MR VISSER: Chairperson, if I may take the opportunity, General Coetzee has been subpoenaed in terms of Section 29(1)(c) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act to attend here to testify to his knowledge of a decision made in respect of the Lesotho Raid on the 19th December 1985. Chairperson, the situation with General Coetzee is that he is not available next week, I have taken this up with him and I asked him what his position would be if his evidence can't be finished within the hour and he said that he will then attempt to make arrangements to come back next week but he hopes it won't happen, be that as it may.
Chairperson, I've also taken up the other point of the legality for want of a better word of the subpoena, we've informed you beforehand we were not going to oppose him giving evidence and he has told me that, as did Mr Botha, he's prepared to answer any questions from anybody.
CHAIRPERSON: On any basis?
MR VISSER: On any basis.
CHAIRPERSON: That helps a lot Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: And he is only prepared to make that concession Chairperson because it's his birthday today.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm not the one who is supposed to get presents then? Mr Visser, in that light as a result, he is your client, are you going to lead him?
MR VISSER: He's not here at our insistence Chairperson, we don't what he's ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware of that but you announce that you appear on his behalf?
MR VISSER: To protect his interests, yes. I could ask him some questions to kick off, Chairperson, probably won't help you much. Now perhaps he should take the oath first, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I think Mr Visser not to compromise you I'll go through what I consider one of the problems, but I'll do it.
Mr Coetzee, I understand that you would like to speak Afrikaans, or you are comfortable in Afrikaans?
GEN COETZEE: Yes I would like to speak in Afrikaans but I am entirely prepared to answer questions in English.
WILLEM HELM JOHANNES COETZEE: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetzee, you are in possession of the subpoena that was sent to you?
GEN COETZEE: Yes I do have the notice.
CHAIRPERSON: And therein you were asked to come and testify about the decision that was taken with regard to the attack in Maseru in which approximately nine persons were killed by a group of police officers?
GEN COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Have you any knowledge of a decision?
GEN COETZEE: None whatsoever.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you not present when this was discussed?
GEN COETZEE: Before the attack I was entirely unaware of all the matters that were discussed.
CHAIRPERSON: I understand that there is some though that you were on leave at that stage?
GEN COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, in my original submission to the Truth Commission I had said that - I said two things, I do have it here, that I had to depend on my memory and secondly I made the mistake of confusing a matter in 1982 when I said that I was Commissioner in 1982 during an attack whereas it appears from documents that I was the Acting Commissioner and that is where the confusion enters and I now have documents to prove that in December 1982 I went in an SSC meeting where a certain attack was approved by the SSC with regard to the attack in 1985.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you not involved?
GEN COETZEE: No, I was not involved.
CHAIRPERSON: And at that time you were on leave?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson, depending on my memory I would say that discussions with family members I was approximately from the 8th or 9th December 1985 I was on holiday in Port Edward and the day of the SSC meeting, that is the 20th, I went on an early flight to Cape Town and that same afternoon by military flight I returned to Margate and continued my holiday and I was in Pretoria, back in my office, the 8th or 9th January 1986.
CHAIRPERSON: It would appear to me that you were called - and I cannot guarantee that this is the reason, but I will try my best, that there was a decision taken and Mr van der Merwe said that he took that decision to launch this attack and there is speculation whether CIC had born knowledge of it or whether the security committee, whether they had born knowledge of it or whether he should have contacted you about this. What is your comment? Let us discuss this one by one. Have you any knowledge whether the CIC knew before or afterwards?
GEN COETZEE: Not at all Chairperson. The only manner in which I can comment to any sense was that to an extent I was one of the founder members of CIC and I knew that it was a non-statutory body that was founded to fulfil a certain - that is what I knew and the debate that had taken place allegedly, I have no knowledge of.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you know whether the SSC Committee, and the chairperson of that time was Mr P W Botha, whether they had any knowledge or whether they had taken any decisions?
GEN COETZEE: The only think that I can testify to unequivably Chairperson is that when I went to the SSC meeting on the 20th December I was unaware of the raid in Lesotho the previous evening, the previous night.
CHAIRPERSON: But you said you went to the meeting on the 20th?
GEN COETZEE: That is correct, I said I took the early flight from Durban to Cape Town, I attended the meeting and the same afternoon I took a military flight back to Margate and continued my vacation. What is quite strange to me but except for speculating I cannot shed any light on the matter is that according the current documents it would appear to me as if they at least some of the members had to have had knowledge of this raid the previous night. I cannot testify to that, I do not have first hand knowledge of it, no one discussed it with me, Chairperson, so necessarily I have to say that these are inferences that I draw and it would appear to me as if we have had enough of that.
CHAIRPERSON: The third aspect is should Mr van der Merwe before he had taken a decision or had given permission for the attack should he have contacted you and discussed it with you?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson, I think it is obvious that neither I nor the Minister of Law and Order know anybody in South Africa could have given permission or any such thing. When one executes it one executes it at own risk. I have made that speech many a time to police officers.
CHAIRPERSON: I understand that, let us not get bogged down by the legality or not of it, murder is murder whether there was permission or not, it is unlawful. Was there any system amongst police because we all know that those persons knew back then that the police had gotten up to certain things, let us not argue about that, during the course of life. Amongst the police with regard to such attacks, was there a system where he should have had to contact you and discuss the whole matter with you?
GEN COETZEE: He could never have formally held discussions with me with regard to a planned action that was unlawful, he could not do that.
CHAIRPERSON: I did not refer to that, I refer to informal then.
GEN COETZEE: There was no guidelines that he had to do such a thing.
CHAIRPERSON: If he wanted to, could he?
GEN COETZEE: Yes if he wanted to he could.
CHAIRPERSON: But he didn't have to?
GEN COETZEE: No he does not have to do it at all. He would have in any case have placed me in a dissatisfactory position if he had come and requested this of me and I can say much about this.
CHAIRPERSON: You're saying that you had no knowledge of this attack?
GEN COETZEE: Beforehand I had no knowledge of this attack.
CHAIRPERSON: When did you find out that the police had launched this raid?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson, after I had returned from vacation and that was approximately the 10th January 1986. I think he was then just promoted to General, I'm not certain, he then came and informed me in my office that he - I cannot recall the exact words that he had used but his viewpoint was that he had found himself in an urgent situation in my absence and that he on his authority had sent police officers into Lesotho to commit political murders and he also informed me that with regard to him he had discussed the matter with other parties without me asking him where, when and why and whom.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you ask whom?
GEN COETZEE: Well I knew who were the interested parties in the circumstances.
CHAIRPERSON: Who would that have been?
GEN COETZEE: It would have been Foreign Affairs, secondly it would have been the Defence Force who were also deployed along our borders and that they were not supposed to overlap and then thirdly it was National Intelligence and the Director General of National Intelligence or the Chairperson or the Director General of National Intelligence was also the Director of the State President's Department and that he had cleared it there, he said he cleared it with interested parties and he asked for medals or decorations for the police officers who were involved. Those policemen or that type of award has necessarily according to police regulation been approved by the Minister of Law and Order and that is why I went to the then Minister of Law and Order and said that I do not recommend the orders that were recommended, I thought that the position was that they be awarded the decoration for courage, that does not mean that one approves it and it is un-neutral award, you can be courageous in many circumstances and that is how I obtained permission from the Minister, he was aware of it and afterwards it was his obligation to issue instructions or to say whom he wants to tell it to or discuss it with his colleagues, to gain legal opinion, he never discussed with me expect, Chairperson, that shortly afterwards, shortly after this discussion there was a takeover of power in Lesotho with which I as Commissioner was trusted with and the Minister knew of it and it was never discussed with me again until the beginning of this year.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, have you any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Chairperson.
General, you knew that members of the South African Police had been involved in illegal action in Lesotho?
GEN COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: You knew that Mr de Kock was the commander of that unit, that it executed the operation?
GEN COETZEE: No, I wouldn't have known that specifically, Chairperson, by then I had been removed from the Security Branch of the police but from the names that had been submitted to me for the medals I would have certainly seen that he was there.
MR HATTINGH: You did not institute any disciplinary steps in order to discipline them?
GEN COETZEE: Not at that stage.
MR HATTINGH: At no stage?
GEN COETZEE: At no stage.
MR HATTINGH: And at the awarding of the medals were you present? Do you accept that Mr de Kock had known that you had to be notified with regard to the award of the medals?
GEN COETZEE: I think that was generally known that whatever procedure had to be followed in order to be awarded a decoration.
MR HATTINGH: And I would assume that you would concede that he would infer from this that his action had the approval of the Commissioner amongst others?
GEN COETZEE: Yes he could have drawn such an inference.
MR HATTINGH: And you are saying that you discussed the matter with the Minister, Minister le Grange, did you also inform him that it was the police who were responsible for this action, that was approximately the 10th January?
GEN COETZEE: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Was it the first time that he had heard of it or did it appear that he had knowledge of it?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson, you are now asking me a question that has been asked beforehand, nodding the head and soforth, after all this time I can really not tell you in great honesty that I think that he did know.
MR HATTINGH: I assume that one of the factors that led to the fact that you did not take any steps against Mr de Kock and his men was that back then you thought that their actions in this regard were in the interest of the country and interest of the Government and in the interest of the National Party?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson I think I would like to answer that question in this regard with your permission. On that particular day in the context of what was happening then and then in the milieu that reigned there, if I had gone to the Minister and said "and now I think criminal prosecution has to be instituted against General van der Merwe", he would have shown me the door and said "listen here, you are out of your mind" because he believed it was in the interest of the country because he believed and that was the general thought or the general train of thought not only with the National Party but also with the government then.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, Visser on record. I don't have any questions now but I may have something flowing from what Mr Berger may ask. May my cross-examination be deferred to after his? Thank you.
UNIDENTIFIED LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: Chairperson, I have no questions.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Just one aspect Mr Coetzee? The CIC, you were one of the founding members?
GEN COETZEE: I have already said, Chairperson, that this was a non-statutory body that had developed in order to assist the State Security Council and the other structures of the SSC and may I add "that had proliferated" and I think the Honourable Commissioner is correct in order to create a type of sound board and in order to an extent to be a bit more than a sound board where information form the planned action was conveyed in order to avoid any overlapping and in order to limit duplication of energy and finances and so forth but it did not have any executive powers.
MR CORNELIUS: And then finally, to whom will the CIC report?
GEN COETZEE: To me it is obvious that, Chairperson, that in this regard that at least Mr van Heerden as expected as I tried to define it would have gone to his Minister. He realised that when he received the information then he would decide what further action to take and activate Foreign Affairs so everyone in his own official position it was expected of them that from there he would continue and report further.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
CHAIRPERSON: May I take that question somewhat further? That CIC Committee, did they have teeth?
GEN COETZEE: I would think that it was a Committee that had teeth, I do not think that it was a nonsensical committee of no value.
CHAIRPERSON: Then may I ask you as follows? During this hearing we have heard how guidelines were drawn up in that Committee and the allegation is that it was only applicable to the army, do you recall that?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson no, that is not where it had taken place, the guidelines for the South African Defence Force in the first instance made it's appearance at the Working Committee of the State Security Council. That was a committee, Chairperson, upon where all the Director Generals, not selected persons, all the Director Generals and other persons had served and where departments had put forward their departmental strategies and the Working Committee's chairperson was a secretary of the State Security Council, there was annexes.
CHAIRPERSON: Please listen carefully.
GEN COETZEE: Yes and there it was offered there and that is where it came to the State Security Council.
CHAIRPERSON: For what purpose?
GEN COETZEE: For ratification by the State Security Council.
CHAIRPERSON: And CIC?
GEN COETZEE: Members of CIC, the Director General of Foreign Affairs, the chairperson of the CIC and some of the other members, many of them sat in on the Working Committee of the State Security Council or on the Secretariat of the State Security Council.
CHAIRPERSON: Those guidelines, what was the value of taking that to CIC?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson, I don't think it was ever formally put to CIC.
CHAIRPERSON: But it says so in the minutes?
GEN COETZEE: I don't think I can confirm that.
CHAIRPERSON: Of the 3rd or the 20th December? Can someone help me?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, can I assist you? If you look at bundle 3, first of all at page 59, you will find the document, the memorandum which you're now referring to which contained the guidelines and you will see that it is directed to members of the State Security Council ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I'm not talking about those, I'm talking about those that relate to diplomatic action and then ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: No, that was never discussed at the CIC either Chairperson, that was on the meeting on the 20th December which you find at page 109, I believe, of Volume 2. Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: That was a CIC meeting?
MR VISSER: No, no, that was the State Security Council meeting, Chairperson. That was on the 20th December. There's only one CIC meeting and that was on the 3rd December. All the rest that are relevant are State Security meetings.
CHAIRPERSON: May I ask as follows, if it was decided that at CIC meeting a decision was taken and it was not followed, whom could have done anything about it and to whom?
GEN COETZEE: The answer to that, Chairperson, is that one would be obliged to in one's department go to the head, depending on the nature of the objection that one has, and would report it there.
CHAIRPERSON: To be dealt with departmentally?
GEN COETZEE: No, for submission for example to the Working Committee or for submission to the State Security Council or for submission to the Secretariat of the State Security Council or to the Minister, so it would depend on what the nature of the objection was.
CHAIRPERSON: Let me bring it closer to home, let us say for example that Van der Merwe went directly to a formal CIC meeting and said "Gentlemen, this is the position, within three or four days or however many days that would be, we understand from acceptable sources that a bomb will be planted wherever in South Africa by members of the ANC or MK" and that meeting decides no, we shall not agree with your proposal that we go to Lesotho and launch the attack there, you cannot do it and he continues and sends Mr de Kock to do it. What happens then?
GEN COETZEE: I think that he will meet with some trouble from some or other instance but, Chairperson, qualified, I do not think that my memory allows me in this regard or fails me in this regard when General van der Merwe spoke to me I definitely gained the impression that he within a short period of time was confronted with information that except for by means of discussions and so forth could submit at a formal meeting.
CHAIRPERSON: That may be so but I would just like to find out what the CIC could have done, I want to find out how strong the committee was because now during the whole hearing we're discussing whether the CIC knew or not. I would just like to determine whether such a body could have decided yes or no?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson, I think the answer is in one of the resolutions one can say had been taken at the CIC meeting, where they had said that we do not have the power to recommend that the borders have been closed, we do not have that capacity but the fact remains that one is dealing with personalities with status, personalities attached to instances that had at least by implication had to inform the government and in that regard it is a formal meeting that one attends in an official capacity, not because it is laid down by law.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, do you have any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, just briefly.
General Coetzee, before you became a Commissioner of the then Security Police were involved with the Security Branch?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson, I was the Commander of the Security Branch from approximately 1980 to approximately 1983 excluding the times when I was Acting Commissioner.
MR LAMEY: The point has already been made but I have not heard your viewpoint with regard to this, would you agree with the evidence that had been rendered beforehand, in the situation then that the government was caught up in that declared revolutionary onslaught against the Government and as such one could called it an armed struggle but let us call it a Government that was waged against the Government and was not answered by a declaration of war from the Government. Would the security forces that were tasked with the maintenance of internal security and the unenviable position which they found themselves in that the laws, then specifically the police, the Security Police, could not be reached or could not combat some of these onslaughts? I know it's a mouthful, it's a long question. Maybe it is more complex than this question when put but I hope you understand what I'm trying to say?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson, the position was that from Government it had been emphasised on various levels and various expressions, private or formally, that the South African Government had been embroiled in a war situation, that had been stated during diplomatic discussions with foreign representatives in other intelligence services. I have to explain that after my police career I was a member of Foreign Affairs for a number of years so this was the essence of their viewpoint that they were embroiled in a war situation. The dilemma that had developed and I think afterwards reference has been made by General van der Merwe that they did not have the courage of their convictions to declare a formal war and proclaim martial law as a type of legal State that can function normally with the existing laws that had existed and these two poles were in conflict with each other, Chairperson, and that is why there was no solution until I retired from the police with early pension. I don't know if that answers your question?
MR LAMEY: So do I understand then by that that in such a situation the laws of the country in many cases brought out of neighbouring States where a terrorist could strike at any moment in the country and then disappear? This example would be a good example to indicate that the laws of the country were not sufficient to act lawfully under normal circumstances.
GEN COETZEE: That is how it was seen by the defence force and I think a large proportion of the South African Police and also the then electoral corps. It was viewed as war and that the norms of war were applicable. I must add that there were two streams of thought which developed from that situation and those were the one that I supported when I gave evidence before commissions of enquiry regarding acts, arbitrary acts and draconian acts that an extreme attempt should be made to establish some form of a legal state. There was also another stream which believed and it wasn't easy to discern who believed what but the second stream believed that the courts stood in the way of this real declaration of war therefore there were these dynamics within that situation.
MR LAMEY: Just to round it off and bring it back to the client whom I represent and the footsoldiers, it is that if he had a perspective due to previous operational experience such as Koevoet and thereafter was transferred to Vlakplaas he would have held the view that his operational experience and application with a unit such as Vlakplaas would be used exactly for the purposes of combating this warfare situation within South Africa, would that perspective of his been unreasonable and in place with someone who was in such a situation?
GEN COETZEE: Yes I would think so.
MR LAMEY: Thank you, I have nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Coetzee, would you please turn to bundle 1, page 61, the start of what was your amnesty application? Mind you, what is your amnesty application. 61, bundle 1.
GEN COETZEE: That is correct.
MR BERGER: It appears as though your amnesty application was also submitted in December of 1996, would that be correct?
GEN COETZEE: That is correct.
MR BERGER: Roughly at the same time as Mr van der Merwe's and Mr Schoon's?
GEN COETZEE: That may be so, I've got no knowledge of it.
MR BERGER: I see from page 62 that you make no mention of - right at the bottom, paragraph 8(b), you make no mention about your stint as Acting Commissioner. Could I please have a look at that document that you were referring to? I see Mr Wagener is handing it out so perhaps we could mark this as Exhibit G then? So according to this telex which is Exhibit G you were appointed in addition to your capacity as the head of the Security Branch you were also the Acting Commissioner of the Police from the 2 August 1982, would that be correct?
GEN COETZEE: It would be correct that I was the Acting Commissioner which does not necessarily imply that I remained of Officer Commanding Security Branch because in practice what happened that there was then appointed an acting head there.
MR BERGER: Acting head, okay. No, I was really just trying to establish the date, the date upon which you became Acting Commissioner would have been the 2 August 1982?
GEN COETZEE: That is correct.
MR BERGER: Until when?
GEN COETZEE: Well until the Commissioner came back, the then Commissioner came back from whatever incapacitated him, as what I could get from him is that he was off duty for almost 100 days.
MR BERGER: So we're looking at approximately three months?
GEN COETZEE: Yes, yes, more or less.
MR BERGER: Through to beginning of November 1982?
GEN COETZEE: November, December, yes.
MR BERGER: Now Mr Coetzee, we were all present at the hearing of - well, you and I and your counsel were present at the hearing of the London Amnesty Hearings, London Bomb and I recall that you effected an amendment to page 63 of your application. Am I correct in recalling that you under paragraph 9(a)iii you deleted the word "neighbouring"?
GEN COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, I did because I state subsequently that in those cases, like for instance the '82 raid into Lesotho, I interpreted at that stage as legal acts in terms of international law and that's why I didn't apply for amnesty for that.
MR BERGER: That's the 1982 raid?
GEN COETZEE: That is correct.
MR BERGER: Yes but you also deleted the word "neighbouring" so as to take account of the London Bomb operation for which you did apply for amnesty?
GEN COETZEE: That is right, yes.
MR BERGER: I can't recall but were there any other amendments that you brought about?
GEN COETZEE: I'm sorry Chairperson, I cannot at this stage remember whether I did that but I did that particularly as a result of legal advice that that type of action was not illegal and I did not request amnesty for that. So those authorised by the State in it's official capacity like the '82 incursion into Lesotho, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So Mr Coetzee, you never ever made an application in respect of the 1982 raid?
GEN COETZEE: I did not, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: And the 1982 raid, was that a join police military raid?
GEN COETZEE: No Chairperson, I'm sorry that I'm meandering between Afrikaans and English here ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) to that question, just bear that question in mind, I just don't want to lose the trend. And you say in this raid to Lesotho in 1985 you were not a participant, you didn't even know about it?
GEN COETZEE: I never knew about it.
CHAIRPERSON: Then why did you make the application in the first place because 1982 ...(intervention)
GEN COETZEE: No I didn't ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: No, the 1982 raid you weren't going to make an application?
GEN COETZEE: That is quite correct.
CHAIRPERSON: In 1985 you're not supposed to make an application because you're not guilty?
GEN COETZEE: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Then why was the application made in the first place then?
GEN COETZEE: No, there was no application of mine.
CHAIRPERSON: Here, the one that you withdrew?
MR BERGER: No Chairperson, in fairness to Mr Coetzee, what has been placed on record by my learned friend, Mr Visser, is that those pages were annexed by mistake, attached by mistake by somebody.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, yes thank you to my learned friend. Chairperson, we tried to explain to you that we don't know who put them in here but they were at some stage, somebody thought perhaps that after - this is evidence that was given before the Human Rights Violations Committee by this witness. He was asked to comment on various incidents which he did and in the process he dealt with the Lesotho Raid. He mentioned in 1985 whilst he says he was referring to the '82 raid and somebody along the line perhaps in the Investigation Unit, I don't know where, thought it best to add this to his Amnesty Application but it shouldn't form part of his Amnesty Application.
CHAIRPERSON: He has made application for other events.
MR VISSER: Only for the London Bomb, that's the only incident for which this witness has applied for amnesty for and that amnesty has been granted.
CHAIRPERSON: I don't want to sound unnecessarily probing Mr Visser, I'm just wanting to clear my own mind. I haven't read this application form because as a result of what you told us that is not relevant to this hearing but on page 62 the heading reads "An Application for Amnesty in Terms of Section 18 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation." The application is under the name of Coetzee, Petrus Johannes. Is it this witness?
GEN COETZEE: That is correct yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Now this application refers only to the London Bombing and then it makes sense.
MR VISSER: Well it should only refer to it except that somebody else added pages with regard to Lesotho and which shouldn't be there and that is from page 70 onwards.
CHAIRPERSON: This would have been evidence that was relevant to another Committee of this Commission?
MR VISSER: The Human Rights Violations Committee.
CHAIRPERSON: Okay, then I'm clear on it.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, if it's of any help, a written representation was made by this witness and this is what it looked like.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm satisfied with what ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: And it was contained in that.
MR BERGER: Mr Coetzee, unfortunately I have a problem because quite apart from what was annexed to your application you say you've only applied for amnesty for the London Operation, that is the only incident that you've applied for amnesty?
GEN COETZEE: That is correct.
MR BERGER: But if you have a look at page 63, now I've deleted the word neighbouring in various countries but if you have a look at paragraph 4
"Nature and Particulars"
which starts
"I'm also known as Johan Coetzee", you say in the second last paragraph, Section D of the memorandum, well let me go a little higher, you say:
"After I was summoned to give evidence before the investigative unit of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, I giving evidence also furnished the unit with an extensive memorandum setting out my response to the questions posed by them in the summons. The memorandum was divided into different sections and attached to it was several annexures dealing with the different matters referred to in the summons itself."
Now that's the memorandum that your counsel has just been referring to, yes. And then it says:
"Section D of the memorandum with it's relevant annexures dealt with so-called extra-territorial operations" ...(intervention)
GEN COETZEE: No, so-called authorised.
MR BERGER: I'm sorry,
"certain so-called authorised extra-territorial operations ordered by either a Minister on behalf of the Government or by the State Security Council of which I was as Commissioner a member. The details of these operations insofar as I have knowledge thereof, is fully dealt with in the attached section and the annexures thereto."
Then you say that there's no clear, it's not clear in international law whether those operations were legal or illegal and then you say:
"If the Amnesty Committee is of the opinion that amnesty is in fact required I hereby respectfully wish to apply for it."
Now if you add to that, if you look at the dates, 9(a)(ii) on page 63, you'll see that the dates of these extra-territorial operations you give as between 1980 and 1987 which is the entire period of your tenure as either head of a Security Branch or Commissioner of Police.
GEN COETZEE: Yes that might be so.
MR BERGER: So wouldn't it be fair to say that when you applied for amnesty in the beginning you were applying for all those operations if they were held to be illegal?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson, the position was as follows. When I appeared before a Regional Commission I asked them, with respect, great respect, the Chairman at that stage was Archbishop Tutu, whether he or the legal advisors of the Commission was of the opinion that for want of a better definition, an authorised action or incursion within the parameters of the Act. As a matter of fact we had a long discussion about it. He was unsure about this position. I didn't only do it on my own behalf, I also did it on behalf of the other people whom I represented there and subsequently I wrote a letter to the Commission and I said that depending upon their adjudication of the situation I will decide whether I must ask, really ask for amnesty or not. So perhaps that's the background of these matters, that I really endeavoured through my own little bit of legal knowledge and by asking advice from senior people and studying a little bit of international law I was unsure. So perhaps that's the cause of some of this terminology.
MR BERGER: So would it be fair to say that in the beginning you applied for amnesty for all of those extraterritorial operations that you knew about in advance in case those operations were held to be unlawful.
GEN COETZEE: Yes in the event it was eventually decided that in any event authorization by the State Security Council or cabinet or by Ministers was illegal, unauthorised, unlawful, I said in those circumstances I would apply for that. There was never a clear answer to that problem I had.
MR BERGER: Now those operations, would it be fair to say that those operations included the operations that are referred to at pages 75 to 77 of bundle 1?
GEN COETZEE: Yes those are those that I remember at that stage.
MR BERGER: Yes.
GEN COETZEE: That I thought was authorised.
MR BERGER: Now let's leave 75 for a moment, look at 76, paragraph 3.1, the Botswana Raid. That is the raid on Gabarone on the 14th June 1985, is that right?
GEN COETZEE: I don't know, I can't remember that offhand I refer to a raid where the catalyst for the raid was an attack in Cape Town on the house of a Minister of the House of Delegates.
MR BERGER: I don't know if you recall our history but it was the raid on Gabarone was a raid on the eve of the Kabwe Conference. I don't know if that helps?
GEN COETZEE: No, I'm referring, sir, here - that's why I said at the commencement of this memorandum of mine that I was completely dependent on my own recollection. This one that I'm referring to here is the one that was triggered off because I attended that house, I went to that house when there was a sabotage attack. Whether then that telescoped into some other matter or this was just part of the triggering off, I don't know, but this is the one that I remember that was discussed at SSC level, that I stood up at the State Security Council and reported on the incident that I refer to here and that there was then discussed the possibility or the feasibility of a raid into Botswana.
MR BERGER: And you went along with it, you went along with that discussion, you didn't oppose that discussion?
GEN COETZEE: No Sir, I can't remember now whether I opposed it or whether it was unanimous.
MR BERGER: Then the next raid is dealt with at paragraph 4.1, the Maputo Raid?
GEN COETZEE: That's right.
MR BERGER: Is that the raid on Matola?
GEN COETZEE: That is correct, yes.
MR BERGER: And that one was also discussed in your presence at State Security Council level.
GEN COETZEE: Yes that was discussed at the airforce. The South African Airforce would after target planning would conduct a raid at Maputo on the targets that was identified.
MR BERGER: Now the raid that you refer to in paragraph 2.1 on page 75, the Lesotho Raid, you say
"The so-called Lesotho raids during 1985 was discussed at State Security Council level whilst I was Commissioner of Police."
GEN COETZEE: Yes.
MR BERGER: You say that is a mistake, that should be -"The
so-called Lesotho Raid during 1982."
GEN COETZEE: That is quite correct.
MR BERGER: Now the reason you say you sat on the State Security Council was because you were Acting Commissioner of Police?
GEN COETZEE: That is correct.
MR BERGER: In 1982?
GEN COETZEE: Yes.
MR BERGER: The raid took place on the 9th December 1982?
GEN COETZEE: Yes I can't comment.
MR BERGER: You would still have been Acting Commissioner.
GEN COETZEE: Or at the State Security Council where it was discussed.
MR BERGER: Okay. Now you say that it was in response to acts of sabotage in the Orange Free State committed by ANC cadres based in Lesotho?
GEN COETZEE: Yes.
MR BERGER: These incidents included acts of sabotage against railway lines near Bloemfontein?
GEN COETZEE: Yes.
MR BERGER: Now ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, when you get to a convenient stage we can adjourn.
MR BERGER: I'll try and condense what I was going to say into one statement.
If I put it to you that the attacks in the Free State that you refer to took place in 1985 and not 1982 would you dispute that?
GEN COETZEE: Chairperson, it's quite possible that there were similar attacks on particular targets but I do remember a 1982 because I was a regular visitor to Lesotho for conferences there, for discussions with their Police and discussions with their Ministers about the threat posed from there. I do know that there were attacks near Bloemfontein at that stage.
MR BERGER: In 1982?
GEN COETZEE: In 1982 yes.
MR BERGER: Alright well then let me ask you this. Is it your position now that you no longer seek amnesty for any of the raids that you referred to at pages 75, 77 and 78?
GEN COETZEE: That is ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, with great respect, we explained to you that an application for an amendment was made during the London Bomb, my learned friend was present, we told you that this is what this witness said, he's applying only for one incident only on one date. I just don't understand what my learned friend is getting at.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, I'm laying a basis for some questions which are going to follow and it then will become apparent to my learned friend why I have gone this route but I see that it's just gone 1 o'clock.
CHAIRPERSON: You were invited to finish the ...(inaudible)
MR BERGER: Yes I have finished the point.
NO FURTHER MECHANICAL RECORDING
