Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody. Today is the 31st of August 2000, the continuation of the applications of Mr de Kock and eighteen others. I have been approached by Ms Cambanis, that there is one of the victims who has got to leave today at twelve, couldn't we accommodate her?

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I apologise, I should have indicated to you earlier that they have changed their, they are ...(indistinct) the entire testimony and they intend staying on until the conclusion. I'm sorry I didn't inform you earlier on, I just mentioned it to Ms Patel.

CHAIRPERSON: That's in order.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Then we will continue as we have been.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I, just before we continue with further evidence, I just want to put on record that a further report has been obtained from the psychiatrist, Dr van der Merwe. I have placed copies of the report before the Committee, as well as before the Evidence Leader, as well as the representative acting for the victims.

Chairperson, you will see I've placed before you the previous report. From the context of the further report, it appears to be a supplementary to that report. I do wish to apologise for the handwriting in which the report is. There is a typed copy you will see that has been prepared, attached to the hand-written report. As it pleases you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Dr Pieter A van der Merwe did the report?

MS LAMEY: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you given it to the other legal representatives, and in particular Ms Cambanis?

MR LAMEY: Yes, I have Chairperson. I received it this morning, I believe Mr Willemse saw Dr van der Merwe again this morning, round about 6 o'clock. You will note that it has been faxed at about 06H58, to our offices.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you had an opportunity to look at it closely, Ms Cambanis?

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I have and I've also shown the copy to the victims, they are satisfied that the psychiatrist knows best and we're not intending to dispute any of the psychiatrist's findings. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

We are conducting these hearings through the agreements reached by the legal representatives. I would say as in regard to who comes here, I'm in your hands but for the rest of the proceedings you are in my hands.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, it's Roelof du Plessis on record. I will be proceeding with my two clients, it's Capt Kotze and Lieut Hammond, and I wish to call Capt Kotze first.

CHAIRPERSON: In which language is he going to testify, Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: In Afrikaans, Mr Chairman.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Kotze, your full names for the purposes of the record.

HENDRIK VAN NIEKERK KOTZE: (sworn states)

ADV BOSMAN: The applicant is duly sworn, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Advocate Bosman. You may be seated, Mr Kotze.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. As it pleases, Mr Chairman. Perhaps before I lead the evidence, I may just state for record purposes, for exactly what Mr Kotze and Mr Hammond are seeking amnesty for. They are seeking amnesty for conspiracy, malicious damage to property, arson, any crimes

committed in terms of the Arms and Ammunitions Act, any other competent verdicts under any of those criminal offences. I'm sorry, I have to add being an accessory after the fact, as well as defeating the ends of justice and then also for all civil actions and civil liability they may have. Sorry, and offences in terms of the Explosives Act. My learned friend, Mr Lamey has pointed that out to me, I nearly forgot that.

CHAIRPERSON: Would petrol also fall under the Explosives Act?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I don't think so.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, may I proceed?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Kotze, I'm going to refer to you as Mr Kotze instead of Captain, is that in order?

MR KOTZE: Yes, that is.

EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Kotze, would you tell the Committee where you were working at the time of this incident.

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, during the incident at Khanya House, I was attached to the Bomb Disposal unit at the Security Branch Head Office, where I served as an Instructor, among others. We were training members of the force, but also in terms of the fact that we were seated at the Head Office unit, we were also responsible for the bomb disposal function throughout the entire South African Police, and as part of our duties, with the exception of the training, we also conducted research. In other words, we were examining all weaponry, the explosive devices and so forth which were traced within the borders of the RSA, and we associate ourselves with the functioning and operation of these devices, what dangers or threats they entailed, so that we could generate this information back into the training process, in order to equip all those members who were involved in bomb disposal, so that they could combat the threat more effectively.

We also followed courses at the Defence Force so that we could expand our knowledge, because often were involved in prominent court cases, as expert witnesses for the State, so that is why we always attempted in as much as possible, to broaden our field of knowledge so that we could speak with certainty regarding certain matters. We also dealt with the logistical necessities or needs throughout the country for the Bomb Disposal unit, therefore we also examined things such as equipment, what those in the field would require to perform their tasks and where necessary we developed or purchased equipment whenever it was necessary. That in a nutshell, Chairperson, was our task.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, Mr Kotze. Could you examine, or you do not have to look specifically, but your application can be found in the bundle from page 347 to 376, do you confirm the content thereof as true and correct?

MR KOTZE: Yes, I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And Mr Kotze, do you regard yourself and Mr Hammond as experts in the field of explosives?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, expertise must be a very broad definition, but we always regarded ourselves as members of the force who perhaps possessed more knowledge regarding explosives than the average policeman out there, due to our involvement and our commitment to the task.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, Mr Kotze. And your Commander was Col Hattingh, is that correct?

MR KOTZE: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And there was also a similar unit at the Security Branch in the Northern Transvaal, is that correct?

MR KOTZE: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson. The way it functioned was that there was a Bomb Disposal unit at every one of the most prominent Security Branches throughout the country. Not at every Security Branch, but at most Security Branches there were members of the Security Branch who received training in bomb disposal and they added this as a further task to their Security task in order to be able to provide service in cases where explosives were involved. So every prominent Security Branch had a Bomb Disposal unit and ours was the one which was seated at the Head Office, which was basically one which had an overall status.

MR DU PLESSIS: Just to begin with the evidence regarding this particular incident, could you tell the Committee what order you received from Col Hattingh with regard to Khanya House.

MR KOTZE: Honourable Chairperson, some time before the incident, I cannot recall precisely whether it was weeks or days, but it was definitely quite a number of days before the incident, Col Hattingh went to Head Office. Our offices were not in the actual building of the Security Branch Head Office, we were situated a number of blocks away and because we were a small staff we usually knew when Col Hattingh would be called away. On that morning that he was called away, he called me into his office and told me that Head Office had requested a special operation and that he wanted me from the side of our unit, to assist in the execution of the operation. If recall correctly, he stated furthermore that the target was Khanya House, where the head office of the South African Catholic Bishops Conference was seated and he also told me that in all probability arson or damage by fire would be the desirable effect, because the purpose with the operation was to destroy the infrastructure of this particular organisation, so much so that they would be prevented from continuing with their activities.

MR DU PLESSIS: At that stage, both you and Mr Hammond had already been previously involved with the explosion of Cosatu House and Khotso House, is that correct?

MR KOTZE: Honourable Chairperson, I personally was not involved with Cosatu House and my fellow applicant, George Hammond, was however involved in Khotso House with me and we planned that together.

MR DU PLESSIS: So you were aware of the Cosatu House operation?

MR KOTZE: Eventually I did become aware of it.

MR DU PLESSIS: And after you received the order from Col Hattingh, what did you do next?

MR KOTZE: I immediately indicated to Col Hattingh that I would definitely require assistance from our own staff contingency, and George Hammond was an automatic choice as a result of our previous actions in this regard ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR DU PLESSIS: And did you explain the order to him?

MR KOTZE: Yes. Col Hattingh agreed that I put the request to George Hammond whom I required to work with me, we went together to Col Hattingh where we exchanged a few more words regarding the operation.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then you went to visit Col de Kock at Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR KOTZE: Yes. If I recall correctly, Honourable Chairperson, during the discussion with Col Hattingh we stated that with the Khotso incident we tried initially to execute the operation by ourselves and after the first abortive attempt, we decided to involve Mr de Kock, whereupon which we managed to execute the operation successfully with his assistance, and in the light of this we immediately suggested to Col Hattingh to make a request to Vlakplaas to assist with this incident as well, and Col Hattingh immediately agreed and stated that we should continue with discussions on this with Mr de Kock.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then you went to see Mr de Kock, is that correct?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, George Hammond and I, if I recall correctly, went to Vlakplaas and held a discussion to the one side with Mr de Kock, upon which he stated that he would be prepared to assist us, but that he did not want to do this without the knowledge of his Commanders. What we then did was to contact Col Hattingh and to request for him to clear this with Col de Kock's Commanders, which was then done and then Col de Kock received an instruction via his Commander, to assist us.

MR DU PLESSIS: But you do not know what was discussed and by whom, regarding Col de Kock and his Commander and Col Hattingh?

MR KOTZE: I do not have any knowledge regarding the nature and content of that discussion.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. And did you ever contact the Technical division at Head Office? That would be WAL du Toit and the Kok brothers?

MR KOTZE: Honourable Chairperson, yes, we immediately realised that such sort of an operation would require access to the building and we then referred it to Col du Toit's unit and specifically Japie Kok.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. And can you recall whether you were involved in any reconnaissance missions to Khanya House?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, if I recall correctly there was one reconnaissance occasion upon which we went to examine the inside of the building. If I recall correctly, Col de Kock was present upon this occasion, Japie Kok was definitely there, because he had to examine the locks and determine what sort of locks they were and also figure out how quickly he would be able to pick these locks. There may have been two other members as well, but as far as I recall I was present during the reconnaissance when we entered the building.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you recall that upon that occasion, Japie Kok and Mr de Kock were present, during that reconnaissance mission?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, that is my recollection, that they were present, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Can you explain to the Honourable Committee what you did in preparation of the operation for that particular evening. What did you take with, what did you purchase, what did you obtain and what did you do to in order to prepare for the operation?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, for the execution of this operation we relied quite heavily on Col de Kock and Vlakplaas and we held various discussions during the course of the days leading up to the operation with Col de Kock and his members and among one another, and the planning basically took place on the run, so to speak. We discussed among others, what we would use to fuel the fire, we decided that petrol would be the most advisable fuel for that. We discussed how we would attempt to propagate the fire to the various sections of the building where the petrol would be poured. We also discussed the protection of the members who would be tasked with specific tasks. We discussed how the transportation would take place, what we were supposed to look out for and what not. It was the regular type of planning for such an operation, which took place in the form of intimate discussions.

MR DU PLESSIS: But there was a planning session on the day of the operation, during the course of the day?

MR KOTZE: That is correct, Honourable Chairperson, and I think that we all convened on the evening shortly before the operation. For one last time we had a discussion regarding all the points of the plan, we made sure that everybody understood what they were supposed to do. This task was largely managed by Mr de Kock.

MR DU PLESSIS: Where did the petrol and the ignition cord that were used in the operation, come from?

MR KOTZE: After we decided to use that it came from our own magazines which we used during practical training sessions for the Bomb Disposal experts outside in the field. So it came from the magazines of our unit. If I recall correctly, we obtained funds for the purchase of the petrol and the Technical unit provided the plastic cans in which we poured the petrol in order to carry it into the building. I think that some of my fellow applicants have already pointed out that Kobus Kok poured the petrol into the cans at their offices and then prepared it as such.

MR DU PLESSIS: Could you look to page 368 of your application, there you state in the second paragraph that approximately 40 litres of petrol were used. Is that correct, or what is your perception regarding that?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, these 40 litres would have been somewhat insufficient, when I made the statement it was quite a number of years after the incident and in the meantime we have tried to reconstruct the events in order to refresh our memories and there was definitely more petrol than 40 litres worth. I would say that it was probably more than 100 litres worth of petrol, but I would not be able to say with certainty what the precise amount of petrol was but it was definitely more than 40 litres.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you also state that you added diesel to the petrol, is that correct?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, I stated that in my affidavit. I know that we added a substance, however in the meantime when I spoke to some of my fellow applicants, I think that it is more correct to say that it was paraffin and definitely not diesel. So I think it may have been an error on my behalf to say that it was diesel.

MR DU PLESSIS: And in this process, was Mr Hammond the one who assisted you consistently?

MR KOTZE: On the contrary, I think the section pertaining to the planning of the operation and the procurement of the paraffin, was conducted by George Hammond. We didn't do everything together all the time. I wasn't present when the petrol was purchased and prepared, but if I recall correctly he was the one who managed this aspect of the operation.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the ignition cord?

MR KOTZE: One of us retrieved it from the magazine, Chairperson. I cannot recall who it was.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Let us then go over to the planning session. Did you have any recollection of who was present or can you no longer recall?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, I can recall the prominent figures, naturally myself, Mr de Kock, George Hammond, the Kok brothers and an assortment of persons who were attached to Vlakplaas and who participated in the operation. It was a number of persons.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you depart on the operation from Vlakplaas?

MR KOTZE: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Were you and Mr Hammond armed?

MR KOTZE: No, we were not armed at all. We also didn't have anything that would identify us as police officers.

MR DU PLESSIS: Were you carrying radios?

MR KOTZE: If I recall correctly Honourable Chairperson, I personally had a hand radio on me. Yes, I had a hand radio.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you recall in which vehicle you travelled to the scene of the incident? In whose vehicle it was.

MR KOTZE: If I recall correctly we were in two kombis and a sedan vehicle. I recall that the vehicle in which I was, which was one of the kombis, was driven by Riaan Bellingan, but I cannot recall precisely who was in the vehicle with me.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Will you please explain to the Committee precisely what you did at the scene of the incident.

MR KOTZE: Honourable Chairperson, during the planning at Vlakplaas we planned the operation as such that the Kok brothers would obtain access to the building, that that would be their specific task and in the same fashion it was the task of myself and George Hammond to see that the ignition cord would be rolled out to the places where the petrol would be poured, and we were also responsible for lighting the cord and determining that that component of the plan was in order.

As a result of the fact that there was a printing press in the building, that component was also assigned to me. I had to determine that petrol was poured in the printing press room and that the ignition cord was also rolled out to that room. So at the time of the operation I was not in the main building, it was George Hammond's duty to perform these tasks in the main building.

MR DU PLESSIS: So therefore, Mr Kotze, you were in the small building where the so-called printing press was situated?

MR KOTZE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you just explain to the Committee, there had been mention of this printing press, but what is your recollection or what precisely was in that building?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, to call it a printing press in the true sense of the word would perhaps not be entirely correct, because there was no printing machine as such. What I do recall is that there was a large copying machine which one would find in any large office and I also imagine that there were other pieces of office equipment, such as document binders and a regular photostat machine with which one used to make copies by means of wax sheets, in the early day, but it wasn't really a professional printing press which stood there.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. If you look at Exhibit E which was submitted, you will see that there are a number of photographs in that document, I just want to ask you about these photos. The first photograph which is on page 2, do you see the building in which the printing press, so to speak, was housed?

MR KOTZE: I can see it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. And if you turn to page 7, which building is that?

MR KOTZE: That also appears to be the same building, but from a southerly view.

MR DU PLESSIS: And page 8?

MR KOTZE: That looks like the inside of the printing press room after it had burnt down.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Mr Kotze, you never entered the main building.

MR KOTZE: Not during the execution of the operation, at that stage I was never in the building itself.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you have any recollection who was with you in the printing room?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, I can only recall one person. There were more than just the two of us but I cannot recall specifically who they were, but I do recall that Japie Kok was there, because he had to unlock the printing press room, and I also recall that at a certain stage he assisted me in pouring petrol all over that room.

MR DU PLESSIS: Could you just explain to the Committee, the ignition cord, what precisely did you do with the ignition cord, who was responsible for it, how did it operate?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, the ignition cord is a demolitions accessory which is generally used in demolitions such as in construction work and mining work, wherever large-scale demolitions have to be performed. It looks like a regular electrical cord, but when it is exposed to a flame it burns at a steady pace with a clear open flame, and the purpose for it was to light the safety fuse. So if you were in a situation such as a mine where there would be a heavy charge, all the fuses would be connected to this safety fuse, which would then render it unnecessary for the demolitions expert to go from fuse to fuse.

The use of the ignition cord was twofold, it would take the fire into the various sections of the building and secondly, because it was a commercial demolitions accessory, it was freely available within the demolitions industry within South Africa, for example, with mining and so forth, and it would not necessarily be linked to a specific organisation or person.

MR DU PLESSIS: Could you just pause there. You spoke of a safety fuse, you must remember that most of the people here don't really know anything about this. Can you please explain to the Committee what a safety fuse is in comparison to an ignition cord.

MR KOTZE: A safety fuse is also a conductor of a flame, it takes the flame from the point of ignition to the charge and then unleashes the explosive action, but a safety fuse is a specific fuse which burns with a closed flame. The fuse is watertight, so that external elements cannot extinguish the fire or the flame then, and the flame would then burn within this watertight capsule.

MR DU PLESSIS: So the safety fuse is basically the opposite of an ignition cord. And does it burn slower than an ignition cord?

MR KOTZE: Yes, it burns slower than certain of the ignition cords and also with a much more constant flame, because a safety fuse is also employed in creating a time delay between the point of ignition and explosion. Typically then, to give the demolitions expert the chance to get to a point of safety after the charge has been set alight.

So on the evening of the operation we decided that we would run two lines of ignition cord, one in the main building and then another line which branched out to the building where the printing press was held.

The ignition cord, because it burns with an external flame, could be branched out quite easily and as soon as the flame reaches these points, because it is an open flame it would set these points alight. So that night we had a line in the building as well as a subsidiary line going to the printing room. We also had a length of safety fuse. I cannot recall precisely what the length was, but it must have been between 90 and 120cm, which we used in order to obtain the delay between the ignition of the safety fuse and when the ignition cord would set alight, which would then give us the opportunity to vacate the area.

MR DU PLESSIS: Who put down the ignition cord to the printing room?

MR KOTZE: George Hammond and I determined the ignition point which was just outside the outside door which faced the northern side on the ground level.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is that the back door?

MR KOTZE: Yes, that is the back door which showed to Skinner Street. And then we took the two points of the two rolls of ignition cord and connected them and George Hammond took the one roll into the main building whilst I took the other roll into the printing room.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. And who was responsible for igniting the safety fuse which would then burn to the point where the ignition cord was attached to the safety fuse, from which point it would burn further?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, I set the safety fuse alight.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Were you the last person at the scene?

MR KOTZE: Yes, all the persons withdrew from the scene and that is one of the reasons why I had a radio on me, so that Col de Kock could then tell me when to light the fuses once all the men had withdrawn safely and circumstances were favourable.

MR DU PLESSIS: There was an insinuation during cross-examination of the other applicants, that the back door was closed after the fire. Can you recall whether the back door through which the ignition cord went was closed or not?

MR KOTZE: The back door was definitely open, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Why do you say that?

MR KOTZE: Well one reason is that the ignition cord ran through that entrance and we didn't want to pinch the ignition cord in a closed door, because that could halt the propagation of the fire. And in order to allow a building to burn properly, we would require a flow of oxygen. Despite the use of petrol, we would require oxygen to fuel the fire, that is why we left the doors open to allow a maximum level of oxygen in the building which would then fuel the fire as much as possible.

MR DU PLESSIS: And I'm asking you this in terms of your expertise as a demolitions expert, could you think of any reason why the door would have closed at a certain stage? Is there any possible reason that you could think of that would be the cause of this during the fire?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, if the door had closed during the fire it is impossible to say beyond all doubt why it would have happened, but one reason I can think of is that if the fire ensued within the building, it would mean that the air would be heated and we know that hot air rises and wherever it rises cold air flows in beneath the hot air, which creates convection streams, and it is a possibility that some of these convection streams may have been strong enough to blow a door closed, or whatever the case may have been. But it is naturally impossible to state that this beyond any reasonable doubt.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is a possibility that you have presented?

MR KOTZE: Yes, that is a possibility that I have thought of.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Kotze, after you lit the safety fuse, where did you go then, what did you do?

MR KOTZE: If I recall correctly, Honourable Chairperson, we agreed that the persons who would assist with the operation would depart in the two kombis and return immediately to Vlakplaas. Col de Kock had a sedan vehicle which was parked somewhere in Bosman Street, if I recall correctly, and we agreed that as soon as the fuse was burning, I would return and join Mr de Kock in the sedan vehicle and that we would then follow the two kombis back to Vlakplaas.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is that what took place?

MR KOTZE: Yes, that is what took place, Honourable Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Now Mr Kotze, can you recall whether you saw from the vehicle of Mr de Kock, could you see that the building was on fire? What could you see?

MR KOTZE: If I recall correctly, we drove past the building a number of times to see what was going on there and how the fire was progressing and so forth. I confirm what Mr de Kock stated, we saw the fire brigade was helping people out of the building, which was quite an unpleasant surprise for us.

MR DU PLESSIS: Were you shocked when you saw this?

MR KOTZE: Yes, I didn't feel very good about it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Was there ever any talk prior to the operation that you can recall, of people that would have been in the building? Did anybody have any information indicating that there would be people in the building?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, I can state quite clearly that from the first word that I heard of the operation, from the first time that Col Hattingh spoke to me, the instruction was for us to execute the operation as such that no-one would be injured. We always spoke of that and discussed possibilities throughout the planning and at no stage whatsoever was it the intention to affect or injure any person. And with the reconnaissance component, we did not come to the conclusion that there were people in the building.

During the evening of the operation there was also no indication to me at least, that anyone was in the building and we were completely under the impression that the building was unoccupied at that stage. Perhaps that would not be the right word. At least we were under the impression that no-one was in the building, we were certain of that and that is why it was truly a very unpleasant experience for me when I saw that people were being helped out of the burning building. It really wasn't our intention.

JUDGE MOTATA: Very well, Mr Kotze. You and Mr Hammond returned to the scene the next day, is that correct?

MR KOTZE: Yes, the following morning we visited the scene.

MR DU PLESSIS: Why did you do that?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, it was usually the custom for us in the Bomb Disposal unit at Head Office, to investigate prominent incidents of explosions for two reasons. Firstly, to inform ourselves of what had taken place there and to see whether or not new methods or techniques had been used, so that we could gain information for the research and training process. Furthermore, we also wanted to provide assistance for the members of the local Security Branch who had been tasked to investigate the scene. And for me and George Hammond it was then important to visit the scene of the incident because it could also provide a potential alibi for us, because it would have been our custom to act as such in visiting the scene. It would also have given us the opportunity to investigate the nature and extent of the damage.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would it have been strange if you had stayed away from the scene?

MR KOTZE: It may have been strange, Chairperson, or certain people may have asked questions if we had not been there, so we decided to continue as if it was a normal working day and a normal task.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, Mr Kotze. Did you notice anything at the scene? Did you see anything at the scene?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, we specifically examined the sections where we had been and we saw that the printing room had burnt quite effectively and that the damage to that section of the building had been devastating. We examined the rest of the building and had a look around and saw that there were areas which had burnt quite well, although there were others that had not really burnt effectively at all. Basically we just had a look at how the fire had progressed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Could you explain to the Committee how you felt when you were there, and did you see any persons from the church there. Could you explain what your feelings were regarding this.

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, it was a peculiar state of awareness to walk around on the scene of the incident knowing that you were responsible for it, because my career up to that point had involved me being the person to investigate what had happened and now I was on the other side or the scene. There were some members of the church staff at the scene and I could clearly see from their body language and their facial expressions that they were clearly very upset and that it had been a very traumatic experience for them, the fact that their place of work had been damaged and destroyed to such an extent. It wasn't a very pleasant feeling.

On the one hand I knew why I had done it and why I had associated myself with the operation, but on the other hand it actually went against my principles as a police officer knowing that I stood in that position, and it really wasn't a very pleasant experience for me personally.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you feel bad about it?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, perhaps to summarise, for me it felt as if I had actually neglected my task as a policeman and at that point I wasn't certain whether the ends really justified the means.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Kotze, do you know anything about weapons which were placed on the scene by some of the persons who were involved in the operation? Did you ever have any knowledge about it at that stage?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, at the time of the incident I did not have any knowledge about it, after the operation I came to hear of it.

MR DU PLESSIS: A document was submitted as Exhibit D, which was signed by Col Ras from the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch and given to Mr Hattingh, it was dated the 14th of October 1988 and made reference to weapons which were found there and there is a reference to two SPM limpet mines, two F1 defensive handgrenades without detonators and four empty AK magazines. I'm showing the document to you, can you see this?

MR KOTZE: Yes, I recognise the document as a fax report, typical of those that we received from the branches during those years to make certain reports.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Then what I want to ask you in your capacity as an expert, the limpet mines and defensive handgrenades without the detonators, one could probably accept that they would not have caused any damage in the fire, nothing could have happened with it.

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, fire is an acceptable technique in the destruction of explosive devices. It is a technique which was developed in the second world war by means of which they would make a hole in the window of the sea mines which had washed up on the beaches and burn out the contents, and my opinion in this case is that fire would not have led to the explosion of these devices, especially in the absence of detonators.

MR DU PLESSIS: And if these devices had been fitted with detonators?

MR KOTZE: If so, the detonators per se would not really have caused any damage, it would depend whether or not the detonators which were the sensitive components of the device, would actually unleash the explosive effect. It would also depend on the explosive content of the device and the exposure to heat. That would determine whether or not something like this would go off. But in the absence of detonators, I have grave doubts regarding whether those devices would actually have exploded.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you recall the duration of the operation?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, I didn't really watch the clock during the entire process, but I don't think that it could have taken longer than 10 to a maximum of 15 minutes, because one would try to get away from such a scene as quickly as possible.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. And during the operation you acted under the command of Col de Kock, is that correct?

MR KOTZE: Yes, we accepted Col de Kock's authority and he was involved in the ...(end of side A of tape) ... because he was also the senior officer there that night.

MR DU PLESSIS: And would you have continued with the operation if you had any idea that there were people in the building?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, if I had been aware of the fact that there were people inside the building, I do not think that I would have continued because then that would have gone beyond the parameters of the instruction if there were people in the building.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis. Mr Hattingh?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Kotze, in terms of Mr Kok's evidence regarding the reconnaissance operation in which he, and as he testified Mr de Kock and another person were involved, I asked Mr de Kock, and I don't believe that he gave evidence about this, I asked him about his recollection with regard to this and his instruction to me is that he cannot recall that he went with you into the building, but that he also cannot dispute it.

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, I must admit that seeing as Mr de Kock was a prominent figure throughout the operation and that we looked to him for guidance in the execution of the operation, it would be very easy to place him in such a position, but after the course of all of these years I myself cannot say with certainty whether or not this was the case. And I must confess that I think that it possibly could have been that way, but I cannot confirm it beyond any doubt.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Just with regard to the quantity of petrol that you gave evidence about, some of the other applicants stated that there were about eight to nine of them carrying these containers of petrol. If there were eight to nine of them, there would have been in the vicinity of 180 to 190 litres of petrol, isn't that correct?

MR KOTZE: Yes, it could possibly have been that way, I cannot dispute or confirm it.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock informs me that according to his recollection there was something to the effect of 200 litres of petrol.

MR KOTZE: Yes, that is possible.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Mr van der Merwe?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Mr Chair.

Mr Kotze, just one or two questions. If one would pour the petrol and paraffin mixture out on the floor in a passage, would it cause smoke or immediately cause fire as soon as the ignition cord made contact with it?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, the petrol would result in an immediate flame because it is a highly flammable substance, as we all know, but because petrol is such a flammable substance it burns very quickly but very briefly and that is why we decided to add the paraffin, because paraffin does not detonate as easily, but it burns for much longer and it would have caused a fire that would be long enough to burn items that the petrol might not have burnt, and there would have been smoke.

MR VAN DER MERWE: According to your knowledge, this mixture had already been prepared by the time you got to the scene of the incident.

MR KOTZE: We had discussed the possibility of the petrol not causing as much damage because it burns so quickly, and that is why we decided to add paraffin, and I was told that it had been done, but I personally did not mix the substances.

MR VAN DER MERWE: But what I want to establish is whether or not paraffin was taken to the scene of the incident to mix with the petrol.

MR KOTZE: No, that would have taken way too much time and it would have rendered the operation too complicated.

MR VAN DER MERWE: If there will be evidence that on the second floor petrol was poured out but that all evidence indicates that the second floor was only filled with smoke by the time the people in the building tried to escape, would you, from your expert position, not agree that it is indicative of the fact that there could not have been any petrol on that floor, otherwise there would have been flames? This would be by the point that the people awoke.

MR KOTZE: Naturally the building started burning at the bottom, because that is where the ignition cord and the petrol started. There would have been smoke, the smoke is hot and along with the hot air it would also have risen and that would have heated up the rest of the building. That is a logical process. If there had been petrol on the second floor, there would have been signs of a severe fire because the petrol would have burnt and there would have been a fire.

If there was a fire on the second floor, and I myself wasn't there, so it's quite difficult to say, but I can imagine that people would not have been able to move there or that they would have been able to view very serious fire damage.

MR VAN DER MERWE: According to what I have read in Exhibit E, it would appear to me that some of the people who escaped, ran down that passage to get to the fire escape and that some of the others found the smoke too thick to move through, but no-one mentions anything about flames, or initial flames on that floor.

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, one can only speculate about these matters, but there are two aspects to bear in mind. If there flames, there would usually not be smoke at the basis of the flames, so the smoke would have formed against the ceiling above the flames. Something further is that the passages and the stairways form something like a chimney effect, so the hot air and the smoke downstairs, would definitely have chosen these routes to follow to the top, due to the natural convection streams which would have originated at this point. So I can imagine that the passages towards the top, not necessarily only on the second floor, but also on the third floor, would have been filled with dense smoke.

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry Chairperson, I don't know to what my learned friend is referring in Exhibit E, but if - I don't know where he was reading, at page 3 on the second paragraph, on the right-hand column

"Sister Bridget, Dr Lambert, Rosemary Cook and Roddy Nunes were all trapped on the second floor, unable to make it past the wall of flames and smoke."

So I'm not sure where he's assuming there was only smoke, from Exhibit E, on the second floor. I think it's quite clear.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr van der Merwe, you were questioning in generalities, could we be focused and say precisely this.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Let me be focused, Mr Chairman, and I will not get cross.

CHAIRPERSON: We shouldn't be.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Let me say to you, if you read a little bit further, that paragraph that my learned colleague has quoted does not refer to where this wall of flames was, it could have been on the staircase, we don't know, but if we go further down, three paragraphs further, if we read nicely there what was said, it says

"I tried to get to them but when I ran up the stairs to help them out, I could only see a thick curtain of black smoke."

No mention of flames. And then just the next paragraph:

"I don't know what would have happened if the fire had spread to their room."

Quite clearly, there's no evidence of fire at the rooms. But I will leave it at that, maybe the people who were there can tell us.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I'm sorry, but if he reads Mr Roddy Nunes ...

"We were surrounded by fire and there was no way of escaping."

MR VAN DER MERWE: Mr Chairman, I think we can leave this for argument, with all due respect, I think "surrounded by fire" could be the whole building as well, we don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: We don't have to saunter towards argument at this stage. I don't know, but let me hear you out, Ms Cambanis.

MS CAMBANIS: No, Chairperson, they will speak for themselves, they will tell what they saw and what they felt. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: My ruling in that respect, Mr van der Merwe, was that when Mr Kotze was telling us about a mechanical operation of burning liquids, in this instance petrol, paraffin, what proportions, he says "you cannot say a hundred percent but this would be the natural progression of such flammable liquids". And you were somewhat saying petrol on the second floor and all that, I think that is overstepping in a way, but the questioning of how this general progression would be and what smoke would do, getting the nearest outlet like a chimney, I think that was fair enough.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Mr Chairman, I won't pursue the matter any further, I think we will agree to disagree in this regard.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VAN DER MERWE: The floors, Mr Kotze, when you visited the building the next day, did you see whether or not there were wooden floors, can you recall?

MR KOTZE: Honourable Chairperson, I could recall or imagine that there were wooden floors. If they were not wooden floors, then they might have been wooden slat floors. There was also carpeting in certain sections if I recall correctly.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DER MERWE

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nel?

MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I've got no questions.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR NEL

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagener?

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, I have no questions, thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen?

MR JANSEN: I'll ...(indistinct) the examination.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Joubert?

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Honourable Chair, I have no questions.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR JOUBERT

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Kotze, the planning was just to use the petrol on the building where the printing press was and on the ground floor of the building, is that it?

MR KOTZE: Honourable Chairperson, if I recall correctly we said that the printing press was definitely a target, we poured over one container of petrol there and the room was quite small, so that would be enough. And then in the other rooms, I cannot recall whether we decided on which floors we will pour petrol, but I would imagine what happened that evening was that the persons poured the petrol as far as had petrol, but it is difficult to say because I was not in the main building to know where the petrol had been poured.

And the other thing is that usually in such building it would be sufficient to only, if the fire erupted on the ground floor and the flames burn upwards, so usually in time it would burn the whole building. So I do not believe it was the intention to pour petrol in the whole building, the fire would do that eventually.

MR LAMEY: And then the igniter cord that was used, you spoke of a length of about 100 centimetres, is that correct? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR KOTZE: No, that is the safety fuse that we used, because the fire was an open flame there was always the danger that there would be enough petrol fumes that it would burn while I was still on the scene, so we used a piece of safety fuse, and you will recall the safety fuse is the one that burns with a closed flame, so I would say that was approximately 120 centimetres. So we had a closed secure flame for a time period of approximately two minutes.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall up to where the cord was laid?

MR KOTZE: I do not know in the building, because during the night of the operation I was not inside, but I do know that I used one roll to do the branching off to the printing press, but the starting point was at the stoep steps at the back side.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, I do not have any further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: I don't have the luxury of a junior counsel as my colleague, Mr Jansen, but I've got no questions, thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Ms Cambanis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.

Sir, you say Mr de Kock was the most senior person, but on your evidence he was not at the building during the operation, is that right? He was not in the building - Mr de Kock?

MR KOTZE: I just quite frankly say, Mr Chair, that like the Kok brothers, we had a specific task to pursue and I concentrated on that. I must say that I didn't pay any attention to Col de Kock's whereabouts during the operation. Whether he was inside or outside the building, I really don't know, I didn't take any note of that in particular.

MS CAMBANIS: So as far - it is possible that he was in the building?

MR KOTZE: I really don't know, I really couldn't say.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, you said you were in radio contact with, was it with Mr de Kock that you said you were in radio contact?

MR KOTZE: That's correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And were you in radio contact with Mr Hammond?

MR KOTZE: Not that I can recall, no, not that I can recall, Mr Chair.

MS CAMBANIS: Of the people that entered the building, do you know who you would have been in radio contact with?

MR KOTZE: Well I ...(intervention)

MS CAMBANIS: If you can't recall who, that's ...

MR KOTZE: As far as I can recall is that the purpose why I had the radio was that we decided beforehand that I will light the fuse and I will withdraw from the scene right at the end when all the others had left already and Mr de Kock would give the signal, and there's only one way that he could do that and that was by means of radio. So how many other radios there were and who had radios, I really cannot remember. I think we had one radio per vehicle at least, so that even if we on our way there and back, so that we could at least co-ordinate while we were split up.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, that's what I've been - now the vast, well not the vast majority, but there were certainly several men inside Khanya House for the purpose of carrying out the instruction, generally in planning, would it not have been important to be in contact with them for the, with the vehicles parked for securing the area?

MR KOTZE: I think with an operation such as this, you don't spend time communicating and talking all the time, that's limited to the minimum and everybody was briefed beforehand so everybody knew what they had to do and concentrated on that. I think in a special operation such as this you use the radio only when necessary and for very particular purposes, that's why I don't think that there was pre radio communication during the execution of the operation in Khanya House itself.

MS CAMBANIS: No, Sir, I'm sorry if I misrepresented to you, I didn't mean that there would have been frequent communication, but for the safety of the men inside the building, one would expect that there would be radio communication between the people keeping guard or keeping watch outside and the men inside Khanya House. I'm not suggesting that ...(indistinct)

MR KOTZE: It's possible that it was like that, yes, it could have been, otherwise - I cannot recall what the exact situation here was, if people work in close proximity you could also do this by hand sign and not necessarily need radio for that. So as I say, I didn't really pay attention to this in particular, I cannot really make any substantive comment on that.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. The building was dark, was it?

MR KOTZE: Yes, it was dark.

MS CAMBANIS: Hand signs would have been helpful?

MR KOTZE: Yes, on second thought, hand signs in such a situation would have maybe not been the appropriate way.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes.

MR KOTZE: I was referring to in general.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, Sir, I'm also referring in general, that one would expect in a mission of this nature that the operatives who would be sent in, their safety would be paramount.

MR KOTZE: Yes, of course. Yes, Mr Chair.

MS CAMBANIS: And generally, because that was such a high priority, all I was saying is that one would expect some communication between the operatives inside Khanya House and the people who were guarding them or keeping surveillance outside, that's all.

MR KOTZE: Yes, Mr Chairman, it would be necessary to have some means of communication for this purpose.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. Of the people - there were, I don't want to say several planning sessions, but planning discussions from time to time, who was the person allocated to oversee the activities inside Khanya House, can you recall that?

MR KOTZE: Mr Chair, normally in an operation such as this you don't have like a foreman walking up and down to see if everybody does their jobs, that's done beforehand. Everybody is allocated his part to do and you do in, identify the area where you have to perform your task and as soon as that has been accomplished, you withdraw immediately. So there isn't like an overseer walking up and down to check on everybody, no.

MS CAMBANIS: And in the absence of foreman or an overseer, if an emergency situation arose in that building, would they be trained to know what to do in the emergency, beforehand as well?

MR KOTZE: Yes, normally there is contingency planning as far as possible, to decide what will happen if things go wrong.

MS CAMBANIS: And what was the contingency plan in this case if something went wrong?

MR KOTZE: I cannot exactly recall how we planned this, but I think our main objective was not to be identified and not to be seen, so if things were not right, we would have of course withdrawn as fast as possible and as quickly as possible without being seen.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, but how would the people inside Khanya House know if something had gone wrong?

MR KOTZE: By means of communication, radio, hand signals, for people close enough to each other, and by voice if necessary.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Sir. Sir, you said in your evidence, in your application as well, that the purpose of this was to destroy the building so that it couldn't be used again, I think.

MR KOTZE: Well I think the objective was to cause as much as possible damage to the building, to the infrastructure, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. And you've already clarified to the Committee that that would have required more petrol. I just want to know if you can remember the first that you - you are now aware that there is three storeys, a ground floor and three storeys?

MR KOTZE: Yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And when you went to the surveillance, do you remember where you went to?

MR KOTZE: My recollection of the surveillance is that I remained on the ground floor and since we were a very small team, I never moved very far from the, if I remember correctly, the set of glass doors on the eastern side of the building. We left it to Mr de Kock to go in deeper and survey the locks and the types of locks and to get a general layout of the building, I wasn't - Mr Kok, Mr Kock was the lock expert, he had to survey the types of locks, amongst others. I never went beyond the ground floor, I never went beyond the ground floor during that time, because I was keeping in the vicinity of the glass doors to see if anybody was approaching from outside.

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, near the glass door?

MR KOTZE: On the east side of the building.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, I don't know, do you recall that the staircase going up to the various floors is in fact situated closer to the, what we can refer to as the back door facing skinner street?

MR KOTZE: I must confess that my recollection of the inside of the building is really very vague.

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, I'm going to withdraw that, because I see one client is indicating that I'm mistaken. I withdraw that and apologise. Sir, the following day when you went onto the scene, you said you examined the building, not examined the building, but you walked around the building.

MR KOTZE: That's correct, Mr Chair.

MS CAMBANIS: And I don't recall, did you go throughout the floors to assess the damage?

MR KOTZE: If I recollect, Mr Chair, I think there were still some firemen on the scene doing their investigation and having been responsible for the printing press, I frequented more in that area. I cannot remember that I've gone up into the building onto some of the other floors. Whilst we were there my main attention was focused on the area that I was responsible for.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, is it correct that when this ignition cord burns it can give a quite distinctive trail that would be discernible by the naked eye?

MR KOTZE: It leaves a trail of what we used to refer to as an ash trail, yes, it does.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, like a snaking wherever it went? It would be easy to ...(intervention)

MR KOTZE: Wherever the line went there would be a residue, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. And as you know we don't have the docket with the fire report, but the witnesses say that that trail is correct as you say, on the outside from the printer to the back door, along the passage and up the staircase. Is that what you would expect to have been done?

MR KOTZE: Well I would imagine that the passage and the staircase would have been the obvious route, but I think my colleague, Mr Hammond, could perhaps shed some light on exactly how it was installed on the inside of the building.

MS CAMBANIS: That would the logical ... to take it up the staircase, that's what you're saying. Sir, the next day on your inspection, not inspection, I've used the wrong word, during your perusal of the place, you can't remember where in the main building you went, if anywhere, is that right?

MR KOTZE: I think we, I think I went, had a look on the ground floor as well. I could have gone up to the first floor, but I really cannot remember. It's also awkward in a building like that after the fire brigade been there, you know, the place is full of water and you have water dripping from the ceilings and the black soot, so it's not always easy to go wherever you want to. But I cannot really recollect whether I've ever went further than the first floor, but I know that I was definitely on the ground floor inside the building, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, during the recce, now in retrospect you'd agree that it's a great pity that no-one bothered to go up to the second and third floor. In retrospect.

MR KOTZE: Well in retrospect there are a lot of things that one could depict as a pity, but I assume and I also assumed at the time that the people who are responsible for the proper investigation would have done that, so I never bothered to do that, I never really visited the scene to become part and parcel of the investigation.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, but surely a recce is the most proper investigation or one of the more proper investigations that could be done, with respect Sir.

MR KOTZE: Well it depends on whose responsibility it is.

MS CAMBANIS: Wouldn't that have been the perfect opportunity to find out what the nature of the, whether there were residents, for example?

MR KOTZE: Mr Chair, as I've already indicated in my evidence, I was quite shocked to see that there were actually people in there that night, but by the time that we visited the building the next morning I also had already heard that none of those people were actually hurt or that they were all safely evacuated from the building, and that to me was already a relief and there was no wish from my side to really walk that trail and see where they were kept and what has happened. The main thing for me was that there was nobody killed or seriously injured and that to me was a relief and I was satisfied that, or glad that that at least didn't happen. So there was no wish on my side to walk the trail and look everything through.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. If you look at Exhibit E just for confirmation, on page 3 on the first column is what Bishop Verstrate said subsequent to that, is that he heard footsteps in the passage on the second floor where he was sleeping. You're not in a position to dispute that?

MR KOTZE: I cannot comment on this at all.

MS CAMBANIS: And if people say that they felt liquid which they assumed was petrol, or thought was petrol, or was petrol, on the second floor, you can't dispute that, that petrol was in fact strewn at least on the second floor?

MR KOTZE: I simply don't know, Mr Chair, because I wasn't in the main building during the operation, so ...

MS CAMBANIS: But with the amount of petrol that was taken there, that's possible? There was sufficient, certainly, it wasn't ...

MR KOTZE: It depends on what sufficient is, Mr Chair, we used one container of petrol in the printing press and that virtually exploded, there was a typical gas explosion there because of the volatility of petrol and the gasses that were formed. It was a total overkill because the place was destroyed. Is that enough or sufficient? Or if you go to the ground floor you use 10 litres or 20 or 50 litres per square metre? I mean sufficiency is a relative concept, I cannot say that with 200 litres you would have gone to the third or even fourth floor. It may have under the circumstances be not even sufficient for the first floor, it's a relative thing, so I cannot comment on that.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, 20 litres in the press unit and 180 litres in the main building, would that be sufficient for these purposes, to achieve the main objective, to render this building unworkable?

MR KOTZE: Mr Chair, maybe I can make this comment. Even a highly flammable liquid like petrol still requires air to burn and even if we had a dam of petrol on the ground floor and there wasn't sufficient oxygen present in the building, then the building wouldn't have been destroyed either. So one would think that with 180 litres of fuel, you could easily lay a building like Khanya House in ruins, but in fact it didn't happen because the building was closed, there weren't any broken windows or anything that could have provided sufficient draught to help the process. So one would think that 180 litres of fuel or petrol would be sufficient, but I think that was practically just about all that we could carry under the circumstances. So I think this is, to my mind, a very relative point as to what would have been sufficient or what not. It depends on how much you throw in a particular area, there may not have been enough for even the first floor or wherever. But since I wasn't there and I cannot recall any specific instructions as to how much petrol to apply in a specific area, I don't think we went down to those details, it's very difficult to say. At that time everybody's adrenaline is pumping and everybody is aware of the extraordinary circumstances under which they are and you try to get rid of your petrol as quickly as possible. So it's quite possible that there wasn't enough petrol even for the first floor, because everybody dumped it on the ground floor. It's very speculative and it's very relative.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed, Ms Cambanis. Mr du Plessis, your foot is fidgeting with out ignition cord.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, if you had formed the impression that was on purpose, I wish to set the record straight that it wasn't.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You may proceed, Ms Cambanis.

ADV BOSMAN: Ms Cambanis, may I just interpose for a moment?

Mr Kotze, somebody had to work out how much petrol you had to take along with you to do what you wanted to do.

MR KOTZE: Honourable Chairperson, in such a case the amount of petrol depends on how many people are participating in the operation and it depends on the access routes and how suspicious it would look if the persons would walk in the middle of the night with hundreds of containers, delivering hundreds of containers before a Catholic church, all those things have to be considered, and it also depends on how comfortable we can carry those containers. Because it is a convert operation one wants to do it as inconspicuously as possible, one cannot carry loads and loads of equipment with you and go unnoticed. But if I recall correctly, the amount of petrol that we took into the building was simply a practical amount that we could carry amongst ourselves, taking all these circumstances into consideration.

And secondly, the petrol would only serve to set the building alight. The whole purpose would be that because of the inherent combustibility of the substances or material in the building ... and once again I can say that those were the restrictions with regard to the amount of petrol that we could carry.

ADV BOSMAN: I can understand that there were restrictions, but can you tell me who worked out how much petrol you could take along with you, when you consider all these factors that you have mentioned?

MR KOTZE: Honourable Chairperson, I cannot recall exactly whether we went and worked it out on paper. I think that in this regard we said that listen, we are so many people, let us get so many containers and that would give us so much petrol and that should be sufficient.

ADV BOSMAN: And with regard to the ignition cord, did you work out a length that you would use and who would work out that length?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, with regard to the ignition cord, it boils down to, it comes in standard lengths and if I recall correctly, Mr Hammond and I just took one roll each, because at the end of the day when the ground floor, for argument's sake, was soaked in petrol sufficiently, then only the first metre or metre and a half would be necessary to get the flame to the petrol and then the ignition cord wouldn't serve any purpose anymore because the fire would propagate itself further.

ADV BOSMAN: But you took two rolls with you.

MR KOTZE: I cannot speak on behalf of Mr Hammond, but I would think that in such regard one would roll it out as far as the roll would go, if one would feel that you do not want to go any further, you would just leave the rest there.

ADV BOSMAN: Can you assist us and tell us what the length of it was?

MR KOTZE: If I recall correctly the rolls were usually somewhere in-between 25 to 50 metres. At that stage I think there were nine various types of ignition cords on the market and the length that the factories used were standard lengths and the amount of length that goes onto, that is sold, was dictated beforehand, and if I recall correctly we used some of the thicker cords and usually that is not a full 50 metres, so it could have been at least 25 metres, but definitely not more than 50 metres.

ADV BOSMAN: That was a rather long interruption, I apologise for that, Mr Cambanis, you may continue.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.

Not more than 50 metres per roll, is that what ...

MR KOTZE: I haven't been in contact with these things for the past 12 years - no, that's a lie, for the past 7 years, Mr Chair, and I doubt whether that roll was 50 metres, I would say that it was rather in the region of 25 to about 40 metres, at the most, for that particular thickness of igniter cord.

MS CAMBANIS: But in any event, Sir, you say you weren't in the building and you can't dispute the evidence or observation that the ignition cord was taken up the stairs to the third floor, the beginning of the third floor?

MR KOTZE: I cannot recall that at all, I cannot say that I dispute it or do not dispute it, Mr Chair, I simply don't know.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, were you aware - can you please assist us with who planted the limpet mines and the explosives inside the building that night? Or who took it and put it in the cupboard?

MR KOTZE: Mr Chair, I must be quite frank, I didn't know of these items until the next day. I really don't know who planted it and who took that responsibility, I really don't know. I was as surprised and upset about it as anybody else, but I really don't know.

MS CAMBANIS: I'm sure - I don't know if you were here, Sir, but Mr de Kock, has quite openly and honestly said that yes, it did come from Vlakplaas and yes, it was planted, you know that now?

MR KOTZE: Yes, I know that, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And we now nearing the end of witnesses and we cannot trace, and between yourselves it's not possible that anyone has come out and said, 'it was planted, but we can't put a face to that".

MR KOTZE: Mr Chair, I can quite honestly say in my mind that I don't know who it was. Mr Hammond was my ex-colleague and after this incident we have spent many years working together as well, so we shared and still sometimes shared a lot of time together in discussions, but even we cannot recollect exactly who put it, who planted the material, who actually took, physically took the stuff and planted it. So I can honestly say that I really don't know. As far as I'm concerned, I'm also grateful that we can clarify that issue that definitely the Bishops Conference wasn't really stashing arms or anything at that stage, but unfortunately I cannot put a face to the person who has actually done that.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Kotze, were you here on the first day of these hearings?

MR KOTZE: I was, on the first day, the first afternoon when Mr McIntyre gave evidence, yes I was here.

MS CAMBANIS: And did you hear that when we told the Chairperson on behalf, when I told the Chairperson on behalf of clients, that had we been satisfied with the papers before Court, there would be no question of opposing, all that my clients want to know is what happened that night and who did it and how they did it and when they did it. Did you hear that?

MR KOTZE: Yes, I heard that, Mr Chair.

MS CAMBANIS: Now this is probably enormously naive of me, but if explosives were going to be taken into the building, wouldn't it be better to get someone in your position or Mr Hammond's position to do that?

MR KOTZE: Mr Chair, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to carry explosives, I mean the things have been designed to withstand very rigorous treatment on the battlefield, because they were - a limpet mine, amongst others, is a conventional weapon, they are intended to go into the thick of battle and still it must be able to be handled safely by whoever is operating them or planting them or preparing them. Yes, one could say in retrospect or retrospect is not the right word, but in ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Hindsight.

MR KOTZE: Not even hindsight, Mr Chair, if you will forgive me, but in normal conduct of matters you would want explosives experts to handle the explosives, but in this particular incident it wasn't really required that an explosives person should carry them to be able to keep them safe or to handle them safely, it could have been anybody, it could have been a five year old child for that purpose. That's how safe those things are in the state where they haven't got igniters in them. So it could have been anybody. And, Mr Chair, I have also revealed something of my emotions that I've experienced during the experience on the scene and the day thereafter, I'm trying to be as straightforward and to be as honest as possible and I can say honestly that I do not know who the person was who placed those explosives in the cabinet. During the operation I was unaware of them, I only found it out the next day. And I will be as honest to say that I was upset by it, because I think it was taking the whole thing too far and that could possible point fingers back directly at us. It wasn't even in the planning of the operation. If I remember correctly, afterwards Col Hattingh was upset about it, but still I cannot say who planted those items, I really don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Were they of Eastern origin, Eastern-bloc?

MR KOTZE: Yes, they were of Russian origin, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You may proceed, Ms Cambanis.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, you've canvassed the issue of the back door being locked, I think that was also the evidence of Mr de Kock, that it had been closed - no, no.

MR KOTZE: No.

MS CAMBANIS: My clients were informed by the investigator or members of the police, that the door had been locked after the arsonists left the building, and based on that fact it was suggested to them that it would have been an inside job.

MR KOTZE: Mr Chair, I was the last person to leave, I was the last guy to leave and that door was definitely open, it was a metre and a half away from me where I knelt to light the fuse, there was no draught at that time, or anything. If the door was found locked the next day, I mean the fire brigade was there, they could have closed the door or could have done something that could have caused the closure of the door. One must also keep that in mind that the fire brigade doesn't really handle an arson scene with gloves, they go in there and they would even break down doors and destruct parts of the building if that will help them to kill the fire, so they have been through there like a tornado as well. So it's impossible to say what really closed the door, but what I can state categorically, without a doubt, that the door was open when I left.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, you said that you were with Mr de Kock in the sedan vehicle when you left the scene and that you came back and you drove past the building a few times to see what happening, is that correct?

MR KOTZE: That is my recollection, yes, Mr Chair.

MS CAMBANIS: What was put by one of the witnesses yesterday is that there's police barracks, I think it's called barracks, in the vicinity, there's a ...

MR KOTZE: Directly to the eastern side of the church, on the corner of Bosman and I think, Skinner Street, there's an old hotel, I can't remember what the name of the place was, but that was later used by the police as quarters for, unmarried quarters for members of the police force.

MS CAMBANIS: But this is a built up area where there was a risk of detection, which is exactly why guards were posted outside to look after the safety of the men inside, because of the risk of detection.

MR KOTZE: With any - yes, of course, with any such type of operation where you are doing things that you shouldn't be, or a covert operation, of course you have to take care of that.

MS CAMBANIS: And I think Mr de Kock - normally you would leave the scene immediately to avoid detection, isn't that the normal expectation?

MR KOTZE: I don't understand the question.

MS CAMBANIS: After the operation it would be important to leave the scene as quickly as possible to avoid detection, surely.

MR KOTZE: Yes, that would be the natural instinct, but then again on the other hand, it is sometimes necessary to see out the operation and see also what happens after your actions and make sure that things are going the way they should or ... It's sometimes just maybe, it depends from person to person and exactly why Mr de Kock decided to stay in the vicinity, we haven't really discussed that, I haven't asked him about it, I just assume that it was to see whether things went well, whether the building is burning well and just get a general sort of like first glimpse after the operation for his own knowledge.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. Chair, may we take the lunch adjournment now in order that I may take instructions?

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, it's almost one. We'll adjourn and take lunch. We'll have an extra 15 minutes because we have to just complete some administrative duties, but we'll definitely start at two.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

HENDRIK VAN NIEKERK KOTZE: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: We are ready to proceed, but firstly, the Members of the Panel wish to thank you for your indulgence in allowing them these extra minutes to complete their administrative duties. We are very thankful for that. Ms Cambanis?

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS CAMBANIS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Patel?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

Mr Kotze, just a couple of aspects. Am I correct in my understanding that of the operational group, yourself and Mr Hammond were the two persons most experienced in terms of how most effectively to set Khanya House alight?

MR KOTZE: Mr Chair, I think it's difficult to say that we were the most experienced, but at least from our job description, we were working with explosives and associated materials on a full-time basis. I don't think we can say that we are more experienced than other people in combustibles or in methods of arson, but from the point of view that we were working with this stuff full-time, as our daily job, from that point of view I could say that we had lots of exposure to it, yes.

MS PATEL: And in terms of this operation, the decision as to the modus operandi in respect of the arson specifically, would that have been left to yours and Mr Hammond's discretion?

MR KOTZE: I think if I can recall correctly, what actually happened was that I think we all had suggestions, even from other members, and we considered all the suggestions on the table and then, you know, decided on the most practical thing to do, or what we thought at that time were the most practical. I won't say that everybody just followed exactly what Mr Hammond and I said, I think we certainly had inputs to make, but I think we sort of like, under the circumstances, taking all the aspects of such an operation into consideration, I think we considered all the suggestions on the table and decided which would be the most practical, yes.

MS PATEL: In coming to the decision as to how much petrol would be used, or whatever combination of flammable substances you wanted to use and whatever else you required to set the building alight, did you take into consideration that the fire department was very close to Khanya House?

MR KOTZE: Yes, Mr Chair, there was some discussions about that, the quick reaction time of the fire brigade, and maybe we, Mr Hammond and I at least, discussed the aspect that the fire brigade could be on the scene before enough damage was done to the building, or before the fire progressed far enough. We've considered that aspect and certainly from that point of view, we were thinking of ways to make the fire burn as ferociously and propagate as quickly as possible, hence the open doors, to use but one example.

MS PATEL: Okay. And then just as a matter or interest, how long would it take from the time you set the safety ignition, the safety valve at the bottom ...(intervention)

MR KOTZE: Fuse.

MS PATEL: ... fuse, that's it, sorry Honourable Chairperson, excuse my ignorance. From the time you set the safety fuse alight on the ground floor, to the end of the ignition cord to burn, how long would that take, would it take a couple of minutes for the entire cord to set alight and for the building then to be ignited, or how long would that take, just an average?

MR KOTZE: It's rather quickly. The length of the safety fuse burns at a constant speed which, if I recall correctly, was in the region of, I think about two minutes.

MS PATEL: Okay.

MR KOTZE: But the moment that the flame goes into the open, in other words when the igniter cord actually propagates the flame, when the flame is now open, you know it's very difficult to predict and I think the purpose of the igniter cord was not to delay it, but to actually just propagate the flame. And I may perhaps just mention that the moment that I was sure that the fuse was burning well, I left the scene immediately, climbed back over the wall and went to Col de Kock's car, and I think even before I went into the car I heard the explosion in the printing press, because petrol fumes were all over, it formed gasses floating in the air, so from that point onwards it was rather quickly. I would say at the most, two and a half to three minutes after I struck the match I think the printing press went up in flames.

MS PATEL: Right, thank you. And then just finally, in response to a question earlier on as to whether you would have proceeded if you had known that there were people in the building, your response as I'd noted it then, was that you wouldn't have proceeded because it would have been beyond your authorisation at the time. This is hypothetical, but if the orders at the time were that people were to be injured as well, would you have proceeded?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I have to object against this question, I don't know what the relevance of the question is and it's an unfair question to the witness. There was no evidence before this hearing that that was ever the order and it's unfair towards the witness to ask this question on what he should have done if the order was different, then we can just as well ask him what he would have done if they had said to him he must kill the people with bayonets in the building. It's got no relevance, with respect.

CHAIRPERSON: It would put us in the realm of speculation, all the permutations.

MS PATEL: Alright. Thank you, Honourable Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Advocate Bosman?

ADV BOSMAN: I have no questions, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Advocate Sandi?

ADV SANDI: I have no questions, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kotze, this spraying or littering of the petrol, for instance let's take where your concern was, that is the print unit, did you spray it that it would fall on certain items, like for instance in Exhibit E I saw something that is similar to a photostatting machine, how were you spraying it, or you just wanted petrol in that print unit?

MR KOTZE: Mr Chairperson, we simply took the containers of petrol and sprinkled it all over. I definitely made sure that what appears to be the photostat machine, what I also assumed to be a photostat machine at that point in time, I made sure that it was well soaked in petrol.

CHAIRPERSON: The background you have sketched in the documents, which was a reaction to when the ANC started with their "covert operations", is that the learning you obtained whilst you were doing your courses, or was this just related to you? I would refer you to page ...

MR KOTZE: Mr Chairman, my knowledge at that time of the ANC, the weaponry, the doctrines, and which ultimately formed my perception of the situation at the time, was a culmination of own reading, own interest, security reports, information that I obtained from the actual mouthpiece of the various organisations, such as the African Communist, Sitchaba, Vukani Awake and many others which being a member of the Security Branch, we've had access to these and before my stunt of duty at the Bomb Disposal unit, I was actually a normal Security Police operator at the Security Branch Pretoria, where I actually dealt with security reports, with the gathering of information. So I was informed from various areas about these, from security courses right down to my own readings, to my actual involvement in the Security Branch operations, from time to time.

CHAIRPERSON: So would it be fair for me to infer that that would have started as early as 1976, when you joined the Police Force?

MR KOTZE: Mr Chair, to be quite honest with you, even before that, when I was at school I read books on communism and by the time that I joined the Police force, I had very strong perceptions and personal views on communism, things that I still have to this day.

CHAIRPERSON: Why I'm asking you that, I was guarding it jealously that if probably that kind of history belongs to people like Hattingh SC, myself, Adv Bosman and probably Mr Cornelius, because we have sufficient grey hair to have been around then. No, no, the interest was that I realised that you were born in 1957 and suddenly in '63, about Rivonia, you had interest, as I said probably you must have been a genius during the Police force before then.

MR KOTZE: No, Mr Chairman, I think that comes from readings and also at security, the courses that we do in the Security Branch, I mean we, as part of our training, we have looked at, you know, shall I say cases in history, of which Rivonia was one. Also Rivonia, as I remember correctly, it is where the first improvised explosive devices that were used in South Africa, where they were devised, that's why from the explosives course we've taken an interest in that and we've studied the methods and the techniques used then. That is where that knowledge comes from, so not firsthand but acquired knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: And that gave you a strong leaning towards the Nationalist Party's policy?

MR KOTZE: Mr Chair, yes, we can say that. Personally, in my perception I think to me the big enemy was communism, world communism at that stage. I was also very much under the impression of what was happening elsewhere in the world. I mean, there was the huge arms race, the nuclear arms race in Europe and elsewhere in the world, which was a direct result of the cold war between West and East, and I think Southern Africa was likewise the hot-spot on the globe where, if I can put it that way, Kremlin communism has taken a strong interest in. And I also believe that although apartheid was maybe an unjust, not maybe, definitely an unjust political dispensation and many people were deprived of those rights, I still believe that that was but the sub-component of the bigger, shall I say danger that was lying ahead and that was that South Africa would be engulfed by Russian communism and by communists and we were turning into something like Angola and Mozambique. They've never yet recovered from those revolutions and the revolution has taken on the same magnitude in Southern Africa. We would have been in a similar situation, and I strongly believe that in many instances the black consciousness movements, of course they found a very sympathetic and apathetic ear with the communists, but for a reason, and would the iron curtain not have come down when it has happened, I sincerely believe that pay-back time would have been there and of what is today the previous, shall I say black consciousness movements, they would have had to pay back and the situation would even for them be worse today. So to me it was never a case of really attacking the man around the corner because he didn't believe what I believed in, but I sincerely believed that everything was intertwined into this bigger enemy that was overwhelming, and that was the main perception that made me associate myself with operations of this type.

CHAIRPERSON: As at 1988, October the 12th, which the date of this incident, you were busying yourself studying international politics, did it have a negative influence on you, or it merely fortified the views you had about communism?

MR KOTZE: Mr Chair, my personal studies actually revealed to me the first time, shall say on an intellectual level, how wrong the apartheid system was and even at that time, being a member of the Security Branch, I acknowledged it to myself and even to some of my colleagues, that I think it's an undefendable, unjust political dispensation. But you know, that my views at that stage was that it will change and there is no ways that it can go in any other direction. But one of the strong perceptions at that stage was that Khanya House, and it was alleged that some of the pamphlets that had come from the printing press in Khanya House, strongly urged the communities to go against the first Municipal elections in which black people could participate.

Now in my mind, being a supporter of the Nationalist Party, I perceived that to be a very strong and a very definite sign from the Nationalist Party, that they are going to change things and the things are changing, this was the first step towards a much more democratic dispensation and anybody that stood in the way of that and tried to disrupt that or to urge people not to participate in this natural process, I thought it was wrong and that's why I could associate myself with the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Mr Kotze. Mr du Plessis, any re-exam?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Kotze, at the end of the day you still believed that this operation was aimed at the liberation movements and against the effective action of the liberation movements against the government.

MR KOTZE: Honourable Chairperson, yes, that is what I believed because it was necessary for me, because the liberation movements in many cases had advocated the chaos that they wanted to reign at that stage.

MR DU PLESSIS: And when this happened, you said that you supported the National Party government in its policy, is that correct?

MR KOTZE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now Mr Kotze, during that operation it was not your function to gather information with regard to what the church was doing, is that correct?

MR KOTZE: No it was not, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you accept that the persons who gave the instructions from the top would have known exactly what the church was busy with and that they would have had a justified reason for taking action against the church?

MR KOTZE: Chairperson, I did not doubt that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Mr Kotze, this mixture of paraffin and petrol which was poured on the floor, did this make the floor smooth?

MR KOTZE: Yes, the wax on the floor is dissolved by the petrol and it becomes very smooth.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you say anybody would be able to run on it?

MR KOTZE: I could not walk properly in the printing press, I had to walk very cautiously, I think it would be very difficult to run in there. On the contrary, while we were busy in the printing press, Japie Kok fell hard and this was while he was trying to walk.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Kotze, and then the roll of ignition cord, am I correct in saying that the one roll was into the building and the other one was into the printing press?

MR KOTZE: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: And this ignition cord that burnt when it burnt passed the safety part and it was burning into the building, can you give the Committee an indication as to how fast it burnt?

MR KOTZE: The ignition cord had a burning speed which was specified according to the product in terms of seconds per metre, but I cannot recall the exact burning speed. What I can also add is that I would think that the moment when the first flame arrived at the first petrol, then it would burn much quicker than what the ignition cord would, but then everything else would burn together and would not play a role.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would one be able to regard it as quickly, very quickly?

MR KOTZE: Well it's as quickly as when you would pour a whole lot of petrol on the floor and add a match to it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Kotze, you are excused.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I ask if Mr Kotze can be excused from the hearing too, he has to accompany his daughter to the doctor and he should have been there already.

CHAIRPERSON: You are excused from the hearing, Mr Kotze.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR KOTZE: Thank you, Mr Chair.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Are you leading any evidence in support of Mr Kotze?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, that is the evidence of his application, Mr Chairman, may I beg leave to call Mr Hammond.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.