ON RESUMPTION
WILLEM ALBERTUS NORTJE: (sworn states)
MR MALAN: You may sit down.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Lamey?
EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, just on a point of order, I don't have an extra paginated Bundle for Mr Nortje, but he has before him, his corresponding copy of his application, which is contained in the Bundle, I might also refer to the original pages therein, but I will also draw the Committee's attention to the paginated papers as we go on.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Lamey, I see in front of me I have an affidavit, dated the 9th of July?
MR LAMEY: Yes, Mr Chairman, could we mark that?
CHAIRPERSON: D.
MS LOCKHAT: Exhibit D, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: This is, has everybody got it, it is a document I think we got it yesterday or Monday, I am not sure, I think it was yesterday, headed Supplementary Particulars and Declaration by Mr Willem Albertus Nortje.
MR LAMEY: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Dated the 9th of July 1999. We will receive it as Exhibit D.
MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman. Mr Nortje, you have given evidence as a State witness during the De Kock trial about the Japie Maponya event and several others, that were the subject of the charges which were brought in against Mr De Kock, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: That is correct Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: You have also initially in 1996, November of 1996, handed in an initial application before you received legal consultation and where particulars were attached to that about specific incidents which were attached to your initial application, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: This is embodied, let me just have a look, in the initial application from page 279 up to page 320?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR LAMEY: In that initial application of yours, after consultation with your legal representative, it also seemed that there were incidents that would not apparently qualify for amnesty and these were omitted later on in your supplementary application which was drawn up?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: And some of the particulars which appear in the initial application, were incorporated by means of a reference or by means of repetition in your supplementary application?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: The particulars with regard to Japie Maponya, there is a brief reference to those in your initial application and there is just a brief reference on page 286 and you refer there that you also gave evidence as a State witness in the De Kock trial, did you mean that reference can be made to that evidence for purposes of your amnesty application?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: And then on page 321 to page, it would seem 403 in your supplementary application, or I don't know whether the complete copy is here, but it would seem a copy of your application, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: And you confirm the correctness thereof?
MR NORTJE: That is so, yes.
MR LAMEY: And in the paginated Bundle, from page 335 to page 342, we find the Japie Maponya incident?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: And we also find particulars with regard to the background and training on page 327 to page 335, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: I will not deal with that, I think it is obvious and we need to get on with the incident which is relevant, the Japie Maponya incident. Is it correct that you were a Sergeant at that stage?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: How long were you attached to Vlakplaas?
MR NORTJE: It was one year, a year and a month maybe that I was attached there.
MR LAMEY: You apply for your involvement for the murder, abduction and assault and conspiracy to murder Japie Maponya and we now know that it took place in Swaziland and there is a technical problem with regard to a murder that was committed in Swaziland, but for our purposes it would be conspiracy to commit murder and any other delict which might emanate from the facts?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: You have recently completed a sworn affidavit which deals with your involvement with what would boil down to defeating the ends of justice and accessory to murder and which serves before the Committee as Exhibit D, do you confirm the contents thereof?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I do.
MR LAMEY: With regard to defeating the ends of justice and those aspects, you also gave evidence in the De Kock trial?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: Specifically with regard to the Japie Maponya incident?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: We all know and it is common cause that Mr De Kock, in July of 1985, took over the command of C1, Vlakplaas?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: At a stage you are, at paragraph 2 you say that Captain Kleynhans and another member of Krugersdorp Security Branch, Mr Dunkley visited Vlakplaas and spoke to Mr De Kock, but you were not present. Did you see, you were not present during the discussion, but did you see them?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I saw them.
MR LAMEY: Did you see that a discussion was undertaken with Mr De Kock?
MR NORTJE: Yes. And if I can just supplement that, that was the end of August or the beginning of September when they were there, I surmised that the purpose of their visit was to do some photo identification with the askaris. Bit by bit I heard that they were searching for somebody, this person, Ondereli Maponya and I later had more dealings with the name, at that stage I did not know the name, but I knew they were looking for somebody in the Krugersdorp vicinity. After they departed there, I think it was the same day when Mr De Kock told me that the 25th of the following month, the month which we would be deployed, I had to report to Krugersdorp and at that stage, I was on my way to Josini according to the planning and I cannot recall that I paid much attention to the matter or asked any questions or to find out exactly what it was, but as I understood from Mr De Kock, they had some problems there and we had to assist them with that situation.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nortje, sorry to interrupt, you say that Mr De Kock said you had to report at Krugersdorp on the 25th and in the interim, you were going to be deployed in Josini. At that stage, how long did you expect to be in Josini, was this going to cut your Josini deployment short or would the 25th have been after you would have expected to have returned from Josini?
MR NORTJE: This would have been, this would have cut our period with two or three days, because in any case, during that week under normal circumstances, we would have come back to Pretoria from Josini during that week of the 25th.
MR LAMEY: The end of that week of the 25th?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: You mention the 25th of that month very pertinently, which month was that?
MR NORTJE: That was September.
MR LAMEY: How do you recall that specifically?
MR NORTJE: What happened was that when Mr De Kock told me that I had to be back by the 25th or had to report on the 25th to Krugersdorp, I made a note, I had a pocket note book with me in which I made notes. It was not necessarily a journal or a diary, but I made some entries in there and I made a note in there the "25th, Krugersdorp, Kleynhans" or something like that, I wrote in there. And later during the Harms Commission when all these things were revealed, I found this little note book because at that stage, there was already a plan that we had to change our dates, so it was evidence that the 25th I had to, the 25th of September I had to go to Krugersdorp.
MR LAMEY: Just to understand this properly, the planning that the dates would be changed, when was this?
MR NORTJE: This was just after Nofomela made his revelations and the investigations were undertaken. This must have been in 1990.
MR LAMEY: But you also changed the claims after you returned from Nesden?
MR NORTJE: That is correct, after we returned to, after we returned, after the murder of Mr Maponya, Mr De Kock told us to change the date so that it would not seem that, so that it would not show that the 27th of September we were in Krugersdorp, but that we came back to Pretoria on the 27th. And then basically he had already made precautions if anything went wrong in future. It was under that impression that I changed the dates.
MR LAMEY: Did you accept that when you returned from Josini, you would receive further instructions at Krugersdorp?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I would have received my instructions there.
MR LAMEY: We all know that you went to Josini and who accompanied you there?
MR NORTJE: Van der Walt was there and there were two mini buses with black members. I have had a look at the names, after we went through the claims and then I realised that some of the people who were with us, it is here in one of the Bundles. It was two small buses, the one was Almond Nofomela’s bus and the other one was Radebe's bus, but Almond was the senior member and I think Radebe was second in command. They both had a bus with members, so there were askaris as well as black members?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I just want to get a point clear Mr Nortje, when you got this instruction to return on the 25th, that meant you and all of the people that were deployed at Josini, it wasn't just you slipping out yourself and the others carrying on with their business there, the whole group came back?
MR NORTJE: We all went back.
MR MALAN: And all of you went to Krugersdorp?
MR NORTJE: No, this is another thing that I want to explain, because there are certain things that I cannot recall as to how it happened, whether I sent the mini-buses to the farm or - I had a problem recalling whether we went back the previous evening, back to Pretoria and the following morning went to Krugersdorp and what is logical is, I think what happened is that the evening, the Tuesday evening we drove back to Pretoria and spent the night there on the farm, and the next morning, Van der Walt and I went with one bus, back to Krugersdorp, that is what I think, that is the logical inference I can draw.
MR LAMEY: May it also be that you went directly to Krugersdorp and the other members went to Vlakplaas first?
MR NORTJE: It does not make sense that we went, except if we left Josini early the next, early that morning and we went directly to Krugersdorp, which is also a possibility, but I can really not remember. We might have sent the blacks there the previous evening and we might have left at about three the following morning, but I am not sure.
ADV GCABASHE : But the same group that you had been with at Josini was the group that you were now moving to Krugersdorp?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
ADV GCABASHE : The same number of people, exactly the same people?
MR NORTJE: I am not sure, if I think about it, I cannot recall that all of them were there, that the whole two buses were there, but on the other hand I want to imagine that the blue bus which was Nofomela’s bus, and the white bus, these were normal Nissan E20 mini-buses, I imagine that I saw them there that day, that is why I had it in my mind that the whole team was with me, but I am not entirely sure.
MR MALAN: Please excuse me, just for orientation, Piet Retief is to the east, so you would basically drive through Pretoria or close to Pretoria to get to Krugersdorp and Vlakplaas was actually on the road to Krugersdorp?
MR NORTJE: Yes, but it was on the other side of Pretoria, but on the way to Krugersdorp.
MR LAMEY: And then let us speak of the white members who were with you in Josini, who was that?
MR NORTJE: It was only Van der Walt.
MR LAMEY: Was it only Van der Walt?
MR NORTJE: Yes, only Van der Walt.
MR LAMEY: And then you reported to Krugersdorp, where did you first report or to whom did you first report?
MR NORTJE: I remember or I estimate a time between nine and ten in the morning, that I arrived at Security Branch Krugersdorp, I did not know Gen Le Roux at that stage, I just knew Dunkley and Kleynhans because I saw them at the farm and I was looking for Captain Kleynhans as I knew him at that stage. I went to the Security Branch offices, I imagine that I asked one of the secretaries where Captain Kleynhans or Dunkley is and one of them came to me and I told them that I am here because of the fact that Mr De Kock had sent me there, and they immediately knew what it was about. They said that they would want to introduce me firstly to the General, he was a Colonel then and we went into his office and we conversed. I cannot recall the correct words.
MR LAMEY: Before you go ahead Mr Nortje, did you receive any further information with regard to why you were there?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is what I am getting to. They informed me there about the situation that they had this man, this Japie Maponya and that he was employed at the bank and that his brother, he was the brother of Ondereli and they gave me some background of Ondereli, that he was an MK member and that they were looking for him and that they suspected that his brother, Japie, would know where he was. As I say, the precise words, I cannot recall but that was the essence of the conversation.
MR LAMEY: Can you recall whether specific reference was made to an incident?
MR NORTJE: The story about the Policeman who was shot, was mentioned.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, was this discussion together with Colonel Le Roux?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR LAMEY: Were there any mention made that he had previously, that Japie had previously been detained or anything along those lines?
MR NORTJE: I cannot recall that.
MR MALAN: Excuse me, did Le Roux inform you or did Kleynhans inform you?
MR NORTJE: I am not sure, I cannot tell you. I would assume it would have been Kleynhans because he was the Investigative Officer.
MR LAMEY: Did you know or understand that previous attempts had been made by the Krugersdorp Security Branch to find out from Japie where his brother was?
MR NORTJE: I cannot recall whether they told me.
MR LAMEY: What was the idea, what did you have to assist them with?
MR NORTJE: The following that we discussed was the fact that I think they told me that - hold a minute, they said that they tried to approach Japie or to recruit him, but that he did not want to have anything to do with them and that is the reason why they called us in because I think that they were under the impression that we with our capabilities and our askaris, that we would be able to approach him clandestinely and then to see if we could not obtain any information from him about his brother's whereabouts. I then told them that we do have something, we have the askaris here, we can first have a look at what will happen, we can send in somebody, I got the particulars from them as to where he was. They said he was at the United Bank, it was not difficult to find it, the blacks would have known where to go to and during the discussion it might have come about that that would be our attempt and that would be the attempt we would make to get the information.
MR LAMEY: Can you just clarify what was that attempt about?
MR NORTJE: The fact that we would send somebody to him, somebody to Japie to present himself as an MK member who knew Japie's brother, because we knew that the person who we would send in, was fresh from abroad. If I say fresh, he was there for a few months, I don't know how long he was there, but he knew him by his MK name, Mainstay and then I assumed that that would best to send him in.
MR LAMEY: Who did you send in?
MR NORTJE: I sent Chris Mosiane or I thought about Chris Mosiane as the person that we would send in. This is after I had discussed it with the black members.
MR LAMEY: After you had consulted with them?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR LAMEY: That you decided who specifically to send in?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR LAMEY: Can you recall if he had to use any method to create credibility that he was also an MK member?
MR NORTJE: He said that he had to have something with him to convince the person, but now I am not sure, we had to give it to him right there. I can say that I suspected that he came back and went back again, but I gave him a makarov pistol and I suspect that I gave him a handgrenade that I had in the vehicle and he would have used this to convince the person to believe him. That is how we planned the thing and we went to the bank, or they went to the bank and they left Chris there, I don't know how it happened, I was not there, but the point is that he went into the bank and he was on his way to do it, whatever he was supposed to do, and ...
MR LAMEY: Can you recall where you waited for them for feedback?
MR NORTJE: I have it in my mind that they came back to the Police station. Then he reported back and he said that the man does not want to know anything, the man was obstinate and he chased him away and he said that he did not want to do anything with him. He also said that there were already people who visited him and asked him about his brother and he does not know anything about his brother, I think that is what he said.
MR LAMEY: Could the report have been communicated in another manner as opposed to directly to yourself or what is your position?
MR NORTJE: Well, I was present when he reported back as far as I can recall.
MR LAMEY: What did he report?
MR NORTJE: That is what I have just said, he said that the man did not want to have any dealings with him and it seemed as if he did not want to discuss his brother.
MR LAMEY: So it was not successful?
MR NORTJE: No, it was not successful at all.
MR LAMEY: What happened after that?
MR NORTJE: While we were there, it was still in the discussion, one of the people said, or I asked them what do you think we should do.
MR LAMEY: Who did you ask?
MR NORTJE: The black members who were there, the Police Officers and the askaris who were with me.
MR LAMEY: This was at the Police station?
MR NORTJE: Yes, this was at the Police station, I asked them what do you think we should do now and somebody made some proposal, I don't know who it was, he said "let's take the man", in other words let's abduct him and I said "no, hold on, we cannot go that far at this stage, we must just first find out what we need to do, we have to discuss the situation with the people here, the people from the Security Branch." I went back to Colonel Le Roux' office and I think there they were all three present in the office, I think it was very important to them, it was their subject, they wanted to know whether we were successful or not, what the situation was. I informed them that we were not successful and we had a discussion and I said "well, there was another method, if we can abduct him and we can force him to open up", this was the suggestion of the blacks, then we will make him talk. He has to talk. What was said further there, but the general idea that came out there was that they were not opposed to it, I had the idea that they were for it, that we abduct him, but I also told them that - I don't know if I said it immediately or a few minutes afterwards, that they must remember that there might be problems, if we take him and he dies during interrogation. As I have said previously, I don't know whether I used those words, but I said that if we take him, there might be the possibility that he would not come back, meaning that he might die during interrogation. I just foresaw it as a possibility because I have seen it while I was in Ovamboland, such things do happen during interrogation and one has to keep that in mind.
MR LAMEY: The possibility that you mentioned was communicated as such, it is not that you had the possibility in your mind, you did communicate it that he might not during or after the interrogation, he might not come out of there alive?
MR NORTJE: It was a possibility that I foresaw that might happen and I mentioned it.
MR MALAN: Mr Nortje, if I understand you correctly, the question was did you foresee the possibility that something might go wrong during interrogation or did you send a message that when we concluded the interrogation, we might kill him?
MR NORTJE: No, that is not what I said. I have seen it previously that people do not make it during interrogation. What happened later was not discussed or planned at all and I told them, listen I cannot continue, if we go over to this step, I have to contact Mr De Kock first of all.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what was their reaction when you said there was a possibility that if you take him, he will never come back?
MR NORTJE: There was no negative reaction where they said "no, let's leave it at that, let's forget about it, let's stop it", there was nothing like that. They basically assumed what I had said and they heard what I said and when I told them "before we go over to that step, I have to contact Mr De Kock first of all", because at that stage, I could not have taken such a decision or done anything without his permission. That is not how it worked.
MR MALAN: Please for my own clarity, what you told them was that something might go wrong during interrogation, he might die, but the manner in which you put it, was that a remote possibility not a probability?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR LAMEY: So you said you first wanted to contact your Commander?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR LAMEY: May I just ask you, while you were at Josini, did you liaise with him?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I did.
MR LAMEY: Why did you contact him?
MR NORTJE: This was an arrangement that we had with him if we were in the field, that we liaise with him on a daily basis so I always knew where he was and if he was not at that place, I would leave a message at the following place where he would be, so that he can call me back, so that I can report. That was the standard arrangement with him.
MR LAMEY: Did you contact Mr De Kock?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I did, I contacted him from Colonel Le Roux' office and he was at Zeerust.
MR LAMEY: Can you recall what you informed him about?
MR NORTJE: Once again, I would not have given any details over the phone, I think he was a Major at that stage, I told him that "we had a problem here at Krugersdorp, I think you must come through before I take any decisions." As I said, I don't believe that I would have given him specific details on the telephone and he said "wait for me, I will be there."
MR LAMEY: We have heard that he said that you said, or that he asked you what you were doing there and you said that you received instructions from Head Office to go there. What is your evidence in that regard?
MR NORTJE: That is not so, that is not what he said to me. I had no instruction from anybody at Head Office because the only person whom I would have contacted or if they did contact me, I would have called him or would have waited before I, so that I could find him before I had left Josini, I would not have left Josini without his permission.
CHAIRPERSON: While you were at Josini, did anybody from Head Office communicate with you in regard to any matter whatsoever?
MR NORTJE: No Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE : Mr Nortje, how did you know that Mr De Kock was in Zeerust, I know he says Mafikeng, how did you know he was in Zeerust?
MR NORTJE: As I have said, we communicated on a daily basis with him and I knew every day where he was and if he was not where he said he would be, I would have left a message at the following place where he would be, because we were all, all of us, all the teams, all the team leaders were always in contact with him on a daily basis.
ADV GCABASHE : So the previous time you had contacted him, you had contacted him at Zeerust as well, when you called him from Josini?
MR NORTJE: No, no, that must have been at another place, it must have been somewhere in the Cape, in the Eastern Cape, because he was at Zeerust for only two days or he had only arrived there, I can't recall whether I called him the previous day, but the previous day I was on the road. I think the last time I spoke to him, was the 23rd or the 24th, the day before we departed or that day, but he told me that he would be at Zeerust and that is why I knew that he would be at Zeerust.
MR MALAN: Where at Zeerust, did you have a telephone number?
MR NORTJE: At the Security Branch.
MR MALAN: He did not give you a telephone number?
MR NORTJE: No, I had the Security Branch's telephone number.
MR MALAN: How do you know it is not Mafikeng's telephone number?
MR NORTJE: No sir.
MR MALAN: Did he give you a number or did he tell you Zeerust Security Branch?
MR NORTJE: He said Zeerust Security Branch and the number I had with me, I called him.
MR MALAN: Did you always have all the numbers of the Security Branches with you?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I always carried a list with me.
MR LAMEY: What happened then after you contacted him?
MR NORTJE: Well, that was approximately after ten o'clock, if I had to work out the time, because round about lunch time he arrived there or they arrived there at Krugersdorp at the Security Branch.
MR LAMEY: Who was with him?
MR NORTJE: Fourie was with him.
MR LAMEY: That is now ...
MR NORTJE: Eugene Fourie.
MR LAMEY: One of the applicants?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: What happened further?
MR NORTJE: I had to inform him about the situation, that we had sent people, that it did not work and that there were some suggestion that we had to take him and we went back to the Security Branch. I cannot recall whether I assumed that I went in with him and discussed the situation again with the General, and with Dunkley and Kleynhans. The conversation as I said, the idea was already that we would abduct the man and we will force him to talk. I cannot recall the specific discussions that he had with the General or with Dunkley or with whoever, or with Kleynhans. I cannot elaborate on that, because I cannot recall what they said, but the conversation was about the abduction. Then the arrangements that had to be made from there.
MR LAMEY: You say you cannot recall all the detail during that conversation, but the matter of the abduction was discussed?
MR NORTJE: Yes, it was.
MR LAMEY: And the other matter, the possible fact about the death of Mr Maponya, do you know?
MR NORTJE: No, according to me it was - the discussion that we would kill him, had not yet taken place.
MR LAMEY: Was it the same type of discussion that you had with Le Roux with regard to the possibility when De Kock was there?
MR NORTJE: I would assume that it was discussed again.
MR LAMEY: But you don't have an independent recollection thereof?
MR NORTJE: No, I cannot specifically remember what was said there, but the discussion was about the abduction, but they understood that there could be some trouble, that the man might die during the process. As I read the situation, they realised the consequences, or whether they realised the consequences, I don't know.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Nortje, just to get this point clear, you say that, and this is my note, they understood that the man might die during the process. Was your warning to them that you are going to use rough methods in interrogation and those rough methods might result in his death?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Not that because we have captured him and he might expose our identities, whatever happens, he will be killed or he might be killed?
MR NORTJE: That is how I understood it at that stage.
CHAIRPERSON: That he might die because of the assault used, not that he might die because - to protect your identities?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: At that stage, I mean. So it was just the assault at that stage?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: And what was the outcome of that discussion where Mr De Kock was present?
MR NORTJE: Well, we had to agree that we would abduct the man and from there, Mr De Kock gave the instructions that - I had a problem as to how because I knew we had the kombi and the Jetta vehicle at some stage, but how it arrived there, I don't know, but afterwards I thought about it, that we had to send them to the farm or we must have sent some of the blacks to the farm. I don't know who it was, whether it was Nofomela or whoever, they had to fetch that vehicle because that was the vehicles that we would use in the abduction. The instruction was given there, Mr De Kock was in command, he said "do this, do that", and the following that I can recall was that we waited, we realised that the best time to take him, would be when he comes from work, and that is what happened. The Jetta, he was loaded into the Jetta with Nofomela, Nzimande.
MR LAMEY: Nofomela, was he an askari?
MR NORTJE: No, he was a Policeman.
MR LAMEY: And Mbelo?
MR NORTJE: Mbelo was a Policeman.
MR LAMEY: And Nzimande?
MR NORTJE: Nzimande was an askari.
MR LAMEY: Very well. And you say that is your recollection that those three loaded him into the vehicle?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR LAMEY: Were you part of the monitoring?
MR NORTJE: Yes, we were standing a way from there, but I could not see it myself, but they apparently loaded him into the vehicle and we had radio contact with each other. I don't know whether Almond had a radio with him, but I know Simon had a radio and they informed us that they had picked him up and they were leaving and the arrangement was that they would go to the farm and that was the only place where we could conduct the interrogation, it was a proposal. I think it was Mr De Kock who said we had to take him to the farm and that is exactly what happened. They then ...
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry who was Simon, was that Radebe?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Was he also in the vehicle, because you mentioned Nofomela, Mbelo and Nzimande?
MR NORTJE: No, he was in another vehicle.
CHAIRPERSON: Okay.
MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I am almost on the point where I want to move over to the Vlakplaas, I see it is four o'clock.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we will now adjourn until, sorry Adv Gcabashe would just like to ask a question.
ADV GCABASHE : Just to complete my notes Mr Nortje, you are saying they put him into the Jetta and went straight to Vlakplaas?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is how I understood it, but let me just tell you later I heard or I only heard this, that on the way to Vlakplaas, in that road he was transferred to the kombi at some stage. I didn't see this, I just heard this.
ADV GCABASHE : That is the report you were given?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
ADV GCABASHE : Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. It is now just passed four o'clock, we will adjourn for the day and reconvene tomorrow at nine o'clock again, when we will continue with the evidence of Mr Nortje, thank you very much.
MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
