MR BOOYENS: We call as the next applicant, Mr Pieter Botha, Mr Chairman. You will find his application starting at page 45 of the documents.
MR SIBANYONI: Mr Botha, English or Afrikaans?
MR BOTHA: Afrikaans please.
MR SIBANYONI: Your full names for the purpose of the record.
PIETER HENDRIK BOTHA: (sworn states)
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, please be seated. Sworn in, Chairperson.
EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Botha, from page 45 to 61, you have provided your personal background and so forth, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR BOOYENS: And do you confirm the correctness thereof?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I do.
MR BOOYENS: From what time were you at Vlakplaas?
MR BOTHA: Initially, directly after my training in 1983, I arrived at Vlakplaas and shortly thereafter I was transferred to the Research Desk and began to work there permanently in April 1985.
MR BOOYENS: Very well. Let us proceed to page 64, where you deal specifically with the merits of this case. Now, can you recall a rendezvous at the House of Coffees, near the Security Head Office?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I can.
MR BOOYENS: Who was there?
MR BOTHA: Col de Kock and Capt Baker, myself, Wouter Mentz, Rian Bellingan and then I'm uncertain whether Willie Nortje and Charlie Chate were both there or whether it was only Willie Nortje who was there, but one of the two was there.
MR BOOYENS: Possibly both or are you not certain?
MR BOTHA: I'm not certain about both, but one of the two would have been used.
MR BOOYENS: Very well. A discussion took place there regarding the deceased in this matter.
MR BOTHA: Yes, there was such a discussion.
MR BOOYENS: What was it about, substantially?
MR BOTHA: The discussion entailed that Mr de Kock told us that Brian Ngqulunga had defected to the ANC and that he was a double agent and for that reason he had to be eliminated.
MR BOOYENS: I see. Did Col de Kock give any indication as to whether this was his own idea or whether this was an instruction that he had received?
MR BOTHA: Well it was my conclusion that it was an order from above.
MR BOOYENS: When you say "above", do you mean higher up in the hierarchy?
MR BOTHA: Yes, in the rank structure, or from the Commanders. I cannot say specifically who.
MR BOOYENS: Well he wouldn't have told you who specifically gave him the instruction.
MR BOTHA: No.
MR BOOYENS: But what you can recall from the discussion is that it was not Mr de Kock's idea, that this was an order that he had received from above?
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: What was the ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: It was not Mr de Kock's idea that this was an order he had received from above?
MR BOOYENS: No, I think you go the wrong interpretation there, Mr Chairman. Can I ask the question again?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: Was it your impression that Col de Kock did not have this idea by himself but had received this instruction from above, was that your inference?
MR BOTHA: Yes, definitely.
MR BOOYENS: Now, he said that the man had defected and so forth and were the possible consequences of such a defection discussed there?
MR BOTHA: Yes, very briefly. We were briefly referred to the fact that some of the attacks and murders of policemen on the East Rand, were a possible result of that, of the information that we had been provided with at that stage.
MR BOOYENS: And what instructions did you receive?
MR BOTHA: We received instructions to eliminate him.
MR BOOYENS: And who was the "we" that received this instruction?
MR BOTHA: Col de Kock told us that Mr Baker would take over the operation and that me, Wouter Mentz, Rian Bellingan and Baker himself would form the team who would undertake the work.
MR BOOYENS: I see. The practical arrangements on ground level were then made by Col Baker, as you have already heard from his evidence.
MR BOTHA: Yes, indeed that is so. In fact I don't think he was a Col at that stage, he was a Captain.
MR BOOYENS: Oh, he was a Captain.
MR BOOYENS: What was your rank?
MR BOTHA: I was a Warrant Officer.
MR BOOYENS: Very well. And did you then receive instructions to wear balaclavas and dark clothing?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: And were you then instructed at a certain time to meet and did you then travel by kombi along a certain route to this prearranged point?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: And once you arrived there you stopped behind the vehicle which was discussed by the previous witness, Mr Radebe, and that is where you found Mr Ngqulunga?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: Please give us a brief summary. You do not have to go into extensive detail about it, but describe to us precisely how the man was removed from Mr Radebe's vehicle and placed in the kombi.
MR BOTHA: Capt Baker, who was driving the vehicle at that stage, approached the vehicle and switched on his headlights. He stopped behind the vehicle and told us to take Brian out of the vehicle. I was the last person to exit the kombi. Upon arriving at the vehicle, which was about five to six paces ahead of us, Rian Bellingan opened the door and took Brian out and he and Wouter immediately became involved in an altercation because Brian was resisting. I tried to help them to bring Brian under control and Bellingan said to me "Piet, hit him a few times just to bring him under control". Now I'd just like to indicate to the Chairperson that in my statement it says that I hit him once, but I hit him twice or three times, so that we could get him under control to get him into the kombi.
MR BOOYENS: What did you hit him with?
MR BOTHA: With my bare fist.
MR BOOYENS: Did you knock him out at that stage?
MR BOTHA: No, he wasn't unconscious, if that is what your question was, but he was confused and that is how we could get him into the kombi.
MR BOOYENS: You then had him in the kombi, and who sat where in the kombi?
MR BOTHA: Wouter Mentz and I sat in the back of the kombi and we had Brian at our feet and Rian Bellingan sat in the left front and Capt Baker was driving.
MR BOOYENS: Now he wasn't unconscious at that stage, did he scream or make a noise or anything like that?
MR BOTHA: The noise had then stopped, he was quiet and I could hear him moaning.
MR BOOYENS: So he was still alive?
MR BOTHA: He was in a condition which would be described as under control. He struggled somewhat still, but at that stage we just held him down.
MR BOOYENS: Was he flat on the floor of the kombi?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: Is that on the floor of the kombi in front of the seating?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: Was it a Volkswagen kombi?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: Very well. And then you drove, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: And were there any other instances where it was necessary to silence him?
MR BOTHA: Later it became necessary because he wasn't only struggling, he began screaming again at a stage and it was then that Bellingan gave me the zap or the kosh to hit him with, and that is how we managed to get him under control.
MR BOOYENS: And a kosh is some form of a leather baton which has grains of lead on the front?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: And according to you he was then knocked out?
MR BOTHA: He was not unconscious, but he was in the condition which he was confused and struggling to breath.
MR BOOYENS: And then at a certain point you brought the kombi to a standstill.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: And you have already heard the evidence that Mentz and you carried him out of the kombi.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: So he couldn't walk by himself and that stage?
MR BOTHA: No, he couldn't.
MR BOOYENS: And we have already heard that Mr Bellingan stated that he shot him.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm this?
MR BOTHA: I confirm it.
MR BOOYENS: And after Bellingan shot him, what happened then?
MR BOTHA: Well after we had dragged him into the veld, we left him in a dark area in an environment which was completely unknown to me. As we placed him, Wouter and I realised that we didn't have gun with us. We went back to fetch the gun and in the process we walked past Rian Bellingan, who asked us where the man was. I then pointed him out to him and he shot him, but before he opened fire I had already begun walking back to the kombi.
MR BOOYENS: And did Bellingan then, after he shot the man, return to you and say something?
MR BOTHA: Yes, after he fired the shots he returned to me at the kombi and said "Piet, go and make sure that the man is dead". I then took the second AK that we had taken along with us and walked to the man and fired a further five to six shots, upon my estimation, single shots.
MR BOOYENS: And you have just qualified that you fired single shots, how did Bellingan fire?
MR BOTHA: He fired full automatic.
MR BOOYENS: Mr Botha, there was a suggestion from my learned friend, Mr van der Walt, on the other side, that the man's clothing was removed, was this done at any point?
MR BOTHA: No, that is completely untrue.
MR BOOYENS: What I mean is, did you still have any time remaining there at the scene, to do such things before you shot the man or did you want to do the deed as quickly as possible and get out of there as quickly as possible?
MR BOTHA: We wanted to get away from the scene as quickly as possible.
MR BOOYENS: So is it correct then that as the previous witnesses have testified, that after that you first went to the Wonderpark Shopping Centre, where the guns were handed over to Charlie Chate?
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: And that is when the Avis rental cars were parked at the Holiday Inn.
MR BOTHA: Correct.
MR BOOYENS: You had a meal and after that you were booked into a hotel in Johannesburg.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: Now you had direct instruction to participate in this operation.
MR BOTHA: Yes, I confirm that.
MR BOOYENS: A motivation was given to you, namely that the man was allegedly loyal to the opposition.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: And at that stage, Mr Botha, you were stationed at Vlakplaas and I think that there has been sufficient evidence before this Commission, indicating that Vlakplaas was the operational wing of the Security Branch, would you agree with that?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I agree wholeheartedly with that.
MR BOOYENS: Did you have any intelligence gather capacity, with the exception of what the askaris did to identify persons, did you have any intelligence collection capacity in order to substantiate or verify the information that Mr de Kock gave you regarding Ngqulunga's involvement with the ANC?
MR BOTHA: No, we didn't, and if there was any such capacity I wouldn't have been aware of it.
MR BOOYENS: And many operations of Vlakplaas, whether internal or external - and I'm referring to specifically when you acted, not when you traced persons, meant that you had to rely upon information which was provided by other specialised intelligence gathering wings of the police, which had been conveyed to you, upon which you had to react?
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: Your intelligence gathering would primarily have involved gather of information for operational purposes, for example reconnoitring a place before launching an operation there and so forth?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR BOOYENS: Did you even have any reason at that stage to doubt the correctness of the information which was conveyed to you?
MR BOTHA: No, because the instruction came from Col de Kock.
MR BOOYENS: Well regardless of who issued the instruction, did you have any reason subsequently, to doubt it or to wonder about the truth of the instruction or did you find out that the information had been incorrect?
MR BOTHA: No.
MR BOOYENS: And subsequently one may have heard of reasons which may not have been true, but at that stage you trusted the information?
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: You also state at the bottom of page 67, very briefly, something which is of significance, at the very bottom, regarding the level of support for your covert operations that you enjoyed. For example, you say
"Many documents, ID documents and passports ..."
... and I assume that these are not genuine or legal passports and legal documents.
MR BOTHA: Yes, these were covert documents.
MR BOOYENS: For example, you would have travelled under a false name and so forth. Were you completely satisfied that this was indicative of the case that Vlakplaas was not simply a group of trouble stirrers who were operating independently, you were applied for covert operations and you also had to enjoy logistical support from other divisions of the police, as well as other State departments in order to obtain such documents.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is what it indicates.
MR BOOYENS: Did you have personal knowledge of, for example, where the ID documents and passports came from?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: Would you explain to the Chairperson please.
MR BOTHA: Chairperson, initially there was a channel that one had to apply through for the false document, you had to provide the particulars, such as the names and so forth. This was after you had received Col de Kock's approval. In many cases I was the messenger who took the details to Gen Beukes, who was a retired General in charge of this operation.
Afterwards the intensity of it increased to the extent that Gen Beukes could not perform these tasks quickly enough and upon two or three occasions, if I recall correctly, I went to the Internal Affairs building myself, to the person who was manufacturing the passports and received the name and the photo there that we had selected.
MR BOOYENS: So in other words, this South African passport was not from someone who was manufacturing counterfeit passports as such, it came from a State department?
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: With regard to this operation and also others possibly, however this one is the relevant operation, you had nothing to do with the overall planning, or at least firstly, with the planning in principle and the later motivation for why the man should be eliminated and so forth?
MR BOTHA: No, I had nothing to do with that.
MR BOOYENS: And you also had no way in which you could verify the correctness of the motivational justification for an operation, you could not study this at all?
MR BOTHA: No.
MR BOOYENS: It has been suggested to some of your colleagues - and possibly you wish to respond to this if you wish, you were told that this man was basically a defector, a spy, a double-agent for the ANC, why didn't you ask him about it? After you had captured him, did you ask him "Is it so that you have returned to the opposition?" I think you said that you never asked him, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: No, we didn't ask him simply because if you wanted to interrogate someone, you would have to establish a preceding basis of facts or supposition upon which you could interrogate the person. I couldn't make up something and confront Brian with it and then find out that it would lead to nowhere.
MR BOOYENS: So all that you would have been able to tell him is "Col de Kock told us that you have defected to the opposition"?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I accepted that that information had already been gathered and testified and verified and it was conveyed to us as such.
MR BOOYENS: Therefore you did not regard it as necessary to undertake any further questioning based upon information given by telephone tapping or informers or so forth?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: And even if you had asked him and he told you "But it's not true, I did not defect to the opposition", based upon the information that you had, a mere denial from his side would not have made any difference, would it?
MR BOTHA: No, it wouldn't have.
MR BOOYENS: I mean, it really wouldn't have fitted in with your order, to decide upon his denial not to carry out the operation?
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: You confirm furthermore with regard to your political motivation as it appears in the documents.
MR BOTHA: Yes, I confirm that.
MR BOOYENS: And furthermore, were you satisfied that a person within the ranks of the Security Police, who as we heard, had access to confidential documents and so for the - was a threat to the total security structure and the struggle which was waged at that stage against the ANC, PAC and so forth.
MR BOTHA: Yes, I confirm it as such.
MR BOOYENS: Mention has also been made that at the time of this incident the ANC was no longer a forbidden organisation and the question was put, why did you continue if this man was giving information to the ANC? Did you hear that?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I did.
MR BOOYENS: Now from your own experience at that stage, as a policeman in the Security Police, although the ANC had been unbanned, was the war over?
MR BOTHA: No, the war was not over at all. If I may quote from the statistics which have already been submitted and from our experience at that stage, specifically the attacks on policemen increased drastically.
MR BOOYENS: And you were still operating as a Counter-Terrorism Unit, you were still capturing persons, as it would appear from the statistics?
MR BOTHA: Yes, indeed that is so, even though it would be on an unprofessional basis, they had begun attempting to move us over to the crime prevention field.
MR BOOYENS: But the following statement appears in the submission of the African National Congress' statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, August 1996, and I quote from page 64, Mr Chairman, under the heading - paragraph 6.2.9.3
"SDUs in the context of the low intensity warfare during the post-1990 negotiation phase."
And the ANC itself is quotes by saying:
"On August 6th, 1990, the ANC formally committed itself to a cessation of armed hostilities."
So even the ANC in its submission to the TRC, stated that it was only on the 6th of August that they committed themselves to the suspension of the armed struggle. Is that in line with your experience?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR BOOYENS: And I understand that that is not to say that the 6th of August heralded the end of the armed struggle, that this was just statistically speaking.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: Do you then confirm the rest of your amnesty application and request that the annexures that you have attached to your application be read in with it? I don't believe that it's necessary for us to deal with it.
MR BOTHA: Yes, I request this from the Committee.
MR BOOYENS: And furthermore, that the submissions which have already been made to this Committee by other senior police officers regarding the background of Vlakplaas, also be incorporated in your amnesty application?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I request this from the Committee.
MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record.
Mr Botha, for a moment my attention was diverted when you spoke of the covert passports, did you also mention the fact that you were issued with so-called covert identity documents?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Which were obtained in the same fashion?
MR BOTHA: Yes, and in most cases which correlated with the passport that one was issued with.
MR HATTINGH: That would be the counterfeit passport?
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And were these also issued with the assistance of other State departments?
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And I don't know if this is of application to all of you, but some of you were also definitely supplied with credit cards in the names of your covert passports and covert identity documents.
MR BOTHA: I know of two cases, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And by nature of the circumstances that would have meant that there was fraud in the issuing of these documents if the department was not aware of it, not so?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And was the police aware that payment was guaranteed on expenditure for these credit cards?
MR BOTHA: I cannot give evidence about that, Chairperson, I don't know whether the banks had stated that they knew that these identities were false and that they would be maintaining these accounts, I just know that there were credit cards which were issued from banks.
MR HATTINGH: You didn't have one?
MR BOTHA: No, I didn't.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson, we have nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Botha, the meeting at the House of Coffees, was this the day before the operation was launched?
MR BOTHA: I cannot recall accurately how long before the operation this took place, but what I can say is that it was not the same day as the operation.
MR LAMEY: Very well. You have already stated that you are not certain whether Sgt Chate or Mr Nortje were present there, but there was an additional person.
MR BOTHA: Yes, I'm not sure of either one of the two.
MR LAMEY: Very well. I just wanted to put to you that Mr Nortje states that he does not recall that he was present at the meeting because he had already been informed previously by Mr de Kock, regarding what was going to happen.
MR BOTHA: That may be so.
MR LAMEY: It would appear to me that you were informed at a later stage.
MR BOTHA: Yes, it was that morning that I heard about it for the first time.
MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Chairperson, I have nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
CHAIRPERSON: By that, do I understand you were informed earlier, on the morning of the day on which the meeting at the House of Coffees was?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that's correct, ja.
CHAIRPERSON: And then you heard again at the meeting?
MR BOTHA: No, I just heard that there will be a meeting, I didn't know at the time of the notice, what the contents of the meeting will be, only at the meeting I heard what was to be expected from me.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagener?
MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairman, I have no questions to this applicant, thank you.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER WALT: Thank you, Mr Chairman. For the record, van der Walt.
Mr Botha, upon a question of the legal representative regarding why Mr Ngqulunga was not interrogated regarding his alleged status as a double-agent, your response was:
"If you want to interrogate someone you need a factual basis or suspicion."
That was your answer.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VAN DER WALT: And for that reason you did not interrogate him?
MR BOTHA: Well it was not expected of me to interrogate him, my instructions were to eliminate him.
MR VAN DER WALT: Then why did you give this answer? Is it not your evidence that you had no factual basis or suspicion that he was in any way a double-agent?
MR BOTHA: I think you have misinterpreted it beyond the context. What was said to us at the House of Coffees, was that Brian had to be eliminated because he was a double-agent. Secondly, that the information that he may have leaked from head office, could have been the reason for the murders or attacks on policemen.
MR VAN DER WALT: Could have led to?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VAN DER WALT: So the only information that you had was that he was a double-agent and that the information that he may have leaked out, could have led to these incidents.
MR BOTHA: You must understand the fact that I stood at the bottom of the chain and that this is quite a few years later and I have to infer from my perceptions and tell you what was said. This is my evidence, that I was only supposed to be involved in his elimination because he was a suspected double-agent or definitely was a double-agent.
MR VAN DER WALT: I comprehend your statement that you stood at the bottom of the chain, but you must also understand that Mr de Kock was at the top and he said that all that was said was that this man had begun to put out feelers to the ANC, and I just want to know where you obtained this further information.
MR BOOYENS: With respect, Mr Chairperson, if my learned friend has listened to my cross-examination of Mr de Kock, Mr de Kock really conceded that indeed perceptions like this might have arisen out of that discussion, when I cross-examined him. He didn't just stick to it that there were feelers pushed out to the ANC.
MR VAN DER WALT: Chairperson, that was not completely my recollection of Mr de Kock's cross-examination, but I will leave it at that.
CHAIRPERSON: You say your cross-examination ...(inaudible - no microphone). My note is that you put the question relating to the meeting at the coffee house
"They recall that you told them that the deceased was in the process of walking over to the opposition or had supplied information which could have led to deaths of policemen and askaris on the East Rand."
And his answer was:
"They could have done so."
MR VAN DER WALT: According to you, Mr Botha, that was the only information regarding Brian Ngqulunga, which was conveyed.
MR BOTHA: That is as far as my recollection goes.
MR VAN DER WALT: If you say that you were last in the chain and we accept that Mr de Kock was in front of the chain, where would Mr Bellingan fit into the chain?
MR BOTHA: Well I'm stating figuratively that I was last in the chain, so I don't wish to draw distinctions if I have to communicate on the same basis with you as to who was in front and who was at the back. When I say that I was last, I mean that I was a member of the group who was sent out to do the work, meaning that anyone who was not involved in that would be in front of us.
MR VAN DER WALT: So Bellingan according to the hierarchy, was on the same level as you?
MR BOTHA: Yes, well I would regard myself, Mentz, Bellingan on the same level of the chain.
MR VAN DER WALT: You will recall during my cross-examination of Mr Bellingan yesterday afternoon I referred him to page 28 of the paginated bundle, where he gives a version of the information which was supposed to have come from Mr de Kock. If you will just go to that page.
MR BOTHA: I haven't read it.
MR VAN DER WALT: Well then I will just take you through it briefly. Mr Bellingan states that Mr de Kock conveyed that Brian Ngqulunga had already returned to the military wing of the ANC, to MK. That is not entirely your evidence.
MR BOTHA: Well I would have to concede it if that is so. You see, if one has to go through such a gruesome experience, one would tend to attempt to overcome the damage that ones incurs, by repressing it or simply not thinking about it. In this case I must concede that if this was W/O Bellingan's inference of the event or the discussion, I would not be able to differ to it.
MR VAN DER WALT: Well that is not the only point of difference, because Mr Bellingan continues by saying that
"Furthermore, the information was that Mr Ngqulunga had already identified East Rand policemen and their residences as possible targets for the ANC."
Can you recall such information which was conveyed at any point?
MR BOTHA: Well I cannot say what W/O Bellingan thought at that stage and why he used this particular choice or words. What I can tell you is that I think that that is a reasonably possible inference if one refers specifically to murders of policemen on the East Rand.
MR VAN DER WALT: Why specifically the East Rand?
MR BOTHA: Well I cannot say from my direct knowledge. Once again my inference is that things were the most hectic there at that stage.
MR VAN DER WALT: Furthermore, he states that Mr Ngqulunga worked in the postal division of head office and that he dealt with sensitive documents, which could have led to him disclosing certain covert operations.
MR BOTHA: Well everybody knew that.
MR VAN DER WALT: And is it also your evidence?
MR BOTHA: Yes, it is also my evidence.
MR VAN DER WALT: Furthermore, he states that Col de Kock also had information with regard to police actions and the members who were involved, which Brian may have given to his comrades, which could have led to the death of police officers. In other words, that police officers had already died as a result of such information being leaked out.
MR BOTHA: Well I don't think that Mr Bellingan states here that this was conveyed at the House of Coffees, unless you want to put it like that to me.
MR VAN DER WALT: No, I'm not trying to put to you exactly where the information would have been conveyed, I'm talking about the information which came from Mr de Kock at whatever stage.
MR BOTHA: It is possible that Col de Kock may have said this to W/O Bellingan after the time.
MR VAN DER WALT: But not at the House of Coffees?
MR BOTHA: No, not as far as I recall. But that policemen would have been killed on the East Rand was definitely put to us.
MR VAN DER WALT: And then furthermore on page 29 he states
"According to Col de Kock, there was a suspicion that he had already lured police officers into traps, during which some had been killed."
MR BOTHA: That is possible.
MR VAN DER WALT: Was that also not said at the House of Coffees?
MR BOTHA: It is possible. You see you must understand that if I really had to go as far as saying for how long the discussion lasted, I would have to give you an estimated time, because here we have been talking to each other for half an hour and we have already covered a certain number of pages that one would find in a book. These things may have been said back and forth and I just cannot recall it. The point that I'm trying to make is that policemen fell on the East Rand and these things that Officer Bellingan has conveyed here, indicated more operational intelligence. I cannot clarify it, I also cannot recall it.
MR VAN DER WALT: But Mr Botha, you would agree with me that what I have submitted to you extends much further than Brian returning to the ANC and possibly being involved in these incidents.
MR BOTHA: Well you are entitled to your inferences.
MR VAN DER WALT: Then with regard to the number of incidents for which you have applied for amnesty ...
MR BOTHA: This is one of two.
MR VAN DER WALT: Very well. Did I understand your evidence correctly that at that stage you were involved in the Intelligence Division of Vlakplaas?
MR BOTHA: No, I think you misunderstood me.
MR BOOYENS: No, the evidence was that he had been at Vlakplaas and that he then went to the Intelligence Desk at head office, after which he returned to Vlakplaas.
MR VAN DER WALT: Thank you, Chairperson, I accept it as such.
Mr Botha, without taking you into excessive detail about this, it has been said to you by your legal representative that there was a suggestion regarding the clothing of the deceased, that the clothing did not have any holes and that it appeared that the deceased did not have any clothing on at that stage. I want to put it to you that the spouse of the deceased states that the clothing which the deceased had on at the time of his death was returned to her without any visible damage. Can you comment on that?
MR BOTHA: No.
CHAIRPERSON: Was that the clothing that he had on at the time of his death, or the clothing that he had on when she saw him after the post-mortem?
MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Chairman, I think my statement yesterday was not totally correct, my instructions are now that it was the clothing which he had on when she last saw him, which was handed over to her, not at the post-mortem. I made an incorrect statement, I just wish to clarify that and rectify that.
I beg your pardon, Mr Botha, I did not hear your answer.
MR BOTHA: Would you please repeat the specific question.
MR VAN DER WALT: The question is that the spouse of the deceased states that the clothing which the deceased would have had on during the incident was returned to her and those items of clothing were not damaged, that is why the suggestion exists that the deceased may not have been clothed at the stage when he was eliminated.
MR BOTHA: I cannot comment on that.
MR VAN DER WALT: Could you give any indication to the Committee why it was also necessary for you to empty a magazine from an AK47 on the deceased?
MR BOTHA: No, Chairperson, I never said that I emptied a magazine on the man, my evidence was that I fired five, possibly six single shots at the man.
MR VAN DER WALT: Could you tell the Committee why it was necessary for you to fire five, possible six single shots at the man, after Mr Bellingan had emptied the magazine on him?
MR BOTHA: Bellingan arrived at the kombi after we had already dragged Mr Ngqulunga into the veld, after he had been shot and he told me "Piet, make sure the man is dead." I took the other AK, walked into the veld and made sure that he was dead.
MR VAN DER WALT: After the time you also had a meal with the rest of the group at the Red Ox Spur.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VAN DER WALT: You had drinks, you were social.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VAN DER WALT: Do you have indication or any knowledge of which other senior police officers would have issued the instruction that came from Mr de Kock?
MR BOTHA: I can only say that later there was a rumour that Gen Nick van Rensburg gave the instruction, but I cannot say from my own knowledge that that is or is not the case.
MR VAN DER WALT: Do you know who dealt with the enquiries of the family in terms of the incident?
MR BOTHA: No.
MR VAN DER WALT: The reason why I'm asking you is because I want to refer you to page 152 of the bundle, that would be the statement made by the spouse of the victim, Mr Ngqulunga, and specifically paragraph 4. At the bottom where she states that after the incident, the Saturday, she was visited - it's in the middle of the paragraph - she was visited by one Capt van Dyk, I think it's Paul van Dyk, as well as a Brig Engelbrecht. Do you see that?
MR BOTHA: Yes. I cannot say whether that is true or not, if that is what you are asking me. I cannot confirm or deny it.
MR VAN DER WALT: So you cannot tell us from where the order came, from which position higher than Mr de Kock?
MR BOTHA: No.
MR VAN DER WALT: You see I just want to put it to you that Mrs Ngqulunga has indicated that she wishes to give evidence before this Committee and that she will confirm this information.
MR BOTHA: Those are your instructions.
MR VAN DER WALT: I thank you, Chairperson, I have nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DER WALT
ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP
MR SIBANYONI: Mr Botha, on page 49 you talk about topics concerning the UDF, ANC, PAC, the black power, were those
films shown as part of courses for all members at Vlakplaas or only for particular groups?
MR BOTHA: No, that was a course, a so-called preliminary course or a first course, which every security policeman was supposed to do when getting involved in the Security Police. That was a so-called background course, academic of nature.
MR SIBANYONI: I'm with you. Were those, that material only consisting of instances where they talk about violence, or was it everything about these organisations?
MR BOTHA: It was everything about the organisations, who they are, what they stand for, what they do.
MR SIBANYONI: I would reckon that you also get speeches made by their leaders, Oliver Tambo and the like, who were in exile.
MR BOTHA: No, no. No Sir, this was an internal training course where senior officers of the relevant desks handling so-called ANC matters of UDF matters or churches matters, or whatever the case may be, will come and address the course and tell them what their security experiences are.
MR SIBANYONI: Okay. On page 50, second line you say when the ANC was banned, that was a great shock to you. What shocked you?
MR BOTHA: Well initially the shock was that of uncertainty because us being actively involved in physically fighting the ANC from day to day, got the shock, that yes, now we're shocked, we've got no enemy, only to experience later that yes, the enemy is still there. We were dumped in turmoil and uncertainty.
MR SIBANYONI: Are you saying, in your minds you wanted to continue with the fight?
MR BOTHA: Yes, ...(indistinct - simultaneous talking) yes.
MR SIBANYONI: And immediately thereafter you say the Generals spoke to you and said this had nothing to do with you, it was just politics.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that's the truth, they came and addressed us formally on Vlakplaas.
MR SIBANYONI: But in one of the hearings we were told that Gen Engelbrecht made the opposite, in fact he came to Vlakplaas and said Vlakplaas will not continue as an operational base or function, but that you should concentrate more on combating crime, but that you must be on the state of readiness.
MR BOTHA: Sir, I haven't heard the previous evidence and as far as that goes I cannot comment, but what I can say is that - well, Gen le Roux as well as Gen Engelbrecht came formally to Vlakplaas, addressed us all on, I think, one or two occasions maybe, where they put it to us that we do not need to be worried, this is a political move and they will keep us informed.
MR SIBANYONI: Then Vlakplaas continued with its normal work, tracing people who infiltrated the country.
MR BOTHA: Well if you say normal, like I've stated it here in my annexes, no, we didn't continue with that normal work, we continued normally in the sense that we came to work and we were then expected to more-or-less infiltrate the crime structures, but we weren't allowed to work terrorism as a base.
MR SIBANYONI: On page 48, second paragraph and second line, you are saying
"Here already I believed that the black man in the country was a traditional enemy of the Afrikaner people."
That sounds as if you ...(intervention)
MR BOTHA: It sounds bad.
MR SIBANYONI: ... racism yes. What do you say about that?
MR BOTHA: No, Sir, with that I was merely trying to say from what background I grew up and where I - to which I was approached for the Security Police, but only to find that within the Security Police, especially amongst the colleagues, there was very little racism which I can testify to. And therefore I think I'm compelled to say, or obliged to say that especially in the case of Col de Kock, he was a non-racist commander and if he ever saw racism you know, you will have it from him.
MR SIBANYONI: In operations you did like this one, Brian Ngqulunga, you were never motivated by the fact that he was a black person?
MR BOTHA: Never, no.
MR SIBANYONI: A sentence immediately thereafter, I see you choose to use the words "kaffir oorlog".
MR BOTHA: Well in inverted commas, yes, Sir.
MR SIBANYONI: To what are you referring there?
MR BOTHA: That was the term used in Afrikaans for the so-called wars between whites and blacks. And I'm going back as far back as the 1870s and 1880s and 1890s. Sorry for - I'm not trying to show ...(indistinct) ignorance here, but you'll see in the sentence I'm also referring to my "groot oupa", that's my great-grandfather, which will show you approximately the time span I'm talking of.
MR SIBANYONI: Most of the police at Vlakplaas - maybe I'm overstating if I say "most", some of them resigned for ill health or medical reasons. For what reasons did you resign from the police?
MR BOTHA: Well initially I did - well not initially, I did resign because of the post-traumatic stress syndrome to which I have recovered to a large extent, I'm happy to say, but it was a very traumatic time for me in my life since I left Vlakplaas in December '92, until I was initially boarded in October '96.
MR SIBANYONI: Okay. Thank you, no further questions, Mr Chairperson.
ADV SANDI: I have no questions, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I have a few. Who prepared your amnesty application?
MR BOTHA: Well myself with my attorney, Willem Britz at Strydom Britz Attorneys.
CHAIRPERSON: Were they the same attorneys as Mr Bellingan's?
MR BOTHA: No, they weren't. Initially maybe, but not at the end, no.
CHAIRPERSON: Because I notice that your application is very similar to his, parts of it.
MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I do not want the risk of testifying and being cross-examined by my learned friend, what happened, Messrs Bellingan and Baker were initially also with Strydom and Britz, at the stage when these documents were drafted and they then changed horses at some stage, but that was after the documentation had been filed.
CHAIRPERSON: This is largely what I'm asking about, it's largely the background documentation. I'm not suggesting anything sinister in it, but it intrigued me that page 30 is almost identical to page 67 and then when you translate it to English you get it at page 138 and 139.
MR BOOYENS: To a very large extent I think one can once again see the word-processor at work here with it's memory.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well that's alright.
The other question which is - I don't know it it's really fair to ask you this, but it's one that's worrying me a little. We've been told about this postal section at the head office, which was a matter where documents of extreme security passed through and from what we've heard in the evidence, I don't know if you've been here all the time, there appears to have been a very casual approach to security there, people all looked at these documents, Constables who were apparently delivering them to Generals elsewhere would read then going up the lift and walking along the passages, so it must have been very obvious that security was at great risk in that office. Can you explain how they kept the deceased in this case, working somewhere like that when they suspected him, if they did suspect him?
MR BOTHA: No, Sir, I cannot explain that.
CHAIRPERSON: It's inexplicable, isn't it?
MR BOTHA: It goes contrary to all the rules ...(indistinct)
CHAIRPERSON: That the moment they came to think this man has gone over, they would move him out of that office as quickly as possible.
MR BOTHA: That's what I would have done, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Re-examination?
MR BOOYENS: No re-examination, thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS
MR BOOYENS: May the witness be excused from further attendance please, Mr Chairman?
CHAIRPERSON: On the same basis, yes.
MR BOOYENS: On the same basis as all ...(indistinct).
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
WITNESS EXCUSED
CHAIRPERSON: I see you're all getting rid of your clients before you have to advance argument.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, the next applicant is Mr Nortje. May we just have a moment just to swop my seat, so that he can sit closer to the Committee and I'll move one down.
