CHAIRPERSON: It does not matter, he can remain seated there.
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Please be seated.
EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr de Kock, you are the applicant in this matter, your application appears on page 1 to 58, where you deal with the background and political motivation, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HUGO: And then you deal with the incident from page 59 to 66 of the Bundle, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HUGO: And just for clarity sake you would just like to refer to the supplementary document that deals with Vlakplaas, the way it was established and the workings thereof, and you would also like it to be included into your application?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.
MR HUGO: And just for clarity sake, it is also completed as it is here?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HUGO: Concerning the incident itself, you left the date open but out of evidence given here that the run up to and the incident itself, the attack in Botswana took place on the 28th of March 1988, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, I would consider it as correct.
MR HUGO: You say in your application that Brig Schoon approached you, can you maybe just in your own words tell us what the date was and what happened in this discussion.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, one morning approximately two mornings before this happened, Brig Schoon and members of the Defence Force, senior members of the Defence Force, amongst others Kat Liebenberg, Gen Joubert, Brig Serfontein also from the Defence Force and then two senior Colonels from National Intelligence arrived at Vlakplaas where discussions were held concerning the creation or establishment of an arms cache.
Brig Schoon requested me to get a certain amount of weapons from an Eastern bloc or Russian origin as well as handgrenades, also from a Russian origin, as well as limpet mines and landmines. He gave me the instructions that if I needed any weapons, I must go and pick it up at Head Office from Col Drury.
I did go and pick up weapons from Col Drury, it was only a few AK47's with a fold-up butt, AKM, the ANC only used AKM, they did not use the normal AK47's. The rest of the AK's, we got from Vlakplaas' own storage. We also ensured that it was Russian ammunition. For each weapon we gave two or three magazines.
Then we took ten landmines with detonators, we prepared them. I can remember them, because we had to clean the landmines and wash them out, to get all the sand off them, sand that was found in Ovamboland and to take off, also to remove all the fingerprints off them. We then sealed them, the limpet mines as well as the landmines, we also had to clean.
There was also sand stuck to them. The magazines we also washed and cleaned. We then, I then handed this over to Martin Naude.
MR HUGO: Just before we continue, concerning what happened afterwards, you now say that Gen Kat Liebenberg and Gen Joubert were present at Vlakplaas. Did you have any discussions with them while they were there?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, at one stage I spoke to Gen Joubert. I know Gen Joubert from Ovamboland where he was my Commander from Section 10. I also worked closed there with the Defence Force with the Commandoes and also other members of the Special Forces.
Gen Joubert mentioned to me that there is political pressure on the Defence Force to act against the ANC, but that Foreign Affairs was objecting, and is against this in that it bears any relation with the establishment of the arms cache.
MR HUGO: Very well, after you had gathered all the weapons, what happened then?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I handed it over to Mr Naude. I did not know, I knew that it was going to the Rand, but I didn't know if it was going to the West Rand or the East Rand, the whole operation was compartmentalised. The day when it happened, there were no indications of any actions, but the next morning, approximately ten o'clock, Maj Naude was called to the office of Special Forces, where we went through documents and amongst others, I had to go through a briefcase that was found at a person that was shot, and Prinsloo, that was at Speskop stationed, asked me if I found anything subversive in this briefcase, then I said to him, it seemed as if it was a person from Water Affairs, from Botswana. He mentioned to me that this person and a nine year old child was killed in a vehicle.
It was then asked that we should liaise with Brig Schoon and that we have to provide weapons like pistols and we have to provide them with a token or the weapons that we found in this air raid, I think then that I found three Macarov pistols from a Russian origin and gave it to him, so that this can be shown to the press. I never received these weapons back, and I never saw the weapons from the arms cache again.
MR HUGO: What came up during the discussion with Gen Joubert, why did this operation, what was the reason for it to be launched in Botswana?
MR DE KOCK: Gen Joubert said that there was political pressure placed on the Defence Force to act against the ANC. If my recollection is correct, during that time there were attacks on shopping centres and amongst others, there was a Wimpy Bar that was targeted with a limpet mine and if I can remember correctly, it was linked to that. It could have led to the actions taken.
MR HUGO: Did you associate yourself with the goal of Gen Joubert and the other senior officers?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I knew that they would attack the ANC, that was the purpose and goal, and the ANC was a common enemy of the Security Forces, and it was classified as a terrorist organisation and we also saw it in that way and that is how we acted.
MR HUGO: Did you during the meeting that took place at Vlakplaas, were you present during this meeting?
MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairperson, I was busy with the arrangements for the weapons, but from time to time, I did attend with Gen Schoon, Liebenberg and Joubert.
MR HUGO: What was your rank when this incident took place?
MR DE KOCK: I was a Major.
MR HUGO: How did you feel concerning the following of instructions of both Joubert and Brig Schoon?
MR DE KOCK: I didn't have any problems with it, I accepted their instructions.
MR HUGO: And the presence of the Head of the Defence Force, Gen Kat Liebenberg, what perception did this create with you, concerning the sanctioning of this operation?
MR DE KOCK: I think he was then second in command of the Defence Force and Gen Joubert was the Head of Special Forces. I just accepted that the authority is good enough to adhere to.
MR HUGO: And you then ask this honourable Committee to give you amnesty for amongst others fraud and the illegal possession of ammunition, defeating the ends of justice, damage to property, possible conspiracy to murder unknown people in Botswana and any other delict or crime that could have occurred in the execution of this operation.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO
MR VISSER: I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER
ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairman.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP
MR MALAN: Mr de Kock, you heard what my question was to some of the other members. I would just like you to look at page 61, where I read, from the paragraph in the middle of the page.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.
MR MALAN: Can the Interpreters hear me now? Can the Interpreter follow me on this one?
INTERPRETER: Yes, I can hear you.
MR MALAN: Okay. Mr de Kock, I would just like to repeat, on page 61 of the Bundle in your application, in the middle paragraph you say specifically that the Department of Foreign Affairs was misled by the Police and the South African Defence Force?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, that is correct.
MR MALAN: Do you then talk about officials or on the level of officials?
MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman, I would say the whole department, because in this case, the way I understood it was that it was only them who was an obstacle.
MR MALAN: Can you remember whether reference was made to politicians or only to the department?
MR DE KOCK: What I can remember is that there was political pressure on the Defence Force to launch attacks, but the Department of Foreign Affairs was the objectors, they had an objection.
MR MALAN: Can you describe that political pressure further, or was only that told to you?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot take it further.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is off. I cannot hear the speaker.
MR MALAN: (Microphone not on)
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
MR MALAN: I will tell you why I am asking this, you say specifically that you understood that there was political pressure put on them?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct yes.
MR MALAN: Then we can make the conclusion that it was the political heads that made this?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR MALAN: And that Foreign Affairs made an objection to it?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR MALAN: Mr Chairperson, if it carries on like this, it would seem like a press conference.
CHAIRPERSON: I hope it is not the same press.
MR MALAN: I would just like to make sure of the fact that you understood that it was a struggle between political heads of Departments, or what did you mean when you said political pressure and Foreign Affairs?
MR DE KOCK: Well Mr Chairperson, there was political pressure placed on the Defence Force to execute this operation against the ANC, but Foreign Affairs was an obstacle in their way.
The establishment of this arms cache then neutralised the argument of Foreign Affairs.
MR MALAN: You cannot describe this political pressure in more detail, it could have been from the general public, it can be from debates in parliament, it can be political Heads from State Departments, you cannot describe it in a better way?
MR DE KOCK: No, unfortunately I cannot. This is how I understood it, or recall it. I do not want to speculate, I can only say what I can recall, and that is also why I mention it in this way.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you are excused.
MR DE KOCK: Thank you.
WITNESS EXCUSED
CHAIRPERSON: Are there any other witnesses?
MR HUGO: No other witnesses.
ADV STEENKAMP: No further evidence, Mr Chairman, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, do you have any argument?
ADV STEENKAMP: No submissions, thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?
MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: Mr Chairman, this is a case where...
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, we would just like to hear you concerning Mr Schoon. The others we do not want to hear.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, you are probably referring to the misleading of the people?
CHAIRPERSON: Specifically how he acted on behalf of the government of the day?
MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, let me answer the question in such a way. Firstly the requirements of the Act is geared that the act or delict must fall within the parameters of a political motive, but now where the law or the Act prevents a person to mislead anyone, there is no provisions concerning this.
A lot of parents lie to their children, because they think it is on their behalf. I am using this as an example, Mr Chairperson, here you've got a case where Schoon sought in the interest of the country and of the government, to uphold the values of the government by acting against the people in Botswana, but if the government because of political pressure did not want to agree with what his idea was of what was supposed to happen or what Kat Liebenberg's idea was, then it would surely have been to assist this process in some way. That would have happened, indeed.
If you forget for a moment what Brig Schoon said, we know and you heard evidence in the Lesotho attack of the "Lavender Boys", the men did not want the Police or the Defence Force to act or to act on a military basis, because that created a lot of problems for the Department of Foreign Affairs and they were the obstacle. You heard Pik Botha, Niel van Heerden and Niel Barnard who also said the same thing.
Here we sit today with the same situation, and Mr Eugene de Kock confirms this, that his recollection of that time is, and I have no doubt that he and the suggestions behind the questions that Mr Malan put to him, that this is exactly what happened in 1985, for five years, they attempted to get the government to give permission for actions. When it did appear, it was at the end of a very frustrating process for the Security Branch and you know that this is what the members of the Security Branch in the Western Transvaal testified about.
CHAIRPERSON: All that you are saying now is that ...
MR VISSER: But that, we know that this was the facts?
CHAIRPERSON: But would he have carried any knowledge of these facts, and he would have testified about it?
MR VISSER: He testified about it.
CHAIRPERSON: Let me just finish. This assistance in the process as you mention it, do you expect that he shouldn't have testified about it here, or should not testify about it?
MR VISSER: If you had listened to his testimony you can gather that he doesn't remember what happened or he doesn't remember the details, it was a few years ago. Evidence was placed on record about his bad memory and to now tie him down to what he tries to recall and what conclusions he tries to draw from what happened 12 years ago, will not be fair.
Even if you take him on his word of what he says, he says that or Kat Liebenberg told him that they must mislead the government in order to get the permission. At the end of the day that it was not in the interest of the government to prevent MK members from infiltrating the country, in the nature of this case, it was part of the struggle.
CHAIRPERSON: If you are doing something against the wishes of the government, what is the suggestion then?
MR VISSER: There were no suggestion ever that it was against the wishes of the government. It is on the contrary, the opposite.
CHAIRPERSON: Why did they then want to mislead the person who would give them permission?
MR VISSER: Well, we do not know if it happened.
CHAIRPERSON: That is what he wanted to do, and that is what he testified about.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, this is what Willem Schoon is telling you, this is what was put to him. That was the whole purpose of creating the arms cache.
If you want to draw that principle through, then you will not be able to give amnesty for the arms cache, because the purpose of it was to mislead the people. What you are suggesting now is that the people would have gone to the State President and said that this arms cache was planted. It would not have happened.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I am very serious. I am asking these questions, I am not fooling around.
MR VISSER: I am not fooling around, but what is your question?
CHAIRPERSON: The question is what is his political position when he acted and wanted to mislead those who were supposed to give the permission for the attack? On whose behalf did he act?
MR VISSER: He acted on behalf of the State, because just like all the other witnesses testified, they were to attack the basis in Botswana in order to provide law and order in the country. They are applying for fraud.
CHAIRPERSON: If they had told the truth to these people and have said, they would have said "no, we do not give permission", what would they have done then?
MR VISSER: Apparently they wouldn't have been able to do anything.
Chairperson, I would just like to repeat that in subsection 2(b) this falls under what Mr Schoon testified about, it falls within the parameters of this Section and with respect, in so many cases that has appeared in front of the Amnesty Committee, it has been pertinently said and the original Amnesty Committee also said in many instances operators lied to those working or in senior ranks, above them.
One of the reasons was that they did not want to expose themselves and one of the other reasons was that they did not want to involve that person in the illegal act that he was busy with. This does not differ from them, with respect, this is my submission.
If Mr Schoon believed that it was expected of him to lie to the State Security Council about who was responsible for this arms cache, he does not take away from what he wanted to achieve, he wanted to assist the Defence Force to get sanctioning to attack Botswana. In my submission that falls within the parameters of the Act.
Pardon? Yes, well, unless you want me to argue the whole thing, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: ... on this matter. Who is next?
ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I am informed that the next matter will be the Naledi matter. Apparently Judge, if I may ask for a five minute adjournment, so that we can just change seats quickly, if that will be possible.
