Amnesty Hearings

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Lamey, you were still busy with cross-examination.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: (cont)

Chairperson, before I proceed, I would just like to point something out to you. I have requested that - there are certain of the documentation which can be found in Exhibit E of which the copying did not turn out very well and there's also a section on page 47, which is lacking. I have requested that additional copies be made so that there can be more thorough copies of the documentation, which I have available.

Mr de Kock, I do not know whether you have Exhibit E before you. It is the bundle of additional documents.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do.

MR LAMEY: On page 39, I just want to put it to you that my instructions are that this document is a document which was in possession of the Security Police. It is a document which comes from a security report and deals with a quest between the ANC and the PAC to form a united front and indicates that there was pressure to form this front, which came from the Organisation for African Unity. I don't know whether you can recall such a specific document, whether you recall this document or whether you received any report or briefing to that extent.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall this specific document, but there was a trend of coalition to form a front among all black groupings. And I believe that this would form part of the policy, this would be a policy document.

MR LAMEY: Mr Gevers has also given evidence that it was his experience on grassroots level that there was indeed such cooperation. What is your experience regarding this?

MR DE KOCK: I would concede it. What I can say from firsthand knowledge however, is that the person with whom I had liaison in the ANC, who was a senior operative, told me that the ANC was losing a great deal of the young men and women to the PAC because the ANC was perceived as being too slow for the revolutionary struggle, that the ANC was too concessive, but that they would allow this for the purposes of unity.

MR LAMEY: I have just received the copies, Mr Chairperson, I beg your leave to submit these copies to you.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lamey, can we just get this right, these would then be pages ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR LAMEY: If I may just take you back to where it begins on page 45. Page 45 would be the front page of the document and the following document can then be marked 45(a). That has the title "PAC Position on Negotiations and Constituent Assembly". That is what is found lacking from the bundle before you.

ADV DE JAGER: Can it be marked 46, because there is no 46.

MR LAMEY: Very well, that would be even better, Chairperson. Thank you, Chair.

And then the next page, 47, there is a section which has been cut off and this would then be the substitute page 47. And the following page has the top section cut off, and that would then be the substitute page 48.

Mr de Kock, we have seen that in 1989, according to the information of the Security Police there was already this quest, especially as a result of the OAU's pressure to form this front. From page 45 onwards we have the document which contains resolutions from a national congress of the PAC, and what I've just handed over to you is the first page which was lacking from that. And I would like to refer you to paragraph 7 and paragraph 8 of that. This congress was held on the 6th to the 8th of April apparently, and there it is said:

"The PAC will continue to strive for the patriotic united front, so that the oppressed and dispossessed majority can speak and act with one powerful voice."

The inference that one can draw from that, and I ask you whether this is correct or not, is that indeed there was a tremendous mutual overlapping ...(intervention)

MR FRANCIS: Mr Chair, I think I should object. I'm not so sure if my learned friend is now leading evidence of behalf of Mr de Kock or what's the position.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he's cross-examining and if he tends to be a bit leading, that is part of cross-examination I assume. Of course when the weight of what is placed before the Committee is assessed of course, all those kind of factors apply, but insofar as the admissibility of the evidence is concerned, the cross-examiner of course is entitled to ask a leading question. If that is the difficulty that you have.

So Mr Lamey, proceed.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, all that I want to put to you is that the ANC and the PAC had a mutual quest which was to replace the existing State dispensation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And also by means of an armed struggle.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: If reference is made here to a patriotic united front in conjunction with what we saw in 1989, so that they could speak with one powerful voice as it is stated in the document and not with two separate voices, namely that of the PAC and the ANC respectively, one could then infer that this patriotic united front which is mentioned, is a front which consists of the ANC and the PAC.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, if one observes it as such, then that is how it appears.

MR LAMEY: And then in paragraph 8 it is reiterated in the 1989 document, that this is particularly upon the request of the OAU. It is stated

"The PAC will closely liaise with the frontline states and the OAU to strengthen the patriotic united front and to ensure it acts as a front."

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that would be in line with a mutual goal.

MR LAMEY: And then on page 47, at the bottom

"The congress reaffirms its commitment to the patriotic united front and the decisions it took at its inaugural conference in Durban, in October 1991."

So it would appear that with at least what we have at our disposal here, the PAC from their side were committed to the development of a united front with the ANC.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: That which appears here, I want to ask you, was this something which was strange in 1992, or was this also in line with the information which was at the disposal of you or the Security Police at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Well I would not be able to be specific in reference to certain documents, however the trend of that time and the manner in which it was conveyed was that we may have differences, but let us unite so that we can focus on a mutual goal. It is in line with this situation regarding a patriotic united front.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, is there an indication in the document, with the exception of the Security Police report, of the movements as such of the so-called patriotic united front, by means of which the members could be identified? Is there any reference in this PAC resolution regarding which organisations would comprise this front?

MR LAMEY: Not expressly. It does not appear as such, the ANC is not mentioned by name in this document. That is so.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, I just wanted to determine whether or not there is any specific reference within these documents.

MR LAMEY: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR LAMEY: The reason why I have referred to it in conjunction with the previous document is because from the Security Police' viewpoint, they connected this to the ANC, as a result of the previous document.

CHAIRPERSON: That is exactly why I'm asking upon what would that security report have been based, is it based upon the documents from the organisations which identify a front or is it an interpretation of the Security Police?

MR LAMEY: I would not know what the 1989 document is based upon, all that I can say is that this is what was circulated in Security Police circles, that this united front would include the cooperation of the ANC and the PAC, as well as the request of the OAU. Furthermore, in the 1992 document we find a reference to a request from the OAU for the unification of the PAC and the ANC to form this united front, without any specific reference however to who the other members of that united patriotic front would be.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, then just with reference to the information which you had. Is it correct that Mr van Zyl was a source who provided certain elements of information? And with regard to the Coin incident and the Nelspruit incident, did you understand that he had established contact with persons, or Tiso by name, from which an interest was developed in that relationship, in Tiso and a group committing a robbery?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. However, I cannot give any evidence on how he managed to establish this point of contact, how it happened that van Zyl reached Tiso or Tiso reached van Zyl.

MR LAMEY: But ultimately you understood that the persons who you would ultimately shoot during the ambush, from their perspective wanted to commit a robbery?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely.

MR LAMEY: Now during the planning thereof you could have used quite a few methods, you could have waited for them to commit the robbery and then you could have shot them, or you could have done this before the time.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I think that one can examine a situation of seeing that it is going to happen and devising a way to prevent it from happening.

MR LAMEY: Would it be incorrect to say that after the commission of the robbery it would have held a high risk for those persons who would be robbed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And it would also have entailed the risk of loss of life?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Say if you know or if you don't know under which impression they were with regard to the Nelspruit incident, whether they thought that they were going to the Coin Security company, as with the previous incident, or whether they were going to another institution.

MR DE KOCK: According to my information they were going to the chief distribution point of all monies which were entering or exiting the Eastern Transvaal. I think that it was something similar to an SBV or an SST. If it was Coin Security, it would be something similar. And that is where they were going when they were shot.

MR LAMEY: My instructions from Mr van Zyl are that they were under the impression that they were going to the Coin Security company upon the second incident, because Mr van Zyl suggested to them that he knew, as with the first Coin incident, that money was being counted and that Coin was handling money for clients as an insurance company or as a security company rather.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lamey, you are appearing for Mr van Zyl, is that correct?

MR LAMEY: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Therefore I assume that you have instructions from Mr van Zyl regarding what he actually knew and what he didn't know and what he conveyed.

MR LAMEY: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: So isn't it possible for you just to put that information directly to Mr de Kock, so that he would know what Mr van Zyl wants to say or will say, so that we can also know what he is going to say.

MR LAMEY: > Yes, indeed I shall.

Mr de Kock, my instructions from Mr van Zyl are that he met Tiso at a stage, and I will give further information about that later, and from discussions it emerged that he would be interested in committing a robbery, and then Mr Holtzhausen also became interested in that information.

The information ultimately also indicated that he was connected to Winnie Mandela and so the planning grew, and especially at the stage when the connection with Mrs Mandela emerged and when it emerged that he was her driver, Mr Holtzhausen especially became interested in this aspect and gave the green light to go ahead with the cooperation with Tiso, which at that stage - or who at that stage already appeared to be interested in committing a robbery with a group of other persons.

Now my instructions from Mr van Zyl are that he as the source of C10, also played along with this intention and actually helped them under the cover of another name. They thought he was a person from the underworld and this was done so that their plan could come to execution. And he also suggested that he knew of a premises in Nelspruit, the Coin Security premises, where money was being counted. And that is ultimately how they ended up at the Coin Security premises the first time.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot not dispute this, I would be able to give evidence regarding the information which was conveyed to me by Sgt Holtzhausen. However, I cannot dispute that evidence itself.

ADV DE JAGER: Does Mr van Zyl contend that he ever spoke with Mr de Kock or did he only speak to Mr Holtzhausen?

MR LAMEY: My impression is that in the beginning he met Mr de Kock, but with the course of the planning he had less to do with him. I will just make certain about those instructions. No, it is confirmed. His liaison was primarily with Holtzhausen.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, just for clarity's sake, is it your instructions that Mr van Zyl initiated the robbery of the specific premises, was it his idea?

MR LAMEY: Yes, he suggested the premises. They were looking for a place to rob, this group, or Tiso then, and he then came forward with this suggestion.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR LAMEY: He also then presented himself as a person from the underworld.

Mr de Kock, the decision with regard to the second vehicle, with the exception of the Cressida regulation 80 vehicle which would be used, do you know where this came from?

MR DE KOCK: Holtzhausen requested the vehicle.

MR LAMEY: An additional vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, an additional vehicle.

MR LAMEY: And did you then propose the kombi vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Well that was the only vehicle that I had, It's not that I suggested the vehicle, he requested a vehicle for this operation, another vehicle other than the Cressida, and I provided this vehicle to him.

MR LAMEY: And you have already given evidence that it was the vehicle of another person and that an insurance claim would be put in on the vehicle afterwards.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the vehicle wasn't taken because of the insurance claim, it was obvious that somebody would put in an insurance claim if his vehicle disappeared.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Then I would just like to know with regard to your evidence which I understand to indicate that it appeared that Tiso was not in the minibus. The expectation having been that he would be in the minibus.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then a search was started for him and Holtzhausen left to look for him.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And they returned and Nortje told you that they had found Tiso and, what now?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: What shall we do with him now.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: It was a problem at that stage.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was a problem.

MR LAMEY: My instructions from Mr Nortje are that you then told him to contact Snor Vermeulen.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Basically to the extent that they should take him to Penge Mine.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You knew what it would mean. And Mr Nortje, due to prior knowledge of the Mabotha incident which involved Mr Mabotha who was killed at Penge Mine and whose body was blown up at Penge Mine, as a result of that prior knowledge he knew what was going to happen.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would assume that.

MR LAMEY: And the reason why told Nortje to contact Snor Vermeulen was so that Tiso would be taken to Penge Mine and Tiso would then be killed there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that was the request of Mr Nortje, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: I don't want to enter a debate with you regarding this, but my instructions from Mr Nortje are that he asked you "What now?" and then for a moment in that brief time, you yourself didn't really know what to do and then you said words to the extent "Get hold of Snor Vermeulen" - and Vermeulen was at that stage in Pretoria, "Get hold of him so that you can take Tiso to Penge Mine".

MR DE KOCK: Initially I asked Mr Nortje whether Tiso could not be detained, if he didn't know enough he couldn't give evidence about it. He answered no, and then I asked him whether we could send Tiso to Swaziland and have him handled there by means of Mr van Zyl. Once again the answer was no, because he said that if Tiso would speak out all of us would be in trouble. That was completely correct, I agreed with that view and I then told him to make arrangements. These arrangements were then made. I mentioned Mr Vermeulen's name and said that he had to be contacted.

MR LAMEY: I just want to put it to you that Mr Nortje says that he does not recall that the Swaziland option was ever indicated or discussed. From his perspective it was an immediate problem and you understood it as such as well and that there was no other resort.

MR DE KOCK: I am not disputing Mr Nortje's version, I am just telling you what happened at the scene, and I have a clear recollection of that.

MR LAMEY: But Swaziland could never have been an option.

MR DE KOCK: No, it could have been an option, but there was no certainty. The man could stay there for two weeks and return or he could contact Mrs Mandela from Swaziland, then we would have a new set of problems on our hands.

MR LAMEY: That's what I mean, it wouldn't have been that would have worked.

MR DE KOCK: It was an option that I considered and eventually found to be ineffective.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I just want to determine whether I have completed my examination. I just want to consult my notes.

Then Mr Nortje recalls that he himself was not present - or let me put it this way, you and Mr Nortje went to the game reserve afterwards, you went to a conference there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the morning after the incident we drove through to the game reserve for discussions.

MR LAMEY: And Mr Nortje says that he was not present with any discussion between you and Gen Engelbrecht, but he recalls that you told him at a certain point that you had informed the then Brig Krappies Engelbrecht about the incident.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I informed him briefly, I didn't tell him that we had murdered four or five people. I didn't give him such detail, but I came from the milieux where we had just completed the Harms Commission and I had the freedom to discuss this with Mr Engelbrecht. We understood each other in that respect. And I foresaw problems with this matter and as a result of the previous relationship and matters which we had handled before the Harms Commission, I told him that we were going to have problems, that we should be cautious.

MR LAMEY: From what you told him, could he infer what this actually meant?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, very clearly, because he acted as such and told people not to make statements.

MR LAMEY: And can you recall whether you told Mr Nortje that you had informed him, or not?

MR DE KOCK: It is possible, but I cannot recall it.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr de Kock, this discussion with Gen Engelbrecht, did this take place at the scene of the shooting or in the game reserve?

MR DE KOCK: No, it took place at the scene of the shooting, next to the vehicle.

ADV DE JAGER: And when did he arrive at that scene, approximately?

MR DE KOCK: I think it must have been 8 o'clock or 9 o'clock in the morning.

ADV DE JAGER: So this was quite a few hours after the shooting, because the shooting took place at approximately 1 o'clock in the morning or somewhat later.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but it would have been approximately that time that he arrived there.

MR LAMEY: I don't know what Mr Holtzhausen's evidence will be when he testifies, but I notice in his statement that he mentions that Mr van Zyl informed him that he, Mr van Zyl, had spoken to Winnie Mandela on two occasions regarding the planned robbery and that she would also participate in the robbery. And he says further, and this is page 310, paragraph 15

"Whether she would have assisted with the robbery or not is unknown to me."

Did Mr Holtzhausen ever indicate to you that Mrs Winnie Mandela would accompany the group on a robbery or that she would participate in the planning of the robbery?

MR DE KOCK: I don't remember anything like that. The information was that Tiso would commit a robbery on behalf of the ANC and that he was working for Mrs Mandela. There was information that he had committed previous robberies on behalf of the ANC. That is all that I knew.

MR LAMEY: Would Mr Holtzhausen then not have told you that Mrs Winnie Mandela would have accompanied the group on the robbery?

MR DE KOCK: If he told me this, then I cannot recall it. I'm not trying to evade the issue.

MR LAMEY: My instructions from Mr van Zyl are that he did not possess such information that she would accompany the group on the robbery or that he gave such information to Mr Holtzhausen. He says that he doesn't know where Mr Holtzhausen finds this information. I just want to know whether Mr Holtzhausen ever said anything to you in this regard, whether you can recall anything like that.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I would just like to take instructions. Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Lamey. Mr Cornelius, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Wim Cornelius. I act on behalf of the second applicant, D J Britz, third applicant, J J Swart, eight applicant, Hanekom and ninth applicant, Vermeulen.

Mr de Kock, I would just like to put a number of questions to you. I am acting on behalf of the footsoldiers as you have heard, and I want to put questions to you to see whether or not we comply with the provisions of the Act to obtain amnesty.

You were the Commander of C10 and all orders or instructions that you issued to the footsoldiers had to be obeyed.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And at all times you acted within the scope of your duty, the course and scope of your duty, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: If you look at the decision of MKHIZE vs MARTINS, which I will argue later, did you at all times with regard to this operation, promote the interests of your employer?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You maintained your political conviction and the State dispensation and you possessed certain beliefs that the ANC and MK was continuing the armed struggle, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you at any stage with this operation, act in your own interests?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Did your employer, the SAP at that stage, at any stage attempt to prevent you from continuing with your activities?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: In fact, the political dispensation at that stage and your employer maintained the C10 Section, they did not cease it or prevent it in any way?

MR DE KOCK: No, they maintained it.

MR CORNELIUS: Despite the fact that the ANC had apparently conceded by saying that they would not continue with the armed struggle.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. That was with the full maintenance of all our arms and weaponry, all our guns and heavy artillery.

MR CORNELIUS: Therefore your employer, the SAP at that stage, believed that it was advisable to maintain a unit which acted with certain political objectives and followed certain courses of action?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Your employer, the SAP, never said that you had acted carelessly, you as the Commander of C-Section?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. In fact if we study the evidence of Gen van der Merwe, as it appeared from the Khotso House and Cosatu House amnesty hearings, as well as the Zero-zero handgrenade hearings, we gain the impression that if you or your members had not carried out orders you would have been in deep waters with the SAP.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, you would have been alienated or transferred.

MR CORNELIUS: And due to the fact that you and your footsoldiers had intimate and sensitive knowledge of operations, it would have been extremely hazardous to have such a man in the unit, who was not obedient.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, if there were any indications of that, if there were any indications that you wanted to cooperate with the enemy or defect to the enemy, it could cost you your life.

MR CORNELIUS: So there could not have been any idea that within the scope of your duty you did not act on behalf of the SAP?

MR DE KOCK: No, I acted completely within the scope of the SAP.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. Let us look at your political motive. If we look at Section 23(f) of Act 34 of '95, your motive with the commission of this crime, or with your action, was to maintain the national dispensation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Your motive was not exactly only the prevention of a robbery which would fill the coffers of the ANC, but your information indicated that it would be MK members who were going to commit the robbery.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was in the interests of combatting urban terrorism.

MR CORNELIUS: And if we study the evidence that you have given, you testified and said that at least one of them was a military member of the ANC, a serving member. And this was said in reference to Tiso.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And usually C-Section acted, and in fact it was established to prevent persons because there was a lack of evidence against such persons, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Consequently then, you would have to be very thorough in your observation of any information or evidence from your informer and the handler of this informer.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And you would have to have complete confidence in that evidence before you acted.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, one would have to trust the source and not fall into a trap oneself.

MR CORNELIUS: And if I listen to your evidence, you had full confidence in this handler, Holtzhausen and his source, van Zyl.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, by nature of the situation, due to previous matters during which persons had been apprehended, that confidence was created and continued to exist.

MR CORNELIUS: And you had no reason to doubt it?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And there has been no evidence before the Committee before this point, which indicated that you had any reason to doubt it?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: If we look at gravity, it would have been grave if they had succeeded in the robbery and obtained the money. Do you agree?

MR DE KOCK: Would you repeat that please.

MR CORNELIUS: It would be serious if they had succeeded in the robbery and managed to obtain the money which would have been used to further the objectives of MK?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would have led to a great deal of violence and other similar matters.

MR CORNELIUS: And you understood that this was a case where there could be no doubt that C10 had to act.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And in contrast with previous amnesty applications during which you have given evidence, we here have the full cooperation of the Murder and Robbery Unit.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And during previous actions there would usually be a request from the Security Branch and then you would have to take the initiative in acting, but in this case Murder and Robbery did all the homework for you and simply required your cooperation, or your assistance. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, well we collected the information and then contacted Murder and Robbery and from that point onwards the cooperative situation existed.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, but if we study the evidence it would appear that especially Chris Geldenhuys and Holtzhausen were reasonably in control of the operation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Holtzhausen would represent C1 and Geldenhuys would be the representative from Murder and Robbery.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes. Thus you would have accepted that there was a decision from the Murder and Robbery Unit that this was a case in which they would have to act?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely, Chairperson. I mentioned that there was a robbery aspect apart from the political aspect to the matter.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes. And it cannot be said that you as Unit Commander of C-Section, went on a frolic of your own.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there was no frolic.

MR CORNELIUS: Then it had to have been a joint frolic from Murder and Robbery as well?

MR DE KOCK: No, I have never frolicked in my entire life.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. Would you agree with me that the footsoldiers would have had no reason to doubt that these victims would be armed with eastern block weapons or some or other form of weapon?

MR DE KOCK: That was my information as well.

MR CORNELIUS: And there was no reason for the footsoldiers to doubt your orders to them?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And previously you have confirmed that everybody worked on a need-to-know basis and that is was not expected that an instruction be questioned or that any further enquiries be made about an order.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. Let me just qualify by saying that if a person did not wish to participate in an operation, I would allow that person not to be part of the operation. There were various such occasions. And I would give only basic information to the persons, especially if it was a cross-border operation. If they did not wish to participate they would sit out and I would select somebody else.

MR CORNELIUS: Thus the footsoldiers could have accepted that there was a very strong possibility that the order had been approved from a higher authority and this would naturally be fortified by the action of someone like Gen Engelbrecht, who was helping them to cover up their stories?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that perception existed, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: If you had knowledge that the victims were not armed, I assume that you would have established a normal roadblock?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: An ambush, as has been testified before this Committee and before Judge Miller regarding the Piet Retief incident, was set up in order to eliminate the persons.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, one would stop that opposition in its tracks.

MR CORNELIUS: In English they call it an ambush.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And also in military terms.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: If you had given an order that a person such as Tiso had to be killed, it would be expected that Vermeulen and Britz would have to execute the orders.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: The applicant, Nortje, was a reasonably senior officer of C10 at that stage.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And he was the senior to Vermeulen and Britz, the applicants.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not in terms of rank, but in terms of years or years of service at C10, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes. And it would have been expected that Vermeulen and Britz would execute the order of Nortje.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would have been an order from me to them, he was the intermediary.

MR CORNELIUS: I understand. Would you then further agree that the reason for the actions by the footsoldiers in this operation would not have been for financial gain? Would you agree?

MR DE KOCK: No, that was never even an idea.

MR CORNELIUS: And by nature of the situation there could not be any element of vengeance or malice towards any of the victims?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: It was purely their political affiliation which rendered them victims.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Members of the Committee.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr van den Berg, questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, when did you realise that you and your unit were not indispensable?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by nature of my service it was not a question of being indispensable or not, people could do with you what they wanted, they could get rid of you if they wanted, if they wanted to disband units they could do that.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Wasn't there a stage where you realised that the writing was on the wall, that you were expendable, to use the English word.

MR DE KOCK: By nature of our work, all of us were regarded as expendable by the higher hierarchy. We could have been wounded or killed or captured at any point and they didn't have a problem with that.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You gave evidence regarding the fact that the activities of your unit began to change, that it was no longer specifically political by nature, but more criminal and crime oriented. Can you recall that evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: But you were primarily an operational unit, if I have it correctly.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: When did you resign from the police?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at the end of March 1993, I was discharged from the Force with a package against my will.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Nonetheless you did leave. I hear what you're saying, that it was against your will.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: What were the reasons for that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, from Gen Engelbrecht's side I understood that the ANC - and this was discussed at various meetings, that C1 had to disband and I personally did not regard it as necessary to leave the Force. I had spent many years working in the uniform branch. I was experienced as a Station Commander or as a Unit Commander in a managerial capacity. And Gen Engelbrecht told me that I was obliged to take this package.

The inference that I drew was that I had been involved in the Harms Commission and that I was contaminated as a result of this. The reason why I have said this is because Cpt Paul van Dyk and Col Vermeulen, who were also involved in the Harms Commission, were also paid off and not one of us were askaris. This was actually only meant for the askaris, this pay-off.

MR VAN DEN BERG: When did you realise for the first time that this would be the end of your career? When did the facts begin to indicate that this is what would ensue?

MR DE KOCK: There was never any indication that this was the end of my career, there was also not a definite indication that the unit would disband. People were transferred to other units or other cities or other provinces. It was a continuous process of reconstruction so to speak.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The matters which emerged from your criminal trial were all matters which took place before you resigned.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And I see ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: No, Mr Chairman, despite my client's answer, that is not entirely correct. Weapons were provided to Inkatha after the time.

CHAIRPERSON: That was also part of the criminal trial.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I'm indebted to Mr Hattingh.

Your amnesty application, this deals with incidents which occurred just before your resignation. Is that the same position or is it the position with the criminal trial?

MR DE KOCK: No, my application has to do with matters which took place as far as October 1993.

MR VAN DEN BERG: That would be approximately 67 months after your resignation?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I have not studied the entire application. Could you just give me an indication, if one looks at the sort of violations that you are speaking of, the majority of these were committed before the 2nd of February 1990. Am I correct if I assume that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And how many incidents came into existence after the 2nd of February 1990?

MR DE KOCK: I haven't counted. I do not wish to guess or speculate.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Approximately? As I've said, I have not studied the entire application, so I'm just looking for guidance from you.

MR DE KOCK: I would say three or four, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Can we look at Exhibit C, that would be the statement that you compiled regarding the activities of Vlakplaas. Do you have it before you, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: There is a heading on page 56 about Vlakplaas' finances. Do you see that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Might I refer you pertinently to paragraph 2.5.9 on page 58.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, I have it.

MR VAN DEN BERG: It reads as follows

"Members of Vlakplaas would often have to act beyond the parameters of the law, with the risks that accompanied it. Along with this, they would have to encounter great danger and depravation. They never received any bonuses for this. I decided that from time to time I would pay out such bonuses to them. The bonuses were paid for selfless duty and not as an incentive to kill activists. The bonuses were also paid out by means of false claims."

Do you see that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And you confirm that evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: This process of the payment of bonuses, when did it begin?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am not certain, I think that it was somewhere in the vicinity of 1989 or 1990.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Because there is evidence from, among others - perhaps I should not put it as strictly, there is evidence from for example, Mr Mamasela and Mr Nofomela, that from time to time they were paid additional monies. Do you have any knowledge about this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it was paid out to them. However, I did not pay anything to Mamasela, I filled out many claims for him during the Harms Commission and then gave the money to Generals van Rensburg or Engelbrecht, and these were large amounts. With regard to Nofomela, I cannot recall, I think he and Mamasela were promoted after the shooting of Gen Nyanda, which was just another way of saying that this was a reward for illegal duty.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Therefore if I understand your evidence correctly, this payment of bonuses began approximately in 1989 or 1990.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is my recollection.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And what was the practice, when would it be paid? Can you think of any examples?

MR DE KOCK: There was no fixed practice, it would have taken place with a specific occasion or in the heat of the moment. It wasn't a standard practice as such.

MR VAN DEN BERG: When you say that it wasn't a standard practice, you can also not say that it took place on a monthly or bi-monthly or fortnightly basis?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I already asked you about Nofomela and Mamasela. If we look specifically at this incident, the Nelspruit incident and the death of Tiso Leballo, it would appear that Mr Gevers received money. Do you know about that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: It would also appear that it was R2 000 per month for two to three months, of which he isn't entirely certain. Mr Britz in his application, states that it was R200 per month for two months. Do you have any recollection of which amount is correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, I don't, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Then Mr Swart maintains that he received less than R2 000. Can you comment on that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And over and above this there was also an amount of R20 000 which was paid out to the informer. Do you know about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was an amount which was paid out to the informer. An informer would be paid, by nature of the situation.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Now we are not entirely certain whether it was the full R20 000 or a lesser amount, do you know anything about it?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I don't know what the amount was, but the full amount would have been paid out to the informer.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And then if we look further, in the application of Mr Gouws, he says that he received approximately R1 000 from Gen Smit. Do you know anything about that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Klopper states that he received informer fees, as he put it. Do you know anything about that?

MR DE KOCK: It is impossible because he wasn't an informer.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, may I just inform you that the aspect of informer fees emerged from an initial written statement made by Mr Klopper. This matter was also handled during the Komatiepoort incident hearing and Mr Klopper did address the matter and informed the relevant Committee about it, and stated that basically he confirmed Mr de Kock's evidence. I just want to put that on record.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but the statement that Mr van den Berg put is in the light of these documents.

MR LAMEY: Yes, I just wanted to put it for the sake of Mr van den Berg's interest maybe. He does not know that evidence has been given about this before.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, very well.

MR HATTINGH: I beg your pardon for interrupting, Mr Chairperson. I just want to know whether the statement is made that Mr Klopper received informer's fees with respect to the Nelspruit incident.

CHAIRPERSON: No, it was not clearly put, but by implication it could be. It was put within the context of amounts which were paid out with regard to this incident itself, so it is probably within that context.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr de Kock, if you look at Mr Klopper's application, this is on page 100 of the bundle and the following pages, he states on page 104 in answer to the question

"Were you in any way benefitted financial or otherwise?"

And he answers:

"Yes."

The next question:

"If so, explain the nature and scope thereof.

And he states:

"Informer fees."

I would probably have to establish from Mr Kloppers if this has to do with this particular incident or another incident, but it is just my statement that he did receive monies from time to time.

MR DE KOCK: No, he did not receive any kind of financial reward, none whatsoever.

MR VAN DEN BERG: If I study your evidence-in-chief and your written application, it would appear to me as if the first time that you came to know of the events which gave rise to the incident, was during the period of the Carousel incident, either during or just before. Am I correct in my summary thereof?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain. I don't have an independent recollection of the precise time of obtaining the information.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You were not present when the first operation at Coin Security would have been executed, were you?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Which information was conveyed to you with regard to that incident? That would be the first incident at Coin.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, basically it was in line with the information which was provided regarding the Nelspruit shooting, that once again we had to do with militarily trained persons and that a robber was going to be committed for the purposes of funding political organisations.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Can you recall pertinently the period of time and what information was conveyed to you with regard to Tiso Leballo?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that he was a trained MK member, that he was still politically active, that he was politically involved and that he worked for Mrs Mandela.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You cannot dispute that Mr Leballo began to work for Mrs Mandela only in March on that particular year?

MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And what information was conveyed to you regarding the other persons who were involved in the robbery?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that they were MK members, that they were trained persons, that they were persons with a military background or military training.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Were any names mentioned to you, can you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there may have been names.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I'm also appearing on behalf of Mrs Mpashike, her son Lawrence Nyalinda was later killed in this incident. He was not a military trained person. Can you dispute that?

MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot.

MR VAN DEN BERG: However, for a certain period he was in Zimbabwe, where he completed his schooling. But between South Africa and Zimbabwe, he travelled with his own documentation and without any kind of illegality which was involved in that. Can you dispute this?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The date for the second robbery, if we might put it that way, the matter during which the four persons were killed and Leballo was arrested, how was that date determined? Do you know anything about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. I have a vague recollection that this was a date upon which the robbers had decided, it was simply a question of exercising control over the robbery which was to take place. I have no independent recollection of how the date was fixed.

MR VAN DEN BERG: It did not have anything to do with the fact that you would be in the Eastern Transvaal at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, on the contrary I vaguely recall that I actually wanted to go to the Western Transvaal, due to problems in Boputhatswana, due to friction which was taking place there, and that I told Gen Engelbrecht - I asked Gen Engelbrecht to send Capt Baker, my second-in-command, and that he refused, he said that I had to go. ...(transcriber's own translation).

MR VAN DEN BERG: That you had to go to this meeting in the Eastern Transvaal?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. I had all sorts of information regarding the stockpiles which were on the other side of the game reserve's border, almost visible, but this was dealt with later.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The information note which was prepared before the incident, do you know about it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And if one studies it - it is on page 375 of the bundle, do you see that it is about arms smuggling?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Therefore it was not an exact version of what precisely was going to take place, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, probably not, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Do you know whether an information note was compiled before the previous incident, the first matter pertaining to the Coin Security company?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall. I'm not certain, but I suspect that there may have been one. However, I cannot put my word on that.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And this information note, the date of this note is the 24th of March 1990, is that correct? With regard to the note. Or was the note compiled later?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am not certain.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Now in terms of the Nelspruit incident itself, as I understood your planning you would simply have undertaken observation. That would be you and Nortje.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Why was it arranged as such?

MR DE KOCK: Because I had to go through the following morning early to the game reserve and by becoming involved in a shooting incident, I would not necessarily have been able to go, it would have complicated the situation. The planning was of such a nature that I would not be on the scene.

MR VAN DEN BERG: But the fact of the matter remains that there were people on the scene who left the scene before the other police officers arrived there. You could have done the same, couldn't you? It wasn't necessary for you to remain there after the shooting, would you agree with me?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I understand that you were not a participant to the planning, but can you inform us about the fact that after the shooting petrol was poured over the bodies and the vehicle was set alight? Do you know anything about the reason for that?

MR DE KOCK: No, it may have possibly been mentioned during discussions, it may have been an idea. But I do not know whether any information was given to me at any stage, that this would be the case. It would not have served any purpose. There wasn't any objective that we sought to achieve by using petrol to set the vehicle alight.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Previously I appeared in the Kwandabele 9 matter, where there was a specific reason for the use of petrol and that was to place the blame for the incident on the shoulders of another party. Would you agree with that? That was usually the reason for burning the bodies as such.

MR DE KOCK: It is possible, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: But you say that reason was not of application in this instance?

MR DE KOCK: No, because we made use of official duty weapons and official duty vehicles. It is not a question of shooting people and setting them alight and disappearing.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You mention in your application on page 7 of the bundle - and this is with regard to the point where the vehicle caught flame. There you say

"When the minibus began to burn I realised for the first time that not everything was in order and I went to stand at the top of the embankment again."

What did you mean by that?

MR DE KOCK: It is my recollection that it was never discussed with me, that it was not part of the entire planning process. The comprehensive planning did also not include this. And if they had adopted such a decision I would not have opposed it, but one would certainly have wanted to know what the purpose behind this was. And that is why I put it as such in this document.

MR VAN DEN BERG: If one looks - Mr Chairperson, I do have extracts from the book which was produced out of these incidents, the book "A long night's damage", by the applicant and as told to Jeremy Gordon. I do have extracts from it, but there is just a single portion which I wanted to put to the applicant and that's on page 219.

And it is basically the same thing as what I have already put to you. There you say:

"Once the minibus had been set alight, I realised there was something fishy going on."

What is the extent of that?

MR DE KOCK: As I have said, there were events taking place here which were not part of the planning and I was not informed about these events. As I've already said, I would not have opposed it, but one would usually do something if one wanted to achieve a particular objective.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The information that you gave or that you had with regard to Tiso, was that he was an ANC member.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Was the involvement of the PAC ever mentioned during this incident?

MR DE KOCK: No, not according to my recollection, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Do you know of ANC members who were arrested for bank robberies on behalf of the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, now yes, because one reads the papers, but at that stage the information indicated that they were trained members and that trained ANC members were involved in crime, among others, robberies. But this was a facet of which I knew. I did not know about the national spectrum of who was doing what.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And would you dispute it that there was no single ANC-type application for amnesty for a bank robbery?

ADV DE JAGER: I don't think that is correct, there was such an application in Rustenburg.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr de Jager.

ADV DE JAGER: I don't know what happened to the application, but I know that such an application was submitted.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I will follow that up, thank you. MR LAMEY: Mr Chairperson, I beg your pardon, I just wish to make a point that there is an ANC/MK member - and it was reported to doing the Rapolla decision, who under the former Indemnity Act, obtained indemnity for among others, robbery.

CHAIRPERSON: On behalf of who?

MR LAMEY: I don't know what the details are, it was just reported in the decision that it was an ANC/MK member. But the criteria which were reported in the Rapolla incident are very similar to what the Committee had to apply when deciding on amnesty. I just wanted to mention this. I thought it could be left for argument, but ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I don't know if ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr van den Berg, I just want to put it clearly, I think that the ANC's official viewpoint was that they did not allow robberies. So I don't mean to say that those allegations which were made in the application are incorrect.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Well let me put it like this, Mr de Kock. Would you dispute that the ANC's official viewpoint was that their members would not be involved in bank robberies?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, I think I gave evidence to that effect, but similarly to our government at that time, it was not always the same as what happened on ground level.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The involvement of Mrs Mandela in this incident, when did this come to your knowledge, or at least the alleged involvement or her alleged connection?

MR DE KOCK: The information was conveyed to me by Sgt Holtzhausen as this robbery situation developed.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And you must have been aware at that time that there was a campaign which had been launched against Mrs Mandela.

MR DE KOCK: There has always been a campaign against Mrs Mandela.

MR VAN DEN BERG: That is correct if one looks at her experiences in Brandfort.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Didn't you discuss or plan that this would be the perfect opportunity during which you could implicate her in a matter which would definitely embarrass her, which would be embarrassing for her and the ANC and would certainly place the National Party in a suitable light?

MR DE KOCK: It would have placed the country in a topsy-turvy situation. There was no such discussion.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Perhaps my question is misleading. Didn't you discuss whether there was a possibility to arrest this gang and then expose the ANC in such actions according to information?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Didn't you ever consider it?

MR DE KOCK: No, we planned the ambush and decided that we should lure the gang into the ambush and shoot them.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Just a few singular aspects. In the affidavit of Mr Klopper - I just want to find the correct passage. His affidavit appears on page 241. If one looks at page 243, he quotes the following and I would just like to hear your commentary regarding this.

"There was an armed robbery in Witbank where a white woman was shot in the head. Dougie Holtzhausen had a source, Ben van Zyl. Ben was a former detective from the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit. Ben provided information that a certain gang was responsible for the murder in Witbank. Gene de Kock wanted to teach the robbers a lesson and an action against them was planned."

Do you agree with that evidence or do you dispute it?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I would dispute it. There was a robbery in Witbank, during which people were shot dead in a bank. Among others, a white woman was shot through the head. The request came via the Witbank Security Branch or the former Crime Intelligence Service and I sent a group of people under the leadership of Scholtz and somebody else.

These were former Koevoet members and trackers and former SAP members. We never caught these persons even though we spent three days working in the environment, and there was never any indication that it wasn't the situation.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Chairperson, I think I'm through, can I just have a look at my notes that I've taken during the course of this morning and ascertain if there's anything else I need to clarify.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I don't have any further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DEN BERG

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr van den Berg. Mr Francis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR FRANCIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, how many times have you lied about the activities of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Would you repeat that please.

MR FRANCIS: How many times did you lie about the activities of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: That I told lies?

MR FRANCIS: Yes.

MR DE KOCK: During the Harms Commission we told many lies about Vlakplaas, we lied all the time.

MR FRANCIS: Where else?

MR DE KOCK: And then during the post-mortem inquests of the Maponya incident.

MR FRANCIS: Where else?

MR DE KOCK: The shooting at Piet Retief.

MR FRANCIS: Where else?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, you will have to refresh my memory.

MR FRANCIS: Did you appear before the Goldstone Commission?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR FRANCIS: Did you tell lies there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, not with regard to everything, but yes I did mislead them.

MR FRANCIS: Did you tell lies to Cpt Klopper or Cpt Albert in Nelspruit, about your involvement?

MR DE KOCK: No, I simply referred him and told him to go to Gen Geldenhuys, I didn't have the script.

MR FRANCIS: But you lied there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, well I didn't inform him, so we could accept that I misled him.

MR FRANCIS: What motivated you to tell lies?

MR DE KOCK: To protect myself, my people.

MR FRANCIS: Against what?

MR DE KOCK: Against prosecution.

MR FRANCIS: So am I correct to say that you're a master of deception?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR FRANCIS: That you'd basically lie at every given opportunity?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is not what this forum is here for.

MR FRANCIS: But don't you find it strange that Engelbrecht himself called you a liar?

MR DE KOCK: One would expect that, we did the same thing with Dirk Coetzee. That is how it worked in that set-up.

MR FRANCIS: Did you lie to your counsel when you appeared at the criminal trial?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I informed them of that which I knew and other aspects I kept to myself because I did not want to embarrass them ethically.

MR FRANCIS: But it's quite true that your counsel would not have lied to the Court.

MR DE KOCK: Absolutely not.

MR FRANCIS: And do you recall that ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, may I just interpose here. If Mr Francis would study the record of Mr de Kock's trial, he will see that versions were not put. There were singular exceptions with regard to the Nelspruit incident and that was when the evidence given by State witnesses was merely tested. And as I've said, these are singular exceptions. At the beginning my attitude to Mr de Kock was either a defence and you tell me what your defence is and I will defend you accordingly. If you do not have a defence, then we can test whether the State can prove its case, but we would rather not want to know what the truth is. Only upon the presentation of evidence for sentencing was Mr de Kock's complete version submitted.

CHAIRPERSON: Therefore there was no evidence regarding the merits of the matter?

MR HATTINGH: No, he did not give any evidence regarding the merits of the matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Thank you, Mr Hattingh.

MR FRANCIS: Your Worship, obviously I think I will come and I will later I think lead some evidence about what version was put to Geldenhuys, and I think I'll refer the witness just now to it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think Mr Hattingh has indicated that with a few exceptions, generally the versions of the State witnesses were tested as counsel is ethically obliged to do in terms of the rules under those circumstances that Mr Hattingh has sketched to us.

MR FRANCIS: Mr Chairperson, obviously I think - let me rather deal with the version that was given, that appears on the record, that was put Geldenhuys.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, very well.

MR FRANCIS: Let me ask you this first. You recall that Geldenhuys testified at the criminal Court case against you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he gave evidence there.

MR FRANCIS: And you recall also that Geldenhuys testified that he saw you shooting at the kombi?

MR DE KOCK: Would you repeat that? Did I see him shooting?

MR FRANCIS: Do you recall that he said that he saw you shooting at the kombi?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I cannot recall that he said that, but if he says that and it is on the record, I will accept it as such.

MR FRANCIS: The ...(indistinct) appears on page 596 and 597 of the record of the criminal proceedings and I've made copies for the benefit of the Commissioners.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairperson, once again I apologise for interrupting. We held a pre-hearing conference where Mr Francis was present and ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR HATTINGH: ... Ms Patel requested us to submit any other documentation which we wished to use for the purposes of this hearing, so that there can be sufficient prior notice. We did not say that we would use the record of the criminal trial. It is quite an extensive document and for that reason we decided that it simply wasn't worth it. We were never informed however that extracts from the record would be used, and now we sit here completely unprepared, we have not studied the record, we do not have it before us. Mr Francis ought to have informed Ms Patel that they were going to use it so that we could have been prepared for this event.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Mr Francis, ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, from my side may I just make a submission. We are also in the position that I was not even involved in the de Kock trial and we only have certain aspects of evidence, we do not have everything. I don't even have a copy of the decision of Judge van der Merwe, to which has been previously referred and I'm also in the somewhat uncomfortable position of not having the relevant documentation at my disposal. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we note that. What I just wanted to enquire, Mr Francis, is it possible for you to deal with other aspects of the matter and to possibly hold over the references to the record. We don't have very much sitting time left this afternoon and you could perhaps, between the time when we adjourn and we reconvene on Monday, perhaps make available those sections that you do intend to use, to give the other parties just an opportunity. Is it possible for you to continue with something else without dealing with the specifics now?

MR FRANCIS: Mr Chairperson, I think it is possible, but I think I need to put the following on record. At the pretrial conference that we had at the TRC, I think Mr Lamey had undertaken to let us have, I think, Exhibit E. It was going to be given to us I think on the Friday before this hearing actually commenced and we only received this on the Tuesday. But I think I would be able to proceed without - I can proceed without you know, referring to the record.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it's not always possible - we try to make the proceedings as fair as possible, we try to cut out on situations of surprise or embarrassment and so on, but it's obviously not possible in a matter particularly of this nature, where there has been a record of thousands upon thousands of pages of evidence. Things happen as the hearing proceeds, so there are always situations where we have to be pragmatic. So you know, within those bounds you know, we're trying to be fair to everybody, so there's no - we're not living in a perfect world, so you know obviously the parties will bear that in mind.

I will try to ensure that there's nothing unfair that happens to any of the parties. So I think under those circumstances, Mr Francis, it might assist and if you're prepared to carry on with something and then give your colleagues the extracts that you are in fact going to refer to.

MR FRANCIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. I think maybe what I should do is to refer them just to some of the portions that - because I believe that they are in possession of the criminal records. I think the one that I intend ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Well we would like to have copies too please. ...(indistinct) that's why there's a pretrial conference. And if you could give us copies too so that we could have a look at it too.

MR FRANCIS: Mr Chair, I do in fact have - it's not bulky documents, I do have the documents present and I think I could probably hand it out now and they would have the opportunity to look at this over the weekend, but it's not bulky.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no, don't interrupt your cross-examination, you can do that when we adjourn. If you need the assistance of Ms Patel, she is there to assist you. So I think carry on and we will do the logistics afterwards. It's really not an insurmountable problem this one. So please proceed.

MR FRANCIS: No, it's not - I do have the copies present. I've made copies for the Commissioners and for the parties, Chair.

Mr de Kock, can you tell us how it became known that you were involved in the Nelspruit killings?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think that this is as a result of Mr Klopper's evidence before the Goldstone Commission. Gen Engelbrecht knew that I had fired shots.

MR FRANCIS: Is it also not so that at the time, or at the scene there was a photographer of somebody who - clippings that were made? And I think you were basically seen amongst one of the police officers who were standing aside.

MR DE KOCK: I think that it was on video, Chairperson.

MR FRANCIS: And that's obviously I think when the police started digging into your activities.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not then, not at all. We still enjoyed the full protection of the National Party and the government.

MR FRANCIS: But did your leaders then deny any knowledge about the activities of Vlakplaas, if you were doing it on behalf of the National Party?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the exposure of Vlakplaas and its activities was similar to the CCB, and that would have brought the government of the day to a fall. And at that stage it would definitely without a doubt, have ceased the discussions at Codessa.

MR FRANCIS: Again I want to come back to what Engelbrecht says about you, he calls you a liar. He says you lied every given opportunity.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there are other situations which Gen Engelbrecht undersigned for example, my promotion to a full Colonel, where he said completely the opposite. So I suppose he sets his sails according to the way the wind blows.

MR FRANCIS: Well I think you are quite aware that he had given Exhibit A to this Commission ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Francis, whatever Engelbrecht would say can't influence me. I've got to decide whether he's a liar on his evidence and whatever Engelbrecht's opinion is, I may decide Engelbrecht is a liar.

MR FRANCIS: Mr Commissioner ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: So I'm not - I don't see the relevance.

MR FRANCIS: I think, Mr Chairperson, I think evidence was led that he got instructions from Engelbrecht and I think it's - it's basically I think, you know tied into this whole question I think of the course and scope, which I think is one of the criteria that the Commission I think will have to look at.

ADV DE JAGER: He said he operated on his own initiative here, not on Engelbrecht's instructions. That was his evidence before us.

MR FRANCIS: Well Mr Chairperson, I think that only came afterwards, after he had filed a supplementary affidavit and I think after some of the footsoldiers I think had said that they got the impression that de Kock had spoken to Engelbrecht about it. And I think he specifically deals with the question I think, whether or not he had - whether he covered up the statements and the like. And I think he also deals with the question of the "inligtings nota".

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well I think it's fair if you're so instructed to put Mr Engelbrecht's version to Mr de Kock for his response. So please go ahead.

MR FRANCIS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. If the Chairperson can bear with me.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

MR FRANCIS: The first portion I think it amongst Exhibit A and then there's an annexure to Exhibit A ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Are you referring to the affidavit of Mr Engelbrecht?

MR FRANCIS: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR FRANCIS: And I think he refers to E2 at page 9 thereof, and in particular I think he refers to 9.8

"I realise now to what extent Mr de Kock and his people abused me over the years by lying to my and by doing it in such a convincing manner and by submitting certain documentation which led to the fact that I believed them and was prepared to lie about their apparent innocence."

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I think that it would be justified for me to say here that Mr Engelbrecht is the Houdini of all liars, that he himself who is Gen Engelbrecht arranged a murder in cooperation with the Murder and Robbery Unit of the Eastern Rand, where a source of Capt Willem Coetzee, who is also known as Timo Coetzee, was fetched from the cells, Gen Engelbrecht himself arranged it with Britz, he himself arranged with Snyman to create a stockpile location. The man was shot dead because he had been involved in an armed robbery and was then prepared to make full statements regarding Timo Coetzee and other members of the Soweto Intelligence Service. I know that the Attorney-General has made no attempt to approach this matter and that it is not part of the bundles, but I know exactly what happened during the Harms Commission, I know about the cover-ups, I know about the death of Brian Ngulunga, in which Gen Engelbrecht certainly had his share, and I am afraid that Mr Engelbrecht is misleading you with his statement.

MR FRANCIS: Well he says the following also on page 11 of the said document, para 10.3

"De Kock's allegation that I would have said that he could steal money by submitting false claims in order to increase his package, is to say the very least ridiculous and I deny it emphatically."

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is the truth and once again I will launch the request - it is not a challenge, I will sit in the middle of this floor and Gen Engelbrecht can sit next to me and we can attach ourselves to a polygraph machine and see who is lying and I can guarantee you I will be the one who is telling the truth.

MR FRANCIS: And also on page 10 of this document he says the following, and it's paragraph 9.12

"Finally, I would like to refer to the extract from de Kock's book as it appears in bundle 2A on page 13, where he apparently alleges that I falsified travel and accommodation claims during 1990. By looking at the relevant documentation it is ludicrous and I deny this allegation emphatically."

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is not correct. There has already been evidence, especially with regard to the Maponya situation and what took place there, not only with regard to travel and accommodation but with regard to the petrol register. I understand Gen Engelbrecht's situation, he would not admit it just as nobody has heard of Vlakplaas and nobody fought against the ANC.

MR FRANCIS: And in that same document that I'm referring you to, on page 7 at para 9.3 he says the following about you

"It would appear that de Kock and his members decided to lie about their involvement in the murder of Japie Maponya by immediately submitting false travel and accommodation claims in order to create an alibi for themselves. As it would appear from the statements made by J P Kleynhans, bundle 2A, page 203 and further, the Krugersdorp officially denied the murder of Maponya, that all of this took place many years before the McNally/Coradie investigation when I myself appeared on the panel in terms of Vlakplaas and its members."

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I will take it somewhat further back, with reference to the Harms Commission. The Zwelibanzi Nyanda incident was also investigated because Nofomela spoke about it and we denied that we were ever involved in it. The claims that we submitted at that time for travel and accommodation were false. It wasn't a false claim that one did deserve, the falseness thereof was that I for example was signed out to be working in the Empangeni vicinity, but in the meantime I was actually shooting people in Swaziland. That is where the deception enters the picture.

And Gen Engelbrecht fully investigated this situation because he had to have x-rays made of the foot of Geoff Bosigo. He also said that it might have been necessary to amputate Bosigo's foot. So he knew exactly what was going on. Engelbrecht is entirely incorrect, very incorrect.

MR FRANCIS: And then just one final aspect. On page 8, paragraph 9.4 - I'm not certain if I've put this to you

"It is a known fact that de Kock over a period of years on various occasions, whether oral or written, lied with regard to the death of Maponya. In fact de Kock often lied so convincingly that he convinced everyone, including the officials who were involved in investigations."

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they helped us to compile our statements. I do not have the investigative background to get away with it. The State could at any time have arrested us. The situation would have been the same as today. And it is not a situation that we were so good that we could mislead anybody, I assure you.

MR FRANCIS: Then I would just like to return to Exhibit A, that's paragraph 3.6. There is the following, and once again this was said by Engelbrecht. Page 3, 3.6

"Furthermore, I am informed by my attorney that during the hearing of the Maponya incident both de Kock and Nortje were placed under cross-examination and they conceded that they had never informed me about the true facts and that they had also misled me as many other persons had done so in other institutions. This concession was made despite the fact that both of them have already upon previous occasions, including their amnesty applications and their evidence-in-chief during the relevant amnesty hearings, had alleged that I knew about certain situations and offences and that I had made myself guilty of defeating the ends of justice. This record is not yet available."

MR DE KOCK: He knew full well what was going on Chairperson. They did the same with Dirk Coetzee as what is being done now. And Gen Engelbrecht himself arranged a murder. So I have no doubt about it. And this is not the forum in which to rectify this situation.

MR FRANCIS: And I think the final point before I depart from this. Once again Exhibit A, annexure E1. That would be the same document, page 3, paragraph 3.6. And I read

"It would appear that the members of Vlakplaas in many instances submitted false claims to Adv McNally and that such false claims were basically reiterated during the Harms Commission, and in some cases also during the Court proceedings which ensued. The allegation of Mr de Kock, that I was actively instrumental in this process by covering up evidence which was given is simply not true. It would appear that I was physically not in any position to do this and this can only be ascribed the involved members own capacity to manipulate evidence and to submit false evidence."

3.7

"It is a know fact that certain political organisations were unbanned on the 2nd of February 1990 and that the role of the former Security Branch, in the light thereof, had to change dramatically. I myself was not involved in the initial process in this regard seeing as it was only on the 5th of November 1990 that I began to work at the Security Branch with Brig N van Rensburg, when I took over his position from the 1st of January 1991."

Your commentary please.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, General Engelbrecht is incorrect. Before his permanent transfer he had already taken statements from the Security Branch members at head office and he was appointed as the chief investigating officer and he was assisted by Col du Plessis for example, who was then again directly involved in murders in the Eastern Cape. That is how the entire thing was handled and controlled.

I can give you another example. There was a member from Bloemfontein by the name of Johannes Mbelo, who was transferred to Vlakplaas so that he could work in crowd control situation. No, Mr Engelbrecht is misleading you very effectively, but I suppose that that is part of the process of how the Security Branches operated.

MR FRANCIS: I think one of the requirements of this amnesty hearing, Mr de Kock, is there has to be full disclosure. Do you agree with me?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR FRANCIS: Now we're faced with somebody I think who admits that he's basically lied on every given occasion.

MR DE KOCK: You can get away with it if you have the assistance from above, there is no other way to get away with it.

MR FRANCIS: At what stage do we start believing - how do we start believing that the version that you're giving to this Commission is the correct one, when ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: Isn't that something for the Committee to decide?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Actually it is, but what is the effect of the proposition that you want to put? Bearing in mind of course that that is where the final responsibility lies for making a judgment on that question by this Panel.

MR FRANCIS: Mr Chairperson, I think I'll probably leave it for later, but I think I will deal with this later.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, perhaps it's better dealt with in argument eventually. Yes. Does that take care of this particular aspect of the cross-examination? Are you about to move to something else?

MR FRANCIS: I think it does and it may be an appropriate opportunity to ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Yes, we've come to the end of the proceedings today. We will adjourn at this stage and we will reconvene here coming Monday at 10 o'clock in the morning. We're adjourned.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS