CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, ...(inaudible) postpone the question of Mr Toweel's client today to allow the parties to comment on Mr Toweel's argument. I'm going to ask you to adjourn the matter of Mr de Kock in the meantime, so that we can deal with Mr Toweel's matter. When we've finished with that, then we can continue with the cross-examination of Mr de Kock. Are you okay with that?
MR HATTINGH: Yes, certainly Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Toweel, you had completed your argument hey?
MR TOWEEL: That is correct, Chairperson. Just for the purposes of the record, Mr Coetser has always been here when I have been here. He informed me that he could not be here today however, he has left with the Bomb Disposal Unit. They have had to go to Cape Town for the week, so therefore he is not present today, but he has been present on all the other days and he still abides by his decision.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, have you got any comments about that argument?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, I was just looking for the pages in the record. I made my submissions to you and it is on record, Chairperson, on the last occasion, so I have nothing to add, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius, are you ...(intervention)
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chair. I've also made my submissions on a previous occasion. I have nothing to add to that.
NO FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR CORNELIUS
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, have you got anything?
MR HATTINGH: No thank you Mr Chairman, we do not wish to make any submissions.
NO ARGUMENT BY MR HATTINGH
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I do not wish to make any submissions.
NO ARGUMENT BY MR LAMEY
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Joubert.
MR JOUBERT: I have nothing to add, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR JOUBERT
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger.
MR BERGER IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Chairperson. I'll be very brief.
Chairperson, the fact of the matter is that the Committee has issued a subpoena to Mr Coetser. In fact he should have been here today. He should have at least have applied for permission to be absent, seeing he still is under subpoena.
If the issuing of the subpoena is being attacked, in other words if Mr Toweel is arguing that a subpoena should not have been issued, then this is not the correct forum to attack that subpoena. The correct forum would be the High Court, to have the subpoena set aside.
The fact is, the subpoena stands until it's set aside and the arguments I made on a previous occasion, the occasion that Mr Visser refers to, are also on record and I have nothing further to add.
It then would appear that Section 31 is the applicable section. Mr Coetser, in terms of Section 31(1), is a person who has been subpoenaed to give evidence and the section is quite clear that he shall be compelled to answer any question put to him with regard to the subject-matter of the hearing, notwithstanding the fact that his answer may incriminate him.
In my submission, Mr Toweel made a fatal concession. He said on the last occasion that Mr Coetser's evidence is relevant to the proceedings of this Committee. The question is now whether Mr Coetser can be compelled to answer questions. Well, first he must get into the witness box, he must take the oath as a subpoenaed person and then he can refuse to answer questions, or then he can invoke his, not a right, but he can then say: "I refuse to answer questions".
Then Section 31(2) comes into play.
"A person referred to in (1) i.e. a subpoenaed person, shall only be compelled to answer a question,"
this is after he's taken the oath and he's now refusing to answer a question,
"which may incriminate him, if the Commission has issued an order to that effect, but after the Commission
(a) has consulted with the Attorney-General who has jurisdiction."
We are informed that that has been done.
"(b) has satisfied itself that to require information from such a person is reasonable, necessary and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality."
We already heard from Mr de Kock yesterday that Mr Coetser was part of the assault team. We've also heard from Mr de Kock yesterday that Mr Coetser was one of two members whom he sent to the Meyer House to kill, or who ultimately landed up killing Leon Meyer and Jackie Quinn. I submit that it's...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Who're the two people that went, Coetser and...
MR BERGER: Coetser and Adamson. Adamson is dead, so Coetser is the only member of the police assault team still alive, who can tell this Committee what happened at the Meyer home.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr de Kock made it quite clear that all that he could relate with regard to what happened at the Meyer house that ultimately led to the killing of both Jackie Quinn and Leon Meyer, was hearsay. In your opinion, would that evidence be very material in deciding whether we should grant amnesty to all the applicants or not?
MR BERGER: The evidence of Mr Coetser?
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: The evidence of Mr Coetser as a person who participated in the actual killing of both Jackie Quinn and Leon Meyer.
MR BERGER: Yes. Yes, it's vital because Mr Coetser can tell us what in fact his orders were when he was dispatched to the house. Was he ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Haven't you got that order already? Didn't Mr de Kock tell us that he told Adamson and, or ordered Adamson and Coetser to do this, that and the other?
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Berger, I'm a little concerned about not so much the order, but the reason why Ms Quinn was killed. I'm not concerned so much about the order because that information, or that evidence we can ascertain from Mr de Kock as the person who actually issued the order, but Mr de Kock would be unable, as he conceded yesterday, to tell us exactly what happened, what led to the killing of Ms Quinn.
MR BERGER: Indeed and if one reads Mr de Kock's amnesty application at page 4 of bundle 1, he says that, and I'll just read. He says
"At that stage Maseru was patrolled by many heavily armed Defence Force members from the Lesotho Defence Force. Approximately 30 minutes before we would have attacked the target house, we received a report from a source indicating that two of the visitors, of which one was a target, had departed from the target house."
So Mr de Kock's evidence is that only one and that's Leon Meyer, was a target and Jackie Quinn was not a target and so Judge Khampepe, yes, I agree with you that it is highly relevant to find out under what circumstances Jackie Quinn was killed and why she was killed. Was she a target, or wasn't she a target?
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock's written application indicates that she wasn't a target, shouldn't have been killed, I assume. Apart from maybe the relatives of the deceased wanting to know exactly how it occurred and perhaps even why, aside from that, I concede that that may be an important factor, if any of the applicants are applying for amnesty in respect of that murder, if nothing is placed before us to justify that murder in terms of the Act, then of course it doesn't take an Einstein to work out what's going to happen about that applicant. One then questions oneself in reasoning this whole thing out, to what extent would the evidence of Coetser assist us in that? If she wasn't a target and she was killed, what is he going to come say that helps the applicants obtain amnesty?
MR BERGER: Well the applicants say that Jackie Quinn was not a target and that she was killed because she grabbed the gun of either Adamson or Coetser as she opened the door and then ...
CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone)
MR BERGER: Well, it's the best evidence that's put before you so far. How does one challenge that evidence? That is what Mr de Kock says he was told and that is evidence, albeit it hearsay evidence, before this Committee. How does one find out whether that evidence is correct, is true? How does one find out whether there's been full disclosure other than to ask the person who was there? And Chairperson, I might add that Section 31(2)(b) is worded in extremely wide terms. The question is whether the information that we can get from Mr Coetser is reasonable, necessary and justifiable in an open," and I stress the word open, and democratic society based on freedom and equality.
There's got to be transparency. We've got to - we're living in a democracy now where transparency is the key word.
CHAIRPERSON: I conceded that initially. I'm saying apart from that, I'm talking about the legal niceties of the Act, aside, apart from the quest of the relatives to find out exactly what happened. I can appreciate that and I can't criticise that approach. There's one or two other issues that concern us still and I'd like to hear your views on it. Firstly, Mr Toweel argues, referring to Section 31(3), that yes, while there's protection granted against self-incrimination, it seems, I think - is it correct here that it is only in terms of criminal proceedings?
MR BERGER: No, Chairperson, I submit not. I submit that 31(3) is couched in the widest possible terms.
"Any incriminating answer or information obtained ..."
I leave out some words,
"shall not be admissible as evidence against the person concerned in criminal proceedings in a Court of law, or before anybody or institution established by or under any law."
Anybody or institution, so yes, there's the specific criminal proceedings, no, but it goes wider that, otherwise ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Would you argue that includes civil proceedings?
MR BERGER: Clearly.
CHAIRPERSON: I think you're right because the spirit of the Act is such. I just wanted to hear what you had to say about it, but I'm sure you'd concede that there's room for argument on it.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, I argued before another Amnesty Committee, Mr Wagener was there, that the spirit of the - the purpose of the Act is to get people to come forward to disclose everything and the quid pro quo is that when you come forward and you disclose everything, then you are "amnestied" and the question is what is amnestied and I would submit that amnestied means to be rendered immune from any legal attack and that must clearly be the intention of the Legislature, otherwise what is the Act all about? Surely the Act is about getting the truth and at the same time saying to people if you come forward and you speak the truth, there will be no legal consequences that attach to you.
CHAIRPERSON: I think that was the intention of the Legislature in any event.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But in this case Mr Coetser is not an applicant, he is a witness.
MR BERGER: Yes, but once he's been subpoenaed, then the protections of the Act must apply to him and clearly if you are subpoenaed and you come and give evidence, you can't then be - that evidence can't be used against you.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I agree with you Mr Berger, but when one reads Section 31(3), you cannot exclude civil proceedings, simply because they have not been specifically mentioned. I think it is wide enough to include an institution as a Civil Court.
MR BERGER: Yes, well that is my submission.
CHAIRPERSON: The other matter that raises concerns with us is that if we accept that the spirit of the Act was to encourage people to come tell it all without risking prosecution in telling the truth, we must bear in mind that this is a law that is apposite to South Africa. Does the risk in telling the truth and perhaps incriminating himself and the protection afforded by Section 31(3), would that protect him against prosecution let's say in Lesotho where the crime was committed, because Mr Toweel on behalf of his client, calls on that factor in sustaining a just excuse for refusing to testify.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, it's clear that decisions of this Committee or any Court in South Africa are not binding on any other country and the same would apply for Mr van der Merwe as well, or Mr de Kock as well.
ADV BOSMAN: I think the difference is they had a choice, they exercised their choice to take that risk.
MR BERGER: Adv Bosman, if Mr - the first point is it would then be up to the South African government to decide whether or not to agree to expedite the particular person and I'm sure, and the government would have to take into account the fact of the processes in the country and ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Just hold it there. Isn't the test not whether the South African government eventually will exercise its discretion in extraditing a particular person, shouldn't the test be whether by doing so, he's at risk of being prosecuted?
MR BERGER: Chairperson, he's at risk of being prosecuted now.
CHAIRPERSON: Well that's his choice, but he specifically calls upon that factor as a just excuse for not testifying and that's our, not problem, that's the factor we've got to deal with.
MR BERGER: Well Chairperson my submission would be, you have to weigh Mr Coetser's risk of being prosecuted in Lesotho against what the Act seeks to achieve, because if Mr Coetser is excused from testifying, it would mean that people who are implicated in amnesty proceedings need not fear any consequences in South Africa. It would then mean that - you see all the relevant people, all the people who have information about what actually happened, are the people who were there when the crimes were committed, so they are the relevant people, they are the people from whom relevant information can be withdrawn. If they don't have to come and testify, even under subpoena, if they don't have to come and testify before the Committee, then the only people who really can properly be subpoenaed to come and testify before you, are the people who know nothing about what actually happened. If one looks at Section 19, I think it's 19(4), yes, it is Section 19(4),
"If an application has not been dealt with in terms of (3) the Committee shall conduct a hearing as contemplated in Chapter 6 and shall, subject to the provisions of Section 33, in the manner prescribed, notify the applicant, any victim or person implicated or having an interest in the application of the place where and time when the application will be heard, inform the persons present in paragraph (a) of their right to be present at the hearing and to testify."
So if we take out applicants and persons implicated, who are the people that can properly be subpoenaed to come and testify before you? Only the applicants. The applicants come along and say: "This is my story." If there's anybody that can contradict that story, who hasn't applied for amnesty and who knows the facts, they can't be compelled to testify, so the Committee, with respect, is then just left with the version of the applicants and as that version has been tested under cross-examination.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I appreciate that. I don't know whether we are empowered or entitled in the circumstances to adopt that robust approach as a convenience to fit in with the spirit of the Act. I accept that that's the spirit of the Act and one would have accepted and expected and perhaps enjoyed that everybody in the country was a willing participant in the process, but not surprisingly not everybody is in that position. Here is a person who resorts, if I may put it that way, to a right which is covered by the Act, that I will testify on the basis that I will not be at risk of being prosecuted or let's carry it further and say, or being sued. The fact that this Act doesn't apply to Lesotho means that he is not exempted from prosecution there. He has specifically called on that ...(indistinct) and we are called upon to decide on that matter as objectively as we can. I've asked you what you've got to say about that. Look, let's look at it cold, look at his rights and what he's entitled to and what the Act provides. How do we handle it? My emotional approach to it may be quite different but how do I look at it, like I'm suggesting to you, cold, in black and white?
MR BERGER: Chairperson, I was going to go back to 31(2) but before I do, just to make one point. To date I don't know of a single instance where the government of Lesotho has sought the extradition of any member of the South African Security Forces for acts committed in Lesotho during the conflict of the past, so it's a risk that I submit is far more apparent than real, but Section 31 is clear in its terms. It says that
"Any person subpoenaed shall be compelled to answer any question put to him, notwithstanding the fact that the answer may incriminate him or her."
And then 31(2) sets out the test and the test is, has there been consultation with the Attorney-General? Is this Committee satisfied that in an open and democratic society, the information is reasonable, necessary and justifiable? In an open and democratic society, in a society where transparency is paramount and has satisfied itself that such person is likely to refuse to answer the questions on the grounds that it might incriminate him or her, which we know is Mr Coetser's problem. He doesn't want to answer the questions because he will be incriminated. So (a) and (c) have objectively been satisfied and (b) I submit to you that in a society in which openness is paramount, we know he has relevant information, we know that. I submit that (b) is satisfied as well. Once all three are satisfied, then I submit that this Committee would be within its rights to compel him to answer the question.
CHAIRPERSON: If we're talking across the border and we consider (3), is the requirement contained in (2)(c) satisfied?
MR BERGER: Sorry Chairperson you've lost me.
CHAIRPERSON: If we consider Section 31 in particular (3) that deals with incriminating evidence not being admissible, that provides protection, if that protection doesn't extend across the border, then the next question to be asked is, has (2)(c) been satisfied or complied with?
MR BERGER: Well (2)(c) says that the Committee must be satisfied that Mr Coetser has refused or is likely to refuse to answer the questions on the grounds that he might be incriminated. We know for a fact that he's refusing to answer the questions on the grounds that he might be incriminated.
CHAIRPERSON: Mustn't that be read with the protection afforded by (3)? I'm suggesting.
MR BERGER: (3) says whatever he says can't be used against him.
CHAIRPERSON: Including incriminating evidence, self-incriminating, but if we're talking across the borders, can we afford him that protection?
MR BERGER: Well, it may - I know that there are Judgments, I forget now exactly the name of the Judgment, but there's a Judgment of the Zimbabwe High Court to the effect that an act which was unlawful, it concerned the Group Areas Act in South Africa, the unlawfulness of the act in South Africa could be relied upon in the High Court in Zimbabwe.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Berger, isn't your problem the fact that the Act, our founding Act that we are dealing with, did not envisage extending this protection to persons such as Mr Coetser on incriminating evidence that would touch upon other countries like Lesotho?
MR BERGER: Well, Section 31(3) was clearly intended to apply to people who had been subpoenaed to give evidence. That much is clear because it says
"Any incriminating answer or information obtained from a questioning in terms of (1)"
and (1) refers to any person who has been subpoenaed, so the protection in 31(3) covers subpoenaed persons.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But Mr Coetser's problem is that it doesn't sufficiently cover him in the event of him being prosecuted by the Lesotho Court.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, I conceded at the outset that foreign courts could take the attitude that they're not bound by anything that happened inside South Africa. I concede that, but in order for there to be a successful prosecution in Lesotho, the Lesotho authorities would have to get the record from South Africa. They would have to get an official record from the TRC and the TRC could refuse to give that record on the grounds that the information was obtained and assurance was given to the person who gave that information that that information wouldn't be used against him.
CHAIRPERSON: The fallacy in your argument Mr Berger is that these reports and decisions and records are intended to be part of a public museum, I'm not too sure what they're going to call this thing, but everybody will have access to it.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Once a hearing has commenced.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, aside from that, at the end of the day it's going to be put in some type of archive building to which the public is going to have access.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: They already have access to it through the internet as we talk.
MR BERGER: But Judge Khampepe, it has to be an official document. For example in South Africa we couldn't use a document which emanated from another country unless it's been properly authenticated.
CHAIRPERSON: I think Mr Berger - I accept what you're saying and it's perhaps mostly correct and true, we get back to the test, we can't foresee what the diplomatic situation is going to be in future. I'm saying that in my view and I speak for myself, the test is whether by testifying here and perhaps incriminating himself, he's exempted from prosecution, full stop. I'm saying that the protection afforded by this Act ends at the borders of South Africa and therefore by testifying here, he's going to put himself at risk to prosecution in Lesotho and isn't that the test? Let us forget what is likely to happen and what the diplomatic situation may be in future.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Are we entitled to even consider what's likely to happen from the Lesotho side, or the Act makes it quite clear that we have to look at the Act and see whether the protection that is afforded by it, has been properly considered. If that evidence cannot be used by a South African Court, then we would be entitled to compel Mr Coetser to give evidence, whether at the end of the day, the Lesotho government decides to prosecute and the evidence that he might have led before us opens him to prosecution against the Lesotho government, is neither here nor there because the Act does not give us any authority in considering whether he really can be compellable to go to that extent.
MR BERGER: Judge Khampepe, as attractive as that argument is for me, I must submit that you can have regard to the bigger picture because the test is about reasonableness. Whether its reasonable, whether its necessary, whether its justifiable to compel Mr Coetser to answer the questions and in applying that test, I submit, this Committee must have regard to what sort of society are we building in South Africa? What sort of society have we become when we talk about an open and democratic society, and at the same time look at the bigger picture as to practically what will happen if Mr Coetser gives evidence or doesn't give evidence. If he gives evidence, practically in South Africa it can't be used against him. Practically what will happen in Lesotho? The chances of extradition are minimal and if the Lesotho government wanted to prosecute Mr Coetser, they do so tomorrow. They could subpoena Mr de Kock, they could subpoena all the applicants here because every single applicant points to Mr Coetser as being someone who went along with the attack. They wouldn't have to rely on Mr Coetser's say-so if they could lead 6, 7, 8 witness for the prosecution against Mr Coetser without touching his say-so before this Committee.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, in testifying here, let's assume Mr Coetser was a willing witness and he was willing because he was afforded the protection as afforded by Section 31 (3) and he was prosecuted in South Africa because he wasn't granted amnesty, he could call - he could invoke Section 31(3) in a South African Court. Could he do so in Lesotho?
MR BERGER: No, he can't invoke it in Lesotho, but Chairperson, look at it from a different perspective. The Act says
"People who are subpoenaed shall be compelled to testify."
Who is that referring to? Well it's not referring to applicants because applicants, if they want amnesty, they have to make full disclosure, they have to come and testify, so it can't be intended for applicants. At the same time the Act recognises that during the course of the conflicts of the past, crimes were committed in South Africa and outside of South Africa. In fact Section, I think it's Section 20(2), yes:
"Any act committed within or outside the Republic during the period 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date."
So the Act contemplates I submit that the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal that Mr Toweel relied upon, besides being distinguishable on the facts, misses the point, with respect, completely and just ignores the words "within or outside the Republic during the period 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date".
CHAIRPERSON: Ignores the issue of civil litigation.
MR BERGER: Indeed yes. So it wasn't as though the drafters of this legislation were oblivious to the fact that crimes were committed outside the borders of the country and the Act says, whilst you're considering amnesty applications, if there's someone who has been subpoenaed, that person who has been subpoenaed must come and testify if the jurisdictional facts have been met. Now it's clearly within the contemplation of the Legislature when they passed this Act, that people would be subpoenaed to answer questions which could incriminate them, and those incriminating answers could be both within South Africa, or outside South Africa.
CHAIRPERSON: Since you raise that in that fashion, has the Act provided sufficiently for the broad spectrum of just excuse and shouldn't we then resort to common law?
MR BERGER: Chairperson, the Act talks about what is reasonable, necessary and justifiable.
CHAIRPERSON: We're talking about just excuse for refusing to testify.
MR BERGER: Does he have a just excuse? Is it ...
CHAIRPERSON: He's called in, let's deal with that one factor, he says: "I have just excuse not to testify" because we all must accept that he's going to incriminate himself. I have reason to believe that he doesn't want to testify for other reasons, but he's resorting to this. He's saying that I have just excuse and therefore I'm not going to testify here because I run the risk of incriminating myself, which record in incriminating myself could lay me open to prosecution in Lesotho, where I don't enjoy the protection afforded to me by Section 31 (3).
MR BERGER: Chairperson, with respect, you can't just revert to the common law of just excuse because the Act, the common law of just excuse doesn't have as its foundation the backdrop of an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and the test is articulated here. The test is he says: "I don't want to testify because I can be prosecuted in Lesotho." The question is, is that a reasonable stand to take? Is it - or is it necessary, justifiable and reasonable, given his objections, nevertheless to compel him to testify in South Africa because of the backdrop of an open and democratic society? That is the test.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Berger, he says more than just that "because I will be prosecuted in Lesotho". He says: "I will be prosecuted in Lesotho and the Act does not afford me any protection." It goes further than just: "I can be prosecuted". He says: "The Act does not afford me any protection and where no protection is afforded, can one not then argue that in an open and democratic society, it would be reasonable?
MR BERGER: No, with respect not. The Act was concerned with the particular South African Society. Now it - does our society require, does modern South African society require that people such as Mr Coetser who are in possession of this highly relevant information, be compelled to testify? Does our society require that? It's almost like Minister van Polisie vs Ewels, to go back and say: "What are the legal convictions of the community?" Well by analogy, what does South African society say today about people such as Mr Coetser? Should they be immune from testifying before an Amnesty Committee because the possibility exists, however remote, that he might be tried in a foreign country? Is that what South African society today says? I submit not.
CHAIRPERSON: I say this with tongue in cheek, but through the Act the South African society also affords any person who testifies before such Commissions the protection from being prosecuted on the basis that they've incriminated themselves in these hearings. Now, does the South African society then given that say: "Look here, we don't care if he's prosecuted elsewhere, we're only prepared to immune him from South African courts".
MR BERGER: I submit that South African society does expect that, yes. Chairperson, my submission is that you've got to take everything and put it into the balance and see where the balance lies. Does the balance come down in favour of South African society getting to the bottom of what actually happened, or does the fear of Mr Coetser of being prosecuted in Lesotho outweigh that?
CHAIRPERSON: That would have been a nice balancing act for this Committee to put into the scale if Mr Coetser's right was not at stake here. That's what I'm trying to establish, whether the factor that he calls upon as just cause for not testifying, is right or not. I have not made up my mind yet as to whether he has that right.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, even if he has such a right, his right has to be balanced against the interests of society. That's what Section 31(2) is all about, it's the interests of South African society in full, transparent disclosure. Who else can be subpoenaed?
CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone) I take that point. But I've heard you.
MR BERGER: Thank you Chair, I can't take it any further than that.
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel.
MS PATEL IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Honourable Chairperson. I believe that my views on the matter are already on record. I wish, however, to add that when weighing up the interests or the rights of Mr Coetser, I will urge you to take into consideration also the rights of the victims in this matter, that by granting amnesty to the applicants there are grave and serious consequences and rights that we take away from the victims in that process, so it's not merely a question of Mr Coetser's rights and how that's going to affect him, it's also the question of the victims and their rights in this matter. That is all I have to say. Thank you.
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson just briefly regarding Ms Patel's argument, it is correct but Mr Coetser is not an applicant therefore he does not affect the rights of the next-of-kin or the victims because he is not an applicant.
CHAIRPERSON: How so? The interests of the family in this sort of hearing are to discover what took place and why their family member has been killed. If there is somebody who can
submit it, whether he be an applicant or a regular person on the street, should it really matter?
MR JOUBERT: Chairperson, I have already submitted my argument that it would be more appropriate, that I do have empathy for the family, but it would be more appropriate before another Commission other than the Amnesty Committee, my opinion on this is on record.
Mr Berger, with regard to Section 31(3), stated that it was not of application to the applicants and that is the fact that the evidence cannot be held against such a person. He argued that it was precisely of application to a witness. In my submission it cannot be, it has to be applied to the applicants otherwise a person who has applied for amnesty and does not receive amnesty has no protection, that is why it should be of application to the applicant. With regard to Lesotho Mr Berger also stated that the Lesotho prosecuting authority does not have the evidence, or does not need the evidence of Mr Coetser which he would have given here, because there are 78 applicants. I don't know how relevant this is, but I am certain that there will not only be one accused in Lesotho, if criminal proceedings were to take place there.
My final point is that the Committee has indicated prima facie that in the light of the spirit of the Act, Section 31(3), grants protection to a person before any Court in South Africa. My submission is that this is impossible if one examines the Act and I have the Afrikaans version before me,
"Not as a witness for the particular person in criminal proceedings in a criminal Court, or in any other proceedings".
It is clear that the body or the institution to which is referred here, is something other than a court of law and if one reads it as such, it cannot be any different. According to my submission it should mean that it is not permissible before any body or person and with regard to Courts, it is not permissible before a Criminal Court. It should be permissible in civil proceedings and in bail proceedings, which do not include criminal proceedings. It should be permissible with regard to applications for the deliverance of a person, therefore the aspects which have been indicated prima facie by the Committee with regard to use in Lesotho, are just as relevant if not more relevant for the South African situation. I cannot take it any further.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Toweel, you have indicated that your client's attitude is the same?
MR TOWEEL: Yes, that is correct and I omitted that when Mr Berger argued previously that he was not present, he actually walked into the hall, therefore he is present.
CHAIRPERSON: Regarding this aspect and our decision, whatever it may be, people can read what our decision is in the main decision.
MR TOWEEL: Thank you very much Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, I'm sorry, did I understand you to say that you will make your decision known at the end of the case?
CHAIRPERSON: Ja, why?
MR BERGER: Because unless your decision is that Mr Coetser is not compelled to answer any questions, then if your decision is that he is compelled to answer a question and he fails to do that, then he is in contempt and he can be sent to prison and that might - after being in prison for a couple of months, or days, or hours, he might change his mind and decide that he would rather testify and then we will have his evidence before you make your decision.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I've been told that the TRC, Truth and Reconciliation Commission decides whether to report a matter to the office of the Attorney-General, that's how I understand it. That's been the practice to date, unless you can direct me to some other provision which provides for summary decision.
MR BERGER: No Chairperson, what I'm suggesting is that in terms of Section 29 of the Act it says
"Any person who having been subpoenaed in terms of this Act without sufficient cause ...(I leave out words) fails to attend at the time and place specified"
Sorry it's (2):
"Having been subpoenaed in terms of this Act without sufficient cause, refuses to be sworn or to make affirmation ..."
I beg your pardon?
CHAIRPERSON: 39.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: 39(e)(2)
MR BERGER: 39(e)(2)
"Having been subpoenaed in terms of this Act without sufficient cause, refuses to be sworn or to make affirmation as a witness and fails or refuses to answer fully and satisfactorily to the best of his/her knowledge and belief any question lawfully put to him/her, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 2 years or to both such fine and such imprisonment."
And my submission is that because Mr Coetser's evidence is highly relevant and essential for the purposes of this application, if you as a Committee defer your decision to the end once all the evidence is in and all the arguments are in, the purpose of forcing Mr Coetser to testify will never be satisfied.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, a subpoena has been issued. Despite that he refuses to testify. Certain consequences flow from that, if he hasn't got just excuse for his approach. Are you suggesting that he can be further forced to testify?
MR BERGER: No, what I'm suggesting is that if your decision is that he does not have just excuse, if that decision were to come down today or tomorrow, whenever, he might change his mind when staring the prison doors in the face. Alternatively once the prison doors clang behind him tomorrow, he might change his mind on Monday and decide that he'd rather come and testify and so by giving your decision now, the chance is greater that that evidence might ultimately be put before you, before you have to give your decision, whereas if the decision is deferred until the main Judgment, then we know for a fact that that evidence will never be placed before you, his evidence will never be placed before you. Once he's been sentenced and he changes his mind, it would be too late if you've already given your decision.
MR TOWEEL: Chairperson, may I just add something in response?
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, are you suggesting that this Committee handle that penal aspect of it?
MR BERGER: No. No I'm not suggesting that the Committee handle that, I'm suggesting that the Committee make a ruling now and if the ruling is against Mr Coetser, that the matter be referred to the Attorney-General for immediate attention.
CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone) I misunderstood you there.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Berger I don't know if you have properly understood the Chair because I thought what the Chair was trying to convey to everyone here is that we'll make our ruling after we've heard all the applicants.
CHAIRPERSON: All the evidence.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: All the evidence that will be led by the applicant as well as Mr McCaskill.
MR BERGER: Before we argue?
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Before you argue and definitely before we give a decision in this matter. There definitely was some misunderstanding between the two of you.
MR BERGER: Thank you Judge Khampepe.
CHAIRPERSON: Does that satisfy your fears?
MR BERGER: It does, thank you Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Toweel, you wanted to say something?
MR TOWEEL: Chairperson, I must say that I understood it that way as well. It is the first time that Mr Berger and I have agreed on anything. I understood it the same way that he did. It is in your hands to decide on the time to make the decision.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Toweel, will you be available on a week's notice to be present for that decision?
MR TOWEEL: Chairperson, I will do everything in my power to be here.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.
CHAIRPERSON: We'll take the tea adjournment.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Berger.
MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson.
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: (cont)
Mr de Kock, could you put your microphone on as well please? Thank you. Morning Mr de Kock.
MR DE KOCK: Good morning.
MR BERGER: Mr de Kock, yesterday I was asking you questions about alternatives to murder and I'd just like to continue with that for a short while. You had a very reliable source from your point of view when you were working with Mr McCaskill in the days leading up to the attack. You also had instructions, very specific instructions to eliminate the Meyer group who were on the verge of entering South Africa to commit acts of violence. If you look at page 70 of Volume 2, this is from the statement of Mr McCaskill, you'll see in paragraph 15 he says the following
"On that Friday"
and it must clearly have been a Thursday not a Friday,
"Teddy an ANC man came to my place. He told me that Leon and other comrades want to see me. I went to see them. They requested me to take them to Bloemfontein on Saturday"
which is probably Friday.
"I then agreed that I will take them to Bloemfontein. I was supposed to pick them up at a certain place next to Venus, which is between the border post and Ladybrand. I then went with them to a certain coloured man, who put his luggage into my car and then went to Leon's place to fetch his luggage. I then got a message at the hotel to meet de Kock and his men at the post office."
Now is it correct that you can't dispute anything in this particular paragraph?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I do not know. Mr McCaskill would be able to testify. From my side I can tell you what exactly happened and I have told you. When I spoke to Mr McCaskill at the post office, he never referred to any luggage or any Teddy in his car. This was about his family who was at the house and whom he wanted to remove.
MR BERGER: But by the same token, you never asked him whether he had any information about what the Meyer group were intending to do. Am I right?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the information that he gave, this is now Mr McCaskill, to the Ladybrand Security Branch and which was conveyed to the region Bloemfontein and from that Head Office, was that they would infiltrate and commit acts of terror, so once again everything here depends on Mr McCaskill.
MR BERGER: You had information from the Security Branch in Ladybrand that Mr McCaskill had passed on this knowledge about what the Meyer group were intending to do, am I right?
MR DE KOCK: That's correct yes.
MR BERGER: And my point is that when you met him at the post office, you never asked him anything further, anything more about what the Meyer group were intending to do, such as when do they intend to leave and from where do they intend to leave and how do they intend to get into South Africa, you never asked that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no because at that stage we were half an hour to an hour from the attack and at that stage Mr McCaskill had already made his preparations. The ANC members had already been gathered at a central point where we would launch the attack and at that stage we were about to attack. No further questions were asked.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, if 5 minutes before your proposed attack you became aware of an alternative to deal with this threat, would you not have changed your tactics or your approach?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, depending on what that would be. I would never be able to say because the whole run-up to this situation at the house was the only - was operationally the only method to eliminate this group and may I put it as follows? If he said 5 minutes before the time, he said everyone has left, then I would not have gone ahead with the attack.
CHAIRPERSON: You perhaps misunderstand my question. I'm asking you if 5 minutes before your proposed attack you became aware of an alternative manner, other than killing them, to deal with this threat of Christmas and a Christmas attack, would you not have opted for the alternative rather than proceeding to kill people?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, but I do not know what the alternative could have been.
CHAIRPERSON: I am not interested in what the alternative may have been. If there was an alternative that came to your mind, or became apparent even 5 minutes before the time you were proposing to attack, would you not have opted for the alternative?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes possibly, but I kept to my mandate to wipe out this Meyer group and I stuck by that.
MR BERGER: Thank you Chair.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Is it so that you stuck to your mandate because these were direct orders that not only came from Brig Schoon, but you believed them to have come from the State President himself.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: This is what I tried to cover with you yesterday when I asked if you had any authority to amend direct orders that came from Brig Schoon and you gave us the impression that you could amend such orders and I couldn't understand your response.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, on ground level as an operative, the situation changes from second to second and from minute to minute. There are - the primary task is to get out of there alive and secondly, the success of the execution of the task and on that basis the Commander and his second in command, or whether they both are killed in the operation, then the members after them would take the following best steps for the group or the operation. That is where unconventional war differs from conventional war.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I understand that, but I just wanted to get the substance of your response about your being able to change a direct order, that not only came from Brig Schoon, but you believed to have come from P W Botha, which said: eliminate the group and you wouldn't have been able to take alternative measures, but to act within the confines of your mandate.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, may I put it as follows? I did comply with the order. I did execute the attack and we did eliminate the group at the scene at ground level. I can take steps, or I can improvise or adjust according to the circumstances, but my instructions were still executed. I attacked the group and we did wipe them out.
CHAIRPERSON: Well what if 5 minutes before the proposed attack you found out that McCaskill was spinning you a yarn and there was no threat of an attack at Christmas time and that you'd been sent on a goose chase and that there was no actual reason for killing these people, you yet had an order from your superiors who gave that order thinking that what McCaskill had reported was the truth. You on the ground at the scene find out that that's not the truth, would you still proceed with the order?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there one would not have done so, but by the time that one has gone so far that one launches an attack and the preparation has been made and when one is already in the country and one is already on the verge of the attack, then the information - it means that the information was controlled by means of other sources and as I have said, there was more than one source to which Mr McCaskill's information could be tested. In other words by the time when one launches an attack, one is certain of the target and one is certain that the person one is looking for is there. It is not an incident in the Jack Cronje incident where in the wrong house 9 people were shot and then afterwards go to the right house and then kill 10 people there. It depends on the operatives and Commanders, but in my instance, I made sure that I was at the right house and had the right people.
CHAIRPERSON: Let me put it as plainly and as simply as I can. Your erstwhile colleagues of the days of apartheid, you yourself say you've got no trust in many of them today.
MR DE KOCK: Correct.
CHAIRPERSON: So people can change and mislead you, etc. etc.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Now for the purposes of the question, let's accept that you believed that McCaskill said and his information was tested in various ways, but in front of the house that you proposed to attack you find out in some way, look we're attacking the wrong people, there's no reason to actually shoot these people and kill them, I'm going to put it to you, you had the discretion of aborting the attack in such circumstances because it would not be justified?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, one would not go and attack a birthday party. If we arrived there and found that there was a birthday party and there are no ANC members, then we would leave again, we were not out just looking for blood. This was not a blood-thirsty adventure.
CHAIRPERSON: That would be despite your orders from above?
MR DE KOCK: The orders from above were to wipe out the Leon Meyer group and that is whom we arrived at.
CHAIRPERSON: Now we get to the Meyer group. You establish that Leon Meyer and company are in this house, but you find out that they had no intention of attacking anything or anybody in South Africa on the Christmas period, that that allegation was nonsense. Would you not have aborted the attack on the Leon Meyer group?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, most probably not, no, because this was a terrorist group then who had already gone out and committed acts of terror and the information was that they would once again go out, whether they would commit this the 24th or the 25th or the 29th of December, would not change the situation.
CHAIRPERSON: They're not involved in attacking people or property, you find that out 5 minutes before your attack.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I do not know of other units and groups, but my group never attacked people who were not involved in acts of terror.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: What the Chair is trying to put to you Mr de Kock is what if 5 minutes before you were supposed to execute your operation, you get information that the source that previously supplied you with the information that the Meyer group was in that house, gave you an incorrect information?
MR DE KOCK: Then Chairperson, in that instance, what I would most probably have done was to withdraw for that moment and to return to the hotel where we had our base and to call Brig Schoon and to tell him the source was leading us around by our nose, do you have any propositions and if he says continue with what is there, then we shall continue, but then I would have to inform him about the operational circumstances and that the operational terminology is that the whole business is a lemon, it is a useless exercise. That is what it would boil down to.
MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. Mr de Kock, when you submitted your report, the one in red ink, would it be correct to say that you never suggested any alternatives to dealing with the Meyer group, other than to kill them?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I did not make any further proposals because it was not expected of me, it was about an attack in Lesotho.
MR BERGER: That was going to be my next question. It was never requested of you by Mr Schoon or Mr van der Merwe, whether there were alternative ways of dealing with the Meyer group, other than by killing them?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, would we be able to complete a successful operation and information was then handed in, in order to wipe them out yes.
MR BERGER: You see because what I want to suggest to you is that there was an alternative to neutralising this threat. This imminent threat of an attack by the Meyer group over the Christmas period. If you had simply asked this excellent source, McCaskill whether he had any information as to when the attack was to be launched, where the attack was to be launched, you would have, based on the fact that he was giving you information all the time, you would have found out that the Meyer group intended to drive through to Bloemfontein the following day.
CHAIRPERSON: But he knew that, he testified to that. I thought he said so yesterday.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I think his testimony even just now is that he had not - he didn't speak to McCaskill about this group at the post office and the information that he had was the information that he had gleaned from the source reports from Ladybrand which did not specify when the group was going to cross over into the borders of South Africa.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, did you know before you went to Lesotho, did you have information as to when this group would enter?
MR DE KOCK: We did have a day, Chairperson. What I do know was that it was now, it was over the festive season, in other words it was the day before Christmas, Christmas or the day after Christmas, it was now urgent and that was the reason for our haste. I would venture to say that in our haste, that was the reason for the haste in the planning of this operation.
CHAIRPERSON: Then I must have misunderstood you because yesterday I asked you why did you not wait for a day and wait for these people until they crossed the border and then deal with them? I asked that of you because I understood that you knew that your attack would take place the evening before them coming through. Did I misunderstand you?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I think my answer was that we had persons here who were trained and they were trained in unconventional warfare and because of that, one could not base oneself on what they said, in other words he can leave earlier then he originally planned and then he could say that he was driving to Bloemfontein and then instead of that go to Ficksburg and that was my answer, that it is difficult to go out and to give the script that you wrote to them as well. I had an enemy who was very well trained in misleading and in masking which direction they went to or what they wanted to do.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I'm a little confused, Mr de Kock, maybe you can assist me. On your arrival in Lesotho, in preparation to execute this operation, did you know that the Meyer group was about to infiltrate the country with a view of launching attacks inside the country?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because that is why I received those instructions from Head Office, it was to launch this attack as soon as possible because the infiltration was imminent, it was urgent, it was a present danger, if I can state it as such.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And my second question is, did you know of the exact date when the infiltration was going to take place?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, as I understood it, it was a matter of between 4 and 5 days
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And when you met Mr McCaskill in Lesotho shortly before the execution of this operation, you still had not ascertained from him if he knew when the infiltration was going to take place.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, I did not ask him there because we were already loaded and ready and as I've said, we were about to attack within half-an-hour to an hour and as I have said yesterday, it was a pre-emptive strike, we prevent these people from entering the RSA whether it was a day or two later, we were already there busy with the attack. When we spoke to Mr McCaskill we were already on the verge of the attack. There was no time to talk now, we were already in the attack situation, we had already started the attack, we were already in attack mode.
MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. You see, Mr de Kock, what I'm trying to put to you is, if you had asked Mr McCaskill the obvious questions, you would have known exactly where the Meyer group were going to be the next day when they crossed the border into South Africa. You see, you say that you don't know maybe he could have given you false information, maybe he could have said: "We're going to Ficksburg" and then have gone to Bloemfontein, or the other way around, but you relied on and trusted Mr McCaskill's information. You asked him to arrange a party for the members of the Meyer group, you trusted him not to tell the Meyer group that you were coming. You trusted him to keep your instructions secret, am I right?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: If you had asked him: "What are they planning and when are they planning it?" even as late as an hour and a half before the attack at the post office, you would have known that they were going to cross and he was going to pick them up next to Venice, between the border post and Ladybrand. You, the next day, you have - as you say, you could have - if things had changed you would have gone back to the hotel and phoned Mr Schoon. You could have crossed the border back into South Africa, waited for Mr McCaskill to cross the border, followed him to Venice or you could have gone to this place called Venice and prepared an ambush. Am I correct that you and your unit did in some instances prepare ambushes?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, we did where the information indicated and where we had control over the information, we did.
MR BERGER: So you see, my point is instead of having this huge international incident with huge ramifications and the risks that were attendant upon that, you could have ambushed the Meyer group, the very ones who were coming to commit acts of violence in South Africa, you could have ambushed them inside South Africa and arrested them. My question to you is, is any of what I've said ludicrous? Is any of what I've said not possible in the circumstances?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I would not regard it as ludicrous. I believe that if one had that capability at that moment, then it was probably possible. These are all attached to times and circumstances, however it was not my instruction to lead or to ambush these people at a certain place and there was nothing that Mr Meyer - that prevented Mr Meyer from telling Mr McCaskill at some other time that we'll go through ...(indistinct) in Transkei and then we were sitting at Thaba N'chu and waiting and everybody went through Transkei and the next few bombs were all exploding in the Cape, so this whole operation, the questions that had to be asked of Mr McCaskill and his answers had already been given and all the planning had been based upon that. The attack that we launched was already requested in Pretoria, placed in writing and approved. There already it had taken place.
MR BERGER: Mr McCaskill, everything that you had told Mr McCaskill to do, he did and every piece of information that he brought to you turned out to be accurate, am I right?
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: The operation from your point of view was a success because of the information and actions of Mr McCaskill.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, yes.
MR BERGER: And what I want to put to you is that you could have achieved your objective of neutralising the Meyer group by arresting them in South Africa rather than by killing them and making such a spectacle in Maseru.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, with regard to the choice of shooting them in Maseru and making a spectacle of it, that was not my choice Chairperson. If my instructions were, ambush them on the South African side, then most probably we would have worked in that direction but that was not what was in my submission and that is not what my submission was requested for, the submission was that can you launch and attack in Lesotho and would you be able to successfully complete it and it was based upon that.
MR BERGER: Now I want to refer you, Mr de Kock, to page 4 of your amnesty application. Right at the bottom you say
"To the best of my knowledge and information from the source and the Security Police Ladybrand, all these persons"
and those were the persons at the party,
"were members of the ANC's military wing. The two members who went to the house of Joe reported that they had struggled to bring Joe out alive, as was previously planned and that they then decided to shoot him."
Now, when I read that sentence, my understanding was that the plan from the beginning "as was previously planned", was to take Leon Meyer alive.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is probably how you understood it, but I explained to you yesterday that this happened at the scene of the incident and this is the basis that I left open for Lieut Adamson. If there was such a request from Brig Schoon, then I would have included it in my planning.
MR BERGER: Your evidence as I understand it now, is that because an opportunity presented itself of taking Leon Meyer alive, you gave instructions that if possible that should be done.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson because according to the arrangements from Mr McCaskill, everybody would have been at the house when we struck the house, that would have been the terminology that we used during the operations because I had to leave out 2 members who I actually needed to assist me with the penetration and the attack of the house and because the opportunity presented itself, it was said: "Go and if it's possible, yes".
MR BERGER: And your evidence yesterday was also that if you had managed to take Leon Meyer alive, you would subsequently have killed him after interrogating him because you wouldn't want him to reveal in Court that you were responsible for the other deaths in Maseru.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson not only that but this was a covert operation, no fingers could point to the RSA, there should be no tangible evidence and most probably as I stated, as cold-blooded as it was, yes, we would have killed him.
MR BERGER: But if the opportunity had presented itself that you could have taken all the members of the Meyer group alive, would you have done that as well?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that would not have been possible, because then I would have had to enter Maseru with freight vehicles in order to transport these people. This was not viable and it also wasn't part of my mandate.
MR BERGER: You see where I'm getting at is where I was a few minutes ago. If the opportunity had presented itself in South Africa, then you could have taken all the members of the Meyer group alive.
MR DE KOCK: Possibly Chairperson, if it was my mandate for this group to enter the country and to eliminate them, I would have done it.
MR BERGER: And then you wouldn't have had to kill any of them because then you wouldn't have committed any crimes in Lesotho.
MR DE KOCK: As far as I know, murder is a universal offence, it doesn't matter where it is committed, it is precisely the same.
MR BERGER: No, you're misunderstanding me Mr de Kock. If you had arranged things in such a way that you could have captured them in South Africa, then you wouldn't have had to kill them after you captured them, would you?
MR DE KOCK: Well that's obvious Chairperson.
MR BERGER: And then they would have been prosecuted in the Courts of South Africa.
MR DE KOCK: Possibly yes.
MR BERGER: Well definitely, they would have been prosecuted as people who've already committed acts of violence in South Africa, because that was the information that you had.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, if we look at the other amnesty applications, we led them into ambushes on the RSA side and shot them dead. I refer to Swaziland and the infiltrations where people planted landmines and people were shot dead. These are still part-heard matters.
MR BERGER: Alright. Let's go from the position now that you didn't consider these alternatives because that was not your instruction, as I understand it and you've now met Mr McCaskill at the post office and he's told you that there are certain people at the house who are not part of the Meyer group and you said to him: "Go and get rid of them and then come back to us and tell us when they're gone." Am I correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR BERGER: When he came back to you and said it's all clear now, it's only the Meyer group at the house, you didn't query his information, you accepted it as valid and accurate.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because his information thus far was completely correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, can you just help me here? Did he not say that when McCaskill came back to him, he said that he managed to remove the people that he needed to remove from the house and that only ANC people were there, because that's a matter I want to raise with him after you've finished with him, as opposed to the group he was looking for?
MR BERGER: Well as I understand Mr de Kock's evidence yesterday, he said that when he refers to ANC members, he's referring to members of the Meyer group.
CHAIRPERSON: Okay.
MR BERGER: In fairness to you, that is what you said, isn't it?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, the Meyer group consisted of ANC members.
CHAIRPERSON: You see Mr de Kock, I just want to establish what McCaskill told you. Did he tell you that there were only ANC members there, or did he tell you that the group that you were looking for, that only that group was there?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that the persons who were there were ANC members and that those ANC members were the people that we were working on from the very beginning, in other words the Meyer group.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger can you just clear up, because I don't want anybody to misunderstand that? McCaskill came to give him the information that people left in that house or the group of people that were left in that house made up the Meyer group, or whether they were ANC people including the Meyer group and there were others who were not party to the Meyer group.
MR BERGER: I'll do that, Chair. Mr de Kock, you've heard the question.
MR DE KOCK: Correct.
MR BERGER: What exactly was Mr McCaskill's ...(indistinct - speaking simultaneously)
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson the group that we were looking for, the Meyer group which consisted of ANC members, was there. That was the comprehensive concept that existed.
MR BERGER: Yes, but ...(intervention)
MR DE KOCK: That the group that was there consisted of ANC members, that there were no members of the public involved, that there were no children eating ice-cream, these were ANC members, it was the Meyer group.
MR BERGER: But he didn't say that amongst those ANC members was the Meyer group, he said all those people at the house are members of the Meyer group, the group that is intending to cross into South Africa to commit acts of violence.
MR DE KOCK: I did not debrief him in front of the post office on the pavement, we were working on the Meyer group, it was an ANC group and the persons who were there were ANC members and they were the Meyer group. These two things were synonymous with each other.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr de Kock, perhaps you could assist us by explaining how you viewed the Meyer group. Who to you represented the Meyer group?
MR DE KOCK: The Meyer group was this group of Leon Meyer, which consisted of the terrorist group, their supporters, their sympathisers and those people who assisted them and all of them were ANC members.
ADV BOSMAN: Okay. Thank you Mr Berger.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And am I correct Mr de Kock that prior to your departure to Lesotho you already knew more or less of the number of persons that constituted the Meyer group, based on the source report and the information that you had received from Mr McCaskill and the estimate was that this group consisted of between 9 to 11 people?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it was in that vicinity, yes.
MR BERGER: Did you consider the fact that there were people at the house who were ANC members, but not members of the Meyer group?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I relied upon McCaskill's information which indicated that the persons whom we wanted and whom we had to stop and eliminate were those in the house.
MR BERGER: Yes but were there people in the house who were not the people that you were looking for, the people that you wanted to stop from entering the country the next day, or in the next few days?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, as far as I knew the group that we were going to attack was this group of terrorists.
MR BERGER: Let me do it by way of numbers. Let's assume that there were 10 people at the house and 5 of them were members of the Meyer group and the other 5 were ANC members who were not members of the Meyer group who did not intend ...(indistinct) into the country the next day, was it your understanding that that was the situation, say 5 and 5, or was it your understanding that all 10, everyone at the house, was part of the Meyer group who intended to cross into the country the next day?
MR DE KOCK: That all who were present at that house were ANC members and part of a group of terrorists and I can qualify for you that a terrorist group does not only consist of 3 to 4 persons who were crossing the border. Such a group had its couriers, its supporters, there were people who managed accommodation and transport for them and then there was also the command structure, because that group could not infiltrate the RSA without an order from someone above them. There were those who were their armourers, those who supplied weapons to them, their logistics persons, their financial persons, in other words such a group or a cell so to speak, consisted of various components which together made up one unit.
MR BERGER: Because what I don't understand is, I've always understood the evidence to be that the people who were targeted to be killed, were the people who were about to enter South Africa to commit acts of violence.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if one wants to deconstruct it to a very simplistic form, then yes, but the Meyer group was a group which consisted of at least 11 to 12 members and this was the terrorist group.
CHAIRPERSON: But Mr de Kock, just to assist you, I think that you should deal with the following for Mr Berger. you state that the only reason why you went to Lesotho was to execute an order. This order thus far, as I have understood it, was a planned journey to Lesotho in order to eliminate persons who, according to information, were planning to infiltrate South Africa soon and to plant a bomb or kill persons or whatever and thus far I have understood your evidence to indicate that this was your order and what Mr Berger wants to establish is whether or not you confirmed with your source that the persons that you were about to shoot dead, are the persons who were grid members, pertaining to the planned attack in South Africa in the following few days.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as I understood the source, these persons who were going to commit acts of terror, were at this house, at this central point and it was ensured as far as possible that all the persons who were involved with it, would be there and that there would only be ANC members.
CHAIRPERSON: No, that's the significant point. Mr Berger wants to know whether according to your information from the source, and I assume that this would be Mr McCaskill, the persons to whom he referred were still in the house and they were actually this group, all of which were members of the group which would infiltrate South Africa.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson according to the available information, yes.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: May I, Mr Berger, with your permission? Mr de Kock, were your specific instructions to Mr McCaskill to only bring those persons that constituted the Meyer group to this party?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall my specific orders as I issued them verbatim, but in general terms I can tell you that this group which was about to commit acts of terror, which was going to infiltrate the country, was the group of persons who were supposed to be at this party, at this central point for the purpose of the attack and he centralised those persons at that point.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: The instructions that you got from Brig Schoon were that you had to eliminate the Meyer group. Does it not follow that you would therefore instruct Mr McCaskill to make sure that he only brings in those persons that belonged to the Meyer group?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall precisely at the moment. I cannot tell you that I said: "Bring those three who will drive to Thaba N'chu and cross the border there.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: No, I'm not talking about people who were going to infiltrate the country, I'm talking about the Meyer group, that we already have evidence, comprised approximately 9 to 11 persons.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the Meyer group was the ANC terrorist group and these are the persons that he was supposed to gather together at that point for us and they were the persons whom he told us were at the house, they were also the persons that we attacked.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Now I'm clear with that aspect of your evidence. The reason why I'm asking this question is that Mr McCaskill on page 71 paragraph 19, he says he informed you who was at the party, that's line 1. Do you recall him informing you as to who was at this party?
MR DE KOCK: All that I can say, Chairperson is that the persons who were present at the party, were the persons who belonged to this Meyer group, those are the persons that he gathered together at that place.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. At least you verified that aspect with Mr McCaskill?
MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, I certainly would have asked him: "Are these the persons to whom you referred? I don't want to attack the wrong people."
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes, thank you.
MR BERGER: Mr de Kock, unfortunately there is still room for
confusion and it is actually a very simple matter. You recall Mr
van der Merwe when he testified, he said there was this threat,
the information you got was that those people were going to
cross the border and commit acts of violence before Christmas
or over the Christmas period and -
"I had to act immediately because I wanted to stop that
threat. I wanted to stop those people from entering South
Africa and committing acts of violence, so that's why I
gave instruction that those people should be killed."
That was his evidence. Do you remember that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: You then were asked whether that was possible, whether that could be done.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR BERGER: And you came back and you said yes, it can be done and you were then authorised to go ahead with the operation.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR BERGER: So it's not a question of wiping out a huge chunk of MK in Lesotho, that wasn't the purpose of the operation, it wasn't the purpose to get the Regional representative, it wasn't the purpose to get the people who provided logistical support, or anything like that. The purpose of the operation has always been, as I understand it, to kill those people who are about to come into South Africa to kill, am I right?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR BERGER: So when Mr McCaskill comes to you at the post office and says to you that there are a whole bunch of uninvited people at the house, you send him back to go and get rid of all of those uninvited people so that the people who are your targets, the people who are about to come in to kill, that they are the only ones left at the part, isn't that what you said to him?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson the order was and the request to him was to gather these persons who were going to infiltrate and commit acts of terror together, he did so and those are the persons whom we shot.
MR BERGER: So when he came back to you after you'd sent him back to the house to say: "It's alright now. All the non-targets have gone", his communication to you was that those people who were about to enter South Africa to commit acts of violence, those were the only people left at the party house. That is the information that he communicated to you, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, in other words there were no innocent persons there.
CHAIRPERSON: I think that we should be very cautious.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.
CHAIRPERSON: In terms of your order there were certain targets, no one else. That is what Mr Berger has put to you. Were your targets the only persons who were in that house?
MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, based upon the information given by the source, yes.
MR BERGER: Alright. Now you found out that one of your targets, in fact the leader of the group, according to you, Leon Meyer, had left the party and so you despatched Adamson and Coetser together with McCaskill to Leon Meyer's house to kill him and if it so happened, to take him alive.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: His wife was never one of your targets.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not a direct target but as an ANC member or person, she would most probably have been shot if she was in that house.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Why?
CHAIRPERSON: But we are referring to targets, according to your order.
MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, regarding the target, I would have to depend upon Mr McCaskill who told me that they were all ANC members, they were all members of the Meyer group and based upon that, I would deal with the situation.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Then we go to the other house.
MR BERGER: Now, you yourself recognised at the time that Jackie Quinn was not a target, am I right?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, in this regard that she was not an infiltrator.
MR BERGER: Exactly, whether or not she was an ANC member. Even if she was an ANC member, she wasn't a target, am I right?
MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't say that Chairperson. ANC members were targets wherever one found them.
CHAIRPERSON: She was not a target on this trip of yours because your instruction was not to attack ANC members in general, but this group whom, according to your information, was to infiltrate South Africa and kill persons.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, those who were members of the Meyer group.
MR BERGER: Mr de Kock, you keep wanting to have an escape route and I keep wanting to try and seal that escape route, so ...
MR DE KOCK: Let us just understand each other here. I testify here about a murder, I am not here to cover up anything whether you or any other person here have any other feelings, then I do understand, but I am not lying here and I am not trying to get myself out of this, I am telling you what the situation was. I was a person on the ground and I dealt with it on the ground and I am telling you now that I am not lying and if you will continue with this, then I should withdraw myself from here, but I am telling you here and now what is the truth today.
MR BERGER: When I ...
MR DE KOCK: May I just have a 5 minute adjournment, Chairperson? I am not feeling too well.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock are you ready to proceed?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I would like to apologise to the Committee and the family for the interruption.
MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: (cont.)
Mr de Kock, I need to get clarity because it's a question of preciseness and I need to know whether your information from Mr McCaskill was that the people left at the party, after the others had been removed by whatever means, that the people left were the people who were about to infiltrate South Africa to commit acts of violence.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it was the Meyer group and they were ANC members and they were terrorists and they would infiltrate and they were part of it.
MR BERGER: No, Mr de Kock. The people left, according to Mr McCaskill, the people who had not been removed, were they the people who were about to infiltrate South Africa to commit acts of violence or were there others there in addition to those who were about to commit acts of violence?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall exactly, Chairperson, there were ANC terrorists and there were persons about to infiltrate the country.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, I thought the witness had indicated that as far as he was concerned, as he understood his information, that the people left in that house were the members who were intended to infiltrate South Africa. That's what he said before we adjourned, that's how we understood it here.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, yes, then at the end he adds and part of, "'n deel daarvan" and that's why there's always room for confusion, that's why I - it's important that we get clarity on this.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Berger, wouldn't it be of assistance to you and us if maybe you had to pose a different question to find out what was his understanding of those who were about to leave the country and the Meyer group? Maybe the Meyer group is the same as the people who were about to infiltrate the country.
MR BERGER: Thank you Judge. Mr de Kock, when you talk about the Meyer group, who are you referring to? Are you referring to those who were about to enter to commit acts of violence, or are you including others as well?
MR DE KOCK: The Meyer group did not exist of just three persons, they were a group, as I have stated previously, a group of between 9 and 12 persons.
MR BERGER: Whose role was to do what?
MR DE KOCK: Committing acts of terror.
MR BERGER: To enter the country to commit acts of violence.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, acts of terror.
MR BERGER: So it did not include the Regional Commanders, it did not include people who were couriers, people who were providing food and other logistical support.
MR DE KOCK: The Meyer group, Chairperson, the original Commander was the Commander. Joe Meyer did not operate in a vacuum.
MR BERGER: So the Meyer group, according to you, includes those people who were not about to enter South Africa to commit acts of violence?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot say that Chairperson. I would there rely on the source that it is the Meyer group and the original Commander was part thereof and then Mr McCaskill would be entirely correct.
MR BERGER: If the Regional Commander was also about to enter the country to commit acts of violence.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was most probably the Commander and supporter thereof.
MR BERGER: Well, let me go a little wider. You see, you've said if Jackie Quinn was in the house, she too would have been killed.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, most probably.
MR BERGER: Now she clearly wasn't a member of the Meyer group.
MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson, I accept that she was.
MR BERGER: Well then let me ask you this. Have a look at page 4 of your amnesty application. Look at the top of the page, third line
"Maseru at that stage was patrolled by heavily armed army members of the Lesotho Defence Force. Approximately 30 minutes before we would hit the target house, we received the report from the source that two of the visitors of which one was a target, had left the target house. My recollection was that one of the persons was a coloured man, Joe. I deployed two members to go to the house of Joe and the other three members and I moved to the target house."
In your own words, Mr de Kock, only one of the two, Leon Meyer or Jackie Quinn, was a target, not both.
MR DE KOCK: Joe Meyer ...
MR HATTINGH: My Learned Friend wasn't asking the witness about targets, he was asking about who were members of the Meyer group.
CHAIRPERSON: Just rephrase your question.
MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock said he was unaware as to whether Ms Quinn was a member of the Meyer group.
MR BERGER: He said he accepted that she was. He said: "Ek het aanvaar dat sy was."
MR HATTINGH: Yes, but then he went on to say that she wasn't a target.
CHAIRPERSON: Let's just get this thing clear Mr Berger, perhaps this is the source of the problem. Are we ad idem that the two people who left the party were Joe and the deceased, Ms Quinn?
MR BERGER: Indeed.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, do you agree that the two persons who left the party were Joe and Ms Quinn?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: According to your statement, only one of the two who left the party was a target.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he would have been one of the infiltrators.
CHAIRPERSON: Who was that?
MR DE KOCK: That was Joe Meyer.
CHAIRPERSON: So therefore Ms Quinn was not a target?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not in the sense that she would have infiltrated, but she was part of the Meyer group and that came from Mr McCaskill.
CHAIRPERSON: What do you mean, "of which only one was a target"?
MR DE KOCK: Because Joe Meyer was the infiltrator, he was the active infiltrator who, during that time, would do the infiltration.
CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand you correctly? Not the entire Meyer group was a target that evening, but only those whom, according to the planned trip to South Africa, those persons were targets?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it's easy to sit here today and say only these three and only those two. This attack was launched at these persons who wanted to commit acts of terror in this country and if this was the Meyer group and this source gathered the Meyer group, then those were the persons we found there and we attacked.
CHAIRPERSON: But then I do not understand your statement. If Ms Quinn was not a target, then the question remains, why was she killed?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, then she was killed in the cross-fire.
MR BERGER: Well, Mr de Kock, your evidence is that according to your information Jackie Quinn was a member of the Meyer group.
MR DE KOCK: That's how I understood it from Mr McCaskill, yes.
MR BERGER: Right. The second point is, on the night of the attack that night, Jackie Quinn was not a target in your eyes.
MR DE KOCK: She was not an insurgent, no.
MR BERGER: She was not a target. Am I right?
MR DE KOCK: I shall concede. No she was not.
MR BERGER: And the reason she was not a target is because of what you've just said, is because she was not about to infiltrate South Africa, correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, correct.
MR BERGER: Therefore Mr de Kock, it must follow that not all members of the Meyer group were targets that night. Am I right?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if they were members of the Meyer group, they were targets.
CHAIRPERSON: So why does that exclude Ms Quinn?
MR DE KOCK: Well, Chairperson, I rely on the information which we received from a reliable source, that the Meyer group was involved in acts of terror and that the persons who were gathered at that house, were the persons who were involved in acts of terror and they were targets.
CHAIRPERSON: But on the one side you say, Mr de Kock, all the members of the Meyer group were targets and you also state that Jackie Quinn was a member of that group, but she was nevertheless still not a target and it is now put to you therefore, all the members of the Meyer group were not targets in this operation, only those who were part of the planned attack in South Africa, only those were targets in that operation. What do you say about that?
MR DE KOCK: That is open for interpretation, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: But this is from your statement and your evidence.
MR DE KOCK: I understand that, Chairperson, but it is not that simple with this type of operation, on ground level, they were part of the Meyer group, these were the people who were gathered there by Mr McCaskill and I shall stand with it. We attacked these persons and we killed them and I cannot take it any further than that.
MR BERGER: Mr de Kock, do you concede that on that night, not all members of the Meyer group were targets?
MR DE KOCK: That not all of them would infiltrate, that is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Targets, that's the question.
MR DE KOCK: No, the Meyer group was a target because they were all ANC members, they were part of a terrorist group and they were part of a group who were killing people and blowing up things and they were part of that group.
CHAIRPERSON: Then why do we follow your statement? According to your statement, Jackie was excluded as a target.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the only explanation that I can give you there, is that Joe at that stage was a direct insurgent.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that not the reason why Mr Berger puts it to you that only those who were part of the planned attack within South Africa, would have been targeted on that operation? It sounds logical.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, if one wants to see it that way, but now one does not want to sound light-hearted here, because it is not so, but I cannot walk into the house and 9/12 people are there and I say that: "You will not infiltrate, you stand one side, you go home and you will infiltrate and I have to shoot you". That is unfortunately how it worked in this type of operation.
CHAIRPERSON: I understand that, but we speak of Jackie Quinn in another house, that is the distinction.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I understand that.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And your problem, Mr de Kock, isn't your problem compounded by the fact that also on page 4 it's quite apparent that you gave specific instructions to Adamson and Mr Coetser to kill or if possible abduct only Mr Meyer and your instruction did not include Ms Quinn?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, usually we did not shoot women, but my instructions to my members were quite clear, that any resistance will be overcome, whatever the nature of it was and that is why I accept responsibility for my members' actions, because when a woman becomes involved in a fire fight, then she can be shot, as it has happened in previous applications.
CHAIRPERSON: That is the only thing, if they interfere in the operation, otherwise you should not shoot them.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because if they become actively involved here, then your own members would receive preference. I can mention two or three cases in Swaziland where we went to lock up the women in the bedrooms or in the bathrooms and we locked the doors.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Was it your understanding that the Meyer group did not consist of women?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not ask whether they were men or women. When one is trained in that regard you are a soldier and your sex does not count.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And if Ms Quinn was a member of the Meyer group, she obviously was a soldier?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, probably.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And she therefore would have been part of the execution of your operation?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, that does not mean that one would want to shoot her directly, but if she became involved, then she would be shot, yes. May I just qualify it further for clarity, so that one - so it is not said here that I am trying to avoid this whole issue. If we met 9 people in the house, we would have killed 9 people in that house.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Irrespective of whether they were women or men?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because in that type of situation on ground level, it is tremendously fluid. There is no laid-down rule the moment when one commences with this attack.
CHAIRPERSON: But Mr de Kock, the only basis that could justify the death of Ms Quinn, is if she interfered with the operation, am I correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the fact that she was elsewhere, may have brought about that she may have survived the attack. Probably, if she did not enter the ...(indistinct), that chance existed.
CHAIRPERSON: That is the only reason why she could have been killed that would justify that killing because she was not a target, she was not an initial target.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as a member of the ANC and a member of the Meyer group as we understood from Mr McCaskill, it was not excluded that she could be regarded as a target.
CHAIRPERSON: But in your statement you say that she was not a target.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, as I explained to you here that in this regard, a target would most probably mean the insurgent. That she was part of the Meyer group exposed her all of the time that she could be killed.
CHAIRPERSON: You see what compounds it further is that when you gave the command to Coetser and Adamson, you told them: "If it's possible, take Meyer", you did not say anything about Quinn. "If he cannot be taken, kill him", nothing about Quinn and that fits in into your first paragraph on page 4 of your statement, that she was not a target. Do you understand what I am trying to say?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I shall have to leave it open for interpretation and for argument, I cannot take it any further.
MR BERGER: Just before the adjournment, Chairperson. Mr de Kock, my understanding now from what you said is that you used the Afrikaans "infiltrant", infiltrator, only those who were on the verge of infiltrating were regarded as targets, am I correct?
MR DE KOCK: No, the Meyer group itself, were all a bunch of terrorists and it was not excluded that they would be regarded as targets there and according to that the source was tasked to gather the Meyer group, it was the prominent terrorist group and he also did gather these persons and they were also all killed.
MR BERGER: Even those who were not about to enter the Republic?
MR DE KOCK: If he was part of the Meyer group and he was there, as the source informed us, then he was killed.
MR BERGER: Even if he was not about to enter the Republic?
MR DE KOCK: Even if he did not cross the border of South Africa.
MR BERGER: No, not about to enter, even though he was not about to enter, still a target?
MR DE KOCK: The people in the house were targets.
MR BERGER: Mr de Kock, even if a person was not about to enter the Republic to commit an act of violence, but that person was a member of the Meyer group, you regarded that person as a target for assassination that night?
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, yes.
MR BERGER: Well then, my question to you is, why was Jackie Quinn not a target?
MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, haven't we exhausted this topic? Really this question has been asked over and over again and Mr de Kock has attempted to answer it. I'm not saying that he's given a satisfactory answer, but he has stated quite clearly that he cannot take the matter any further.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger he did in fact say - we'll have to argue about it. He conceded that the lawyers must argue about it, he can't take it any further. I don't know if maybe you're asking the question for some other reason, other than why we've dealt with it thus far.
MR BERGER: Mr de Kock if I can then just ask you this, was it your instruction to kill those who were about to enter the Republic to commit acts of violence, or was it your instruction to kill all members of the Meyer group irrespective of whether they were about to enter the Republic to commit acts of violence? Your microphone is off.
MR DE KOCK: My mandate was to wipe out this terrorist group who would infiltrate the Republic, who would commit acts of terror and who were involved in acts of terror.
MR BERGER: Your instructions included even those who were not about to enter the Republic to commit acts of violence, is that how you understood it?
MR DE KOCK: That is how I understood it, yes, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: Perhaps we could take the adjournment now.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Berger.
MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson.
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: (cont.)
Mr de Kock, would it be fair to say that your instructions to Adamson and Coetser were that they were to go to Leon Meyer's house and kill both Leon Meyer and his wife Jackie Quinn?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR BERGER: If you would turn to page 80 of your evidence at the criminal trial, Volume 2, line 14, you say
"And although the entire group of us who were there together..."
Sorry, it's Volume 2 page 80, line 14:
"And although the entire group of us who were there together, we were 6 in total, we would have launched the attack at the one house because all the ANC members were centred there. Upon our arrival at the scene, two of these persons had already departed, among others it was the coloured man Joe and then his wife and then I had to deploy two members who went with the source to this house, so that they could launch an attack there in order to kill Joe and one of the members remained seated in the get-away vehicle. We placed another member at the corner of a house because this house was situated next to Leboa Jonathan highway."
Why did you say at your criminal, "to kill Joe", when your instructions were to kill Joe and Jackie?
MR DE KOCK: We would have shot Joe in any case and I said that I left it open to them at the scene meaning that if they could bring him out, they should do so.
MR BERGER: No, that's not my question. My question is, two minutes ago you said your instruction was to kill Joe and Jackie. Here at the criminal trial you say: "Om vir Joe dan nou te dood". So what is it? Was your instruction to kill Joe, or was your instruction to kill Joe and Jackie?
MR DE KOCK: Most probably my evidence was not entirely thorough during my trial, the volume of what I had to say there was quite extensive and it may not have been as thorough.
MR BERGER: Well, have a look then at page 81 please. You say, or Mr Hattingh asks you
"Now this incident"
this is line 5,
"is this the incident which was recently served before the Truth Commission?
Your answer:
"That is correct. The woman who was killed there was a Miss or Mrs Quinn and I had an absolute doctrine, there was a very specific fixed rule that women and children would not be shot unless they entered the battle itself because any person who underestimated a woman's capacity, would be a dead man. I can assure of that. Women are just as committed and just as hard fighters as any man."
Then you go on, you say:
"However what happened is that she opened the door when this operative knocked on the door and when she saw him, this is according to him, she grabbed the weapon by the silencer and in a tugging action with the struggle, the silencer came off and he fired. He stormed into the house along with the second operative and they found this man Joe in the bathroom where he was assembling his handgun. He was in the process of assembling the weapon and they then attempted to take him prisoner to bring him with because he was the leader of this group. They shot him there as well. There was a baby in the house, he said and then there was also a black woman who was minding the child. There was a baby sitter and they were locked in a room. They then withdrew."
Now as I read your evidence, Mr de Kock, your intention was not to kill Jackie Quinn, but it was only because she grabbed onto the silencer that she was shot and killed.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson one would have foreseen that if they had been at the house where all of them were to be centralised, then there would have been a 99% chance that she would have been shot dead there as well.
MR BERGER: But Mr de Kock, that's not my question. You see, according to your evidence at the criminal trial, I referred you to page 80, now to page 81, Jackie Quinn was not intended to be killed. The only reason that she was killed, according to you, is because she grabbed onto the silencer and so circumstances arose at that particular instant which made it necessary to kill her.
MR DE KOCK: Yes at that stage, however on the other hand, if they had been at the house where they were centralised, she would have been shot there as well.
MR BERGER: But that's not the point of my question. The point of my question is that she had moved away from that house, from the party house, she had gone home with her husband and child and she was no longer a target, she only became a target because she got involved in the actual physical fight, but that doesn't square with your earlier evidence that your instruction to Adamson and Coetser was to kill her.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, she is dead. Yes, I foresaw this and the chances that she could die were 100%. She was shot dead. I accept responsibility for this.
CHAIRPERSON: But Mr de Kock, your evidence on page 81 of Volume 2, this is the record of the criminal trial, in the middle of that page at approximately line 13, it appears to me that there was a struggle for the weapon between Ms Quinn, who opened the door and the operative, as you described him in your evidence. Now was Mrs Quinn shot as a result of an accident during the struggle for the firearm, or was she shot dead in line with your order?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, what took place at the house is that she died there as a result of the altercation with Mr Coetser when she ripped the silencer off, but I did foresee that she could be shot, so I accept responsibility for that as well.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes I understand that.
MR DE KOCK: But she succeeded in tearing the silencer off and upon that he fired.
CHAIRPERSON: You see, the reason why I have put this question is that it appears at this stage that Coetser will not be giving evidence and I must consider your position in connection with the evidence as you have understood it, when he told you what took place there.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, they both told me what happened.
CHAIRPERSON: How far we could take the information that he gave you regarding those events, is another story and that is something that I will have to discuss with my Committee members, however I just want to clarify the facts as you understand them.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Now I understand that if she hadn't grabbed the firearm, it is very possible that she may not have been shot dead?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there is a probability.
CHAIRPERSON: Let's take it further. According to your evidence, she grabbed the firearm. Was she shot because she did that, or was she shot during the altercation or the struggle for the firearm? I am putting it to you that in that regard, it would then have constituted an accident.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I understand Chairperson. As I have understood Mr Coetser and Mr Adamson, when she grabbed the firearm, he fired, that was Sgt Coetser. Lieut Adamson did not fire. However I will not exclude the possibility that she would have been shot in either event, but in this case, she grabbed the firearm and ripped the silencer off and that is when he shot.
CHAIRPERSON: You see, yes, to me according to the record you state
"The operative knocked on the door and then she saw him. This is according to him. She grabbed the weapon by the silencer and in a tugging action with the struggle the silencer came loose and then he fired."
I just want to know how you understood it.
MR DE KOCK: That is how it was conveyed to me during the debriefing after the incident.
CHAIRPERSON: So it is possible that he never intended to shoot her?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that possibility exists.
MR BERGER: Mr de Kock, how is that possible, if you gave him an order to kill both of them?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was there on ground level and he also had to make his own decisions. He was an operative in his own right and from that point it was a deployed responsibility and he had to act according to his understanding of a scene, that is why one had to have thinking persons in unconventional warfare.
MR BERGER: ; There's a difference. Can you see that there's a difference between giving a direct order to kill someone and accepting the possibility, without giving the order, accepting a possibility that that person might get killed in the cross-fire. There's a difference between those two.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there is a difference, but something may occur which would result in it not happening.
MR BERGER: But you say that your express instructions to Coetser and Adamson was to kill both Joe and Jackie.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I stated that and I accept responsibility for that and they are dead now. Unfortunately I cannot do anything to repair that. Yes, they are dead, I gave the order, they are dead and yes, I did issue the order.
MR BERGER: ; Well you see, I want to put it to you that you didn't, you didn't give that order because you knew very well that Jackie Quinn was not a target.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, she was a target when she was at the house. I've already told you that McCaskill had gathered ANC members there for us, she was part of the Meyer group, I will abide by that, I cannot take it any further.
MR BERGER: If you had intelligence on the Meyer group, you would have known that Jackie Quinn was a school teacher legally employed in Lesotho. Did you know that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, she could also have been that.
MR BERGER: You would have known that she crossed regularly into South Africa from Lesotho and back into Lesotho from South Africa. In fact the last time she crossed was in July of 1985 with a passport, an official South African passport. You would have known that.
MR DE KOCK: Most probably there was information to that effect, yes.
MR BERGER: And that's why she wasn't a target and that's why you say what you say at page 4 of your amnesty application.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson there was not any information indicating that she was not involved with the ANC and their members and their activities.
MR BERGER: Isn't it now that you are accepting responsibility and saying that yes, you gave the order to Coetser to kill both Joe and Jackie because you're helping Coetser?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I am here, during a session of the TRC everything is upon us, I have said yes I said to kill them, I hope that you are satisfied. I am not here to assist Coetser. Coetser is here to put his own case and for me it would have been very simple to say Lieut Adamson did the shooting. If I did that I would be assisting Coetser. I am not prepared to lie because during the debriefing Coetser stated that he had fired the shots and he also shot Meyer and we have seen that the custom today is to place all the blame on the shoulders of the dead and I am not prepared to do that.
MR BERGER: Well, Mr de Kock, then I don't understand your evidence. I don't understand why you said what you said at the criminal trial and I will argue that at the end. I don't understand why you said what you in your amnesty application and I will argue that at the end. So you say that Coetser told you that he was the one who killed Jackie Quinn because she struggled and pulled the silencer off his gun?
MR DE KOCK: During the struggle, the silencer came off and he overcame that resistance and shot her.
MR BERGER: ; And did Coetser tell you that he also shot Leon Meyer?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, he and Adamson then passed Ms Quinn and found Meyer in the bathroom where he was busy assembling his pistol and he shot him there.
MR BERGER: Coetser shot him?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR BERGER: So Adamson didn't fire any shots according to the report you got?
MR DE KOCK: No, he did not fire any shots.
MR BERGER: They also told you, was it Coetser who told you about the baby sitter?
MR DE KOCK: It was Coetser and Adamson. During the debriefing, both of them were included in order to obtain both their versions.
MR BERGER: There wasn't a baby sitter, I'm putting it to you.
MR DE KOCK: Well, I'm telling you what was said to me. I don't have to create baby sitters, I'm telling you what was said to me.
MR BERGER: ; Well, perhaps you can help me with this Mr de Kock. How did Adamson and Coetser know that that baby sitter was not an MK soldier?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson.
MR BERGER: How did Adamson and Coetser know that that baby sitter was not part of the Meyer group?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson.
MR BERGER: You never asked them?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I asked them what happened there and they told me, there was nothing to be changed about it.
MR BERGER: What made you think that the women whom you found in the party house, that none of them were baby sitters?
MR DE KOCK: Well according to McCaskill, there were no other persons, or no other innocent persons there anymore, all the people present there were ANC members and we reacted to the information as such.
MR BERGER: You knew - of the 9 people who were killed that night, do you realise that 5 were women and 4 were men?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson I was looking at the persons whom we were shooting without taking into consideration their gender.
MR BERGER: Your philosophy is that you don't shoot women unless they actively participate in an attack?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR BERGER: And three of the women who were killed in the house that you entered were Lesotho nationals.
MR DE KOCK: It did not mean that they were not ANC members or not involved in ANC activities.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: May I interpose Mr Berger? Was your information, Mr de Kock that the persons who constituted the Meyer group also included Lesotho citizens?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, but they were ANC members.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Was that the information that was relayed to you by Mr McCaskill?
MR DE KOCK: All that information came from Mr McCaskill.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And how far was this house from the Post Office where you had a meeting with Mr McCaskill?
MR DE KOCK: In other words between the house and the post office? Chairperson, I don't know. I don't know whether it was a kilometre and a half or two kilometres. I'm not certain, I would not be able to give you an estimation of distance at the moment.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You were able to drive from the post office to the house. Are you able to estimate how long it took you in terms of seconds or minutes to get to this house?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I would not be able to tell you today because we did not travel to the house along the highway or the main street. We travelled through a suburb along the back route so that we wouldn't draw any attention.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You took a longer route?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we remained in the dark, we remained from the main street due to a high presence of military members.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And in your long route, would you say that you took longer than 5 minutes?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I don't know, I wouldn't want to speculate. It may have been 5 minutes, it may have been between 5 to 10 minutes. It wasn't a question of chasing off to a place. One would drive and observe all the areas around one. It may have taken longer.
MR BERGER: Thank you Judge. Mr de Kock, surely your Intelligence operatives would have told you if there were Lesotho nationals amongst the Meyer group?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson if one requested this specifically, but we were working with ANC members.
MR BERGER: Did you know the names of the people in the Meyer group?
MR DE KOCK: There were names, Chairperson, yes, however I cannot recall them.
MR BERGER: Well, do any of these names ring a bell? Lulamile Dantile?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chair.
MR BERGER: Leon Meyer, that you know?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: Vivienne Mathee?
MR DE KOCK: Have heard it.
MR BERGER: Monwabisi Mojole.
MR DE KOCK: It rings a bell. I'm not certain who that is.
MR BERGER: Numkosi Mary Mini?
MR DE KOCK: Have heard it.
MR BERGER: Mankaylang Mohatle?
MR DE KOCK: Does not ring a bell with me.
MR BERGER: Will Motau?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.
MR BERGER: Amelia Lesengyeo?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: Jackie Quinn?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: Those were the people who died that night. Some of those names you'd never heard of.
MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't say that I'd never heard them, it is just that after all this time I cannot recall and by nature of the situation, with Intelligence reports one would be dealing with a multitude of names, some of them were false names, some were the correct names.
MR BERGER: Morris Seabelo.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, I have heard that name.
MR BERGER: Glen Darries.
MR DE KOCK: Cannot recall at the moment.
MR BERGER: Trevor?
MR DE KOCK: Don't know.
MR BERGER: Temba?
MR DE KOCK: Don't know.
MR BERGER: You see, Mr de Kock, if you have a look at page 71 of Mr McCaskill's statement, bundle 2 page 71, he says at the bottom of page 71, paragraph 22
"I spent the whole Christmas"
this is now after the attack,
"I spent the whole Christmas in Bloemfontein at my brother's place. I was then taken to Ladybrand and thereafter I was taken to Pretoria by Lieut Andreas du Plessis. Eugene de Kock arrived an told me that only 6 people who died at the Lesotho killing were terrorists and 3 were Lesotho citizens. de Kock said that they could not pay me for other people who were killed because they were not ANC members."
Is that true?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson and I also don't remember who this Lieut du Plessis was.
MR BERGER: You see because Mr ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: But Mr de Kock, I don't believe that the identity of Mr du Plessis is of such grave importance. The point that Mr Berger wants to make is that for you, or if you at that stage knew that 3 of the deceased were persons from Lesotho and there was a disagreement regarding the amount of money which had to be paid over to him because he claimed so to speak for those who were not supposed to have been killed.
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, there wasn't a financial disagreement, and there was also not a disagreement regarding whether or not these persons were members of the ANC. These are persons that he himself identified and brought together as members of the Meyer group, not me or any other person except him.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you meet him when he was brought to Ladybrand?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, because by Christmas I was already back in Pretoria, so I could not have met him at Ladybrand.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Berger.
MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. You see Mr de Kock Mr McCaskill says at page 69 paragraph 8 that you and others promised him R5 000 for every so-called terrorist that he delivered to you that was killed.
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. Mr McCaskill in this regard is a stranger to the truth. He refers to a person by the name of Blackie there. There was no person by that name in my unit. No that is not so.
MR BERGER: Never mind if there was Blackie or whoever, did you ever promise Mr McCaskill R5 000 a head?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR BERGER: What did you promise him? R2 000 a head?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I told him what the official scale of remuneration was.
MR BERGER: And what was the official ...
MR DE KOCK: As I've already said, R2 000 per head, whether an ANC person was killed or captured.
MR BERGER: And lesser amounts for what? I don't understand. You say there was a scale, what was on the scale?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was an official remuneration scale, amongst others. An AK47 for example, if that was found, then the ...(indistinct) or person who pointed it out was R600, a hand grenade was R299 I think and then there were various scales for ammunition and for rocket launchers and so forth.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, the whole community during that time under the police and the informers and so forth, it sounds as if they could be described as an unreliable bunch and if you went to the authorities as said: "We have killed 10 people there and I need R20 000 to pay to this source", how did you then prove that you had indeed killed such a number of terrorists, as you referred to them?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the official reports which were received from Ladybrand later and went through Bloemfontein Security Branch was confirmation of the 9 people who were killed there and based thereupon, upon that confirmation the pay-outs are made.
CHAIRPERSON: How would they have known?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Ladybrand as I have said, not long afterwards they handed over the post mortem reports. There were sources within the police of Lesotho, so for them to get confirmation would not have been so difficult.
CHAIRPERSON: But you do not have to prove to your superiors that if you said 9 people, then they would accept it.
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, one would have to support that claim and then amongst others one would use reports, or the telex reports which came from the Regional Office would have to be attached or submitted along with this claim.
MR BERGER: Isn't it that after the event, you weren't certain if 8 or 9 people had been killed?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, as I reported it the following morning to Brig Schoon because of our haste in leaving the house, I was not certain how many people were killed.
MR BERGER: And the numbers that were bandied about were 8 or 9?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.
MR BERGER: 8 or 9 in total at the two houses. You see the
interesting thing, what I think is interesting anyway is you know
this unsigned statement of Mr Nortje, particularly at page 65 of
Bundle 2. In there Mr Nortje is purported to have said about a
third of the way down:
"Elvis was paid about R30 000 to R40 000 cash for
his information. The money came from the
authorities."
Now the way I do the arithmetic is, 8 people at R5 000 a person comes to ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: This is for information, is it not possible that that was a different amount as opposed to payment for killings?
MR BERGER: No Chairperson, I submit that if one reads the statement, it's clear that this is what Mr McCaskill was paid for his assistance.
CHAIRPERSON: The passage you read says that he was paid that amount cash for his information.
MR BERGER: Yes, I know, but I'm doing the sums, 8 people at R5 000 a head is R40 000.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: Mr McCaskill says in his statement that he wasn't paid what he had been promised because included in those who were killed were people who never should have been targets.
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he was paid out and it was R2 000 per person and he himself gathered that group at that house, not I or any other person, he himself with the assurance that those were ANC members and that was the Joe Meyer group.
MR BERGER: How did it work? Who actually paid the informer the money?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the claim would go into the Commander and from there to the Chief of Security and from there it would go to the Finance Section and from there a person like myself would pay him.
MR BERGER: Yes, so if he had been entitled to R40 000, that R40 000 would have come to you, you would have paid it over to him?
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: Is it not possible that an amount of R40 000 was paid out and you said to Mr McCaskill: "Because there were some Lesotho nationals involved or killed, the authorities have decided you're only going to get paid R2 000 per person, that's R18 000, here's your R18 000"?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the money, every cent was paid to him, McCaskill.
MR BERGER: Do you agree with me Mr de Kock, there was plenty of room in the way that informers were paid for the handler to pocket as much of the money as he wanted?
MR DE KOCK: No room was left for such a thing and I assure you that it did not happen. He was paid for what he wanted and he received every cent of it.
MR BERGER: R18 000?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, R18 000.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, you say Mr McCaskill could not have expected R40 000?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he could not.
MR BERGER: The two vehicles that you took into Lesotho, you went via a legitimate border post, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Correct, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: And then you burned the vehicles before you left Lesotho?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR BERGER: And what claims were submitted in relation to those vehicles when you got back?
MR DE KOCK: None, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: You must have said something in your report about why the vehicles were burned.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, I reported to Brig Schoon and this was verbally, that I had left two vehicles there. I did not want to run the risk of going through the border post the following morning again. My decision was to set it alight there next to the river and the reason for setting them alight was that all possible evidence, for example sweat and saliva and hair and fingerprints would be destroyed and on the other side, we had vehicles which could not be traced back to the SAP.
MR BERGER: But you had to make mention of that in your report?
MR DE KOCK: I did not write it in the report, this was done verbally.
MR BERGER: What part of your report was written?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, upon my report-back the Monday, if I recall correctly, I do not believe that - I drew up a brief written report, very brief and I know I did not mention the vehicles, that I discussed with him personally.
MR BERGER: What did you put into the written report?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall Chairperson.
MR BERGER: You must have confirmed that you had gone into Lesotho and that you'd killed - you'd eliminated the Meyer group.
MR DE KOCK: That's what I did with him telephonically Chairperson.
MR BERGER: So that also wasn't in your report?
MR DE KOCK: That I had telephonically called him? No Chairperson, I could have mentioned that information indicates that no fingers could be pointed back to the SAP and for example there were no injuries and we did not leave any equipment behind and so forth and I cannot recall, I would have to speculate.
MR BERGER: Well this was a top secret report. If you wrote in your report that the mission has been accomplished and there's no possibility of it being traced back to us, if you wrote that into the report, then that report must have been highly, highly confidential.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe that this would have been handled in the same manner as the one written in red, but when I received it back I destroyed it.
MR BERGER: So then why couldn't you add in what you had done with the vehicles?
MR DE KOCK: I could have, but I am now speculating. The whole time now I am speculating. I have told you initially that I cannot recall what I wrote in that report and whether I had given such a report.
MR BERGER: Let me ask you this then that you won't have to speculate about. How many people did you personally shoot and kill that night?
MR DE KOCK: I think 4 or 5 Chairperson.
MR BERGER: The man outside in the car.
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR BERGER: ; The woman who jumped on the back of Nortje.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct.
MR BERGER: Who else?
MR DE KOCK: And then there was a person in the toilet.
MR BERGER: A man or a woman?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know, I didn't have a look, I just shot and I left and then there were two persons in the bathroom, the one was already injured, him I shot again and then there was a person hiding under that person and I killed that one also.
MR BERGER: Men or women?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: 5 people?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR BERGER: And Mr Nortje?
MR DE KOCK: I accept that he must have shot 2 or 3. I know one person was still sitting in his chair as if he was sleeping. I think he had one shot through the head.
MR BERGER: And what weapon were you using?
MR DE KOCK: It was a British Pache, it is a factory manufactured weapon with an integrated silencer.
MR BERGER: You'll have to excuse my ignorance. Is that a rifle or is that a pistol, or a revolver?
MR DE KOCK: It's a sub-machine rifle of 9mm calibre.
MR BERGER: And Mr Nortje was using an Uzzi?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: Yours fired 9mm rounds, what did his fire?
MR DE KOCK: 9mm as well.
MR BERGER: And Mr Coetser, what was he using?
MR DE KOCK: He had a PPHS42, it's a Russian sub-machine gun that uses a 7.65 round, something similar to the ...(indistinct) round that was used by the ANC.
MR BERGER: And Adamson?
MR DE KOCK: He used a 9mm pistol.
MR BERGER: And all his bullets were accounted for?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know, I did not go and count everyone's rounds there, but he mentioned to me that he did not fire and Coetser confirmed it and I did not have a problem with it.
MR BERGER: And Mr McCaskill, was he armed?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR BERGER: Do you know that the Lesotho Liberation Army claimed responsibility for this attack?
MR DE KOCK: There was something like that in the media, in the press, yes, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: Do you know why they would have claimed responsibility for the attack?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know why, because we did it.
MR BERGER: Do you know of any collaboration between the police and the Lesotho Liberation Army?
MR DE KOCK: No, none.
MR BERGER: Can you confirm whether the Lesotho Liberation Army was a tool of the South African government?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot say whether they were a took but what I do know is that and this is unconfirmed information which I received from my friends at Military Intelligence, was that they were part of an army project and that is as far as I can take it.
MR BERGER: I want to read to you from a newspaper report at page 93 of Bundle 2. Do you see it's headed "Mystery Hit Squad swoop and kill 9 in Maseru"? Do you have the article?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR BERGER: The second paragraph says
"Lesotho Radio said South African Commanders using silenced weapons had been responsible."
Is that statement correct?
MR DE KOCK: Our Commandos would be equated to the Army, but the silenced weapons, that was correct.
MR BERGER: Then if you go down the page, do you see the paragraph about three quarters of the way down, which reads
"An 18 year old coloured, Richard McCaskill..."
do you have that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR BERGER
"Claimed he was a survivor of the raid and said 6 people had burst into the house where a party had been underway and had started firing pistols with silencers."
Do you know this Richard McCaskill?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson and he would not have been a survivor if we found him in the house and there were not 6 of us in the house, only 2 of us.
MR BERGER: But he got the silencer part right.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, I can only say that he will not have been a survivor and we were not 6. If he could count us, then he would have seen us and then we would have seen him.
MR BERGER: Then he goes on, he said
"The raiders' faces had been painted black, but there arms showing beneath short sleeves revealed white skin."
Were you painted?
MR DE KOCK: No, that's a fantasy because may I just say that I had a policy that the clothing that we wore, the moment when you throw your rifle over a fence, then you can walk into a restaurant, in other words your clothing must be suited to the operation but it should be suited to be able to mix with other people also. This is all ramble stuff, this painting your face black and everything else.
MR BERGER: If you go to the middle paragraph, the middle column, do you see half way down it starts
"At the other house ..."?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I have that.
MR BERGER
"At the other house in a well-to-do section of Maseru, the next-door neighbour who had heard muffled shots"
this is now at Leon Meyer and Jackie Quinn's house,
"said that 5 minutes later there had been a scratching at a lower window of her front door. The glass had broken and Ms Quinn (it's actually Mr Meyer) had dragged himself through, feet first, bleeding from the mouth and stomach. He had asked for pain killers and she had tried to telephone an ambulance but had been unable to get through. She had gone to the hospital to call one and by the time she had led it back to her house, Mr Quinn was dead. Police arrived and entered the Quinn flat to find Mrs Quinn dead and Phoenix unarmed"
ADV BOSMAN: Unharmed.
MR BERGER: Unharmed, I'm sorry. You see, still no mention of the baby sitter.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I do not have a problem with the fact that you ask me questions about it, but I shall go on what Adamson and Coetser told me and that is why I've said it here.
MR BERGER: ; And they told you that Mr Meyer had been - they couldn't capture him alive and so they had killed him?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was told that he was killed and he was killed in the bathroom. It would appear that it wasn't the case.
MR BERGER: Because if your objective was to interrogate him and later to kill him, surely once they had wounded him in the way that they obviously had, he would have been easy to capture and interrogate?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I do not know whether the man was unconscious and then regained consciousness afterwards. I can only say that the type of rounds used in the PPH are powerful and I do not know what his prognosis was after they shot him.
MR BERGER: Sorry Chairperson, would you just bear with me for a moment? When you - you never went to the house of Leon Meyer or Jackie Quinn?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: ; To this day you've never been to that house?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR BERGER: What is the address of that house?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall, Chairperson, I don't know.
MR BERGER: You've never known the address?
MR DE KOCK: I had an address which I phoned through then from Ladybrand and that is all that I can recall.
MR BERGER: Thank you Mr de Kock, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson. Mr de Kock you've just stated in response to a question by my Learned Friend or colleague Mr Berger that in respect of the question relating to Richard McCaskill, you stated that you don't know that person and if he was present at the house, he would certainly have been killed. Can I just refer you to the amnesty application of Mr Nortje in Bundle 1 on page 38 where he says right at the bottom of page 38, after he sets out the account of what took place at the home, he says
"One person escaped in the process."
Can you deny that one person had in fact escaped?
MR DE KOCK: No one escaped there Chairperson. After Mr Nortje went in, I went in behind him and no one passed us.
MS PATEL: Alright and then just to move on to another aspect, in relation to the weapons or the armoury that was taken on this operation, were explosives taken along?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think we had 6 or 8 hand grenades of Russian origin with us.
MS PATEL: Were they used?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MS PATEL: So Nofomela in his application to us, I refer you to Bundle 1 page 164, I will concede that his testimony in this regard is hearsay, but he says that
"Tebiso had informed me that they had thrown hand grenades at a house where the inhabitants were having a party."
You deny that that ever occurred?
MR DE KOCK: It did not happen, Chairperson.
MS PATEL: Alright. And then finally, just to move on to the aspect of "Spes. Magte's" involvement in Lesotho at the time, we've heard the testimony of General van der Merwe who states or who has stated to us that the purpose of, or in fact one of the intentions of going to members of CIC was not only to use them as a sounding board as to whether the operation would meet with approval or not, but also to ensure that there wasn't a clash between the different departments, that's how I - his evidence is correct. Yes okay, operationally, yet when one refers to Nortje's application to us, he refers to the fact that you and "Spes. Magte" who were involved in the Lesotho at the time, that you refused to share the source with them and that there was some clash between the two of you around that operation. Could you perhaps elaborate on this?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there was no clash and I do not know to which source he refers, because we only had the one source and this source was that of Ladybrand, so there can be no clash. I did not have any claim to any of their sources.
MS PATEL: No, to your source, Nortje refers to your source that you refused to share with "Spes. Magte", do you deny?
MR DE KOCK: No, there was no clash between myself and Special Forces, none whatsoever.
MS PATEL: Did you not liaise with Special Forces at all during this operation?
MR DE KOCK: I did meet with their representative. I told you it was Mr Peter Stanton, but I did not meet any of their members. However in January I met some of the people there who said that at that time they were there, but because of our action, they did not launch any action.
MS PATEL: In your criminal trial you mentioned on page 79 that the BSB was also present in Lesotho at the time and your words specifically are
"To execute these attacks."
What is that a reference to?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson as far as I know, they planned to attack Lesotho as well during that same time.
MS PATEL: Lesotho as in who specifically?
MR DE KOCK: Well more specifically Maseru.
MS PATEL: Okay and who specifically in Maseru would they have attacked as far as you know?
MR DE KOCK: I do not know, Chairperson. If I can draw an inference and I will have to speculate, it must have been the same as it was in 1982 or 81 where 50 or 60 people were killed.
MS PATEL: You used the words specifically "om hierdie aanvalle uit te voer". What does "hierdie" refer to?
MR DE KOCK: The attacks on the ANC, Chairperson. We did not attack anybody else there, we did not attack the police or the Defence Force there.
MS PATEL: "Spes. Magte" in terms of the "riglyne" that has been alluded to in the various SSC CIC minutes, they would have had the jurisdiction, so to say, to launch the operation that you had in fact launched unlawfully, not so?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson.
MS PATEL: Well I put it to you that they would have.
MR DE KOCK: If you can testify to that then that will be okay.
MS PATEL: Why, given that they were already present and working in the Lesotho area at the time, can you comment on why they were not requested to carry out this operation?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot assist you there. I had my instructions and it was clear and I took it from there.
MS PATEL: Do you know whether Schoon was aware of "Spes. Magte's" involvement in Lesotho at the time?
MR DE KOCK: I do not know, Chairperson.
MS PATEL: Would this have been knowledge that, or information that would have come through from your Intelligence reports at the time?
MR DE KOCK: Not from mine, no Chairperson.
MS PATEL: From the region that was eventually sourced back to Pretoria, would it not have formed part of the general intelligence reports that were received at the time?
MR DE KOCK: It could have been Chairperson, I would not know.
MS PATEL: And Schoon had access to those reports as you did?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we all read the same reports.
MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, have you got any ...(intervention)
MR HATTINGH: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, shall we commence with the final aspect that Ms Patel has questioned you about? You say that you had access to the reports that Brig Schoon read?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And in those reports, did you see any reports about the presence of Special Forces or any undertaking of their's to be involved in that operation?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: You were questioned in detail as to whom you wanted to go and shoot there and who you were planning to shoot there and so forth. May I ask you on a hypothetical basis, or before I ask you that, did you have the capacity to use your discretion?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And this is set out in the supplementary affidavit with regard to Vlakplaas and there you deal comprehensively with that discretion?
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And Gen van der Merwe also testified about this?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: On other occasions he confirmed that part?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: We know what your order was, but if you had arrived there and found Mr Chris Hani who was not active in that area, wasn't he?
MR DE KOCK: I am not certain.
MR HATTINGH: Well, let us just name him as a well-known leader of MK.
MR BERGER: Mr Chairperson with respect, the question which ends: "Nie waar nie?" is as leading as one can possibly get.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.
MR HATTINGH: Was Mr Hani the leader of MK?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was.
MR HATTINGH: I beg your pardon, I think my microphone wasn't on. Was Mr Hani the leader of MK?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And if you had entered the house, you had an order to eliminate the Meyer group, you did not have any information indicating that Mr Hani was part of the Meyer group, but you found him there, what would you have done?
MR DE KOCK: I would have shot him.
MR HATTINGH: You recall the evidence of Brig Schoon in this regard, not with regard to Mr Hani, but with regard to what your duty would have been should you have found other ANC members of leaders at the house where the Meyer group was? Do you recall this?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Can you tell me in general what he would have expected of you?
MR DE KOCK: He would have expected of me to act and to shoot them.
MR HATTINGH: Yes. On page 796 I ask him
"So that if Mr de Kock and his cohorts encountered these members or some of these members who wanted to enter the country in the presence of other ANC members, you would have expected them to act against those ANC members as well?"
and he answers:
"Yes, I would have expected that."
And then I ask him:
"And Mr de Kock would then have had to use his own discretion in his capacity to take action against such persons?"
and he answers:
"Yes."
Then I ask him:
"Because we have already heard and I have also been instructed by my attorney that the Committee has heard such evidence, that it was expected of Vlakplaas members to apply their own initiative to act according to their own discretion and not always to wait only for instruction"
And Brig Schoon says:
"Yes, that is correct."
And I say to him:
"And Gen van der Merwe also gave similar evidence before the TRC, is that correct?"
and he says:
"Yes, that is correct."
Do you agree with that evidence?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Now how much time did you allow yourself for this operation?
MR DE KOCK: For the execution of the active killing of the persons?
MR HATTINGH: Yes.
MR DE KOCK: I allowed myself a minimum of two minutes and a maximum of five minutes.
MR HATTINGH: And did you have a lot of time to walk in and make observations before you went over into action?
MR DE KOCK: No, not at all.
MR HATTINGH: Did you know whether there were MK members in the room, or in the house?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that was the information from the source.
MR HATTINGH: Did you know whether or not they were armed?
MR DE KOCK: No, I suspected that they would be because they were trained terrorists.
MR HATTINGH: Did you foresee that you could possibly be attacked or that they could defend themselves against an attack?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was the chance for defence or resistance.
MR HATTINGH: You were asked why you didn't wait for the persons to enter the country. This was upon my Learned Friend, Mr Berger's expression of luring into an ambush. How did you regard the term ambush or trap?
MR DE KOCK: Usually, depending upon the information, a trap or an ambush would have to be planned a number of days in advance.
MR HATTINGH: Was an ambush ever planned in order to effect an arrest?
MR DE KOCK: No, it was to kill. All doctrines of an ambush state that you shoot everything that moves.
MR HATTINGH: You have also applied for two such incidents where persons from neighbouring states and particularly Swaziland were waited for and were lured into an ambush.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there were three incidents.
MR HATTINGH: Three? Very well and what took place during these incidents?
MR DE KOCK: All of them were shot dead.
MR HATTINGH: Was there an informer involved in such incidents?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, with one of them.
MR HATTINGH: And what happened to him?
MR DE KOCK: He was also shot dead.
MR HATTINGH: Is this something that you preferred?
MR DE KOCK: No, not necessarily.
MR HATTINGH: You stated that many things could have gone wrong if you had waited for them to enter the Republic before you acted against them. You have also mentioned that they may have entered via another border post or at another time. Can you think of more examples of things that could have gone wrong if you had decided to wait for them and to lure them into an ambush?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a variety of things or possibilities, but I could also have lost some of my own people and that was not even a consideration, it wasn't permissible at all.
MR HATTINGH: In what way would you have lost some of your own members?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they could have fired back and killed or injured some of my own members, some of these persons could then have escaped and could have continued with their own campaign of terror.
MR HATTINGH: With the other incidents during which people were lured into an ambush, did they succeed in escaping?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: Was any attempt made to eliminate the persons that they had brought through at the border post?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, those who were waiting at the border fence and who were armed, were also shot dead.
MR HATTINGH: Was any attempt ever made to get hold of the person who had transported them in, or who had facilitated their journey?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Did anybody ever succeed in escaping?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: I think you have already answered this question but if you had succeeded in abducting and interrogating Mr Meyer, what would have been his ultimate fate?
MR DE KOCK: He would have been killed.
MR HATTINGH: What was the reason for this?
MR DE KOCK: In the first place, Chairperson, we would not have been able to take him to Court and secondly he would have been able to identify us.
MR HATTINGH: And once again, in the document pertaining to Vlakplaas, the supplementary bundle pertaining to Vlakplaas, you deal comprehensively with Vlakplaas as a covert institution.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: What was your order regarding the secrecy of Vlakplaas as a police unit?
MR DE KOCK: In as far as possible and even beyond the parameters of the law, it was to remain a secret.
MR HATTINGH: We are aware that Vlakplaas was later exposed when Mr Nofomela and Mr Coetser made their revelations. When was this, can you recall?
MR DE KOCK: 1989.
MR HATTINGH: And these incidents took place in 1985?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Was Vlakplaas at that stage, as far you knew, still a covert institution?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Very well, in your evidence you have already mentioned that there was conflict between Mr P W Botha and Mr Leboa Jonathan regarding the issue or the fact that ANC activists were being accommodated there and were permitted to launch attacks on the RSA from Lesotho.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: You have heard the evidence of Gen van der Merwe in which, among others, he quotes from speeches which were delivered by Gen Malan in Parliament, this is on page 7 of Exhibit A
"Security Forces will hammer them wherever they find them. What I'm saying is the policy of the government. We shall not sit here with our hands folded, waiting for them to cross the borders, we shall settle the hash of those terrorists, the fellow travellers and those who help them."
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: This was in the Hansard Report of 1987, but before this incident, had you ever heard similar statements?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson but I also saw actions in Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana before this incident.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, where indeed action was taken against persons in neighbouring states.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And if you were to have waited until the persons had entered the RSA and if you had arrested them then, would that have taught Lesotho any kind of lesson?
MR DE KOCK: No it would not have.
MR HATTINGH: What took place, according to your information, after this incident happened, this incident pertaining to the so-called ANC activists in Lesotho?
MR DE KOCK: I think that the first deportations of ANC persons began approximately 2 to 3 weeks subsequent to the incident. I cannot recall the precise dates, but it would have been approximately after 2 to 3 weeks and the entire structure of the ANC within Lesotho collapsed.
MR HATTINGH: Would you have achieved that result by acting against these activists here in the Republic?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: Upon the evening of the incident when you established contact with Mr McCaskill at the post office, did you think that he possessed more information than that which he had conveyed to you up to that point?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he gave us everything that he had and as he had it.
MR HATTINGH: What would you have expected if he had possessed new information which was relevant with regard to the action?
MR DE KOCK: That he would have offered it immediately.
MR HATTINGH: Did he offer such information?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, when he stated that there were two persons who had departed from the house.
MR HATTINGH: But apart from that information, any other information indicating that persons had asked him to transport them or to depart with them on the following day?
MR DE KOCK: No, he did not say anything like that.
MR HATTINGH: Did you know with what vehicle Mr McCaskill drove around?
MR DE KOCK: No, to this day I still do not know which vehicle he drove.
MR HATTINGH: You gave evidence that Mr McCaskill would have received R2 000 per person.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, with regard to ANC members.
MR HATTINGH: Did you see in the newspaper reports among others, to which Mr Berger referred in his cross-examination of you whether or not any mention was made of the number of persons which were killed during the attack?
MR DE KOCK: I think it was 9.
MR HATTINGH: Just for the sake of example, page 92 of Bundle 2 or Volume 2
"9 people shot dead in last week's mystery ..."
and then on page 73, the report that he dealt with in his cross-examination of you in which it is also stated that 9 people were killed.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: How many or how much did Mr McCaskill receive according to you?
MR DE KOCK: R18 000.
MR HATTINGH: And did you read his affidavit?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Will you have a look at it? It is on page 72 of the same bundle, Volume 2. He states
"I was made to sign a blank piece of paper and given R18 000"
so he admits that he received R18 000.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but he wasn't given any blank paper, he signed for his money.
MR HATTINGH: What was the policy of the police when an informer received his money? Was he supposed to sign a receipt?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And what happened to this receipt?
MR DE KOCK: It would be handed back to Head Office and attached to the original document.
MR HATTINGH: As proof that he had then received the money?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: I just want to have confirmation from you regarding your book. Mr Gordon, did he obtain all the information embodied in this book from you personally?
MR DE KOCK: No, he cleared up certain aspects here and there, but most of it came from my amnesty application.
MR HATTINGH: Did he give you the opportunity to examine the correctness thereof before publishing?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: So if it said that this story is told to him by you, Eugene de Kock, it would not be correct?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: With reference to the book, what happens to your share of the profits of this book?
MR DE KOCK: It is invested in a trust account which is managed by Mr Hugo's attorney, or firm of attorneys. It is there for the benefit of those who have suffered as a result of the former dispensation on both sides.
MR HATTINGH
"This book is Eugene de Kock's, as told by him to Jeremy Gordon. The foreword, interlude and afterward represent the views of Jeremy Gordon alone. The royalties from this book have been donated by Eugene de Kock to the victims of apartheid and their families. In a statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission at Port Elizabeth on 1st October 1997, de Kock said doing so would 'be a small gesture' towards reconciliation. It is minimal, but it is all that I can do at this stage. The money should be put into a trust fund and the families on both sides of the spectrum should benefit from the fund, especially the youth."
Do you confirm that inscription as your attitude in this regard?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
ADV BOSMAN: Mr de Kock there is just one matter regarding which I do not have complete clarity in my own mind and this is about the content of your order to Lieut Adamson and Sgt Nortje. Can you recall how this was formulated, or isn't it possible for you?
MR DE KOCK: No, it would have been very brief and very cryptical.
ADV BOSMAN: So it would not have been explicit, in other words, is that your evidence?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I could say that it wasn't that explicit. We didn't have time to negotiate with one another.
ADV BOSMAN: You see, what confuses me is that I was under the impression that you stated specifically for them to shoot Leon Meyer and Jacqueline Quinn, but that if they were capable of taking Meyer alive, they should do so and later it appeared to me as if you said that he had the discretion to shoot if there was anybody else and that is where my confusion lies. Can you assist me in any way?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot take it any further than that because I cannot repeat it verbatim for you today and place it within the context of that precise moment.
It makes it difficult for one to provide clarity.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you Chair.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr de Kock we have previously heard in other amnesty hearings that the police had a verification system of information in order to determine the reliability of information supplied to them by informers, simply because of the great possibility which existed of informers giving them wrong information at times in order to make a quick buck. Do you agree with at least that ... (intervention)
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: We have previously heard from other amnesty hearings that the police had a verification system of information whereby information supplied by informers would be verified through other sources in order to determine its reliability to exclude the possibility that existed of informers giving wrong information for financial gain, to make a quick buck.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, one would, as far as possible, one would try to do that verification.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And you have stated in your evidence that whereas Mr McCaskill was previously handled by Willie Coetser, am I correct?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: There came a time when there was no need for Mr Coetser to be present for Mr McCaskill to give information that he had in connection with the Meyer group, he was able to give that information directly to you without having to go through his handlers.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was during that last week while we were busy arranging the operation.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So you had a week wherein information was supplied to you directly by Mr McCaskill?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I had no reason to doubt him and I believe that Mr Coetser would have warned me if he picked up something from his channels that Mr McCaskill was misleading us because that could have cost us our lives.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: How did you verify the information that was supplied by Mr McCaskill to you?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I had no reason to doubt what he gave us and we would have received a warning prior from Ladybrand's Security Branch if anything else had happened.
I did not have a private source that was linked up next to Mr McCaskill, I was dependant on Ladybrand Security Branch.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So in short, was the information that was given directly to you by Mr McCaskill ever verified by you to determine its reliability?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the verification to me was the fact that at no stage I was warned that Mr McCaskill was misleading us and that foundation has been laid down when he previously worked for Ladybrand Security Branch.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So you trusted him to give you the right information and you simply relied on his say so?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it was not only just simply. May I put it as follows? It was that Mr McCaskill had our lives in his hands because we could have walked into a house and we could have walked into 20 ANC members with AK 47's.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So you trusted him because your lives were at risk?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, this type of action is a risk, a very high risk.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: No to move to one aspect which is troubling me. You must be aware that when you organise a party, you have people whom one can really say their job is to sniff out parties, they don't wait for an invitation, they go to where the noise is and they gate-crash. i mean that's a known thing, is it not?
MR DE KOCK: I do not know, Chairperson. In my culture if you are not invited and you go to a party, then you will catch a hiding.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Let me assure you Mr de Kock that amongst the African people, once you have a party, you just cannot stop people from inviting themselves.
MR DE KOCK: I know that Chairperson.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And having stayed with some of the Askaris, they probably would have shared that piece of information with you.
MR DE KOCK: ; Yes, Chairperson, I am quite familiar. In all the units where I served there were black members.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Now did Mr McCaskill explain to you how you would prevent gatecrashers from inviting themselves to the party house from the time when he left the house to meet you at the post office, up to when you were to come back with him to the party house?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson upon our meeting the first time at the post office, he warned me that people had arrived there and if I recall correctly who were not invited and that there were family members of his there and he was requested to remove those persons, which he then did.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But did he tell you how you would prevent a further occurrence of the people inviting themselves to the party house from the time when he left for the second time to meet you at the post office? Did he explain to you what measures he had put in place to prevent a similar occurrence of people inviting themselves to the house?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because at that stage the only thing he mentioned was that two persons had left, that his family was no longer there and we were ready for the attack.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: During the cross-examination by Mr Berger, I asked you a question how far the house was from the post office, you recall that?
MR DE KOCK: That's correct yes.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Why I asked that question was to have a picture in my mind of the distance, to be able to assess just how great a possibility existed of people inviting themselves to the house whilst he was on his way to meet you.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, may I put it as follows? One can certainly not exclude the possibility that the moment when Mr McCaskill took the first corner, people amongst others came around the corner and arrived there, but this leaves me open to further speculation, it could have been more ANC members.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Or it could have been more Lesotho citizens, people who are gatecrashers.
MR DE KOCK: I think we can leave ourselves open there, Chairperson, if we start to speculate about this.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You foresaw that possibility, did you not?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, at that stage I no longer followed the possibilities. We were 5 to 10 minutes from the attack, it was right now. Too many aspects to think about and at that stage one starts to exclude those aspects, for example people would arrive there and so forth but may I mention that Mr McCaskill's information was of a high degree and it appeared to be so later on.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Nortje has stated in his written application that he knew some of the people who were killed in this operation and I think you mentioned specifically one Ms Mini, because he had sight of the photographs. had you had also an opportunity of having sight of the pictures of people who were identified as "the Meyer group"?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I may have seen photos. I do believe if there were I would have had a look at them, but may I relate an experience to you which I experienced in my life? A photo of a person who is still alive differs very much from a person who is dead, sometimes it looks like two different people, so that may only be from my perception but that is my experience that I had personally.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But if you had had sight of Ms Mini's photograph, would you not have been able to recognise her as you stormed into the house?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we were not looking at faces, we were looking at targets. I, for example, could not shoot the person on the back of Mr Nortje's back. I struck the person with my firearm and then shot. One does not try to identify and do it first. We here work with fractions of seconds.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. As you have already stated during Mr Hattingh's re-examination, ...(indistinct) situation, anything that moves gets shot at.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct Chairperson. In 1976 I had my first training with that situation.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, I think specifically Vlakplaas had methods to find out whether they could identify certain people before they killed them, is that not so?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the ...(indistinct) was to show photos to askaris and then the identification could be made.
CHAIRPERSON: Was anything like this done before this incident?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, not as far as I know.
CHAIRPERSON: Why not?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this operation, the cards were played close to our chest and we had a source right in the core of this group.
CHAIRPERSON: But that is what I'm for, but may I just ask something of you before I return to that? Why did you threaten him at the post office?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at that stage I tried to ascertain that he was not turning back. One had to be careful with any source so that they would not lead one up to a point and lead one into an ambush. It was an issue of: we are here now, you brought us here and we cannot turn back now. He could of course, after he left there just drove away and stayed away and then we could not have launched the attack.
CHAIRPERSON: So you did not completely trust him?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson there are various categories of sources, but no, I did not completely trust him. If a source works only because of moral values, that's different than a person who sells out for money. It may be so that he sold his friends for R2 000 and he sold me for R10 000. One has to be careful with such persons.
CHAIRPERSON: But if you did not completely trust him, why did you not try to determine whether you had placed yourself in a position to see whether you would kill the correct persons?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we killed the correct persons.
CHAIRPERSON: Well we can argue that, but ultimately it is so, but beforehand you did not know who you would find in that house?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, Mr McCaskill informed us who we would find in the house. It does not help to say that we did actually kill the correct persons there.
CHAIRPERSON: I am trying to determine, how did you approach the whole situation, so that you could kill the correct persons, seen in the light of the fact that you did not trust the source entirely?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the source's information, the foundation upon which all his other information was based and the manner in which he supplied his information and the proof he supplied, the controlling of the other sources in order to confirm his information, all of this were contributing factors to confirm his credibility, but I am an operative and I am the person who would do the shooting or who would be shot and I shall keep open all my options.
CHAIRPERSON: You were aware of how parties acted in those areas and you conceded to my colleague that you - that many people could come to such a party.
MR DE KOCK: It's possible Chairperson that something like that could happen.
CHAIRPERSON: Would you have killed all those persons, even if they were not members of the ANC if there were other people there?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the manner in which the source organised this party and arranged it and even the fact that we sent him back in spite of the risk, this is actually an extended risk to us, so that he could remove persons who were already there who were not supposed to be there, should be a sign that we did not go there because of our blood thirst, we tried where we could to avoid unnecessary casualties.
CHAIRPERSON: Please do not read anything into this that I want to ask you. You served for many years in the Security Police and you led a certain life along with that and thereafter you found yourself incarcerated. If one day you should be released, do you think you would be able to come and live in society without any problems?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, this is something that I have thought over many a time and amongst us, senior members have asked me the same question and my advocate has asked me the same question. Yes, Chairperson, I do think I can make a contribution to prevent any of this happening ever again.
CHAIRPERSON: Please continue.
MR DE KOCK: On the one side one does not know whether I should stay in the country or whether I should leave. In my opinion it would be a negative step. There are various factors and emotions involved here, but I do not believe that I have a problem with the community, I do not know what the community's attitude towards me will be.
CHAIRPERSON: Now you suffered in that life in the sense that lived in the police, but as I understand all your written applications, you believed in apartheid and you did all these things on behalf of the government of the day. At least to an extent, you had to believe in apartheid itself and supported it, what do you think of it now?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a confusion of emotions then that is one of the things that I have to live through, but I do not believe that it is necessary for apartheid to hurt and to kill and ultimately we realised that it was a person who wanted to maintain their power at the cost of the black communities and even the white communities and I feel that 95% of our time and ideas and energy was spent in being unconstructive and not being constructive or creative. I do not have a problem with a black party, it's just that I joined the wrong party, the IFP, ultimately. May I put it as follows: the attitude of Head Office, not only here but in Ovamboland and those who do not like it will have to take it in the context that I say it, I do not mean it bad: "Let de Kock work with the kaffirs because he works with them well", that was Gen Smit's attitude and all my units were black units and I brought them up to units which today in certain regards they would be regarded as good units and in other ...(indistinct), they were not such good units.
CHAIRPERSON: But Mr de Kock, those black people who worked with you, they were traitors, they killed black persons. Everything they did was on behalf of the government of the day in the name of apartheid. What I would like to know, the reason why I ask this is important for certain reports. What is your attitude to a system like apartheid, forget about who you were working with, apartheid as a system?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I did not know any other system but apartheid, that is one of my problems.
CHAIRPERSON: But that is the point.
MR DE KOCK: I did not live in any other system that I know, how would it be if it was different? I am not trying to play Makareli here but I don't know.
CHAIRPERSON: That is why I ask. If you are released now, things would be a little different. Not entirely but we're getting there. How would you fit in?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I have placed out some tentacles here and there and that tentacle is not very far from us, but most probably I shall make myself available to a Black State, a legal government outside this country. With regard to non-government organisations, I may not be able to - I may have to handle them and if I have to attach my charge sheet to my CV that will not work, but I would train people, or help to train people to secure their own areas and that is specifically in land mine areas instead of them blowing themselves up so that they could secure those areas and clean up those areas and rebuild those areas with regard to agriculture and other things that are attached to that, paramedics and education, but these are only ideas that I have. From management side, I do not have a problem, I have dealt with management in the past, but I say specifically in another country, because these are black countries, this is not a country with a white government or with a majority white government because I do not know whether I have a place in this country and I do not want to test that.
CHAIRPERSON: A final aspect, as a consequence of your history and how you lived in the Police Force, do you think that most of the people who were guilty of similar offences, including yourself and this took place over a long period of time, probably they do not know anything else. Do you think it is necessary to receive treatment for it?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would say that those persons would have had to be treated a long time ago, but not only the security persons, I am here referring to ANC and PAC, because they also suffer and they suffer tremendously. I think that all of us, even myself, the incarcerated, we should have written to someone, but we would neglect our duty if we do not look after these people and I have an additional cross which makes it difficult for one because many a time I have asked myself the question. I was charged, I was convicted and I was incarcerated. Other persons who did the same and if we look at the Cronje matters which were actually vampire in nature, without trying to sling mud at each other, but those persons' integrity, their values were maintained because they were not charged and incarcerated because I have an additional cross and burden that I have to carry and overcome and if I refer to - I have to help my people, then it is not only the Defence Force and the Police Force, it includes the whole entire spectrum and that includes members of the ANC and PAC because those persons suffer from the same problems that most of the rest of us do.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.
MR DE KOCK: Thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I don't think there's any point in calling another witness.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
