vlakplaas members would be sent to assist them. Your version was that no, you couldn't do it then and in any case, you did not have a written request for it?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: If I may refer you to Bundle 1(c), page 704, I would like to show it to you Mr De Kock, it is one of the circulars that were sent to Divisional Commanders of Security Branches and where they were informed about the existence of Vlakplaas and they were informed as to how they could use the services of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: In paragraph 4 thereof, the following is said, in order to avoid confusion the following guidelines is put down

"(a) The deployment and withdrawal of teams would be done by a senior Officer of Group C and would be arranged with the particular Commander."

Somebody has underlined it here, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And was that the position that arrangements had to be made between the Commanders?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: So could Kleynhans and Dunkley arrive there and tell you "I want your assistance?"

MR DE KOCK: No, they could not Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And on page 705 at (b)

"... as soon as a team is deployed, a senior member must report to the Divisional Commander's office."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And (c), it looks like the team

"... the team will for the duration of their stay, be under the command of the Divisional Commander."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And on the 6th of January 1992, on 706, there is another circular with this regard.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, it was 1982.

MR HATTINGH: It was 1982, did I say ...

CHAIRPERSON: 1992, yes.

MR HATTINGH: Sorry, I apologise Mr Chairman, 26th of October 1982, we find a further circular and in paragraph 4 thereof, once again, it is said that

"... when members of the Unit visit your area as previously stated, they will fall under your command for the duration of their stay. If necessary, for whatever reason, if their services are needed, to send some of your staff with them, it must preferably, reasonably senior and experienced people have to be used. Although Head Office is concerned about the discipline of the Unit, it has to be prevented that junior personnel as story carriers be used, the presence of Head Office Units in the Division itself, would be a very delicate situation. This has to prevent that the impression be created that permanent members, especially the younger ones of the Division be sent to monitor the conduct of the Officers."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Questions were put to you with regard to Mr Martin Naude, why you did not trust him and you said that if he was present and you found Brigadier Schoon and Mr Naude was present, you would have requested him to leave?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: In this document to which we have referred to, your supplementary affidavit which deals with Vlakplaas in particular, that is Bundle 9(d) Mr Chairman, from page 40, they deal with the so-called Sanhedrin?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that is what was referred to, the meetings of the different Units of the Security Commanders Divisions which will convene at Head Office and there you say that although Mr Martin Naude sat on these meetings, you were never invited to attend these meetings?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: On page 41, paragraph 2.2.25.2 you say that, in the last few lines of that paragraph

"... I believe that there was a dual reason for this, firstly Vlakplaas was the Operational arm of the Security Police and therefore I could not give input with regard to security matters which were discussed in these meetings and secondly, as Commander of C1, I would only report about incidents which were not meant for the ears of all the other Security Branches."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So you say that your activities were not meant for the knowledge of all the other Security Branches of the Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You were also questioned about why you only took along white members to Nesden and you were asked in general about the question whether other members of C1 at Vlakplaas, were always informed about all the activities that took place there, do you remember the question to that effect?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Were some of the black members also present with the abduction and interrogation, were they also askaris?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And once again, in the document, Bundle 1(d), you specifically deal on page 42 with the askaris and there you give a complete rendition as to what problems you experienced with them amongst others?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You also mention and you also say because you were not sure whether they would once again change their affiliation and would return to the instances where they came from, the ANC or the PAC and so forth, you deemed it necessary to monitor all telephone calls that were made from Vlakplaas and record them?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And some of the permanent black members also were tasked, were listening to these tapes and had to inform you if some of these people were changing their loyalties?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: On page 50 on 2.3.1 you say

"... as far as was possible, I tried not to have the askaris involved where activists were killed, the reason for this was that we did not trust them completely and we feared that they would disclose such information about these murders to the ANC or PAC."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And it was also put to you that I think the word that was used was "buddies", that you took your buddies with you, the people whom you share a complex of flats, that is correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Was Mr Van der Walt one of those people?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: He did not stay in the same house with you?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: How long was he attached to that Unit when the Maponya incident took place?

MR DE KOCK: I think two months Chairperson, I am not sure.

MR HATTINGH: It would seem from your trial, I cannot recall the dates, but he can tell us, it was a very short time that he was attached to the Unit when Maponya was killed?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: He also came from Koevoet, did he serve under you there?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he served under Warrant Officer Willie Nortje and I understood that he distinguished him in the field.

MR HATTINGH: Gen Le Roux' evidence, you have heard Gen Le Roux' evidence before this Committee that at some stage he accepted that Mr Nofomela would be killed, excuse me, Mr Maponya would be killed?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: From his side, did he ever enquire about this to you, did Mr Kleynhans or Mr Dunkley enquire about this to you?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Why did you think they did not?

MR DE KOCK: Because they knew he was dead, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: About the allegation that Mr Nofomela would have taken notes during the interrogation of Mr Maponya, can you recall that he gave evidence about that in your trial?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall that His Lordship, Justice Van der Merwe gave judgement about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't have a clear recollection thereof, but I think it was discussed yes.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I have a copy of the judgement here, I think it also forms part of the documents before you, unfortunately I do not have a page reference, but it appears on page, sorry I have a copy of the judgement here. It is not the copy provided to us, I will give you the reference to the page in the Bundle before you, but the page reference of the criminal record is 12536.

MS LOCKHAT: Excuse me, it is Bundle 3(b) of our documents, if it is ...

MR HATTINGH: I know it is 3(b), but I don't have the page reference. I am told that it is 246 Mr Chairman, 256. There His Honour, Justice Van der Merwe says

"... regarding the notes which according to Nofomela were taken by him about the revelations which he made and which were taken to Kleynhans the following day, his evidence is so incoherent that I actually do not find it necessary to discuss that, because it would take up unnecessary time, the record speaks for itself in this regard."

Do you recall those words?

MR DE KOCK: That would be the correct version.

MR HATTINGH: With the exception of what Justice Van der Merwe said there, according to you, Kleynhans was present?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And so was Mr Dunkley?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And if Mr Maponya had given information, then they would have known about it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they would definitely have made notes about it, because it was important for their investigation.

MR HATTINGH: Why were they there?

MR DE KOCK: Well precisely to obtain that information.

MR HATTINGH: What do you say about Mr Nofomela’s allegation during the trial that he took notes and that you told him to give them to Mr Kleynhans the following day?

MR DE KOCK: That is not true.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Nofomela is present here and during cross-examination by his legal representative, no such statement was put?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You were examined when you said that you would take responsibility for your men and Mr Malan put a question to you and asked whether you expected the Generals to take responsibility in the same manner for you. Do you recall that question?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Upon which you answered in the affirmative?

MR DE KOCK: No, I think that I said that I expected nothing from them or that I wanted nothing from them.

MR HATTINGH: Correct, but you were asked whether that was what you meant?

MR DE KOCK: No, all of us know that they know nothing and that they never did anything, and that they know nothing of anything.

MR HATTINGH: Are there Generals of which you know who have knowledge about the incidents in which you were involved?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: I don't want you to go into detail of that, you have already given evidence about that in previous applications and you will probably give evidence about it again in future, but do you expect of them to take responsibility for those incidents?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they must explain their share in those matters, but seeing as they were too weak to take responsibility for any other person or member of such incidents, I will take responsibility for my men.

MR HATTINGH: You also said that you were never again approached by Krugersdorp to offer assistance in the interrogation of an individual?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I have no recollection thereof.

MR HATTINGH: However, you did mention an incident during which you were requested to assist with the explosion of a building?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Who was the person who requested that assistance?

MR DE KOCK: It was Colonel Le Roux and Captain Kleynhans who were there.

MR HATTINGH: You have already explained your reaction to the request, but that you did assist in the provision of explosives?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did such an explosion then take place, Mr De Kock, that you know of?

MR DE KOCK: No, I didn't hear anything and I also didn't receive any feedback as to whether the explosives had indeed been used, and it was never returned to me either.

MR HATTINGH: One hypothetical basis, if such an explosion had indeed taken place, and could be traced to the Police, what influence would that have exerted, what would it have caused?

MR DE KOCK: If it had been found that members of the SAP, here on the inside of the RSA, were blowing up buildings, in other words that they themselves were involved in terrorists and if they were apprehended, it could have brought the Security Police to a fall. And with the result that it would also have led to the collapse of the entire Police.

MR HATTINGH: Now with regard to your evidence regarding Gen Le Roux' words to you, you said numerous times that he told you to take this man, to abduct this man, something to that effect and that he never again wanted to see this man?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Do you say by that that Gen Le Roux simply wanted you to take Maponya and kill him and nothing further than that?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he had to be interrogated and information had to be obtained from him.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall whether you brought the implications of such an action to his attention, or was it necessary to notify him of such implications?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the behaviour and attitude of Colonel Le Roux and the cause and the gist of the discussion made it clear that he did not leave it open for any misinterpretation with regard to the death of Maponya.

MR HATTINGH: You also gave evidence about an application which you submitted for amnesty, I don't recall exactly when, but it was before your arrest?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: A form was given to you upon which you had to submit your application?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you mention all the specific incidents in that document or did you request amnesty in general for all offences or crimes or acts that you may have been involved in in your execution of your duties as a Police Officer?

MR DE KOCK: It was a broad description, I think I gave an estimated figure and if I recall correctly, I included a sentence that indicating that this included all members of Vlakplaas as well as former ANC, PAC members.

MR HATTINGH: Is this the document which caused a great deal of controversy at that time, was amnesty granted to you in terms of this document that you have submitted?

MR DE KOCK: No, but during my trial, a copy of this document or such a document was submitted.

MR HATTINGH: The facts, or let me put it this way, that document which was given to you to fill in, was this given to all Policemen or only to all Security Policemen, who received the document?

MR DE KOCK: I know that it was given to Security Policemen. I think I was still in the Security Police's Legal Division when it was handed to me by one of the legal representatives from the Security Police, I was in their offices, that is where I sat completing the document.

MR HATTINGH: And the general wording thereof, of the deeds which you had in general requested amnesty for, who was responsible for those words or the choice of words?

MR DE KOCK: It was pro forma, it was a printed form, so there must have been many of those forms, I am just not certain about who compiled the sentence or the context of the sentence.

MR HATTINGH: After the current government took over power, or it may have been before this time, when it became clear that they would assume power, did this fact come to light, the fact that all Security Policemen or at least the most of them, had submitted such an amnesty application?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. I think that a figure of 2 000 to 3 000 was mentioned.

MR HATTINGH: And this was quite controversial?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And ultimately not one of those applications was granted legal amnesty with regard to any one of those applications?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You were also examined about Mr Maponya and you gave evidence that Gen Engelbrecht was involved in covering up the incident?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You will recall that the State called various witnesses in this regard. We have their evidence here before us, there was a Mr Cloete, I refer to Bundle 3(a), Mr Chairman, page 433. 3(a) Mr Chairman, page 433. At the time of the Maponya incident, according to his evidence on page 433, he was the Manager of the United Building Society as it was then known, do you recall his evidence in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And do you recall that he gave evidence in general that Gen Engelbrecht took a statement from him in which he stated ...

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, sorry, it is Jan Wagener on record, my page 433 is the evidence of Mr Nofomela?

CHAIRPERSON: It is Mr Cloete, is it 3(a), are you looking at Bundle 3(a)?

MR WAGENER: Yes, what is the page number?

CHAIRPERSON: It is 433.

MR WAGENER: Is that the paginated or the typed pages?

CHAIRPERSON: It says Vol 75/433, it is the paginated number.

MR WAGENER: Sorry, mine is paginated, the evidence of Mr Nofomela, but I will look for the evidence of Mr Cloete.

CHAIRPERSON: I am just trying to, it says Vol 75 and it's got 1 at the top. Perhaps, are you sure you are in Bundle 3(a) and not 2(a)?

MR WAGENER: Sorry Mr Chairman, I am in Bundle 2(b) that is the inquest record.

CHAIRPERSON: No, it is 3(a).

MR WAGENER: Apparently then it is the same evidence, it is also, it is in the inquest Bundle, that is Bundle 2(b).

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, but take a look at Bundle 3(a), and then it is page 433.

MR WAGENER: I beg your pardon.

CHAIRPERSON: It is the evidence of Montgomery Martin Cloete, do you have it?

MR HATTINGH: On page 434 Mr Ackerman who was the State Advocate, asks him

"... when you made the statement, it appears to have been on the 20th of December 1989, were any documents shown to you?"

and he says -

"... yes, the leave record card of Japie Maponya was shown to me."

And he says -

"... is this the leave record card to which you refer in Exhibit 118(p)?"

And he says "yes."

"According to this leave record card, when was Japie Maponya on leave, if I may put it to you, it would appear the 26th of September until the 30th of September, is that correct? It is correct. Then again from 1 October to 18 October? That is correct"

Then he continues -

"... is this the document which was shown to you by Brigadier Engelbrecht?"

and he says "that is correct."

Then on page 435, the statement which Mr Cloete made with regard to your trial, is read out and a portion of this statement appears on page 435, he says -

"... I am aware that Japie Maponya, two days before he went on his yearly leave from the 26th of September 1985 to the 24th of October 1985, was not on duty. He also did not report for work after the 25th of September 1985."

So what Mr Cloete says is that he is aware of the fact that two days before Japie Maponya was supposed to go on annual leave, he did not report for work, and according to the leave record, from the 26th of September he would have gone on leave, but on the 24th and 25th of September, he did not report for work, do you recall that being his evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Then we proceed, he says at the end of his statement on page 435

"... in the light of his leave record and advice form, Japie Maponya did not report for duty on the 24th and the 25th of September 1985 and these are the two days to which I referred."

Then Mr Ackerman asks him -

"... is that statement correct?"

And he answers -

"... no, it is not correct."

Then we go over to page 437 at the bottom of the page, just before the number 5136, he says -

"... it was on the 24th of January 1989 that Brigadier Engelbrecht made the statement under oath and it was handed in to the post mortem inquest."

Now to get back to your statement, you told us that it is incorrect where you stated that Maponya did not report for duty on the 24th of September 1985. You say it is not correct and he says it is not correct, and then on page 438 -

"... how is it possible that you could have made such a mistake?"

He says -

"... because I did not have insight to the register in which he had recorded, that is ..."

this is an interjection by Mr Ackerman, Exhibit 118(k)? Then the reporting register is brought forward, he says -

"... yes, I only had insight to his leave record, and in the reporting register, it can be seen that he did indeed report on the 25th of September, so he was on duty on the 25th of September."

Then Mr Ackerman says -

"... also on the 24th and also on the 23rd?"

Answer -

"... yes. And his annual leave was indicated on the register from the 30th of September, it is indicated in blue and if you proceed to the third page, you will see that it is indicated in blue until the 24th.

Somewhat further down, Mr Ackerman says in Exhibit 118 you mention that he would have taken his annual leave from the 30th and he answers it is correct. Now the question is -

"... why did you say that he was not at work on the 23rd, the 24th and the 25th?"

and he says

"... when I made the original statement, I worked according to the leave card and I could remember it was a few days before he would have gone on leave, that he did not report for work, and the leave card reads from the 26th until the 30th. At that stage I assumed that two days ago, would have been the 24th and the 25th, that he had not been there."

Then he says -

"... if we look at Exhibit 118(k) it would appear that his leave would have commenced on a Monday."

And he says "on a Monday, it is correct."

Then he is asked -

"... is that the usual practice, should one be taking long leave, that it would commence on a Monday?"

And he answers -

"... then it begins on a Monday, yes."

"... In the leave form, Exhibit 118(k) it is then written in pencil, 26, 27 and 28, do you see this?"

And he says -

"... yes, it must have been written in afterwards, after he had not reported for duty, then it was indicated in pencil that he would have been on leave, probably unpaid leave, but his annual leave commenced on the 30th because it is indicated in blue."

And he is asked -

"... if Exhibit 118(k) that is the reporting register, had been shown to you, would your statement have been different?"

And he says -

"... that is correct."

"Where was Exhibit 118(k)", he is asked, and he answers "I have no idea."

Then it is said -

"... but certainly it must have been kept at the Branch?"

And he answers -

"... it was probably kept at the Krugersdorp Branch, but it was not shown to me when I made my statement."

If you, Mr De Kock, are asked as a Detective to go and see whether a person was on duty or not on a particular day and you go to the company where he worked, what would you ask for?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would ask to see the register and if necessary, I would take possession of the register.

MR HATTINGH: Are you referring to the reporting register?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: The register was found by the Investigating Officer in your case, Mr Holmes. What was his rank?

MR DE KOCK: Warrant Officer Holmes.

MR HATTINGH: He found this register approximately ten years after the incident and it was submitted in your case as an Exhibit. We have a copy thereof in our possession, do you recall that it was submitted?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Apparently a Brigadier could not find it?

MR DE KOCK: No, he couldn't. Not because he couldn't, I believe he wouldn't.

MR HATTINGH: At least if he had found it, he purposefully did not bring it to the attention of the person who was taking the statement?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And it is on the strength thereof that Brigadier or Gen Engelbrecht says in his statement that Japie Maponya did not report for duty two days before he was supposed to go on annual leave?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Adv Gcabashe, do you have any questions that you would like to ask Mr De Kock?

ADV GCABASHE : Just one aspect, Mr De Kock, just to get it absolutely clear in my mind. You are essentially saying and really this is the essence, that had Krugersdorp simply wanted to abduct Mr Maponya and question him about just that one single thing, his brother, they could have done it without your assistance?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, they could have.

ADV GCABASHE : And anybody who brought C1 in, Vlakplaas into an operation, essentially wanted drastic measures used against the person who they were targeting and would know very well, that that person might be killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : And when you had finished talking to Mr Le Roux on the 25th, before you went back to Vlakplaas, this is indeed the impression you were left with, you had no interest in this man at all and you could do with him as you pleased essentially, having executed what he had asked you to do, question him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : He gave no intimation at all that Mr Maponya was not a political threat in any way, he didn't share any other bits of information with you about Mr Maponya, Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : Thank you, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan, do you have any questions you would like to ask?

MR MALAN: I have two questions pertaining to two linked incidents. Throughout your evidence, you have referred to the order given by Le Roux, to kill Japie Maponya and if you are asked that there were instructions to kill, you react affirmatively and say that there was an instruction to kill. I understand that you had no doubts from his body language, the way he spoke and his choice of words, that he didn't want to see Maponya in Krugersdorp again?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR MALAN: But it was never said to you "kill him?"

MR DE KOCK: No, the word "kill or murder" was not defined in terms of legal language.

MR MALAN: Very well, and then at another stage a question was put to you about Kleynhans and Dunkley's presence during the matter and why they were initially supposed to accompany you. I think that that has to do with your journey to the Nesden border post and you said that it was their operation and my notes maybe an abbreviation of what you said, but what I have from what you said was that they were supposed to go with because they had to realise what the implications were of that which they had requested, that Vlakplaas were not assassins for hire.

MR DE KOCK: No, we were not.

MR MALAN: And then it appeared to me as if you said it wasn't that terrible to go and kill somebody under the order of somebody else?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, whether it was upon the order of somebody or upon one's own initiative, it was a terrible situation.

MR MALAN: But if you were the one who took the decision, it was a certain measure of responsibility in that you had control over it, but you didn't assume responsibility for it? I beg your pardon for interrupting myself, but I saw in you a struggle that indicated that these two men were supposed to accompany you and that Le Roux was supposed to be there as well, because they were the ones who requested it, so they should surely understand what it meant?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. I am not going to be long-winded about this, I will be brief. On a day, Major Craig Williamson came to Vlakplaas and it was about the death of Peter Castleton who had been involved in the London bombing, and Craig Williamson's request was "we will have to take Peter out", in other words kill Peter. I said to him, "very well, I will give you the pistol, but you kill him." It is very easy to say "let's take a man out", because you are the one that has to sleep tonight.

MR MALAN: Yes, for me the strange element is that if you feel so strongly that somebody has to be killed, but you don't think about the consequences, why don't you move away from impressions and body language and tell Le Roux "do you know what you are saying, do you know that this man has to be killed, do you realise that that is what you are telling me", if that is how strongly you feel about it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, within the context of that time, and the circumstances prevailing at that stage, it would not have been something with which you would have confronted a Colonel. You wouldn't have pulled fingernails out of him to get him to define a murder to you. The situation at the office at that stage was clear, that we knew a man was going to be abducted and that is why I asked once again, what must we do with him.

MR MALAN: Let me tell you briefly why I have put this question, if we have to believe both you and Le Roux in terms of your comprehension and your perception of the incidents and we have to achieve a level of clarity regarding this, then Le Roux didn't think that he was going to be killed, but you had no doubt that the order meant that he had to be killed? We are now referring to the abduction and at the time of the order to abduct, Le Roux didn't have the faintest idea according to his evidence, that Japie Maponya was going to be killed. You didn't have any doubt that that would have been the execution and that that was what he intended, but somewhere you depended on impressions and body language. Is that truly the way things occurred?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. The Colonel didn't say "take him, abduct him, interrogate him and hit him to death or shoot him to death".

MR MALAN: But it sounds to me so simple, you could have said to him "Colonel, are you telling me to kill him?" Japie Maponya may still have been alive today if we have to believe both of you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is very difficult for me, we are sitting in another time here and I am doing my best to explain the entire situation to you. I am not trying to implicate somebody in the matter, I am telling you what really happened there, I am expressing my sentiments to you and I will stand by that.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Any questions arising from questions that have been put by the panel by anybody? Thank you.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, Mr De Kock mentioned something about Fourie in his evidence ...

CHAIRPERSON: No, it is just questions arising from the panel.

MR LAMEY: I don't want to take it further at all, but we will deal with that in the evidence, thank you Mr Chairman.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, sorry, during re-examination by Mr Hattingh, certain new aspects were raised and I request your leave to ask one question on one issue only please. Mr De Kock, I just want to make absolutely certain whether I understand you correctly, the first statement which Mr Hattingh put to you in re-examination was to refer you to page 12708 of your criminal record, and to put a statement to you regarding that. I just want to know from you, you gave evidence under oath during those proceedings?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: And it was very comprehensive evidence that you gave?

MR DE KOCK: Well, I am not certain how comprehensive that was, but we could accept it as that.

MR WAGENER: I have a copy of it somewhere, it is about 1 000 pages in the transcription, so I would regard that as comprehensive.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would be about more than one situation.

MR WAGENER: Well, then what precisely do you mean, the statement was put to you as I have written it down, that you are giving evidence after you have been convicted, after certain findings had been reached and you cannot change anything about it, that is basically the statement that was put to you, that is why you had to accept the findings of the criminal Court?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: Do you mean Mr De Kock, that after that for the purposes of mitigation, you could give evidence and lie as you wanted to because the criminal Court had already made its findings, what exactly was the point that you wished to convey?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not lie as I wanted to during my evidence there, and I think that the Judge in all aspects along with his assessors, are far more qualified that Mr Wagener who regards himself as a legal giant. I have no problems with the Judge or the assessors.

MR WAGENER: Then Mr Chairman, just prior to the lunch adjournment, Mr De Kock, once again gave evidence on new aspects regarding my client, I do not intend cross-examining on that, it is issues totally irrelevant to these proceedings, but I wish to put on record that my client, I have spoken to him, he strongly denies the allegations against him and then in view of concessions made by Mr De Kock during cross-examination, I have here with me an affidavit by Mr Engelbrecht and I would wish to hand it up as an Exhibit now, if I am permitted.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know what the attitude of the other legal representatives are, but perhaps what I intend doing now is, we can do this immediately after a short adjournment, I should have done this earlier, but I have been requested to have a short break, because it is very tiring for the interpreters who are simultaneously interpreting, especially the Interpreter into Sotho or Setswana who is alone. He hasn't got somebody to relieve him, I just intend taking a five minute break or ten minute break. After, when we reconvene, which evidence will we be hearing, will it be Mr Nortje?

MR LAMEY: It will be Mr Nortje.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. And then at that stage, Mr Wagener, you can hand in that affidavit of Gen Engelbrecht.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o)

CHAIRPERSON: I see we have the affidavit, this will be Exhibit C?

MR WAGENER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER: .

WITNESS EXCUSED