WILLEM FREDERICK SCHOON: (sworn states)
ADV BOSMAN: The witness is properly sworn, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Advocate Bosman. Mr Visser?
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Schoon, you are an applicant in this amnesty application concerning the abduction of Mr Msibi.
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MR VISSER: For the Amnesty Committee that's hearing this matter you provided them with background information, or you confirmed the background information of it.
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And you would like to submit it and to other people present that's interested.
MR SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: May I hand that up to you, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I'm in your hands ...
CHAIRPERSON: Let me mark it B, because we've got A already.
MR VISSER: Indeed, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, it shall be marked B.
MR VISSER: I was going to say I'm in your hands, the witness can read it out or we can take it as read into the record and perhaps then I can just address certain points in the statement, but I'm entirely in your hands.
CHAIRPERSON: I think just for tidiness of the record, I would request the witness to read it into the record, then you can tidy thereafter.
MR VISSER: Mr Schoon, will you then please focus on Exhibit B and just for introductory's sake ask you, you refer to Exhibit A in your Exhibit B, in paragraph (a), that Exhibit A refers to a document of which the Amnesty Committee and others here present are aware of, that is the general background to amnesty applications and the reason why we are referring to it in this piece is because it usually is referred to as Exhibit A, but now we will refer to it as Exhibit C.
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And do you ask that the contents of that exhibit, the general background that is applicable to amnesty applications of Security Police members, that we incorporate it in your application?
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MR VISSER: On page 16 to 20 of this Exhibit C, there is a discussion of the importance of Swaziland during the struggle of the past, does that correlate with your recollection and your knowledge of the time, and do you confirm that it is correct as it appears in this document?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Brigadier, if I can then ask you, you have before led evidence and it is recorded in paragraph (b)(i) and (ii) and (iii) in certain amnesty applications and you also refer the Committee to that evidence.
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And you also ask that that evidence, that as far as applicable, be also included into your application for today.
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: You have completed your application and your application for amnesty appears in bundle 1, page 1 to 14, and you deal with the incident from page 9 to 10, is that correct?
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MR VISSER: Do you confirm that it is the truth according to your recollection, also the contents of that amnesty application of yours?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR VISSER: And do you also confirm the political objectives and your own background as it is set out?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Now Brigadier, your application includes an incident - I'm at page 2, paragraph 1, Chairperson, you application entails an incident as in June 1986, that happened in Swaziland and also then in the Republic of South Africa. That is abduction of Mr Msibi from Swaziland, the illegal transportation of Mr Msibi over the border, that is now from Swaziland to South Africa, the illegal detention, and then something that was left out, the assault of Mr Msibi, defeating the ends of justice in not making known the true facts or any omission or offence that may result from this, is that correct?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Can you then start at paragraph 3, and maybe we can just deal with it very quickly. Some of the applicants in bundle 1, have referred to 1989 when this incident took place and your recollection was that it was in June '86. Now it seems Mr Chairperson, from Exhibit A, that although Mr Msibi is not here to testify today, it does seem that he indicated in his affidavit, it was not a media conference and it was an affidavit that he submitted, and there he explains that he left South Africa in '76, and then in the second column, the second paragraph
"One morning in June 1986, at about 9H30 hours, I was due to meet Vincent Malaza ..."
So it does seem pretty clear that it was in 1986.
Can you just start at paragraph 4 and tell us how each persons fitted in within the structure of the Security Police at that stage.
MR SCHOON
"During the incident I was the Head of Group C at the Security Head Office in Pretoria. As such, Vlakplaas fell underneath my control. The then Col Buchner also resorted under my control."
MR VISSER: And from which division was Col Buchner?
MR SCHOON: He was connected to Group C2, which dealt exclusively with the interrogations and filing of identifications of MK members who had returned and fallen into the hands of the Security Police.
MR VISSER: And is it also so that he had to do with the recruitment of such persons to whom you have just referred, and that he was also their overall handler in the country?
MR SCHOON: No, not in all cases, Chairperson. This was actually an exception in which he also became the handler.
MR VISSER: I see. Please continue.
MR SCHOON: Gen Stadler ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: You said Col de Kock.
MR SCHOON: Col de Kock was the Commander of Vlakplaas and the applicants Nortje and Bosch also fell under de Kock's command. Gen Stadler was the Head of Group D, that would be the Intelligence division.
MR VISSER: Was he above or below you in the rank structure of officers?
MR SCHOON: At that stage I was his senior.
MR VISSER: Very well, please continue.
MR SCHOON
"Brig Schalk Visser was the Divisional Commander of the Security Branch, Eastern Transvaal. Supt Gert Visser and W/O Greyling fell under his command.
Mr Msibi was a senior ANC Intelligence Officer, he was seated in Swaziland. From security reports and information which came from informers and arrested ANC supporters, the Security Branch was informed of the fact that Msibi was a very important leader in the ANC and MK.
Information indicated that Msibi had already reached the position of Head of Intelligence of the ANC/MK in Swaziland, by 1986."
MR VISSER: Could you just pause there for a moment. Mr de Kock stated in his amnesty application that Mr Msibi was apparently so important that he was the bodyguard of the President of the ANC, and Mr Msibi himself states in Exhibit A, in the first column and the second-last paragraph
"From 1979 to 1983, I was the personal guard of the ANC President, Oliver Tambo."
Did you know of that?
MR SCHOON: Personally not.
MR VISSER: But would you deny that this was the case?
MR SCHOON: I cannot deny it.
MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed.
MR SCHOON
"The armed onslaught from Swaziland against the RSA, was managed under the name of the so-called Transvaal Military Machinery. As Head of Intelligence, Msibi had very close liaison with the command component of MK, as well as the warfare machinery.
Amongst others, it was known that Msibi played a significant role in assistance to persons who had left the RSA, in order to receive military training abroad, as well as assisting them with their return after such training, and their infiltration back into the RSA.
Furthermore, he was involved in obtaining Eastern-bloc weapons, as well as smuggling these weapons into the RSA, where these weapons would be used in the execution of acts of terror. Msibi was a tremendous threat to the order and peace of the RSA, and it was necessary to bring his influence to an end."
MR VISSER: Now when you say this, Brigadier, was Msibi a target for the Security Branch or not?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, when the information became available that he was the source who was fed by Malaza with information, he became an extremely important person, who had to be developed as a target.
MR VISSER: Very well, we will see the further developments of this. Please continue.
MR SCHOON
"During the struggle of the past, all the warring sides relied largely on intelligence. Consequently, this was also the approach of the Security Branch and the attempt was to recruit supporters of the enemy in order to obtain information in this manner, seeing as better results could be obtained in such manner. Among others, it also contributed to the prevention of acts of terrorism.
In general, I wish to fix attention on the fact that 1985 to 1988, were some of the worst years regarding violent actions by revolutionaries against the RSA. Swaziland, particularly in 1985 and 1986, played a significant role in this revolutionary onslaught."
MR VISSER: In Exhibit C, pages 16 to 20, to which we have referred, reference is also made to the Umkomati Accord, when the South African government made an agreement with the Mozambican government, and subsequently, pressure was exerted on the activities of ANC cadres in Mozambique and that consequently they defected to Swaziland and Botswana.
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Please proceed.
MR SCHOON
"The general situation of violence in South Africa was so serious that in June 1985, a partial State of Emergency was announced. The State of Emergency was later extended to cover the entire RSA, and lasted to 1990."
MR VISSER: Brigadier, this will be a question of record, the nation-wide State of Emergency was announced on the 12th or the 21st, one of the two, of June in 1986 and was ultimately lifted in 1990, is that correct?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is as far as I know.
MR VISSER: Now upon a question which was put by my learned friend, you were asked whether anybody arranged for a Magistrate to visit Mr Msibi in prison, what was the procedure regarding emergency regulations when it came to visits by Judges and Magistrates? Was anything arranged for this?
MR SCHOON: Yes, there were special Judges and Magistrates who were seconded in order to visit these persons regularly and to find out about their welfare and to take any complaints which may emanate from such visits, and investigate such complaints.
MR VISSER: Therefore it doesn't surprise you to hear that Judge Goldstone, for example, paid such visits?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Did you have any personal knowledge of Judge Goldstone's visit?
MR SCHOON: No.
MR VISSER: Please proceed.
MR SCHOON
"There was no doubt regarding the fact that ANC/MK members were launching attacks on the RSA, which had been planned and orchestrated in Swaziland, particularly landmine attacks in rural areas, as well as limpet mine attacks in restaurants, during which many innocent persons were killed and seriously maimed."
MR VISSER: You are now coming to the facts of the matter, we have dealt with the background.
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
"During the relevant period in time, it was known at the Security Head Office that a certain Warrant Officer Malaza had been arrested on the grounds that he had acted as a spy for the ANC, at the Security Branch in Nelspruit. Gen Stadler was at the head of the investigation for the case against Malaza.
Furthermore, I was informed that Malaza, during interrogation, had admitted that he had provided information to the ANC and that there were two other colleagues of his that he had recruited in order to convey such information.
I recall that one of these persons was called Mokgabudi, because he was the son of a policeman who was stationed at Vlakplaas, and I knew him well."
MR VISSER: May I just interpose? People spoke of Daisy, and perhaps it isn't very clear to everybody what Daisy is, what was it?
MR SCHOON: Daisy was a piece of land which was purchased, I think by General Coetzee, and which was used by Group D, or the Intelligence division of the Security Head Office. They had certain premises there which they used for among others, training and interrogation even.
MR VISSER: So it was a small farm or a smallholding near Pretoria?
MR SCHOON: It wasn't really a farm, it was a smallholding and it was quite to Hartbeespoort Dam.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR SCHOON
"Furthermore, I was informed - it became known during the interrogation that Malaza's contact person or handler in the ANC in Swaziland, was Msibi and that Malaza offered his co-operation in order to attempt to get hold of Msibi.
There was a realisation in the Security Head Office, that this was the ideal opportunity to possibly abduct Msibi, in order to obtain information regarding the armed onslaught which was being conducted from Swaziland, and that possibly he could be recruited to cooperate with the Security Branch.
The mere removal of Msibi from Swaziland would in all probability contributed to a decrease in political violence in the RSA, and would certain have had an affect on the insurgency of terrorists to the RSA from Swaziland.
I became involved in discussions regarding the possible abduction of Msibi, but I cannot recall all the persons with whom I discussed this."
MR VISSER: If I may interrupt you. It is probable that you may have had discussions with Stadler, seeing as he was the leading officer regarding the Malaza matter, and because he had interrogated him?
MR SCHOON: Yes, in all probability. I recall that it came from the Security Head himself, but I cannot recall who at that stage was the Head of Security.
MR VISSER: But in 1986, and just for the record, it was Gen Stan Schutte.
MR SCHOON: He had only been there for a very brief time and that is most probably why I have omitted him.
MR VISSER: You are not certain, so you cannot say with certainty with whom you discussed it?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Proceed.
MR SCHOON
"I agreed with the idea to abduct Msibi from Swaziland to the RSA, and I gave Col de Kock the instruction to launch the operation. He had to co-ordinate this with members of the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch."
MR VISSER: Regarding you, who took the decision to approve the abduction of Msibi, from Swaziland?
MR SCHOON: I take that responsibility, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: As you recall, at the very least you agreed with this and you gave the approval for the instruction?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR SCHOON
"The operation was set down for a particular day. On this day, Gen Stadler, Brig Visser and I, met one another at the Oshoek border post where we waited to monitor the operation in Swaziland. De Kock along with other members from Vlakplaas, who I cannot recall, and certain members from Eastern Transvaal, entered Swaziland with Malaza, in order to attempt to abduct Msibi. The idea was for Malaza to make an appointment with Msibi, during which he would be seized and brought to the RSA.
As I can recall, there was an initial unsuccessful attempt and then the members spent the night at Oshoek with us and then planned to attempt to launch the operation again the next day."
CHAIRPERSON: If I could just interrupt myself here? If I may have deviated, it is because I have confused another case with this case, during which we had to stay over an extra night because the operation had not been completed on that particular day.
MR VISSER: So you are not certain, but you think it was this case that went over two days?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR SCHOON
"The following day I can recall that the members returned from Swaziland with Msibi and he was immediately taken to Pretoria, so that he could be interrogated by Stadler. On the first evening I was present at Vlakplaas for a while, while Msibi was interrogated."
MR VISSER: If I may just interrupt you again. We have heard evidence today from the previous witnesses that Msibi was also assaulted at Oshoek, and you haven't mentioned anything about this in your affidavit, what is the reason?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I'm aware of the fact that he was assaulted but to the bets of my knowledge, I cannot recall that it took place at Oshoek.
MR VISSER: Can you recall that you were present during an assault on Msibi at Oshoek?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, as I've stated, I know that he was assaulted, but I recall that it took place at Vlakplaas, I cannot recall that he was assaulted at Oshoek.
MR VISSER: However, if you are incorrect, then you will accept that?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Please proceed.
MR SCHOON
"After I had filed my amnesty application I recalled that Msibi's motor vehicle had been pushed over a cliff and destroyed, although I myself was not involved in it, I later heard that Msibi had agreed to become an informer for the Security Branch, and he co-operated with the SAP, under Gen Buchner.
Msibi was later killed in Soweto. I'm not familiar with the circumstances surrounding his death."
MR VISSER: Just before you proceed, could we just return to Vlakplaas. Msibi was then abducted from Swaziland and taken to the Oshoek border post, to the clubhouse, can you recall whether or not he was interrogated there?
MR SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, he was superficially interrogated and I am aware that members returned to search his place and that they returned with a box containing certain documents.
MR VISSER: Can you recall anything regarding the devices to which previous witnesses have referred as to having been in the box as well?
MR SCHOON: Yes, I can recall this.
MR VISSER: You are not a demolitions expert?
MR SCHOON: No, not at all.
MR VISSER: So you will not be able to tell us what these devices were meant for?
MR SCHOON: No.
MR VISSER: And when you were at Vlakplaas, you say that you recall that you were present when he was indeed assaulted.
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Can you recall who the persons were who assaulted him at Vlakplaas?
MR SCHOON: Col de Kock was the main person and then some of the other persons also contributed.
MR VISSER: And was Mr Msibi interrogated there?
MR SCHOON: Yes, he was interrogated.
MR VISSER: In which way was he assaulted, can you recall? Or let us begin by asking whether or not it was a serious assault, in terms of serious injuries which were incurred, or was it an assault which was aimed at getting him to talk?
MR SCHOON: A few blows were dealt to him and I do believe that he was also struck with a belt.
MR VISSER: At Vlakplaas?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Were you in any way particularly interested in the procedure there? Who was the person that had to see to that?
MR SCHOON: The investigation was given to Stadler and he took the lead when it came to the interrogation. I did not participate in the interrogation itself, although I can recall that I also struck him once.
MR VISSER: What did you want to determine from him during this interrogation?
MR SCHOON: During this interrogation we wanted to determine what he knew about what was going on in Swaziland, who the persons were who were working with him in Swaziland.
MR VISSER: In order to obtain information as you have testified earlier?
MR SCHOON: Yes, we needed information upon which we could react.
MR VISSER: Did you feel that it was necessary to act as such in order to prevent the revolutionary threat from Swaziland?
MR SCHOON: At that stage I thought so, although I realise now that I was mistaken.
MR VISSER: Would you proceed to the last page. Just tell us what your political convictions were at that stage.
MR SCHOON
"These events took place during a situation of warfare, where the rules of regular warfare did not count. My action was aimed against the supporters of a liberation movement which was the enemy of the government and which was waging a revolutionary onslaught against the State dispensation, during which among others, innocent citizens were killed or injured and much damage was brought to property.
The struggle that we waged was a political struggle and everything that I did, I did in the execution of my duties as a policeman, in order to protect human life and property and in order to maintain the constitutional dispensation of that time, and in support of the National Party, and to prevent a situation of chaos and anarchy in the country.
In light of the pressure which was exerted upon us in the Security Branch, by the political leadership of the time and many statements and speeches during which reference was made to the obliteration of the terrorists, I truly believed that such action was expected of me.
I truly and sincerely believed that what I did was expected of me as a policeman and that I acted in the execution of my duties as a policeman and that my actions fell within my express or implied authorisation. I was never rewarded for my participation in the action, nor did I draw any benefit from it."
MR VISSER: If I may just examine you on four final points. You were aware that with the abduction there was a transgression of border control regulations, is that correct?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And you associated yourself with the fact that your men would be transgressing those regulations and they did so upon your instruction, is that correct?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Are you aware of anything such as brandy which was fed to Mr Msibi?
MR SCHOON: No, I cannot recall anything like that.
MR VISSER: What is your recollection of the size of the clubhouse at Oshoek?
MR SCHOON: My recollection is that it was approximately the size of this venue, if not somewhat bigger.
MR VISSER: Did you make any enquiries or did you have any knowledge regarding how precisely Mr Msibi met his demise?
MR SCHOON: I have no idea, I simply heard that he was murdered.
MR VISSER: You do not know by whom?
MR SCHOON: I do not know.
MR VISSER: Was the case ever solved, as far as you know?
MR SCHOON: I have no knowledge.
MR VISSER: Are you aware of the fact that Mr Msibi testified in a criminal trial against these other persons to whom reference has been made, the persons who defected to the ANC?
MR SCHOON: The two policemen who provided documentation for Malaza, yes he testified in their criminal trial.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
Therefore you request amnesty as we have stipulated it at the beginning of your application, is that correct?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chair.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Hugo?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Brigadier Schoon, if I understand your evidence correctly, the name Msibi came up again after Malaza was interrogated or questioned by Brig Stadler, is that correct?
MR SCHOON: That's correct.
MR HUGO: And then for the first time you became aware of his prominent position within the ANC structure and what his activities were at that stage.
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MR HUGO: This interrogation that took place by Brig Stadler, that took place at Daisy?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR HUGO: Were you present during this questioning or interrogation?
MR SCHOON: No.
MR HUGO: So can we then accept that the information that came to your knowledge was conveyed by Stadler after the interrogation?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR HUGO: After you received this information you then made this decision that certain actions had to be launched against Mr Msibi.
MR SCHOON: I agreed with the action or the operation, because I had a suspicion that the Commander gave the instruction, but I did reconcile myself with it and I did support it and I did make the necessary arrangements.
MR HUGO: You see that is why I'm asking this question, I'd just like to clarify this in my own mind, because I would like to know where this idea came from initially, this abduction.
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, it would have been impossible that the Head of Security Branch, the Commissioner, the Minister, had no knowledge of Malaza, because it was not an everyday case, at most it was high treason and I believe that those in the top structures would have been informed.
MR HUGO: But you have to take into consideration now that you were a Brigadier at that stage, that you would not have been able to have taken this, or made this decision on your own.
MR SCHOON: Yes, I would have been able to, because Swaziland was under our command, or within our district, so it wouldn't have been strange.
MR HUGO: But you would have done it after you'd spoke to Stadler and the with co-operation of Visser, Schalk Visser?
MR SCHOON: Definitely so, yes.
MR HUGO: In other words, it would have been a considered opinion that you would have formed and then on the basis of that, launched this operation?
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MR HUGO: After you've gathered this information from Brig Stadler - he was not a Brigadier at that stage?
MR SCHOON: Yes, he was.
MR HUGO: But he was a junior?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR HUGO: After you received this information from him, you then called in Mr de Kock to give him certain instructions.
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR HUGO: Just to make it short, you called in de Kock in his capacity as Commander of Vlakplaas, because the Security Branch viewed Vlakplaas at that stage as the operational unit and recruited them for this type of operation. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR SCHOON: Correct, Chairperson.
MR HUGO: Is it also so that during this conversation with Mr de Kock, you gave him information concerning information that was given to Stadler and that was discussed by you and that you also informed him about the decision that was taken.
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR HUGO: And you also then motivated why you thought it was necessary to launch such an operation.
MR SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HUGO: And Mr de Kock indeed then agreed with what you said.
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR HUGO: Then concerning the presence of yourself and Brig Stadler, and I think at that stage Col Visser, Schalk Visser, at Oshoek, and you'll probably agree with me that it was strange that in the broader spectrum of operations at that stage, you were a reasonably strong contingent of senior officials at this operation.
MR SCHOON: Not necessarily that strange, it was a very unique incident. Schalk had to be there because was the Commander of the section, it would have been unethical if we were there or acted there alone without him being present. Gen Stadler was at that stage Head Investigative Officer of the Malaza case.
MR HUGO: Let me tell you why I'm asking you this question. Your presence there and that of Stadler and Col Visser, had to create the impression that this operation was authorised from a very high level.
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MR HUGO: And I also accept that you will concede that when you conveyed such an instruction to de Kock and he to the people under him, and with the motivation that you gave, that you expected them to execute these instructions.
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR HUGO: Then just concerning the weapons that were used in this operation. Did you know that Mr de Kock and his men were armed during this operation?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, they were usually armed, I did not question them about it in this specific incident.
MR HUGO: I'm not quite sure, I think maybe you did testify about it, but did you know that they would cross the border without going through the border control point?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR HUGO: And you also saw that as part of the operation, the planning and the execution thereof?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR HUGO: Can I then say to you that Mr de Kock's recollection is that concerning the weaponry, that they did have Uzzi weapons with them which had silencers, and these were weapons that they brought from Vlakplaas. Can you comment on that?
MR SCHOON: It would not have been strange, yes.
MR HUGO: Then you would not have said it was wrong, or anything in that line?
MR SCHOON: No.
MR HUGO: You would have seen it as part of the execution of the operation.
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR HUGO: Concerning the assault as Oshoek, can I then just tell you that Mr de Kock cannot recall that you were specifically present when the assault took place and that he does mention that it's possible that you were not in the room when it happened. I would just like to say that for record purposes. What he does say is that Mr Msibi was brought, or taken to Vlakplaas and that further assaults took place where you were present.
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR HUGO: Mr de Kock's recollection does agree with your version that slaps were administered and that he, Mr de Kock, personally took off his belt and did hit Mr Msibi with the belt.
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is my recollection.
MR HUGO: Can I just ask you, the fact that you did not intervene, could that also create the perception that what they are doing, even though it's outside of the parameters of the law, it was acceptable, in that it fell within a broader goal or perspective?
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MR HUGO: I'm jumping a bit now, but let us just go back to the stage where all the options were considered and a decision was made to launch this operation. At that stage, did you consider eliminating Mr Msibi in Swaziland?
MR SCHOON: No, it never came up, Mr Chairperson.
MR HUGO: And I accept the reason was that you did not want to make a decision to eliminate people without thinking of what the results would be.
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MR HUGO: Then Mr de Kock says in his written submission that Mr Msibi at a certain stage, was transported from Vlakplaas in a helicopter by, I think in his version was the Defence Force, are you aware of that?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I may have heard of it, but at that stage Msibi was out of my hands, Stadler then took over and any further actions with him was initiated by Stadler.
MR HUGO: Then just one loose end. The time during which this event occurred, I'm now talking about the Oshoek event or incident, Mr de Kock also places the abduction at approximately 10 o'clock in the morning and then the further events that occurred in that day was during the rest of the day. Can you remember that it happened while it was still light?
MR SCHOON: Yes, I can recall that. And he also reported back that there was a lot of struggling, or they struggled to get him under control, he resisted a lot.
MR HUGO: Yes, that also agrees with the allegations that were made in Exhibit A, to which Mr Visser referred, and that also places it at approximately 9H30 in the morning.
Mr de Kock's recollection is furthermore that this operation at Oshoek was completed on that same day and that same evening they returned to Vlakplaas, but he's also not quite sure, it could have been the next day.
MR SCHOON: No, according to my recollection we arrived quite early that evening at Vlakplaas, we did not arrive very late.
MR HUGO: In other words, your recollection is that Msibi was held at Oshoek for the evening and the next day he was taken ...(intervention)
MR SCHOON: No, he was never detained there, no.
MR HUGO: Then I would just like to refer you to another aspect in Exhibit A, if you can just go through it with me. It is the second column, the first paragraph, it says - this is Mr Msibi talking
"One morning in June 1986, at about 9H30, I was due to meet an SP (now SP appears to me to be a Security policeman)
MR SCHOON: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR HUGO
"... and I was due to meet a Security policeman, Vincent Malaza, who worked with the ANC."
It seems to me, and I would just like your comment on this, that Mr Msibi here indeed acted as a representative of the ANC during this meeting.
MR SCHOON: That is the impression that is created here, yes.
MR HUGO: And one could then argue the implications, but I would just like to know what your perception was, that this meeting would not have been about a squash game that they would play, but that it would be about their activities, him being an informant conveying information to the ANC member.
MR SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HUGO: Lastly I'd like to ask you, this operation then became known in the Security Branch circles, in the sense that it was reported to Johan van der Merwe, do you know anything about that?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, they would have reported it to him or to Gen Schutte, if he was the Commander.
MR HUGO: Can you recall if you personally conveyed it them?
MR SCHOON: No, I think Stadler did it.
MR HUGO: But the report-back was with your approval, with your knowledge?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR HUGO: And they never took any steps against you from the higher echelons, or that you were admonished at all?
MR SCHOON: No, Chairperson. On the contrary, I can recall that while I was at Oshoek, I made a call to Headquarters to inform the Commanding Officer about the success of the operation.
MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, if you would just bear with me for one second. Thank you, Mr Chairman, it would appear that I have covered all the points that I wanted to. Thank you very much.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hugo. Mr Cornelius?
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chair, I don't have any questions.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Prinsloo?
MR PRINSLOO: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no questions.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Nel?
MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. I don't have a question, but I'd just like to put something to Brig Schoon.
Brigadier Schoon, I act for McCarter ...(intervention)
INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike is not on.
MR NEL: Although he did not put it in his application, my instruction that I received here today is that he supports paragraph 22 of your statement where you say that there was an unsuccessful attempt the evening before. Mr McCarter recalls today that for some reason or other, Mr Msibi did not arrive and then the operation was launched the next day and it was successful. I'd just like to place that on record. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Nel. Mr Lamey?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson.
Brigadier Schoon, I represent Nortje and Bosch. Is it correct that - and I also understood so from you, that their task in this operation was the abduction itself, to go and get Msibi in Swaziland and to bring him to the Republic and then afterwards to hand him over to the Intelligence section who was interested in him at that stage?
MR SCHOON: I gave the broader plan to Col de Kock and he had to sort out the finer details and get the people to get involved in it.
MR LAMEY: And after Msibi's abduction when he was transported to Vlakplaas, it was mainly the Intelligence division who was involved in the interrogation. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR SCHOON: Correct Chairperson, because the investigation was given to them.
MR LAMEY: Can you recall if there was a member, Willie Botha who was involved in the interrogation?
MR SCHOON: Yes, I can recall him.
MR LAMEY: Then as Mr Nel put it, it's also my clients' recollection that before the operation took place on that specific morning, that on the previous day there was an unsuccessful attempt where the person did not arrive. In paragraph 23, I would just like to put it to you the recollection of the applicants whom I'm representing is that after Mr Msibi was abducted in this vehicle, he was at a plantation close to the border and they waited in the vehicle there before he was taken to the Oshoek Police Station at the Republic's side. Can you comment on that?
MR SCHOON: No, I do not know anything about it.
MR LAMEY: I do not think you had arrived at that stage at Oshoek. And then that afterwards he was taken to the police station, where he was interrogated and then that evening transported to Vlakplaas.
MR SCHOON: The interrogation was not at the Oshoek border post but at the clubhouse, which was approximately 200m from the border post offices.
MR LAMEY: Is it a Police clubhouse, or is it a border post clubhouse?
MR SCHOON: Yes, it was the Police clubhouse.
MR LAMEY: And that evening of the abduction or the transportation of Msibi to Vlakplaas, where he slept that evening, he was then moved from there. I assume that you were not there later that evening?
MR SCHOON: They were still busy interrogating him and I left.
MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I've go no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, before my learned friend, Mr Lamey - and let it not be said of me that I want to encourage him to ask questions, but he asked questions about the Intelligence Agency and it just occurs to me that there might be a confusion here. Is he referring to National Intelligence, or the Intelligence division in the Security Branch? I think you should ...
CHAIRPERSON: Or Military Intelligence?
MR VISSER: If he was referring to National Intelligence, then obviously there's no problem but I think he should just tell us what he's referring to.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think it would make us all clearer, Mr Lamey.
MR LAMEY: Which took him later the following day? Because the Intelligence section of the Security Police was involved in his interrogation, but according to the recollection of my clients, it was Military Intelligence that took him away the following day.
MR VISSER: National Intelligence. Military Intelligence?
MR LAMEY: But it's not the Police Intelligence.
MR VISSER: That clarifies it, thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you for that, Mr Visser. Mr Makondo?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAKONDO: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Schoon, at Vlakplaas, how many times did you meet Mr Msibi when he was there?
MR SCHOON: I didn't catch your question quite clearly.
MR MAKONDO: When Mr Msibi was at Vlakplaas, how many times did you meet him?
MR SCHOON: I saw Mr Msibi only once and that was on the day of his abduction at Oshoek and then at a later stage, that evening at Vlakplaas where he was interrogated, and afterwards I never saw him again.
MR MAKONDO: During the night where you saw him, his first interrogation, did you stay until the interrogation was over or did you leave somewhere in the middle?
CHAIRPERSON: His last response was that
"When he was interrogated I left."
That was right at the tail end, when he was cross-examined by Mr Lamey.
MR MAKONDO: Thank you, Chairperson, I perhaps wanted clarity as to at what stage of the interrogation.
Can you recall at what stage? Perhaps you could estimate time.
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I will guess now, I did not stay right to the end, I think I've got the idea that I may have left about 10 o'clock that evening.
MR MAKONDO: When you left, what I want to know is the time period that you spent with him during the interrogation, do you recall that perhaps?
MR SCHOON: I did not personally interrogate him, I left that to the other men, they did the questioning.
MR MAKONDO: You mention other men, excluding Mr de Kock who you have already mentioned, who else was there at Vlakplaas?
MR SCHOON: Stadler, one of his men, I do not know who else. There were some of the Intelligence operators who also assisted with the interrogation and Vlakplaas members also periodically came in.
MR MAKONDO: During the interrogation, was there assault on Mr Msibi?
MR SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, he was slapped and hit with a belt.
MR MAKONDO: Let me take you through Exhibit A, the third column, the last paragraph where he said
"During the evening interrogation, cigarette butts were nipped on my face, an attempt was made to set may hair alight. A tyre was put on my neck and a threat made to necklace me."
MR SCHOON: I carry no knowledge of that, no.
MR MAKONDO: Whilst you were present during the interrogation, did he lose consciousness?
MR SCHOON: No, Mr Chairperson.
MR MAKONDO: At Oshoek, in your presence, did he ever lose consciousness?
MR SCHOON: No, Mr Chairperson.
MR MAKONDO: And the assault that took place at Oshoek, if I recall you said you were not present.
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I cannot recall that he was assaulted there. I know that he was assaulted and as far as my recollection goes, the assault took place at Vlakplaas.
MR MAKONDO: At Oshoek, do you remember who was inside with Mr Msibi and yourself, the people who were in there?
MR SCHOON: Schalk Visser, Gert Visser, Stadler and possibly one or two more.
MR MAKONDO: Were there other people who were not inside with him?
MR SCHOON: Yes, I've got an idea that some of the men stood outside, they chatted outside, they waited outside, they did not participate in the interrogation.
MR MAKONDO: After you left him at Vlakplaas, did you ever come into contact with him?
MR SCHOON: No, not at all.
MR MAKONDO: Did you learn about his death?
MR SCHOON: Yes, I heard.
MR MAKONDO: When?
MR SCHOON: It was approximately a year or two after the incident it was reported in reports and it came under our attention.
MR MAKONDO: During his stay in Vlakplaas, did you perhaps get the report as to what information did he give?
MR SCHOON: I may have, or it would have come to me in the normal sequence of events and with the desk that I dealt with, I would have seen what he had said to them, but it is such a long time ago, I cannot recall.
MR MAKONDO: Would the same be in terms of his stay in Eastern Transvaal? Would it be the same, your response?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR MAKONDO: Thank you, Chairperson, that will be all.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Makondo. Ms Patel.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.
Just one aspect, Brig Schoon. In your application to us on page 10, in response to a question as to whether anybody was injured or killed or property damaged during this incident, you state there that:
"No-one was injured or killed"
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MS PATEL: But you've conceded now that Mr Msibi was in fact assaulted.
MR VISSER: There is a slight difference between being injured and being assaulted, and frankly, if you look at the question, with respect ...
MS PATEL: Well really, aren't we then just splitting hairs? If somebody is assaulted and given the evidence that has been led today, that it's not a common assault, I would clearly argue that if a man is being hit with a belt, then that amounts to assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm, and it necessarily follows that the man was then injured, surely.
CHAIRPERSON: Wouldn't there be some ubiquity, because here on page 10 it speaks of the abduction and then immediately follows that question you asked and then he says nobody was injured or killed, or any property damaged. And what he testified about is the assault at Vlakplaas, if I understood him well. So I think you can rephrase your question, because there's ambiguity in any event, which I notice immediately, speaking for myself. But if you could rephrase your question.
MS PATEL: Alright. Would you concede, Mr Schoon, that Mr Msibi was in fact injured during the assault on him?
MR SCHOON: It is possible that he was injured, yes, but he did not have any visible injuries on his body.
MS PATEL: That would be during the time that you were present though?
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Patel.
ADV BOSMAN: I have no questions, thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Advocate Sandi?
ADV SANDI: Yes, I think I do have one or two, Chairperson, thank you.
There has been evidence, Mr Schoon, that Mr Msibi was turned to work for the Security Police, did you become aware of such a circumstance?
MR SCHOON: Yes, Mr Chairperson, his questioning was done by Col Buchner and identification of the photographs ...(intervention)
INTERPRETER: The Interpreter cannot hear the speaker.
CHAIRPERSON: May I just interrupt you, the Interpreters cannot hear you, could you please speak louder?
MR SCHOON: I don't think this thing is working very well, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Can you hear?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, Buchner questioned him about people who were arrested and he would sit for two to three weeks with such a person, where he would go through all the photographs from 1 to 5 000 photographs, he would go through them and ask him, "Do you know this person", and if he's got something to say, then the history will then be written down and this person will then explain in detail which camps they met him and it would then be half a page of each person that he identified and they would then write down the history of that person.
That would take about two to three weeks before this process was completed and during the time the people who did this work, built up a relationship with this person and at the end he could then say this person will become a good witness, he's willing to cooperate and that specific person will then be chosen and asked to testify and he will then be used and later he will be taken up in the stream of rehabilitated members. He will then become an informant and in this case Buchner, because of the unique circumstances of this, he handled him right from the beginning personally from Soweto and after a few months I know he then handed him over to the Security Branch in Soweto and then they looked after him from that point onwards.
ADV SANDI: Your answer has been very long, Mr Schoon, I'm not sure if ... Is that to say that your understanding was that he was actually working as an informer, is that what you knew at the time about Mr Msibi?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, he first became an informer after Buchner recruited him and then he started working with us. What information he revealed, I do not know, and if he brought in any information, I also do not know.
ADV SANDI: And after he was released, do you know if he continued having this relationship with Mr Buchner, as an informer?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, he started working as an informer the day after he was released, before that he couldn't do it because he was detained, but when he was released, he then became a source for Buchner, but what production he delivered, I do not know.
ADV SANDI: Thank you, Brigadier.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Schoon, but before I thank you, I can see Mr Visser doesn't want to re-examine you, but let's give him the opportunity to refuse.
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, if you invite me, I will ask one question.
Mr Schoon, you heard evidence about a vehicle of Mr Msibi that was destroyed, you did not mention it.
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I did.
MR VISSER: In your evidence today. The reason is because I did not lead you in that. Were you informed that such a vehicle was damaged? Were you informed about it?
MR SCHOON: Yes, Col de Kock did mention it to me.
MR VISSER: So if Ms Patel puts it to you that your paragraph is wrong on page 10, where you say no damage was done to property, then she would be right, because there was damage to property, is that correct? ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR SCHOON: Correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
MR SCHOON: Paragraph 24?
MR VISSER: Yes, 24.
CHAIRPERSON: 24, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Yes. Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Schoon, you are excused. Should we require you at a later stage, we'll advise Mr Visser.
MR SCHOON: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
WITNESS EXCUSED
CHAIRPERSON: Any further evidence from you, Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: That will be the evidence that we're going to present, thank you, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Thank you. I notice that we have a few minutes before four, but it is my view that we can't lead evidence-in-chief ...(indistinct - no microphone) who would come in and cross-examined the next day. I think it would be unfair, but there are circumstances when this would happen, but I don't believe today it would be fair to any applicant. I may just say to you, Ms Patel, that I see we've got another application to-morrow, I would request you to advise the parties involved to be here too, for that matter.
MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson, I'll make the necessary arrangements.
CHAIRPERSON: I don't think anybody would be against me if we adjourn early, it's a Monday in any event. We adjourn for today.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
