Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: It seems like you people have decided that you'll open the batting.

MR HATTINGH: That is correct yes, Mr Chairman, Mr de Kock will be the next applicant and he will testify in Afrikaans.

CHAIRPERSON: I just hope there's no bets raging on the evidence.

Mr de Kock as previously, I assume that you will be using the Afrikaans language when you testify. Is it still that you have no objection to taking the oath?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, you are an applicant in this matter and your amnesty application appears in bundle 1, from page 1 up to and including page 10, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And do you confirm, subject to certain qualifications which will later be confirmed, the correctness of the contents of those pages?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You have testified upon many previous occasions before the various Committees of the overall Amnesty Committee of the TRC, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And during many of those occasions you submitted a supplementary bundle of evidence which was prepared for the very first session of the Amnesty Committee which investigated Vlakplaas activities and the document also confirms that it is the supplementary affidavit of E A de Kock for Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm the correctness of the contents of that document?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And then before we commence your evidence regarding this particular matter, I would like to ask you to provide some background information regarding your career and your time at Vlakplaas. Let us being with the time that you arrived at Vlakplaas, when was that?

MR DE KOCK: I arrived there on the 1st of June 1983.

MR HATTINGH: And when did you assume the ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, all of us are satisfied that we have knowledge of that background, we have heard it before, we have also read it. To conserve time I think that it would be better, under the circumstances, to submit that that particular document containing that particular background history is available to us but we must understand that he could be cross-examined about it. If it's suits you, I do not wish to interfere with your tactic, but I would just like to tell you that we are aware of that background history. If you do not wish to examine it once again, you do not have to do so.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson, with your indulgence I will deal with it very briefly, as you have rightfully remarked, the information is embodied within this document. There are just certain incidents that I would like to highlight to serve as background for his state of mind when he received the order to execute this operation.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I'm sorry, I don't want to interrupt my learned friend unnecessarily, but we haven't been furnished with any copies of the document that my learned friend was referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: You haven't got it?

MS PATEL: Chairperson, my apologies to my learned colleague, I hadn't realised till now that he wasn't in possession of the background material.

CHAIRPERSON: How does that place us now, Mr Berger, do you need time to go through it or ...?

MR BERGER: No, we can carry on but I would appreciate it if we could also be furnished with a copy of the document.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel, could you see to it.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, in 1983 you arrived at Vlakplaas and when did you assume command of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: 1st of July 1985, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So you were the Commander for only a few months when you became involved in the Lesotho incident.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then you also deal briefly with the fact that while you were still the Commander of Koevoet in Namibia, you became involved in the London bombing incident, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I was flown from there to Pretoria and from Pretoria to London.

MR HATTINGH: And who decided for you to become involved in that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know who undertook the selection.

MR HATTINGH: And you were then involved in this incident.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Who gave you the order to become involved with it?

MR DE KOCK: Brig Goosen.

MR HATTINGH: And did you accept that this was the order which came from above?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you executed the operation.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any award after the completion of the operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, several months later an SOE declaration was awarded to us.

MR HATTINGH: And who in your mind did you believe was instrumental in the execution of this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Not only that the Commissioner of Police had to know about it and the Security and the Minister, but also the President, because we are referring to International terrorism when we discuss this matter. I would venture to say that this could be viewed in the European continental context.

MR HATTINGH: That was your belief.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And shortly after you arrived at Vlakplaas and before you assumed command, were you involved in any cross-border operations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I was involved in the attack on Zwelibanzi Nyanda and a group of the ANC there and I was also instrumental in the death of Mr Nyanda and his people.

CHAIRPERSON: Where did those two incidents take place, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: That was in Swaziland. The bombing was in London and then the attack was launched in Swaziland, where Mr Nyanda was killed.

CHAIRPERSON: So you are referring to two incidents, including the London bombing.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the London bombing took place while I was still part of Koevoet, but I was brought in for the purposes of the attack. After I was transferred from Koevoet to Section C1, approximately three months after my arrival I was involved in the attack in Swaziland, on the home of Mr Zwelibanzi Nyanda.

MR HATTINGH: You also applied for amnesty in connection with that matter.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, and then shortly after that incident I was also involved internally ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: Before we get to that I would just like to complete the Swaziland incident. Last week you were informed that amnesty was granted with regard to the Swaziland attack.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And who gave you the order to execute that operation?

MR DE KOCK: In that case it was Brig Jack Cronje, who was also the leader of the attack.

MR HATTINGH: This was a cross-border operation in which you were involved before the Lesotho attack and after that you were also involved in various others, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: For example, you were also involved in the Sibi abduction, a person who was abducted from Swaziland.

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR HATTINGH: You were involved in the Panso operation, which was also an operation which was launched in Swaziland.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: During which persons were killed.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Which you also executed under the order of your Commanders.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you applied for amnesty for the Panso matter and similarly you were also informed last week that your application was successful.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You were also involved in the abduction of Sheila Nyanda - I'm not quite certain of the details of that case, was it an abduction?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was an abduction, but by the Security Branch of Ermelo. I only arrived at the scene later and ultimately I was instrumental in having a helicopter with a doctor flown to her.

MR HATTINGH: And in 1989 you were also involved in an attack on a house and its inhabitants in Botswana, the so-called Chand incident, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you also applied for amnesty for that matter and with regard to that incident you were also informed last week that your amnesty application was successful.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: In that case - the Chand incident took place in April of 1990.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And in that case, who gave you the order to become involved?

MR DE KOCK: Gen van Rensburg.

MR HATTINGH: And did he give evidence during the amnesty hearing pertaining to the Chand matter?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall, Chairperson, I think he denied it.

MR HATTINGH: But he was subpoenaed to attend?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And he denied giving you the order.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: We have not viewed the decision itself, but your application has been successful.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: We now come to your knowledge regarding the CIC, the knowledge that you had shortly before the Lesotho operation. What was the CIC, according to your knowledge? Before the Lesotho operation.

MR DE KOCK: My knowledge of the CIC was that it was a Co-ordinating Intelligence body, where sensitive and confirmed intelligence would be brought in and controlled and then co-ordinated so that intelligence agents would not interfere in one another's areas and prejudice one another or attempt to recruit one another's informers or shoot one another's informers dead, and that this body had an executive function. That was my conviction.

MR HATTINGH: So your perception was that it could authorise or approve certain orders.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know who the Chairperson of the CIC was at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was Dr Neil Barnard.

MR HATTINGH: And were you aware that he was the D-G of National Intelligence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And that he resorted in that capacity, directly beneath the then President, PW Botha.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: So that was your information regarding the CIC, correct or incorrect.

MR DE KOCK: That is so.

MR HATTINGH: You were then requested by Brig Schoon to make a submission with regard to the question of whether Vlakplaas possessed the capacity to execute an operation such as the operation which you indeed executed.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, in your criminal trial you also gave evidence about this and in the criminal trial bundle, which is bundle 2, on page 85, I ask you during your criminal trial the following question

"Who knew about this operation as far as you know?"

and your answer:

"There can be no doubt that the State President, PW Botha knew about it, because he was also the person who was in conflict with Leboa Jonathan. All three the security services of the country, the Military Intelligence Service, the Police Intelligence Service and the National Intelligence Service would have known about it because they had session on the Co-ordinating Intelligence Committee. So also the Commissioner of Police, the Security Head, would at that stage have been aware of it and then also my own Commander, Brig Schoon."

Was that your perception regarding all the persons who were aware of this before you executed the operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Earlier in your evidence on page 78, you gave the following evidence, it is approximately a third down the page, I say to you

"Very well, proceed."

You say that Brig Schoon then asked you, and your answer:

"He asked whether or not we would have the capacity and whether or not I would be able to execute an operation which would indicate whether or not we had the capacity and whether we would be successful. Upon this an operation was planned on paper and I wanted to take the report to him for his approval before it would be sent away to be typed, because we had to examine spelling errors and syntax and he got me moving while he was on his way with Gen van der Merwe to a meeting at the CIC. That was the Co-ordinating Intelligence Committee."

How did you know that they were on their way to a CIC meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was my perception because there was talk of it that morning and Gen van der Merwe was on his way, he wasn't in his office. As far as I can recall he was in the passage and he was already on his way.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall whether either one of them told you that they were on their way to a CIC meeting?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that was my perception, but I formulated this perception from what I heard that morning. I cannot be more specific.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, you heard during the evidence which has been completed, that CIC was not in a position to approve this attack. I must say that I have not discussed this with my colleagues, I do not know what the position is regarding this, but in your perception of that time, what did you think, could they have approved it or not? And if so, in what capacity? And how would they have gone about giving their approval?

MR DE KOCK: If I examine the operations and functionings, especially due to my background with the Security Police, it would have been that the CIC could have handled a very urgent situation on the basis of "Continue for the time being and we will go to the State President to see what he says." That is my opinion, but my fixed conviction, and I was only brought under a different impression here when Brig Schoon testified and confirmed that it did not have an executive function, I was astounded, because up to that day I believed that the CIC had an executive function.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me clarify it for you. All these people have given evidence and they have stated that according to the law, they did not possess such capacity. I'm not so certain as to how the CIC operated, that is why I am asking.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by nature of the situation, a cross-border operation was not embodied within the Statute and the Police Act and its regulations, it was not legal for us to conduct a cross-border operation. In other words, because it was an illegal operation, the CIC would most probably have discussed it on a verbal basis and not put it on a document. And that is why it is easy to deny, it is very easy for Dr Barnard to say that there were Acts which stipulated certain things, but all of us know ... I can give an example. Dr Barnard's own National Intelligence Service which appears to be a bit of an oxymoron currently, was involved in the abduction of Ismail Ebrahim from Swaziland. He cannot deny that he knew that his own organisation was involved in these covert or clandestine operations, because they had their own section which was conducting such operations. So just to say that CIC would never have given an order for a cross-border operation or would have extended its permission for this, he would be lying to say so and he would also be placing Mr van der Merwe in a very difficult position as a result of his lies.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Proceed.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.

ADV BOSMAN: Could I just enter at this point with a question.

Mr de Kock, could you give us a broader impression regarding upon which you base the perception that CIC was involved in this executive capacity?

MR DE KOCK: I could clarify it even further for you - let me deal with the perception first. After a CIC decision there was usually an action. The Security Police in that regard, worked according to different layers. I never had session on a CIC meeting or an SSC meeting for that matter, but this entire situation was that Mr van der Merwe was on his way to a CIC meeting, not an SSC meeting and that is how I received the information that morning. And upon the return and the handing over of the documents confirming that we could go ahead with the attack, I accepted unconditionally that CIC had given its approval for the attack.

But to elaborate even further, especially regarding what Mr Barnard does not say, is that in 1986 or '87, again in December, Special Forces launched an operation in Swaziland where all the wrong targets were attacked, two Swiss citizens were abducted, a restaurateur that I knew very well in Swaziland, was brought in and when I asked Capt Nel who was the Head of the Forces, as to what was going on and why this man was brought in, he said that Special Forces didn't want to launch these attacks, that these attacks were futile and that Neil Barnard had threatened PW Botha and had forced him to force the Defence Force to execute the operation. And these words came verbatim from Capt Gerrie Nel. What I have told you now. Because I had to deal with those persons, they had to receive new clothing, they were still dressed in their night clothes and so forth, that is what I base my perception upon.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr de Kock. You have already dealt with the next section of evidence that I wanted to examine with you. You have stated that Gen van der Merwe was on his way to a CIC meeting.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And it was so urgent that he took your submission, which was hand-written in red ink, just like that, in opposition to the regular custom of having a document typed out before presenting it to the CIC.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, this was a quite a unique occurrence.

MR HATTINGH: Did you accept that your submission would be discussed at a CIC meeting?

MR DE KOCK: I had no doubt about that.

MR HATTINGH: And then you proceed with your evidence, on page 78 you say - I ask you

"Of what, Mr de Kock?"

you say:

"It was a division of the SSC which resorted directly beneath the State President, PW Botha, and he took this documentation. It was still written in red pen, it wasn't something which would be the regular custom, and he simply took it with him like that."

I ask you:

"Was that unusual?"

and you say:

"Yes, it was unique because everything would be typed and set out properly and signed and then be submitted. Upon his return, it wasn't very long afterwards, he handed this report back to me and said that we were to continue with the operation. Very short and sweet that we were to continue."

Did you accept that this document had been submitted to the CIC, or at least members of the CIC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And that the CIC had authorised this operation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And you knew that the Chairperson of CIC was Dr Barnard.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, and from there directly to the President.

MR HATTINGH: So what was your perception, what would the President have known about this?

MR DE KOCK: Well I believe that he must have known firstly, that the attack was urgent and imminent and after the attack he would have been informed about it.

MR HATTINGH: You also state that during this time there was friction between PW Botha and Lesotho, regarding the fact that they had allegedly accommodated ANC members there and allowed the ANC members to use Lesotho as a platform from which they could launch attacks against the RSA.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, PW Botha appeared personally on TV, during which he accused Lesotho, and I think two days later this was in the press. Leboa Jonathan challenged PW Botha to show him that there were terrorists in his country.

MR HATTINGH: Were these all contributing factors to your perception that the government of the day and particularly the President, PW Botha, were well aware of the fact that this attack would be launched and that it was ultimately launched?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Now in your application, and that is why I requested for you to qualify your confirmation of the contents of your application, you state the following in your application on page 3

"One morning in December 1985, I was requested by Brig Willem Schoon whether or not my unit would be capable of launching an attack on Lesotho. I told him that this was indeed possible and he requested a written submission from me to him. I asked Brig Schoon who had issued the order and Brig Schoon told me that it came from the very top. I asked him whether or not this meant that the State President had given permission and Brig Schoon then nodded affirmatively."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: In his evidence, Brig Schoon denied that he told you anything like that, how certain are you of your recollection?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at that staged it could have been that what I asked and what Brig Schoon understood and responded to, could be a question of confusion and I do abide by the idea that I may have been mistaken.

MR HATTINGH: Were you ever involved regarding any other operation that this operation enjoyed the approval of the State President?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was the operation during which we bombed Cosatu House and that was very direct, a man-to-man word-for-word non-rank request from me as to where this order came from and he told me that it came from the State President.

CHAIRPERSON: Who told you that?

MR DE KOCK: It was Brig Schoon.

MR HATTINGH: Is it possible that you could have confused the two incidents with each other?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that possibility does exist, Chairperson, I will leave myself open to that.

MR HATTINGH: Let us then continue with your evidence. You were then under the impression when you received this order, that it came from the highest authority, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, because it was an international attack it could only have come from the highest authority.

MR HATTINGH: And then Mr de Kock, it was said to you that it was denied that PW Botha knew about it, that the CIC knew about it, so in other words, from the very highest level it was denied. How do you feel about that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, these people such as Dr Neil Barnard and Neil van Heerden and Pres Botha, all want to put everything on Gen van der Merwe, I don't mean to defend Gen van der Merwe, I think it has been very clear from my previous evidence that things have not always been favourable between us, however, Neil Barnard and Neil van Heerden and the others left the security of the country in the hands of Gen van der Merwe. He had to take decisions, he could not take those decisions without informing them because then he could just as well have executed a coup d'état in this country. They were very much aware as they were snoring away in their beds in their holiday homes, that there would be an attack, I have no doubt about that.

MR HATTINGH: I would like to deal with your current feelings. At that stage you believed that what you did you did under the order of the government of the day and that it was in the best interests of the country and now you are told that this was not the case, how do you feel about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, on the one hand I felt abused, I feel that our operational capacities were used in a destructive rather than a constructive way, I feel that we killed people who should not have been killed because a group of political leaders and puppets could not get along with one another, and for this purpose we had to destroy people and their homes and it served absolutely no purpose. This is a cross which one must bear and it is not only one cross.

MR HATTINGH: You must have noted during the proceedings here and more particularly the first session of proceedings during which this incident was heard, that some of the next-of-kin of the victims who were then present here and who are possibly also present here today, were quite emotional about the matter and made certain remarks, how do you feel about that?

MR DE KOCK: They have very just cause to do so and they have the right to express this physically or otherwise within this situation. I would have felt exactly the same if it was my son or daughter who was killed there under those circumstances. Therefore I reconcile myself with that nature of emotion and the feelings that they have.

MR HATTINGH: How do you feel about the fact that you killed these people?

MR DE KOCK: What can one really say, other than one finds oneself at the lower rung of the social ladder.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Let us deal with the ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: With the exception of that, how do you feel in your heart about it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that one would want to return these persons to their families. I was never much of a reader and I have never been very emotional but the feeling is, I don't know, I don't really know how to tell you how it feels to be so incapable of restoring these people to their families and of bringing some sense of relief to these families, it leaves one feeling very powerless.

MR HATTINGH: You have expressed similar sentiments during your evidence in your mitigation during your criminal trial.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You then made this submission and you received the order to execute it, before we get to the execution of it can we just get some more background. Then there was much activity on the Lesotho border because of the activities of ANC members who were coming out of Lesotho, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you as the Commander of Vlakplaas, gave instructions to be of assistance there.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: As you have already explained also in your supplementary document, the groups of askaris under the command of police members, would be sent out to be of assistance with the possible identification of members of MK who had received training along with the askaris abroad.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Were you already involved in this when you received this instruction? In other words, your Vlakplaas unit, were they already involved with the border activities in the Ladybrand vicinity when you received this instruction?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I think we had already been deployed for two or three months, we were working there on a almost a permanent basis and because Lesotho is in such a position that one could go to Free State, Transkei, the Cape as well as Southern Natal, we tried to cover as much area as possible in order to stop infiltrations.

MR HATTINGH: And as background, the modus operandi that Vlakplaas followed was that a group of askaris would be sent out under the leadership of a few police members and then after some time they would return to Vlakplaas and be sent out again.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, but in this instance, if I recall correctly, on occasion I tried to work on an orientation basis in the Cape, in order to - in other words, I wanted to have people in that vicinity 24 hours a day. I would send people in and bring others out.

MR HATTINGH: And you have already testified in this document previously, that you as the Commander of Vlakplaas from time to time had to return to Head Office in order to report about the activities of your units there and the information that you had obtained there.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: When you received this instruction from Brig Schoon, were you at that time back in Pretoria?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because I wrote out the report.

MR HATTINGH: And at that stage were some of your people still in Ladybrand?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And after you received the instruction to execute this operation, did you then go back to the Ladybrand vicinity?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall who accompanied you?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it would have been one or two members, because I had a directive with all my members that because we were a counter-insurgency group, members should move in two's or three's and because of certain aspects, although it was not a limiting problem, I chose not to drive myself.

MR HATTINGH: Mr McFadden in his statement mentions Mr Blackie Swart who was there sometime - or not Mr McFadden, Mr McCaskill mentions that Mr Blackie Swart was also present there, what do you say about that?

MR DE KOCK: No, that is impossible, I think he was still a student in the Police College at that stage, but he was definitely not at Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: So he was not even attached to your unit?

MR DE KOCK: Not at all, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And there was also a member ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Where would Mr McCaskill get in touch with Blackie Swart?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think Mr McCaskill would be able to inform us about that because there was no Blackie Swart ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: At that stage?

MR DE KOCK: No, not at all. In 1989 or 1990, a person by the name of Blackie Swart joined us at Vlakplaas.

CHAIRPERSON: At that time was Mr McCaskill still at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, Mr McCaskill, after the attack he went back with us to Vlakplaas where he stayed for a while and from there he left again back to Ladybrand where he was handled further by his handler.

MR HATTINGH: Mr McCaskill also mentions the name of Martiens Ras, was he involved with this operation at any stage?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I had Mr Martiens Ras in Western Transvaal on a permanent basis because he grew up there and he knew the vicinity. He was definitely not involved in this operation.

MR HATTINGH: What type of personality was Mr Ras, or is Mr Ras, is he a person who held many ideals with regard to a career in the Police Force?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it was not a job to him, it was a career.

MR HATTINGH: His father was also a highly placed officer in the Defence Force.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, his father was a General.

MR HATTINGH: Did he discuss this matter with you after awards were given to you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he blamed me because I did not take him along on this.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, and he was also not one of the members who received the award.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, his other reason was he was also a Koevoet member and he also had these qualifications and he held it against me that I did not take him along, but this was a surgical type of operation with a small group and one did not take persons along on safari, that was not our work.

MR HATTINGH: But the fact that he held it against you because you did not take him along, that is why you recall that he was not there.

MR DE KOCK: He was definitely not there, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: He's also not an applicant in this matter.

MR DE KOCK: No, he's not.

MR HATTINGH: And Mr Blackie Swart neither.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, after you received the instruction to execute the operation, when you arrived in the Ladybrand vicinity, did you cooperate with the Security Branch Police of Ladybrand?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we had already co-operated with them when we arrived there the first time, because when Vlakplaas members are deployed and they work in that vicinity, then automatically they will resort under the head of that region and then from there they would resort under the Branch Commander for instructions, service and discipline in the vicinity, for example, Ladybrand.

MR HATTINGH: And does that include yourself?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that would include myself.

MR HATTINGH: What was your rank during that year?

MR DE KOCK: I was Captain, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that policy that Vlakplaas when they worked in another area, that they would resort under the local Police, was that a written rule?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because we operated on a national basis the other security divisions were very sensitive that we could not possibly damage existing structures and sources or prejudice them because of our presence.

MR HATTINGH: While you were in the Ladybrand vicinity, before you received the instruction to execute this operation, did you obtain information with regard to members of the ANC or of MK who were active in Lesotho?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the reports that Ladybrand submitted to us, we studied these reports and there was quite large volumes thereof and there were also documents from Ficksburg and the other border posts which resorted under the Bloemfontein Division.

MR HATTINGH: And these reports, did they contain names of MK members who were active in Lesotho?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, MK members, collaborators of the ANC, every possible facet with regard to the collection of information was involved here.

MR HATTINGH: Were there also photos of the certain MK members, of all the persons whose names were mentioned?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there were photos in the photo albums which were issued to the security members. There may have been photos. I do not have a clear recollection of what was attached to the reports, but it was quite large volumes of reports.

MR HATTINGH: The name of Mr Meyer, Joe Meyer, was this name known to you before you received the instruction to execute this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because in reports there was always reference and the reference was later made to the Meyer group. In other words Meyer and his group.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then regard him as a leadership figure?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was definitely a leadership figure and specifically after his conduct in the Western Cape, one could say he was the leadership figure in a group. If I can give you an idea, one would refer to the Bader-Meinhoff group but there for example would be 20 people in that group. In other words, someone is isolated as a leader of the group.

MNR HATTINGH: "En so was mnr Meyer uitgesonder gewees."

MNR DE KOCK: "Dis reg, Voorsitter."

MR HATTINGH: Can we just diverge from the events there and go back in time. Did you have any information, have the information that Gen van der Merwe testified to with regard to the MK members who wanted to enter the country over the festive season and launch their attacks?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that was so.

MR HATTINGH: And when you received the instruction to do the submission, was there any urgency attached to it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR DE KOCK: I apologise, I sometimes have to use English, my language is not so good anymore, but there was a sort of "frantic" attitude, there was a necessary situation.

MR HATTINGH: I know this happened 15 years ago, Mr de Kock, but can you please give us an indication, how much time had elapsed from the time that you received the instruction to execute the operation, up to the night of the 19th/20th of December?

MR DE KOCK: I would say between three and five days, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You were now back in the vicinity after you received the instruction, did you have access to the Security Police of Ladybrand's - the sources of the Security Police from Ladybrand?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I would just like to mention that Security Branch informers were protected. If one for example wanted to speak to an informer, then his handler would be present. In other words, one cannot just take his source and it was regarded as sensitive. In other words, there was control as to what one could ask of the source, but in this regard, when we received the approval to launch the attack, then the situation changes and then I as the Operational Commander, can ask for the source to be made available to me because I also have the support of Head Office to, I would want to say, enforce something like that.

MR HATTINGH: Under your command there was a Lieut Adamson, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Was he, in other words, the next in rank after you of the Vlakplaas members who were there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And on this occasion when you returned to Head Office to report, did he accompany you or did he remain behind?

MR DE KOCK: He remained behind, Chairperson. I also used him to work there on a permanent basis because he was born in the Bloemfontein area and grew up there and knew the area quite well.

MR HATTINGH: So he was in command of the Vlakplaas component on the occasions when you were not present.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You now requested access to the source, were you granted such access?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall after 15 years, exactly where and when you met the source?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no I cannot recall exactly where I met Mr McCaskill and exactly when I met him. I do know that I met him on occasion or the second or third occasion with his handler with him, but upon the approval of this operation, Mr McCaskill was appointed to us.

CHAIRPERSON: I would just like to clear a few things up here. This operation was planned before you met Mr McCaskill.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, we obtained information ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But before you met Mr McCaskill yourself?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, when I met Mr McCaskill for the first time it was an issue of he had access to ANC members and he was a good source, he can supply information. He gives one A-class information. A-class information is a person who is on the scene himself and gives the information firsthand. He can, for example, get the information from ... but a B-class informant is not a person who can give you firsthand information. The attack had then not been planned yet. Upon the instruction that the attack should be launched, Mr McCaskill had already been appointed to us on a permanent basis.

CHAIRPERSON: What I'm trying to find out is, who was the source of information which led to the decision that this attack should continue, that it was worth the trouble going to these people and blowing them up and shooting them?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr McCaskill was not the only source who supplied information about members of the ANC in Lesotho, there were many more other sources, but the degree of their information was less than that of Mr McCaskill and I think that on that basis he was appointed to us, but there was a myriad of information which came in as well from other sources.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand there was information, we don't know what about, that at some stage there were 50 ANC Military people in Lesotho and then Mr van der Merwe went to Mr Pik Botha's department and asked certain things regarding telexes which had to be sent to the Lesotho authorities. At that stage was there also, I shall describe it as a warning, that if Lesotho did not do anything about this, then South Africa will do something about it themselves? We differ on what that could mean. One of the possible interpretations is that what actually happened was because of that warning.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And at that stage do you know if - it sounds to me like this and I'm asking you so that I can get an answer, was this plan implemented at that stage already, was there talk of this plan? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think one can foresee it as such because at that stage I would not have known because I did not move on that high level at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: We know by the 29th of November that such a request was made by Mr van der Merwe, can you recall whether at that stage, on the 29th of November, that there was talk of this incident?

MR DE KOCK: Not that I knew of, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: At which stage were you brought in?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when Brig Schoon asked me whether we had the capacity, can we do this, that was my first involvement.

CHAIRPERSON: And in comparison with the 29th of November, can you give us an indication when that would have been?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am not able to assist you there because I did not move at that level.

CHAIRPERSON: May I ask you then in the following manner. You know when the incident took place.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: How much time, in days or weeks, before the incident took place were you brought in in your capacity as a Vlakplaas member?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when Brig Schoon asked me to draw up the report, then I knew something could happen here, there was a decision here. What I did indeed to do then and what we concentrated on was also the internal situation in Lesotho, because of the polarisation within the groups in the Defence Force and the Police and the general public, but there was no urgency with me, I did not pick it up that we would launch a cross-border attack, one could expect it. What I would like to mention to you, and this might be on the periphery of the whole thing, but the thing that Dr Neil Barnard and Neil van Heerden says, that they could apply economic sanctions, those are all lies, because already in December the mines had been closed except for a skeleton crew who kept it running, the building industry was closed, heavy and light industries were closed. All these people were already in Transkei and Lesotho and Mozambique, they would only return on the 15th of 20th of January, and for the National Party back then to say that it does not want the people back in the mines, that would mean that they are going into bankruptcy themselves because the basis of the economy was gold then. So what Mr Neil Barnard is doing is lying and he's placing Gen van der Merwe in a very difficult position. That's all that I can say. It is logical.

CHAIRPERSON: Now on the 3rd of December you handed over this document in red ink.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I only handed it in much later, Chairperson, I would say about four or five days before the attack.

CHAIRPERSON: I am under the impression that the last CIC meeting was on the 3rd of December of that year and you say you handed over this document, as I recall it, on the day when you were under the impression that Mr van der Merwe was on his way to a CIC meeting.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So how does that work then, if the last meeting during that time was on the 3rd of December?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, personally, in my own opinion as a junior member at that stage, there was a CIC meeting on the 3rd, but these people met informally at times. I just say this by means of inference, but there was nothing, it was nothing for Dr Barnard to get on the telephone and say "Can you recall what we said on the 3rd of December, with regard to the small country south of here?" Or something along those lines. I state that as a hypothesis.

CHAIRPERSON: Now this document written in red, those days when you handed it over to Mr van der Merwe, did you get in touch with Mr McCaskill by then?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I met him by then.

CHAIRPERSON: I mean in regard to this incident.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, no, because he attack had not been planned yet.

CHAIRPERSON: Relative to that date, when was the first time that you got in touch with Mr McCaskill with regard to this incident?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think the moment after I travelled from Pretoria back to Ladybrand and then told him "You have now been appointed to our group and now you will be working with us."

CHAIRPERSON: Please listen carefully and think carefully, because things do not sound right to me. Somewhere it was said that you wanted further evidence from Mr McCaskill that the house that the South African Police had to go to, to go and kill people was that of persons who had firearms and explosives and so forth as proof that they were on the verge of entering the country and would be doing something round about Xmas. Those are the allegations. And I understood that, that information was also contained in the document that was written in red, to indicate the urgency of the situation. Or do I have it incorrectly?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I will not say that you are incorrect because something like that was said, but there may be some confusion here. I personally did not receive or see any handgrenades with Mr McCaskill and speak about any detonators, but I saw photos of handgrenades which I received from his handler. It is possible that Lieut Adamson at that stage had liaised with them directly and Special Forces, a CCB component also worked in Lesotho and at Ladybrand for the purposes of an attack, but at that stage I did not make any preparations for an attack.

And I would like to reiterate that after Brig Schoon gave me the document in red and I went back to Special Task Force and asked for weapons and asked, they said they did not have and I told Lieut Adamson to find me some rubber dinghies and the only thing he could do was to find three rubber dinghies from the OK's in Bloemfontein or something, that was the only thing I could use. So at that stage I did not make any preparations with regard to personnel.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Continue, Mr Hattingh.

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, I note that it is after eleven, I don't know if you want to take the tea adjournment now.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, just before the tea adjournment you were asked by the Chairperson how much time elapsed from your submission to the attack and you said that it was three to five days.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: This submission that you made, the document written in red ink, was it an information document or a logistical planning document for an attack?

MR DE KOCK: It was a plan, logistically and in terms of capacity, indicating whether or not I had sufficient manpower, weaponry, the nature of the weaponry and what the chances were, given the circumstances in Lesotho, for success or not.

MR HATTINGH: You did not want to convey intelligence to them as such.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the intelligence would have been at Head Office already because from the branch it went to the division, from the division to Head Office and then to the various desks.

MR HATTINGH: You yourself also provided intelligence that you had collected while you were active there.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: There was the order and you were there at Ladybrand and once again you met Mr McCaskill. Could I just be clear on this, is it your evidence that you had met Mr McCaskill before the order for the attack was given?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: That was during of your regular investigations that you conducted there.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because one would make further enquiries based upon a report that conveyed certain intelligence, so the report could be thorough in terms of the handler who handled the informers, but for example, if I wanted to investigate infiltration or ex- filtration I might have different needs and that is why one would need to make further enquiries.

MR HATTINGH: Just to be clear regarding the provision or the addition of handgrenades or weapons by him in order to prove that there was indeed a capacity in Lesotho for certain persons to launch such an attack, you stated that it could have been handed over but it wasn't handed over to you.

MR DE KOCK: No, because I would not be afraid to say so to you.

MR HATTINGH: Had you ever viewed any photographs of such weaponry?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I had viewed photographs of the handgrenades.

MR HATTINGH: Then you once again contacted Mr McCaskill after you received the order to plan the operation, and what was discussed between the two of you in general terms?

MR DE KOCK: In general terms it was about how we could approach the aspect of this group in terms of centralising them as much as possible, how we could launch the attack so that we would be able to reach the greatest number of these groups; would they be in one place or more than one place, would we have to attack more than one house to get to them? That was the basic gist of it, it wasn't the specific sequence as such. I just want to convey to you the basic operational approach which would have been discussed with such an informer.

MR HATTINGH: I just want to deal very briefly with some of the allegations contained in Mr McCaskill's statements, not that they are all of extreme relevance, I just want to give you the opportunity to deal with them briefly. Were you ever under the impression that he was unwilling to cooperate with you in terms of intelligence about ANC activities within Lesotho?

MR DE KOCK: No, not at all, he was very willing. He was already at that stage a source for the Ladybrand branch. The reports that I read there had already come from him and he had already been handled by the Ladybrand branch.

MR HATTINGH: And had he received remuneration from them?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he did.

MR HATTINGH: So if he says that you threatened him into offering his co-operation and that initially he misled you and gave you false intelligence and so forth, what would you say about that?

MR DE KOCK: That is false, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. He also mentions that an arrangement was made that you and some of your members would be in the bar of a certain hotel where he would also be before you could see how Meyer looked.

MR DE KOCK: No, I was in no bar of a hotel where ANC members were, so that I could see how they looked.

MR HATTINGH: Was it practically viable for you to move about freely within Lesotho while you were busy planning an attack on a house in that area?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would not have been viable for a person who would be a target to be able to identify you later. However, we moved around within Maseru and the surrounding area, we ourselves attempted to recruit informers and one would of course have to familiarise oneself with the area.

MR HATTINGH: Regarding this so-called meeting, he states on page 69 of Volume 2, paragraph 8

"A short while later they arranged another meeting with me. I was called to Ladybrand and we had a braai that day. Again de Kock and Adamson were present and others known as Nortje and Blackie Swart."

You have already stated that Blackie Swart was not present at all.

MR DE KOCK: No, there was no such event, not that I can recall, because at that stage there was no Blackie Swart.

MR HATTINGH: He also states in his affidavit that you would have given him detonators for handgrenades which he was to take back. Those would be the handgrenades that he came to show you, that for those handgrenades you would have provided him with detonators that he had to attach to the handgrenades so that they would explode immediately upon activation and that the person using the handgrenade would then be killed in the subsequent explosion.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, this would not have come from Vlakplaas because I would have known about it. It wouldn't have made any sense to me because tactically speaking, it didn't serve any purpose. It wouldn't help to fix two handgrenades if there were 60, one would have to fix all 60. It is possible that somebody else may have made such a suggestion but it certainly didn't come from us.

MR HATTINGH: You wanted to attack a group of persons, your attack was not aimed at one or two persons.

MR DE KOCK: No, it was aimed at a specific group, not 50 or 80 people.

MR HATTINGH: But not one or two that you wanted to kill by means of handgrenades.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. He also states the fact, and I think you have already discussed this, that there was an allegation that you threatened him, that you would have threatened his family if he didn't cooperate.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, before our arrival he had already been an informer for the Ladybrand branch for quite some time.

MR HATTINGH: He says that you gave him a 7,65 pistol that he was supposed to take to Meyer, for one or other reason, did you do anything like that?

MR DE KOCK: No, as I understood from the reports they already possessed their own weapons.

MR HATTINGH: And then he also states that there was a party at which some of these MK members were present and that you would have attacked during that party, but that you didn't do it because you were of the opinion that the place was not suitably situated. This is the party before the night of the incident.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there was only one party which was arranged and that was on the evening of the attack.

MR HATTINGH: What was the arrangement with him with regard to remuneration?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I told him that the South African Police had an official remuneration scale which was a confidential document, the official remuneration scale dealt with rewards which would be paid out for weapons, explosives and also the arrests or killings of a terrorist and in that case, for the arrest or killing of a terrorist the amount was R2 000. It was agreed with him that this would be the remunerative scale according to which he would be remunerated. That would be the scale according to which he could justify his actions.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he take the money after the incident?

MR DE KOCK: He took every single blood-drenched rand, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You asked him regarding information about where these people would converge on a central point, did you ask him to arrange something like this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the party was arranged for ANC members and then among others this would have included the group which was launching attacks and which was planning to launch attacks. And that entire aspect was left in his hands because he was so close to these persons and they were actually his best friends.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

CHAIRPERSON: I just want to have clarity about this. The party was aimed at gathering these persons who were the targets.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So that you could deal with them.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, to shoot them dead.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was aware of this?

MR DE KOCK: He was aware of the fact that they were going to be shot dead, it was arranged as such. I didn't have any orders to capture 9 or 12 people and bring them back, it was an attack for the purposes of elimination.

CHAIRPERSON: What I want to determine, and I do not want anybody to say that we have misunderstood each other, that this was the plan which was aimed at gathering the persons who were the targets together in one place, so that the shooting could be completed as quickly as possible.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Was there any discussion when the plan was formulated? Was it ever said "The best thing to do would be to arrange for a party" and McCaskill would then have to gather these targets together? What about persons who would be attending the party, who were not supposed to be targets?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this party was arranged only for ANC members and this is what Mr McCaskill told us his capacity was and he used that capacity of his and executed it as well.

CHAIRPERSON: So everyone that you found there you thought were ANC members?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, without a doubt. We will still come to that, but you will see that McCaskill stated shortly before the attack, "My brother is there, there are other people there", and I said to him "Go back and remove them." And he removed those persons who were not ANC members and left the rest behind and we attacked them.

CHAIRPERSON: Proceed please.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.

Very well. He states in his affidavit that you provided him with alcohol and snacks and money with which to hold the party, can you recall this?

MR DE KOCK: I recall vaguely that we provided him with the finances to purchase whatever may be needed at the party.

MR HATTINGH: Then he also states that among others you gave him cans of beer which he was supposed to give to Mr Meyer and two other comrades, as he put it, so that they would fall asleep. What do you say of that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not give him any such cans. It also wouldn't have helped to give only two or three, one wouldn't know what the people preferred to drink or what they would drink, so I did not provide him with any cans.

MR HATTINGH: Was it ever the style of Vlakplaas, when acting against targets, to attempt to drug the people first, as we have heard in the media was done to other persons?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we were an operational unit which attacked the enemy in his own manner, we would us a "subterfuge", we would lure one another into ambushes. There were various other ways that we used to destroy one another.

MR HATTINGH: He says that you also gave him tablets which had to be mixed with brandy and coke in order to put the people to sleep.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: During the attack on the Chand house, did you ever make use of such tactics? ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I beg your pardon, Mr Hattingh.

I don't know that you were personally involved in the following two incidents that I'm about to mention, but there is evidence which has been given before the Committee, not this particular Committee, that drugs were indeed used before the killing of persons. In broad terms, the Mthimkulu case, the other is the son of Judge Kondile, during which his son was given coffee or something to drink which contained tablets or pills before he was shot dead.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we did not make use of such methods. What I can tell you for the sake of clarity, is that approximately a month or a month and a half before this incident the Ladybrand Security Branch requested whether we could develop a cool-drink or a beer which could serve as a sedative which would enable them to abduct ANC members from Lesotho. I liaised with Brig Schoon and he contacted a person who was unknown to me and approximately a week later, I think it was a Black Label beer, there were 12 cans, which would then put people to sleep. One would consume such beer and one would fall asleep.

CHAIRPERSON: Were these substances available?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not know of such substances, but as a result of my experience in South West, I knew that food would be poisoned and among others I viewed such food substances myself, although I did not administer it as such. We handled such foodstuffs which were contaminated. But this beer which was arranged for us by Brig Schoon we gave to one of the askaris to drink and it took approximately three men to hold him down and we had to take him to hospital later on. It certainly wasn't any kind of sedative, it was an hallucinogenic substance. I will give you the name of the person shortly. In either event I had to book him into the Ladybrand Hospital for two days because he became so hyperactive. It had nothing to do with sedation.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps it was one of these cans which gives you wings.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we would never have caught any one of those persons if they had had anything like that to drink because it had absolutely nothing to do with sedation. I don't know who manufactured it, but there was definitely a manufacturing error.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chair.

Could we just return to the question put by the Chairperson. He mentioned two incidents to you which have been dealt with by other Committees, involving the administering of drug substances, was Vlakplaas involved in any such incidents?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: Was Vlakplaas ever involved in any such incidents during which drugs were used?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: Did you do this with the Chand matter in Botswana?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: With the Nyanda matter in Swaziland?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: In those cases you made use of the element of surprise, you walked in and shot these people dead.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, we walked in and got the job done.

CHAIRPERSON: There was a member of Vlakplaas by the name of Coetzee, he gave evidence that he brought those pills for Judge Kondile's son.

MR DE KOCK: He's part of the Walter Miti(?) group, because Mr Coetzee is the sort of person, and I only discovered this later from a pathologist, he was in possession of some of the most poisonous substances in the world which, for example, if injected into a person would lead to death seconds later. It wasn't a question of having to administer a pill or a tablet to somebody and then wait a while and administer some more, it would lead to instant death. I cannot really discuss Mr Coetzee's things, but people did try to manufacture things. We have heard this every day in the media as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock I'm just putting it to you because you were the Head of Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And there are people who have given evidence before Committees, that they were also at Vlakplaas at a certain stage and that this is what they did. I stated that I wasn't certain whether or not you yourself were involved.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, poison wasn't our line.

CHAIRPERSON: But I must inform you that people have testified that these things have happened.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, these things did take place, as it happened in the Eastern Cape, but one must also examine the operational style of the individual, depending upon his style and his needs.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, may I attempt to be of assistance. We were involved in both Kondile and Mthimkulu and the only Vlakplaas operative there was Dirk Coetzee, but that took place in 1981 and 1982. Kondile was in 1981 and Mthimkulu was in 1982, which were at least three years before Mr de Kock came to Vlakplaas in 1985, and I think that's the reason why he can't give ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I take that point, it's just that I was interested in knowing whether he knew about ...(indistinct) subsequent.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Dirk Coetzee was indeed a Commander of Vlakplaas before you were stationed there.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: When he was stationed at Vlakplaas you were still in Namibia.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: If I refer to Vlakplaas and you, I mean from the time that you arrive there, and from that time onwards was Vlakplaas ever involved in such activities?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: You asked Mr McCaskill to gather these persons together, did he inform you that such an occasion had been arranged?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and that this function was for the ANC members.

MR HATTINGH: And where was it to take place?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he stated that it would be at a house and later I heard that it was in fact his own home.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And what did you agree upon, how would you have gone about the execution of the plan?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by nature of the situation the house had been identified to us by the informer, Mr McCaskill, and I along with five of my members would wait for the time when Mr McCaskill would tell us that it was suitable to attack the house. We waited outside the house. As the plan went we would then penetrate the house and shoot everybody that we found there.

MR HATTINGH: How, where and when would he inform you that the time was right for the attack?

MR DE KOCK: We had a hotel room at the Lesotho Sun, so that we had telephonic communication on a continuous basis, Mr Adamson liaised with Mr McCaskill and at a certain time we were given a time when we would see Mr McCaskill at the main post office in Maseru, which was in Leboa Jonathan Drive, and we then found Mr McCaskill there at that particular time.

MR HATTINGH: What was the purpose with that rendezvous?

MR DE KOCK: The purpose was to determine whether or not the ANC members were indeed there, whether the persons that he had identified to us were there and he then stated that the attack could not go ahead at that time because his family was still there, and that is when I told him that there was no turning back. I also told him at that stage that if he wanted to turn back now, I would have to accept that he is playing a double role and that our own lives were in jeopardy and that I would shoot him without hesitation.

Afterwards he returned to the house. I told him to meet us again at the post office in half an hour's time. I told him to remove his family from the house. And half an hour later we found Mr McCaskill at the post office once again, he confirmed that his family had left the house and that only the ANC members were there and that it was now a suitable time to attack the house.

He also told us that two of the members, among others the main target, Mr Joe Meyer, had just left the house, and then at that stage I had to deploy two members, Lieut Adamson and Sgt Coetser, to accompany McCaskill to Meyer's house because we didn't know where Meyer's house was. Nortje, Bosch, Vermeulen and I then moved to McCaskill's house and launched the attack there.

MR HATTINGH: Before you get to that, at that stage were cellphones available?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Because in paragraph 19 of Mr McCaskill's affidavit he states, and this is on page 71

"I left the party at about 23H00 to meet de Kock and his men. I told them who was at the party. They told me to take my car to work. They accompanied me to take my car to my work. We went to fetch another car next to a garage. We went to my place where the party was held. They instructed me to get into another car. We left the other car at that spot and went away with another car. Adamson said we should go and see Jabu at his home. On our way to Jabu's place we got a message that Leon was not at the party."

Is there any manner in which such a message could have been communicated to you while you were travelling in a car to the house?

MR DE KOCK: No, because Mr McCaskill - regarding any kind of device, we had two radios which appeared to be useless later on. It did not have any reception further than 50 metres. There was no Jabu involved at any stage and the information came from Mr McCaskill that Joe Meyer had left the house, not from any other person or by means of the radio.

MR HATTINGH: That is when you decided to deploy others, or at least members of your team to go to Meyer's house.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and I sent Mr McCaskill with them because we didn't know where Joe Meyer's house was.

MR HATTINGH: Who did you deploy to accompany him?

MR DE KOCK: It was Lieut Adamson and Sgt Coetser.

MR HATTINGH: And did they then depart from there in a car?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, as far as I know they left with Mr McCaskill.

MR HATTINGH: And you and who else went to the house where the party was being held?

MR DE KOCK: Nortje, Bosch, Vermeulen and I.

MR HATTINGH: The four of you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there were four of us.

MR HATTINGH: And then you arrived at the house.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr Bosch remained seated in the vehicle, approximately 50 meters away in order to offer a warning in the event of members of the Lesotho Defence Force arriving there. I placed Mr Vermeulen at the corner of the house so that he could watch the Leboa Jonathan highway running to the border and could also issue early warnings or provide a first line of defence if anybody arrived there.

Mr Nortje and I went towards the house and on our way there a person came out and bent down at a vehicle. He looked up and saw us. It was approximately 20 metres away. I fired two shots at the person and as far as I know I hit two shots into his head through the window. Mr Nortje and I entered the house ...

MEMBER OF PUBLIC DISTRESSED

MR HATTINGH: Would you perhaps like to take a short adjournment, Mr Chairman?

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, you now refer to Leboa Jonathan highway, relative to that highway where was the house where the party was being held?

MR DE KOCK: It was right next to that highway. The highway leads from the Maseru border post directly into the town of Maseru.

MR HATTINGH: And back then, Mr de Kock, was there political unrest in Lesotho?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was tremendous political unrest and as I have said there was polarisation amongst the police members and the Defence Force and politicians and all the other forces and then there was a prominent group there, they formed some sort of militia for Leboa Jonathan, and I think it was the Basotholand Youth Congress who walked around armed and even intimidated the police there.

MR HATTINGH: Were there any armed staff of the Security Forces on the streets?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, amongst others on Leboa Jonathan Highway there were Land Rovers which patrolled the area and passed each other on the way to the border and they were heavily armed.

MR HATTINGH: Did you meet any such vehicles during the course of that night?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, when we turned into Leboa Jonathan Highway in central Maseru there's a large Basotho hut or building that was built to resemble a Basotho hut and it looked like a Basotho hat, where one could buy curious and there we met a Land Rover with eight heavily armed persons and a heavy calibre machine gun mounted on the vehicle. So it was problematic.

MR HATTINGH: So you say that after you shot the person there at the vehicle, you and Nortje entered the house.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson. What happened was that I ran to the vehicle, because this was an unexpected situation and things could get complicated, in order to ensure that he was indeed dead. He was dead. I dragged him out of the vehicle to ensure that he was deceased.

Nortje had already stormed into the house and when I stormed after Nortje, then a woman who was working at the sink, she did not see me when I stormed in, but she stormed after Nortje and then she grabbed him from behind or she jumped on his back. He had already sprayed the building on the inside with his automatic Uzzi submachine gun and I struck the woman from behind to get her off him because she was holding onto him and then we followed up thereafter.

In the bathroom, I think two persons were shot in the bathroom and in the toilet one person tried to hide in the roof and I shot him and we quickly moved through the house, through the rooms because everything went - I would not say went wrong, but against our expectations. One would approach a wardrobe by shooting behind it in case someone would be hiding inside it, so that you are not shot when you open the door and then we immediately left the premises thereafter.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know how many people were killed in the house that evening?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was not certain because we counted very quickly and we did not keep count as we moved. We wanted to leave as quickly as possible. I did not use the opportunity to use the pocket camera which I had with me. Mr McCaskill told us his information was that at times if there was documentation, it would be hidden in a television set, a small portable television set. I told Mr Vermeulen to take this so that it could be opened later, and we immediately departed.

MR HATTINGH: This was now in the vehicle in which Mr Bosch was waiting for you.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did the other three gentlemen leave with you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we all departed together.

MR HATTINGH: Where did you go then?

MR DE KOCK: We moved then to our rendezvous point next to the Caledon River and we decided what our next action would be and about fifteen minutes later, Lieut Adamson and Mr Coetser arrived there with the source, McCaskill, and I then decided we shall set fire to the vehicles there and we shall move back across the border. I did make provision that we may have to break out in the direction of Ficksburg or to another post, but I did not see the opportunity for it and then I gave instructions that the vehicles were to be set alight.

MR HATTINGH: At what time was this approximately, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I do not know, it had to be between twelve and two or between eleven and two, in that vicinity.

MR HATTINGH: And what time does the border post close?

MR DE KOCK: It closed at ten.

MR HATTINGH: So you could not move back through the border post with the vehicles.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the initial planning gave us the opportunity to move through the border post after the attack, but with the situation that Mr McCaskill went along and had to remove his family members and everything accompanying that, it took us much longer.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then go across the river back into the Republic?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: How did you get into Lesotho the first time, did you go through in vehicles?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I think I and - either Mr Bosch or Mr Nortje went through in one vehicle and Mr Adamson and Mr Nortje or Bosch went through in the other vehicle and then Mr Coetser and Mr Vermeulen would then go across the river with the firearms.

MR HATTINGH: By using the rubber dinghies.

MR DE KOCK: Yes. And they were supported on the South African side by Almond Nofomela and four members of the Ladybrand Security Branch.

MR HATTINGH: And how did you move back across the river, did you use the rubber dinghies again?

MR DE KOCK: Two of the rubber dinghies were useless, they were torn and the third one we succeeded in bringing through the weapons with it and we waded through because it had already started flooding and on the other side the Ladybrand Security Branch members picked us up and from there we moved back.

MR HATTINGH: These are now the members who were involved the operation as well as those who gave support on the South African side as well as Mr McCaskill.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then go back to the Ladybrand Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I and one of my members went to the Ladybrand Security Branch office with the Commander of the Security Branch at that stage, and the other members went to the farm where they were accommodated and I first made some calls from Ladybrand office, amongst others I called the head police station in Maseru to explain to them and I gave them a description and an address of Mr Meyer's house and told them that there was a child and a baby-sitter in the house.

I then contacted Brig Schoon and I woke him and told him that we are back on the South African side and that we had shot between 9 and 11 persons, of these ANC persons, this ANC group. I made a second call to the Maseru head police station and gave the description of Meyer's house once again and thereafter I departed to my place where I was staying. When I arrived there ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: May I just stop you there please. How did you know about the child and the baby-sitter who were in the house?

MR DE KOCK: This was conveyed to me by Lieut Adamson.

MR HATTINGH: And it was them who launched the attack there.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did he tell you what happened there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall what their version was?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, their version was when they knocked on the door a woman, a white woman opened the door and she, either in shock or defence, she grabbed the rifle which had a silencer and the silencer was removed from the firearm and he fired and he fired at her at point blank range. They went over her then and into the bathroom and in the bathroom they found Joe Meyer, where he was busy loading his firearm. They tried to grab him to bring him out and in that scuffle they decided to shoot him and they killed him.

MR HATTINGH: You were not there, this is just hearsay to which you give evidence now. What was the position, was there any plan to abduct Mr Meyer instead of killing him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was not our instruction and right from the start our intention was to kill, however upon Lieut Adamson's departure along with Coetser and McCaskill I told him that if there was a vague possibility, and upon his operational observation at the scene, that he could bring Joe Meyer along, that he should do it but he should not go to any trouble doing it and that their own lives should not be jeopardised in the attempt.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Did you then return to the place where you stayed?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The woman who grabbed the firearm, was she killed?

MR DE KOCK: If you can repeat that, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The woman who grabbed the firearm at Meyer's house, was she killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, yes, she was killed, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And Meyer himself was killed there.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there some other woman with a child there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, Lieut Adamson and Coetser told me that there was a child and then there was a black baby-sitter and that they had locked these into the main bedroom. I just left it there, I believed them, I had no reason to doubt them because Adamson was an officer who had many years of operational experience and he was also a former Koevoet member.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: May I interpose, Mr Hattingh.

Mr de Kock, why did you even suggest this remote possibility that Mr Meyer was to be brought alive?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this was a decision which I took right there at the scene, it would have been of value tactically speaking, that if we could bring him out, that we can gain information as to where the rest of the terrorists were who worked in Lesotho. This however does not mean that Mr Meyer would later be prosecuted, it was a covert operation and it would have remained covert and in all possibility we would have killed him later.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Wouldn't that have gone against the instructions that you had received from Brig Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, but as the Operational Commander on the ground one tries to attach value tactically and strategically and one makes certain determinations there and I only left it open to Lieut Adamson, that if such an opportunity raised itself, then he should try and bring the person. Yes, the direct instruction from Brig Schoon, that was against it, but I was the tactical Commander on the ground, it is not that Mr Meyer would be able to make a statement later. As I have already told you, when he gave the information to us he would most probably have been killed afterwards, because we cannot take him to court.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: What value would that information have been to you, because you were exposed to a very willing informer and who was able to deliver quite effectively, in Mr McCaskill.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, Mr McCaskill knew this group quite well, they were good friends of his, he knew of them, but he did not know where the rest of the terrorists were, but Mr Meyer may have known or given us an indication as to where we can find the rest of them, and it is on that basis that at that moment I left the gap for Lieut Adamson, "If it is possible, do it, but do not jeopardise your own life in doing so."

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. I did not understand your evidence to suggest that there was some information which you still sought from Mr McCaskill, that he was unable to provide at the time when the decision was taken to execute this operation, that's why I just found it strange that there was any information that Mr Meyer would have furnished to you that would have been of value at all.

MR DE KOCK: Mr McCaskill by nature of his situation, was a friend of this group of Mr Meyer, but I did not believe that he could be able to tell us where the rest of the other 80 was, but Mr Meyer, by nature of his involvement and his knowledge, would most probably have given us much more information than what Mr McCaskill could give us, because Mr McCaskill was friends with this group that he sold out here and he was of value there. He would not be able to give us the rest of the 80. But at that stage it was an idea that I gave to Lieut Adamson at that stage.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you. Mr Hattingh.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, did you think that Mr McCaskill after this incident, could be of any value to you, that he could return and fulfil his position as an informer?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not for Vlakplaas but for the Ladybrand Security Branch.

MR HATTINGH: But did you consider the possibility that persons who were killed there and their comrades, would be able to determine who supplied the information that led to the death of their comrades?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I think it would have been common cause that he was the source.

MR HATTINGH: And would he be able to return to that community and supply further information after this incident?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So he was no longer of any value to you as an informer.

MR DE KOCK: Not for Vlakplaas, no, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. You said that you went to your place where you stayed after you made the three telephone calls, what happened then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it will be militarily - because of the information that we had, the political situation as well as the military situation - I decided to launch a low-level attack on the border post on the Maseru side and I then used six high explosive rounds. I fired it at the Maseru border post on the Lesotho side, which caused a few casspirs to move down to the border post and reinforcements were brought and there would be more activity at that border post and that would flow through to the other border posts at Thaba N'chu and Ficksburg. There was something like 70 to 80 other terrorists in Lesotho or in the Maseru vicinity and I as Commander at that stage was concerned that some of these persons would try to infiltrate South Africa and the following morning I heard that because of that action on the Lesotho side, roadblocks were set up to Tella Bridge in the Transkei and to the border post at Thaba N'chu and the border post at Ficksburg and every single vehicle was searched there. So members of the ANC would not be able to move around with their weapons for further infiltrations.

MR HATTINGH: Was anyone injured as far as you know, because of this attack?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, no-one was injured, although one of the buildings was slightly damaged.

MR HATTINGH: Thereafter did you return to Pretoria, not necessarily immediately but a day or two thereafter?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the following morning we went to the border post at Maseru bridge and I already saw that there was a go-slow action there with specific regard to heavy loads that had to go through to Maseru.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then eventually return to Pretoria?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I returned on the Sunday.

MR HATTINGH: And did you report to your Commander, Brig Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the Monday morning I informed him completely.

MR HATTINGH: We have now heard from Generals Coetzee and van der Merwe that awards were given to you and members who were involved in this operation.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: What award did you receive?

MR DE KOCK: It was the Silver Cross for Bravery, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And who gave this to you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was later informed that it was Gen van der Merwe, but I recall that it was Gen Basie Smit. It is probable that he attended the function, but that is my recollection thereof.

MR HATTINGH: And the award of a medal to you after the operation, how did this influence your perception with regard to who gave the instruction of the operation?

MR DE KOCK: That it came directly from the State President, because it was not something that could be awarded without the knowledge of the State President.

MR HATTINGH: And McCaskill, did he return back to Vlakplaas with you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I do not recall whether it was the same day but in that week he arrived at Vlakplaas for safekeeping. He was a Ladybrand source and we could accommodate him there, and he stayed there for quite some time.

MR HATTINGH: At Vlakplaas itself?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, at Vlakplaas itself.

MR HATTINGH: And there he got to know you and the other members well?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: In his statement he says the first time you were introduced to him you were introduced to him by another name.

MR DE KOCK: That is not impossible, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you and members of Vlakplaas use pseudonyms?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: I think you deal with that in the Vlakplaas document. It was officially approved, you received official identity documents with false names.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And in order to do that the co-operation of other State departments had to be called in.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you also received credit cards under the same false identities.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Was that in order to safeguard the covert nature of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, and in order to assist us, so that we could move around secretly because of our work.

MR HATTINGH: Without anything being traced back to the South African Police?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And in order to obtain such credit cards, did you need to obtain the co-operation of the institutions who supplied these credit cards?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the senior members of security were involved there.

MR HATTINGH: I think this question has already been asked by the Chairperson, but you said the remuneration which Mr McCaskill had to receive he did receive such remuneration.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, Judas Iscariot works for money or for ambition or a combination of the two, for nothing else, and Mr McCaskill sold out his best friends for R2 000 a head.

MR HATTINGH: Which he received.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, this is what he was doing here as Judas Iscariot, he sells out those who are the closest to him because they sell at the best price.

CHAIRPERSON: How much did he receive?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as far as I can recall he received R18 000.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr de Kock, the system that you've alluded to of paying informers, this had general application, it was not limited to operations within the South African border? Was it of application also with regard to cross-border operations?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Vlakplaas did not have a border when it came to operations, the whole of Africa was an operational area to us, for the Military, the Police and National Intelligence.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. And in your opinion was this remuneration paid with the knowledge of the Commissioner of Police?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not say the Commissioner, but the Security Chief, yes, because I can only make the claim and then Schoon has to increase or decrease the amount and he for example, would recommend it and then it goes to the Chief of Security for approval and from there it goes to the financial division which will do the pay-outs.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And who would have been the Chief at that time?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know - well, Brig Schoon recommended it, I do not know who did the approval, whether it was Gen van der Merwe or whether it was the Security Chief himself, but it would have been one of the two.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

MR HATTINGH: A few singular aspects before I conclude your evidence, Mr de Kock. You have mentioned CCB involvement there at the border, was the CCB known by that name during that time or do you not know?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I say the CCB, because before that they were Group 40 and before that they were Operation Barnacle, but it was one and the same thing. Persons who were in control of the CCB or Barnacle, D40 Group, was a former Rhodesian Security operative who also worked for the Selous Scouts. His name was Peter Standton and he was their representative at that stage. I liaised with him because he also had to liaise with the Ladybrand Security Branch, and they also indicated to me later that they had interests there.

MR HATTINGH: Was he involved in the preparation for your attack and for the attack itself?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, everything was compartmenta-lised, we worked apart.

MR HATTINGH: And the firearms that you used during the attack, were these so-called silent weapons? In other words, weapons which were supplied with silencers.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, these firearms were not traceable. And then the technical preparation for silent weapons, in other words the silencers, was done by technical division.

MR HATTINGH: And these were weapons with which you were officially issued.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, what were your political motivation for the execution of this act?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was the prevention of terror and then stopping the terror in its tracks. In other words, it won't go forward, left or right or backwards, and it dealt at that time with the effective combating of terrorism.

MR HATTINGH: And the instructions you received from your Commanders.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you believe that it is in the interest of the then government to execute this operation?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You up to today cannot say with certainty how many persons were killed.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. As you will see, it is between 11 and 9 persons. We did not keep count. Initially in the reports that came through from the sources there was uncertainty as to the number of persons.

MR HATTINGH: And in newspaper reports they referred to nine persons, etcetera, not so?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: So you request amnesty for your conspiracy to kill persons in Lesotho, however many that number may be, and for any other offences which might flow from this operation, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, and then also for perjury during the Harms Commission, because this was one of Almond Nofomela's chief allegations against Vlakplaas, because he was the person who waited on the other side of the border for us.

MR HATTINGH: And you denied it under oath.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: This was part of a cover-up operation, one of many cover-up operations.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you also request amnesty for any delictual accountability which might flow from your involvement in this operation.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, conspiracy you said?

MR HATTINGH: I did say conspiracy. If it is an offence that can be led here. There is uncertainty in the light of the judgment of His Lordship, Justice Hartzenberg to that effect.

CHAIRPERSON: What about murder?

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, if you are of the opinion that you can grant amnesty for offences committed abroad, because you are saying the Appeal Court's judgment is obiter. I have not yet gone into that completely.

CHAIRPERSON: My reasoning is as follows. When a conspiracy took place within this country to commit murder, does it matter where the target of the murder is? The fact remains that if that person had been in South Africa, he would still have been killed.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is no on.

CHAIRPERSON: The question of South West Africa is that it was committed in South West Africa, in the interests of South West Africa. The conspiracy may have taken place here in South Africa. I wonder if a person commits conspiracy in connection with a South African, despite the fact that the murder took place across the borders of the country, the South African Government cannot bring that person before the courts of South Africa. That's my question.

MR HATTINGH: All I can tell you, Chairperson, is that in Mr de Kock's criminal trial he was never charged with murder regarding persons who were killed in neighbouring States. There were various, Brian Ngqulunga and Japie Maponya. One was killed in the former Bophuthatswana and the other in Swaziland and the Attorney-General was of the attitude that the person cannot be charged with murder here if the killing took place in another country. That is why Mr de Kock was only charged with conspiracy to murder and he was found guilty of the charge as well. However, Chairperson, from a practical perspective, it would make very little difference if you were of the opinion that you could grant amnesty for murder. The question regarding whether or not it is effective could be left for argument by someone else at a later stage, if they feel that it is not effective. However, if you are of the opinion that you could grant amnesty for murder, then Mr de Kock also requests amnesty for murder then.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you concluded?

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

MR BERGER: Chairperson, it's definitely not me now.

MR VISSER: I don't mind going first, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: I have no questions, thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. Cornelius for Vermeulen, I have no questions.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson. I haven't got many questions, there's something that I just want to clear up.

Mr de Kock, just one aspect regarding the background of Vlakplaas. Would it be correct if one were to make the following summary regarding the operation of Vlakplaas in comparison to Special Forces, for example, which was part of the Defence Force, that it was not a secret that the Defence Force had a unit such as Special Forces? Their operations were indeed covert, but as an institution of Special Forces was no secret unit of the Defence Force as such? However, Vlakplaas was an operational wing of the South African Security Police, similar to Special Forces, with the big difference that it was not commonly known that that wing of the Security Police indeed existed, therefore Vlakplaas itself as an institution was a covert institution.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I am not legal expert as such, I do not possess any legal knowledge, but all Armies in the world have a Special Forces component which is tasked with launching such operations, while the policing functions do not include the killing of persons beyond statutory stipulated Rules or Acts, and in that regard Vlakplaas was definitely more covert than other similar units.

MR LAMEY: Then just to return to the events leading up to the operation itself. Mr Nortje at that stage was a Sergeant, is that correct? A member of Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I think so.

MR LAMEY: He did not liaise with Head Office, you were the one who liaised with Head Office.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: His instructions to me are that he does not know of the submission that you made to Brig Schoon for Mr van der Merwe, he also does not know at which time you made this submission. Furthermore, he does not know when the order was issued from above with regard to the form of the operation. If I understand you correctly, you received an order from Brig Schoon, which had specifically to do with the style or the form of the operation as such.

MR DE KOCK: The form was quite obviously secret and covert by nature, it was not an overt attack as such.

MR LAMEY: I beg your pardon, perhaps you have misunderstood me. The submission that you made and the order the you subsequently received three to four days before the launching of the attack, was about an order pertaining to the form of the operation.

MR DE KOCK: Well the form was to shoot the people dead, so that they would not enter the country over the borders.

MR LAMEY: This took place a few days before the time according to you.

MR DE KOCK: At Head Office things worked on a one-to-one basis due to the secrecy. I would liaise with Brig Schoon, that's one-to-one, then Brig Schoon would liaise with van der Merwe, which is one-to-one, van der Merwe would liaise with the Commissioner and the form was for these persons, these terrorists not to enter the border or the country, they had to be eliminated.

MR LAMEY: Before that moment when the order was issued, given the situation in Lesotho and the fact that there was close co-operation between Vlakplaas and Ladybrand at that stage already, was there ever any expectation or possibility of an operation of that sort which originated before the order was in actual fact issued? I'm referring to a possibility or an expectation or an anticipation, possibly, of something like that. Not as a given but as a possibility.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by nature of my word at Vlakplaas, from 1983 already, there was always an anticipation that when the people stopped talking the shooting would begin. So somewhere in the back of one's mind one could have reckoned that if talking didn't help, then there had to be another way out and that would have been an armed way out.

MR LAMEY: Very well. The intelligence which emerged ultimately, is it correct that the group of MK members would infiltrate, according to the information that you had, on the day directly after the operation was launched?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Well those are my instructions from Mr Nortje.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would have been just after that evening.

MR LAMEY: And then the woman who was in the kitchen or scullery area of the house that you entered, was that Mary Mini, an MK member?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson, I didn't look at any faces or ask for any names.

MR LAMEY: My instructions from Mr Nortje are that it was Mary Mini, but that he didn't realise it at that stage, that he only realised subsequently, after you shot her. Because my instructions are that you apparently told him, and I don't know if you can recall this, that it was Mary Mini.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I think that in retrospect, a week to two to three weeks later, as the information came out it may have emerged. I think that the Ladybrand branch had the post-mortem reports, so it may have come from there.

MR LAMEY: The Special Forces or the CCB or the wing of the Defence Force that you encountered in that area in Ladybrand, did this occur before the order came from Brig Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: Not the members themselves, but Mr Standton who represented them and was their operational planner, he was the one that I encountered, but I did not encounter a group of members as such there. With out following deployment however, I did encounter members of the CCB there. Among them was Sakkie van Zyl.

MR LAMEY: When you refer to the following deployment, when was that?

MR DE KOCK: That was in January. In other words, shortly after the attack.

MR LAMEY: But in December?

MR DE KOCK: No, it was only Mr Standton and after we launched the attack I did not see Mr Standton again.

MR LAMEY: Did their presence there indicate a possible operation from their side?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. Perhaps I could elaborate. When I spoke to Johan van Zyl in January, he told me that they were waiting for more members to arrive, but that there would have been many more members of the ANC who were to be killed, so this would have been a large-scale operation which would have left Maseru in ruins.

MR LAMEY: Would it have been farfetched for Vlakplaas to think, before the order came, that there was a possibility of an operation which could take place?

MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't say it was farfetched, I prepared myself for an operation. One would keep this in the back of one's mind at all time, that when the academics stopped talking, we on the ground level would grab each other by the throats and kill one another off. And because we were an active operational unit on a 24-hour basis, one had to prepare oneself for it at all times.

MR LAMEY: My instructions are that when Mr Nortje and the others left Vlakplaas, they took night vision equipment and silenced weapons with them.

MR DE KOCK: They always had night vision equipment. We didn't necessarily have silenced weapons.

MR LAMEY: I just need to achieve certainty regarding the weapons fitted with silencers.

My instructions are that the silenced weapons and the night vision equipment was taken with them to Ladybrand. This was several days before the operation took place. Mr Nortje's time estimation is approximately 10 days.

MR DE KOCK: After I contacted the task force I went to Vlakplaas and I fetched the silenced weapons because only I had the keys to gain access to that storage room.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, I have no further questions, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JOUBERT: Mr de Kock, just to place things into perspective, the allegations in Mr McCaskill's affidavit which later be correct by means of evidence, you have addressed some of these allegations in your evidence and I just want to achieve further clarity regarding these aspects. If we look at page 68 of his affidavit, paragraph 5 ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Which bundle is this?

MR JOUBERT: It's Volume 2, Mr Chair.

It is Mr McCaskill's affidavit, paragraph 5, the second-last sentence where reference is made to the handgrenades which were given to you. You have already testified that the handgrenades were not handed over to you personally, Mr McCaskill is of the opinion that he cannot recall whether the handgrenades were handed to you or to Mr Coetzee, who was his handler at that stage. So the concession is made there that it could possibly not have been handed over to you.

MR DE KOCK: No, it definitely was not handed over to me and I maintain that this is a lie that he has been telling for the last six years. They were not handed over to me. I dealt with weapons and ammunition so often, especially in covert circumstances, that I wouldn't lie about it under these circumstances.

MR JOUBERT: Please misunderstand, Mr de Kock, we agree with you that it was not handed over to you, it is an error which was made in the affidavit.

MR DE KOCK: Then I thank you.

MR JOUBERT: Regarding the allegations made by Blackie Swart, or regarding Blackie Swart's presence as well as that of Mr Martiens Ras, it is my instruction that both these persons, as far as Mr McCaskill recalls specifically, were not present there. That was included in this affidavit. He will explain this when he gives his evidence, but that concession is also made. We just want to clear up these misunderstandings.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you.

MR JOUBERT: And then also on page 71 of the same volume in the same affidavit, paragraph 19, where it was stated

"On our way to Jabu's place we got a message that Leon was not at the party."

It is also my instruction there to bring about a correction. Mr McCaskill states that when he returned from the house where the party was being held, he told you that there were still persons present there and that Mr Meyer and the others had already departed and that he needed to remove his family. So as you have testified it is correct, it is not entirely correct as it is set out in his affidavit.

Mr de Kock, would you agree that the handler of the Security Branch, Ladybrand, Mr McCaskill's handler was Willem Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: I'm not certain, I cannot recall the man's surname, the only Willem Coetzee that I can truly recall is Willem Coetzee who was also referred to as Timul Coetzee, but it could not have been him.

MR JOUBERT: I'm assuming that it is Willie Coetzee.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that could be so.

MR JOUBERT: Then we will have to bring about a correction regarding that in the affidavit as well because the reference is to Willem Coetzee, not Willie Coetzee.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that would be correct.

MR JOUBERT: You have testified that at no stage did you threaten Mr McCaskill to make information available and that you did not threaten any danger or harm to him and his family.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR JOUBERT: Do you know whether any other person or persons could possibly have threatened him in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot say that anybody else threatened him.

MR JOUBERT: Therefore you would not be able to dispute his evidence that he was threatened at a certain stage, even though it was not by you yourself but that it could have been another member of the Security Branch or any other person?

MR DE KOCK: I would have to depend upon what he states. I did not threaten him because then you would have an informer or a source who would be unstable as a result of fear.

CHAIRPERSON: At which stage was this?

MR JOUBERT: Mr Chair, right at the outset when he was still gathering information. I will now get to the threat at a later stage.

The only threat that you expressed to Mr McCaskill was at the post office when you told him that if you could not continue with the operation you yourself would shoot him.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and I was circumspect so as not to walk into a trap or an ambush myself because we were on different sides of the fence.

MR JOUBERT: You testified that Mr McCaskill had been an informer for quite some time, who had always provided reliable information to you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he provided very good information for the Ladybrand Security Branch and we used the reports that he had submitted to his handler, and during those last few days before the attack he was a prominent figure in the establishment of this attack and the successful completion thereof.

MR JOUBERT: Then why at such a late stage did you begin to doubt his attitude or say that he was a double agent as such?

MR DE KOCK: You must understand that I was in the middle of Lesotho, dealing with an army which was surrounding me and now was certainly not the time for things to go wrong.

MR JOUBERT: Was it easier to launch the attack than to retreat?

CHAIRPERSON: Does Mr McCaskill dispute that Mr de Kock at that stage threatened him?

MR JOUBERT: Mr Chair, I didn't have any instruction on that issue yet, I will gather that over the lunch hour.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But doesn't it appear in his affidavit, Mr Joubert, because it's quite clear if you read paragraph 4 and 5, that the threat includes Mr de Kock. Surely you must have gone through this affidavit.

MR JOUBERT: Yes, Judge Khampepe, but it was not in the context of a threat just prior to the initiation of the attack. The threat that we refer to and the threat that is evidenced in here was a threat right at the beginning which was exercised towards Mr McCaskill ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, to persuade him to become an informer. That is the threat that I'm also alluding to. If you read paragraph 4, in particular the first line

"I was approached by Willem Coetzee ..."

and then he goes on to say:

"He took me to a certain place outside Ladybrand. It was an open space in the ...(indistinct). At that spot we then met Eugene de Kock, a man by the name of Lieut Adamson and a certain white man, introduced to me as Joe. De Kock and Adamson were introduced by a false name and I subsequently came to know who they were."

then, first line, paragraph 4:

"They then called me a few days later and asked me to collaborate with them or else they will attack me and my family."

MR JOUBERT: Yes, Judge, that is indeed our version, but that does specifically refer to the fact that Mr de Kock was the one who issued that threat.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But doesn't he by implication, include Mr de Kock? He has already referred to de Kock, to Mr Coetzee and also to this Mr Adamson.

MR JOUBERT: Yes, Judge, but you will recall, with respect, that at the outset when I started my cross-examination of Mr de Kock, I indicated that my instructions are that there was definitely a threat to him but the evidence would not be that it was specifically from Mr de Kock as such, because Mr McCaskill cannot testify in that regard. He cannot recall who the person was who threatened him per se, with the attack on him and his family.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But if you read paragraph 4 and 5, he includes all these people and when he refer to a threat, he refers to that threat having been issued by the people that he has already referred to in the other previous paragraphs. Can't you read it the way I'm reading it, because this is how I read it.

MR JOUBERT: Judge, obviously I indicated that the threat was forthcoming from, be it the Vlakplaas or the Security Branch of the Police Service, but not - the evidence would not be specifically that Mr de Kock threatened him, it was obviously from the team or anybody involved at that stage, with the handling of Mr McCaskill.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: The way I read it is that the threat came from the people who had contact with Mr McCaskill. Those people are Mr Adamson, Mr Coetzee and Mr de Kock. Maybe you should get clarity from Mr McCaskill with regard to that point, that aspect of his evidence as it appears from his statement on page 68.

MR JOUBERT: Well Judge, if you will grant me a moment I will canvass this issue with him once again but he was unable ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We are going to break for lunch now. In addition, if we are going to get back to a second allegation of a threat that would have occurred near the post office, I don't think there's any point in cross-examining Mr de Kock about it when your client may during consultation, agree that that is what happened. If you're not too sure if it happened or not, you rather get instructions on it. Let's break for lunch and we'll resume at 2 o'clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JOUBERT: (cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, before the adjournment I was asking you with regard to the threats which were directed at Mr McCaskill, and I would like to place these threats within perspective or within context, because it doesn't appear in context from his statement. Mr McCaskill cannot recall specifically that you threatened him at the post office, he says it could be and he says threats were uttered by various persons, but he cannot recall this threat per se. It may be so, if you say it is so, then it could be.

With regard to the other references in his statement on page 68 of Volume 2, paragraphs 4 and 5, where in context it is referred to threats on his life and that of his family, my instructions are that Mr McCaskill initially was first threatened by the members of Ladybrand Security Branch. You cannot dispute that.

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not recruit him.

MR JOUBERT: And Mr McCaskill will also further say that after he was handed over to you and your men as your source, that he no longer worked directly with Mr Coetzee, there was also threats uttered against him and against his family, at times by yourself and at times by members of Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, here we had a source who gave his full co-operation, he's a source who gave complete information and a source who with great accuracy and expertise, gave good an accurate information, it was not a person who was threatened, he was a compliant person. If we threatened him he could have turned around and ran away, so that is not how we deal with such a source.

MR JOUBERT: Mr McCaskill will say that, and this appears to be while he was still working for the Ladybrand Security Branch, he initially gave them false information and only after he was threatened and it was indicated that the movements of him and his family was well known, only thereafter did he give reliable information. Do you know about this?

MR DE KOCK: I had nothing to do with his recruitment and the nature thereof, I can only say that initially when he was seen with his handler and only during those three to five days he worked with us, when we were permanently working on the commission of the operation, but regard to his recruitment and what they did, I do not know about that.

MR JOUBERT: And with regard to what he gave earlier to the Ladybrand branch, would this come to your knowledge?

MR DE KOCK: I would have read about it, but everything indicated to terrorism. There was, for example, no sub-file with reports which said that we caught him lying here or this low grade information, or something along those lines, because the handler would warn one usually with regard to the quality of his source and his capacity to mislead one, or anything strange about him, or his mannerisms, so one would know how to approach and handle this person.

MR JOUBERT: You denied that at any stage you gave him a 7,65 pistol.

MR DE KOCK: No, at no stage did I give such a pistol to him.

MR JOUBERT: This is now with reference to page 69 of the same statement, the same volume, paragraph 9 thereof, my instructions are that you wanted to hand the weapon to him, you did not physically give it to him and then he said that he did not want to take the firearm over the border himself because he was afraid of the search at the border post. Do you deny that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because if he was a source, then we could have given him loads of firearms and on our side there would not have been any problem, but as I have testified earlier I did not give him a firearm because the ANC had their own firearms and it was not necessary for me to give him a firearm.

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr de Kock, when he co-operated with you he was not an ANC member, he worked on behalf of South Africa, what would have happened if he needed the firearm to shoot himself out of a problem?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was not under suspicion by any of these ANC member, otherwise they would have killed him themselves or had made a plan with him or had stayed away from him. At no stage was there a consequence that he was under suspicion, on the contrary he had these people's complete trust, so much so that he could invite them to his house for a party.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I have to say, after the incident, immediately after the incident if I was there, then I would have wondered why was I invited to a party at this man's house and when shots were fired he was absent.

MR DE KOCK: I think questions were asked but then he was already safely on the other side of the border, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that the plan?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he would return to South Africa along with us, in other words there was no danger in Lesotho from the ANC's side for him.

MR JOUBERT: Mr de Kock, you see Mr McCaskill says that his weapon was handed over to him to enable him to set up a type of ambush for Mr Leon Meyer and this was not a successful attempt because McCaskill had cold feet and did not set up the meeting at an alleged weapons cache point. He had to give this firearm to Mr Meyer and tell him that there was a weapons cache point that he had found and then he would lure Mr Meyer to this point, so that the Security Police could eliminate him. Do you deny that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, we did not launch such an operation because he could lure Mr Meyer to any other place and we could have shot him in his tracks right there where he was standing, so it was not necessary to give him a pistol. The ANC's weapons cache points, he could have gone there to get a firearm. And if I look back now I think that he brought some of their handgrenades to the South African side.

MR JOUBERT: And if Mr McCaskill would have said to you that on a certain day he would bring Mr Meyer and certain other members through to South Africa, then you could have arrested them at that stage or eliminated them at that stage.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but no such thing was said and there was no such planning that they would come to this side, which was to be arranged by Mr McCaskill.

MR JOUBERT: Was there no issue that these people would enter the country?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they would enter the country but not where Mr McCaskill arranged that they would come driving in and they would not know of anything and then we would catch them.

MR JOUBERT: You see in Mr McCaskill's statement he says that he was approached by some of these members to transport them, I think it was to Bloemfontein, and that would have been the day after the party.

MR DE KOCK: That may be so, because he also arranged the party, so it's not impossible, I shall not dispute that. I cannot testify as to what he arranged with them.

MR JOUBERT: The house where the party was arranged, that was also Mr McCaskill's residence.

MR DE KOCK: That's how I understood it, yes.

MR JOUBERT: And during the planning of this action it was also brought under the attention that amongst others, his friends and some of his family members were at this residence and they would be there possibly during this party.

MR DE KOCK: He told this to us when we met him there the first time at the post office because this was a party only for ANC members. And upon our first meeting he said "But my family is there", and he spoke of his brother and then he went back because we told him "Go back and go and remove them."

MR JOUBERT: Mr McCaskill's evidence shall differ from yours because he will say upon the initial planning you were told that a possibility exists that his friend and his family would be present there and that during this planning it was told to him that as soon as the situation was in place, arrangements should be made so that these people could be removed from the premises. And that is what he came to inform you about that evening, that they were still on the premises, you sent him back to remove those persons to another room, to an outside room.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, as I explained it to you that is how it happened, but I believe that McCaskill will testify himself and then it can be tested.

MR JOUBERT: You see why he testifies to this effect is that you said you were resident in a hotel that evening.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we used it as a bases.

MR JOUBERT: And how did you arrange to meet with Mr McCaskill at the post office?

MR DE KOCK: This was arranged telephonically by Lieut Adamson and he was contacted at a specific point, I think it was a restaurant, where he, for example, on the hour or on the agreed hour he would receive a call.

MR JOUBERT: Did Lieut Adamson contact Mr McCaskill?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he did.

MR JOUBERT: And this was as you said on the hour or on the half hour on that particular evening.

MR DE KOCK: If you say for example call at 7 o'clock then you'd ask him "How long will it take you to your house?", and he said "Half an hour" and then he'll say "I'll call you back in forty minutes time", and you give him ten or fifteen minutes to get there.

MR JOUBERT: So he would have to drive up and down to his house from the telephone and back.

MR DE KOCK: That's possible. I cannot take you back as to how the arrangements went there.

MR JOUBERT: The reason why I ask you this is because the instructions from Mr McCaskill to me was that there was no such telephonic conversation, he did not even have a telephone at his house. He says that during the planning of the whole operation, agreement had been reached for the action that particular evening and then arrangements had been made for a time that you would meet him at the post office.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with this type of operation there's always a variable situation, I have my part of the script and I cannot write the other part of the script and the nearer you get to the initiation of such an operation you sharpen control, because one has to look that you do not yourself become a victim here.

MR JOUBERT: Were you aware of where his friend and his family would be removed to?

MR DE KOCK: No, because at the post office when he said that his brother was there and we told him "You should go and remove him", I did not know where he would take them. That was not my interest, the people would just have to be taken away, they were not part of that group.

MR JOUBERT: And on these premises where the operation was executed, the house that you hit, was there also an outside room?

MR DE KOCK: I did not look, I am not sure.

MR JOUBERT: Mr McCaskill will say that there was indeed an outside room and that the initial arrangement was that the persons would be taken to that outside room in order to ensure that they will also not die in the attack.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I shall not be able to dispute that, maybe those people can come to us and tell us what they saw and heard.

MR JOUBERT: Mr de Kock, you denied that you specifically gave Black Label beer that was marked, to Mr McCaskill, I think there was reference made to three cans, Mr McCaskill says the tablets and the beer was personally handed over to him by you and not by other members of Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not give him any tablets or pills, I would recall that. With regard to the Black Label, this was something that had been tested on one of the askaris, his name was Petrus Kogwadi(?), already a month, a month and a half before then, and as I have explained to you it had the total opposite effect, so there was no way that we could have given it to him.

MR JOUBERT: Do you not find it strange that Mr McCaskill refers to doctored Black Label beer?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, he was at Vlakplaas later and some of the askaris broke into the safe room and did not know that the beer had some of these things in there and two of them ended up at Weskoppies because the people did not know whether they were ill or whether they were crazy. I think that is where he gained that knowledge.

MR JOUBERT: With your reference to a bar episode at the Pretoria Hotel, where Mr McCaskill said that he arranged that yourself and other members - and I now have instructions that it was Lieut Adamson who was with you, that you were there in the same area in order to see what Mr Meyer looked like. Do you deny that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I deny that, it did not happen and I can assure you that if I was there I would have told you I was there.

MR JOUBERT: Were you familiar with the looks of Mr Meyer, did you know what he looked like, have you seen photos of him?

MR DE KOCK: I think there was a photo in the photo album, but that was not important, the man was on a point, they were centralised and he was a target and I shall shoot at a target and I shall kill the target.

MR JOUBERT: So you had no idea what Mr Meyer looked like?

MR DE KOCK: Not really. I may have - there may have been certain characteristics which one would be able to recognise, but today I might not be able to recognise them.

MR JOUBERT: With regard to the other party to which reference is made, it is indeed so that it was not a party which was set up by Mr McCaskill, this was not part of the plan, the first party he refers to. What he does tell me is that the ANC planned a party and that he gave this information through to you, upon which he was requested to find out where it would be and then consideration was made to launch the attack there.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have no recollection thereof. I know of the one party and that is the party that Mr McCaskill arranged for us with the ANC members, upon which he executed direct control, he arranged the party, he ensured that the ANC members were there and he ensured that we arrived there. That is how it worked.

MR JOUBERT: But can it be true about the other party, that there was such another party and that he gave that information and that you decided not to do anything?

MR DE KOCK: There may have been such a party but I did not know of it. I cannot say that there was no such party, but it was not a party that I had knowledge of.

MR JOUBERT: And some of your members, they may have received such information.

MR DE KOCK: I would have to ask them, Chairperson, I cannot dispute that.

MR JOUBERT: In your evidence you also said that Mr McCaskill said that documentation would be hidden in a portable TV.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he said that if documentation was hidden, it would be in the television set.

MR JOUBERT: Mr McCaskill will deny that he ever said that to you, but he will submit that the television as well as the radio were removed on that particular evening by yourself and other members.

MR DE KOCK: I know that I told Mr Vermeulen to bring the TV along so that we can open it and see what was inside, but no radio was taken, only the television set was taken.

MR JOUBERT: And this television set and the radio was the possessions of Mr McCaskill and it was given back to him a few days afterwards.

MR DE KOCK: The television was opened that same evening, we did not find anything there and we gave it back to him, but there was no radio.

MR JOUBERT: And then a final point, the braai which is referred to on page 60, paragraph 8 of Volume 2 of which you deny the existence, Mr McCaskill will say that this braai had taken place and that it was on premises of the Security Branch at Ladybrand.

MR DE KOCK: Would you repeat that please.

MR JOUBERT: Mr McCaskill will say that the braai which is referred to here had taken place and indeed at the premises of the Ladybrand Security Branch. Behind the premises there was an area.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if we braaied there then the chance would be that members of the public would see us going in there with him, because it was right in town itself and this could lead to his identification.

MR JOUBERT: But my instructions are that the area is entirely enclosed and one could not see inside from the outside.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is my opinion that his handler would not run that risk, I can assure you, because we had a high level source, someone who we would safeguard at all times. What I can say is that the Security Branch offices, the persons who worked in the tea-room and who were the cleaners were members of the public.

MR JOUBERT: I do not know whether I covered the detonators which were given to him for the handgrenades, Mr McCaskill says that the handgrenades were given to him but it was possibly done by Coetzee.

MR DE KOCK: That is possible, Chairperson.

MR JOUBERT: I have no further questions, thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JOUBERT

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson, I have a few.

Mr de Kock, you said that your motive in carrying out this attack was a prevention of terror.

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR BERGER: Do you recognise today the tragic irony in the fact that he used terror to prevent terror?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I shall define that. My own definition of counter-insurgency was that if I am a counter-insurgent, then I am on my side of the border and the moment I cross the border I become an insurgent. You are quite correct.

MR BERGER: I must tell you, I've been asked to tell you that my clients, the families of the people that you killed, have been sitting here day in and day out waiting for one of the applicants to apologise and they note that you are the first of the applicants to actually express some regret for what you've done. They do note that.

MR DE KOCK: I thank you.

MR BERGER: But I must also tell you that they want me to tell you that they don't forgive you and that if they had the chance they'd like to give you a big "klap".

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I understand that. If I was in their position, then I would choose to take the life of the man, so I have comprehension for that.

MR BERGER: You mentioned before lunch that there were some post-mortem reports that the Ladybrand Security Police had in connection with the deaths, is that right?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I have a vague recollection that they did receive the post-mortem reports.

MR BERGER: The post-mortem reports in respects of all the deceased, all 9?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, it's something that I heard, I did not see it myself.

MR BERGER: When was this that you became aware of these post-mortem reports?

MR DE KOCK: This was approximately somewhere in January, towards the end of January in '86.

MR BERGER: The reason I ask is because we have been trying to locate post-mortem reports, we've been unable to locate any post-mortem reports, particularly from Lesotho. We didn't know to look at the Ladybrand section of the Security Police, and we would ask that - if this matter is going to be adjourned as we've been warned that it might be, we would ask that the Amnesty Committee of the TRC take steps to try and locate these post-mortem reports, because if we try the chances of getting them are practically nil.

Mr de Kock, let's go back to the beginning. You ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, who can we contact for this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, today I would not know whom we can ask, I do not have the vaguest idea of who is now in control and what was destroyed between 1990 and 1994. I really do not know whom to refer you to. If we can determine who the second-in-command was, it was a Lieut Frik ... I shall get to his surname later, and he can probably give us a reference there, but now I cannot assist you.

CHAIRPERSON: This was at the Security Branch office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Who was the highest ranking black policeman there?

MR DE KOCK: There was the person by the name of W/O Jantjies.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't know whether he's still in the Force?

MR DE KOCK: I do not know, Chairperson. I've heard that he's still in the area but not whether he's still in the Force or not.

MR VISSER: He's not in the Police Force any longer, Chairperson, he's a client of ours, also an applicant for amnesty. If you need to contact him, I'm certain my attorney will facilitate that contact for you.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: By the looks of things we're going to have quite a time at our disposal to look for him in any case.

MR BERGER: Mr de Kock, your unit or members from your unit, from Vlakplaas, had relocated down to Ladybrand some time before you got your order from Mr Schoon, is that right?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, yes.

MR BERGER: How big was your unit that had relocated down? How many members?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was approximately between four or five of the white members and then I had a large section at that stage, because I also sent some of the black members that side. I cannot give you exact numbers but for the number of members that were there, they were a large number.

MR BERGER: Did that include Mr Nofomela?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Nofomela was there.

MR BERGER: And what was the purpose of your activity down there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, amongst others it was to place us there for identification of members of ANC or PAC at the border posts and then I deployed other members from Ladybrand in the direction of Thaba N'chu and then from Ladybrand in the direction of Ficksburg, so that they could work along the border.

MR BERGER: It wasn't one of your objectives to launch an attack on the ANC or PAC, in Lesotho?

MR DE KOCK: No, it was not.

MR BERGER: And during all that time had you met Mr McCaskill?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I only met him much later. Security branches will not disclose their sources to you just like that, you do however receive reports that these sources supply, because it is processed. One would not be able to determine from the report who the source is, in case such a report would fall in the wrong hands. So I only met him at a much later stage.

MR BERGER: The reports that you received, were they reports from sources or were they reports that had been drawn up by the Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: They were reports which came from the Security Branch and from their sources, but there was a centralisation as well, because for example, there was a field office in Ficksburg and another in Thaba N'chu and those reports would be centralised in Ladybrand and then Ladybrand would make copies of their documents and send it to Bloemfontein and then from the Bloemfontein region it would go through to Head Office. So it was a number of estuaries flowing into a bigger river.

MR BERGER: But my understanding is that you never actually read a report from a particular source.

MR DE KOCK: No, on the whole we read, or we received all the source reports.

MR BERGER: So you didn't know what information was coming through from Mr McCaskill, did you?

MR DE KOCK: Not initially.

MR BERGER: No. When was the first time that you actually met Mr McCaskill?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, unfortunately I cannot provide you with a date or a specific period in time ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Can you say how long before the attack it was?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it could possibly be three weeks to a month, but that is pure speculation.

MR BERGER: And what would have been the purpose for your meeting Mr McCaskill at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: As result of the attacks in the Western Cape and the identification of the Leon Meyer group, a concentration began on these active revolutionary units, or at least this active group, which had attracted so much attention to themselves.

MR BERGER: Besides the fact that you met Mr McCaskill, what information did you get about the so-called Meyer group?

MR DE KOCK: It was in the reports which were sent through by the handler and there were various aspects of information. I would have to speculate now, I cannot tell you verbatim what appeared in those reports, but it would have been about movements or things that Meyer said or things that he was planning or where he was the previous night and what he said or who had weapons and who did not have weapons. A source would be tasked by his handler for a specific objective, it wouldn't be of any value to task a source to work with Meyer but then he gives you information regarding trade unions. One would task a source in a certain direction.

MR BERGER: What information did you get, if any, about Morris Seabelo?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall, there would have been information, however I cannot return after all this time and tell you what was said or what the complete information was.

MR BERGER: You weren't told about a Seabelo Group?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: It was a Meyer group.

MR DE KOCK: The group was known as the Meyer group, as a result of the prominence of their actions.

MR BERGER: And because Leon Meyer, or Joe was perceived to be the leader of this group.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he was the operational leader so to speak, he was the person who got the terrorism done, he was successful in his acts of terror or his terrorist onslaught and this brought all the more attention to him.

MR BERGER: You didn't have information about who his superiors were?

MR DE KOCK: It could have been there, but I cannot recall it at present. What they did with the neighbouring States and the ANC and the PAC and the other organisations, was to have an organogram of who the head was and his functions and then they would break it down to the very lowest level. It could have been there and I would most probably have studied it, however i cannot repeat this for you today.

MR BERGER: Alright. So one December morning - you're not in Pretoria for a briefing, or you'd come up to Pretoria to brief someone, I take it, and that's when you bump into Willem Schoon.

MR DE KOCK: Well I didn't bump into him by accident, he was my Commander and I would go to him.

MR BERGER: So you went to report to him.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chair.

MR BERGER: Can you fix a date for that meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I have listened extensively here and I cannot give you a precise date. If one had known that one would be giving evidence here today I would have kept a journal, but unfortunately I cannot provide you with dates or times, unfortunately.

MR BERGER: You see because you'll recall, and you've been sitting here and you've been listening, do you recall that Situation Report, Special Situation Report that we've referred to so many times, the one that was prepared for the State Security Council meeting on the 20th, the one that's dated the 17th of December 1985?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I've heard of it.

MR BERGER: The Van Vuuren Report. Maybe if you want to just have a look at it. I'll refer you to it. It's in bundle 3, page 77. Thank you to Mr Visser. Now if you look at page 80, do you see there right at the top of the page - well if you go back to page 79, sorry, then you'll see under the heading "Toeligting", do you have that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do.

MR BERGER: Paragraph A. It says

"After what has been reported on an unconfirmed basis, the ANC plans to launch armed actions against the RSA during December 1985 and particularly over the festive season."

And then over the page, paragraph D, at the top:

"A usually reliable source during the first week of December 1985, saw an unknown number of AK47 guns and unidentified round metal objects (reputedly landmines) in the possession of a known ANC terrorist in Lesotho. The terrorist made it appear that he and three other cohorts would go to Kimberley and Bloemfontein to work there, before Xmas 1985."

Were you in possession of this information?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not in possession of this document but I could have read it in a security report of the Ladybrand branch.

MR BERGER: No, I'm not suggesting that you had this document, because then you would have sat on the State Security Council.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And then you probably wouldn't be sitting where you're sitting now.

MR DE KOCK: No, I would have had a very successful business in the Cape.

MR BERGER: But what I am asking you is whether you would have been privy to this information. In fact what I'm asking you is whether - you wouldn't have been the person to take this information up to Mr Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. If I could explain here, information of this nature would for example, go from the source to the handler, from the handler to Bloemfontein immediately, because they made us of telex machines at that stage but it was coded, and then from Bloemfontein directly to Pretoria. So I believe that it ended up here in Pretoria at the relevant person or persons. I would most probably have read the security report from the source.

MR BERGER: Do you know who this "betroubare bron" is that is being referred to here?

MR DE KOCK: No, the only person that I can think of is Mr McCaskill who is seated over there. There cannot be anybody else because if we have a look, at first they say it is unconfirmed, in other words another source reported it but it could not be confirmed. But now the good and reliable source who is close to these persons is asked to determine whether or not it is true and he returns and says "Yes, it is." And he then also hands over handgrenades.

MR BERGER: And so the "betroubare bron", in your view, must have been Mr McCaskill.

MR DE KOCK: It couldn't have been anybody else. It is upon his own admission as well.

MR BERGER: So couldn't it be that your meeting with Mr Schoon, was during the first week of December 1985?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, there was probably more than one visit paid by me to Mr Schoon, he was also a hands-on type of Commander and if he didn't like what he heard over the phone he would say "Don't speak any further, come and see me, I don't care where you are." So there were probably more visits by me.

MR BERGER: So were you up and down Pretoria/Ladybrand fairly often, particularly during that period November/December 1985.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot tell you specifically because I didn't keep any record, but I would accept that I went that way at least once a week, between Ladybrand and Pretoria, because my regular border that I worked on was Swaziland and here I had to change it to Lesotho.

MR BERGER: So it's quite possible that you were in Mr Schoon's office at the beginning of December 1985?

MR DE KOCK: It is entirely possible.

MR BERGER: Now in that meeting he says to you "Is it possible to launch an attack in Lesotho"? Doesn't he go further than that? What exactly does he ask you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not on the 3rd of December, because when he asked me for the document which I was to compile for him, regarding whether or not we had the capacity to attack or an assessment of our capacity at least. It was between three to five days before the attack. So I would say that it would be between the 15th and the 20th, in that vicinity.

MR BERGER: You see Mr de Kock, what I want to suggest to you is that what you think was three to five days was in fact approximately two weeks. Fourteen days, about fourteen days.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, due to a lack of documents I would not be able to dispute it but my recollection is based upon the fact that I had to make use of things such as rubber dinghies and things like that, which was due to a lack of time. If I had had three weeks to prepare, then I would have had proper operational vehicles. I base this upon that period of three to five days, which indicates that I really didn't have much time to prepare, we were under a lot of pressure.

MR BERGER: You see you say three to five days, if my memory serves me correctly I think Mr Schoon said seven to ten days and Mr Nortje in his statement says two weeks.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not going to dispute this with you, I can only tell you what I truly know. I do not wish to adjust it because then I would be dishonest, not only towards myself but towards you as well.

MR BERGER: And you know if you look at Mr McCaskill's statement, if you look at all the things that had to happen, what I'm suggesting to you and what I will suggest to Mr McCaskill, is that the things that he describes could not have happened within such a short period of three to five days.

MR DE KOCK: The preparation and the attack took place in that brief span of time if I look at the nature of our preparations and the nature of the attack as well. I would most probably have wanted more members to provide back-up, but due to the haste and the pressure to execute this operation, I had to abide by what I had at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, initially there was a report that there were a certain amount of ANC members in Lesotho, who were possibly preparing for an attack.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: At that stage the urgency which eventually emanated did not exist, did not exist at the beginning of December, but somewhere during the course of December information was received which intensified the entire operation and made it more urgent, before Xmas.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that the reason why at that stage the urgency had not yet set in but the planning indeed began somewhere at the beginning of December?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that could probably be so, but it didn't come from my side because someone else's urgency later became mine. That there was urgency in the SSC or the CIC, is a possibility.

CHAIRPERSON: But it is being put to you that the planning which includes you was initiated at the beginning of December already, is that possible?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not be able to confirm that for you, absolutely not, otherwise I run the risk of being dishonest.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you concede to the possibility, or do you exclude it?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because it - or at least it could be that.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chair.

MR DE KOCK: I don't have any facts with which to dispute it.

MR BERGER: You see Mr de Kock, to put it even into a wider perspective, we know that the Security Police had information towards the end of November, in fact I think the date was the 29th of November 1985, that the number of ANC soldiers in Lesotho was increased from, it's either 50 or 30, from 50 to 80 and that they were ready to attack South Africa. That was the information that was already coming through before the end of November 1985.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would not dispute it.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, I think he's made the concession, unless it's important to get him to admit it. I don't know if you need a fully-fledged admission rather than what he's prepared to concede.

MR BERGER: No, I'll continue.

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, Mr Berger has put to this witness a question on evidence which doesn't exist. I don't know whether he's aware of that. To which he got an answer. For example, he said that Brig Schoon's evidence was that it was a week, now eventually he conceded that it might have been, but his evidence was that it was one day. You see that in the record, page 831. Nortje never, that we know about, ever spoke of two weeks. Unless my learned friend knows ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: In Mr Berger's favour I must say he referred to the documentary evidence at this stage.

MR VISSER: Yes, but there Nortje doesn't talk about two weeks, he talks about 10 days.

MR BERGER: Perhaps if my learned friend has a look at page 63 of bundle 2 and in particular six sentences from the bottom of the page, where Mr Nortje says

"The operation in Lesotho was planned two weeks before it happened."

he might not take issue with me.

MR VISSER: I see, so that was extracted from all his evidence. Okay. I wanted to draw your attention to the fact, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I'm sorry, I don't understand how I misrepresented Mr Nortje's evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm in the same position, just carry on Mr Berger.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, may I just come in here as it involves my client. I just want to place it on record at this stage that there is an initial amnesty application of Mr Nortje, which you'll find in bundle 19 and 20, 19 and 20 of Volume 1, and there is a time, I think in the fourth paragraph "ongeveer tien dae". And then in his supplementary application he also speaks about "ongeveer tien dae". The supplementary portion is on page 37. The statement which appears in Volume 2, my instructions are that Mr Nortje cannot recall signing such a statement at any stage before, and we have asked the Evidence Leader perhaps to tell us where does this statement come from. It was something of a surprise to see this in the bundle. We don't know where this information comes from.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that where two weeks are mentioned?

MR LAMEY: ; I think my learned friend, Mr Berger, refers to the two weeks on Volume 2, page 63.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he confirms that. Be that as it may, if we're going to grapple about four days after fifteen or twenty years, is ten days and fourteen days going to make all that difference?

MR LAMEY: No, no, the point I want to make, in Mr Nortje's estimation he has approximately ten. I mean he will probably ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ... in certain circumstances could be fourteen also.

MR LAMEY: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It could also be six.

MR BERGER: Mr de Kock, why do you say that you had a perception and you still have a perception that the CIC was a body that had authority to order attacks?

CHAIRPERSON: I speak under correction Mr Berger, I don't think he said they had, they exercised such authority although they didn't have any legal authority to do so. That's how I understood his evidence. But I speak under correction.

MR BERGER: No, Chairperson, Mr de Kock perhaps will confirm what he said earlier, he said his perception was that the CIC had authority to authorise attacks.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it a general perception among the people on my rank level, Lieutenants, Captains and Majors, that when information came down from CIC, it would be dealt with or acted upon. In other words, it could be that somebody in the SSC made a decision, sent it through to CIC and then the next information that we received was that it came from the CIC, and based upon that perception I believed that they had executive authority.

MR BERGER: Who would have informed you that the authority came from CIC?

MR DE KOCK: Well in general the information was usually that it came from CIC and that we could act. In other words, the heads of the Intelligence Services had already clarified that they would not be prejudicing one another's interests in consequent operations, and if that information was sent through to me to take an operation further, as it happened with Swaziland as well, it came from Brig Schoon.

MR BERGER: Yes, but prior to this authority coming from Brig Schoon, you already had the perception that CIC had this authority.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, as I've stated that was my general perception, that once it had been cleared with CIC, then it was authorisation for an attack.

MR BERGER: Now from whom did you get this perception?

MR DE KOCK: It would be difficult to name a person as such, we on rank level discussed it among one another and for example, if I'm not mistaken the Swaziland attack, there was talk that there was CIC clearance for this. So on that level or basis, due to general custom or use of that idea perception, it became acceptable to us.

MR BERGER: And when you say "ons" you mean all the officers of your rank and higher?

MR DE KOCK: Schoon himself didn't know that there was executive authority, but my contemporaries all believed it.

MR BERGER: In the scheme of things you had the State Security Council right at the top, where did you place the CIC in relation to the State President and the State Security Council?

MR DE KOCK: I would say that the CIC fell below the SSC, but there were two channels to the State President, one was the SSC to the State President and then there was the CIC, via Dr Barnard to the State President. The National Intelligence Services had their fingers on the pulse both internally and externally. They were a de facto benign KGB in that regard.

MR BERGER: So if you talk about organograms, would you place the CIC slightly below the State Security Council and a bit to the side with a direct access to the State President as well?

MR DE KOCK: No, what I would say here is that they resorted directly below the SSC, but from the CIC there was another channel running through to the State President. Perhaps he didn't believe everybody on the SSC, so he needed to have another channel of information.

MR BERGER: And that wasn't a perception as you say, that you alone shared, that was a general perception.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Now you also said that it was your perception that everyone, from the State President to the Minister of Law and Order to the Commissioner of Police, through to Mr van der Merwe and Schoon, that they all knew about this attack before it happened. That was your perception.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I think my perception was that they would have known about it because it was an international attack, we would be referring to international terrorism. That they would have known about it subsequently is a definite possibility and that includes Dr Barnard.

CHAIRPERSON: I was under the impression that you testified that before the incident you were convinced that they knew about it.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, and that is also my belief and it is still my belief today.

CHAIRPERSON: But it doesn't sound correct if you say that they should at least have known about it subsequent to the incident, it doesn't sound right to me. Could you explain it please.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, or perhaps I have confused my own language use, that they knew before the attack that there would be an attack and that they knew subsequent who it was and that they definitely knew subsequent to the attack.

CHAIRPERSON: With all the attacks they knew who it was because they knew before the attacks who would be launching the attacks.

MR DE KOCK: But they knew beforehand that the Police would be launching it and subsequently they knew precisely who in the Police had done so, because they awarded medals.

MR BERGER: I'm more concerned with before the attack, your perception then when you got your order, was that everyone in the chain of command who I had mentioned, knew that you were about to launch an attack.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I apologise I did not ask him. If Mr Barnard knew, did Mr PW expect to be informed that this attack was imminent?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I would go as far as to say that the State President expected this attack.

CHAIRPERSON: This may be a strange question but I shall ask it. If Mr Barnard did not inform the State President beforehand, while he should have, and Mr PW Botha found out that Mr Barnard had indeed known before the attack what was to happen, what would he have done?

MR DE KOCK: He would have regarded it as negligence and he would have fired him right there probably, because we now refer to something that might have international repercussions. We went and attacked a land and shot people.

CHAIRPERSON: So if Mr Barnard knew, there was very little chance that he would admit it to PW afterwards if he did not tell him beforehand.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he would not have admitted to it, he would most probably have denied it and said no-one told him.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, in your amnesty application at page 3, you say at the bottom of the page:

"I asked Brig Schoon who gave this instruction and he indicated that it came right from the top. I asked whether this meant that the State President had granted permission and Brig Schoon nodded in the affirmative."

Now you've related this version several times, you say it here in your amnesty application, you said the same thing at your criminal trial and you say the same thing in your book, but now I see that you wavering a bit and you're saying maybe you were confused. But now I'm confused because are you saying that you could have confused this incident with Khotso House or are you saying that you in fact did ask Mr Schoon this question at the time of this order and that he may have not understood you and that his nod might have been in response to something that you hadn't asked him? That there was confusion between you and him, or are you saying that you've confused two incidents?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I conceded that most probably what I asked, or what he said or what he heard could have been different, because I would like to mention here right at the top meant to us that this came from the State President. The following person right at the top is Jesus Christ. I mean that is not where PW Botha was, he was right at the top, he was not the following person. And why I asked this question was because I as the leader of the Police unit went to execute a military function. One could not only look at the tactical aspect but one had to look at the strategic aspect, which included the political aspect because I had persons who had to follow me, probably against their will and what would happen to us if we are caught there, who will assist us?

CHAIRPERSON: May I ask this question directly, did you or did you not ask Schoon whether the instruction came from the top? Did you ask him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, I asked him.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this during the discussion here?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I asked him, it is still in my memory.

CHAIRPERSON: And what was his reaction?

MR DE KOCK: He nodded his head.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it possible that right at the top meant anybody else other than PW Botha?

MR DE KOCK: That is possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Why do you say that?

MR DE KOCK: That I then understood it incorrectly, I spoke of right at the top, I thought of the President and Brig Schoon thought the Commissioner or the Head of Security. That is the only explanation that I can give.

CHAIRPERSON: But if this was an attack outside the borders of the country according to those rules, only the State President could grant permission.

MR DE KOCK: That is so, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So the possibility is that it was indeed PW, or it is the probability.

MR DE KOCK: I up till the time when Brig Schoon said he did not mean the State President, I believed that PW knew, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Now the Police themselves were not authorised to do this in any case, but foreign attacks were the area of the military, as I understood the evidence.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But nevertheless you say that PW was the person on the probabilities, who granted permission if Schoon was speaking the truth.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, that is why I said that I leave myself open, that what I said there and what he understood there I know it could be different.

CHAIRPERSON: But any foreign attack could not have come from the Commissioner, but from PW.

MR DE KOCK: It could only have come from him because otherwise he did not have any control of the country.

CHAIRPERSON: And what I put to you, I say this knowing that the rules then, it was only the Army who could attack outside, but any attack, whether it be the Army or the Police, had to come from PW. Is that what you are saying?

MR DE KOCK: That is so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, I'm still not clear. At page 126 of your book you say the following, you say - the book, Chairperson, is a Long Night's Damage. Chairperson, just for the record, the book is a Long Night's Damage, sub-titled: Working for the Apartheid State as told to Jeremy Gordon, by Mr de Kock, published by Contra Press 1998.

Mr de Kock, at page 126, in the middle of the page you say:

"One December morning, Brig Willem Schoon asked me if my unit could launch an attack in Lesotho. I said it was possible and he asked for a written submission. I asked Schoon who had requested it. He said it had come from "the top" ("heel bo"). I asked him if this meant that the State President was involved. Schoon nodded."

Now if you compare that with what you say in your amnesty application at page 3 of bundle 1, it's almost identical.

MR DE KOCK: This book is based on my amnesty application, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So what you say here ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: According to your book there is no doubt who was at the top.

MR DE KOCK: No, and up to the time that I listened to Brig Schoon I was convinced that PW Botha was involved in this.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But not only that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: According to your book you directly asked Schoon.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, because I wanted to know ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, I know why you asked, but here in your application it is not so clear that you directly asked him who was it right at the top. Do you understand?

MR DE KOCK: I understand, Chairperson.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I'm a little confused, Mr de Kock. In your amnesty application you directly ask Mr Schoon if by "heel bo" that meant the State President. You yourself uttered the word State President, and that's when he nodded.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: This is how I understand your evidence, which is slightly different from what you've just conceded to when the Chair put it to you. There could have been no misunderstanding from your side because you are the one who put the question to Mr Schoon, if "heel bo" meant the State President, and that's what he nodded to.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Then why do you doubt now?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, because I leave myself open, that I may have been mistaken, although today I still believe that the President did know.

CHAIRPERSON: But how could you have been mistaken? You then asked, you said it came from right at the top, who was right at the top, was it the State President, and he nodded. In the book it is more-or-less the same. And your evidence says that there is room that you were possibly mistaken.

MR DE KOCK: I allow that room there, Chairperson.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Why do you allow that room, Mr de Kock? I cannot see on what basis you can allow that room, because you see in your amnesty application and I haven't read your book, there is no room for that kind of misunderstanding to have occurred. If one follows the logic that you have put in your amnesty application, why you really believed that the instruction came from the State President, that you are the one who asked whether "heel bo" meant the State President and that's what Mr Schoon nodded to.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, that is how it is and today I still say that I still believe it today, but I shall leave some room that I may have been mistaken then.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: How can you be mistaken?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I sit here and I hear that CIC did not have any executive authorities.

CHAIRPERSON: But that does not touch upon the fact that you did indeed ask Schoon.

MR DE KOCK: No, it does not touch on that.

CHAIRPERSON: And he said that - he indicated that it was the State President, and you believed him.

MR DE KOCK: Yes. And as I have told you, today I still have a recollection thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: Those are the facts.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, may I interpose here, I did not want to correct Mr Berger when he made the statement to Mr de Kock that thrice he's said the said thing. I did indicate this in his evidence-in-chief, that he did not state the same during his criminal trial as that what he said in application and in his book, and during his evidence at his criminal trial he did not expressly say that he asked who it came from and that it was told to him that it came from right at the top. According to his evidence in his criminal trial, he based this on an inference, and there is a difference between what he testified at his criminal trial and what he testified here.

And then also for the Commission's information, and we have done this previously, we have led evidence before various Committees that this book "as told to Jeremy Gordon, it is not as it was told to Mr Jeremy Gordon. He took Mr de Kock's amnesty application and directly translated it upon the understanding that before the book would be published, that Mr de Kock would be granted an opportunity to check the correctness thereof and that the person omitted to do this, he just translated it. So the book is Mr Gordon's translation of Mr de Kock's application.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I'm indebted to my learned friend. I haven't sat in on all the amnesty applications but there's a note at the beginning of the book, on page 4, which says "This book is Eugene de Kock's, as told by him to Jeremy Gordon."

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is not true, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: In the circumstances, Mr Berger, that is in dispute, the author of that book is not present and I hope he isn't called to give evidence. If you want to refer to certain passages in the book, will you please clear it with Mr de Kock first, as to whether in fact that is what he said and the veracity thereof.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, may I just add that at the time when this book was written, Mr de Kock was in prison and Mr Gordon didn't have access to him to the extent that he was able to obtain the version from Mr de Kock personally. We didn't even have such access to him.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: In this case you don't have a problem, Mr Berger, because you can seek reliance on his amnesty application.

MR BERGER: Absolutely, I accept what is being said, it's unfortunate that things get published which are not strictly speaking correct.

MR DE KOCK: May I just say something here. Mr Gordon upon four or five occasions used some of my visiting hours to clear up certain aspects, but this was more about the Inkatha aspects and the firearms and so forth. So during that short time to handle the whole book was humanly impossible. So Mr Gordon was there, yes, he tried to clear up what he could, but we could not go through every line written in the book. I just wanted to tell you that.

CHAIRPERSON: Whatever the situation may be, I think Mr Berger understands the problem and if he wants to research the book or refer you to the book, he will clear up what he wants to put to you first.

MR BERGER: I confirm that, Mr de Kock. And I must apologise because I was incorrect when I said that you mentioned it at your criminal trial, I was looking now for the reference and I can't even find the inference, never mind the reference.

MR DE KOCK: This is just fair towards Mr Gordon that I do this, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: But Mr de Kock, let's go to the source and the source apparently is your amnesty application, page 3, bundle 1. You write there

"I asked Brig Schoon who gave this instruction and Brig Schoon indicated to me that it came from the top."

Then you say - you didn't rely on an assumption or an inference, you say:

"I asked him whether this meant that the State President ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, this is one incident you could be on top and inside.

MR BERGER: Mr de Kock, you go on and you say

"I asked of him whether this meant that the State President gave permission and then Brig Schoon nodded affirmatively."

There's no room for inference and there's no room for assumption, he says - you ask him first who gave the order, he says "heel bo". You say "Do you mean the State President?" He says "Mm". He nods. Now this, as you correctly say, this was an incident which was bound to have huge international repercussions.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Not so with Khotso House, Khotso House was a building in the CBD of Johannesburg, which could have been blown up by anyone. What I'm suggesting to you, what I'm putting to you is that this was an incident with such possible ramifications that you could not have confused the discussion preceding this attack with the discussion preceding Khotso House. Would I be correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is entirely correct, Chairperson, however I cannot testify to the state of mind of Brig Schoon there and that is why I leave room for that possibility. As I have told you there may be some confusion there. I do not know whether he even listens to me properly. I'm not trying to defend him here, that is the last person that I would want to defend, I can assure you of that.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: May I interpose, Mr Berger?

CHAIRPERSON: Well then why are we leaving this "ruimte"? You asked him, it was a simple question, an important question, it was a question in preparation of something that would be major and he says "Yes, it is the State President." I cannot think that someone would misunderstand that.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And there is no question of room for misunderstanding.

MR DE KOCK: I shall concede that, Chairperson.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And further Mr de Kock, how can a person who's giving you an important instruction such as this one, have been absentminded? Is it conceivable?

MR DE KOCK: Very well, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: When you asked him this question about who gave the instruction, you were looking at him and he was looking at you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And when he said it comes from "heel bo" and you then say "Do you mean the State President?" and he nods, you were looking at him and he was looking at you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And that is still your memory today.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Now in this request to draw up a report, were you told that the so-called Meyer group was the target?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the Meyer group's situation was at that stage, one could say common talk, not only at Ladybrand but also at Head Office, as a group who was successful and who were once again on their way to committing acts of terror.

MR BERGER: You see Mr de Kock, surely it must have been so that targets were identified, because otherwise isn't it a bit meaningless to say to you "Would it be possible for you to launch an attack in Lesotho"? I mean you could launch an attack on a sub-station somewhere along the border and that would be an attack. Surely you had to have more details than that.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the Meyer group, as I have said in the security reports they were a prominent factor at that stage.

MR BERGER: So was it Mr Schoon's request, or am I off target here, was it his request "Can you launch an attack to wipe out the Meyer group in Lesotho? Was that his request or was it something different?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I recall correctly it was to wipe out this group who wanted to enter the country for purposes of terror over the Xmas period. And that was the Meyer group, there was no other group who at that stage during the festive period, wanted to infiltrate, of whom there was any information. The information was the Meyer group, infiltration, festive season, and wipe them out.

MR BERGER: And he asked you to go and draw up a report as to whether this was feasible or not.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it was a logistical and a possibility report.

MR BERGER: So there were two parts to the report. First of all, is it possible to go and take out this group and secondly, if so, what will you need in order to do the job?

MR DE KOCK: Well do I have enough equipment logistically, yes.

MR BERGER: And you had to put this in writing.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Why?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was his request. I do believe that it was not a very long report, most probably it would have been to jog Gen van der Merwe's memory at whatever meeting they were or wherever they had to submit it.

MR BERGER: Well it was supposed to be a report that was going to be typed up.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR BERGER: So I assume then - and that was Mr Schoon’s request, am I correct?

MR DE KOCK: That I write out the report?

MR BERGER: Yes.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR BERGER: And that you get it typed.

MR DE KOCK: Well that it was typed, or that it would be typed, that was general practice, one would not have to tell someone.

MR BERGER: Make sure you get it typed.

MR DE KOCK: That was general, one does not hand up a written report.

MR BERGER: So when Mr Schoon asked you for a report, you understood it he wanted the typed report on whether it was possible and whether you had the necessary equipment to carry out the attack.

MR DE KOCK: He asked me to write a report that I would have had typed if I had the time, but after I wrote it out and took it to him, at that time he took the report from me, so it was not typed.

MR BERGER: Your understanding was that it was a report that was going to be submitted to a Committee.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is so.

MR BERGER: And how long did it take you to draw up that report?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not long, one has this knowledge with one, not written but one knows what your manpower facilities are and what the capabilities of your manpower are and then one has a look at the firearms one has and one knows what your capabilities are.

MR BERGER: So how long did it take you to draw up the report?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as long as it took me to write it out, I cannot tell you. I went to my office and I do not think that it took me longer than half an hour.

MR BERGER: Now let me refer you to the evidence you gave at your criminal trial. You said, page 78 of bundle 2, line 11. You say

"Very well.

Well this is Mr Hattingh saying:

"Very well, continue. You say Brig Schoon then asked you ..."

and then your answer:

"He asked whether we had a capacity and whether I could work out an operation just briefly, which would indicate whether we had the capacity and whether we would be successful. Thereupon an operation was placed on paper, it was written, and I wanted to take the report to him for his approval before it was to be typed, because they had to look at spelling errors and syntax."

So far you confirm that, even today?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR BERGER: And then you go and you say

"And he then met me in the corridor while he was on his way along with van der Merwe, to a meeting at CIC. This was the Co-ordinating Intelligence Committee."

Do you confirm that?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Why was it your understanding that they were on their way to a CIC meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, my recollection thereof is that Gen van der Merwe was in the corridor of Head Office, on the way from his office, he was in the corridor and Brig Schoon was also there and I had the report there written in red and he took it from me and gave it to Gen van der Merwe, and from there they left. But they were in a hurry or like someone who was late for an appointment.

MR BERGER: Alright, I can understand that you thought that Mr van der Merwe was on his way to some meeting, to some appointment, but why do you say that it was a CIC meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was the only other body of which I knew to which this report could be on its way. And I say this speculatively, but most probably I received it from Brig Schoon. But I will not drag him in here as a life-belt, but I must have got this idea.

MR BERGER: At the time?

MR DE KOCK: At that time, yes.

MR BERGER: Because when you gave this evidence, correct me if I'm wrong, but when you gave this evidence in your criminal trial, Brig Schoon had not yet applied for amnesty, nor had Mr van der Merwe, am I correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, they did not.

CHAIRPERSON: When was that trial, Mr Berger?

MR BERGER: Mr Hattingh will be able to help.

MR HATTINGH: It commenced February '95 and it was concluded towards the end of 1996, Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: Let me ask you this, Mr de Kock, when you gave this evidence in your criminal trial, had you had any consultation or discussion with either Mr Schoon or Mr van der Merwe?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, everyone, all the contemporaries and more senior officers and Ministers avoided me like the plague and all those below me, with the exception of three to four members from Vlakplaas, were State witnesses, therefore I had nobody to speak to.

MR BERGER: When you gave your evidence at your criminal trial, your impression was that they were on their way to a CIC meeting.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And is that still your impression today?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: How long did it take before someone came back to you to say "Permission granted"?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it wasn't long, it was about two to three hours in my opinion, because Brig Schoon telephoned my office there because I was waiting for him there, I couldn't wait in his office, I waited in my office, and he told me to come down to his office.

MR BERGER: Alright, he said "Come down to my office", and then, in his office?

MR DE KOCK: He then gave me the report and told me that it had been approved and to continue.

MR BERGER: And what was your understanding?

MR DE KOCK: To continue with the attack and to eliminate the persons.

MR BERGER: And who had approved of this mission?

MR DE KOCK: According to me it was the CIC, and nobody else other than the CIC.

MR BERGER: Your evidence earlier today was, you said

"I had no doubt that my report was discussed at a CIC meeting."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR BERGER: You see that's why I want to put it to you that you got the instruction on the 3rd of December, because we know now that there were no further CIC meetings after the 3rd of December 1985, until 1986.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not be able to give evidence about that because I only was permitted to a certain level and no further than that. Unfortunately I cannot assist you.

MR BERGER: Now from Pretoria, did you then go back to Ladybrand?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. As I have testified earlier I wanted to see whether or not I could obtain rubber boats here. From there I went to the farm where I went to load the weapons and then I returned to Ladybrand.

MR BERGER: I just want to understand, Mr de Kock, where you differ with Mr McCaskill. Are you saying that there was no plan to lure Leon Meyer out to a site and to shoot him?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I can only qualify, not where I was involved, but I would have known because my members would have informed me. But there was no such thing as luring him out to a certain place and shooting him there, we could have shot him that evening in his car or when he was exiting his garden gate.

MR BERGER: And are you saying that there was not a plan to kill the Meyer group, members of the Meyer group at that first party, the party that had not been arranged by Mr McCaskill?

MR DE KOCK: I am not aware of that party, Chairperson, I know about the party that we arranged via Mr McCaskill, which would serve as a centralisation of this Meyer group.

MR BERGER: When you got your orders to proceed with the operation, do I understand the position correctly when I say that the evidence was that the Meyer group was about to enter South Africa before Xmas, to kill people and that your instruction was to locate the Meyer group and to kill them before they had the opportunity to come into South Africa and cause death?

MR DE KOCK: That is how I understood my orders, that's what they meant by a pre-emptive strike.

MR BERGER: Now how many members were part of the Meyer group, according to the information that you had at your disposal?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we relied upon the source who was Mr McCaskill, that this group consisted of 9 to 11 to 12 persons.

MR BERGER: And that's the information you got from Mr McCaskill.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was the reliable source, he was the person who conveyed this information.

MR BERGER: How did you know that he was such a good source? How did you know that he could be relied upon to deliver only those people who were about to enter South Africa to cause death?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he made it clear to us that he was personal friends with these persons, as in good friends. And secondly, he offered proof by means of the photographs of the grenades which I viewed and the grenades that he also brought, and with this he confirmed that he had access to the weaponry of this group and I knew that the ANC was hypersensitive and paranoid regarding where they concealed their weapons, so only somebody with an inherently intimate friendship with these persons would know the location of these items.

MR BERGER: But how did you know that what he was bringing you was ANC arms and ammunition?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we relied on his word ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: That's my point. What had he done in the past that qualified him as such an outstanding source?

MR DE KOCK: Well I relied upon the word of his handler at the Security Branch in Ladybrand, but we must also realise that ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: And who was that? Sorry.

MR DE KOCK: I would accept that the person who was his handler was Willie Coetzee. You must understand that with the handling of a source there was never only one source per Security Branch, that very same handler most probably had six to eight other sources as well and what he reported would be compared with what they said and it would be evaluated and clarified, then further questions would be put to him and he would be asked, for example, didn't it happen at such and such a time or at such and such a place, and it would never be said that another source had reported. It would be clarified with him in order to establish his credibility and to examine the quality of his information. Sometimes one would find a source working with a source and they wouldn't even be aware of each other. I can give you a personal example where I recruited a married couple and neither one of the two of them knew that they were working for me.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, I was going to ask you this after everybody had cross-examined you, but while Mr Berger's raised this issue I might as well. What has always intrigued me about the members of the Security Force of then days, is their reliance, convenient reliance on information where results such as these would eventuate. Was there a system whereby you could cross-check the information, especially as to identity of people they point out as being members of the military wing of the ANC? Given the fact that they were paid per head for killing, did you not consider that they are likely, to increase their remuneration include people who may not be such people?

MR DE KOCK: I don't believe that one could ever exclude that possibility, the possibility that a source would have his own agenda as well. There would be persons who would sell others out for money and would put themselves in that direction. I would not exclude the possibility of that, because in the first place he was a traitor so he might as well "go the whole hog."

CHAIRPERSON: Precisely. And I was wondering how you people before you people killed anybody, verify that you were going to kill the proper person.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as I told Mr Berger, this Mr Coetzee for example, would recruit Mr McCaskill as a source but he also handled other sources who were not known to Mr McCaskill and the information that they brought in would be evaluated and cancelled out or compared at least, with what he had sent through and then Tom, Dick and Harry who were also handling sources would also be collecting information and this would once again be correlated and it would be established whether or not Mr McCaskill's information was correct or not. And the Security Branch went to great lengths with this, they had a file on every person. I cannot speak on behalf of the other Intelligence Services, but the Security Branch went to great trouble with this.

CHAIRPERSON: You see in this case you tell him to organise a party of ANC members, you then took his family out.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Of the people you killed, were you able to verify before you went in there that these are the people who are members of the ANC, or in particular, those who were earmarked to come into South Africa to commit all these crimes during Xmas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by the time that we launched the attack we had the source telling us that members of his family were still at the house, this was within an hour to an hour and a half of launching the attack. That he would first have to take them away and leave only the ANC members there. We would rely on that and then he would tell us "Here are the ANC members, here is the Meyer group", and we would attack them. That there may possibly have been another consideration in his mind is not improbable.

CHAIRPERSON: Well that kind of consideration as far as money is concerned, should have been foreseeable on your part as well.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, the information that we already possessed that he had already conveyed to us, indicated that he was friends with the Meyer group, that he knew the Meyer group and that the members who would be there would be the members of the ANC. That is why he first removed his family from the premises or anybody else who wasn't supposed to be there, and then offered us the rest as a package.

CHAIRPERSON: But given the character as you put it, of people who turned traitor, it is not out of the question that they would increase the number of deaths merely to fill their own pockets.

MR DE KOCK: Well I cannot exclude that possibility.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Berger.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: ... Mr Berger on that one.

My problem with this aspect of your evidence, Mr de Kock, is that according to Mr McCaskill your request was that he must bring in as many ANC members as possible to that party, your request was not limited to the Meyer group.

MR DE KOCK: Well the Meyer group consisted of ANC members, so it this group consisted of 12 members, then I would have wanted to prevent these 12 persons from committing further acts of terrorism. If we had to do so by elimination, we would do that.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But his evidence is that you requested him to bring in as many ANC members, not specifically as many as members belonging to the Meyer group as possible.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, McCaskill specialist field was the Meyer group, precisely because he was such a close friend of the family and these persons. There were no other indications that he was friends with any of the other 80 persons in Lesotho. This is what McCaskill came in with and McCaskill was the axis around which all of this was constructed. And it was about the Meyer group, it wasn't about you know, "Invite 30 persons or more for us."

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: What you are saying is that Mr McCaskill knew all along that the group that you were interested in was only the Meyer group and when your request included as many ANC member as possible, that was only confined to the Meyer group.

MR DE KOCK: That was about the Meyer group, yes.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you, Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Judge.

So Mr de Kock, when you say in your evidence, in fact you were asked by the Committee, earlier you were asked:

"What about party-goers who were not targets?"

And your answer was:

"The party was only for ANC members."

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR BERGER: When you say that, do you mean to say that the party was only for ANC members who were members of the Meyer group?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, because those were the people that McCaskill worked with, those are the people that he knew. Those were the persons that he had meals with, those were the people whom he visited at their homes. There were no other sources who liaised on such a narrow, close or intimate level with the Meyer group. At least no other sources that were known to the branch.

MR BERGER: The bottom line is you just relied on Mr McCaskill, you did no independent cross-checking to make sure that his information was accurate.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, not from my side, I would have expected it from the Security Branch, they had additional sources. During those last few days I had only McCaskill on a permanent basis, it would have been difficult for me to recruit another person who liaised on such an intimate level with the Meyer group.

MR BERGER: You never kept the Meyer group or anyone from the Meyer group, under surveillance, or you never sent anyone to keep them under surveillance?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that would have been basically impossible, one would need 80 or 90 people for something like that, along with vehicles. And regarding the circumstances in Lesotho in political and military terms at that time, it would have been a risk as a white person, to be there.

MR BERGER: Didn't Mr McCaskill tell you that he had been requested by Mr Meyer to transport him and other MK soldiers into South Africa, on the Saturday?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have no recollection of that.

MR BERGER: You see the difficulty I have is, and maybe the answer lies in your instructions, but if the information was that - and the information came from Mr McCaskill, that this group was about to enter South Africa to commit acts of violence and Mr McCaskill knew about it, surely he would have known when they were going to come into South Africa, how they were going to come into South Africa, and they could have been arrested as they entered South Africa. Is the answer that this wasn't done because this wasn't your instruction, or is it this wasn't possible?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know about the fact that he was supposed to transport them, the information was that these persons were going to be infiltrating, but as far as I know there wasn't a report in which McCaskill stated that he would be transporting them to South Africa. I don't have any recollection of that.

MR BERGER: No, but you see Mr de Kock, your evidence is that Mr McCaskill was so reliable because the ANC was so hypersensitive about its arms caches and its plans, that they were not going to reveal this to anyone and so therefore McCaskill must have been right in there, right amongst them. If he knew all of that and if he was so intimate with this group, surely a simple question would have been "When do they plan to enter, how do they plan to enter and where do they plan to enter"?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, my order was to attack and eliminate the people in Lesotho and that's what I did.

MR BERGER: That is why I put those two possibilities to you. So it's not that this couldn't have been done, your answer is it wasn't done because your order was to kill them.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the order was for them to be eliminated.

CHAIRPERSON: If there was an alternative, why didn't you take it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at that stage this operation was of such a nature, of urgency and pressure and the notice was so brief, that there was going to be terrorism over Xmas and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, why didn't you ask McCaskill at which point they would be entering the country and what time and then wait for them?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am not here, and I don't mean to be sarcastic, but these things sometimes only work in Hollywood. In the practical side of insurgency and counter-insurgency, it didn't work that way and as an operative who had experienced and survived many such incidents, I knew this very well. The information was that Mr McCaskill could deliver these persons and he did.

CHAIRPERSON: I will remind you of something that you said earlier in your evidence during another application of yours. The first time when you were asked to contribute to the explosion of Khotso House, there were persons who was held there ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: That was Cosatu House.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I beg your pardon, Cosatu House.

CHAIRPERSON: And then you asked Schoon, I think, from whence the order came.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And it was during that incident that you thought it was PW Botha. I cannot recall the information correctly.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I asked him directly and he told me that it came from the State President.

CHAIRPERSON: And you refused because there were innocent people in that building at the time when you were asked to bomb it.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you told Schoon to tell the State President that he could bomb the place himself, isn't that so?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the State President exercised pressure for it to be done before a certain date, which was an electoral date if I'm not mistaken.

CHAIRPERSON: But later you executed it because you were satisfied that those innocent persons would have been removed from the building. If I recall your evidence correctly.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Now in this case you state that you received an order to enter and kill, the question to you is why you didn't use the alternative. You were in a position and you had previously told Schoon to tell the President to do it himself, why didn't you take similar action with regard to this matter and wait for them to enter the country?

MR DE KOCK: The question about Cosatu House is that it was a static building ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: Chairperson, the speaker is unclear, the Interpreter cannot hear the speaker. There appears to be a problem with the microphone, the Interpreter cannot hear the speaker.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, there is something wrong with your microphone, the Interpreter cannot hear.

MR DE KOCK: In the case of Cosatu House it was a static building, the building couldn't go away and I needed more time and I could have more time, but in this case there was a group who at that time was urgently planning an act of terror and I had a situation that is somebody decided to do something six hours earlier, then we would lead the initiative ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, may I also just draw your attention to the fact that the attack on Cosatu House took place in 1987, some two years later than the Lesotho raid.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Before you proceed, Mr Berger.

Mr de Kock, did you believe at that time that you had any authority to amend a direct order from Brig Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: ...(indistinct)

INTERPRETER: Chairperson, there appears to be a problem with the microphone once again, the speaker's too soft.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: There's something wrong with your microphone.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, I don't know if that's divine intervention, when you get a convenient stage.

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

ON RESUMPTION

MR BERGER: Mr de Kock, I'll wrap up this ...(intervention)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Berger, before you proceed can we just give him an opportunity to respond to my question.

Do you want me to repeat my question, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: No, as I have understood it, I could change Brig Schoon's order - no, not at that stage. On ground level operationally speaking, I could make my own decisions but the order to attack that facility was urgent.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. When you say that you could change the order at a ground level, are you talking about the manner in which the order has to be executed, as opposed to the order itself?

MR DE KOCK: Well the order was to eliminate the group, but at the scene itself and as one moved around at the scene and made further observations, one's situation could change from moment to moment and one would have to make changes consequently. That was the nature of operations. It was unconventional and one needed unconventional thinkers to participate in such actions. One can see this when I told the Lieutenant "If you can get Meyer out, do so, but don't break your back." In that case I would make use of my initiative as a leader of an unconventional elimination team, to put it that way, in order to be able to bring about changes on ground level.

If one couldn't make changes on ground level and followed a heard mentality, one would never be able to conduct such operations successfully. But when it came to the order to eliminate the group, it was expressed, they had to be struck and killed, they would not cross the border from Lesotho to South Africa.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Judge.

Mr de Kock, nothing had changed in respect of the operation, which caused you to amend the order, which gave you cause, I should say, to amend the order to kill the entire Meyer group, am I wrong? What had changed which allowed you to amend the order from one to kill everyone, to one that allowed you to abduct the person who you perceived to be the leader? Nothing had changed.

MR DE KOCK: No, not really because ultimately he was shot dead along with all the other persons who were there. Or perhaps I've misunderstood you.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me attempt to facilitate this. Your order which you respected completely, was to eliminate the Meyer group.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: During an attack in Lesotho. This was issued on a basis of urgency.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: At a certain point after you had commenced with the elimination of these persons, did you deem it advisable that it would be better not to kill Meyer at that time but to take him out that you could possibly collect further information and then kill him? It is put to you that if you were that respectful towards your order to kill the person, how did it occur that you considered taking the man out of the country?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, while I was moving on that terrain and I knew that we were going to hit the Meyer group ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I beg your pardon. Mr Berger, was that correct?

MR DE KOCK: ... and we were to eliminate them, 80 ANC members would remain, but for me as the Operational Commander on ground level, it would have been incompetent not to think about that and after this group was eliminated, who of those 80 would be the next to infiltrate? These were ideas which flashed through one's mind. It is not a question of us having an hour long discussion about it. At the scene of the incident, when I told Coetser and Adamson "Go with McCaskill", I told Adamson "If you can, it would be advisable, but if not, shoot." That is a decision that I took at the spur of the moment at the scene ...(intervention)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr de Kock, may I just interrupt you. I did not understand your earlier evidence to have meant that you intended to abduct Mr Meyer, in order to cross the border into the Republic of South Africa, I thought you requested Mr Adamson to take him alive, as it were, in order for you to interrogate him with a view of obtaining more information about his membership, I mean about the number of people who belonged to his group and that after you had obtained that information, you would have killed him.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, what I said was, if it was possible, if the possibility arises to abduct this man, but don't go to great lengths. And this did not negate the fact that Adamson now suddenly had to change his planning. Adamson also went to kill the person, "But let us say a bonus situation arose and we can take him along, then do it, but as I've said, don't break your back doing it, we are here to kill them first and foremost." And that is how I testified earlier.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So was it your intention to abduct him and take him with you to the Republic of South Africa?

MR DE KOCK: If we could, Chairperson, if that possibility or occasion arose, then Lieut Adamson, I left that door open for him to use his own initiative. If he did not want to bring him he could have shot him, but he was not sent to abduct him, he was sent to kill him. But if a bonus situation arose that we could abduct him, then we would have.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And that would have meant that you had amended quite materially, the order that you had received from Brig Schoon, which order was specific "Eliminate the Meyer group"

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we can play with words here, but during that time the Meyer group as they were known, ceased to exist, because they had already been shot by then. And with regard to Meyer himself, there was no issue that later he would appear again and point out persons who abducted him.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you agree with me that it would also have been a bonus, to avoid the international consequences thereafter, and in doing so, killing the persons in South Africa?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, we can speculate about that, maybe the whole bonus would have been if the attack did not take place at all.

CHAIRPERSON: But you received an instruction to execute and I would just like to find out, it sounds as if you had the right to an extent, or you thought you had the right to somewhat change certain directives if you thought it necessary.

MR DE KOCK: On ground level while I was busy, yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now what stopped you on the 20th of December, we have information that these people would come in tomorrow to do what you thought that they were going to do, why could you not postpone your instructions for one day and wait for these people to come into the country across the border, arrest them, whatever the case may be, ultimately execute your directive and kill them?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, today in hindsight we can say this could have happened or that could have happened, but we are sitting here with an element, a military trained element, who themselves were unconventional soldiers and who were not static targets and one goes on the information that one has then. Anything could develop afterwards, but in this regard it was "Wipe out the target", and that is what we did.

CHAIRPERSON: May I then ask you, I do not know whether you are able to answer, in English they call it a thrill ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Can you repeat that please.

CHAIRPERSON: They call it a thrill in English. As unconventional soldiers, was it not better to go out and shoot people? From the soldier's perspective.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, in my unit and I ensured that there were no persons in my unit who received any physical or mental gratification for themselves because of this incident, because now one would have an ill and unstable person and I did not allow such persons in my unit, definitely not, because we could have destroyed the whole Maseru that night then, which would appear to me would not be that difficult.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr de Kock, may I just ensure that I understand you correctly. If it was not that Mr Meyer went to another house, then you would not have said "Possibly abduct him", did I understand you correctly?

The idea that Meyer could possibly be abducted only developed in your mind when you deployed Mr Adamson to the other house.

MR DE KOCK: If he was in the house with the others he would have been killed right there.

ADV BOSMAN: I just wanted to ascertain whether I understood you correctly there.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was only after we divided, in other words persons had left from the target house. And at the scene, because the two vehicles moved together and at the scene we divided and then McCaskill went with him to point out the house.

ADV BOSMAN: Are you saying it was just division which planted this idea in your mind?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because the house was the central point.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, I understand.

MR DE KOCK: And then we would have wiped them all out there.

ADV BOSMAN: I understand.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, perhaps we should take the adjournment now.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn to half past nine tomorrow.

MR BERGER: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, may I enquire, I heard you and my learned friend, Mr Berger, talk about the matter being postponed, we don't know anything about this, could you perhaps enlighten us?

CHAIRPERSON: Well I was planning to do so tomorrow morning. It may be that on Friday we're going to have to postpone this matter for reasons beyond our control, but we haven't been able to confirm that yet. We're waiting for medical evidence. Why is that?

MR VISSER: ; I was going to put up a very serious argument now, but you've taken the wind out of my sails, Chairperson.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS