CHAIRPERSON: The Panel remains the same, the representatives remain the same I take it. Are we now continuing with Mr Coetzee?
MR VISSER: Visser on record Mr Chairperson, if it pleases you, yes. We call Mr Coetzee, but before I do so, before I do so Mr Chairman, may I briefly refer you to the documents which we handed up yesterday to you. You will have noticed that the one document entitled "Algemene Agtergrond tot Amnestie Aansoeke" is very similar to ones which you have in the past received from us. The reason why a fresh one has been handed to you Chairperson, is by virtue of the fact that this particular document does undergo some modifications and changes and additions as time goes by. The present modification which I wish to draw your attention to, you will find at page 24. May I immediately ask whether this can also be marked Exhibit A Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: A?
MR VISSER: Exhibit A, yes Chairperson. Mr Chairman and members of the Committee, we have elaborated slightly on the issue of Swaziland and Mozambique because of the hearings of this week and that of next week for your information Mr Chairman, and may I take you through it very briefly, it is very brief in fact as it is, but Chairperson what we do is we refer you in paragraph 74, to the conference at Simon's Town towards the end of 1980 beginning of 1981 and we have informed you previously Chairperson and as did Gen Johan Coetzee give evidence in the London bomb matter, if you will remember correctly, that there was this conference where it was decided that the army, the Defence Force was not to operate in Swaziland as it would do in all other neighbouring countries, but that Swaziland because of the good relations which there were between the Swazi government and the king on the one hand and the Security Branch of the Police and Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa on the other, that it was, there was an understanding that the Security Branch would operate in Swaziland. It was explained Chairperson, that that "operation" consisted of two aspects, one being the gathering of information of Intelligence and the other was to execute certain projects. The understanding was always Chairperson by both parties to this understanding that the Security Branch could act in Swaziland as long as Swazi citizens did not become affected in any way and of course Chairperson, as long as we can say that between the lines, as long as there were no scandals which would embarrass the Swazi government. Chairperson in 1982 we refer to in paragraph 76, there was something in the line of a formal understanding reached, nothing was ever put in writing, but the understanding was really a confirmation of the Simon's Town conference and that which I have already alluded to. Chairperson in 1977 the important point of this whole issue of Swaziland is that this agreement did not have the power of an inter-State agreement between two independent States as I have already said, there was no formal agreement entered into, but what happened Chairperson was that by virtue of perhaps how it was conveyed to the members of the Security Branch on the ground, it was a generally accepted perception among members of the Security Branch, that they were "entitled or authorised" to act in Swaziland. We know Chairperson, and we would emphasise the point, that any conduct, any action taken by any member of the Security Branch of South Africa in Swaziland, was per se illegal because it wasn't sanctioned by formal agreement. We emphasise the point Chairperson, in paragraph 18 where we refer to the perception among members that they were "geregtig" as it were, they were authorised to act in Swaziland. Chairperson, because of its proximity to Mozambique, Mozambique is also important and we make a brief reference in paragraph 81 of page 25, to Mozambique. What happened there was that there was a formal agreement Chairperson, in 1984 and we all know about the Nkomati Accord between the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique. The important aspect of that was that Mozambique, the Mozambican government in that Accord undertook that it will not allow its soil to be used as a springboard for terrorist activities from Mozambique into the Republic of South Africa. Chairperson, paragraph 82 is a summary of what the knowledge of the Security Branch Intelligence was at the time and that is that from Mozambique, though Swaziland, from time to time, an active role was played by prominent MK members in the planning and execution of political violence in the Republic of South Africa and we mention in paragraph 82(a) some names which will ring a bell because of previous amnesty applications which you have heard Chairperson. And of course, by virtue of the fact that weapons of war were infiltrated and people were taken out of the country through Swaziland for military training abroad, brought back, infiltrated back into the Republic of South Africa, thirdly that people who were taken out of the Republic of South Africa for brief crash courses in weapon's training and you will hear some of that in the present application Chairperson, and that an extended network of safehouses were conducted and operated in Swaziland Chairperson, where these activities were conducted from and where financial and logistical support was given to so-called terrorists leaving and re-entering the country. Chairperson, the information contained in this very, very brief summary, we say in paragraph 83 comes from 1982 when undercover agents Chairperson, were infiltrated into MK in Swaziland and where they came to know of the two machineries, the two main machineries that were operated in Swaziland, the one being the Transvaal Military machinery and the other the Natal Military machinery, both of which have featured in previous amnesty applications before you, Mr Chairman, and I am quite certain before the members of your Committee as well. The intention Chairperson, of the machineries, we have set out in paragraph (c), it is really common knowledge at this stage Chairperson, what they intended to do and what they were in fact busying themselves with. Chairperson, just by way of example, from Swaziland you have heard in Natal that Operation Butterfly and Operation Vula originated there and were operated from there and then Chairperson, lastly, from the ANC's own presentations to the TRC, we have for your convenience copied the various Committees, the Regional Political Military Councils from 1983 to 1985 at page 28 and 29 from 1985 to 1990 which appears to cover all the incidents for which amnesty is required before you. I do seem, while I am saying that, I do seem to remember that there was one in 1991, so perhaps I did not cover the whole field, but there was one matter in 1991, but apart from that one exception Chairperson with respect, these are the names and the organisations of MK and the ANC operated from Swaziland. Chairperson, thank you for allowing me that short introduction, this is really the only aspect which is novel in the new Exhibit A, and I will then ask Chairperson, that you will accept the other document being the evidence of Supt Willem Coetzee, as Exhibit B Chairperson, and I would ask to call him as a witness, he is available.
MR SIBANYONI: Can I take you back to page 24, paragraph 75, just the spelling of the Swazi king, it should be S-o-b-h-u-z-a. Thank you.
MR VISSER: I stand corrected, thank you Chairperson. While my attention has been referred back to paragraph 75, perhaps I should not have skipped over it so lightly, apparently Chairperson, and this is the point made in paragraph 75, King Sobhuza had a real problem with any military activity on his soil and that was basically the reason why he allowed members of the Security Branch of the police to act, but he wouldn't know anything about military activity on the Swazi soil. Chairperson, I then call Mr Coetzee with your leave.
MR SIBANYONI: Mr Coetzee, your full names please?
MR COETZEE: Willem Helm Johannes Coetzee.
WILLEM HELM JOHANNES COETZEE: (sworn states)
MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated.
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, if I may proceed. It is just a fused bulb apparently Chairperson, it is working. Mr Coetzee, you have previously given evidence before an Amnesty Committee, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: You have also studied Exhibit A which serves before this Committee, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: That is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Have you studied it?
MR COETZEE: Yes, I have Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Do you agree with the contents of Exhibit A?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And do you request that the information embodied therein as well as the evidence which is referred to in Exhibit A be incorporated in your evidence and be considered by this honourable Committee when considering your amnesty application?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Will you proceed from page 2 and tell us about your knowledge about the current incident for which you apply for amnesty?
MR COETZEE: During the period January 1988 up to July 1989, I was attached to the Intelligence Unit, Security Branch Head Office, Pretoria, Group D and in this regard I resorted under the command and control of Brig Oosthuizen and Gen-Maj Erasmus. As a member of the above-mentioned office, my duties were amongst the following - ...
MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, please keep in mind that everything you say has to be interpreted and that you must please go a little bit slower and pause at the end of each sentence, just to give the Interpreters to catch up with you.
CHAIRPERSON: The same applies to you, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: I yet again stand corrected, Mr Chairman.
MR COETZEE: The management and handling of informers involved with the monitoring of political dangerous State organisations and groupings of activities in both the RSA and outside the country, both from this perspective of Intelligence collection and Court directed investigations, I monitored the activities of amongst others the undermentioned organisations or groupings - the South African Youth Congress, South African National Students' Congress, Congress of South African Students.
MR VISSER: If I may interpose for a moment, is what you are saying in paragraph 2 that the chief activity in which you participated was the collection of Intelligence for the purposes of Court directed investigations against these organisations?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Very well, continue.
MR COETZEE: In this regard I and members of my Unit under my command and control succeeded in successfully infiltrating above-mentioned groupings. Information indicated that underground cell structures in the above-mentioned groupings had manifested and escalated and that members of the above-mentioned groupings both on management and grassroots level, outside the country had visited in order to form part of existing MK underground cell structures amongst Cosas.
MR VISSER: May I just interpose, you have referred to Sayco, Sansco and Cosas and here in 4(a) you only refer to Cosas, is that the intention that it only has to be Cosas?
MR COETZEE: As mentioned above Chairperson.
MR VISSER: So it would be amongst Cosas, Sansco and Sayco groupings?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, I do apologise the word "voortgeset" in that sentence, shouldn't be there.
MR COETZEE: Members of such cell structures, to channel members of such structures outside the country for military training and to arm cell structures for the purpose of military training.
MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, if we may just pause there, what you are saying here is that you received information about these activities and you say that, in 4(a) that this would form part of existing MK underground cell structures in Cosas, Sayco and Sansco, what does that mean?
MR COETZEE: Amongst their members who had already existed Chairperson.
MR VISSER: In other words, in Cosas, amongst the students and Sansco and Sayco, the idea was that by them an independent cell structure, MK cell structure would be established, is that what you are saying?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Will you please proceed?
MR COETZEE: Information which was obtained after arrests of certain persons, for example MK Lucky and one MK Joseph Mangwashe, Sgt C.L. Petse, page 152 of the Bundle.
MR VISSER: Yes, and what you refer to after that is that an amnesty application was lodged in regard to them?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson. It was that the ANC/SACP alliance had focused themselves on the activating and use of students in the revolutionary struggle in order to usurp the government, especially the tertiary education level, students were recruited.
MR VISSER: Since when did you notice this tendency?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, it had manifested since 1985 and because of information Brig Oosthuizen during August 1988, granted leave that a national workshop in Pretoria be held to focus on this problem and to discuss it. During this particular workshop the threat was analysed with the focus on the determination of preventative action. By the end of 1988, I succeeded by means of informers and agents, to obtain information with regard to the activities of Louis Mohale, also known as Tabo. Mohale at this stage was a managing member of Sansco's Transvaal's Regional Management. The penetration and accompanying monitoring of Mohale's activities brought to light amongst others the following, that Mohale was part of a core group within Sansco who popularised and supported the armed struggle in the RSA. He and others in Sansco had contact and liaison with Sayco and Cosas structures of which the particular members already had access or formed part of the armed MK underground structures in the RSA, in Soweto and Turfloop. He was an advocate of the idea that Sansco in its own right an independent underground MK structure had to be established at tertiary education level and be established. Sansco had to conduct discussions with MK outside the country in order to, so that such MK underground structures be established and broadened on tertiary level to channel Sansco members to outside the country for purposes of military training, establishing weapons cache points in the RSA for use by the particular MK underground structures. All information surrounding the intensifying of the particular threat, was promoted on a continual basis with Head Office. Col de Kock in his capacity as Commander of Vlakplaas and the application of askaris was a source of information which was of particular interest to my division. It is then obvious that from time to time, I would discuss with him with regard to the struggle in general and information in particular. On occasion I held discussions with Col de Kock at Security Head Office in Pretoria about amongst others the people's war concept and strategy, activities and conduct of MK command structures outside the country, the scope, manifestation and escalation of such structures and dangerous State threatened actions in South Africa, the role and function, fulfilment of armed MK underground structures in the RSA.
MR VISSER: Is it correct to draw the inference from what you have testified so far Mr Coetzee, that the establishment of underground structures where that may be, and especially on tertiary education level, was a great threat to the security of the country and the maintenance of internal security?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR COETZEE: Early during February 1989 my informant, one Phineas Moshualiba, also an applicant in the current application for amnesty who had earlier penetrated Mohale's group in Sansco and had continually supplied information with regard to the group's activities, reported to me that there had been a change. According to Moshualiba, Mohale decided that he and members of his group would travel to Swaziland in order to implement his ideas as mentioned above. This information was of great interest because the visit to Swaziland could realise their objectives as mentioned above. This information was conveyed to Brig Oosthuizen by me and we discussed and exchanged ideas about the information which was obtained over a period of time and decided what the counter action would be. After reception of the information with regard to the plans of Mohale and his group, and after Brig Oosthuizen and I had discussed the situation, Brig Oosthuizen gave instruction that I continue with the planning of an action and that he in the meantime would speak to Gen Erasmus about the matter.
MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you are still going too fast, would you please slow down.
MR COETZEE: I understand that Brig Oosthuizen will testify that he then discussed the matter with Gen Erasmus and had proposed to him that action be taken against the group and that Gen Erasmus would discuss this with Brig Schoon, but in the meantime he said we should continue with the planning. Afterwards Brig Oosthuizen and I visited Vlakplaas where we spoke to Col de Kock. We informed him about the following activities of activists and revolutionaries on tertiary education terrain, activities and objectives of Louis Mohale, the problem which emanated and the threat because of Mohale's planned visit to Swaziland. Several proposals were made and discussed with regard to action against the members of this group. In my application I had said that Col de Kock had proposed that action be taken in Swaziland, against these persons, but I am not entirely certain about the statement. The decision which was taken was that if the operation would be authorised by Head Office, the particular persons would be led into an ambush and be killed, although I did not have part of any further discussions at Head Office and I cannot comment from this perspective.
MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, I would like to interpose here, it may not be the correct place, but would you please briefly tell the Committee more about Louis Mohale, where he came to your knowledge for the first time, where he was and what he allegedly did there, very briefly?
MR COETZEE: In a nutshell Chairperson, he came to my attention already as a student at the University of the North, because of activities he was suspended from the University and amongst others Mr Chairperson, he was involved in matters of arson at the University during student unrests, where he had already had worked with MK underground structures.
MR VISSER: After he was suspended from the University, where did he go to?
MR COETZEE: He then established himself in Johannesburg Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Where you refer to Mohale and his group, you refer to their activities in the Johannesburg vicinity?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Would you please continue at paragraph 20, that is where I interrupted you.
MR COETZEE: In this regard, I wish to point out that the particular informants and agents for this purpose was managed by me, and that all information with regard to the particular operation, was co-ordinated on a continual basis with Brig Oosthuizen and Col de Kock. We foresaw a real problem that at that stage, possibly 10 to 15 political activists would travel to Swaziland if they would make use of a minibus. Furthermore the possibility could not be excluded that innocent persons may be in the bus as well and action in such regard, would lead to great loss of life. Because at this stage we had access to very well penetrated informers, Brig Oosthuizen proposed that we should take control over the operation by making a vehicle available and ensuring that only those persons whom we have already prioritised as those persons responsible for the student unrests and violence, would be in the vehicle. The idea was to rent a vehicle by means of a source. I then made available an Opel Kadett to the Mohale group.
MR VISSER: What kind of vehicle was it?
MR COETZEE: It was a Regulation 80.6, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: What does Regulation 80.6 mean?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, a vehicle which was declared by the State.
MR VISSER: And then became State property?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VISSER: You are now at paragraph 24.
MR COETZEE: The particular Saturday, the 12th of February 1989, I accompanied Brig Oosthuizen, Col D. Els and Col Snyman to Vlakplaas, during which the new information was conveyed to Col de Kock and we wished them luck. At the same time, I handed over a plastic bag to Col de Kock.
MR VISSER: That must read an envelope, not a plastic bag, I handed over a plastic bag with an envelope in it?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, I handed it over to Col de Kock and in the envelope there was a letter which was written in code, it was a fictional letter which had to serve to create the impression that the ANC had killed them.
MR VISSER: What was the idea with the letter?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, to make an allegation that they collaborated with the South African system.
MR VISSER: In his amnesty application, Mr de Kock also referred to a large group of people, I think on page 3 he refers to 16 or 17 people who were initially the focus, and you speak of 10 to 15, and you speak of the same aspect here. If a minibus was made available to them, then many people could have been in the mini-bus?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Some of the applicants allude to the fact that four activists at the end of the day was eliminated and the question which I would like to put to you is that in paragraph 20 you say all information was continually co-ordinated with Brig Oosthuizen and Col de Kock. After you had decided to make available a motor vehicle instead of a minibus, how many people did you expect then would travel with this vehicle to Swaziland?
MR COETZEE: If I recall correctly Chairperson, approximately five persons.
MR VISSER: And eventually, later you arrive at that, but eventually what was the amount of people who travelled from Soweto to Swaziland?
MR COETZEE: There were three of them Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Will you then continue at paragraph 25?
MR COETZEE: On the particular day, through Moshualiba I monitored the departure of the group. We were however not able to monitor the group's travel from Soweto to Oshoek. Moshualiba and I manned a telephone in Johannesburg, of which Mohale had the number too. At approximately 22H00 Mohale contacted us and spoke to Moshualiba, Mohale informed that he had established contact with other MK members, the identities unknown, in Swaziland and that he and his group would meet on a second occasion in Mbabane for the purposes of training in weaponry.
MR VISSER: So they departed the Saturday morning from Soweto as I understand you and the following that you heard from them, was when Mohale called Moshualiba from Swaziland?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: I think you may have mentioned it, but to make it absolutely clear, the Opel vehicle which was made available to Mohale and his people who went with him, by whom was this done?
MR COETZEE: It was by Moshualiba.
MR VISSER: Was the arrangement then that Mohale would contact Moshualiba at this telephone number which you refer to her in paragraph 26, to report to him and to tell him where they are with the vehicle?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: We will continue at paragraph 27, you also arranged that there be an attempt to monitor this vehicle from Soweto to Swaziland, will you then continue at paragraph 27?
MR COETZEE: Furthermore I arranged that two members, Col D. Els and Snyman at points, Witbank and Oshoek, man monitoring points in order to report if they saw the vehicle, a white Opel Kadett with which the group was travelling. The group had apparently followed another route because Els and Snyman did not observe them at all. Later I had heard that the three persons, Mohale and members of his group, had been led into an ambush and was eliminated in Swaziland. At all times, I associate myself with the action and I participated in the conspiracy to murder them. I am then apparently guilty of murder of whoever was killed in this action, and defeating the ends of justice by not reporting the incident. With regard to Col de Kock's amnesty application, I would wish to point out the following, the Monday after the incident, Gen Erasmus, Brig Schoon, Brig Oosthuizen and I held talks with Col de Kock at Vlakplaas, with Col de Kock I beg your pardon Chairperson, in order, with regard to a problem which emanated from the identification of the vehicle, which was made available to the group. I confirm that it was decided to duplicate the vehicle.
MR VISSER: So what you are actually saying is you agree with Mr Eugene de Kock's evidence in this regard?
MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Will you please explain to the Committee what identification are you speaking of here, what happened to this Regulation 80.6 vehicle?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, this vehicle, I don't have an in-depth knowledge about this particular incident, but I am aware that a code number of the manufacturer or the code number was identified in the vehicle of the manufacturer, which was used to identify the ownership and year of manufacturer, which eventually led Chairperson, to the vehicle, and that the vehicle could be connected to the ANC.
MR VISSER: So you just decided to duplicate the vehicle?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VISSER: So you could say but here is our vehicle, and that is not our vehicle there?
MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if the interpretation, connected with the ANC, it was connected to the South African Police, wasn't it?
MR VISSER: No, it was a police vehicle and when it became traced, they duplicated the vehicle and said ...
INTERPRETER: I beg your pardon Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you sure that this was on the Monday?
MR COETZEE: I cannot recall the date or the time, it is possible Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I just think it a little unlikely if there was an ambush in Swaziland on the Sunday afternoon, that by Monday they would have checked the numbers of the vehicle and what have you? It does not matter.
MR VISSER: Col de Kock seems to recall it was the Monday, we don't really remember Mr Chairperson, but there was such a meeting.
CHAIRPERSON: There was a meeting later?
MR VISSER: There was a meeting and a vehicle was duplicated, yes. Will you please proceed with paragraph 31 and explain to the Committee how you saw the situation of the past and why you participated in this action?
MR COETZEE: These incidents took place in a war situation where the rules of normal conduct of war was not applicable. My action was aimed ...
MR VISSER: Please go slower.
MR COETZEE: My action was aimed against supporters of a liberation movement who were the enemy of the government and who managed their revolutionary onslaught from Swaziland, during which, amongst others innocent citizens were killed or injured and much damage to property occurred. In the light of the pressure which was placed on us in the Security Branch by the political leaders of the time, and the many speeches to which there was referred to the destruction of terrorists, I believed that such action was expected of me and that my action fell within the scope of my express or tacit authorisation. My participance in this incident was aimed in combating the revolutionary onslaught and was aimed at the protection and maintenance of the previous government, and the State dispensation, and to prevent chaos and anarchy in the country. As motivation for my participance in this action, I mention that I continually acted in the execution of my duties in the service of the SAP and in execution of orders which I received from senior officers. I believed that what I had done was expected of me as a policeman and that I had acted in the execution of my duties as a policeman, and that my actions fell within my explicit or tacit authorisation.
MR VISSER: I apologise for that Mr Chairman, it is my fault, it is a repetition of the previous paragraph. Please continue.
MR COETZEE: I humbly request that amnesty be granted to me for any offence or delict committed by me before, during and or after the incident with regard to the incident which took place at Mbabane, Swaziland on or during approximately the 12th or 13th of February 1989 during which one Louis Mohale alias Tabo, Derek Mashobane and Portia Shabangu were murdered.
MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you did not go into Swaziland and you were not present during the ambush when the persons were eliminated, and consequently you do not know from first hand knowledge and from your own knowledge how many people were killed in the vehicle at the time when the ambush was executed. Is it your belief that it was only these three persons, from what you testified about the people who departed from Soweto that morning?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: If a fourth person was present, you would not know about it?
MR COETZEE: No Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, that is the evidence.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Does anybody know including the person responsible for leading evidence, whether the Swazi police have been asked what their record shows, how many people were killed in this incident?
ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, all the enquiries we made, unfortunately were negative, we could not trace any further information about this incident, whatsoever. I think there was information from the High Commissioner's office, I think we made enquiries to the High Commissioner as well in Swaziland, but no information could be forthcoming from that office as well.
CHAIRPERSON: It appears we have both a date and fairly accurate information as to the place where the ambush took place?
MR VISSER: That is the evidence-in-chief, thank you Chairperson.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Mr Coetzee, singular aspects and I think you have largely dealt with it, I would just like to point out certain aspects, in paragraph ...
CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if it is really important, but I noticed the copy I have of the Exhibit B is unsigned, has a signed copy been handed in?
MR VISSER: No Chairperson, he has confirmed it under oath, but if you so choose, then he can sign a copy.
CHAIRPERSON: For the sake of keeping an exhibit, I think it might be as well if one were signed.
MR VISSER: Certainly, we will see to it that it is signed in the tea adjournment Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Coetzee, may I refer you to paragraph 8, 9 and 10 of your statement, I will not read it but in there you deal with discussions which you had held with Mr de Kock, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Is it correct when I say that such discussions took place on many occasions?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And it was not limited to information which you supplied to him with regard to this specific incident?
MR COETZEE: It is possible Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: You also discussed other matters?
MR COETZEE: It is possible Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And you were also involved in other operations where Mr de Kock was also involved?
MR COETZEE: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: It was also used, or it was also the norm in the Security Police to exchange Intelligence back and forth?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And certainly as you are sitting there now Mr Coetzee, you cannot recall which detailed information you supplied to him? You can only say that you discussed these things in general, as you mentioned it in paragraph 10? You don't have a recollection of exactly what you told him with regard to this specific incident?
MR COETZEE: No Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And then a few other singular aspects. Mr de Kock's recollection is that during the planning at Vlakplaas, your first visit to Vlakplaas, that Gen Erasmus and Brig Schoon were also present, what is your recollection?
MR COETZEE: That is possible Chairperson, although I cannot recall it.
MR HATTINGH: And then his recollection is also, he is not entirely certain about this, but his recollection is also that the day of their departure from Vlakplaas to execute the operation, that is the occasion when you say once again you went to Vlakplaas, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: His recollection is that Gen Erasmus and Brig Schoon were also present on that occasion.
MR COETZEE: No Chairperson. There I stand by the facts as mentioned, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Not Brig Schoon, I erred when I said Brig Schoon, Gen Erasmus and Brig Oosthuizen?
MR COETZEE: I recall the two Colonels and Brig Oosthuizen Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. And then with regard to the concession that you made in your statement, that you may be mistaken when you say that the idea, that the elimination had to take place in Swaziland, came from Mr de Kock. I have read the statement of Brig Oosthuizen and according to that, it would seem as if that decision was taken before Mr de Kock was approached to be of assistance with the operation?
MR COETZEE: That is possible Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And then in conclusion, one aspect, the discovery that the vehicle belonged to the police, and on page 6 or 7 Mr de Kock says he was contacted by Capt Johan Viktor of Pretoria and he says
"... it was a day or so after we returned",
he is also not certain. He says, he puts it on the basis of a day or so later, it was established that the vehicle belonged to the police?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairperson, we have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairperson, Booyens on record. Mr Coetzee, during this period of time in which the information was conveyed to Mr de Kock, the matter of whether or not these persons were going to Swaziland for training and whether they were going to bring arms back from Swaziland, was one of the more prominent aspects of your problem?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: In the language of the regular Security policeman, the man out in the field, a man would go out to a foreign country and obtain training and bring back weaponry and such a person would be described in normal police language as a terrorist, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.
MR BOOYENS: Then I would like you to assist me with something which Mr Piet Botha recalls. He says you have already told us that you manned the telephone during the day, now in the first place can you recall whether the code name for the group which had moved through, this group of activists was their code name Flower Arrangement or The Flower Arrangement?
MR COETZEE: Yes, it is possible that we may have referred to them as such.
MR BOOYENS: You see, Mr Botha says that he and Mr Baker in Mbabane had to wait and see whether these persons would make contact with the askaris that they were supposed to make contact with, and that an approximate time was given and then these people did not arrive and it became late and they then drove out to a hotel which was a number of kilometres outside of Mbabane from where he made a telephone call and spoke to you and asked you where The Flower Arrangement was that was supposed to come through. Is it possible that such a telephone call was put through, that there was a query as to why these persons were late and that he contacted you to find out why they would probably have been late?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct, but I cannot recall who precisely made the call.
MR BOOYENS: Yes, that is understandable because Mr Botha still says that you asked him "who are you", because you did not recognise him. So you cannot recall, I am not saying that you know that it is him that put the call through, but you remember that somebody telephoned to say that the group was late?
MR COETZEE: Yes, I confirm that.
MR BOOYENS: Then just one further aspect, once again regarding the number of persons in the vehicle. A few moments ago you stated that there were approximately five, so is it possible that you may have told Mr de Kock and I assume as information became available on a consistent level, it was conveyed to the Operational Team, is it possible that you could have said that it was four or five to Mr de Kock and that this information would then have been conveyed similarly to the group out in the operational context?
MR COETZEE: Yes, it is possible.
CHAIRPERSON: You did not say they were five people in the vehicle, did you, I thought you said there could be five, but in fact there were only three?
MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: And possibly just in conjunction with the Chairperson's question, did you convey your expectation of the number of persons in the vehicle to Mr de Kock?
MR COETZEE: Yes, I believe so.
MR BOOYENS: And it was only on that morning that you knew that the vehicle wasn't full, that there were only three passengers?
MR COETZEE: Yes, upon departure.
MR BOOYENS: And then it was too late, because you could no longer make contact with the persons in Swaziland to tell them that there were only three?
MR COETZEE: Yes, I assume that.
MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Cornelius, Mr Chairman. I have just one aspect that I wish to clarify with you Mr Coetzee, with the regular footsoldier who would have been involved in such an operation, in the light that this was an external operation, which enjoyed the approval from the senior levels, there would have been no doubt in his mind that he was acting on behalf of the political dispensation against a political enemy?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: There could have been no doubt in his mind?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: It was the regular practice that all foreign operations enjoyed top senior approval and authorisation because it was such an extensive operation?
MR COETZEE: Yes, I would assume that.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
CHAIRPERSON: I think there is information elsewhere, isn't there, that no foreign operations were carried out except with top level approval?
MR CORNELIUS: That is correct Mr Chairman, that was I think in the London bomb trial pretty prominent.
CHAIRPERSON: I think in some of the papers before us here, there is the same thing, do you agree with that?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no questions for Mr Coetzee.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL
MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw, Mr Chairman, I also don't have any questions.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOTHA: Thank you Mr Chairman, Botha. Just one aspect for the sake of clarity regarding a possible unclarity that may appear from the statement of Mr Snyders, my client. Indeed it is my instruction that according to his operation, there were three passengers in the vehicle. He stated at one point that three persons were killed, but in another part of his statement he says that there were four, is it your evidence that there were three in the vehicle?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR BOTHA: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOTHA
MR VAN HEERDEN: Van Heerden Mr Chairman, I would like to request a short adjournment to take instructions on a certain aspect from the family of Mohale.
CHAIRPERSON: Does anybody else have any questions that they want to ask in the interim?
CHAIRPERSON: We will take the short adjournment now, then.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
WILLEM HELM JOHANNES COETZEE: (s.u.o.)
CHAIRPERSON: Any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN HEERDEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Coetzee, in your statement on paragraph 2(c) you state the reason why the organisations were infiltrated and you also state that they were successfully infiltrated. Could you elaborate on that please?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, what I am implying is that there was also a variety of informers and agents elsewhere in the country who had been placed and who had accessed these organisations.
MR VAN HEERDEN: If you say accessed, what do you mean by that?
MR COETZEE: They had the capacity to closely monitor movements and actions.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Does that then imply that such persons became members of the organisations?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Did you personally have contact with some of these members?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Can you recall any of these persons with whom you had contact, who were also informers?
MR COETZEE: At this stage I have already mentioned the person, the others were agents or informers, whose identities I do not wish to expose.
MR VAN HEERDEN: The person whom you have mentioned, was he a member of the South African Police?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Which organisation did he infiltrate?
MR COETZEE: Sansco, Mr Chairperson.
ADV SANDI: Just on, I don't know maybe your next question will be dealing with a different issue, this person, at the time he was at the University, was he already working for the Security Police?
MR COETZEE: Would you repeat the question please?
ADV SANDI: Yes, you have mentioned Mr Moshualiba who was at the University of the North, was he working for the police at the time he was there or did he join the police afterwards?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, since 1984 according to my recollection, he was involved in the SAP.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, there is a misunderstanding, it is Mohale that was at the University of the North, not Moshualiba.
ADV SANDI: Yes, but Moshualiba is the one who was working for the police, not so.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but he was not at the University of the North.
ADV SANDI: He was not at the University?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.
ADV SANDI: Okay, thank you.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Can you say how it is possible for a person who wasn't a student to become a member of such an organisation?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, this member of the Force was tertiary placed.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Does that then imply that he was a student?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: For what length of time did he study, that would be at the University of the North?
MR COETZEE: I would just like to rectify something, Moshualiba to whom we have referred, was not placed at the University of the North.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Where was he placed?
MR COETZEE: He was placed in Sebokeng Mr Chairperson, and in Soweto respectively.
MR VAN HEERDEN: When did you hear for the first time about Tabo Mohale?
MR COETZEE: I cannot specifically recall the date, but as a result of his activities at that stage, in 1988, 1989, he had drawn much attention to himself.
MR VAN HEERDEN: How did he manage to draw this attention?
MR COETZEE: As a result of his involvement in tertiary activities.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Could you elaborate on the concept tertiary activities?
MR COETZEE: In other words that would be within the context of Sansco's objectives Mr Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: And this Mr Moshualiba, the police officer, was it in 1988, 1989 that he had contact with Mr Mohale?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 6 of your statement, you mention the workshop which was arranged and emphasis was placed upon the determination of precautionary measures, could you elaborate on that?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I can no longer recall precisely what was discussed with and during the workshop, but I would imagine that one of the points of discussion would have been the identification of so-called underground cell structures which operated from a tertiary level within the country.
MR VAN HEERDEN: What would the precautionary action have involved?
MR COETZEE: The establishment of informers and agents within existing structures within the country.
MR VAN HEERDEN: How regularly did you have contact with Mr Moshualiba?
MR COETZEE: I would just like to rectify something, I am referring to Mr Moshualiba.
MR VAN HEERDEN: I beg your pardon, that is my mistake.
MR COETZEE: On a consistent basis Mr Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 7(a) you state that Mohale was a member of a core group which supported and popularised the armed struggle, how large was this core group?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I can no longer recall precisely, but what I can confirm however is that the persons who ultimately accompanied him, was part of his group.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Would that be the group in general or the core group?
MR COETZEE: The core group, Mr Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 11 you state that a change came about in the group's activities and that they would travel to Swaziland. Could you perhaps elaborate on this change that this group underwent?
MR COETZEE: What I have referred to Chairperson, would be initiatives from Mohale to go abroad in order to realise the objectives as already stated, the objectives of this core group.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Where in Swaziland would they have gone?
MR COETZEE: I cannot recall precisely to whom, Chairperson, but I can recall that mention was made of Manzini.
MR VAN HEERDEN: How far away from the border was Manzini, how far from the nearest access route?
MR COETZEE: I would assume Chairperson, that it may have been Oshoek, which is approximately 40 to 50 kilometres away, I may be mistaken in this regard.
MR VAN HEERDEN: You state here that you consulted with Brig Oosthuizen and also through him with Gen Erasmus and that you also spoke to Col de Kock and that various proposals were put forward regarding action against members of the group. Can you recall what proposals were put forward?
MR COETZEE: At this stage I can only remember still that we had to act in order to prevent that these persons succeed in their objectives of returning to South Africa with arms as well as the creation of a military capacity.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Can you recall which proposals were made in order ... (electricity failure) ... the discussions that Mohale held with the agent? Could innocent persons have been in the mini-bus?
MR COETZEE: It is highly possible that persons may simply have accompanied the group for the purposes of a tour or a holiday.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Now when Brig Oosthuizen suggested that control be assumed of the operation, could you explain how one goes about taking control of an operation?
MR COETZEE: In order to prevent that innocent persons become involved in a cross-border visit, and then also by means of the vehicle, to restrict the number of persons that could really make use of the vehicle, in order to make a smaller vehicle available and in so doing, take preventative action and place Mohale in the position to leave the country only with his core group.
MR VAN HEERDEN: To whom was this vehicle, the Opel Kadett given?
MR COETZEE: If I recall correctly, it was given to Mohale himself.
MR VAN HEERDEN: By whom?
MR COETZEE: By the agent, Mr Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: What did Tabo Mohale do during 1988 and 1989?
MR COETZEE: He was a student.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Where?
MR COETZEE: If I recall correctly, at Unisa.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Derek Mashobane?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I do not have much knowledge regarding the latter mentioned person.
MR VAN HEERDEN: You say you do not have much knowledge, what do you know?
MR COETZEE: Except that he was part of Mohale's core group.
MR VAN HEERDEN: And Portia Shabangu?
MR COETZEE: I would confirm the same regarding her.
MR VAN HEERDEN: That she was also a member of the core group?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Earlier you stated that Tabo Mohale was a student of the University of the North, did I understand you correctly?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VAN HEERDEN: When was this?
MR COETZEE: I can no longer recall all the data and periods of time.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Furthermore you stated that he had been expelled as a result of cases of arson during unrest situations?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: It is my instructions from the family of Tabo Mohale that he was never a student at the University of the North?
MR COETZEE: That is the information that I had available, Mr Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 24 of your statement, you state the latest relevant information which was conveyed to Col de Kock. Could you elaborate on that?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, the arrival of the other two persons to whom we have referred was among others at that stage, conveyed to Col de Kock as well as the possibility of a further one or two persons who may possibly have undertaken the journey as members of the core group, but who at that stage, was still unknown to us.
MR VAN HEERDEN: How many persons would have been in the vehicle, according to you?
MR COETZEE: If I understand or recall correctly, Chairperson, between five to three, that was the regular number that was used with regard to the vehicle.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Furthermore you spoke of a fictitious letter which was supposed to create the information that the ANC had killed them? In your evidence-in-chief you stated briefly that the content of the letter was about the fact that they had dealt with the RSA system, can you elaborate on that?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I can no longer recall the detail of the letter which was compiled or composed, but I can recall that ultimately in other words, we wanted to place the responsibility for the deaths at the ANC and furthermore the letter contained data which would ultimately create the impression with the Swaziland police of where these persons came from and what the purpose of their visit was.
MR VAN HEERDEN: What code was used?
MR COETZEE: Identical codes which were used by the ANC MK structure on a consistent basis with the underground cell structures.
MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 25 you say that the departure of the group was monitored by means of Moshualiba, how was it monitored?
MR COETZEE: What I meant by that Mr Chairperson was the delivery of the vehicle and the physical departure of Mohale and the others from Johannesburg or Soweto. I am not entirely certain of the precise address or the precise situation of the address from where they had departed.
MR VAN HEERDEN: How did you plan to monitor the group from Soweto to Oshoek?
MR COETZEE: By means of the placement of the two members to whom I have already referred.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Before the departure and during your discussion with Col de Kock, did you discuss any details regarding the operation?
MR COETZEE: I cannot recall, I would assume Chairperson that at that stage the operation had already been finalised, although details of the operation were not known to me, if I recall correctly.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Did you have no share in the planning of this operation?
MR COETZEE: I would believe that when we were involved in discussions with Col de Kock, we would participate in general in the planning of the operation.
MR VAN HEERDEN: What do you mean that you would participate in general?
MR COETZEE: That Col de Kock would manage the operational component and then according to his own planning, would have implemented the operation Mr Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: How many persons departed from Soweto?
MR COETZEE: If I can recall correctly, as I have already stated, only three of which I was aware at that stage.
MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 26 you state that you and Moshualiba on that particular day, manned a telephone of which Mohale had the number. Where was this telephone?
MR COETZEE: I assume Chairperson, that it was at a safehouse.
MR VAN HEERDEN: How many telephone calls were made to that number that evening?
MR COETZEE: I can only recall one telephone call from Mohale from Swaziland.
MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 28 you state that later you heard that these three persons were led into an ambush, when were you informed about this?
MR COETZEE: I would assume that it was on the Sunday or the Monday subsequent to the incident.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Who told you about it?
MR COETZEE: I would imagine that it was Brig Oosthuizen who informed me.
MR VAN HEERDEN: I have nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN HEERDEN
ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP
ADV SANDI: Is there any reason why Mr Mohale was not arrested for conspiring to send people away to Swaziland to receive military training, even before he had actually sent those people away?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, at that stage we would have had to expose our agent.
ADV SANDI: The agents would have been Moshualiba, who were those agents?
MR COETZEE: It is Insp Phineas Moshualiba, at that stage he was a Sergeant.
ADV SANDI: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, no thank you, but perhaps if you will allow me through the Chair, could we ascertain from Mr van Heerden whether there is objection to the applications and if so, on what basis Chairperson, so that we don't have the same problem as we had last week in Natal, not having been informed beforehand.
CHAIRPERSON: What is the attitude of the family Mr van Heerden?
MR VAN HEERDEN: Mr Chairman, my instructions are that they've got no objection in principle to amnesty, provided there is a full disclosure and that the political motive is disclosed. That is the basis of the presence of the family here.
MR VISSER: That is fair enough Mr Chairman, thank you. I have no questions in re-examination, might the witness be excused if you are finished with him, Chairperson.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: On the same basis as usual, if something arises, you will arrange for him to return?
MR VISSER: He has been informed to be in attendance, Chairperson.
WITNESS EXCUSED
