Amnesty Hearings

WILLEM FREDERICK SCHOON: (sworn states)

MR VISSER: I am informed, Chairperson, that a summary of his evidence has been handed to everybody, may I ask that that be marked Exhibit C. Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Schoon, you also apply for amnesty with regard to the incident in Lesotho on the 19th/20th December 1985, upon which certain persons were killed, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Your application is found in bundle 1, pages 79 to 105.

BRIG SCHOON: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I'm told that I'm wrong. I'm sorry, Chairperson. 131 to 145.

Do you confirm to the best of your memory and knowledge that the content of your amnesty application is correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you wish to elaborate on it and bring amendments where it is applicable, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You are familiar with the document which appears in Volume 3, pages 87 to 113, which is referred to as "The General Background to Amnesty Applications", is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Is there any part thereof that you are not able to confirm from your own knowledge and perspective?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, I underwrite the document in totality.

MR VISSER: You have already previously given evidence before the Human Rights Violations Committee on the 16th of November 1996, in the so-called Armed Forces Hearing, as well as the so-called Armed Forces Hearing on the 9th October 1997 and in the amnesty hearings with regard to Cosatu House, Khotso House, Marius Schoon, Lemmyboy Mbale, certain four COSAS members, certain two unknown PAC members, two unknown ANC members, Griffiths Mxenge, Mohale and two others, Pule and Take Five, Pansu Smit, Mr Joe Pillay and the Zero Handgrenades, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And that evidence of yours you incorporate in your evidence here today.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have also made written submissions upon which you wish to draw the Committee's attention, and this was made in November of 1996, is that correct? It is not before us now, but you have made such a written submission.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, I have.

MR VISSER: And you also rely on the amnesty judgments of the original Amnesty Committee with regard to the matter of Cronje and Others, as well as the judgments of the Amnesty Committee in the Khotso House case and the London Bomb case, is that so?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Your application entails murder or any other delict which with regard to the persons whom you mention there, Leon Lionel Meyer alias Joe Juluka, Jacqueline Quin, Joyce Modemeng, Nomkhosi Mini, Stanley Matthee, who is apparently the same person as Vivian Matthee, Glen Darries, Lulamile Dantile who is apparently the same person as the following person, Morris Seabelo, and Joseph Majose. Is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Or any other persons whom you are not aware of - you were not on the scene?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: ... who may have been killed or injured in the incident, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And whose identities are unknown to you.

BRIG SCHOON: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Then there's also the matter of the transgression of the international borders and customs control legislation and also the offences with regard to the possession, use and transport of arms and ammunition which was used by the team, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: As well as defeating the ends of justice, in that you omitted to disclose the true facts of the matter, or any other offence which might emanate from the evidence.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Would you please commence at page 3 and tell the Committee what your knowledge is with regard to this incident.

BRIG SCHOON

"During this incident the command structure at Security Head Office was as follows: General PJ Coetzee was the Commissioner; General JV van der Merwe was second-in-command of the Security Branch and; Lieutenant-General Stan Skutter was the Chief of Security. I was head of Group-C and as such, Vlakplaas resorted under my control. Col de Kock was the Commander of Vlakplaas and the other applicants, Nortje, Bosch, Vermeulen and Nofomela, resorted under Mr de Kock's command. I had insight in the ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I beg your pardon to interrupt. Of this witness can we determine what he did, what was done and what he did furthermore with regard to this incident?

MR VISSER: May I assume then, Chairperson, that the rest of Exhibit C can be taken as read and we can just home in on the vital aspects?

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, he will be subjected to cross-examination on whatever is written. You can make any corrections now if there are any to be made. Shall we make this Exhibit C?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, there is reference at page 1, to Exhibit A and the same reference in paragraph 3 at page 3, that refers to the document, The General Background and normally it's Exhibit A in the hearings in which we appear, in this case it is bundle 3 as we have already stated, so it won't be Exhibit A, so that reference is now incorrect.

Brig Schoon, you have heard the evidence of Gen van der Merwe.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I have, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you in principle agree with what he had testified here with regard to the threat that had existed in 1985 from Lesotho?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You wish to make a correction in your application. In your amnesty application you said that Lesotho in 1985 was the chief infiltration route of the ANC to the RSA, would you like to amend that statement?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I would like to amend it to such, so that it would read that it was one of the primary infiltration routes.

CHAIRPERSON: Where shall we find that, page?

BRIG SCHOON: 141.

MR VISSER: Volume 1, page 141 and it's the first sentence under 9(iv), where it is stated

"... the primary infiltration route"

Brig Schoon says that's not entirely correct, it must be -

"... one of the primary infiltration routes."

And in Exhibit C you furthermore deal with Lesotho, which you've already confirmed and then you continue to deal with insurgency and so forth - it has been indicated that it is not necessary to repeat all of this, paragraph 13 you explain where the names came from, that it had came from research which was done by yourself, Gen van der Merwe and the attorney and that is why those names are there. Would you please start from paragraph 14 and tell the Committee.

BRIG SCHOON

"On a day in December 1985, Gen Johan van der Merwe gave me instructions to determine whether the Security Branch had the necessary information and capacity to act against the ANC in Lesotho and to make an urgent submission to him.

To the best of my knowledge members of Vlakplaas had already been busy in the Ladybrand vicinity, as Col de Kock indicates in his amnesty application."

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Schoon, may I ask something here? Can you get any closer to a day in December?

BRIG SCHOON: That was the closest I could get it, Chairperson, I cannot get any closer to an exact date.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you. I'm sorry for the interruption.

MR VISSER: Will you please continue. You had received an instruction from Gen van der Merwe in 1985, what did you do then?

BRIG SCHOON: Paragraph 16

"I dedicated the instruction to Colonel, then Major de Kock. Major de Kock then submitted a report where he explained the capacities of Vlakplaas. I recall that the written submission was written in red ink and Gen van der Merwe fetched it from me before there was time to type it, because he was on his way to a CIC meeting where he wanted to submit the operation.

CIC is the abbreviation for Coordinating Intelligence Committee. This committee coordinated all security intelligence, so that conflicts could be prevented. CIC however did not have any authorising capacities. I was not at the meeting on that particular day and I do not recall what was said there or by whom."

MR VISSER: Did you sit on the CIC?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

BRIG SCHOON

"Gen van der Merwe informed me later that day that we continue with the operation as it was proposed by Col de Kock. I accepted that there was no opposition by members of CIC against this operation."

MR VISSER: If I may interrupt you. In Volume 1 in your amnesty application you said that CIC approved this action.

BRIG SCHOON: That is how I understood it at that stage, Chairperson, because then I was not aware that they had no executive powers in giving any orders.

MR VISSER: Page 143, Chairperson.

And were you later informed as to exactly what their capacity was?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson, I later heard and was informed.

MR VISSER: Very well.

BRIG SCHOON

"I noted that Col de Kock alleged that I said that the instruction for this action came from the State President, Mr PW Botha. I deny that I had said so since I was only aware that Gen van der Merwe had given the instruction and that CIC's members were aware of it. I thereby do not wish to be understood to say that the instruction was not given. I however have no personal knowledge with regard to this issue and I refer to Gen van der Merwe's evidence in this regard.

I conveyed the order or approval to Col de Kock and he and members of Vlakplaas went to Ladybrand to launch the operation. I do not know who all the members were who had accompanied him. Col de Kock would coordinate with the members of the Security Branch, Ladybrand.

The recollection of applicant Nortje that the members had spent approximately 10 days in Ladybrand planning the operation, does not concur with my recollection of the urgency of the matter.

On a particular evening - I am reminded that it was the 19th/20th of December 1985, Maj de Kock and the group of Vlakplaas members crossed the Lesotho border and executed the operation. In this process the persons whom I have referred to above, were killed and certain documents were confiscated.

Maj de Kock, after the operation, reported to me and I on my part reported to Gen van der Merwe."

MR VISSER: Brigadier, there is also mention that the Special Forces of the South African Defence Force were busy planning the same or a similar operation, did you have any knowledge about that at that stage?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, I did not have any knowledge of it.

MR VISSER: Can you comment on it?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I cannot comment on it.

MR VISSER: And then Col de Kock in his criminal trial had mentioned that members of the CCB were also there executing attacks on members in Lesotho, did you know anything of this?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, no, to the best of my recollection the CCB did not exist at that stage and he probably here refers to Special Forces.

MR VISSER: Did you have any part in the award or the decision of the award of medals to the operatives?

BRIG SCHOON: Not directly, Chairperson, I only had the names which Col de Kock gave to me and I conveyed these names to Gen van der Merwe.

MR VISSER: Would you just then complete as from paragraph 26.

BRIG SCHOON

"These incidents took place during a war situation where the rules of conventional warfare was not applicable. My action was aimed against supporters of a liberation movement who were the enemy of the government and who had launched a revolutionary onslaught against the State dispensation during which amongst others, innocent citizens were killed or injured and much damage to property.

This struggle which we fought was a political struggle and everything that I had done I had done in the execution of my duties as a policeman in protection of the life of persons and property and in order to maintain the dispensation of the time and in support of the National Party and in order to prevent that the land falls into chaos and anarchy.

In the light of the pressure that was placed upon us in the Security Branch by the political leaders of the time and many speeches and utterances where reference was made to the wiping out of terrorists, I truly believed that such actions were expected of me. I truly believed that what I had done was expected of me as a policeman and that I had acted in the execution of my duties as a policeman and that my actions fell within my express or tacit authorisation.

I did not benefit in any manner for this action and I did not gain any personal advantage from it. I humbly request that amnesty be granted to me as previously stated in this."

MR VISSER: Just two aspects. In the amnesty application, a copy of the amnesty application which is bound in bundle 1 of your amnesty application, paragraphs 10(a) and 10(b) where you deal with the political background is omitted, it is not here.

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, it is not.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, it is identical to what Gen van der Merwe's is, if you wish that to be made available to you we can do that.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll let you know if that is required.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chair.

Just a final aspect. What did you regard was the instruction that was required of you and the operatives to execute, what did this entail?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, it entailed - or rather, may I start as follows. This was about certain information that was obtained from Ladybrand Security Branch via Bloemfontein, that a certain group of trained ANC cadres were ready to enter the country in order to sow murder and mayhem during the festive period of 1985.

MR VISSER: And your instruction?

BRIG SCHOON: The instruction was to prevent this action by acting against this group in a military manner.

MR VISSER: Would this mean that de Kock and his people could only act against them or what was the position?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, as a rule the enemy at that stage whom we regarded as the enemy, we acted in totality against them, it did not matter whether one knew him or did not know him, but if one met with him he was your enemy and one did what was necessary to wipe him out.

MR VISSER: So by implication that would mean that whosoever the operatives ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: My learned friend is leading again.

MR VISSER: I have no further questions, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Are you sure, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: I have no further questions for this witness.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take the lunch adjournment please.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

WILLEM FREDERICK SCHOON: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Brig Schoon, before I deal with the incident itself I would just like to obtain some background information from you pertaining to the activities of Vlakplaas. Is it correct that from Vlakplaas teams consisting of so-called askaris and members of Vlakplaas, were sent to various regions to assist with the identification of freedom fighters or MK members and their arrests and so forth?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And is it also correct that Mr de Kock in his capacity as the Commander of C1 at Vlakplaas, by nature of the situation could not accompany all of these teams, but in terms of the need that arose he would visit these groups wherever they may have been, in order to determine what was going on?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Is it also correct, Brigadier, that at the time of this incident and as it appears from the documents before us, the danger from within Lesotho was very great?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is so.

MR HATTINGH: And that much attention was given from Vlakplaas ranks to this problem?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, I've already testified to that I think.

MR HATTINGH: And by nature of the matter you would not recall it that well, after about 15 years, whether Mr de Kock's evidence will be that some of his members and some of the so-called askaris would spend months, sometimes two to three months before the incident, on the Lesotho border in order to obtain information regarding the ANC within Lesotho?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that he himself found himself in that area rather frequently, sometimes for protracted periods of time and sometimes for brief periods of time?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it is possible.

MR HATTINGH: But it was also expected of him as the Commander of Vlakplaas, to report to you from time to time as you were his Commander and that he was supposed to report to you about the activities of these units.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And it was then necessary for him to return sometimes from where he found himself, in order to inform you on what they were busy with.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall whether he returned for such a visit from the Lesotho border, when you approached him and requested whether or not his unit possessed the capacity to act against ANC members in Lesotho, or can you not recall this?

BRIG SCHOON: Is this to do with this particular incident?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, it is his recollection that when you approached him and asked him to make a submission regarding their capacity to act against the ANC within Lesotho, that this was upon one of the occasions when he returned from Lesotho for one or other reason, although he cannot recall the precise reason for his return.

BRIG SCHOON: In all probability it is so, Chairperson, however I cannot recall it immediately, but I would not dispute it.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And that - he cannot recall, but in all probability it was his custom to have at least one of his members with him at all times, primarily to drive for him at night because he had somewhat of a vision problem.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that he most probably had at least one of his members whom he brought with him for the purposes of his visit to head office.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that he was approached by you and requested to make a submission, as testified to by you.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Before you approached him, from time to time, be it oral or written, he must have made reports to you regarding their activities on the Lesotho border and the information that they had obtained in this regard.

BRIG SCHOON: I would accept that.

MR HATTINGH: But you cannot recall what the information was?

BRIG SCHOON: No, not specifically.

MR HATTINGH: If he had given you names of the activists who were active in Lesotho, you would not be able to recall the names as such?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR HATTINGH: Furthermore, as we have already heard from General van der Merwe, it was the custom of the Security Branch to make written reports to head office pertaining to information which the branches had received regarding activities of freedom or liberation organisations.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Would those reports also have come to your attention?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, they would have.

MR HATTINGH: And in this manner you may have heard some of the names of the activists who were in Lesotho, names that you can no longer recall today.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, most probably.

MR HATTINGH: Now this report that you asked him to compile, it was purely to indicate whether they possessed the logistical capacity to act against the activists in Lesotho, isn't that so?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, it may be so. Today I'm not very certain what precisely it was about.

MR HATTINGH: He will testify that this was the purpose behind the report. Gen van der Merwe wanted to know whether or not Vlakplaas, C1, possessed the logistical capacity to if necessary, launch an attack against these activists in Lesotho.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it is possible.

MR HATTINGH: And that the report which he compiled - this is the one that you referred to, the document which was written in red ink, that report dealt only with such matters - he can no longer recall the particulars in detail himself, but it would have contained information such as "Yes, you we go in, we will require a rubber dinghy to cross the river, we will need the following, but we will be able to obtain such items and we will be able to act if we should receive an order to do so".

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I do recall that it was a report on a double-folio sheet in written handwriting and that it dealt with the capacity, and I am not certain whether it included targets, but I was under the impression that it also mentioned targets.

MR HATTINGH: Well targets in the broader sense of the word, isn't that so?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, in the basic of the word, were they aware of targets and did they have the capacity to deal with these targets.

MR HATTINGH: His version will be that it did not mention the names of the activists against action could or had to be taken.

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot testify about that, it is 15 years ago.

MR HATTINGH: And you brought him to the understanding that the report that you requested from him had to be attended to as a matter of urgency.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And then shortly after you gave him the order he submitted the report to you.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: He is under the impression that the report would be dealt with a CIC meeting, he cannot recall why he was under that impression, but I note that in your affidavit, paragraph 16, you say the following

"I delegated the order to Colonel, then Major de Kock. Major de Kock submitted a report in which he summarised Vlakplaas' capacity. I recall that the written submission was written with a red pen and that Gen van der Merwe came to fetch it from me before there was time to have it typed, because he was under way to a CIC meeting where he would submit the operation."

Is it possible that you may have conveyed such information to Mr de Kock?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, Col de Kock was with me in the office early that morning in order to give me the report and shortly after he had handed it over to me and we were still studying it, Gen van der Merwe entered the office and asked whether or not the report was ready. I told him that this was the report and that we were still to have it typed. He told me that there wasn't enough time to have it typed. He took the report from me and said that he had to go to CIC urgently.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. So that is how Mr de Kock came to hear of CIC?

BRIG SCHOON: Correct.

MR HATTINGH: Because he cannot recall how it took place, but I think that he will accept what you have just said.

BRIG SCHOON: That is how I recall it.

MR HATTINGH: When you requested the report from him you did not provide him with the names of persons against whom you wanted him to take action?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I didn't.

MR HATTINGH: In fact in your affidavit you state in paragraph 14

"On a day in December, Gen Johan van der Merwe gave me the order to determine whether or not the Security Branch possessed the necessary information and capacity to act against the ANC in Lesotho and to make an urgent submission to him."

According to this it would appear to me as if the order was not to act against specific persons, but to act against members of the ANC.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, if I recall correctly mention was made of a specific group which was active in Lesotho and which upon other occasions, had already committed acts of terrorism within the RSA.

MR HATTINGH: You did not know of how many members the group consisted?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I can no longer recall.

MR HATTINGH: But it was a group.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And by nature of the situation, action against these persons in Lesotho would have entailed a great risk for the operatives and Mr de Kock.

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Their own safety was in jeopardy.

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: But nonetheless the police in general and more particularly the Security Police and then also the then government, could seriously have been prejudiced if Mr de Kock and his cohorts had been arrested while they were busy with the execution of the operation.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it would have created a tremendous political hullabaloo.

MR HATTINGH: And the government would have had to be very careful in explaining it and the police would not have been able to explain it quite thoroughly.

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you would also accept then, Brigadier, that such an operation - I beg your pardon, perhaps I should ask this question first. Is it so that there was a reasonable degree of disparity between the Lesotho government and the South African government at the time of the planning of this operation?

BRIG SCHOON: I believe that it was so at that stage. MR HATTINGH: It would appear from the documents before us, isn't that so?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Are you aware of the fact that the so-called Lesotho Liberation Army, or body or whatever they called themselves, was also active in Lesotho at the time of these events?

BRIG SCHOON: Is it the LLA?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I was aware of that.

MR HATTINGH: And that there was quite a stressful situation in Lesotho at the time of this incident.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And if Mr de Kock then states that at the time of this incident it was not strange to see soldiers of the LLA on the streets in uniforms and with weapons?

BRIG SCHOON: No, it would not have been out of the ordinary.

MR HATTINGH: So that an operation of this nature would have had to be completed within the shortest possible period of time.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And then you state in your evidence that the order was to thwart the attempts of this group to enter the country over the festive season.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: But the rule was also for action to be taken against the enemy, whether or not you knew him. Those are the words that you used.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So that if Mr de Kock and his cohorts encountered these members or some of these members who wanted to enter the country in the presence of other ANC members, you would have expected from them to act against those ANC members as well.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I would have expected that.

MR HATTINGH: And Mr de Kock would then have had to use his own discretion in his capacity, to take action against such persons.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Because we have already heard, and I've also been instructed by my attorney that the Committee has heard such evidence, that it was expected of Vlakplaas members to apply their own initiative and to act according to their own discretion and not always to wait only for an instruction.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And Gen van der Merwe also gave similar evidence before the TRC, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You state that you were not aware of other Special Forces plans to carry out a similar operation and according to your recollection the CCB had not yet come into existence at that stage.

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Are you aware that the CCB was first known by another name before it achieved the name CCB or Civil Cooperation Bureau?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR HATTINGH: I can tell you that Mr de Kock will testify, and I also appeared on behalf of them before the Harms Commission, they were known initially as Group 40, later it was Barnacle and then they became the CCB, but they were always the same people. Would you dispute that?

BRIG SCHOON: It is possible, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You were also involved in other cross-border operations, is that correct? Involved in the sense that you gave orders or to a greater or lesser extent were also involved in the operation.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And so you were also involved in the Pansu incident which has already been served before the Committee, this is an incident which took place in Swaziland.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: During which you gave an order to Mr de Kock to become involved in the incident, during which action was also taken against ANC members who were in Swaziland.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And in fact you accompanied the group which launched the operation to the Oshoek border post, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And during that action persons were also shot dead.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And this was at a stage when Mr de Kock, and I speak under correction, perhaps you would be able to assist me, my recollection was that Mr de Kock was not yet the Commander of C1 at Vlakplaas, is that correct? I have been corrected, apparently he was already the Commander. But there was another action and I don't know whether this was in your time, during which action was taken against members in Swaziland by Vlakplaas members, including Mr de Kock who has also applied for amnesty for this, when the current head of the South African Defence Force, Mr Siphiwe Nyanda's brother was shot dead in Swaziland. Did you know about this?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And that incident took place when Mr de Kock was not yet the Commander of Vlakplaas.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I think that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock's evidence will be that due to these factors which I have mentioned, the fact that there were always members of the LLA on the streets, he only gave himself two minutes to launch and complete this operation and that they entered the house, he and Mr Nortje, who is also an applicant here, while Mr Vermeulen stood guard outside in order to avoid a possible attack from the outside and that within the period of approximately two minutes, the operation was completed. You would probably not be able to dispute this.

BRIG SCHOON: No, I wouldn't.

MR HATTINGH: And due to the lack of time they didn't even search for any incriminating material such as weapons or documentation. You have made mention of documents but he states that they never took any documents into possession, is it possible that you may be mistaken in that regard?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it is possible.

MR HATTINGH: Because during the cross-border operations and I think it might just be the Nyanda incident or Pansu, such documents were indeed taken into possession. Are you perhaps confusing the incidents?

BRIG SCHOON: Usually documents would be taken into possession as well as weaponry in some instances.

MR HATTINGH: He will testify that they took cameras or a camera with them in order to take photographs which would then later assist with the identification of the persons or indicate the presence of weaponry and so forth, but due to the urgency of the matter and the short period of time in which they were to complete it, they didn't even give themselves the time to take photographs.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I was aware of that.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

MR TOWEEL: On behalf Mr Coetser I have no questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR TOWEEL

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair, Cornelius for NJ Vermeulen, I have no questions.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman, for Nortje and Bosch.

Brigadier Schoon, from your supplementary statement, Exhibit C, there are a number of questions that I would like to put to you. Paragraph 12, page 4 you say -

"In 1985 reliable information indicated that there were several ANC safehouses in Maseru and that certain identified ANC members were using these houses in order to accommodate ANC terrorists in transit as well as to conceal weaponry. If an operation could be successfully launched against the involved, I was of the opinion that the acts of terrorism which had been aimed for the Xmas season would be prevented and this would lead to a decrease in political terrorism within the RSA."

Furthermore - if we can skip the paragraph 13 and move onto 14, you state that -

"On a day in December 1985, Gen Johan van der Merwe gave me the order to determine whether or not the Security Branch possessed the necessary information and capacity to act against the ANC in Lesotho and to make an urgent submission to him."

And then you say further in paragraph 15 -

"To the best of my knowledge, members of Vlakplaas were already in the Ladybrand area busy with work, as Col de Kock indicates in his amnesty application."

The information to which you refer here in paragraph 12, would that have been the information which was obtained from reports from the Ladybrand Security Branch, among others?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, correct.

MR LAMEY: And then it would appear to me within the context of your statement before you get to December 1985 specifically when Gen van der Merwe requested you to make the submission about the capacity, you say that if a successful operation could be launched against these persons, you were of the opinion that the terrorism over the Xmas season could be avoided. My question to is that before you received the order from Gen van der Merwe, wasn't it already foreseen that an operation of some or other nature which could include an attack over the border in Lesotho, could be planned?

BRIG SCHOON: It must have been a possibility and I would have thought that suitable steps would have been taken in consideration of such a proposal.

MR LAMEY: The reason why I ask you is because - or let me put it to you as such, in order to make a submission about a logistical capacity, at a certain stage there must have been familiarity with the region, familiarity on behalf of the Vlakplaas members, reconnaissance must have been undertaken, possible handling of a source and so forth.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, the request came from Gen van der Merwe and I believe that if he had been up to date with the circumstances, he would not have requested such information.

MR LAMEY: No, certainly, but what I mean is in order to enable Vlakplaas to make such a submission there must have been prior facts and circumstances for Vlakplaas, in order for them to make such a submission.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, definitely, because Col de Kock produced the report within a day, if I have it correctly. In other words, he already possessed the information.

MR LAMEY: If such an operation had been anticipated or foreseen in your mind before the order came from Mr van der Merwe, one could readily accept that it must also have been foreseen by Mr de Kock or other members of Vlakplaas.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, and if they had regarded it as possible, I do believe that they would have made the necessary submission at the appropriate time.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall how much time had lapsed from the time that the green light was given, if I may state it as such, for such an operation? Meaning the operation of the nature of an attack that had eventually happened, how long after that instruction was given until it was executed, how much time had elapsed?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I cannot specifically recall, but I do believe that it was within a few days.

MR LAMEY: Could it have been a week, in the proximity of a week?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I cannot specifically say that it was a week.

MR LAMEY: So you are not certain?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I am not certain.

MR LAMEY: So you are not exactly certain how much time had elapsed?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: One can accept that it was not months or several weeks.

BRIG SCHOON: No, it was definitely not more than a week. As I have said, it was a few days after the green light had been given but I am not able to say whether it was one day or two days or how many days it was.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

MR JOUBERT: On behalf of Mr McCaskell, I have no questions, thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY JOUBERT

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Schoon, in your written statement you ask the Amnesty Committee to take into account the evidence that you gave at the Marius Schoon hearing, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: That was the hearing where you told the Committee that murder was not your style.

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And yet you're applying here for amnesty for murder.

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Now the list of people that you murdered you've set out at page 2 of your statement.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I did not personally kill them, I may be an accomplice here but I did not personally murder them.

MR BERGER: Well if you were to be charged in a criminal court you would be found guilty of murder, isn't that so?

BRIG SCHOON: That is indeed so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Then you would be a murderer, so let's deal with it on that basis. Stanley Matthee, Vivian Matthee and Glen Darries is the same person.

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot argue with that, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Lulamile Dantile and Morris Seabelo is also the same person - well it's another person I should say. You can't quarrel with that either.

BRIG SCHOON: No, I cannot dispute that.

MR BERGER: You have no knowledge of the people for whose deaths you are responsible, jointly with other people of course.

BRIG SCHOON: I have no personal knowledge, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Now if you have a look at bundle 1, page 141, it's your application, you say there in (iv)

"Nature and Particulars"

... then second sentence -

"Gen Johan van der Merwe instructed me to determine whether the Security Branch had the necessary information and capacity to act against the ANC in Lesotho and to make an urgent submission to him."

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: What exactly do you mean by that, what precisely did Mr van der Merwe tell you?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, as I recall it at the time of the handing in of my application I recalled that Gen van der Merwe had given me an instruction to bring a submission about the capacity and targets that we had in Lesotho. That is how I recalled it.

MR BERGER: Well you say there

"... to act against the ANC in Lesotho."

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Now according to your information at the time, there were 80 ANC members in Lesotho.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, this is what I have seen in documents afterwards.

MR BERGER: Well at the time what were you asked to find out, whether the Security Police had the capacity to kill all 80 ANC members, or ...(intervention)

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, it was specifically about a certain group who were in Lesotho and the information indicated that they had planned to enter the RSA during the festive season, to commit acts of terror.

MR BERGER: And the name of that group, how was it identified?

BRIG SCHOON: The group was identified but I cannot recall the name. Later in other documents that I had studied I saw the names of Ms Quin and Mr Meyer were mentioned.

MR BERGER: And would Ms Quin's name have been on that list?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know, Chairperson, I cannot recall.

MR BERGER: Is it possible that her name was on the list?

BRIG SCHOON: It is possible, Chairperson, but I cannot state it as the truth.

MR BERGER: But what you to recall is that there was a list of names.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, names were mentioned of a group. I don't know whether all the names were mentioned but certain names were mentioned of a group that were there.

CHAIRPERSON: On a piece of paper?

BRIG SCHOON: I beg your pardon, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: On a piece of paper? We are talking about a list.

BRIG SCHOON: No, this was an intelligence report.

CHAIRPERSON: Written?

BRIG SCHOON: A written intelligence report from the Security Branch, Ladybrand.

MR BERGER: And on this intelligence report, were the names of certain members of a group of ANC soldiers based in Lesotho.

BRIG SCHOON: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And you gave that information over to Mr de Kock.

BRIG SCHOON: No, by nature of the situation he would have seen it because all intelligence of that nature was channelled through to them.

MR BERGER: I don't understand. You've received an intelligence report from Mr van der Merwe which ...(intervention)

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, these intelligence notes came from Ladybrand and when it is relevant to a certain desk a copy of it is marked and it is handed over to you and such reports that I had thought that Col de Kock and his people also had to see, I gave a copy of that to them as well.

MR BERGER: And this was one such report that you sent on to him.

BRIG SCHOON: That must be so, Chairperson, I am not able to be specific at this stage.

MR BERGER: Alright, so now you get an intelligence report from Ladybrand and then at some point Mr van der Merwe comes to you and says "Does the Security Police have the necessary information and capability to act against the ANC in Lesotho?"

BRIG SCHOON: It is possible, Chairperson, but ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: And how do you know who he is referring to?

BRIG SCHOON: He specifically referred to a group who were located in Lesotho.

MR BERGER: And he gave you the names of the members of the group.

BRIG SCHOON: That is possible, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And you then compared those names with the intelligence report that you had independently of Mr van der Merwe.

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, that is not how it worked. These reports came to me and I marked them out to be sent to those persons that had to see them, it did not stay with me.

MR BERGER: You see, Mr Schoon, what I don't understand is how do you put two and two together, because you're saying that Mr van der Merwe comes to you with a request and he gives you certain names, independently of him an intelligence report comes through and you somehow put two and two together that the unit that is referred to in that report is the unit that Mr van der Merwe is referring to.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I cannot recall that I said that Gen van der Merwe gave a report to me. That report would under normal circumstances, of the activities, would have arrived at my desk and I would have known of it and when Gen van der Merwe came to me I cannot recall that he gave a report to me, he only said that I should make a submission to him with regard to the capacity and I am not certain of the information that we had with regard to Lesotho.

MR BERGER: Against whom in Lesotho?

BRIG SCHOON: Against the group who were in Lesotho, who were readying themselves for entering the RSA.

MR BERGER: And he gave you sufficient information so that you knew it was the group that was being referred to in that intelligence report.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I recall that that was more-or-less the extent of it.

MR BERGER: Now Mr de Kock says he wasn't given any names, he wasn't given a list at all of names.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, that report had to arrive at his desk.

MR BERGER: Because your instruction to him according to you, this is to Mr de Kock, was whether he had the capacity to strike against those people, the people who had been identified in the report and the people who Mr van der Merwe was referring to. That was your request, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: That may be so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Well any ...(intervention)

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot specifically recall it at this stage.

MR BERGER: You'd like to keep both options open.

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, I do not recall it.

MR BERGER: So you don't remember what it was precisely what you asked Mr de Kock to give you a report on?

BRIG SCHOON: I know that the capacity was one of the things and I did have it. And I may digress here or be incorrect here, that it also had to be targets, but now that I think of it, it is only logical that the targets were already available.

MR BERGER: Mr Schoon, you can remember that the subsequent report that you received was in red ink, you can remember that it was double-folio piece of paper and you can't remember whether names of targets were mentioned.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, the fact that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry. Are you talking about the "verslag" that came from de Kock?

MR BERGER: Yes, I'm saying that you can remember on the one hand ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR BERGER: Well perhaps I'll - let me repeat my question.

On the one hand you can remember - and this is happening at round about the same period of time, you can remember the detail of a report that was given to you in the sense that you can remember that Mr de Kock's report was in red ink, was on a double-folio piece of paper, but you can't remember whether in an earlier report or whether in your instructions to Mr de Kock I should say, you mentioned specific targets, you can't remember that.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Or whether in a request obtained from Mr van der Merwe, we specific group was mentioned.

MR BERGER: Indeed.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, the report was in red ink and that was something quite uncommon.

CHAIRPERSON: What report are we referring to here?

BRIG SCHOON: This is the report that Col de Kock had written in his own handwriting.

CHAIRPERSON: How many reports did he hand over to you?

BRIG SCHOON: Just the one, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now this report that he handed over to you, is that the one that followed when you gave him instructions to watch these persons and to find out whether they had the capacity?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, this was the report that I requested from him following on the request of Gen van der Merwe that we had to place something in writing for him which indicates what their capacity was. And I added here, "and the targets", but it would appear now from what I hear of Col de Kock's evidence that the targets was not part of it, that it was only the capacity that he had stipulated down there. And what made this unique was the fact that it was written in red ballpoint pen on a double-folio page and that was the page that Gen van der Merwe took from my office before he went to CIC.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us get this clear. You spoke to Mr van der Merwe or he spoke to you with regard to this incident.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he give you a written report?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So by verbal instruction you consequently told de Kock to do certain things.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Amongst others he had to find out whether they as a group, this is now de Kock and his group, had the capacity to act against the ANC who were in Lesotho.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And you are saying that you thought that you also gave him names of persons whom he had to watch.

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, I said that I thought that I requested him to describe the targets as well.

CHAIRPERSON: And then he came back with a report that you are saying you recall it was written in red ink and so forth, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That report that was written in red ink, were there any named targets in there?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, today I am not certain but I doubt it.

CHAIRPERSON: Were there any reasons therein as to why action had to be taken against certain people?

BRIG SCHOON: I do not recall that, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So why is it in your application?

BRIG SCHOON: That is what I thought, Chairperson, but now that other persons state it otherwise, I doubt it.

CHAIRPERSON: What do you doubt?

BRIG SCHOON: The correctness of my initial application.

CHAIRPERSON: So why can it be that they are not incorrect?

BRIG SCHOON: That may also be so, Chairperson, but I doubt, I do have my doubts.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

In 1996 you wrote unequivocally that Maj de Kock -

"Maj de Kock submitted a report in which a number of targets were set out and his reasons for actions against these targets were motivated."

And today, four years - let me not err on the side of excess, three side and a couple of months later you say you could have been mistaken in 1996.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And the reason you say you could have been mistaken in 1996, is because others of your comrades dispute what you say.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, there are some of my colleagues here who do not state it as such, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Well, if there were no targets set out in the report and if there were no reasons for acting against the targets, if those reasons were not motivated in the report, what was in the report?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, the information with regard to the persons, the targets, was relatively known, that was general knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon, what was in the report?

BRIG SCHOON: The report of Col de Kock?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. You are saying that now you doubt whether names were mentioned of targets and the reasons why action had to be taken against them, what was in the report that was written in red?

BRIG SCHOON: The capacity that they had to act against targets there. For example, that they had the necessary logistics and armaments and the means and the manpower.

MR BERGER: What did ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Was the number of targets mentioned in that report?

BRIG SCHOON: I'm not certain, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Because one would expect that when someone writes out a report and says that we have the ability or capacity to act and it is a report submitted for approval to seniors, then at least it had to say that "Listen there are 10 or 12 or 20 targets and we have the manpower and we can act against them". Do you not think so?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson. I cannot recall whether targets were mentioned there.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I refer to the amount of, the number of targets.

BRIG SCHOON: That is possible, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, in order to prevent any confusion may I just ask that we get clarity as to what we mean here by target, a target could be a house where there are 20 people inside, or do we refer to 20 people as 20 targets? Can we just try and clear up that possible confusion.

CHAIRPERSON: When you refer to targets in your application, to what did you refer?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, to persons and fixed targets. For example transit houses, hiding places.

ADV BOSMAN: So do you mean identified targets?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Then that makes sense, then the seniors would be able to determine whether this assessment was correct, that you had the capacity to attack these people.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you were therefore not incorrect. It would appear that such information had to form part of that report.

BRIG SCHOON: That is how I had it, Chairperson, but I do doubt it. - if others say that it was not so.

CHAIRPERSON: Then you should about saying that they are wrong and you are right.

BRIG SCHOON: But I am much older than them and I am susceptible to senility.

MR BERGER: So the way I understand it, Mr Schoon, is you thought that targets, and I can only think of houses and people as being possible targets, you thought that targets were mentioned in the report but when you heard ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, for clarity's sake, I'm not taking you on on this, in the context of this attack it could only have been houses or safehouses and people because "teikens" could also mean sub-stations etcetera. It was not directed at Lesotho itself.

MR BERGER: Well my point is that you thought in 1996 that targets were mentioned in the report, you were not equivocal about it then but now when you hear that Mr de Kock says "No, there were no targets in the report", you doubt your memory and you say "Well maybe there were no targets in the report".

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I'm sorry to have to come in here again, we're still having confusion about the use of the word target. If I remember correctly, and if I didn't put it on that basis, then I must correct it now, Mr de Kock will say no names or people were mentioned in the report.

MR BERGER: Yes. Your understanding when you completed your 1996 application was that there were names of targets in the report from Mr de Kock, that was your understanding in '96, isn't that right?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Targets meaning people and buildings?

MR BERGER: Yes, I just put to the witness "names of people were mentioned in the report", that's what he thought in 1996, he says yes. That is so.

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, yes.

MR BERGER: Now because Mr de Kock says that there were no names mentioned in his report you doubt your memory and you say he must be correct.

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Alright. Mr de Kock also says the following - I'd like you to listen to this, and it's in bundle 1, page 3. He says

"On a morning in December 1995, I was asked by Brig Willem Schoon whether my unit was able to launch an attack in Lesotho. I indicated to him that it was indeed possible and he requested me to make a written submission to him. I then asked of Brig Schoon who gave this instruction and Brig Schoon informed me that it came from the top. I asked him whether this meant that the State President had given permission and Brig Schoon nodded affirmatively. The State President at that stage was Mr PW Botha."

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, no, I cannot recall such a discussion. On the contrary, as far as I can recall Col de Kock never doubted any of my instructions and he performed them duly.

MR BERGER: You say in paragraph 18 of your written statement at page 6

"I noted that Col de Kock alleged that I said the instruction for the action had come from the State President, Mr PW Botha. I deny that I said that because I was only aware that Gen van der Merwe had given the instruction and that CIC members were aware of it."

Now you make no bones about it, you're not doubting yourself at all, despite what Mr de Kock has to say, you say you deny that you had that conversation with Mr de Kock.

BRIG SCHOON: I must have got it from Gen van der Merwe and he also denies it.

CHAIRPERSON: That is not the point, the point is on another aspect you are prepared to accept that you are incorrect and you rely on what Mr de Kock recalls. The point is, is the same applicable now with regard to this aspect?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, I think Col de Kock may be able to correct it, that I did not involve the State President here. He may have been involved, but without my knowledge.

MR BERGER: Why do you think Mr de Kock will retract this statement?

BRIG SCHOON: He did not dispute it now when his legal representative heard me under cross-examination.

MR BERGER: Well let's assume that he stands by this evidence that there was this conversation and that he asked you who had given the order and you said it had come from the top and he said "Do you mean the State President" and you nodded. Let's assume he stands by that evidence.

BRIG SCHOON: I'll stand by my evidence, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: That evidence won't make you doubt your recollection and make you say maybe you are mistaken?

BRIG SCHOON: Not in this regard, definitely not, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And that's because Mr van der Merwe says that he never had any discussions with the State President.

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, it is because I have to live with my own conscience and I have to speak the truth here, and the truth is that I have no knowledge that former President PW Botha was involved in this story. I don't know of it, I don't have any such knowledge.

MR BERGER: No, it goes further than that, you deny that you said anything about PW Botha to Mr de Kock.

BRIG SCHOON: I deny that I ever used PW Botha's name. I would have wanted to.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us get this right. ...(indistinct - no microphone) according to Mr de Kock's application he does not say that you mention the name of the State President, he says that this most high would indicate that the State President's permission was given and now he also says in his application that

"Brig Schoon nodded in agreement"

So he doesn't say that you brought the State President's name into it, he says that he asked whether or not the proposed plan enjoyed the permission of the State President and then you nodded in agreement.

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, I don't know about that.

CHAIRPERSON: But I'm telling you what he says.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I do not wish for any confusion to arise.

BRIG SCHOON: No, Mr Schoon, it's not that you - you've just said "I don't know about it", but that's not your evidence, your evidence goes further, you deny it, you say it never happened. That's your evidence.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I did not involved the State President in this incident.

MR BERGER: In other words, you dispute the version that Mr de Kock has put on paper here and you say as a fact you know that it never happened.

BRIG SCHOON: I never said it, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: No, please I don't want there to be confusion because it's not saying - Mr de Kock is not saying here that you said PW Botha's name, he's saying that you said "It comes from the most high" and he then said to you "Do you mean the State President?", and you nodded in agreement. Now your evidence is unequivocal, your evidence is you never said "Dit kom van heel bo af" and you never nodded in agreement when he said "Do you mean the State President?". am I right. That is your evidence, it never happened.

BRIG SCHOON: That is my evidence.

MR BERGER: Because if it did happen, then that would mean that you would have had to be have been told that by someone else, someone senior to you.

BRIG SCHOON: It didn't happen, Chairperson, and I cannot speculate about it.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on. The speaker's microphone is not on.

CHAIRPERSON: ..., isn't that so?

BRIG SCHOON: I didn't hear the question, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The statement is that if Mr de Kock is correct, then you must have obtained that information about the State President somewhere because you yourself did not speak to the State President.

BRIG SCHOON: I did not and I did not have such information.

MR BERGER: You never had access to PW Botha.

BRIG SCHOON: At no stage, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So my point is simply this, if you had said and done what Mr de Kock says you did, then it would necessarily mean that you would have had to have got that information from one of your seniors.

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, Chairperson, but I did not receive any such information from them.

MR BERGER: And that senior would have been Mr van der Merwe.

BRIG SCHOON: I did not receive any such information from him.

MR BERGER: Okay. The group that was being targeted and whose names were mentioned in the intelligence report and mentioned by - some of which names were mentioned by Mr van der Merwe, do you confirm Mr van der Merwe's evidence that the information that you received was that that group was on the point of entering the country to carry out acts of violence?

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, Chairperson, and it appeared in the security reports which came from Ladybrand to Security Head Office.

MR BERGER: So this was - and the attack that you asked Mr de Kock, whether there was the necessary capacity and information to carry out, was an attack which primarily, the principle purpose of the attack was to strike at this group that was about to enter the country.

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And the reason that you decided to strike. and when I say you I mean you plural, was because you were of the opinion that lives inside South Africa were in imminent danger and you wanted to strike so as to ward off this danger and prevent loss of life.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And if - following on from some of the questions which were asked from you earlier, if other ANC members who got killed in the process, that would just be a bonus.

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And if non-ANC members and non-South African citizens got killed in the process, that would be a pity.

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What about children, small children?

BRIG SCHOON: I beg your pardon Chairperson, I didn't hear your question properly.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the position regarding children, would the same have been of application if there were children in the house?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, that was one thing that we were reasonably sensitive about and it was consistently brought home to the operatives that innocent people, children and property should not be injured, damaged or killed.

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't you just concede that if unfortunately there were persons there who were killed as targets, that would be a casualty.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, and that would be unfortunate.

CHAIRPERSON: But in the light of that I'm asking you what the position was on children.

BRIG SCHOON: Children were never tasked as targets.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but if the target house at any stage during an attack was housing children, would you have continued with the operation?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I don't believe so, but what this case proved was there was a baby and I think that Col de Kock went out of his way to make the necessary precautionary measures to ensure the safety of that baby.

CHAIRPERSON: Can we read anything into that, that all of those who were indeed killed were specifically killed? If what you say now is the truth, that he especially did not kill the child.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, if there was a target it would be acted against. At this stage I cannot speak on behalf of Col de Kock, because he was in command of the operation the moment when he left head office.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I know and I do not expect that you speak for him, I'm referring to the policy and the order.

BRIG SCHOON: I wouldn't have expected him to kill innocent people.

CHAIRPERSON: Because they would have been in the same position as a child?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So what then of your answer that if such people were killed during an operation it would be unfortunate?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, then we would have to take into consideration the circumstances under which they were killed.

CHAIRPERSON: Then I will ask you once again, in the light of your answer that it would appear that Mr de Kock specifically did not kill the child, can we then infer from that that those who were killed were specifically recognised and killed.

BRIG SCHOON: That is the only inference that can be drawn, Chairperson, unless the person involved could offer any other reason.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well we will come to that, but is it also your opinion?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Schoon, besides Mr van der Merwe, who else did you consult with - and besides your attorney and counsel, who else did you consult with in preparation for this hearing?

BRIG SCHOON: Only my advocate and attorney and Gen van der Merwe and I did so in cooperation with them. Furthermore I did not consult anybody.

MR BERGER: You haven't discussed your evidence with Mr Coetzee?

BRIG SCHOON: No, not at all.

MR BERGER: Now I want to take you to the day - you say it was "on a day in December" - it's paragraph 14, Exhibit C.

"On a day in December 1985 ..."

... that Mr van der Merwe came to you and asked you whether the Security Police had the necessary capacity, I'm not going into the question of names or any of that now, we've dealt with that. You said earlier in your evidence when your counsel was asking you questions, that you can't be certain of the date but you've narrowed it down to December.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Why December, why not November?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, we have a definite date here, the night of the 19th to the 20th of December and I know that the operation was executed not very many days after this report which Mr de Kock compiled, was taken by Mr van der Merwe to the CIC. It must have been a week at the very most. So it would definitely have been during December and during no other month.

MR BERGER: So you're working backwards?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, by means of elimination one would then calculate it.

MR BERGER: So you say that the time-frame between - would it be the time-frame between giving Mr de Kock the go-ahead and the carrying out of the operation? You say that that time-frame could have been as much as a week.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Then if we add onto that the time between you giving Mr de Kock the go-ahead and you giving him the - I'm going backwards like you've been going, you giving him the original instruction to produce the report, we would go back an additional how many days?

BRIG SCHOON: At the very most a few days, but in my mind I have it that it was only one day. Gen van der Merwe asked me the previous day and on that same day I consulted Mr de Kock and the following morning he brought the report. In other words it was a question of less than 10 days from when the whole thing started to when the deed was committed.

MR BERGER: At the most 10 days?

BRIG SCHOON: That is how I have it, yes.

MR BERGER: Have you read the book "Comrades Against Apartheid"?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Now you get the report from Mr de Kock, the one in red ink, double-paged, and before you can have it typed up, Mr van der Merwe comes into your office and he takes the report, he says "I'm off to CIC meeting, I need this report now, there's not time to have it typed up". Is that how it happened?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And then he goes off to this CIC meeting and some time later - do you know how much later it was?

BRIG SCHOON: I think it was still during the same morning because the CIC meetings would take place early in the morning.

MR BERGER: He comes back to you and he says "I've discussed this, I've raised this matter at the CIC and the CIC has given authority for the raid to proceed".

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know if he said "authorisation", but he said that we could continue with the operation, but I drew the inference that CIC had given permission. At that stage I did not yet know that they didn't have any executive authority.

MR BERGER: Yes, well of course your evidence that you give now is in the light of the evidence given by Mr van der Merwe, but let's have a look at what you said in 1996, at page 141 of bundle 1. You say there, the last sentence of the first paragraph of (iv), you say - this is now the red pen report

"I delivered to Gen van der Merwe and on that very same day still he discussed it at CIC, Coordination Intelligence Committee, and obtained approval to launch the operation."

So your recollection in 1996 was that Mr van der Merwe received approval at that CIC meeting for the operation to proceed.

BRIG SCHOON: That was the impression under which I was on that day, yes.

MR BERGER: And that's because that's what he told you when he came back from that meeting, isn't that so?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it could be by implication that he said "You can go ahead with the operation", and by implication he then said that there was no objection and that we could continue.

MR BERGER: Why didn't you say that in your application, why did you state it as a fact that he received approval for the operation to proceed?

BRIG SCHOON: When I submitted my application I was under that impression.

MR BERGER: I'm putting it to you that you're equivocating now because of the evidence you've heard from Mr van der Merwe.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, I said so, that initially I did not know that CIC did not have any executive capacity and I've only now come to know of this.

MR BERGER: You were also asked in your application where the instruction came from, page 143, paragraph 11(b), and you say

"I understand that it was a joint order of the Coordination Intelligence Committee, CIC, and Gen JV van der Merwe."

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is how I understood it at the time of the submission of my application.

MR BERGER: And that was because Mr van der Merwe before the meeting said "Give me that document, I need it to put it before the CIC meeting", and he came back after the meeting and said "You have approval, you can go ahead".

BRIG SCHOON: That is how I understood it because I was under the impression that he gone to CIC with this document in order to obtain permission for this operation to be launched. That was a logical inference that I drew from this.

MR BERGER: So if that was your impression, your impression at the time was that Gen - no, you're impression at the time was that Mr van der Merwe needed the document, the report, in order to get authority from the CIC. That's what you've just said.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Why do you state in paragraph 17, page 6, Exhibit C in the last sentence

"I accepted that there was no opposition from the members of CIC against the operation"

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, it was at this stage that I was informed that CIC did not have any executive capacity to approve operations and this is what my legal representative advised me to state there.

MR BERGER: So when it says

"I accepted that there was no opposition by the members of CIC against the operation"

... that's not correct?

BRIG SCHOON: I accepted that they had approved it.

MR BERGER: Indeed. Where would Mr de Kock have got the money that he needed for the operation?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, he had a standing advance from which he could cover expenses and so forth. A standing advance.

MR BERGER: So he had ready access to the money.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, they had it available at any time.

MR BERGER: Have a look at your statement, paragraph 18, Exhibit C, this is where you deal with your denial that you had any discussion about the State President, PW Botha at that stage. And you say in the second last sentence

"With this I do not wish to be understood that the order was not issued."

In other words you're not saying that PW Botha didn't give an instruction.

BRIG SCHOON: No, that's exactly what I'm saying.

MR BERGER: You're saying

"However, I do not have personal knowledge regarding this aspect and I refer to Gen van der Merwe's evidence in this regard."

Now I'm not certain which evidence of Mr van der Merwe you are referring to. Which evidence is it?

BRIG SCHOON: That Mr PW Botha would have known about the incident.

MR BERGER: What did Mr van der Merwe say that you are now referring to? That you align yourself with.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, no, at this stage I cannot get any clarity as to what it is.

MR BERGER: Is that something also that your legal advisor advised you to put in?

BRIG SCHOON: I have an idea of it, yes.

MR BERGER: Now in paragraph 21, same page, you say in the second sentence, you're talking about the actual attack

"In the process the persons whom I referred to here were killed and certain documents were confiscated."

Now my learned friend for Mr de Kock put to you that Mr de Kock will say that they didn't have time to retrieve any documents.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I was under the impression that documents were seized, but it would appear that I was mistaken here.

MR BERGER: Once again you will bow to the memory - oh, no, that sounds very bad, you will bow to the recollection of Mr de Kock, his ability to recall is greater than yours.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: The report that you refer to in paragraph 21 from Mr de Kock, that report would have informed you exactly who had been killed and how many people had been killed and what damage had been caused.

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, it would have briefly entailed the number of persons that were killed and if names were available, the names and positions that they occupied, but it would have been a minimum information because commonly it would have been done by telephone and it would only be said that the operation was successful and so many people had died and nothing went wrong on our side. Something to that effect. And that would be the information that I would convey to Gen van der Merwe.

MR BERGER: So the report you would have got would simply have said "9 people were killed"?

BRIG SCHOON: Something to that effect, and that "we are safe" and nothing else. Because it was a cover operation not much risks would be run by spelling everything out on the telephone.

MR BERGER: Oh this wasn't a written report, this was a telephonic report.

BRIG SCHOON: No, it was an oral report.

CHAIRPERSON: Was a written report handed in later?

BRIG SCHOON: I beg your pardon, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Was a written report handed in later?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, then reports would come in from the division where it had taken place and he would only have said such an incident had taken place, without supplying specific particulars as to who was responsible because it was a covert operation. And then furthermore we then relied on media, newspaper reports and radio reports in order to find out what had exactly happened.

CHAIRPERSON: As the person who gave the instruction to him, how would you know that he had killed the correct persons?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I would have had to accept his word that it was the right persons that were killed.

ADV BOSMAN: May I just ask Mr Schoon, what would have happened to written reports in this regard, with regard to covert operations?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, there were no actual written reports that the operation - that would have disclosed the operation, the operation itself. The operation itself was verbally planned and verbal instructions were given to the operatives. There were no written reports left behind.

ADV BOSMAN: No, I am not asking whether there were any reports that were written for the archives. Let us return to the report that was written in red, I should have asked this of Gen van der Merwe, what would have happened to that document?

BRIG SCHOON: That document would have been destroyed, Chairperson.

ADV BOSMAN: By whom?

BRIG SCHOON: By Col de Kock.

ADV BOSMAN: But he didn't get the document back.

BRIG SCHOON: He did.

ADV BOSMAN: Did you hand it back to him?

BRIG SCHOON: I did.

ADV BOSMAN: When?

BRIG SCHOON: The day when Gen van der Merwe had returned from CIC, he gave the document to me and told me we can continue.

ADV BOSMAN: Would that have been the normal practice?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

ADV BOSMAN: Then let us get to that point. You just said, if I recall correctly, that Col de Kock had reported to you telephonically, that is what the normal course was, and later it would have been followed up by a short written cryptic report.

BRIG SCHOON: No, not a cryptic report, not by him, but by the Security Branch in whose area it had taken place, because at that stage Bloemfontein was the Security Branch under which Lesotho resorted and they would have reported that their sources in Lesotho had reported to them that this that and the other had happened and a report would be sent to me then.

ADV BOSMAN: Can you recall whether you received such a report?

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot recall it specifically here today, Chairperson, but it would have been strange if such a report did not arrive at my desk.

ADV BOSMAN: Let us take it further. If you did receive such a report, what would happen to it?

BRIG SCHOON: It would be circulated to all interested desks.

ADV BOSMAN: And eventually, what happens to all this paper or documents?

BRIG SCHOON: It would be filed, Chairperson.

ADV BOSMAN: You never attempted to find any of these reports when you found that you were relatively vague with regard to this incident?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, this was the first thing I did. Before I handed in my amnesty application I went to security head office and I spoke to Mr Barkhuizen there, he was in the legal department, and I asked him "Where can I find documents with regard to incidents in order to refresh my memory?" He threw his hands up in the air and said excuse me there is no place where I can go to, and that is as far as I got in order to try and refresh my memory. That is why I had to rely on statements and applications of other persons in order to refresh my memory, Chairperson.

ADV BOSMAN: Did it surprise you that you were not able to obtain assistance in that regard?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, some persons were not straightforward and these persons who had applied initially were looked at sceptically, one could expect very little help from former colleagues.

ADV BOSMAN: I don't want you to speculate but I think you're going to have to, what did you think happened to all those documents?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, in 1989 I retired from the Force and I heard that it was all destroyed, all those records were destroyed. And that is apparently the reason why no documents can be found.

ADV BOSMAN: That answers my question. I just wanted to know why you could not refresh your memory in this regard. Thank you very much.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Commissioner Bosman.

Mr Schoon, your evidence was that at some point a report did come through, a written report did come through referring to this operation.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, it is logical that someone had to report. Bloemfontein Security Branch would have taken it up or picked it up. On the contrary they should have been aware of this operation because it would have been done with their full knowledge and soon after it was completed they wanted to try and find out what exactly had happened there, who were the persons who were killed, in order to inform us and then they would have reported this in written from.

MR BERGER: When did you find out, if at all, who the people were who had been killed in the attack?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I cannot recall that, I am not certain.

MR BERGER: Are you saying that you did find out at some point or that you never found out?

BRIG SCHOON: I believe later we would have found out, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: From whom?

BRIG SCHOON: From the sources and from newspaper reports, and as it would appear later from official documents that the ANC had submitted to the Amnesty Committee.

MR BERGER: No, I'm talking about 1985/1986.

BRIG SCHOON: No, then it would have been from security reports from Bloemfontein, and newspaper reports.

MR BERGER: Did you attend the medal ceremony?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I would just like to read to you what Mr Vermeulen says in his application, at page 125 of bundle 1. He says there that - this is just before the heading "Swaziland". He says

"Everyone who was involved in the operation received medals for bravery at a function at head office, where Brig Schoon and I think Basie Smit and other senior officers were present."

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, I do not recall attending such a function.

MR BERGER: When did you for the first time become aware of the existence of the CCB or any of its previous incarnations?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, the CCB first came to my attention during the Harms Commission, and that was in 1990, I think. Before that I was not aware of its existence.

MR BERGER: There's something that bothers me, well there are a few things, but in particular, paragraph 29 on page 8 of your statement you say the following

"I truly believed that what I had done was expected of me as a policeman, that I had acted in the execution of my duties as a policeman and that my actions fell within my tacit or explicit authorisation."

Why are you relying amongst other things, on implied authority?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, because of my position that I had occupied in the Security Branch, I believed that it was expected of me van my political bosses, who were the National Party at that stage, that I should do these things. And 40 years of my life I dedicated to keeping the National Party in power, and this is what I get as my reward today, sitting here.

MR BERGER: It could have been worse.

BRIG SCHOON: It could have.

MR BERGER: You could have been prosecuted.

BRIG SCHOON: The possibility still exists, we don't know whether we will be successful in this application.

MR BERGER: But you see what really bothers me is, you say you got an order from Gen - no, you say you got an order from, a joint order, from the CIC and Mr van der Merwe. Well that's what you originally said.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: And now you say you got an order from Mr van der Merwe.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: And you carried out that order.

BRIG SCHOON: Correct, Chairperson,

MR BERGER: You didn't go beyond the terms of that order.

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So why are you relying on implied authority? You were carrying out an order.

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So?

BRIG SCHOON: But in the process one may do a little bit extra and one wants to add that too.

MR BERGER: I don't understand that answer at all, what extra did you do?

BRIG SCHOON: The instruction was to go and wipe out this group who were ready, and I don't know whether there were any extras.

MR BERGER: Maybe this was also something that you were advised to put in.

BRIG SCHOON: This is in all our applications, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Mr Schoon, what I want to put to you is that you haven't made full disclosure of all relevant facts.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, to the best of my ability I have, I did not try to withhold anything.

MR BERGER: And the most significant fact that I put to you that you are withholding is the fact that you told Mr de Kock that the instruction came from "heel bo", and that when he asked you whether you meant the State President, you nodded in agreement.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I did not say that. And I would like to constitute right here that this is fabricated by Mr de Kock. I definitely did not tell him that PW Botha had authorised this operation.

MR BERGER: And you see it's significant and relevant because your withholding of that fact necessarily enables you to protect Mr van der Merwe and through him, other senior politicians.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I am not protecting anyone, in the least Gen van der Merwe. And what I said earlier, if I had known that former State President, PW Botha was involved here, I would gladly have said that to this Committee, but I cannot because it would not be the truth.

MR BERGER: No, you can't because in 1996 you didn't, in 1996 when you were asked you didn't mention PW Botha, you can't say that now, that's the reason.

BRIG SCHOON: In 1996 it was true and today it is still true that I had no knowledge that he had ever been involved in this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Why would you so much like to say if he was involved here?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, just like Col de Kock I am also aggrieved that they had left us in the lurch.

CHAIRPERSON: How did they leave you in the lurch?

BRIG SCHOON: Well they left us to our own devices with this amnesty process, not one of them came forward in order to admit that these persons worked to keep us in power. But I cannot perjure myself here in order to jeopardise anybody else.

MR BERGER: Who would you have expected to come and say the things that you are saying ought to have been said?

BRIG SCHOON: To use Col de Kock's words, the man right at the top, and that is PW Botha.

MR BERGER: Only him?

BRIG SCHOON: And de Klerk.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did they not know what you were doing?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know, I was only one of the smaller pawns.

CHAIRPERSON: So why do you blame them? As far as you know they did not know.

BRIG SCHOON: They were the leaders.

CHAIRPERSON: So? As I understand your evidence you cannot say that they knew.

BRIG SCHOON: Exactly, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So why should they come here and say that "We stand behind these men because they acted on our behalf"?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, if I had any proof to that effect, I would have disclosed it.

MR BERGER: Thank you, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PATEL: Mr Schoon, can you tell us, at the time that Mr de Kock was deployed at Ladybrand, under whose command would he have fallen? Would it still be yours or would it be the head of Ladybrand Security Branch?

BRIG SCHOON: It would be under the command of the Security Branch Commander in Bloemfontein.

MR PATEL: And who would that have been?

BRIG SCHOON: I'm not certain who it was at that stage, I think it may have been Col Smith back then, or Brig Smith, I'm not certain.

MR PATEL: Okay. And the persons at Ladybrand Security Branch who filed reports to your - made reports regarding Lesotho activities, or the activities of the ANC activists in Lesotho, available to you, who specifically in Ladybrand would have done that?

BRIG SCHOON: It would have been Ladybrand, Chairperson.

MR PATEL: Who at Ladybrand would have passed on that information?

BRIG SCHOON: If I recall correctly, it was either Sgt or W/O Coetzee.

MR PATEL: Coetzee.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR PATEL: Can you give us an initial, Coetzee is a fairly common surname.

BRIG SCHOON: No, I think there was only one Coetzee there. Or there was only one Coetzee there.

MR PATEL: Alright. And according to your knowledge at the time, would the source or the informer have been handled by the Ladybrand Security Branch or would it have been handled by Vlakplaas members?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, the source would have been handled by Ladybrand, but I believe that Vlakplaas' people would have requested to have access to him and that would have been acceded to.

MR PATEL: So the basis upon, or the information that was placed at your disposal, the source of that information would have to a large extent have been as a result of the work from, is it Mr Coetzee and Mr de Kock from your department?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is so, Chairperson.

MR PATEL: Can you tell whether during the planning of this operation, because I believe the planning was done from Ladybrand, whether the Ladybrand Security Branch members would have been involved in that process.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I was not there, but I believe that they would have been involved in the operation.

MS PATEL: Why do you believe they would have been involved?

BRIG SCHOON: Because that is where Col de Kock and his group would have received the gross of their information.

MR PATEL: Would you grant me a moment please. Alright, thank you Sir, that is all.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: One question, thank you Chairperson.

You have listened to the evidence of Gen van der Merwe here, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you hear whom he said had to accept responsibility for taking this decision?

BRIG SCHOON: He himself, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And when you refer in Exhibit C to his evidence with regard to Mr PW Botha, can you refer to anything else but this?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

ADV BOSMAN: I have no questions, thank you Chairperson.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I have one question, Chairperson.

Mr Schoon, as you are aware we are required to consider whether you have satisfied the requirement of full disclosure, so inasmuch as I have a great deal of sympathy with your inability to recollect the events that happened as far back as 1981, unfortunately one has to consider the totality of your evidence and that entails having to weigh your responses to questions that have been put by various counsel with regard to certain issues. Now there is only one issue that concerns me, Mr Schoon, and this relates to the information that you disclosed in your original application on the 13th of December 1996. What I want to know is, whether at the time when you completed your written application, you had had an opportunity to consult with Mr van der Merwe, in order to refresh your memory about the events that had happened quite some time ago.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, I did have the opportunity.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: The reason why I'm asking you this question is because your response with regard to approval having been obtained from CIC, is similar to Mr van der Merwe's. Now a that stage did you know that the CIC did not have the capacity to authorise such an operation?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, and that is why I had said here in my evidence today, that only much later did I realise they did not have any executive powers.

CHAIRPERSON: Why are you saying they did not?

BRIG SCHOON: To give orders.

CHAIRPERSON: Why? The evidence of Mr van der Merwe is that they did not have the capacity because it was illegal, they could not give any illegal instructions.

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, I think his evidence was that they had no executive powers, they fulfilled a coordinating intelligence capacity and not an executive, they were not an executive authority.

CHAIRPERSON: Now what made you think back then that they had such powers?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, back then I did not know what their function was, it is only now with these hearings that it came to my attention.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But did you - I'm sure during your consultation with Mr van der Merwe, you must have gone through the question of whether or not CIC authorised the operation. I mean that would have been a very simple questions to consider, for purposes of completing your application in the manner in which you did.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I think my application was handed in before he handed in his and it is possible that he might have refreshed his memory from my application.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But was this issue discussed between the two of you?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, I don't recall that we discussed it. Not at that stage.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: If it wasn't discussed, and one would have imagined that it would have been an important issue for discussion which impinges on whether you would be capable of being granted amnesty or not, do you know why it wasn't discussed?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I believe no-one noted it at that stage.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Did you not ask Mr van der Merwe about the document that was submitted by Mr de Kock, which was written in the red ballpoint, and to your knowledge today, to your knowledge then, was taken to a CIC meeting as you have already testified that you recollect that Mr van der Merwe came to your office whilst Mr de Kock was also in your office, and that's where he took possession of that document in the red ink, in order to take it to the CIC meeting, were those facts not covered by you during your consultation with Mr van der Merwe?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: If not, what facts were you able to cover during your consultation, because that consultation was intended to refresh your memory about an incident that you must have forgotten about.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I think during the time when we handed in our applications, I had more information than Gen van der Merwe had with regard to this incident, because he refreshed his memory from this red ink document that I had mentioned. And that I obtained from Col de Kock's criminal trial, from the documents that I had studied of that.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon, ...(indistinct)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

CHAIRPERSON: ... did anyone approach you after the incident when the government denied that it was them, in order to find out what happened there and who had done it?

BRIG SCHOON: No-one, Chairperson, absolutely no-one.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have knowledge of anyone who was approached by the politicians?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Because I would have expected that if they did not know, then they should have asked someone, specifically if they sent this letter before the time.

BRIG SCHOON: That is only logical, Chairperson, but I do not know of anyone.

CHAIRPERSON: You have a few times answered here in your evidence upon questions which were put to you, that you in your written evidence had said something because a legal team had told you to say that. Did I understand that correctly?

BRIG SCHOON: Not told - can you repeat the question please, so that I can understand it properly.

CHAIRPERSON: When you were asked certain questions - I would just like to hear from you whether I understand correctly, did I understand that in answer to certain of those questions you said that your written evidence states so because your legal team told you to give that evidence?

BRIG SCHOON: No, they did not tell me to testify to that effect, Adv Visser drew up the statements, he has the things on his computer and it is printed thereon and he gives it to me to study it and says "Listen, do you agree with this and that?" And if you agree, then he says "Very well, we'll write it as such". This was only to facilitate the process.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon that is not what I'm asking. I would just like to find out what you testified, I would like to find out and find confirmation of what you had said during your evidence, do you understand?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I understood that in answer to certain questions you answered that certain answers or certain evidence in your written statement states that because your legal advisor had told you to say that.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson. This paragraph 29 ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I am not concerned as to what paragraph it is, I'm only asking.

BRIG SCHOON: ... and upon advice of the legal representative, that paragraph was included.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did you need such advice?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, that is why one goes to an attorney and an advocate because I am a layman.

CHAIRPERSON: But these are facts, these are not legal points. This happened or it didn't happen. The reference to someone else's statement with regard to who accepts responsibility for what had happened, that is a fact, this is not about any legal points, how is it that you deemed it necessary? Could you yourself not have told him "Listen, I accept responsibility".

BRIG SCHOON: Are we referring to paragraph 29 here, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Whatever that may be, you have said that is why you went to an attorney. I would just like to point out to you that a legal advisor can advise you where you do not understand the legal points, but you will tell him what the facts are, is that not so?

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And one of the opportunities is about the factual position, not the legal position, so I want to know from you why you deemed it necessary to take his advice and why could you not do it yourself.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I did not know at that stage. If we're referring to paragraph 29.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Visser, I could be speaking under correction, didn't Mr Schoon make reference to two different paragraphs or even three? It certainly wasn't one. I'm just trying to get a note thereof, I'm not succeeding. He actually mentioned three different paragraphs in which he had been given advice by his legal representatives. Can you assist us with those paragraphs?

MR VISSER: I was hoping that I'd be asked, Chairperson, because it seems that the legal advisors are on trial here. Chairperson, in the first instance, when it first came to light was when my learned friend, Mr Berger, was asking Mr Schoon in regard to the word "approved", and he was putting to him that in his amnesty application he had used the word "approved", why does he know use the word, the word "Die KIK het nie beswaar gehad nie", and Schoon said "That is what I was advised to say", in the sense that that is the choice of words in the light of the information which then existed, when this Exhibit C was drawn, used by the lawyer. Which is quite correct. Because the lawyer could simply never had said then at that stage "It was approved", because that wasn't the information any longer.

The other issue related to paragraph 29, which is purely a legal matter, and what Schoon is saying is, "That was inserted here because the lawyers advised me to insert this in my affidavit." He does not only insert it here, as you well know, Justice Khampepe, it is inserted in the general background to amnesty applications concerning members of the Security Forces as well, and there it is dealt with in some detail. It has also been dealt with in the written arguments which we have handed in from the bar, to various Committees throughout. So this is not a new thing. The point is, Schoon says "I was advised to put this in here", he takes it no further than that.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I'm sure you'll be able to give us an elaborate address when an appropriate time comes, I just wanted an indication of the relevant paragraphs. You've mentioned now two paragraphs, I think already Mr Schoon has responded to the Chair's question about paragraph 29, which is the other paragraph?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, if I can assist ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I'm not finished yet.

Chairperson, I'm answering your question. There was also a third and that is at page 6, paragraph 18, where he was asked -

"Why do you refer to van der Merwe's evidence?"

which was a reasonably unfair question, but be that as it may, and he was told that -

"But you referred to van der Merwe's evidence"

and Schoon couldn't remember at the time why this was and he said it was probably because my legal advisor said. Now even if it is, the question is, Chairperson, so what? That is certainly the function of the legal advisor, to draw your attention to the fact that there is similar evidence or evidence in van der Merwe's testimony that can be of assistance. So it takes the matter no further at all, Chairperson, but those are the three issues.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Well thanks for at least assisting us with regard to the identity of those relevant paragraphs.

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ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, did you want to say ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR VISSER: No I'm through, Chairperson, with the witness, thank you.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER

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