CHAIRPERSON: Good morning. We want to start the proceedings. For the record, we are continuing with the amnesty applications of E A de Kock and nine others, in respect of the Nelspruit 4 and Tiso incidents. We were still taking the evidence-in-chief of Mr de Kock.
Mr de Kock, we accept that you are still capable of continuing.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well, I will remind you that you are still under oath to speak the truth.
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh?
EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (cont)
Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, yesterday afternoon we were busy dealing with the position of Vlakplaas, after the unbanning of the organisations such as the ANC.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And may I just ask you to summarise this. How did you regard the ANC and the PAC and other similar organisations during this period after the unbanning, up to and including the incidents which took place at Nelspruit?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the ANC and the PAC, although they adopted a political and negotiative direction, were still involved in a conflict and they were still focused on revolutionary change instead of an evolutionary change. With Vula for example, it was clear that the objective was revolutionary, that it was revolutionary by nature. And that which was presented to the public and the world beyond your border, is not exactly that which took place on ground level.
MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, I assume that you have received the other pages of General Nyanda's evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we have, thank you.
MR HATTINGH: And can we then accept that this will form part of Exhibit C and that it will be numbered from 103 onwards?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr de Kock, could I take you through that briefly. During cross-examination, General Nyanda, on page 104 was asked by me:
"Now the prosecutor had the date wrong because from the minute it would appear that the minute was signed by the parties on the 4th of May, but in any event, the Vula operation continued after 4th of May, is that correct?"
And he says:
"It is so."
"And had it not been for the fact that people like yourself were arrested, it would have continued up until at least the signing of the Pretoria Minute, not so?"
And he answers:
"Probably beyond that."
Do you recall that evidence?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And then on page 105 he is also asked - middle of the page
"After the entering into of the Groote Schuur Accord, further arms were introduced into the country, is that correct? Orders were placed for further arms to be brought into the country."
And he says:
"It is so."
"And the military training of people inside the country continued."
"It is so."
And then somewhat lower down in the page I say to him, with reference to a place which was known as 16 Avoca Road:
"In any event it is put to you on page 16 ..."
That is a reference to cross-examination by another person at another instance of General Nyanda.
"... put to you on page 16, that at Avoca Road two modified petrol tanks were found. Do you remember that?"
"It is so."
"One was a Mercedes tank and one was a Kwesta ..."
I think that must be a mistake, probably a Conquest tank.
"... and you were asked: Can you tell us anything about these tanks? And you initially (I said to him) said no. Then you were asked: 'Well did you know they were there? And you said: Yes, I knew they were there. So what were they used for? Do you want to tell the Court, do you want to tell us what these tanks were all about? And you said they were used for carrying arms. Further down the page it was put to you: They have been modified so that they held a minimal amount of petrol and the rest of what looked like a petrol tank was a space in which arms and explosives could be carried. Is that correct? And you said: Yes. And from which countries were arms carried into South Africa in those petrol tanks? To which you replied: From Botswana.
And then I continue with my examination.
"I would just like to ask you some questions about that. There was a military base near the Mozambique border, called Skwamaans(?). Were you aware of the existence of that base?"
"No."
"Now the police who were manning that base found, if I may show you photostat copies of photographs, I assume the originals can be produced if necessary. Can you I just show you a photostat copy of the photograph of a modified petrol tank and another one indicating the number of AKs that were found to be in that petrol tank. Is that the sort of petrol tank modification that you testified to at the bail application?"
"Yes, something like that."
"Now is it possible therefore that that method was also employed by the ANC to smuggle arms into the country from places other than Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland and so on?"
And he says:
"I think it is possible."
"Because this particular vehicle was stopped in the vicinity of the Mozambique border. Apparently it had come from Mozambique into the country. Do you accept that?"
"I accept that it is possible that the ANC could use that."
Then I ask somewhat lower on the page, regarding another matter when weapons were brought in or were found in a vehicle at the Golel border post. And I ask him at line 21:
"But it was given wide publicity and it happened, if I remember correctly, after the unbanning of the ANC."
He says:
"I think I do recall it."
"Can you perhaps put a date to that incident?"
"It was 1993 or 1992."
"1993, yes. And am I correct in saying that the same method was used to bring firearms into the country on that particular occasion?"
And he says:
"No, I think on this particular occasion they used the boot of the vehicle."
"Not the tank?"
"Not the tank."
You heard that evidence?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Is that in line with information that you received after the unbanning of the ANC, regarding activities which you had exposed after the unbanning of the ANC?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. I can mention that especially on the East Rand, especially in the areas such as Daveyton and Duduza, in that vicinity, we picked up information that the Self Defence Units were being provided with ammunition by the ANC, but it was difficult to infiltrate that specific organisation or group. But the information was definite.
MR HATTINGH: You launched an operation which you called 'Operation Ex-calibre'.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And that operation led to the tracing of tremendous amounts of weapons which had been smuggled into the country.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
ADV DE JAGER: Please repeat the name of the operation.
MR DE KOCK: It is 'Ex-calibre'.
MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any commendations or awards for the work that you had performed in that regard?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. Commendations were issued in the form of certificates for that work. I must just mention that in the process a total of 28 persons were arrested, 24 went to Court and 4 died, and all of them were Mozambicans, who had been involved among others.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. Did you ever receive any information regarding the possible involvement of ANC members or supporters in robberies and that the booty of such robberies, whether partially or completely, was being channelled to the ANC?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the information existed that robberies were being committed in the name of the ANC and the PAC. I cannot give specific evidence that the money or the booty ended up at these organisations, but that it was done on behalf of the ANC or PAC, was supported by existing information.
MR HATTINGH: Was this information which was received upon a singular occasion or on more than one occasion?
MR DE KOCK: This information was received on more than one occasion. There was an escalation in armed robberies and armed assaults, if I may put it like this, after the unbanning of the ANC and the return of trained members.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Hattingh, perhaps you could just clear this up right now. I think that it was recognised by the PAC, in submissions before this Committee and other Committees, that they used these robberies. However, I may be mistaken, I stand under correction, I don't believe that it was actually ANC policy as such. Do you have any possible information about that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes there was information. I am aware of the fact that it was not ANC policy, but that these robberies did indeed take place. I know, among others, that the Johannesburg Intelligence Services were focused on certain persons, of which one was a senior person.
MR HATTINGH: And when you refer to senior person, in what organisation do you mean?
MR DE KOCK: In the ANC specifically. And I know, as the ANC put it, that it wasn't their policy, but it was also not the policy of the former South African Government to blow up buildings. Nonetheless, it took place.
We can observe the example of Khotso House and Cosatu House. It wasn't necessary to cross borders and launch operations abroad, nonetheless we did so. We have examples of attacks in Swaziland and Lesotho. Therefore, what the government and the organisations presented to the voters and the people out there, is not necessarily what really took place on ground level.
MR HATTINGH: Wat was u geloof in die verband, na aanleiding van die inligting wat julle ontvang het? ...(no English interpretation)
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I had no doubt that militarily trained persons would be involved. From my objective and from an operational objective, it appeared to be more co-ordinated. These groups were larger, there were fewer arrests and more armed resistance should the police have succeeded in apprehending these persons. And I had no doubt. One probably couldn't blame them because you would find thousands of people returning with no prospects of employment.
MR HATTINGH: But with regard to the booty which was taken from such exercises, do you believe that some of it at least was taken to the ANC?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is a global tendency within any organisation. Let us not stigmatise any organisation here, let us refer to a terrorist organisation. The trend is to obtain funding, whether it be by means of blackmail or robbery. If we look at a French organisation, the OS, which came to existence after the fall of Algeria and the Simbese(?) Liberation Army, of which Patti Hurst was such a prominent member and even up until this very day we have liberation movements or terrorist movements who are funding their coffers by means of State exploitation. Even the IRA does this.
MR HATTINGH: Let me take you somewhat further back. Yesterday you mentioned a meeting which was held at Vlakplaas, during which a Commander of the Murder and Robbery Unit was present and during this meeting you were addressed by General Engelbrecht.
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Did this subject of robberies with the objective of supplementing the funds of terrorist organisations come to discussion at any time during this meeting?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it did.
MR HATTINGH: And who mentioned it?
MR DE KOCK: It was General Engelbrecht himself. The information surrounding this sort of action was centred at head office and it would have been under his attention and he specifically mentioned that the former conflicting organisations were involved in armed robberies.
MR HATTINGH: And General Engelbrecht at that stage was the overall Commander of C10, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And before that he was for many years connected to the Murder and Robbery Unit?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, he was the National Commander of Murder and Robbery.
MR HATTINGH: And just to refer more specifically to this incident, you said that Mr Holtzhausen told you that the information indicated that trained MK members or that a trained MK member would be involved in this armed robbery.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any information regarding what would happen to the booty of this robbery?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, the information was that it would go to the ANC. I cannot say specifically to which unit or wing or the ANC, but I knew that it was on behalf of the ANC.
MR HATTINGH: And this information, did you regard it as confidential?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I had no reason to doubt it.
MR HATTINGH: Mr van Zyl was also the informer who presented information regarding Carousel?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And that attempted robbery on Coin Security did indeed take place, so it appeared as if his information was reliable.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Did you thus believe that you were acting against persons who were acting on behalf of or in support of the ANC in committing these robberies?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Let us just get to Exhibit C, that is the document dealing with Vlakplaas. Do you still have it before you? Please page to page 60. That heading, paragraph 2.6
"Actions by Vlakplaas members on own initiate and own discretion."
Let me just ask you a direct question with regard to this incident. Did you obtain authorisation from your direct commander, directly above you, to execute this operation?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the operation was approved. It was approved that we could travel to Nelspruit, but with regard to the travelling itself, I took the initiative and used my own discretion.
MR HATTINGH: You did not inform your immediate commander regarding the nature and circumstances of the operation?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: Did you feel that it was necessary in this case?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, this operation was no different to for example, the operations which were launched at Piet Retief, where two shooting incidents took place. Among others, at Amsterdam.
MR HATTINGH: And those operations that you have just mentioned, did they take place with prior permission or approval of the immediate commander?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: Now this section of Exhibit C deals with the execution of own discretion. You have heard the evidence of General van der Merwe, when he gave evidence, as quoted here in this section.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: That is was expected of members of the Security Force to apply their own discretion.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And it is quoted here, his evidence is quoted rather thoroughly here and he states expressly that it was indeed expected of you not always to run to your commanders to receive orders, but to use your own initiative and discretion when you went over into actions.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. And by nature of C1's activities, all members, regardless of whether you were an officer or a junior officer, you had to be able to think for yourself and take the lead. If your senior officer was shot dead in a cross-border operation, the members had to be able to think for themselves in a such a situation.
MR HATTINGH: And when this incident took place you were already a Colonel in the SAP?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I think I was a full Colonel.
MR HATTINGH: And you had already spent nine years as the Commander of Unit C10?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Therefore you were very experienced and you were already a senior officer and you decided to exercise your own discretion?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: You've also heard the evidence of General van der Merwe before another Committee, approximately two weeks ago. That was with regard to the Zero-Zero hand grenade incident, the matter which was heard. During that time he reiterated the evidence which he gave, which is contained within Exhibit C.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Just a moment please, Chairperson. Very well. In this section of Exhibit C it is also mentioned with regard to cases of the past, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think it is also of application to this matter. In cases during the past where you exercised your own discretion, the incidents would be reported to the commanders afterwards?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And therefore they knew that you had acted beyond the parameters of the law?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. Our cross-border operations for example, were all beyond the parameters of the law. If we can just take a more comprehensive look at this. If we blew up an office of the ANC in London, it would qualify as international terrorism. This wasn't something that was funny at all.
MR HATTINGH: Were any disciplinary steps ever taken against you or any other member of Vlakplaas, as a result of the fact that you had been involved in operations which went beyond the boundaries of the law?
MR DE KOCK: No. Even with the inception of the Harms Commission and other investigations, all the information which the Security Branch had was used to cover up the real facts.
MR HATTINGH: And was this also the case, was this also covered up?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, completely.
MR HATTINGH: Yesterday afternoon you testified that you had already told General Engelbrecht on the scene that there was a problem with regard to this incident.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: You also testified that he was present at Grasdak when statements were compiled.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And on this occasion, was he once again informed what had really taken place?
MR DE KOCK: I do not recall independently, but I think yes, because the evidence would have to correlate with other aspects of evidence. So one couldn't really help, but to discuss these aspects of the true evidence.
MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any commendations or awards for operations in which you had been involved, such operations having involved illegal actions?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. For the bomb explosion in London and also for a cross-border operation in Lesotho, a third operation in Swaziland during which Zwelibanzi Nyanda was shot dead. And where there weren't any decorations, there would for example be a function at which persons would be personally congratulated. The Minister would be there to shake hands with them.
MR HATTINGH: And by the Minister, you refer to the former Minister of Security, Mr Vlok? MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. And then we also had the Head of Security there and congratulations were extended all over.
MR HATTINGH: What is the highest award that you received as a member of the South African Police?
MR DE KOCK: The Silver Cross for Courage.
MR HATTINGH: Let us just deal with them one for one. The Silver Cross for Courage, what is that for?
MR DE KOCK: That is for the action in Lesotho.
MR HATTINGH: And that was the operation during which you went over the border and shot dead a group of people?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I think nine or ten people were shot dead.
MR HATTINGH: And that award, is it usually extended to officers below the rank of General?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, this is an award which can be allocated to any member.
MR HATTINGH: And what other award did you receive?
MR DE KOCK: Upon two occasions I received the SOE. It is a decoration which is only awarded to Generals when they become Generals.
MR HATTINGH: And why did you receive these two awards?
MR DE KOCK: One was for the explosion of the ANC's head offices in London and the other was for the attack on the ANC transit house in Swaziland, during which Zwelibanzi Nyanda was killed.
MR HATTINGH: And those actions took place with the full knowledge and sometimes the order of the Generals in staff in Pretoria, at head office?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. And we also enjoyed full logistic support as we did with all our operations.
MR HATTINGH: And was this awarded by the Minister?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. The medal from the London operation was awarded by Minister le Grange personally and in the case of the Nyanda operation as well as - it was an SOE for the London operation. The Silver Medal was awarded by General Smit and General Johan van der Merwe, who conducted the awards. Photos were being taken and hands were shook.
MR HATTINGH: That was when van der Merwe was the Commissioner of Police?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, and Smit was the Head of Security. And the other SOE was also awarded during a ceremony. But this was all done in secret, this wasn't the usual award ceremony with a passing-out parade at the end of the year, which would take place at the Police College. One would simply call these six to eight people in a small group into the office and the decorations would be awarded, there'd be a pat on the back and goodbye.
MR HATTINGH: And for what was this? - the last one.
MR DE KOCK: That was the shooting incident in Swaziland. An SOE was also awarded for that.
MR HATTINGH: And was the reason for this exceptional method of award, the secrecy that was attached to it?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, the announcement of medals would take place in the police rank orders. There were two types of orders, the general and the officers'. And a brief reference was simply made regarding an action which for the interest of the State could not be made known and the names of the persons to whom it had been allocated.
MR HATTINGH: I have already asked you whether any disciplinary action was taken against you or other members of Vlakplaas, as a result of your involvement in illegal activities. Let us just take it further. In the approximately nine years that you were the Commander of Vlakplaas, was any disciplinary action whatsoever taken against you? Was any action or authorisation of yours ever questioned or severely criticised?
MR DE KOCK: No. And with regard to the involvement of my members, with particular reference to ANC and PAC members, we had all the power at our disposal. We covered up those matters. And where necessary we submitted false statements, changed certain statements and even went as far as changing the identities of some askaris that even to this very day they cannot reclaim their original identities.
MR HATTINGH: And at that time when you were still a member of Vlakplaas, Mr de Kock, how did you feel about your actions against the liberation movements?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I felt that it was justified. I felt that we would fight it out until there was not a white person left in this country, even if we have to leave the country was in ruins. If we had to use extreme violence we would do so. I was not prepared to see this country in a similar situation to the other countries in Africa, such as Mozambique for example, where we would have a case where the entire population of a village would be obliterated completely, where men and women and children would be chopped to death and raped. I wasn't prepared to have such a situation in this country.
MR HATTINGH: And how do you feel today regarding your actions in the past?
MR DE KOCK: The way I feel now, Chairperson, we wasted time, we strangled one another and destroyed one another and wasted a lot of time which we could sooner have spent on the creation of a safer country with a zero crime rate. We have changed the lives of many others irrevocably. And in my opinion we could just as well have handed the country over in 1960 and gotten over with it.
MR HATTINGH: Do you mean that you achieved nothing by killing people and destroying buildings?
MR DE KOCK: No, it was completely futile, it was only to maintain that particular government and for nothing else.
MR HATTINGH: And how do you feel about those persons who suffered as a result of your actions?
MR DE KOCK: I am not suffering as much as they are. If we measure their losses we will see that they are completely unrecoverable and they have all my sympathy in this regard. Although it will not reclaim anything, I would like them to know this.
MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, yesterday afternoon I told you that we would attempt to obtain photographs of the scene in order to assist you. We have obtained a series of photos, but unfortunately these are not the photos that we actually wanted. We recall photos having been taken from above on the bridge, which will give a much better perspective of the scene as such. We will still attempt to obtain those photographs.
In the meantime, could we refer you to two photographs of the scene, which may assist you in garnering a better impression of how things looked there. If we could just hand this in. A colour copy of the originals and then for the convenience of the Committee, I have made regular copies of that. We have also received copies for the rest of the legal representatives.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Mr Hattingh, we will mark this - I think we were busy with C, so we will mark this as D. This one with a number 17 on it, will be D1. It is a photograph with a signpost indicating Nelspruit and Kwanyemazaan. So that one is going to be D1 and the other one with the number 56 on it, will be D2.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.
Might I just ask you, Mr de Kock, to assist us in this regard. As I recall D1 indicates the road which the minibus travelled on and the direction in which it travelled when it was fired at.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: The bridge where you stood is not visible on the photograph. It is not the bridge in the background of this photograph, the bridge would be more tot he front of the photograph.
MR DE KOCK: Yes. If I look at the left corner at the bottom of the photograph, there is an elevation in the level of the ground.
MR HATTINGH: And that leads up to the bridge?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it leads up to the bridge.
MR HATTINGH: Did you walk up that embankment, when you took up position on the embankment?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And the vehicle which is parked there, the white vehicle with a blue revolving light on it? Do you see it?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Is that the position that a vehicle was placed in after the shooting incident?
MR DE KOCK: I am not certain. It may be so, but I'm not certain.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. And then there is a minibus on the left front side, which is parked there.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. I don't know if it is that minibus, or whether it is one which was placed there for the purposes of reconstruction. I wasn't there when the photographs were taken.
MR HATTINGH: Well it cannot be the same minibus because the original was burnt. But is that the spot where the minibus came to a standstill, the point at which you opened fire on the minibus?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And the road that we see in the photograph leads to the industrial area of Nelspruit, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: The two vehicles which can be seen in the left bottom corner of the photograph, the bakkie and the sedan vehicle, they had just come down from the main road between Nelspruit and Witrivier.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. They were not part of this ...(intervention)
MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct, they were not part of it, but it's just to give an indication how one would come down from the crossing to this road.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Very well, if we can just turn to Exhibit D2. That also indicates the road in the same direction, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And it also indicates a minibus which is parked there, such as the one on the previous photograph. In fact it is a photograph of the same scene, just from a different angle.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And here we have certain indications. Can you just tell us if you can recall what C1 indicates?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain, I think it may be an angle of fire.
MR HATTINGH: Well there are more stripes, could that possibly indicate the positions where shells were found, which were left by Vlakplaas members who fired shots at the bus?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Would that be approximately where the members took up their positions before the shooting incident ensued?
MR DE KOCK: No, I think it may be where Gevers and Swart were, if my memory serves me correctly. If you look to the left from the middle, you will see that there is some kind of elevation in the ground level there and some distance higher up would be where Holtzhausen and Gouws took up position. I'm not exactly certain where they took up position, in comparison to Boshoff. I'm not really certain of that.
ADV DE JAGER: Do you not have a key to this plan or this photo, so that you could indicate to us what these C1 stripes indicate, for example.
MR HATTINGH: I believe that there must be something like that. Would you please grant me a moment so that we can look into that matter.
ADV DE JAGER: Well I'm sure you can do this later, because I see that there are other stripes here ...(indistinct) on the right hand side of the road - I don't know what the indications there are, but it might be a B.
MR HATTINGH: No that's also ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: No that's also a C with a 245 - C1, with five stripes indicating points which appear to me to have been drawn on the road with chalk. It's very clear on the colour photograph which I have here. So these may be shells.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, we will investigate this further. May we do so during the tea adjournment, so that we could submit the relevant information to you afterwards?
CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairperson, thank you. We have nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Mr Lamey, have you got any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.
Mr de Kock, is the foundation for co-operation between C1 and Murder and Robbery, specifically in Pretoria, something which was already established during that briefing session from General Engelbrecht, which took place in 1991?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was a proposal and some sort of an introduction to one another, so that the co-ordination was official. Let me put it that way.
MR LAMEY: And the members of Murder and Robbery, Pretoria, who were specifically involved in this case, were the former acting commander. That was Captain Geldenhuys, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: As well as a member of that branch, Sgt Deon Gouws?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: Is it also correct that Murder and Robbery members, due to the nature of their line function, also were involved in investigations of murders, but also politically related murders and politically related robberies, or robberies in which members of political organisations were involved?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I am aware of the fact that members of Murder and Robbery were deployed for the exact purpose of investigating the escalation in political violence. And just for the sake of completion, I would like to mention that one of the other persons who were there from Murder and Robbery, was a Mr Boshoff. He was also at the scene.
MR LAMEY: Who was also on the scene, yes. I omitted to mention him. And with this specific operation, it was probably also due to its illegal nature - or let me rather put this in a question form. Was it also due to that reason and due to the cover-up which was to take place, important that the members be there, otherwise it would appear strange if it was robbers and no Murder and Robbery Unit members were involved?
MR DE KOCK: The element of robbery and armed robbery here also indicated that they would have to be involved.
MR LAMEY: I can just tell you that Sgt Gouws was also involved in that meeting, he was also present during that meeting and he will give evidence that it also came to his knowledge during that meeting that it was one of the subjects during that meeting that robberies were being committed by members of the liberation movements.
MR DE KOCK: I would accept that, with the exception of the officers. I think every officer had to bring two or three of his own members along from the various murder and robbery units. However, I didn't know the members.
MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, you have already given evidence that that information indicated to you in your capacity as the Commander of Vlakplaas, that there were members of the liberation movements who were involved in the robberies. This was information which you had at your disposal at that stage.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: The channel with regard to the handling of Mr Ben van Zyl as an informer, is it correct that you also appointed Sgt Dougie Holtzhausen as his handler?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: Can you recall that there was a meeting between yourself and Mr van Zyl, during which you also requested him to provide information to C1 on a more regular basis and that you were the one who appointed Sgt Holtzhausen as his handler.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, this was in Johannesburg. I think that it was at one of the Sun International Hotels, and Mr van Zyl, upon two or three occasions, reported to our offices. So there was liaison.
MR LAMEY: And you also knew that Mr van Zyl had previously himself been a member of the Murder and Robbery Unit in Brixton?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: And after he left there, by means of his private initiative, he gathered information which was sent to various branches of the South African Police, with regard to crime?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: And the overall factor which led to the fact that he became more involved in the provision of information to Unit C10, can you recall that this was an incident which took place at Eikenhof, involving information that he had obtained regarding weapons and that as a result of this information that he gave a woman was arrested?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: Now if we just look at the channel, Mr van Zyl would then provide the information to Mr Holtzhausen and Mr Holtzhausen would from that point keep you up to date with what was going on?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: And the information which you then received from Holtzhausen, in this case that an armed robbery was going to be committed, during ANC or MK members would be involved, was given to you by Holtzhausen.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: And then that information which you received as such, was not strange to you given the background of that briefing session which had taken place previously as well as the information which was circulating in security circles?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR LAMEY: It was also not strange to your subordinate members?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR LAMEY: Mr Holtzhausen basically planned this operation with your approval, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: I just want to ask you whether you knew that Mr van Zyl had also used staff members such a person by the name of Hamilton, during the Nelspruit incident as well as another person by the name of James. These would be staff members who had collected information for him and sent it through.
MR DE KOCK: I would accept that he had sub-sources yes, Chairperson, but I was not aware of their identities.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lamey, staff from where? From the police or from his own company, or staff of another company? Which staff are you referring to?
MR LAMEY: His own staff.
Did you know that Hamilton at a stage was also an informer for the Johannesburg Security Branch, also with regard to the connections of Tiso with the Returned Exile Committee?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not that I can recall. I'm sorry, but I really can't recall it.
MR LAMEY: Did you know that Hamilton himself was a PAC member?
MR DE KOCK: No, I didn't.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I would just like to submit to you a document that I want to examine Mr de Kock about. Let me just explain that a bundle of documents has been compiled, which has been provided to the Committee. Can we just allocate an exhibit number to this document?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it is the bundle of additional documents. There are eight documents in this bundle.
MR LAMEY: Shall we make this Exhibit E?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, very well. Yes, it is paginated and apparently there are 51 pages in my copy.
MR LAMEY: Yes, that is correct. Chairperson, afterwards it came to my knowledge that there is a report from the Weekly Mail from the 8th of May 1992, which I would like to submit to the Committee. It has already been distributed to all the legal representatives.
CHAIRPERSON: Will this then form part of Exhibit E?
MR LAMEY: Yes, we can incorporate this with Exhibit E and just give it a page number from 52 onwards.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Then this is an article from the Weekly Mail, 8th of May 1992, with the heading
"MK rebels turn to gangsterism."
Is that correct?
MR LAMEY: Yes, that is correct.
Mr de Kock, I just want to tell you that I received this document from a former member of the Security Police, who was stationed at the Intelligence Services in Soweto and who managed a library among others, where this documentation was kept for his official purposes. Do you have the bundle before you by any chance, Mr de Kock? I would like to begin with the first document which appears to be a document of decisions which were adopted by the ANC's National Conference in July 1991. On page 1 reference is made to the four pillars, which we have referred to numerous times in previous amnesty applications. But if we look at this document, in 1994, those four pillars were still very firmly in place. Is that what your knowledge was?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: If we look at page 2 for example, the so-called underground is there constituted to be fortified.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: With reference to the armed struggle it is stated that although the armed struggle had been suspended, it still remained a pillar of the struggle.
MR DE KOCK: Yes. And I must qualify. I think that in 1994, from the end of May or June or July onwards, a house in Melville or Bertrams was searched and an army truckload of handgrenades and limpet mines of eastern block origin, as well as any other form of ammunition, was taken from there and transported to Pretoria. And in a Sunday newspaper, an Afrikaans newspaper, there were colour photographs of this and there was quite a public uproar because the ANC refused to have these weapons ballistically tested. But this is just to give an indication that all the sides were still in conflict with one another. I'm sorry, please proceed.
MR LAMEY: Very well. And then on page 5, if you will turn to that page, there is a paragraph 5 there. Reference is made to a decision which was already adopted in December 1990 during the National Consultative Conference, to establish so-called defence committees.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: The so-called SDUs or Self Defence Units, is it correct that they were especially strengthened after this period in time?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was some form of a group, but it lacked co-ordination, there wasn't proper leadership or co-ordination, but after the unbanning it really became an organised body as such.
MR LAMEY: And then with regard to Umkhonto weSizwe, on page 9, the resolution was also adopted that MK would be maintained and developed and with regard to point 2, MK would in all aspects be, or remain combat ready.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: The following document, Mr de Kock ...(intervention)
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on. The speaker's microphone.
MR LAMEY: I beg your pardon, my microphone was switched off.
On page 13 there is a document from the ANC which was compiled in July 1989. And Mr de Kock, is it correct that in July 1989 already there was talk of negotiations and this was shortly before what took place in February 1990, when the ANC was unbanned?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, actually on the contrary, if I don't have it incorrectly, it goes back as far as 1986, when Kobie Coetzee went to speak to Mr Mandela for the first time on Robben Island. And that was the first occasion upon which I noticed that the winds were about to change.
MR LAMEY: I just want to refer you specifically to paragraph 17 on that page, where the following is said
"Discussion of the whole question of negotiations in no way affects and should not affect the overall strategic orientation of our movement and the tasks that arise from the orientation. Our strategic task is the destruction of the apartheid regime and the transfer of power to the people. This we seek through mass political action, armed struggle, the international isolation of the apartheid system and by ensuring that the ANC plays its proper role as the revolutionary vanguard of our struggling people."
Do you see that on page 15?
MR DE KOCK: I beg your pardon, I was on page 17.
MR LAMEY: I'm sorry, it's paragraph 17 on page 15.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: And all that that really means is that in the prospect of negotiations the armed struggle remained one of the more important elements of the struggle which would ultimately replace the government.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I believe in the same way that we were on standby they were also on standby.
MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, there is then a security report on page 16, which was issued after the unbanning of the ANC, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: And that the security report refers to a report which was transmitted on the ANC's Radio Freedom, on the 11th of February 1990. That was after the de Klerk speech and the announcement of the unbanning of the ANC.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: And there it is stated that the armed struggle will not be suspended and that the request to hand over weapons will not be complied with.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: And then Mr de Kock, there is an extract from the ANC journal of July or August 1990 ...(intervention)
MR DE KOCK: Which page is this?
MR LAMEY: Page 25 and 26. There are articles there which actually begin on page 25, but goes over to page 26, dealing with the armed struggle. On page 26 you will see the following is said
"And the ranks of Umkhonto weSizwe should be expanded, it's cadres must be systematically upgraded..."
...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lamey, could you give us an indication of the point in the page where you are reading?
MR LAMEY: It is the final column of the article under the heading "Armed Struggle", which begins on page 25.
"And the ranks of Umkhonto weSizwe should be expanded, it's cadres must be systematically upgraded. In the final analysis the armed struggle can only be abandoned altogether, as distinct from its suspension in a cease-fire when a new constitution has been democratically adopted."
So actually, what this mouthpiece states is that only upon the adoption of a new constitution will the armed struggle be suspended in earnest.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: And then the following document I understand, is a document which was compiled by an ANC task group in 1991, and this deals with among others, the role of the self defence structures which have been referred to. I refer you to page 30, paragraph 1.5. Paragraph 1.5 refers to this so-called self defence structure which by definition was paramilitary.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson. I can only say that some of these aspects here, as I have read them, are based on a book by Maregwela. The name of the book is the Mini Manual on Guerrilla Warfare, or Suburban Guerrilla Warfare. And I see many aspects of that book which are reflected within this document.
MR LAMEY: We are still on page 30, paragraph 1.6, lower down in the page. There it is said
"The August 6 cease-fire ..."
I think that refers to the Pretoria Minute, and you have also referred to that in your evidence of what Gen Siphiwe Nyanda testified about.
"The August 6 cease-fire does not neutralise MK, it has an important role to play. MK cadres, particularly ex-prisoners and those due to return from exile must play a leading and active role in the establishment of the defence structures."
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: Is it also your experience that the exiles, especially the MKs who had returned, played prominent roles in the leadership that they extended to the Self Defence Units which were created by the ANC?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: And then I would like to refer you to page 33 and further. From page 33 it deals with the subject of among others, training of people for the purposes of the SDUs. On page 66, or at least on page 34, paragraph 6.6, reference is made to weapons.
"Political campaign will have to waged for the arming of the Self Defence Units. All avenues need to be explored, including the setting up of licensed security organisations. Licensed weapons can be obtained. Funds will have to be collected on a voluntary basis from the community."
And then:
"Once even a few firearms have been obtained, firearm training can begin. This should be handled by MK cadres and sympathetic township police."
I would just like to pause here for a moment, Mr de Kock, because this document implies that licensed weapons were to be used for this purpose only, and you have already referred to this in your evidence and you know that one of the clients that I represent, Mr Nortje, was very closely involved in the issue of weapons smuggling into the RSA.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: And is it correct that especially illegal weapons which were used by the SDUs, caused a great headache for the South African Police and particularly your unit because you were specifically tasked in combating this kind of activity?
MR DE KOCK: Well the standard issue weapon of the SDU was an AK47.
MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, if I may just interrupt at this stage. I'm not sure that I follow the line of questioning of my learned colleague. Is the allegation that the victims in this matter were in any way related to the SDUs and the functioning of the SDUs? Otherwise I don't understand the relevance of the questioning. I just need clarity.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Are you attempting to establish that the armed struggle continued after the so-called peace talks?
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, the purpose with this is simply that from the point of departure of my clients, they had a specific understanding of the context and the continuation of the struggle at that stage, even within the context of the time period after the unbanning of the ANC. Mr de Kock in his evidence, also referred to information which he had and the purpose of this documentation is simply to view the situation from the mouthpieces of the organisations, so that we can understand what their strategy was. But it goes further than this. For example with regard to the issue of unlicensed weapons, we will find in practice, as Mr de Kock gave evidence, that illegal weapons were used by these structures and not licensed weapons, and that once again returns to the crime element which emerged during that period. It is about that, Mr Chairperson. I am trying to get to the document which is marked page 52, which I will still get to.
CHAIRPERSON: Is it your clients' case that the establishment of the SDUs was a consequence of the armed struggle?
MR LAMEY: The armed struggle which had not yet come to an end.
CHAIRPERSON: But that's the problem that Ms Patel has, she has a problem with the relevance of all this information and examination regarding the SDUs when this incident is actually about a bank robbery. So are you trying to establish a connection between the bank robbery which provided funds to the liberation movements and in some or other way had something to do with the SDUs, or what is the relevance of this? Does this have to do with the SDUs?
MR LAMEY: It is about the SDUs and that particular aspect as well. It is about the crime element with regard to the smuggling of weapons in that regard. And then, I will still get to page 52 and the document which appears on page 52, which deals with a reference to criminal activities during which certain factions were involved.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR LAMEY: And unfortunately I have been stopped at an isolated aspect before I could completely attempt to illustrate the point that I'm actually driving at.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well, then I will allow you to continue, but the point which Ms Patel is trying to make is a very relevant point.
MR LAMEY: No, it is not our contention that the people who were killed during the Nelspruit incident were members of the SDUs. We do not have information which stretches that far, and that is not what I'm aiming to point out.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, because it would appear as if it is the case that even after the unbanning of the ANC, the struggle between the Security Forces and the ANC continued. If I understand it correctly.
MR LAMEY: Well the matter actually has two perspectives. On the one hand the documentation indicates that the SDUs from the liberation movements were established to protect themselves against unlawful attacks by police, and on the other hand there was another perspective from the Security Force regarding that.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Yes, I will allow you to continue, but please bear in mind the point that Ms Patel has issued.
MR LAMEY: Well I will just continue then. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Go ahead.
MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, I just want to ask you, as the Security Police were using the facade of legal actions, this was also the case with the licensed weapons, that it was presented that illegal methods were not used in order to provide the SDUs with funding and weapons. Reference is made to the voluntary basis within the community when it came to collecting funds for these organisations. So at face value it appeared to be completely illegal, if you look at the documentation.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: But what was your experience in practice?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, those persons who did not have sufficient funding would, by means of a barrel of a gun, be forced to obtain funding. I'm sure that there were those who would give them money voluntarily. However, the SDUs served a very good purpose. Those areas in which they functioned were handled by them and they executed a measure of control in such areas. Yet on the other hand they were also an agent of coercion to force the inhabitants of such areas to participate in marches and to strike and so forth. The one part looked good, but the other part was something like a war in the shadows, so to speak.
MR LAMEY: But the point that I'm trying to make is that in just as little as there was an express criminal approval for a criminal action in a State document, just so one would not find this within the planning or policy document of a liberation movement.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: But in practice it looked completely different.
MR DE KOCK: Yes. It would give government or institutions the advantage of deniability.
MR LAMEY: And then Mr de Kock, while we are still on this point I would like to refer you to page 52. That is the actual document that I have been getting at. Do you have the document before you, "MK Rebels turn to Gangsterism"?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: Now you must have known that the Weekly Mail was a newspaper which at that stage had exposed offences committed by the Security Police.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: And that their reporting was primarily aimed at that.
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR LAMEY: And in this case, if I could refer you, the report deals primarily with factions within the ANC and exiles who had returned and who were not completely in concurrence with the direction that had been adopted during the negotiation process. But what I actually want to get to - I just want to find that particular place. In the second column of the report you will see at the bottom it begins
"The Polla Park rebels ..."
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, I have it.
MR LAMEY
"... for example, are clearly operating hand in glove with criminal groupings."
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY
"... who are opposed to a sophisticated development scheme that was pioneered by the former residents committee and would have brought some form of order to the settlement."
And then below that it is said:
"Activists in the ...(indistinct) report that the local warlord-type figure who operates out of one of the hostels in the name of MK, runs a private army that has aroused considerable resentment by collecting levies for arms and imposing protection fees on residents."
The report refers to an example of an incident where it appears to me that arming took place on an illegal basis and that the request for funding for these weapons was made to the community in a forceful way by these members who had resorted to methods of gangsterism. That is basically what it is about. What I want to ask you is whether the content of this report correlates with information and experiences which you had?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I did not hear of any official financial logistical line which was given to the SDUs from Shell House, and one could then accept that they must have obtained funding among others, in this manner. All that I know which emanated from Shell House, which was an official appointment from the ANC's side, was the overall co-ordinator and commander of the SDUs, who was Robert McBride, but the rest I believe, the rest of these persons would have had to rely on themselves for funding.
ADV DE JAGER: And I think that it is also common cause that they attempted to obtain weapons so that they could execute their objective of self-protection or self-defence.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I see that it is 11 o'clock now, would this be a suitable time for the adjournment?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we'll take an adjournment for 15 minutes.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, it has come to our knowledge that your client is actually not very well at this point and that it would be advisable to have him properly examined a medical doctor and to obtain a report on his condition, particularly in regard to the possibilities of him proceeding with his testimony. And for that purpose his evidence will stand down at this point, pending the outcome of the investigation.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct, Mr Chairman, thank you very much.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. So at this stage we will let the testimony of Mr de Kock stand down and we will continue with his testimony as soon as he has been properly examined by the doctors and we have a report on his condition. The indications are that it might be in his best interest to get the testimony in this matter completed as soon as possible. And for that purpose we will - if it is possible, we will continue with his testimony as soon as he is in a position to continue.
EUGENE DE KOCK STANDS DOWN DUE TO ILLNESS
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel, who is the applicant that we will be dealing with at this point?
MS PATEL: Mr Lamey, advises me that it's Rolf Gevers. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, just before Mr Lamey proceeds, may I hand up to you another two photographs and a key to the three pages or the three photographs then, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: The next photograph, in fact photo number 2 in fact shows the bridge over the Kwanyemazaan Road and the third one doesn't really, just indicates a person pointing out, I think empty cartridge cases. But the photo number 2 might be of assistance and then the key will indicate what the markings on the photograph represent.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. We will mark those, it would be D3. D3 would photograph number 2. In fact - yes, perhaps we should mark them individually. Photograph number 2 would be D3 and photograph number 3 would be D4 and the key to the photographs would be D5.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
ADV DE JAGER: I don't know if there is an error here, but I did not receive D4.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Lamey, are we continuing with the application of Mr Gevers?
MR LAMEY: Indeed, Mr Chairman, thank you.
