Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: I am Andrew Wilson and the Chairman of the Committee and I will ask my two members to introduce themselves so their voices can appear on the tape for the benefit of those who have to type out the record.

MR SIBANYONI: I am J B Sibanyoni, a member of the Amnesty Committee.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson, Ilan Lax, a member of the Amnesty Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Could I now ask those representing the applicants, the implicated parties or the victims, to please put themselves on record and finally our Evidence Leader?

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, I am P A Hattingh. I am instructed by Mr Hugo and we appear for Mr de Kock and sorry, we also appear for Mr Simon Radebe.

MR BOOYENS: May it please the Committee, Mr Chairman. Kobus Booyens instructed by van der Merwe and Bester. I appear for Jacobus Kok, Jacob Francois Kok, Wybrand Andreas du Toit, Willem Riaan Bellingan and implicated party Hermanus du Plessis. Thank you.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Honourable Chairperson, Lamey of the firm Rooth and Wessels and I appear for applicants Kobus Klopper, Willem Albertus Nortje and also Isak Daniel Bosch. With regard to Mr Bosch I am standing in actually for a colleague of mine, a Mr Rossouw also of the firm Rooth and Wessels.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Chairman, I am J G Rautenbach. I'm instructed by the firm Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom and I appear on behalf of the Mlangeni family.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, my name is Lyn Lockhat and I appear on behalf of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand that certain of the implicated parties, I have a note in front of me saying that they have been notified and are legally represented. Mr J H Tait is represented by F. van der Merwe.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Yes, that's correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Brig Nick van Rensburg is represented by Goldberg and Victor.

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And Col H du Plessis is represented by Wagener.

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And I gather from what I was told before the Hearing...(intervention)

MS LOCKHAT: Excuse me, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I placed on record already that we appear for Col du Plessis, Mr van der Merwe is his attorney.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, sorry. And I gather that Mr Dirk Coetzee, a first victim has been notified, is legally represented and has indicated that he does not oppose or intend to take part in the proceedings.

MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed correct, Chairperson. I have a letter which was received from the Attorneys Julian Knight and Associates. With the leave of the Committee I'd like to just hand that up, whereby he indicates that he is opposing the matter and he doesn't wish to ...(intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: That he is opposing?

MS LOCKHAT: He's not opposing. Then, Chairperson, I also have an affidavit deposed to by Andre Kritzinger, which I'd also like to hand to the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Have the other parties seen these documents?

MS LOCKHAT: It is before them, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The reply was all nods, so I think I'll place on record that they all said yes.

MS LOCKHAT: And then just lastly Chairperson, just, there's a supplementary application that was submitted by Mr Nortje and we just have two pages that were not included in the bundle, Chairperson and I'd like to hand it to the Committee.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson yes, may I just explain? There was, only a portion of the Nortje supplementary statement forms part of the bundle. The relevant portion regarding the death of Mlangeni and the attempted murder on Dirk Coetzee specifically was not included in the bundle although it's part of his supplementary amnesty application.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, so this is not a new document, it's a document that has already been filed a considerable time ago and this is merely an extract.

MR LAMEY: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Now where should this go?

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I submit that the appropriate place would be...

MR LAX: Page 69. It would be a 68 (a) and (b) probably.

MR LAMEY: Yes indeed, Chairperson.

MR LAX: That's of the first bundle.

MR LAMEY: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Right we'll mark those present at no 52, we'll say 68 (a) and 68 (b).

MR LAMEY: As it pleases, Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And it will then form part of bundle 1 of the papers. If you will just give us a moment to look at the document you've handed in.

Now I mark the letter from Julian Knight as (a), the affidavit prepared by Mr Kritzinger as (b). There is one matter which I would not like to raise, which I was going to raise in any event, but it now emerges from the affidavit and that is, I read the records available of the evidence led at the hearings, the trial and matters of that nature and it seemed clear that at that stage the packaging was available and was handed in and referred to. I wonder if it is still available and if so, whether we could have sight of it because I had some difficulty in what I read of deciding what sort of handwriting there was on the packaging, whether it was print or ordinary handwriting and matters of that nature and also precisely how it was addressed, for the return address and if it was available, I think it would be of assistance, if it is available now, I think it would be of assistance. As I understand it, he got the package at his office, I'm talking now about the unfortunate Mr Bheki Mlangeni, he opened the packet there and left the packaging behind, which is why it is available.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I just can comment on that. It's not, according to our records, do we know that the package is available, of any connection with the Attorney- General's office, but I can certainly then just do further inquiries and I could inform the Committee during the course of the day. I don't know if Mr Flip Hattingh can perhaps assist us as well?

MR HATTINGH: Chairman, I don't recall whether the packaging was handed in as an Exhibit.

CHAIRPERSON: It's by no means clear. It was clearly there and available and people looked at it and gave evidence about it.

MR HATTINGH: And they obtained the handwriting of...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Samples were taken.

MR HATTINGH: Of Vlakplaas, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And I agree, that's what caused many problems. I was unable to say whether one should now say, "Well it's an Exhibit that has been filed there" or whether it is part of the docket and if so, what's happened to the docket.

MR HATTINGH: I seem to recall that we had photographs of the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It was photographed. If you could see if you still have, but I know what happens to these papers after years.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, we will certainly see if we can find them Mr Chairman and let you have them.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I be of assistance here? At some stage we were in possession, that was during the inquest, of photographs, enlargements, everything, of the package, the wrapping of the device that was used and all of that and we kept those photos for our own information until we were at some stage summoned to the Attorney-General's office and we actually gave them numerous photos and enlargements of the wrapping and of everything that was relevant, so I'm sure that it that's taken up with basically Mr Ackermann, that he should be able to provide us with some other information, whether it was used at the trial or not. There may even be more than those that were used.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, ...(indistinct) Because there appears to be an indication as to whose handwriting it was. It was a little confusing reading the papers as I did in haste when the original approach was denial of all knowledge, which later changed and accordingly how to evaluate the various versions put was a little difficult, but thank you, Gentlemen. What are we now going to start with?

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, may we call Mr de Kock?

EUGENE A DE KOCK: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Now you've all been here since before 10 o'clock, some time before I gather. We will be taking the adjournment accordingly between 11 and 11.15. If you get to a convenient stage in the evidence, choose it then, I don't want to try to break into the middle of any portion of evidence.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, you are an applicant in this matter. Your application appears from page 2 in bundle 1, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Have you had the opportunity to study these documents once again?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And do you confirm the correctness of the allegations contained therein?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Do you also confirm once again the supplementary affidavit which has been placed before the Committee upon the Hearing of the first series of incidents known as cluster 1, which deals with Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Then very briefly Mr de Kock, at a certain stage...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, is that the whole bundle?

MR HATTINGH: The bundle, yes, Mr Chairman. At one stage it was bundle 1 (d).

CHAIRPERSON: Can I have a look at the front of yours, because I've got a pile of these things up there.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, at a certain stage you were called to Head Office by Brig van Rensburg, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And what was his position at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: He was the Commander, C Section, under which C1 and Vlakplaas then resorted.

MR HATTINGH: And did you then go to his office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Where you found him, along with Col du Plessis?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Were any orders issued to you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. Brig van Rensburg gave me a note with a Zambian postal address, which he had obtained and he asked me whether or not we could formulate a plan with Dirk Coetzee. The address would then be the address which Dirk Coetzee would have been using in Zambia and the euphemism of formulating a plan, was quite clearly indicating that Dirk Coetzee had to be killed.

MR HATTINGH: Before you went to the office, Mr de Kock, were any steps taken by the police, of which you were aware, in order to attempt to determine the whereabouts of Mr Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And what were these steps?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, firstly the request was issued to me by Brig van Rensburg that Mrs Coetzee be followed. I had to arrange for a surveillance team which would attempt to determine whether or not she could lead the police to Dirk Coetzee and then furthermore we also started receiving cassettes from tapping devices which indicated that Mrs Coetzee's home telephone had then been technically covered and this sort of permission could not have been issued by Brig van Rensburg, he would have had to consult on a higher level, for example via Gen Smit and from thereon to the Minister in order to obtain permission to technically cover such a telephone.

MR HATTINGH: And the recordings which were made of those telephonic conversations, did you receive these recordings at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Some of my members were appointed to fetch the cassettes and to listen to these cassettes and to see whether or not there were any indications of Coetzee's whereabouts and what his possible plans were, so that the police could then prepare themselves accordingly.

MR HATTINGH: Did you also issue orders to members to follow Mrs Coetzee in order to attempt to determine where Mr Coetzee found himself?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Let us then return to the meeting there in the office of Brig van Rensburg. Did you then initiate steps in accordance with the order that you had received there to make a plan, as it was put, with Mr Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. One of the questions which I asked Brig van Rensburg was who would be the sender because there would have to be a sender's address.

MR HATTINGH: May I just determine from you, did you decide at that stage already what the plan would involve?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we had not yet formulated a fixed plan. There was not yet an idea or which method or device would be used. We would not be able to reach Coetzee on a personal basis, in other words physically.

CHAIRPERSON: Why not?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was in Zambia.

CHAIRPERSON: And as I understand it, the South African Police had connections all over that part of the world.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but this was a situation which we wanted to keep as quiet as possible. It wasn't the general type of operation. The Defence Force had much better connections there, but we couldn't make use of them.

MR HATTINGH: Did you however realise that due to the fact that you could not reach him physically, you would have to send some form of a device to him via the posting network?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would have been an aspect which we would have had to examine and then come to some sort of agreement in order to decide what we were going to do.

MR HATTINGH: Therefore you already had the sending of some or other postal item in mind?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: That is why you wanted to know whose name you would be using as the sender's address?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: What was said to you when you asked whose name would be attached to the item?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I asked and Col Herman du Plessis then mentioned to me, he mentioned a name which was Bheki's name and when I asked him who this person was, he said that this was the person who represented Coetzee during the Harms Commission here in Pretoria. Now I didn't know this, because I wasn't interested in it. I was only interested in it when it came to my own delivery of evidence and his office was situated next to Brig van Rensburg's office. We went into his office and returned with an address for someone by the name of Thompson or something like that and then the name of Bheki.

MR HATTINGH: Was it conveyed to you on a piece of paper?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And did you then receive it from him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: At that stage when this discussion took place, was the Harms Commission still underway?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, as far as I know it was.

MR HATTINGH: And were you aware of the fact that Col du Plessis was involved with the Harms Commission and its proceedings?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: On behalf of the Police?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. Not only was he involved in it on behalf of the police.

MR HATTINGH: But he was also one of the implicated persons. He was implicated by Mr Coetzee, but he was with the Commission on a full-time basis and he assisted the Commission with regard to logistics and so forth.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then return to Vlakplaas after this discussion with Brig van Rensburg?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I co-opted W/O Bellingan to assist me. He is the only one, he was the only one that I knew of at Vlakplaas at that time, who had worked with Dirk Coetzee and was familiar with his habits and his manners as well as his various tastes and dislikes and he was therefore quite an important person for me to assist in determining how to approach this task.

MR HATTINGH: Might this be a convenient stage to take the tea adjournment?

CHAIRPERSON: Right, we'll now take the short adjournment.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: We have been given, just before the adjournment, a letter from Goldberg and Victor, to which is annexed an almost illegible affidavit and thereafter a legible copy of the same. We will identify that as C. I think it's C for the whole little bundle. Having read the affidavit, it appears to us that it conflicts entirely with the evidence this applicant has given so far and that it will be necessary to call Mr van Rensburg to give evidence, but where there is a conflict of this nature, it would not be fair to attempt to adjudicate on it on the basis of one of the two parties being subjected to cross-examination, the other one merely putting up an affidavit and sitting back and we accordingly would like his legal advisers attention to be drawn to the fact that we consider it will be necessary that he be subpoenaed as a witness. If he wishes to come forward himself and wishes to instruct his legal advisers to cross-examine the present applicant, he is entitled to do so.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman.

EUGENE A DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (cont) Mr de Kock, you have also had the opportunity to study the affidavit which was submitted by Brig van Rensburg during the tea adjournment. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: We will deal with it more thoroughly now that we have it in possession. In paragraph 4, he states

"One day, during the first half of 1990, Eugene de Kock came to see me in my office and informed me that a friend of his, attached to a National Intelligence Section, had determined that Coetzee was with the ANC in Lusaka. I instructed de Kock to make an inscription in the necessary file and that the address in Lusaka would have been recorded in that file."

What do you say about this allegation, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: It is false. I have no contact with National Intelligence Services. I only had contact with the military Intelligence Services and then of course with the CCB. Furthermore, the ANC's postal address could be obtained from the Lusaka telephone directory or one could simply have called inquiries here in Pretoria and they would also have been able to give it to one and this postal address to which this consignment was sent, was not to the ANC's Head Office, it was a personal address which would have been exclusively used by Dirk Coetzee for the purposes of communication. During a later discussion, after the package was sent, this discussion was with Brig van Rensburg and Herman du Plessis was also present, it appeared that Brig van Rensburg had obtained the postal address from a letter which Dirk Coetzee had written and along with, or had sent along with a member of the South African Police to South Africa. This former policeman was stationed in Piet Retief and defected with another member of the Force to the ANC. Dirk Coetzee sent a letter with this policeman so that it would be delivered here or sent here, one of the two, that is how I understood it. In other words, no interception could have taken place by means of the postal services. This policeman, however, liaised with the South African Police and the letter arrived at Brig van Rensburg.

MR HATTINGH: And the address which was on that letter, was this the address which he gave to you to which the package was supposed to be sent?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Where did you learn all this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson it was during the discussion after the package was sent, there was another discussion regarding Dirk Coetzee and the nature of the Intelligence which was made known and as a result of discussions, it came to be known.

MR HATTINGH: Did you ask him how he had obtained the address?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I did ask at a certain point. I didn't expect any answer and this is what was told to me by Brig van Rensburg.

MR HATTINGH: This would be the version that you have given us?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And then in the second paragraph, the next paragraph, paragraph 5 he states

"I deny emphatically that I gave de Kock the order to murder Coetzee or that de Kock or any other persons conspired to kill Coetzee. I deny that I ever gave a note containing Coetzee's personally address to Mr de Kock."

MR DE KOCK: No, the truth is a stranger to Brig van Rensburg in this case.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And in as far as his version within this affidavit clashes with your version, you stand by your version?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I have absolutely no reason to change anything. I have never shirked from any responsibility or anything and I am here to convey the truth and nothing else.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Can we then just hear from you before we continue with the plans which you formulated, was any reason given to you explaining why they wanted to kill Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, at that stage Coetzee was in Zambia and he was on his way to London to give evidence there, or he would have testified there before the Harms Commission and it would have involved Gen Lothar Neethling and poison which he would have provided and according to Brig van Rensburg, he had to be prevented, he had to be stopped. At that stage in either event, he'd already made serious allegations of Brig van Rensburg himself and Col du Plessis himself with regard to murders in the Cape or at least in the Port Elizabeth vicinity. They were also the persons who lodged this request.

MR HATTINGH: If I understand you correctly then, Mr Coetzee at that stage, had already made his revelations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: But he had not yet testified before the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: Was the idea to prevent him from giving evidence before Judge Harms?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: By killing him?

MR DE KOCK: I must just state that I didn't know Coetzee at that stage and that I had not previously worked with him, so to me personally, with the exception that I was the Commander of Vlakplaas, he could not prejudice me personally in any way.

MR HATTINGH: He had been a Commander of Vlakplaas, Mr Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And this was before you arrived at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, long before that.

MR HATTINGH: Can you give us an approximate indication of when Mr Coetzee left Vlakplaas as the Commander?

MR DE KOCK: I think it would have been in December 1980 or January 1981, somewhere around that time.

MR HATTINGH: And when did you join?

MR DE KOCK: May 1983, or no it was the 1st of June 1983 that I arrived at Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. So that would be a year to two or three before you arrived there that he had already left Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAX: I beg your pardon, did I understand you correctly that you did not know Coetzee at all?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't know him. He could have walked past me and I would not have known how he looked. The first time that I became aware of his appearance was when there were photographs in the Vrye Weekblad.

MR LAX: Thank you. Please proceed.

MR HATTINGH: But you knew of him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Particularly after he made his revelations.

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I had heard of him previously from other members, but it was never of any particular interest to me.

MR HATTINGH: How did you feel about the revelations which he made to the Vrye Weekblad?

MR DE KOCK: Well, Chairperson, to me it was high treason. MR HATTINGH: Did you feel so emphatically about him that you would have planned out of your own to murder him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the sentiment was certainly there, that he deserved to be tackled, but it wasn't personal gain to me in the regard that he could prejudice me.

MR HATTINGH: What you are actually saying is that he was never with you at Vlakplaas and that he was not aware of any offences in which you could possibly have been involved.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You received the order, as you have testified and you returned to Vlakplaas and that is where you had discussions with Mr Bellingan. Could you tell the Committee briefly which plans you considered in killing Mr Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at a certain stage, and this was quite problematic because firstly one would have to get the item or the product there to Zambia and this would then be about the packaging and the sending of this item, then one also had to be certain that it would arrive at the appropriate person, because the further away a device moved from one, especially since this was an indirect attack, the chances of losing control would also be increased, so we wanted to incorporate security measures on every level. At a certain stage it was decided to send him a case of wine and then to contaminate the wine in some or other way.

MR HATTINGH: To poison it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, to poison it.

MR HATTINGH: But this plan was abandoned because either Coetzee didn't like that particular wine or he would hand it out and the wrong persons would receive the wine. Then it was also considered to intercept his insulin.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know that he was a diabetic who had to use insulin?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And to see whether or not one could use that channel in killing him?

MR DE KOCK: That was also abandoned because Bellingan and I were both aware that his one son was also a serious diabetic, so that plan was also abandoned.

MR HATTINGH: Were you afraid that the son might come into contact with the insulin?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he may have used some of it as well.

MR HATTINGH: Ultimately when it was decided and it was mentioned to me by Bellingan that he loved music, particularly Neil Diamond and we first examined a radio cassette player, then we examined the option of a Walkman.

MR HATTINGH: Why was the possibility of sending him a radio cassette player abandoned?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we could have prepared the radio cassette player but then the entire vicinity would be blown up and everybody else who was in that vicinity.

MR HATTINGH: So you did not wish to injure or perhaps kill other persons in the process?

MR DE KOCK: No, one would only go for the target and even with the cassette player or with the Walkman, we went to the extent of not making a bomb of the device itself, only of the head phones, So in other words, one would go for the person who would be listening to one of the two tapes?

MR HATTINGH: And then ultimately, did you decide upon the use of the Walkman with the head phones?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And the explosives which would then be used, would it have been done in such a manner that only the person who put on the head phones would be killed by it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And no bystanders would be killed?

MR DE KOCK: No, we did not wish to create any aerial damage or injuries. Something such as a hand grenade for example, or if one prepared the Walkman oneself, it would be an area weapon which could injure from the point of detonation to 15 metres radius, so we wanted to cover this aspect.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then decide upon the Walkman and request assistance from the Technical Division of the SAP?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I went to the Technical Division and I co-opted them. I request them by means of Col Waal du Toit, to assist me and I discussed the matter with him in brief and requested whether they could manufacture such a device. He said that he would look into the possibility. I was accompanied, as far as I know, by W/O Bellingan and subsequently I suggested to Mr du Toit that Mr Bosch who was in my Technical Division, would be the liaison officer with him and that I would be kept up to date with all the developments and that progress reports would be made to me.

MR HATTINGH: And were progress reports conveyed to you from time to time?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Was the device then completed eventually?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: I understand that there was a test-run, however, I was not present during this test-run.

MR HATTINGH: Did this take place at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: I understood, after my arrival at Vlakplaas one day, that there had been such a test-run during which a similar device had been detonated on the head of a pig to determine the results, to see whether or not the function was working and it was successful.

MR HATTINGH: And you then received the device?

MR DE KOCK: I did not receive it.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall who did?

MR DE KOCK: No, then I would have to speculate in answering because I recall that I arrived at Vlakplaas the morning and Mr Bosch informed me that the package had been delivered and sent and that Radebe and Bellingan had gone through to Johannesburg to post it from there.

MR HATTINGH: And did they eventually inform you that the package had been posted?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And then you heard nothing further?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, at the end of the day Dirk left Zambia for London and quite some time elapsed during which we heard nothing of the package and what had happened to it.

MR HATTINGH: And Mr Coetzee did indeed testify before the Harms Commission in London?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I foresaw that the package had most probably been identified as a bomb by Mr Coetzee. That the possibility existed that it was removed from the post and that these facts were kept quiet for the purposes of investigation, in other words, let's see who will jump out and make inquiries about this.

MR HATTINGH: And I assume then that you did not make any inquiries, or make any calls to determine what had happened to the package?

MR DE KOCK: No, I couldn't risk it, I would have given myself away completely.

MR HATTINGH: Very well.

MR DE KOCK: As far as I can recall this was during a weekend, it was when I heard during a news report on the radio that there had been an explosion of a package bomb at a house in Soweto and during subsequent reports in the news, it appeared that this may have been the device and the following Monday, or at least that Monday when I arrived at work, I was duly informed that such an explosion had taken place and that it was this device.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know who the person was who had been killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was then informed that it was Bheki Mlangeni.

MR HATTINGH: And this is the person whose name was placed on the package indicating who the sender was?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Did you ever think that a person who had not sent the package would receive it and listen to it?

MR DE KOCK: No. If one had to speculate, I could only think that such a person may possibly have thought that someone had sent it on his behalf, in his absence, but that is purely speculation on my behalf. It may be correct.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. You didn't know Mr Mlangeni?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: When you sent the package, what was the political objective that you had in mind, if you had any political objective in mind at all?

MR DE KOCK: Firstly, it was in order to deal with the person who was betraying the South African Police Force and the Security Force, who was committing treason, which was opportunistic treason, but which would have had detrimental consequences for the government and the Security Forces. They suffered severe criticism. He was then also my enemy because he joined the ANC and he was a physical opponent.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Did you know Mr Mlangeni at all?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: Before the time?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: It was never your intention to kill him?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I had no doubt that Dirk Coetzee would receive the package and if he had identified it as a bomb, it would have been removed from the system because no person in the world would send a bomb back.

MR HATTINGH: You were charged with attempted murder of Mr Coetzee and furthermore you were also charged with the murder of Mr Mlangeni, but ultimately you were convicted of the attempt to murder Mr Coetzee and with regard to Mr Mlangeni the court found that you must have foreseen that someone else could have been killed by means of the device and you were found guilty of culpable manslaughter with regard to Mr Mlangeni, so the attempted murder you were sentenced to five years imprisonment.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Which was charge 15 during your trial and charge 16, dealing with the death of Mr Mlangeni, you were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for the murder or the manslaughter of Mr Mlangeni.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any reward for the task that you performed in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: No, only the imprisonment.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you remember where the attempted murder was alleged to have been committed?

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, there was a very lengthy argument addressed to the court on the attempted murder. My attitude was that the court couldn't entertain that charge because, as far as we were concerned, the final steps in the execution on that attempt were taken in a country outside the Republic, but the court didn't accept that argument and found that the attempt to murder Mr Coetzee was committed in the Republic.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that what the indictment said?

MR HATTINGH: That's what the indictment said, yes, Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. After the death of Mr Mlangeni there was a post mortem inquest.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And it was a formal inquest with oral evidence.

MR DE KOCK: Witnesses were called.

MR HATTINGH: I'm talking about the post mortem inquest. No, I don't know if you gave evidence, but there was oral evidence given.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but I cannot remember.

MR HATTINGH: Were you aware of the fact that the police investigated this case and at one stage pointed a finger at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: How did you get to know about this information?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, one morning very early at the office Mr Klopper informed me that he received a message from a Capt or a Maj Kritzinger who then worked at the Soweto Security Branch.

MR HATTINGH: Was he one of the investigative officers of Mr Mlangeni?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, and that he and other people, I did not have a fixed date when they would come to visit Vlakplaas or any signs of this incident.

MR HATTINGH: They would come and look for certain indications that the package was either manufactured there or sent from there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then take any steps in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, as far as I can remember I asked Mr Bosch, his office was the only technical office, to clean it, including pens, pencils, paper, anything that can be tested, that he should remove all of these items from his office and as far as I know, this device was not built there, or sent there, or packaged there. If they would have found items, it could identify certain other operations.

MR HATTINGH: In your evidence concerning Mr Klopper, I can just remind you about it where he broadly gave evidence that indeed all stationery was removed or was replaced with new ones.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And did Mr Kritzinger, when he arrived there - or did he arrive there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was another person with him, but I did not know him.

MR HATTINGH: And did they then investigate the office of Mr Bosch?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I know they did go the office. We gave them directions because if they were to investigate the whole of Vlakplaas, they wouldn't have been able to do it. I think they were directed to the office, yes.

MR HATTINGH: And they then searched the office?

MR DE KOCK: I do not know if they took anything with them.

MR HATTINGH: They wouldn't have found anything that connected it with the package.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAX: Mr de Kock, if I may interrupt? Did they take a handwriting sample from you at all?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at a stage Mr van Dyk and the other 12 members of Vlakplaas were called to the Head Quarters and there was a Dr Klatzow who represented the family as well as Colonel, I cannot remember his surname, I think it's Hattingh. Yes, my legal representative just said Hattingh, and we were then accompanied by Gen Engelbrecht, who was then a Brigadier at that stage. He was also present and then certain samples were taken of our handwriting. Mr Radebe and another person, they were not available, they were not in the country and if I'm not mistaken another Mr Radebe had to submit handwriting samples.

MR LAX: Thank you.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, maybe just before your own hearing started, the investigative officer in your case once again took handwriting samples from certain people who gave evidence.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes. I heard about this in my court case. I did not think they took some of my handwriting because they already had enough. Samples were taken from Mr Radebe and I think from Mr Britz. Samples were also taken from him. I cannot remember who were present when the samples were taken. This is what makes me wonder now about the original packaging, why it was available, because how would they then compare the handwriting.

MR HATTINGH: Can you remember the covering or the packaging, if it was still available at your hearing?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I think photocopies were made of it, but it was very clear. I am not sure about the packaging, or the original packaging.

MR HATTINGH: Apart from the handwriting samples were fingerprints also taken?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: From all the members?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I think that Dr Klatzow took some.

MR HATTINGH: Are you talking about the photographs?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: As I recollect it, fingerprints were taken also from the machine itself.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, fingerprints were also taken from the device. There was also forensic investigation. That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, after you planned and you sent this device, did you get any feedback, or receive any feedback to Brig van Rensburg.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did give him feedback personally.

MR HATTINGH: Did you tell him what you did and did you give him the details of this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I said we prepared the device, it was a radio and that we sent it and that we have to wait and see.

MR HATTINGH: Was there anybody else in company?

MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot remember.

MR HATTINGH: Was this at Head Quarters again?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Chairperson. No further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr de Kock, with regard to the position of Col du Plessis, I must put it to you that Col du Plessis states and has instructed me that he has no recollection that at any stage he suggested that the address of Bheki Mlangeni be used as the sender's address and that he did not convey the suggestion to you. Is it possible that you may be confusing him with somebody else? That you may be confusing the occasion or that this may be a discussion which took place at a later stage and when I say a later stage, I mean subsequent to the incident, that it may have been discussed as to how it ended up with Bheki and Mlangeni and then you may have said that it was Coetzee's contact, or something like that?

MR DE KOCK: No, because according to Col du Plessis, Mlangeni was the only person from whom Dirk Coetzee would receive anything. It was a case of one on one contact, if it had come from anybody else, for example from Jan, that he said he received it from Bheki Mlangeni, it wouldn't have been acceptable. It was either from Bheki Mlangeni or not. That was the situation.

MR BOOYENS: Then just furthermore, Col du Plessis tells me that he had no knowledge of any conspiracy and the nature of the operation. That is just a statement that I must qualify to you. Is it possible that there may have been a discussion between you and van Rensburg that du Plessis didn't really know what was going on and didn't really know about the operation as such and that he possibly just heard Dirk Coetzee's name, or something to that effect, in other words he didn't really know that there was a plan to murder Dirk at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I will differ, as I have already differed.

MR BOOYENS: With regard to Mr Tait, there are indeed persons who were put on the trail of Dirk Coetzee's wife to see what her movements were, because they didn't know where Dirk was. You wanted to determine whether or not she was making contact with anybody or visiting Dirk somewhere in the country?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Tait's position is that he was a member of the surveillance team at one stage but that he really didn't know what it was about or what the intention with it was, he simply carried out orders, in other words he knew nothing of the conspiracy.

MR DE KOCK: No, he didn't, he simply carried out his orders with regard to the surveillance.

MR BOOYENS: Then let us come to the next situation. You have already touched upon this, but I would like us to elaborate somewhat with regard to this. These telephone interceptions, there were also postal interceptions, which came to Dirk Coetzee's wife.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I vaguely recall that post was intercepted. It had something to do with documents or medical aid fund, something in that connection. I wouldn't like to commit myself to any definite statement about this, but it was something in that line.

MR BOOYENS: Now according to instructions, if we briefly examine your Section, was it WA 11 and 12, which had to do with postal interception and telephonic interception

MR DE KOCK: I think it was WA10.

MR BOOYENS: They say it was WA 11. Well let's just stick to that. Let's refer to WA11. This was a separate Section, which was also stationed in Rebecca Street, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Now just for the sake of clarity, because Rebecca has come to be associated with the Technical Division of Waal du Toit and the others, there were also other divisions of the Security Branch there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And the Telephonic and Postal Interception Division did not resort under Mr du Toit?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR BOOYENS: I understand that the overall Commander there was a Col or a Brig Helberg, but I'm not certain of what his rank was at that stage. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And from what was said to me, Helberg was a man of the rule book.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was quite particular regarding the correct departmental procedures.

MR BOOYENS: And so Mr de Kock, you or Mr Waal du Toit, for example, could have gone to Mr Helberg and said "We want to tap the telephones, please assist us." What do you think would have happened if you had done that?

MR DE KOCK: He would have refused.

MR BOOYENS: So if Helberg was not satisfied that there was official authorisation for the tapping or telephones and the interception of post, he would simply not have allowed it.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, such a request did not come from us. I simply received the order for us to fetch the tapes from Technical, in other words, what was arranged, if it was arranged from above, it would have been arranged from Brig van Rensburg and higher and then have been devolved down to Mr Helberg. This was not a bottom up request.

MR BOOYENS: You say Brig van Rensburg or higher?

MR DE KOCK: Well it must have gone higher at least in order to obtain Ministerial permission. I don't know if it was Ministerial permission or the permission of the Commissioner of Police which was required.

MR BOOYENS: However these would have been instructions which would have come from a very high level within the police?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, as far as I know, it would have come from the Minister's offices. I can just mention by way of example and perhaps Mr Coetzee would later be able to support this, we went as far as cancelling his medical aid so that he could not make use of Polmec, which was the police medical aid fund. In other words, we created as many obstacles as possible for him.

MR BOOYENS: And once again, Mr de Kock, you and the other applicants did not carry enough weight to be able to accomplish this and this would also have had to come from above?

MR DE KOCK: No, that was at the very highest level. One could not intervene with that.

MR BOOYENS: I'm assuming and I'm not representing Mr Helberg, but you do not allege that Mr Helberg must have known about the entire conspiracy. His instructions were simply that this was Dirk Coetzee's wife's telephone number, there's the authorisation, tap the telephone and make recordings. He wouldn't have known that this was part of a plan to eliminate the man ultimately?

MR DE KOCK: No. With regard to the clandestine nature of Vlakplaas operations and the liaison with Waal du Toit and the others, it was very departmental, Mr Helberg would not have been involved in this.

MR LAX: May I just intervene? Would any other sort of tapping device have been used, anything other than a telephone line?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but I'm not an expert on this, I think that some of the other applicants are the experts when it comes to these matters. I could obtain the product but I never manufactured it myself.

MR LAX: Somewhere in the documents there is someone who states that the house was suitable for other types of tapping devices, that is the impression which was created.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but that had to do with Vlakplaas. This was also the Technical Division who undertook the installation for us. So that was something completely independent from what took place at Rebecca Street.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I come in here now too? This is - I'm afraid I may be completely wrong. I have been reading all these papers, but my recollection is that this telephone tapping was a very organised system, that there was direct contact between telephone exchanges and the offices in Rebecca Street. It wasn't a question of someone putting a connection onto the line just outside Mrs Coetzee's house?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I am a lay person when it comes to these matters. They placed it directly on the main frame between Pretoria and Johannesburg. That is where the interception took place.

CHAIRPERSON: This was being used a great deal for political purposes, it wasn't just Mrs Coetzee, so they had set up an elaborate tapping system because they could tap in on any telephone.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct because there was one tape where Dirk Coetzee was contacted by the Report offices in London, but this was via his wife's home and there was more person than one, telephonically, other than Mrs Coetzee.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you. Just in conjunction with the question which the Chairperson has just put to you, just for the sake of clarity I would like to hear your comment on this. The legislation gave the Minister the power to say that you could tap someone's telephone, but according to my instruction, that power was delegated to the Commission who would then have given that sort of authorisation. Do you know anything about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would accept that because a delegation could take place but the persons who usually made the applications would be those who were investigating a particular matter. For example Col Waal wouldn't have been able to ask to tap someone's line. I wouldn't have been able to do it, I would have to go to an investigator who was dealing with a specific matter and then request that he tap the line for me. So that is the basis upon which it operated.

MR BOOYENS: And I'm not going to go into the technical details of this, but it is so indeed, according to my instructions, that the line was then attached at the exchange, with the assistance of the telephone services, and then connected to the building in Rebecca Street.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I think that all the Security Branches throughout the country had a small office where there were such recording machines that were used for tapping purposes.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, but the point is Mr de Kock, that it was not linked to tape recording machines at Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR BOOYENS: They were linked to machines in Rebecca Street where all the Technical Divisions were and so forth, it was linked to that place and from there onwards you picked up the tapes with authorisation, so that you could listen to the tapes.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And when I read the evidence, I also inferred that it seemed as if certain people wanted to allege that you Eugene de Kock, wanted to kill Dirk Coetzee. If it was your operation alone, you did not have the capacity to obtain all the technical backup which we have witnessed here.

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. Now just with regard to the position regarding Mr Bellingan. Mr Bellingan was stationed with Mr Coetzee at Vlakplaas. He had spent a lot of time at Vlakplaas. He was there before you arrived there.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct. That is what I understood from Mr Bellingan.

MR BOOYENS: And it is indeed so that Mr Bellingan was requested by you to provide information regarding Dirk Coetzee's preferences, but both Mr Bellingan and Mr du Toit tell me that you are mistaken when you say that Bellingan was with you when you discussed the matter with Mr Pretorius.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that probability exists, it was a long time ago.

MR BOOYENS: Now by nature of the matter, have I understood you correctly that the idea of a Walkman linked with music originated from you. Where did it originate, from you?

MR DE KOCK: I would accept the responsibility for that.

MR BOOYENS: Because the execution was left over to you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. The discussions regarding how we would approach somebody that I didn't know and then the various options and the inherent dangers that it would hold for bystanders and also the minimisation or marginalisation of danger for bystanders, which ultimately led to the choice of the Walkman and I approved it. I cannot say who suggested the Walkman.

MR BOOYENS: This was not a statement which I put to you, I asked you a question. So when you say that you cannot recall, I would be satisfied with that answer. In either event, when the idea was put forward, you went to Waal du Toit, in other words to tell him: "We have this idea, can it work in practice", is that what you told him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And do you agree with Mr du Toit that you also told him that you had received an order from above?

MR DE KOCK: He knew.

MR BOOYENS: In this case it was necessary for him to know that it was meant to be posted by it had to be rendered as

secure as possible, that Dirk Coetzee was the target, that he was abroad and furthermore that the order came from above?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I told him and I must also state that I take responsibility for those persons whom we co-opted, for all of them within the Technical Division, and then also my own members, but not Gen van Rensburg, or Col du Plessis or the others.

MR BOOYENS: Steve Bosch was your technical man at Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And you then brought Steve Bosch into the picture?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And just for the sake of clarity we will lead the evidence, Mr Japie Kok tells me that Mr Steve Bosch then visited him and then discussed the matter with him and in some or other manner Mr Japie Kok didn't know that you had already spoken to Col du Toit. They then went to Col du Toit who knew everything about the planning and told them to continue. Do you accept this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I accept it.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. May I just get instructions on one point? Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock I would just like to ask you concerning this matter, in your hearing you heard the evidence from Nortje, Klopper and also Bosch and I also assume that you looked at the bundle, is this correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: I do not want to make statements, on detailed information, is there any aspect in their evidence on which you disagree, or which you can remember that you disagree with, so that we can clarify it?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, if there was something that I was supposedly with them when this device or prototype was tested on the pig's head, I was not present. I wouldn't have a problem to have been there and to see it. I do not think that I would have any reason to deny it, but I remember that one of your clients said that. I would just like to rectify that.

MR LAMEY: I think that if I read your evidence correctly, Mr Bosch or Mr Nortje, I think they said that you were somewhere on the farm but not when they tested the device itself on the pig's head. My instructions from Mr Bosch is and I do not know if you can remember this, but after the testing he did give feedback to you, or reported back to you that it was successful.

MR DE KOCK: I will accept it, Mr Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Something to that effect.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would have been his work to do it, so I do accept it.

MR LAMEY: Mr Bosch's instructions were or as far as he can remember, when he got the instructions from you, it was that he had to make the device but at that stage he didn't know that the specific method was to be a Walkman, according to him. He got the request from the Technical Department to go and buy this Walkman, so I do not know what your comment is on this.

MR DE KOCK: I know that we bought the Walkman and we paid for it from the funds. I am not going to deny this, or challenge this, I do not doubt that there was certain confusion about this.

MR LAMEY: Mr Bosch said that he remembered, or it's not very clear for him, that he had to liaise with the Technical Department, although he was the technical person, that you couldn't have produced this device at Vlakplaas, that he had to approach the Technical Department and then Japie Kok, but in the meantime it seems as if you already liaised with Kok and he didn't know about this.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I could say that there was an overlap at one stage.

MR LAMEY: I cannot say exactly an overlap, a possible communication gap.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is possible.

MR LAMEY: Now is it correct that Mr Bellingan would have been involved in the sending? Mr Bosch's task was completed concerning the technical aspect of this operation and at the end, when the package was ready, as far as he can remember he said with Kobus Kok he was involved in the final arrangements concerning the package, but he cannot remember how the package got to the farm. It's possible that he took it there, but he mentioned that he saw this package on his desk and then with that his task was completed and he was not involved in the sending of it.

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, he informed me that the package did arrive, but I cannot remember who he told brought this package or the message or the report that I received from him that Mr Bellingan and Radebe already went to Johannesburg to go and post this parcel. I gave them instructions to give me feedback concerning this. We wanted to keep the circle as small as possible.

MR LAMEY: Can you remember the note with the address of Dirk Coetzee? Can you remember who you gave this to?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, no, unfortunately not.

MR LAMEY: Very well, my instructions from Mr Bosch, I'd just like to put it to you that you didn't have the information about the address at Vlakplaas and that he himself did not write the address on the parcel itself.

MR DE KOCK: I cannot deny that.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that Bosch who says that?

MR LAMEY: Bosch, yes. Very well. And then concerning occurrences that happened after this, my instruction from Mr Klopper is that Mr Kritzinger did contact you or that he came to Vlakplaas and he said Klopper mentioned that you were also present and he had a discussion with Kritzinger and in this discussion he mentioned that they wanted to investigate.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, that may be true, but we did get a warning from Kritzinger. As far as I can remember we were at our Administration offices on the 7th floor at Head Office when Klopper told me this. But because of the time span there may be certain confusion. he did arrive at Vlakplaas, yes he did.

MR LAMEY: Not the same day.

MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot give you a specific date.

MR LAMEY: But I would just like to draw your attention to the fact that Mr Klopper did, or was at Head Office, he said it may have been mistaken that he went to Vlakplaas, but there was a conversation with Kritzinger about this.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, that is when they were supposed to search the place. We had to show them the place because Vlakplaas is very big. The buildings are enormous and if they had to do certain tests, like fingerprinting, it would have taken them ages.

MR LAMEY: This statement from Mr Kritzinger in front of the Committee at this stage, I do not know if you had the opportunity to look at it, or if you discussed it with your legal representative.

MR DE KOCK: According to Kritzinger he said that: "Klopper alleged that I told de Kock that I would go and search Vlakplaas and I had to use certain technical equipment to do this. I do deny all these allegations." Was it your impression that Kritzinger did give you enough time or warning to get your house in order?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And that Klopper understood it the same way?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he did.

MR LAMEY: Mr Bosch at the end of August 1990, he left Vlakplaas. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he did.

MR LAMEY: When these investigations were done, Bosch wasn't at Vlakplaas anymore and that the liaison officer that was involved in the making up of this parcel, none of the evidence was left behind in his office.

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I must concede that I may be wrong that Bosch did clean the office by means of a vacuum cleaner and water, scrubs ammonia to remove any possible remains.

MR LAMEY: The instructions from Bosch was that he was not involved in this but that the people who were involved in this were Mr Nortje and Klopper. Bosch said that he wasn't at Vlakplaas anymore.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do concede.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, may I just make sure? I just want to check further instructions. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry before you go on, I thought you said a moment ago that Bosch cleaned the office with water and vacuum cleaners and ammonia.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was my idea.

CHAIRPERSON: And the next, you say that you accept he wasn't there at the time.

MR DE KOCK: Well, Mr Chairperson, as I said that is how I remembered it and it may be wrong, it's not impossible.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, concerning this, Mr Bosch was at the end of August 1999 - he went to - he also said that he was not at Vlakplaas at that stage. He wasn't involved in that at all and he would have said if he was.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I've already answered Mr Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: What does that acronym mean, DCC?

MR DE KOCK: Director of Covert Collections.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, there are no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

MR RAUTENBACH: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAUTENBACH: Mr de Kock, the first aspect that I want to discuss with you is that earlier in your evidence, you stated that it wasn't your operation and that is why you received the support with regard to the telephone lines and so forth. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: What I meant by that is that I was working with this case, but I wasn't the only one. I know that the Intelligence Services from the SAP were also working on this case in a broader channel.

MR RAUTENBACH: Because what I want to ask you is, when you say that in order to conduct the telephone tapping, you stated in your evidence that it was necessary to go up beyond Basie Smit to the Minister, who could delegate that power.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now this operation that we are discussing, are we actually discussing one operation, that would be determining where Coetzee was and his ultimate elimination, or have I misunderstood you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe that the determination of his whereabouts would have led to his elimination.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then I must ask you, would you agree that the determination of his whereabouts, if one considers this logically, was connected to his eventual elimination?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, ultimately it could have led to that.

MR RAUTENBACH: With regard to persons who were involved, you referred to van Rensburg, Brig van Rensburg as well as Col du Plessis, with regard to the telephones you stated that this went up to a higher level.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: With regard to the so-called operation to eliminate Coetzee, as I understand your evidence you were basically introduced to the operation by van Rensburg.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: And the initial reference was for this to go much higher up with regard to the telephone and the Minister who had to delegate power to the Commissioner. Would the same have been of application to the idea or the operation itself to eliminate Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr de Kock, do I understand your evidence correctly that your evidence basically implies that the decision to eliminate Coetzee from your experience and your expectations would most probably have come from above?

MR DE KOCK: I had no doubt.

MR RAUTENBACH: With regard to that portion of evidence, could I ask you that if we say that it comes directly from above, where would you set that level of decision-making? Where would it have come from, if it came from the top?

MR DE KOCK: I would go as far as two persons, either the Minister or the Commissioner or both.

MR RAUTENBACH: For many persons it would probably be general knowledge, but just for the purposes of the record, who at that stage when you heard of the decision, was the Commissioner and who was the Minister?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I know the Minister was Adriaan Vlok, I think so and the Commissioner, I'm not certain who the Commissioner was at that stage. I don't want to speculate. I wouldn't be able to tell you.

MR RAUTENBACH: It was 1990. Was van der Merwe already the Commissioner in 1990?

MR DE KOCK: Well then, if that is so then it would have been him.

MR RAUTENBACH: And as I have understood you, you would have expected such a decision for the operation to eliminate Coetzee, according to you and your experience within the Security Force, it would have been taken on those levels?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I must just state that one's memory is jogged. Some of these tapes that we listened to at Vlakplaas, we made notes about interesting aspects, or aspects that we would have thought would have been of interest to the senior staff, particularly for the purposes of their investigations into cover-ups or handling of any sort and I gave those brief summaries to Brig van Rensburg upon various occasions. I received the reports from members, especially those who worked over weekends, and I myself made brief summaries.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now when you say that you submitted these summaries to Brig van Rensburg, would you have expected, in the normal course of events, that those reports would be sent up to the higher levels?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, most definitely because this was a national crisis, if I may put it as such. Ultimately it was a crisis.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr de Kock, would I understand your evidence correctly if I were to infer, and please tell me whether or not you agree with me or whether I'm taking it too far, if I were to infer that your evidence actually boils down to the fact that you are seated here today, if one examines all the persons applying for amnesty, you are here today as the highest officer in rank order of all these persons who are applying for amnesty?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: And what you then state furthermore is that the truth is most probably so that there are persons much higher up in the rank order, on the very highest level, who have not applied for amnesty but who were actually supposed to apply for amnesty?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: With regard to the attempted elimination of Dirk Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then I just want to ask you, Mr de Kock, with regard to the investigation which was conducted by the South African Police, Kritzinger's name has already been mentioned and there are clear suggestions, actually more than suggestions, to the effect that Kritzinger would have issued the warning that there was an investigation and that he was coming to Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did you ever become aware during any discussion with Kritzinger or any other person, that there was a so-called special investigative officer who had been appointed above him? I think the name of Gen Ronnie van der Westhuizen was mentioned?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was a General there, a General by that name but Gen Engelbrecht took over from him.

MR RAUTENBACH: Very well. With regard to Gen Engelbrecht's involvement, did you have liaison with Gen Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: We're not referring to Krappies Engelbrecht here?

MR RAUTENBACH: Yes, we are. Did you have any liaison with him, any inquiries, any discussions with regard to the fact, because he was the Chief Investigating Officer, with regard to the fact that a finger was pointed at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, because in that regard everything pointed at us eventually, that is why we were also the persons who had to submit handwriting samples.

MR RAUTENBACH: ... that there was a so-called special investigative officer who had been appointed above him and I think the name of Gen Ronnie van der Westhuizen was mentioned.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was a General there, a General by that name, but Gen Engelbrecht took over from him.

MR RAUTENBACH: Very well. With regard to Gen Engelbrecht's involvement, did you have liaison with Gen Engelbrecht - are we not referring to Gen Krappies Engelbrecht here?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we are.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did you have any liaison with him, any enquiries, any discussions with regard to the fact, because he was the chief investigating officer with regard to the fact that a finger was pointed at Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. Because in that regard, everything pointed at us eventually. That is why we were also the persons who had to submit handwriting samples.

MR RAUTENBACH: How many discussions would there have been, according to you? I know that this is quite a long time ago, but with regard to Gen Engelbrecht, were these discussions held on a continuous basis?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was on a continuous basis.

MR RAUTENBACH: And when did Gen Engelbrecht become involved? You referred to Kritzinger, that he appeared on the scene at some point and that he issued a clear warning, as you understood it. When did Engelbrecht arrive on the scene, before or after this situation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as far as I can recall, Gen Engelbrecht was with us on the day that we would have had to see Doctor Klatzow with regard to the tests and the samples. There was an exchange during the Harms Commission of sweepers, Gen van der Westhuizen was there at a stage, also Gen Alwyn Conradie and then Gen Engelbrecht came over. He was connected to the Detective Branch, but had been deployed to Security Branch for the purposes of the Harms Commission.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr de Kock, many of those who are present here are quite familiar with, for example, the terminology. Could you tell us briefly what you mean by use of the word "sweepers", what was a sweeper?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this would be in the case of a problem that originated, such as in this case, there would be a person who would prejudice the investigation in some or other way or would impede the investigation in some or other way, so that it would swing in the favour of the State. This wouldn't necessarily mean that he would burn a document or something like that, but that the document would simply not be submitted to the Court.

MR RAUTENBACH: Is that an example?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is as an example.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then may I just ask you, Mr de Kock, if you refer to the sweeper, who are you referring to?

MR DE KOCK: In this case it was Gen Engelbrecht.

MR RAUTENBACH: So was the impression that you formulated during the investigation into the matter, that Gen Engelbrecht without stating this in words directly, but was it your impression that Gen Engelbrecht inasfar as possible, would provide protection to you and your members?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: And that with regard to the investigation, he would do everything in his capacity to ensure that ultimately the investigation would not lead to your exposure?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Were you aware of the fact that Gen Engelbrecht, for example, gave evidence during the post-mortem inquest?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not give evidence personally there and I cannot recall that he testified.

MR RAUTENBACH: The contact - I just want clarity about that, the contact that you had with Gen Engelbrecht, it would appear to me that most of the contact that you had was with Gen Engelbrecht and not with van der Westhuizen for example.

MR DE KOCK: At a certain stage I did liaise with Gen van der Westhuizen, but thereafter it was with Gen Engelbrecht on a continuous basis. If I may put it as such, there was a daily system of crisis management, new information would come forward, new aspects of evidence or documents, this was a daily situation.

MR RAUTENBACH: Was it your understanding with regard to van der Westhuizen, that he was the initial sweeper who was then replaced by Gen Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I vaguely recall that. I cannot say pertinently that van der Westhuizen did this or that at some of other point, but with the inception of the Harms Commission, he was initially involved.

MR RAUTENBACH: I know that you have stated earlier that a document wouldn't simply be burnt by the person, he would just ensure that the document was not submitted. Just tell me if it is so or not, that with regard to Gen Engelbrecht in this particular matter, and this is now the attempt to eliminate Dirk Coetzee, is there anything that you could indicate as an example, which would indicate to us why you came to the conclusion that Engelbrecht was actually merely acting as a sweeper?

MR DE KOCK: I refer to the Japie Maponya matter, during which the petrol registers were fetched from Krugersdorp by W/O Nortje and given to Gen Engelbrecht, after which they disappeared. Furthermore, with his investigation into the bank branch in Krugersdorp where Japie Maponya was employed, I think it was a service register or a pay slip which was not submitted during the post-mortem inquest although it had been shown to him or it had been placed in his possession.

MR RAUTENBACH: Just with regard to that remark of yours, was this something that you knew, that you had already known by the stage that Gen Engelbrecht investigated this matter of the attempted murder of Mr Dirk Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: It was not only the internal situation within the country which was covered up, but also that within the neighbouring States. I testified that in neighbouring States we were simply collecting information, meanwhile we were receiving decorations and awards for operations in these States, and this was denied during the Harms Commission.

MR RAUTENBACH: May I just ask you the following, and I'm trying to confine myself to this matter, with regard to the attempted elimination of Dirk Coetzee and the subsequent investigation, at that stage in time, when Gen Engelbrecht, and this is with reference to the stage in time when you dealt with the handwriting samples and so forth, can you recall anything during that period that gave you the impression that Engelbrecht would attempt to protect you against all adversaries?

MR DE KOCK: What he knew was available and we were told that our statement should be that certain people were not available, that they were out of the country. People like Mr Radebe, he was available but it was said that he was not available.

MR RAUTENBACH: At a stage the legal representatives of the Mlangeni family, with regard to the handwriting samples, received information that one of the persons had been identified by the handwriting samples and this person was deceased. Do you recall anything like that?

MR DE KOCK: I recall that it would have been during that time.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you recall that this was presented by the police, that this person was deceased?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I think he was an askari, if I think about it now. That is why there wouldn't be a record about him.

MR RAUTENBACH: What is the name that you recall?

MR DE KOCK: I beg your pardon?

MR RAUTENBACH: What is the name that you recall, regarding the person who would most probably have been the person who was reported as deceased?

MR DE KOCK: No, I said that it would have been an askari, so this person would not have been traceable. But I cannot recall the person's name.

MR RAUTENBACH: Because the name which was conveyed at that stage was that Simon Radebe was dead. Was he an askari?

MR DE KOCK: No, he was a full member of the Force, but it was for that reason that the person was not concealable, not at all.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then just to place what I've said to you clearly. This was conveyed by Kritzinger, Kritzinger presented that Simon Radebe was dead and that a handwriting sample could not be obtained. He told this to the family.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that was part of the defeat of the ends of justice.

CHAIRPERSON: Was Radebe the person who in fact wrote it?

MR DE KOCK: I would also like to know, Chairperson, because up until now I haven't been able determine who wrote the address or who made the inscription on the forms, I'm not sure myself, I do not know. I do not if it was already done or if it was delivered at Vlakplaas like that, or certain inscriptions were made at the post office. I cannot remember that someone said who wrote it.

MR LAX: Well you wouldn't have gone to such trouble ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But you've told us about these elaborate precautions taken, of the police lying, saying that Radebe was not available, he was overseas, Kritzinger saying Radebe was dead. Why should all this be done, if he may not have anything to do with it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, what was foreseen at that stage was that he could possibly have left a fingerprint or that he would have left something behind when he handed in the package at the post office. You could not hand it in in a plastic bag. As far as I can recall, he had to hold it with the rope that was wrapped around the parcel. But now we do not know that maybe he touched the parcel in any other way. This is as far as I can recall.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you remember, Mr de Kock, concerning the package, and maybe you cannot remember this or maybe you didn't see it or did not have enough information concerning this, but it seems as if there was a part that was done by a computer, concerning the address, and then there was a part that was written. But as far as I can remember, the written section had to do with what was filled by the post office when this package was posted there. There had to be insurance, somebody had to pay the insurance.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think the computer print, that was done before the package was posted or was sent to Johannesburg. I'm not sure who did it, if we did it or if it was done by the Technical Department. I did not see or inspect the package before it was sent off. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR RAUTENBACH: That part that the computer did, where was this done, was this at Vlakplaas or the Technical Department?

MR DE KOCK: It wouldn't have been at Vlakplaas.

MR RAUTENBACH: Do you say it would have been at the Technical Department?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, well I assume so.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then it seems, Mr de Kock, that the idea was that nobody would write on the parcel just before it was posted, so that there was no handwriting on it.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that would have been the ideal.

MR RAUTENBACH: But as far as I can remember, what happened when they got to the post office was that some requirements were given that insurance had to be taken out on this parcel, that an address or a document had to be filled in by hand.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: And if I'm correct, Mr de Kock, then it means it could have been one of two people, it was either Radebe or Bellingan.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then I want to ask you, Mr de Kock, concerning the report-back, we are once again talking about the bigger picture, the people who were also involved in the higher ranks. Since the last discussion that you had with van Rensburg and du Plessis, before the package was sent, can you remember if you had any other discussions with them concerning what happened?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did mention that after the package was sent, I think we said there was a radio on its way.

MR RAUTENBACH: When you that discussion with van Rensburg, did you have that discussion after the package was sent?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. In other words, our task was completed and we had to wait for the results.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you tell us how you could have done that report-back, was it a meeting that you attended, was it a phone call? I don't think it would have been a written report-back. Can you just give us more information concerning that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it could have been at any time of the day, I could have arrived at head office and said to him listen, we posted the package yesterday, it's on its way and now we just have to wait for the results and we did not know how long it would take. It was something in that line. But he would have been informed about it to such an extent that he could give further report-backs.

MR RAUTENBACH: After a time elapsed and nothing happened, did you have further discussions with van Rensburg or du Plessis? Or let's say specifically van Rensburg, concerning what happened, what is going on?

MR DE KOCK: No, not that I can remember.

MR RAUTENBACH: Were there any enquiries made about what is going on?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it could have been, but I would be wrong if I say because I cannot remember. What I do know is that the package was, as we say, long overdue, because Coetzee then went to London.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then just one aspect concerning this sending of the parcel or package, did you have any idea how long it would take this parcel, or how long this parcel will remain in the post office before it reaches its destination?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I knew there was enough time, I think there was more than enough time. But as far as I know, there was enough time for this package to reach Coetzee.

MR RAUTENBACH: How long did - how much time did you have before Coetzee would have testified?

MR DE KOCK: I'm not sure. I do not want to mention a date, but I'm sure there was enough time.

CHAIRPERSON: While we're about it, can you - if you can't I can quite understand it, can you tell us approximately when was the package sent.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I won't be bound by it, I would say it was maybe between three weeks and five weeks before Coetzee had to go to London. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

CHAIRPERSON: But when was that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot remember the date.

CHAIRPERSON: Well how long after that did the bomb go off, did the packet go off?

MR DE KOCK: I think it may have been six or eight months. I'm speculating at this stage.

CHAIRPERSON: So somehow ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: It was approximately - the bomb exploded on the 15th of February 1991, and it seems as if it was sent in May 1990.

CHAIRPERSON: So it was sent in May 1990.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, according to the documents.

CHAIRPERSON: Because seeing that - when Coetzee gave evidence, page 276 of volume 2 of bundle 2, he said that

"It was on the 20th of April that we flew to London"

Line 28.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, I don't know if it was his first or second testimony.

CHAIRPERSON: So he'd already been to London to the Harms Commission before this device was posted to him.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I doubt it, because if I understand Mr Coetzee's evidence correctly, he was at the post office to receive the package, but that he didn't take it because he said, or he identified it as a bomb.

CHAIRPERSON: Page 279, the package was sent on the 10th of May and he first came to know about it in August, long after he had been to the Harms Commission. Page 279, the second paragraph. He goes on to say that on the 2nd of October he had to be in London for the Neethling case, and that's when he went to the post office and saw the bomb.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: So he'd known about it for some two or three months, but hadn't gone to pick it up.

MR DE KOCK: I can just mention, Chairperson, that we used the information that we got. I'm not trying to find excuses, but I did not have access to this information.

CHAIRPERSON: Because I'm totally confused, that if you sent him this device in May, to stop him testifying against Neethling and by June/July nothing had happened, that you didn't take further steps.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, as I said we could not liaise or phone somebody to make enquiries. The idea that was created and that I supported was that that it was identified as a bomb and taken out of the system for further investigation, most probably the ANC or the Zambians, and to make enquiries you would be pointing a finger at yourself.

CHAIRPERSON: So then you gave up - I'm not talking about a finger at you, I'm talking about the South African Government now, because we're told this came from ministerial level, they decided to give up all attempts to stop him testifying at the Neethling hearing.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, you can put it that way, but if you have to go further and with hindsight look at it, if he gave evidence there he cannot give evidence in a Court case and the end result would be the same.

CHAIRPERSON: But I thought the whole purpose was to prevent him giving evidence at the Neethling ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: It is so, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ... because of that, to do that, the Minister or the Commissioner of Police instructed people to kill this man.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And they, after a few weeks, just decided they weren't going to do anything more about it.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, I did the work as I thought it best, within the time frame that was given to us. And in the nature of the case, I do take responsibility for the actions taken, but it is as you say.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take the adjournment now. Gentlemen, how do you need? 2 o'clock? We'll now adjourn till 2 o'clock.

MS LOCKHAT: All rise.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAUTENBACH: (cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, I have a definite recollection that Dirk Coetzee had to give evidence in the civil Court case concerning Lothar Neethling, also in London. Can you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now with regard to what we discussed before the lunch break, I would just to tell you how I understand the evidence. I understand the evidence to be that at the stage when the package reached Coetzee or at the stage when it was sent, he already testified at the Harms Commission, it was finalised. Is that possible?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible.

MR RAUTENBACH: Very well. Then I furthermore understand that - I am not quite sure that when the package reached him he already testified in London concerning the Neethling incident. I do not think it's important because the period it took for the package to go from Johannesburg to Lusaka was a very long time. I would just like to refer you back to your own application, and I refer you to - Mr Chairman, I'm referring to the index, bundle 1, I'm referring to the paginated page number 4, and I'm also referring to the fourth paragraph thereof.

In that fourth paragraph you say the following -

"Dirk Coetzee had to testify against Lothar Neethling and the Security Branch was eager that he had to be taken out or killed before he testified."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can I just get clarification then, Mr de Kock. Do I understand it correctly, that the reason seems to be that he had to be killed because he would have testified against Lothar Neethling rather than things he would have mentioned in his evidence during the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, one could also go further and say that they wouldn't want more evidence come to light because of his allegations and that could go further, that then happened later on. But my instructions here were that he had to be killed before he testified in the Neethling case.

MR RAUTENBACH: So I understand your evidence correctly, that his death was connected to the Neethling case.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Well then concerning van Rensburg and the other people whom you say had to take the decision at a higher level, it was your intention then or the way you understood it was that they were specifically worried about the Lothar Neethling hearing.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: At that stage, am I correct that inasfar as it concerns Neethling and the allegations against Lothar Neethling, this was already made known in the newspapers, Vryeweekblad and it was already known.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: So basically what was left was the evidence that he would give then in a civil case.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson. Well I understood it as the Lothar Neethling case, I did not have details about this, if I can then refer to the people in the higher structure.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now reference was made in the Court in a question addressed to you, and it was, it didn't go any further or that the package was left there. Can you remember that it was said to you. And this is my following question, do you know Leon Flores?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you tell us where you know him from and how do you know him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he worked at a border post in the Eastern Transvaal, and he later applied for a transfer to Vlakplaas and came to work there and he then later went to the DCC and he also served under them then.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did you have any contact with Leon Flores after he left Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did.

MR RAUTENBACH: Could you give us more details concerning this in terms of what contact you had with him and what it entailed?

MR DE KOCK: Well it was a question about an exchange of information. Maj van der Westhuizen came to speak to the askaris concerning information about the ANC, Mozambique as a target possibility. So there was an interdepartmental exchange.

MR RAUTENBACH: You were also then, or you were aware of the fact that Leon Flores, after Dirk Coetzee remained behind in London, that he was arrested in England.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did you also become aware of the fact that there was evidence in the post-mortem, that the visit of Flores and du Randt had a connection with Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, possibly partially so. It was more of a favour from the side of Flores to us. The case or the matter came to light when Krappies Engelbrecht asked me if I had any contacts in England, and I did not have operational contacts. I did know that Flores knew somebody whom he was going to see, and that person did visit him here at a stage. And Gen Engelbrecht, what he wanted, and it was his order, was that he wanted more information about what Dirk Coetzee was doing now. There wasn't talk of killing him. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR RAUTENBACH: Let us just get this into perspective. You told us that the instruction came from the top, then you tell us we know that the bomb did not reach its original destination.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then it was said that Gen Engelbrecht was seeking information about where Dirk Coetzee is and what he was doing.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: But if the plan was to eliminate him, why did he need this information then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in providing him with the information, I believed he could then possibly start a new operation. I do not know if it would specifically be us that would do it or execute it, or if it would have been other Forces.

MR RAUTENBACH: I don't know if this appears in the bundles, but at one stage you must have come to the realisation that Du Rand - I think she indicated for whom she worked, not for Military Intelligence, but for ...(transcriber's interpretation) ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: She worked for GS2, or something like that.

MR RAUTENBACH: It's a department in the Army.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: That she said that Flores du Randt(sic) had money with him, a lot of money, when he went abroad to England on this mission with her, correct? Did you see them?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did.

MR RAUTENBACH: You also probably saw that there was evidence in the post-mortem, that he at one stage gave the money to somebody called Simpson and that he stopped being worried about the money and then that she made the conclusion that he used the money.

MR DE KOCK: The contact with Flores was Simpson and he contacted Flores - or let me put it this way. I met Simpson one night here in Pretoria and the task was not to kill Coetzee, it was to gather information about him. There weren't any tasks given, there wasn't a written report or a verbal report on it, but Flores later came and said that Simpson said that they had certain expenditures, him and others, and that he did follow Coetzee and did surveillance on him and that they had certain expenses, and that the amount from rand to pound was between R10 000 and R12 000.

I phoned Gen Engelbrecht and told him that "this is the situation", and at first he said "no, just ignore it", but then I told him "but if it appears in the British media, we won't laugh about it". I then, by means of a false claim, with his approval, wrote this R10 000 or R12 000 off and the money was given to Flores to give to Simpson and that he then go his way. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR RAUTENBACH: So you are telling me that you did not know or do not know if this money was handed over to Simpson, this money that du Randt talked about? I still do not know if it was handed over to him.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then I also want to ask you, is it not so that at the stage that Flores and du Randt were arrested in London, this package or bomb already exploded?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I do not know.

MR RAUTENBACH: I would like to tell you that it must have happened at a stage after the bomb exploded.

MR DE KOCK: I will leave it to you. I do not recall.

MR RAUTENBACH: And furthermore I would just like to tell you that, are you aware of the fact that the British Police took Dirk Coetzee away, or before they could take him away, he changed his home or address and that he was monitored by certain people.

MR DE KOCK: I think I read something like that in a newspaper report, but it did come under my attention. I do not know how or in which document I read this.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did you ever become aware of the fact that certain allegations were made, or that Flores in a statement, or would have said to Emry in a debriefing session, told Emry - he was an officer in the ..(indistinct) who did the debriefing, that he said that the money would be paid to Simpson, so that Simpson would make arrangements with the Royal Ulster Constabulary to eliminate Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I do not believe that R12 000 could make a difference, it had no worth in London. No amount was given for an assassination and this specifically was money that I said was pay-off money to keep him quiet. And it would have been an enormous embarrassment if this appeared in the newspapers and people talked about it.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can I just get clarification on this, maybe people do not understand you correctly. Are you saying that to approve the money, this R12 000, you did this before Flores went abroad?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: And this was to pay over to Simpson to do surveillance on Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: I would say yes, it was surveillance, but we did not receive any written report about his address or what his routines were, where he visited. We didn't have a report.

MR RAUTENBACH: It seems to me that if I understand your evidence, it was something that this liaison was between Gen Krappies Engelbrecht and Flores, concerning the surveillance.

MR DE KOCK: No, Gen Engelbrecht asked me and then I contacted Flores. And the situation in London had nothing to do with Vlakplaas. Flores and them were on their way there to do their own matters. And as far as I understand, it was the suggestion of Pamela du Randt to a Mr Hunter, who worked in the Conservative Lower or Higher House, he was involved there in politics and he was anti-ANC, and it was suggestion of Pamela du Randt to this person to handle him. So that is where the situation actually started. Our case was a peripheral one.

MR RAUTENBACH: But you still say that the idea was, and this was from Gen Krappies Engelbrecht, that we accept now for a moment that this happened, that he was sent after the package already exploded and that it was already clear that he didn't serve his purpose, that it then seems that Gen Krappies Engelbrecht now wanted to determine where Coetzee was in England.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and he wanted to know what he was doing, what he was busy with. That was the specific, it was his specific request.

MR RAUTENBACH: So what I understand is that before you have told us they wanted to know where Coetzee was and you said earlier in your evidence that it possibly had something to do with his elimination.

MR DE KOCK: I believe that afterwards, yes, if we received information about his elimination, that somebody could get the task to do this.

MR RAUTENBACH: I'm now specifically referring to the second part. When Gen Engelbrecht became aware that the bomb had exploded and he said he's still looking for somebody to monitor or do surveillance on him, can one not read between the lines then that they still wanted to eliminate him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is true.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now concerning, or you do know that if you look at the documents that were made available to you, that Flores at one stage made a statement in which he, to Emry, where he mentioned your name, that he would have received the money from you and that the purpose of it was the elimination of Coetzee. That was the statement that he made.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, I do not know anything about this statement, I did read it, but the elimination was never ...(intervention)

MR RAUTENBACH: If I say "statement", I mean he had a discussion with Emry, Emry then made certain notes and then afterwards, after the post-mortem he turned around, this is Flores, and said no, this is not Eugene de Kock, I just mentioned his name because I wanted to pass the buck onto somebody else, he's well known in the Security circles, and that is why I mentioned his name. Can you remember seeing this in his evidence?

MR DE KOCK: No, not as far as I can remember, but he could have put it that way, but the end result could have been the elimination then. But this is my opinion.

MR RAUTENBACH: If I may ask you, you said now that you did give Flores the money. What do you make of his denial that in the post-mortem hearing he said that he received nothing from de Kock? Do you think it was fear, or what do you think it was?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it seems that he had to keep to the system of denial. That was the general system on this side and it did happen in all the forces when something was politically sensitive.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then I just want to mention to you as a portion of the evidence which has been submitted by Mr Kobus Klopper during the trial, and I just want you to tell me whether or not you recall that aspect of the evidence and if you have any comment to make about it please feel free to do so. I'm referring to the index bundle 2 and the paginated page is 3. Round about the sixth paragraph thereof. The paragraph begins as such

"Now do you know that he used Leon Flores?"

... and I'm referring to the evidence of Klopper.

"Leon Flores was arrested in London on the, I think at the airport, if I recall correctly. And on this specific day, the accused and I, Henry van der Westhuizen, who worked with Leon Flores, and Willie Nortje, I cannot recall who else still, were at the Centurion Lake Hotel in Verwoerdburg, where we were drinking and he was referring to money which he had given to Leon Flores and he was afraid that Leon Flores would buckle under pressure and disclose what he had been sent for."

Did he say what Leon Flores had been sent for?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I can recall, Leon Flores was to recruit Irish people to kill Dirk Coetzee.

MR RAUTENBACH: Let's just pause there for a moment. With regard to that portion of evidence, I would like to ask you for your comment.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can merely tell you that with regard to the recruitment of Irish persons to kill Dirk Coetzee, the answer is no, because by nature of the situation one would have to pay these persons or remunerate them in some or other way and no provision was ever made for that. Simpson did say that he was a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force, UVF, but whether or not this was the case, I could never confirm. To this very day still, I don't know whether he was a member of this organisation. I don't have an independent recollection of this.

MR RAUTENBACH: Well the point is that if one looks at the evidence of this, which has been given by Klopper here, then he too very clearly speaks of a discussion regarding persons who were supposed to kill Coetzee. And the question is basically, if you said that you don't recall this independently, are you then denying it?

MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot deny it, I can only tell you that no provision was ever made for this, because if you hire a group of persons there would have to be more contact or liaison. I can put it for you conversely that it would never have been necessary for us to hire anybody because we could have conducted the elimination ourselves.

MR RAUTENBACH: Yes, I understand that, but what I want to know is whether or not you would deny it. When you say that you wouldn't deny it, what are you referring to?

MR DE KOCK: I don't have an independent recollection of this and I cannot tell you specifically yes or no.

MR RAUTENBACH: And then there is another portion. If you look at the bottom of that very same page, I would say approximately three-quarters of the page down.

"Do you know who arrested Leon Flores?"

And then the answer is -

"I understood that it was M15, the British Intelligence Services."

"Did you know Leon Flores well?"

"That is correct."

"And can you just repeat for us, you say that the accused was worried."

"He was very worried."

"And did he convey why, did he specifically discuss it with you or with persons in general?"

And his answer then is -

"He spoke to us in general, stating that he was worried that Flores would turn and talk."

And then -

"What would Leon Flores have been able to say? Did he say, regarding Col de Kock's involvement with the mission to Ireland?"

"That is correct."

"To do what?"

"To recruit people to shoot Dirk Coetzee."

Let us just pause there. Do you have any comment about that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. Flores was not co-opted or hired by us to hire any persons to shoot Dirk Coetzee, I can assure you of that.

MR RAUTENBACH: What would you say, Mr de Kock, in your experience, of the evidence of Klopper, why would he do so?

MR DE KOCK: It may be his interpretation.

MR RAUTENBACH: Do you mean his interpretation of the discussion that took place?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, of his recollection of what took place there.

MR RAUTENBACH: However, you would have to agree with me that if one studies the evidence of Klopper, for one thing one could say that he certainly isn't ambivalent, and that is with regard to the fact that it would have been to kill Dirk Coetzee.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I can understand that, Chairperson, but Flores had no mandate or request or order to recruit persons to kill him, and I can assure you of that. This isn't something which by nature of my background, would have done, to simply recruit people and not know who they are. As I've stated, the money was paid, it was supposed to go to Simpson, it was "keep quiet" money and that was Flores' mandate.

MR RAUTENBACH: Nonetheless, I would assume that you would concede that the identification or detection of Dirk Coetzee in London for example, in England, if that had been part of the task, then it would not have excluded his elimination if the order was to trace him.

MR DE KOCK: No, I would not exclude it.

MR RAUTENBACH: And I just want to ask you with regard to the uncertainty which was experienced at a certain stage during your cross-examination regarding one of the other parties, pertaining to the so-called walkman bomb as such. The way I understand it is as follows, and please correct me if I am wrong, the fact is that you had some or other package in mind which was to be sent to him in the form of a bomb and that the decision that it would necessarily be a walkman bomb, that sort of decision would reside with the Technical Division.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, we would have presented the idea and they would have told us whether or not something like that was viable. So the idea would have come from us.

MR RAUTENBACH: So the idea for it to be a walkman bomb would have emanated from you and you would then have said to the Technical Division "this is what we want, can you do this, is it viable?"

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: With regard to the composition of the package, you say that you spoke to Bellingan, among others, and that Bellingan knew him quite well.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Could you explain briefly with regard to the two tapes which were sent along, were there two tapes?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: The one was marked "Evidence - Hit Squads.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: What was the point with that?

MR DE KOCK: It was so that Dirk Coetzee would definitely listen to it. In other words, coming from Mlangeni, he would definitely have listened to it, and no other person, it was of relevance for him.

MR RAUTENBACH: Why did you send the Neil Diamond tape with?

MR DE KOCK: According the Bellingan this was the sort of music that Coetzee enjoyed and as we believed, it would have substantiated the fact that this was for him, it was his package and we reckoned that it would also set his mind at ease, that this was for him, that it was meant only for him.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then just one further aspect. I know that there was speculation about it, but I suppose that one could simply just place this on the record with regard to the other form of speculation which existed regarding why Mlangeni would have opened the package of which he himself was supposed to have been the sender. I don't know whether or not you have picked this up anywhere in the record, but it would appear that he was hasty to get to his offices and when he arrived at his office and found the package, he basically looked at the package and removed the packaging to see what was inside and left the packaging in his office in the wastepaper basket and took the cassette player home with him. So he never again had the opportunity to fully realise - if he had seen the two names, Coetzee and Mlangeni, and had not specifically concentrated on who the sender was and who the recipient was supposed to be, he didn't have the second opportunity. So in other words, the packaging itself remained in the office and he only had the machine with him and he didn't have a second chance to verify the nature of the package. Did you understand this, or did you read this into the evidence?

MR DE KOCK: For many years afterwards people speculated as to why he took the cassette player with him. And firstly, the tape of the "Evidence - Hit Squads" would have been work for him, so he would have taken it with so that he could listen to it. Secondly, he may have thought or assumed that in his absence, due to his exams, that somebody else had posted it on his behalf. So that is what I think.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then I would also like clarification regarding the address or the addresses that you obtained. Initially, the address which you mentioned was the Coetzee address in Lusaka.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then there was the other address which you obtained, and as I understand it, you obtained this from du Plessis.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Where did du Plessis obtain the address from?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know whether he had it on his desk or whether he had it obtained it from documents which had been sent by the firm to the Security Branch with regard to the hearing. But I am speculating.

MR RAUTENBACH: The address which he gave you, was this an address which was written in ink or was it typed?

MR DE KOCK: No, it had been written on paper. He went away and came back, I don't know how long he took, but it was a very brief time, and he then gave me the address.

MR RAUTENBACH: I infer from that that you assume that it was his handwriting, that he had written it down for you.

MR DE KOCK: Well he left the office, went into his office and then returned with the note. So there wasn't any other medium by which that message could have been conveyed.

MR RAUTENBACH: Were you ever aware that on the morning after Bheki Mlangeni died, the firm Cheadle Thompson and Haysom compiled a list of possible suspects which was specifically aimed at Vlakplaas, on the following morning and that already on the following morning it had been made available to Kritzinger? Were you ever aware of that?

MR DE KOCK: No, not, Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: When was the first time therefore that you realised that Vlakplaas was indeed regarded as a suspect?

MR DE KOCK: I speculated at a certain point, but I think it was two to three weeks later, but I am speculating. I would give it that lapse of time.

MR RAUTENBACH: I want to put it to you that on that initially list of suspects that was provided on the morning after Mlangeni's death, your name also appeared.

MR DE KOCK: I was not aware of that.

MR RAUTENBACH: I'm stating this under correction, because I could re-study it in order to verify it, but I understand that the name of Waal du Toit was also on the list.

MR DE KOCK: I'm also not aware of that.

MR RAUTENBACH: May I just check my notes, Mr Chairman, to see if there's anything else.

Sorry, Mr de Kock, just for the sake of completion. Are you aware that the judge, during the post-mortem inquest, in his statement said that if Kritzinger had investigated Vlakplaas earlier, he would perhaps have made more progress with his investigation, that there was criticism against him as a result of this?

MR DE KOCK: It is possible that I may have read or heard about this, but I cannot recall it.

MR RAUTENBACH: And then just another aspect is that the package must have been posted with Bheki Mlangeni's name as the name of the sender. Do you know why that specific post office was selected, the post office in Joubert Park?

MR DE KOCK: I assume that it is perhaps because it is a large post office, but I cannot tell you why specifically that post office was selected, I don't know why.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr de Kock, would you exclude the possibility of high treason? You refer to high treason and you refer to him as an arch betrayer or an arch traitor, would you say that revenge played a significant role in your decision to send the package to Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: I would exclude revenge, revenge was never the issue here. It was never the motive, not by any nature.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then just finally, on behalf of the family, is there anything that you have to say at this stage to the family with regard to the incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. And if my fellow applicants would grant me the opportunity, I would speak also on their behalf in saying that their loss is irrevocable, it cannot be rectified and due to the lack of tolerance or zero tolerance on politicians, we literally strangled one another on ground level. I would like to express my sympathy, empathy and regret to the family, not only on my own behalf but on behalf of all those members who worked below me. I would like to say that they did not need Bheki's death, neither did we, nor did this country, and I could never rectify it, neither could the others. I don't know what else to say. There isn't sufficient vocabulary to express it.

MR RAUTENBACH: I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RAUTENBACH

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, how long did it take for you to plan this operation, to send the bomb? Over what duration did this take place?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Can it be a couple of days, moths?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Prior to meeting van Rensburg, was Vlakplaas ever surveying Dirk Coetzee, prior to your meeting with van Rensburg?

MR DE KOCK: Could you repeat.

MS LOCKHAT: Prior to your meeting with van Rensburg, where he had given you the orders to survey etc., did you, as Vlakplaas, did you place Dirk Coetzee under surveillance prior to your initial meeting with van Rensburg?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, there was a case during which he was under surveillance.

MS LOCKHAT: Can you just explain to us why.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I had to say that it was he who was under surveillance, it would be incorrect, it was his family and also particularly his wife, in the hope that the Security Branch would then be led to Dirk Coetzee via these channels. Why, I don't know. I suppose once we had established his place of residence, one would have been able to expect two situations, one being arrest, perhaps the other, elimination.

MS LOCKHAT: And was this your idea to survey Mr Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: So whose idea was this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it came from the higher levels in the Security Branch, initially from Brig Schoon and thereafter from Gen Nick van Rensburg.

MS LOCKHAT: And when you received the instructions from van Rensburg, did you report back to him after you sent the bomb?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I have already testified to that.

MS LOCKHAT: And after the long period of time that you heard nothing about the explosion or the elimination of Dirk Coetzee, did you go back to van Rensburg again?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, after the explosion I informed him that it was indeed our package.

MS LOCKHAT: And just one other question I was going to ask you. Did you have regular report-backs to van Rensburg, just generally?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, every morning we would visit his office.

MS LOCKHAT: So you don't you think it's a bit strange, you report back every morning basically, here's a package sent off, the bomb doesn't go off, you don't talk to him about this incident again till after the explosion?

MR DE KOCK: It isn't strange, all of us were waiting.

MS LOCKHAT: And when the bomb did not go off, what did van Rensburg say? Did you ask you, listen what's the next follow-up plan?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we were waiting for the bomb to go off. There couldn't be any follow-up plan until one knew what the result had been.

MS LOCKHAT: But this took a very long period, Mr de Kock.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: So there was no discussions of any other plan?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, this was something which had been sent and one would then have to wait for the events to take their course.

CHAIRPERSON: Did it ever enter your head that you should perhaps take precautions about it being returned to the sender?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, one would perhaps consider contacting the firm that would have entailed the risk of exposure and I thought to myself, where would that lead.

CHAIRPERSON: But you had - you've told us there was an organisation that watched over telephones and the post section of the Police Force.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, that is so.

CHAIRPERSON: And this was a parcel that would have come from a foreign land.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It would have been easy to pick up.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Was anything done to safeguard the life of the person whose name had been falsely written on the package as the sender?

MR DE KOCK: No, as I have told you, I believed that the package had been identified as a bomb and had been removed from the system.

MR LAX: Just before you go on. Surely you could have warned them from a telephone box or something, it wouldn't have been traceable. I mean, I understand if you'd used your ordinary phone it would easily have been traceable, but there are hundreds of ways you could have done it, you could have sent them a constructed letter done cut and paste, or anything.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I had no doubt that we will reach the target, and which was Dirk Coetzee, and that it did reach him.

MR LAX: But yet you did think of warning them, but you then desisted from doing that.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to go back to the issue of the orders. At page 217 of bundle 2, Bosch mentions that you had given them the orders to survey Dirk Coetzee, and he specifically stated that these orders came from higher up. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: But throughout the criminal trial, he doesn't tell us that, he tells us that you had given him instructions, you specifically had given him instructions to go and prepare this bomb, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: To do what?

MS LOCKHAT: To go and prepare the bomb, to set it off, to prepare.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do understand that.

MS LOCKHAT: But nowhere during the criminal trial does he state that this came from a higher order, that this instruction on your part came from ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: At that stage the Court case was around me and not about the higher hierarchy.

MS LOCKHAT: Yes, sure, I understand what you're saying, Mr de Kock, but I'm just trying to make a point here that he explicitly states that just by surveying Dirk Coetzee, you did get that order and you gave him that order, but he says it came from higher authorities.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, I cannot just issue vehicles and money for surveillance and it does not come from a higher authority. It's a different case if it was MK terrorists, but in this case it was a sensitive issue and the instructions did come from the top. And I believe that I would have mentioned this to him.

MS LOCKHAT: And then just the other issue on the tapping of the lines. You said that whenever you needed lines to be tapped in, one other route was to go to the investigating officer, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's how I understood the procedures.

MS LOCKHAT: So what would you do, just inform the investigating officer, look we want to tap into this person's line, and then he would arrange it for you?

MR DE KOCK: We never tapped outside lines, as a Commander of Vlakplaas, I only dealt with Vlakplaas lines. We had an internal counter-intelligence section and where they got the authority to do that, or that telephones had to be tapped through the department.

MS LOCKHAT: But was it necessary in all circumstances to get the authority from higher up, say from the minister for instance? Do you think that would happen in all circumstances?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I personally never applied for the tapping of lines in investigation, it was done in the branches. So maybe in the case of Mr Kritzinger or what he said, he may be able to answer it.

MR LAX: If I could just, while you're looking, just to put it in a clearer way. If I understand you correctly, the branches were busy with tapping a whole range of people and they got their authority to do that.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: ... in a sort of decentralised way. You would go to the branches and say "are you looking at a certain person", or whatever, "is there any information that you can give us in relation to that?"

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, usually when we worked in a section and specifically in a specific branch, we sometimes did read the telephone conversations of lines that were tapped. In other words, the branch had the line and then we would also look at the reports in order to gain some information from them, where must we go and look, or who must we approach. But in this case, concerning Dirk Coetzee and the lines, we now go and look at who was the investigating officer at headquarters who had the authority to do it because that would be important for them.

MR LAX: My point is a simple one, I'm just trying to understand this. And that is that there were a whole range of people being tapped continuously throughout the country and if you wanted information on person X or person Y, then you knew that they were from a particular region or - let's say they were from Cape Town and they were a particular activist and you wanted information on that person, would you go to the branch in Cape Town and say listen, I'm busy with certain work, I need to follow up on person X, what have you got for me on that person? Or would you need special authority to have access to that transcript or whatever the case might be?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as far as I know you go the person working at that desk, let's say they are tapping the phone of the PAC or any other organisation and they say that we need information about Johannes Shabalala, and then, do you have a tap device on his line? If they say they do not have information about that, they would then apply for a tapping device on that person's line. But if they did tap his lines and they had information, we could have access to that and read the documents.

MR LAX: Precisely. So you didn't need special permission for that, you would simply piggyback on their operation that was already ongoing.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: A minute ago you said, and I don't quite understand it, you said if you wanted to in Dirk Coetzee's case, you would have found out who was the investigative officer at headquarters.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's where we got our instructions from. We didn't get our instructions from the Northern Transvaal branch. And in this case, the people who did the investigations for the Harms Commission, they had the interest in it. That is what I mean. I'm sorry if ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It was the Harms Commission investigative officers you were talking about?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: There wasn't an investigative officer particularly into Dirk Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: What impact would Dirk Coetzee's revelations have had at that stage on Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, Vlakplaas was then highlighted as a assassination unit, which acted outside of the law, internally as well as abroad and that it was detrimental to the Security Police and it virtually brought the National Party to its knees.

MS LOCKHAT: And how would it have an impact on you personally?

MR DE KOCK: Me as a person? Well Chairperson, you do continue with your work and that is all. From the top matters are dealt with and you are protected.

MS LOCKHAT: Do you think that there was a possibility that Vlakplaas obviously now would have been closed down because of those revelations and you would be without a job?

MR DE KOCK: I had to answer this question at a previous hearing. I was a uniform policeman, I was not an askari, I could have been transferred to a uniform branch, to a detective branch, it was not a question of I would lose my job.

MS LOCKHAT: And there was lots of talk at Vlakplaas - I can just see through the criminal trial by Nortje, Klopper and Bosch, that you had a hatred for Dirk Coetzee, they actually went as far as that. Can you explain to us why so emphatically it's stated?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that may be their interpretation, I don't think there was any love between the members of Vlakplaas and Dirk Coetzee, not at all. And I think it was universal that traitors are seen with abhorrence. If you think of the examples in America and in England, treachery can be lethal.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to go back, one last thing, your meeting with van Rensburg. Did he specifically tell you go out and eliminate Dirk Coetzee? Were those his specific orders to you?

MR DE KOCK: He asked us if we could send a package and make a plan.

MS LOCKHAT: And to send a package, to you would mean?

MR DE KOCK: The whole discussion, the whole inflection, the euphemisms that were used, everything was an indication that it was here about the death of Dirk Coetzee.

MR LAX: Well "send a package" is hardly a euphemism in this context.

MR DE KOCK: Not that in the context that we said, there was no reference that we should send him a package of sweets or anything else, it was definitely not that intention. It was not a question that we were going to interrogate him, the feelings were very clear about him.

MR LAX: If he said make a plan, one would understand what he meant by that, that's clearly a euphemism with a specific meaning in the context, but to "send a package" is the modus operandi that he would suggest to you that you use.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, within the world in which we moved, I'm now talking about myself and others, to send somebody a package is to eliminate them, there was nothing else.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

MR LAX: Just on this question of hatred, it also struck me when I was reading the papers that at the one level you explained it to say "well that's his interpretation of my behaviour. I can't remember which person it was, but the one person describes you as almost being obsessive about Coetzee. He said you were constantly making remarks which implied a degree of hate.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, reports appeared daily in the newspapers and the Vryeweekblad was later a weekly security summary, it gave all the information about the Force, talking about the past now, and it is clear that people will react to that.

MR LAX: And then if I could just take you back, this discussion that Klopper referred to, this meeting at Centurion, where he talks about you being worried, we've canvassed your view on the actual content of his - but if you weren't worried about the Irish killing him for example, because that money wouldn't have been enough etc., etc., what were you worried about?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, my biggest problem was that Flores was involved in various actions outside of the law and various people died in those activities, and that was my problem.

MR LAX: So you were worried he'd expose all those activities?

MR DE KOCK: If he did expose, then it would substantiate the people who made the allegations. So it was about the Vlakplaas operations that I was worried about and not his.

MR LAX: So in essence that would then lend truth to all the other allegations, because it would be further corroboration of this kind of thing.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: There was one other thing that just puzzled me and that is that everybody's talking about a parcel bomb, this is not a parcel bomb, this is not a parcel bomb at all, a parcel bomb is something that explodes when you open it.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think it was just the use of language. The kettle's not boiling, it's the water in the kettle for example. I think it was just the use of languages.

MR LAX: Except that you chaps are experts in this sort of field and you differentiate between different kinds of weapons quite clearly.

MR DE KOCK: If you become technical for the purposes of clarity, then we could, but amongst each other - we could say that we throw somebody with a handgrenade until somebody specifically comes and says "but what kind of handgrenade", then you'd say it's an F1 or a RGD5 or an M26, or something like that.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, did the Security Police ever have problems with Bheki Mlangeni? Did he ever cross paths with them?

MR DE KOCK: Not that I know of, Chairperson, no.

MR SIBANYONI: Listening to the evidence here, one will get the impression that the sole target was Dirk Coetzee and Mlangeni was never a target.

MR DE KOCK: He was not a target at all, Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: How would you say his killing was political?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot say that it was political. I cannot claim it, but what I can say is that he was a strong supporter of the ANC and I believed that it was a case of an innocent bystander, somebody caught in the crossfire. And that is my opinion.

MR SIBANYONI: The information I heard was that he was either candidate attorney working for a law firm, did the police have any information about his political activities? Did he have any political activities?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not work on him, I got his name from Col du Plessis, as the only person from which Dirk Coetzee would receive something, that was why his name was mentioned. There was no other reason why his name was mentioned or used.

MR SIBANYONI: Although you were a Commander at Vlakplaas, the impression I get is that in these incidents you are saying you were acting on orders from above, you were not part of the decision-making process.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, no further questions, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I've got a few different things I'd like you to help me with. First of all, Krappies Engelbrecht, is that also Izak Johannes Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: That is the same person, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Who has given us various affidavits. The second point I'd like to deal with is, this idea of sending a package, sending a bomb in the parcel, this bomb would have to go out of the country through South African customs and into Zambia, is it ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ... through their customs.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't there a danger that one or other of customs people in examining, if they decided to do so, the contents of the parcel might have blown themselves up? As soon as you turn the machine on, it went off, as I understand it.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that very vague possibility we had to foresee. I cannot say that it cannot happen, or couldn't have happened. The possibility was so unlikely that we thought it safe.

CHAIRPERSON: And lastly, you were as head of Vlakplaas, doing an onerous and a difficult job.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: From the many papers submitted by you, as I have read, you were satisfied completely at the time that what you were doing was in the interests of your country.

MR DE KOCK: It was, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that all the other people who worked at Vlakplaas were doing the same.

MR DE KOCK: I had no doubt that they did, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that Vlakplaas was an extremely important part of the effort being made to safeguard the interests of the country.

MR DE KOCK: That is so, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you then were exposed to the disclosures made by Mr Dirk Coetzee.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And as you have told us, they appeared regularly in the newspapers, in Vryeweekblad and elsewhere.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did this have the effect of, perhaps infuriating is the wrong word, of upsetting deeply you and the other policemen who were engaged in these tasks?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, not only myself, but the whole headquarters, the Security Police right through the country, the National Party specifically. It was a hammer blow between the eyes.

CHAIRPERSON: So you all felt strongly against him because he was letting the side down, he was a traitor to what you all believed in, is that the position?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: That's all, thank you. Re-examination?

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: I beg your pardon, Mr Chairman, before my learned friend re-examines, Mr van der Merwe has been contacted by the attorneys acting for van Rensburg and perhaps if I may just suggest, he asked me to ask just for an adjournment that he and Ms Lockhat can perhaps just discuss with you, Mr Chairman, what the position is. Because they are also from Port Elizabeth, that's why they contacted him.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, do you want a short adjournment.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, please.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that going to affect this evidence?

MR BOOYENS: Well, yes, as I understand it. That's why I say Mr van der Merwe must, because I've got it second-hand and attorneys give one notoriously bad instructions.

CHAIRPERSON: Right very well, we'll take a short adjournment.

MS LOCKHAT: All rise.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o)

CHAIRPERSON: Are you ready?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, a section of Mr Klopper's evidence was read out to you with regard to the Flores matter in London. May I just ask you directly, did you send Flores to go and kill Mr Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you send him to arrange for him to be killed?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: If Mr Flores would have disclosed that he was supposed to have given money to a person for the purposes of surveillance or observation which he allegedly conducted on Mr Coetzee, would this have been any source of concern for you if such information came to light?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Regarding the question whether you were supposed to notify Mr Mlangeni, you stated that you believed that the bomb would reach Mr Coetzee.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you recall his evidence that he gave against you during the criminal trial, that indeed he had the package in his hands in the post office to which it had been sent?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that he had asked the officials in the building to call the police, because he believed the package to be a bomb.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that they did not pay any heed to his words.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You will also recall his evidence that he encountered Mr Jacques Pauw at the airport on the way to London in the case against Mr Lothar Neethling.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that he told him not to take the package and that his request was never complied with.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Regarding the question ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: There's one other bit of his evidence, if one's going to place it on record, as I recollect it, he also asked the ANC official who was with him when he was at the post office, to notify Bheki Mlangeni.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct, Mr Chairman.

And then, Mr de Kock, did you on any other occasion send a bomb to one or other person or organisation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we sent two bombs on two separate occasions to an ANC operational unit in Swaziland. The first was upon an order of the DCC Head, Anton Nieuwoudt and then there was another group which was busy with infiltration.

MR HATTINGH: Did these bombs reach their destination?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Did they detonate?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they detonated and in the one case the ANC courier was seriously injured and in the other case, a postal worker took the package away from the person whom it was intended for and he was seriously injured. Then a third case, we sent a bomb to the PAC office in Tanzania. They immediately said that it was a bomb and the Tanzanian Defence Force was brought in, the area was cordoned off and the bomb was diffused.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Regarding your sentiments towards Coetzee, it was put to you that Mr Klopper particularly stated that you were manic about him. You would recall that these persons were also asked during cross-examination, what their sentiments were towards Mr Coetzee.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And their responses to that?

MR DE KOCK: I know that van Heerden said that he would kill him at any time, even at that stage when he was testifying.

MR HATTINGH: Yes. And the rest also testified that they were not very favourably inclined towards him and that they regarded him as a traitor.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. One question ...(intervention)

MR LAX: There was one thing I omitted to ask earlier and I just want to be as clear as possible about it. You were asked by the Chairperson what you did once you realised the bomb hadn't gone off, but at the end of the day the intention was to kill this man, Coetzee.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAX: And other than sending this bomb off, no other steps appear to have been taken, why is that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, because we were in anticipation of the detonation of this bomb.

MR LAX: But 10 months is a long time, with the greatest of respect.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it could take quite some time, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But you've told us that you were yourself quite satisfied that Dirk Coetzee had already discovered it was a bomb.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is how I regarded it, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So there was not prospect of it going off.

MR DE KOCK: Well we needed certainty first, and to make any enquiries would present problems.

MR LAX: The point is that in the meantime the prospect of him testifying against Gen Lothar Neethling was getting closer and closer and there does not appear to have been any other steps that anyone took.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I had received any further orders from my senior officers, or any further ideas, I would probably have given execution to these ideas or orders. They were free to do so at any time with their access to information, to co-opt me into any such further plan.

MR LAX: So you were waiting for further instructions in essence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. They could have decided on anything else, they could have requested me to wait in London, they could have decided upon anything.

MR LAX: You've told us that you met with van Rensburg, literally daily.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Didn't you ever think of speaking to him and saying well, shouldn't we try something else, this is just not working?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, we had sent the package and we were waiting for the results. We didn't really have a morbid fascination with this situation, the chances of Dirk Coetzee being killed were latent and we were waiting, but there was no daily discussion regarding what the next step was supposed to be.

MR LAX: I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you, Chairperson.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, the next applicant is Mr Bosch, with your leave.