Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hugo?

MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, yes, I call ...

CHAIRPERSON: Before we were electrically interrupted, you were about to call Mr De Kock? Right, yes, very well.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Hugo?

EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman. This witness is going to testify in Afrikaans Mr Chairman.

Mr De Kock, you are the applicant in this matter, is this correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: I just want to discuss your history briefly, it is contained in your application which has been placed before the Committee?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: You were born on the 29th of January 1949 in George in the Cape Province?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: You are currently serving a prison sentence for several counts of offences which you have been found guilty for and sentenced for?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: The matter for which you are currently applying for amnesty, is that one of the sentences which was given to you?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HUGO: Your application appears on page 81 until page 144. Do you confirm this, have you read it, is it true and correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: Then I would like to discuss your earlier history and your education which you received in Boksburg and matriculated in 1966?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: In 1967 you underwent military training?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And then in 1968 as a 19 year old young man, you joined the Police Force and underwent the basic training through the Police College in Pretoria?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: In 1968 you then voluntarily joined the Police Counter-Terrorism Unit?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And you also undertook several excursions to the then Rhodesia which would last for approximately three to four months each time?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: In 1970 you occupied the position of Lieutenant and Station Commander of Ruakana in Ovamboland?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And in 1978 you were appointed as the Station Commander at Oshakati and you were also a member of the Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Then in 1979 you became a founding member of the Koevoet Unit in the former South-West Africa?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Then in 1983 you ended up at Vlakplaas, or at Unit C1, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: In 1985 and more specifically ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hugo, may I just interrupt you for a moment. Do we have enough headphones here? And the people down there? Slow down a bit, thank you.

MR MAPOMA: Sorry Sir, may I also announce that the Xhosa channel is channel 3. Xhosa channel is channel 3.

MR HUGO: I am sorry Mr Chairman, I wasn't aware of the fact that I was going too fast.

CHAIRPERSON: You can easily get carried away Mr Hugo.

MR HUGO: Mr De Kock, we reached the stage during 1985 when in July 1985, you took over as the Commander of Vlakplaas or Unit C1?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: Then just for the sake of general background, is it correct that on page 89 and further you give the factors of how your political consciousness and feelings were formed and shaped?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: Then just to return to Vlakplaas, on page 9 you refer to Gen Coetzee's memorandum in which he set out the purpose and objectives of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Could you tell the Honourable Committee what the apparent reason was which was presented to the public by Gen Coetzee with regard to the use of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the apparent reason was that Vlakplaas would serve as a rehabilitation centre or rehabilitation base for former members of the ANC and the PAC and that these persons would then also be utilised for the identification of ANC and PAC members, whether physical or by means of photographs and then after these former ANC and PAC members had worked for the police, they would then also testify and give evidence in court against their former cohorts who would then have been arrested in the Republic.

Furthermore they would also be used for the tracing of ANC and PAC members, because it was possible for them as a result of their association in the camps in Angola and Zambia, to physically identify trained members and to then arrest such members.

MR HUGO: That is with regard to the one branch of Vlakplaas. There was also another aspect to Vlakplaas which Gen Coetzee did not address in his memo?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. The second agenda of Vlakplaas was to be active and operational and take action against members of these operations whether internal or external. This would include the neighbouring States and also international States.

We would then refer to Europe as an example to kidnap members of the ANC and the PAC, to recruit them, or to shoot them and to destroy their facilities.

MR HUGO: Your Commanders, were they aware of these functions which were executed by Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. With most of these incidents, myself and the members were accompanied by either Brigadiers or Generals or both until the border, the Oshoek Border Post for operations in Swaziland and no such actions could take place in neighbouring States without the approval of the Chief of Section C1 or the Security Chief.

MR HUGO: Is it correct to say that Vlakplaas or C1 was actually the exclusive operational arm of the Security Police in the Security Forces?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Mr De Kock, did you ever occupy any place during any meetings or committees which decided about operations which were to be launched, which were involved with the identification of targets?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. The identification of the target would usually take place by means of Section C2.

I cannot say that it is sister section, it would be a second section of Section C, which would then undertake the interrogation of ANC and PAC members, targets, identify places of residence, routes in neighbouring States, and so forth.

This Section C2 also shared information with National Intelligence and other Security Branches and also with Military Intelligence by means of a Unit with the acronym Trevits. TREVITS stood for the counter revolutionary target information centre.

It was a group that indicated targets. They would decide who or what would be the target, and we would then give execution to that request or order.

MR HUGO: Just before we come to the particulars of this incident, just a number of aspects which you addressed in your written statement.

On page 79 you refer to the political objectives, among others to the indoctrination, the training and the influence, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: On page 105 you state that you are aware that the former State President P.W. Botha protected some of his soldiers in order to prevent criminal prosecution of these soldiers?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: On page 110 you refer to the political dogma or concept of total denial which existed within Security circles?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: On page 121 you discuss the situation with regard to the execution of orders and that this was done without asking any question?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: On page 123 with particular relevance to the current application, you discuss the aspects of the cover up of offences, committed by the Security Forces?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: And then on page 130 in the final instance, you discuss the context in which these events took place and the background against which they took place?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: On page 137 you stipulate what exactly gave rise to this incident for which you are applying for amnesty today.

Would you like to tell us in your own words how exactly it came to be that you were involved in this incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I was the Commander of the Counter Insurgency Unit in Vlakplaas in 1985 when this incident occurred, during which an alleged ANC member was shot dead in the former Transkei.

I can recall that members of C1 were involved in a joint operation with the former Transkei Security Police and that along with the Transkei Police, they were working in the Transkei.

I cannot recall who the liaison officers were and by exactly which channels the arrangements were made. I am saying this because we couldn't work in any of the neighbouring States at all, such as Transkei, Venda or Bophuthatswana, unless arrangements had indeed been made with the relevant Security Branch in that TBVC State.

Arrangements were usually made, let's say for example in Bophuthatswana the arrangements would have been made through the Liaison Officer who was stationed at Zeerust. For example if we wanted to do an operation in Venda, we would liaise with the Liaison Officer who was liaising with Venda, who would then be stationed at Louis Trichardt.

In other words, we would have liaised with one of two institutions in order to do work in the Transkei. One would have been Aliwal North, with Willie de Lange, a Captain Willie de Lange, the other would have been with Warrant Officer Dan Naude, who was officially and generally known as the Liaison Officer or person who liaised with the Transkei Security Forces, and then indeed with the Head Office.

Only then would C1 be able to enter the Transkei and in co-operation with a Transkei Security member or police member, would they be able to take action within the Transkei, because they didn't have any powers of arrest.

My recollection is also that this infiltration of the ANC and PAC members was undertaken from the Lesotho area to Transkei.

MR HUGO: Might I just interrupt you here for a moment. Firstly you have stated that an incident took place on page 137, the third line, during which a member of the ANC was shot dead in the former Transkei. Who told you that this was indeed an ANC member?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, my recollection of that time is that the documentation which was received from the Eastern Cape, this would include telexes, reports and phone calls, created the impression that this was indeed an ANC member who had been shot dead in the Transkei.

MR HUGO: Did you have any reason to doubt this or to research the issue in order to determine whether or not this was the truth, that he was a trained member of the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, by the time the report reached me, this person would have been identified. In other words one or two former ANC members would have identified this person, or even more than that.

The identification of this person, would have been put in writing as well as the Security Force file number. I just want to explain to you what I mean by the Security Force file number.

In former times files would be marked with S1 for whites, S2 for Asians, S3 for coloureds and S4 for blacks. If a white person had been shot, it would be S1 and that person's specific number.

So for me to undertake further research would have been unnecessary. That which would reach me, would go via East London, through PE, through the Divisional Commander to the Head Office of Security in Pretoria, where it would be checked and then it would be percolated through to C1 and C2.

MR HUGO: Is it correct to say that you cannot objectively state that the deceased was a member of the ANC, that is the information that was given to you and you accepted this and believed this in good faith?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. There is no reason why I would have doubted it in any way.

MR HUGO: Very well, you may continue. What happened after that?

MR DE KOCK: I have a recollection of a shooting of an ANC member who had been identified by a former member working for the Security Police, by the name of Shosha. The allegations were that the ANC member, after he had been arrested in the Transkei, attempted to escape and according to information given to me, the ANC member was shot by Shosha.

MR HUGO: I beg your pardon. Might I just once again interrupt you. Do you remember who gave you the information that the ANC member had been shot by Shosha?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I have a very vague recollection but I must just mention that I did not include it with this, because I did not want to go over into speculation. Lieutenant Adamson, a former Koevoet member and unfortunately he is deceased today, he had cancer, he was in control of this group as far as I can remember.

Shosha was a female member of the ANC who had only just begun working for us. Lieutenant Adamson mentioned to me and I remember that this was during a telephonic conversation, that there was a wrestling which took place in the kombi between the Security Force members and the ANC member.

The ANC member escaped through one of the side windows of the minibus and during this, it happened that they held him by his shoes and during his escape, he lost his shoes. That is actually how he escaped, but during the struggle Shosha shot this man through the leg with a pistol.

And apparently, according to my understanding, this shot was placed high up on the hip. She had a 32 pistol. She had been issued a 32 pistol as all female members of the police were issued.

I must just say that this is possible, but I did not want to include this in order to border on speculation, however, I do believe that it is significant. The information which was based largely on hearsay was that the Transkei Police were handling the case and that an informal inquest was held into the matter.

A while after that, questions were however posed in Parliament as to who this former ANC member had been, who was in the service of the Security Police and had been appointed as a member of the South African Police.

I was called in by Brigadier Willem Schoon and requested to cover up the identity of the former ANC member. It was then denied that such a member ever existed or that any former ANC member had ever been in the service of the SAP.

I cannot recall the entire process in particular, but I did make arrangements for the removal of the documentation from Tshabalala's file as well as for the removal of any other relevant information on the central computer network of the South African Police.

The nett result thereof was that Tshabalala ceased to exist for all ends, that would be administrative and any other purpose.

I continued to appoint Tshabalala and once again took him into service at Head Office as a source and appointed him under the name of Mavusu.

MR HUGO: Once again, may I interrupt you. You heard during evidence given by Mr Tshabalala that after his reappointment, he still received cash amounts. Could you please give us an explanation as to this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. By the time that I took over, Tshabalala had already been in service with the police for a period of approximately five years, and with his discharge under the name Tshabalala, a point of difference originated in the salary amounts.

Every year he received an extra amount and we funded this from the Secret Fund. I can also remember that there was a difference in the Travel and Accommodation Allowances between different rank categories. We would have supplemented those differences from the Secret Fund, in order to ensure that he would not suffer any financial losses as a result of the change of his name.

My recollection is however vague, because I cannot recall all the details regarding this particular matter, but we would see to it that he would not be placed at any disadvantage.

MR HUGO: Very well, you stated that you arranged for the salary payments. You mentioned something about Parliament.

MR DE KOCK: It was clear that Parliament was indeed misled because I heard that reaction to these questions was requested in Parliament and that there was merely a denial that the police knew anything about this certain Tshabalala.

MR HUGO: Could you just stop here for a moment please, and look at the following document. Mr Chairman, we have prepared a bundle of documents. May I beg leave to hand it up to the members of the Committee?

Mr Chairman, before we start numbering these Exhibits, I think a further document was handed up this morning, and we did not mark that one, and I somehow think it is Exhibit G, if I am not mistaken.

CHAIRPERSON: That will be the statement by Gen Kawe, is that correct, which was referred to by Mr Dukada?

Is there any objection to that statement being handed in? Mr Mapoma?

MR MAPOMA: No objections Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wessels?

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, may I enquire whether that is the original document that is there and whether it is an affidavit?

CHAIRPERSON: The document that was handed to me, is a photocopy. It doesn't on its face, it doesn't appear to be an affidavit. It is just a statement.

MR WESSELS: I will not object to that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, all right. Mr Dilizo?

MR DILIZO: Mr Chairman, I have no objection, thank you.

MR MAJOKWENI: Similarly Mr Chairman, I have no objection.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Shall we mark this statement by Leonard Sibobo Kawe as Exhibit G.

The bundle of documents which Mr Hugo has handed up, shall we mark that H.

MR HUGO: As it pleases you Mr Chairman. Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr De Kock, you have Exhibit H before you, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: And then the first document of Exhibit H, we have consulted this aspect, is this correct that it is an extract from the Parliament as given in the Hansard?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: Will you then please look at the middle of the page, there are three columns. Do you see that?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct?

MR HUGO: Will you please read that extract to us as well as the answer?

MR DE KOCK: It is number 635, it is Mr P.G. Saul asked the Minister of Law and Order whether a certain person whose name has been furnished to the South African Police for the purpose of the Minister's reply, is a member of the police and if so, when did he join the Police Force, what is his present rank, to which Branch (Police) is he attached, where is he stationed, and what is his name. The answer of the Minister of Law and Order, no, not according to the personnel records of the South African Police.

With other words, the questions from A - E then fall away. And that is - and that was the objective which we had, the objective was to mislead and to cover up and it also worked that way ultimately.

CHAIRPERSON: The person whose, this certain person who is being referred to here, who was that person, do you know?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, unfortunately I cannot remember. I am not sure if that was Louis le Grange or if it was Adriaan Vlok.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. I mean this certain person who is being referred to in the question?

MR DE KOCK: Oh, no, that is Mr Tshabalala.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR HUGO: Mr De Kock, while we are discussing these documents, can you just page, it is still part of Exhibit H, just the next document. It is a letter that is from the Security Branch to the Commissioner of the South African Police?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: I am not going to read the whole letter, but is it correct that here the Chief of the Security Branch seeks leave to appoint Tulani Basil Mavusu to the South African Police?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And this was signed by Gen J.V. van der Merwe, who was later the Commissioner of police?

MR DE KOCK: It is correct and just as confirmation, Mr Tulani Basil Mavusu is Mr Tshabalala.

MR HUGO: And the recommendation was approved by Major General Kemp?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct. I would just like to meld that such changes, to discharge a person the one day and to appoint him the following day, could only happen on a very high level.

I can do the documents, I can do the administration, but the approval has to come from a high level.

CHAIRPERSON: This letter was apparently written by Captain Stander, is that right?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And the person who signed it, is Brigadier J.V. van der Merwe, who was then with the - is it the Security Branch Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was the Chief of Security Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Chief of Security. Now, these persons, did they know that this was in fact Tshabalala?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. Of the three persons Captain Stander would definitely have known. He was the Chief of the Personnel Division of Security Head Office.

Gen J.V. van der Merwe was the Head of Security Branch Head Office as well as all the Security Branches and Divisions throughout the country.

However, I cannot confirm that Gen Kemp would have known that we were busy misleading Parliament. It could be that it was said to him that this was part of an operation or an infiltration, but he would not have been informed that we were busy with perjury and that we were misleading the country.

MR HUGO: Mr De Kock ...

CHAIRPERSON: Just a minute. Captain Stander and Brigadier Van der Merwe, would they have been specifically told that what we are doing here is to mislead Parliament?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I don't believe that Captain Stander would also have known about all these facts. By nature of the facts, he would not have known much of the particulars.

Regarding Gen Van der Merwe, he would have known, because the questions came from Parliament to the Commissioner, and from the Commissioner to the Security Head Office Chief and then to Brigadier Schoon and then to me. So therefore between me, Brigadier Schoon and General Van der Merwe, that connection would have existed.

The reason why I say that Captain Stander would not have had complete knowledge, was because it was on a need to know basis and because of that, we would not have informed him. He was also appointed as a temporary member.

That is why there is a (T) in brackets just after Captain, that stands for temporary.

MR HUGO: Mr De Kock, if you can then just page to the following page, it is still part of Exhibit H, and just tell us - just identify the document and tell us what it is all about?

MR DE KOCK: It is the transfer of leave records Mr Chairperson. We would not want to disadvantage Mr Tshabalala and that leave which he had to have, would be transferred to the new file.

This is what this document deals with. You will find on top in the right hand corner, there is a budget section. His leave and financial implications, that is all part of the budget section.

MR HUGO: Could I just ask you, I see it is signed by Brigadier Adlam. Did he have knowledge that there was an identity change and what the reason was therefore?

MR DE KOCK: He would have known that there was a change here, but he would not have known why. He would not have been informed to that.

MR HUGO: Can you then page to the following page. Can you just tell us what that is, it is still part of Exhibit H?

MR DE KOCK: If I just scan it quickly, it would seem to be an offence committed by Mr Tshabalala and there is a crime register number, and his name would have been changed on this subpoena or on his Departmental records.

As you find there, Tshabalala was scratched out and Mavusu was written there.

MR HUGO: And at the bottom it says note, it was written in pen there, could you just read that out to us?

MR DE KOCK: The following report to the Commissioner of Police, his surname is Mavusu and not Tshabalala.

MR HUGO: Very well, and then still part of Exhibit H, just the last page. Can you just tell us what document that is?

MR DE KOCK: This is a telex report, report number 44, and it is from the Divisional Commander, Security Border, Colonel Griebenouw, that would be in Port Elizabeth, where the Divisional Commander would be seated and it is directed to the Commanding Officer, X302 at Pretoria, that would be Brigadier Schoon, who was the Head of C Section, in other words he was the Chief of Section C1, C2 and C3.

It is marked top secret, and the reason for the top secret label is that the classifications, if I recall correctly, where it deals with external relations or foreign relations with our neighbouring States, or internationally, for instance Europe, but everything was marked top secret.

The following classification that one would have, was if it dealt with an internal sensitive aspect and would influence internal policy and it would be strictly secret. This would just be secret.

The following classification would be just secret. It is not just a stamp that is put there because somebody feels that this is secret. There is a formula. I can just not recall all, but that is why that is marked top secret, because it dealt with the Transkei and the Transkei was seen as an Independent State.

MR HUGO: Very well then, would you like to read to us what is written in this telex.

MR DE KOCK: It is hearing, Constable it looks like A.E. Tshabalala, the charge is murder. Report number 134, dated, I cannot make out the date there, it is paragraph 1, the case is a joint operation between the South African Police and the Transkeian Police, to fight terrorism and there was work between the South African Police and the Transkeian Security Branch. Gen Kawe requested Colonel Griebenouw to help with the defence in this matter.

Because above-mentioned member is, it is right to have legal advise and I would like to request what is the possibility to have a senior Advocate to represent both accused. The matter would be in 1986/09/17 and your finding would be appreciated. DT would be printed telegraph.

MR HUGO: And then, concerning the incident, could you just complete at the bottom of the page 138 to the top of 139.

MR DE KOCK: The persons responsible for this would be the Minister of Law and Order, the Commissioner of Police, the Security Chief, the Unit Commander and myself in my capacity as Chief of Section C1.

After the operation was concluded, I reported back to Brigadier Schoon. I cannot give further information in terms of what happened at the scene in Transkei except for the little information that Lieutenant Adamson gave me.

I believe that he received that information from the group who was involved in that incident.

MR HUGO: And Mr De Kock, I would just like to ask you a few questions concerning the policy that was applicable at C1.

Firstly, when members of C1 are deployed to other parts of the country, what is the procedure and how is this handled?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the Divisional Commander of the Eastern Cape, would request in writing or in a print telegram, that members of C1 work in his area, if it is East London or Aliwal North or Elliot, that doesn't matter.

It comes from the Divisional Commander and it is addressed to C1, Section C1 and C1 is tasked to have a group of persons work in that area and then the Commander of that group, who work in the area where they are requested, would report to the Divisional Commander.

For example it would be Colonel Griebenouw, Colonel Griebenouw would appoint an Officer who is responsible for discipline and remuneration of that group of Section C1. In other words the C1 group serves under the Divisional Commander for the purposes of the receiving instruction and for discipline.

MR HUGO: Can we just be more specific there. With regard to this particular incident, who requested the members of Vlakplaas to work here?

MR DE KOCK: If I recall correctly, as far as I can remember it was a request from East London. We worked in three areas, and I have a recollection that it would be Warrant Officer Dan Naude, who was the Liaison Officer who liaised with this group of mine.

The other two groups who had an interest in us and that is why we worked from a central point, the reason being it was central to all the areas that we worked and the best accommodation available for a group that we had, was the Security Branch of Queenstown and the Security Branch of Aliwal North.

And from Barkly, that would be our central point to work wherever, but that was our central point.

MR HUGO: The most important question, or a more important question, the person who asked you to deploy members from Vlakplaas, did they tell you what the purpose of the operation was to be in which these members had to participate?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that would have been mentioned. But now I don't have a clear recollection of it, but what I do recall is that somebody like Warrant Officer Dan Naude indeed slept over with my people at Barkly East, to give them information and to task them with what he wants done.

He was there for a week or 14 days.

MR HUGO: Can I ask you in this manner, Lieutenant Dan Naude as it is suggested in some of the statements, he said that we are looking for someone to kill Mr Dandala and do you have - not Mr Dandala, Mr Ndondo, excuse me.

MR DE KOCK: He couldn't ask us to go and shoot somebody. If something like that happened, this would be a covert act and he had to take it up with Colonel Griebenouw and Colonel Griebenouw would take it up with Brigadier Schoon.

But because he was the appointed person in charge, for tasking these people here for the function for which they brought us here, he would be the appointed person, that he knew who were the sources on ground level, he knew who they were looking for.

We worked on a national level and it was impossible to remember all names of the people who were being looked for. In this matter, Warrant Officer Naude would have specific information and he wanted a specific group to go and look for this person.

MR HUGO: Mr De Kock, you heard that there was testimony with regard to the kombi's that were used, there were two kombi's for the operation. Where did this kombi's come from?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, the kombi's at Vlakplaas was bought from the Secret Fund, or else there were kombi's who was given to us by the Quartermaster.

The reason why I mention the Secret Fund, was it could not be traced back to the Security Police in any way. These vehicles were fuelled at a private garage and were repaired there, but we do not come close to a police institute and a member of the public sees this vehicle and does not identify it as a police vehicle.

MR HUGO: While we are dealing with the kombi's, it seems from the document that we have before us, that there were false number plates on these kombi's in Qala when the incident took place, and that the number plate was a Qala number plate, more specific XS2222. Were you aware of that?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. If those number plates were given, it was given to my people by either Dan Naude or persons in Aliwal North.

For covert purposes, we had sets of number plates, we had about eight or nine sets of number plates, and with these number plates, there were also licence discs, there were third party discs that were printed for us, and we just had to fill them in, but I never had any Transkei plates. This would have been provided to us in Barkly East.

MR HUGO: And this forms part of the bundle, a statement by Mr Dandala where reference is made to Morse and Shosha who were members of the Transkeian Police. Those were people who worked for you and they were under your command.

At any stage, were they members of the Transkeian Police, this is now Braam Morse and Shosha, the woman who participated in the shooting?

MR DE KOCK: No, they were members of the SAP.

MR HUGO: Can you recall, we know the incident happened on the 24th of September 1985. How long after that did your members return to Pretoria?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall Chairperson. The reason why I say that is because usually we deployed them for a period of two to three weeks, sometimes a bit longer, or sometimes a bit shorter, by a day or two, but in order to deal completely with the salaries, we had these people return at the end of the month.

It would have been at the end of the month, or the second or third of the following month. It won't be here because of the shooting incident.

They were involved in an incident for the first or second day, but they still don't return, but they did not return because of the shooting incident, they would have just moved to another area, to Aliwal North or Queenstown. But this was part of our programme which we used.

MR HUGO: Can you recall how many times Mr Tshabalala had to return to Umtata for the hearing after this incident?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. If I tell you, I would be guessing. I cannot recall. I know that they came back, but I don't know how many times.

MR HUGO: Yourself, you were never present in Umtata during these hearings?

MR DE KOCK: No, definitely not.

MR HUGO: Can you tell the Honourable Committee, you heard that there was testimony about photo albums that was collected and that was gone through. What was the modus operandi with regard to the use of these photo albums in the early 1980's and the late 1980's?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a photo album to be used at national level. This was compiled at Head Office and there was - before the election, there were about 6 800 photo's and the names of members of MK and APLA and there was a further 2 500 names available, but we did not have the photo's, but we were aware of the photo's.

When I say we, I mean the Security Police, and furthermore every region, besides this national album, they had albums for people who they were looking for, I can call these people subjects. Looking for people who were just of importance for them in their area.

And I noted that the storage or the Branch Offices had albums for their Branches and there was a card index system that some of the departments, and there was a cross-reference to the card index that would be at C.R. Swarts and the national album would be there also, and there would be a cross-reference to the regional album, that is just applicable to that region.

MR HUGO: Would it be correct to say that when ANC members or PAC members are arrested while they attempt to come into the country, and they were detained then, and they turned, detailed life sketches of these people would be drawn up to be used later?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. When such a member is interrogated and this member works with us, we do not compile a history for him, but every person in every camp, the Commander, have a profile that is sketched with habits, leadership characteristics, other characteristics, also of the basis, the people who could be recruited later.

All of this is put into a central computer at Head Office and if any of these persons who were identified by the detainee, or let's say the terrorist, would be caught later in the Republic, they would just go to the central computer and we would say A, B, C was with him in Pangu Camp or this was in Grafnel in the camp. These three people can testify against him.

You would just then use the persons who gave information, who can give relevant information with regard to that specific person. It was a complete system.

MR HUGO: With regard to the duties of the so-called Askaris, would it be correct to say that general duties would be the recruitment of sources, the infiltration and tracing of weapons, they would also be tasked to make contact with freedom fighters who were coming into the country?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. One of the problems which the Security Branch experienced with the infiltration of the man on the street into an MK or APLA cell, would be that they didn't speak the language of the camp as we put it. They wouldn't know the songs which were sung in the camp, they wouldn't have the same form of speech and they wouldn't use the same form of reference, terminology, they wouldn't know the Commanding Officers and so forth, and that is why these members were of cardinal importance.

They could speak the language of the other MK members.

MR HUGO: Is it also correct to say that over and above the tasks which had been stipulated and discussed, that the Askaris who served under you, didn't have carte blanche to do whatever they wanted and to kill people around every corner?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. One of the problems which I took over at Vlakplaas, was the tremendously weak discipline and high level of alcoholism.

Sometimes one would have to bring it home quite harshly and physically, that this would unfortunately not be permitted. Very swiftly classes were presented, some of my members were studying through UNISA, they would compile lectures on the use of weapons and other such subjects.

Not one of these Askaris was known, or at least familiar with the departmental procedure for handling weapons. They were not familiar with the Police Law and Regulations, and we began to present lectures. Sometimes for a week at a time, they would attend lectures every day.

MR HUGO: However, it is also true that these Askaris were used in unlawful actions during which people were killed, however these took place in a structured fashion and formed part of a premeditated plan which was part of a premeditated operation?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct. It was not a question of carte blanche.

MR HUGO: Mr Tshabalala also testified that he received remuneration after this operation, to the amount of R500-00. Can you recall this remuneration?

MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot recall it, however, it would not be incorrect. There was an official scale of remuneration which was revised every year. This existed in the Security Police, it was issued by Security Head Office and was reviewed every year.

On this list of the scale of remuneration, there would be stipulations such as bringing in an AK47, would given an extra R800-00, for a missile, it was R500-00, for ammunition, per 50, would be R50-00. For the arrest, the wounding or the taking in of an ANC or PAC terrorist an amount of R2 000-00 would be paid out.

The same system of remuneration existed in Ovamboland, at Koevoet, and annually these scales of remuneration would be adjusted. I can remember in 1985 and in 1989, the value of an AK47 shifted from R800-00 to R2 000-00 and in 1989, 1990 it moved up to R6 000-00 in order to get it out of the system.

However, this had a negative effect because people began an industry around this, one could buy it for R50-00 in Maputo and sell it here for R6 000-00. This is what happened in actuality.

MR HUGO: With regard to the falsification of documents, can you provide us with any details regarding those with who you liaised in order to obtain false identification as well as false documentation and the submission of such false documentation to Internal Affairs?

MR DE KOCK: Firstly it went through Colonel Beukes who worked at the Intelligence Services and then later, or at least he usually handled these aspects.

Later with the expansion of Vlakplaas, it became necessary to give us permission to handle these aspects. I cannot recall the specific pattern which I followed, especially with Tshabalala's case in changing his name and all his personal details. However, I know that it was very effective, because he cannot regain his former name.

However, I cannot be of any assistance with regard to the precise steps which I followed. It was very thorough, however. I am not even sure how I handled the finger prints, because usually one would be able to classify, or according to the finger print classification, one would find the person's original identity, but even those details were removed.

I am not certain of the exact process which I followed.

MR HUGO: Just two final aspects. The first one is that there has been evidence that in the minibus there was also a bag with weapons.

Could you tell the Committee what the arrangement and procedure was with regard to the arming of Askaris when they went on operations?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, usually every member would be issued with his service pistol, a 9 mm in calibre. Lieutenant Morse was specifically issued with a machine pistol. Firstly it was an HMK and later it was a Uzi.

But this was actually issued more for his personal security and his domestic security. There is nothing sinister about that.

However, I also issued to every minibus a bag, or a contained with two R1's, two shotguns with a variety of ammunition, as well as two sub-machine rifles. There were also teargas grenades and M26 hand grenades.

The reason for this is that because we were looking for terrorists, it didn't mean that we were going to find terrorists. My people might find themselves in a situation where they would be trapped by a crowd or find themselves in a situation of unrest. They would then be able to use the teargas.

They would be able to use the buckshot. Should they find themselves in an urban or rural situation with military trained terrorists, they would be able to use the Uzi's and the R1's. The reason for the R1's is that they were suitable for the rural areas and the Uzi's were suitable for the penetration of homes.

MR HUGO: Were any Eastern Block weapons made available to them for these operations?

MR DE KOCK: No. Where there were cross-border operations or a specific operation internally, I can remember a specific operation in Durban. Such a weapon would be issued and placed under the control of the group leader of that specific group.

In other words, it would be used only for the task for which it was needed and then returned. Internally, the usual practice was to confirm the bona fides. For example I can refer to the Guguletu 7.

However, if it was external, it would be for deadly purposes. If we took weapons over, it would definitely be for the use of such weapons.

MR HUGO: Then finally Mr De Kock, could you please tell the Honourable Committee, which political objectives you wanted to achieve by firstly not disclosing the information that you had that there was an unlawful operation being undertaken in the Transkei, and secondly why you participated in the falsification of documents, and what you thought you would be able to achieve by means of that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it may sound strange to you, but there were some of the Security Branches in this country and Security Policemen at Head Office, who didn't know about Vlakplaas' existence. I can state this unequivocally.

By nature, the Unit was an absolutely secret institution. The continued existence or the survival of this Unit was absolutely necessary for the successful prosecution of ANC and PAC members in the courts.

It was also established in order to promote the police and State dispensation, to give them the advantage of being one step ahead of the enemy with regard to information and identification and by nature of the situation, it was also a mechanism of protection for these former ANC and PAC members, for their families. It was a sort of protection umbrella.

However one would like to put it and I say this with compassion, because not everybody is equally strong, a white Askari or a black Askari, was a traitor to his people or his group, or that which he believed in. I feel this within myself as well.

These people's lives were genuinely in danger at that time.

MR HUGO: What do you think, or what was your perception at that stage, with regard to what would happen if the true facts of this incident, were to be disclosed?

MR DE KOCK: Firstly, I have no doubt that there would have been an international objection to this. That an unlawful system such as ours, could make use of people to maintain it.

Secondly, we would have the situation that the exposure of such a Unit would have resulted in the ineffectiveness, it would have neutralised the Unit, and then there would have been no more secrecy. It would have been easier just to label those who had not been involved in the hearings as Askaris, and other similar consequences.

MR HUGO: Would you say that this would have been the last straw for the activities of Vlakplaas and other such institutions?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. It would have led not only to the exposure of the Askari system, it would most probably have led to the second agenda, and that was the agenda for covert operations.

It could have had a domino effect and probably have led to premature exposure of the covert structure for internal and external operations.

MR HUGO: I've got no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO

CHAIRPERSON: In view of the amount of time that we lost this morning, because of the electricity, we intend sitting until 17H30, so I think it will be convenient perhaps at this stage, to take a very short adjournment of about 15 minutes, and come back at about four o'clock, I think it is, at which stage then Mr Knight will commence his cross-examination of Mr De Kock. Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (still under oath)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Knight.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KNIGHT: Yes, Mr Chairman, thank you. Mr De Kock, was Captain Braam Morse, Mr Tshabalala's senior officer?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR KNIGHT: As senior officer to Mr Tshabalala, did Mr Tshabalala have room in which to question commands that was given to him by Mr Morse?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR KNIGHT: Would it have been possible for an Askari in Mr Tshabalala's position, to have had an agenda of his own, let me qualify that by saying it was put in cross-examination that he stood to gain more by having Mr Ndondo killed, than by taking him in for questioning?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR KNIGHT: If the operation or the object were to have been initially to kill Mr Ndondo, would the operation have been different in its format?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I believe so. Firstly no queries would have been issued, it wouldn't have been a day operation. They could have done a grab operation at night, or they could have abducted him, to put it that way. Therefore that would be my expert opinion that the original objective was not to kill somebody.

MR KNIGHT: I know that you were not present during the operation and I am going to ask you to speculate a little bit but with regard to your own operational experience.

What would the situation have been from Captain Morse's perspective when the person taken in for questioning, Mr Ndondo, in fact managed to escape from the vehicle? Why do you think Captain Morse would have at that stage ordered his subordinates to shoot?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe firstly and I believe that he believed that he was dealing with a trained member of the ANC or MK. There were various categories of these persons who were in a neighbouring States, those who received quick training as well as more advanced training at later stages.

The situation was that we had to do here with a trained member of the ANC. When it comes to speculation, it could be that such an escape could have carried broader consequences such as the warning of a possibly operational cell in the area, the destruction of certain documents, shifting or transfer of certain weapons, or any other material. However, that would be the speculate aspect to your question.

MR KNIGHT: In your experience, what would have become of Shosha, had it become known within the ANC that she was in fact driving in a minibus with tinted windows, with members of the Transkei Security Police as well as other unknown persons?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, all former members of the PAC or the ANC or Askaris as such, lived with the knowledge that they could killed or identified at any time.

The fact that that person would have escaped or been arrested, would not have been of such importance, because ultimately the Askaris would have testified in court against such a captive member or the ANC or the PAC.

It is so that reference was made to Mr X in the newspapers, however the ANC and the PAC would have known who Mr X was, because the defence would make that known.

MR KNIGHT: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KNIGHT

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Dilizo?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DILIZO: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr De Kock, firstly starting with the misleading of Parliament, was it the matter of practice within the Security Police in South Africa to make sure they mislead Parliament whenever it would be to its benefit as it was in the particular case, concerning Tshabalala in particular?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't know. I only had to do with this specific incident.

An other incident which is not of relevance at this point, however it appears to be relevant, was a weapons stock piling point, which in co-operation with the CCB was built by Section C1 and C2 near Krugersdorp. These weapons were found and this led to a light storm action on houses nearby.

This led to a number of deaths of members of the public, apparently the wrong houses were attacked. By nature of the situation, Parliament would have to be misled, but I don't know who the Generals were that were specifically involved in that incident. This is just to give you a broader picture.

MR DILIZO: Yes, with regard to the denial concerning Tshabalala, so that untrue statement was carried through successfully up to Parliament?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR DILIZO: Again with regard to the question of the co-operation between the Transkei and the former RSA Security Police, why was it necessary that you should have some offices or Branches in Queenstown, Aliwal North, Barkly or East London and not in Transkei in particular?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we couldn't move into Transkei because it was an independent State and if we had to arrest anybody there, we would have to bring that person out to the RSA, to the Republic, and in the court case, it would lead to a conflict of delivery.

Not all my people were familiar with the Transkei, the environment and the languages spoken here. The Security Branch in East London would have had the greatest level of interest within the Transkei and what was happening within the Transkei as a result of their border with Lesotho.

I hope that is a sufficient answer for you.

MR DILIZO: Would you say the policemen who were involved and the Askaris involved in the operations, were informed of the whole purpose of the Security Police with regard to the political activists?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. If I had to speak for myself, I would say yes, all particulars would be furnished. I know Warrant Officer Naude and he would have given thorough particulars which would have been of pertinent application to the subject.

I trust that he did do this, I do not have any doubt about that.

MR DILIZO: Would the people in the rank of Constables, like Dandala and other Askaris be involved in the planning and the formulation of the operations or whether that would be within the level of the seniors, the senior authorities in the Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when I was in Barkly East, I saw that a group that would go and work in Queenstown, would be shown photographs of possible infiltrants or information about these persons, where these people's families were residing, where they might go drinking at shebeens and other bars. They would be requested to investigate certain car rental or taxi ranks.

The briefing session would be as thorough as possible, in order to guarantee success.

MR DILIZO: So for instance, let's take the - let me phrase it differently - in the event of a suspect or political activist trying to escape after the arrest from the police, and then the police including the Askaris start shooting that person, would your authorities first of all consider the appropriateness of the actions of shooting, or whether perhaps they would just condone those actions and make a cover up, to use the term?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is very difficult to provide an answer to that question. What I can say is that given that time and the time level in which we are moving, the Republic was actually burning with activists, internal resistance against the government and if there had been anything which would have placed the South African, Transkei governments and the Security Police at a disadvantage, one would have expected that there would be a certain level of deception.

MR DILIZO: Would you say for instance whether in this case of the killing of Batandwa, whether the authorities had first of all considered whether Tshabalala, Morse and Dandala had acted lawfully in the shooting or not?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I really wouldn't be able to say. I have studied the documents and it appears that there is a reasonable level of contradiction.

I wouldn't be able to say how the authorities experienced it right there at the scene of the incident. I am not trying to be obstructive or obstinate, but I really can't tell you.

MR DILIZO: When looking at the subsequent conduct by authorities, including you, with regard to this matter, my impression is that the authorities did not look at the appropriateness of the conduct of these three, that is Morse, Tshabalala and Dandala, but on your side you proceeded with the question of the verification of his document and that according to the evidence of Dandala and Tshabalala, Tshabalala appeared once or twice in court, and thereafter never appeared and that it was Dandala who appeared alone and again the case did not proceed any further, up to now?

The impression I am having is that it would appear that the authorities had condoned those actions without having considered whether these three had initially acted lawfully or not in the killing. I don't know whether you get my point?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I will concede to that. I will refer to the later Harms Commission in 1989 which was a cover up of Olympic standards.

MR DILIZO: So, would this subsequent conduct by the authorities, not mislead a person in the position like Dandala a Constable, that his actions whether they acted excessively or wrongfully, they were condoned in the circumstances?

MR DE KOCK: Under the circumstances of that time, both internally and in the independent home lands, actions against terrorism if I may put it that way, were not frowned upon.

There was also the mentality that this would take place at whatever cost. I believe that Morse, Tshabalala and Dandala would have believed that although according to the law and departmental stipulations, the law was not entirely met with, it would still enjoy the approval of the government.

MR DILIZO: So, that would be the case even if they had acted excessively in the shooting or not, the authorities would not more strictly concern themselves with the appropriateness of the actions?

MR DE KOCK: I must just qualify that a trained member of MK or APLA was seen in a completely different light than a burglar or a car thief. The psyche among the members of the Security Police and the Counter-Insurgency community was that a terrorist had received military training and was dangerous.

He couldn't just be your equal, he could be even more skilled than you, and to be the second one to shoot, would lead you to your grave. If you shot first, you would win. If you shot second, you would die.

That was a mental state of the operators and the workers, especially on ground level where most of the injuries were received, that was the mentality of the members.

That which would appear to be excessive, would not be excessive for the operative on ground level.

MR DILIZO: Which could therefore also mean that when dealing with a trained so-called terrorist then, one would not have been expected a person like Dandala, Morse or Tshabalala to have given a warning shot before actually shooting, because it was a question of either you dying, or him dying?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes. In this case they were not fired upon and one wouldn't know exactly what their thoughts were at that moment in time.

I think it is a myth which has existed for quite a number of years, during my training there were departmental orders that there was no such thing as a warning shot.

A warning shot would land somewhere and it could hit somebody innocent. I have never in my life, fired a warning shot because to whom, or at what am I shooting? I must just mention this in passing.

MR DILIZO: So, in which case therefore you would also not regard the conduct of either Dandala, Morse or Tshabalala as reprehensive in that one of them shot at the Batandwa Ndondo without first giving a warning shot?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. In counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism training, one would shoot at one's target immediately. In counter-insurgency there would be no warning, you would shoot first.

MR DILIZO: I also take it that the same would apply to the so-called excessiveness in the shooting, that is the number of shots, would not matter in those circumstances?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I wouldn't be able to agree with that. The number of shots are too many, but from the experience which I had in Namibia, I found that while a man was running, you would shoot. That would be the basis psyche.

I have seen people running with five or six shots, I have seen people running with leg wounds. I have seen someone running with a wound in his chest and people would carry on shooting and only later on would one discover that this person has five or six shots on his body.

We are talking about heavy calibre fire. People continue shooting, because they believe that they are missing. That is the experience which I had. I can't speak for others.

However, the number of shots is a lot, and I would say that it is excessive. However, I don't want to eliminate the possibility that while he continued running, they continued shooting, that is a possibility.

MR DILIZO: The reason why I am asking this question is the impression I am having is that, if one in the insurgency situation would shoot to kill, therefore the number of subsequent shots would be immaterial, even if you were successful with the first shot. That is the picture I am having in my mind in the consideration of your answers?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if the first shot was a hard shot, I don't believe that there would have been any other shot, however I am speculating.

If he had stopped running, they might not have continued shooting. However, that is speculation.

MR DILIZO: So would it be possible more specific in the insurgency situation for a person to shoot to kill, because if he doesn't, his opponent will shoot to kill him?

MR DE KOCK: I have never fired any shot other than to kill in counter-insurgency. I would shoot to kill, that would be it.

MR DILIZO: So, coming to the question of the Askaris, so I take it that the Askaris were such people that, whose identity had to be concealed from the members of the public, and more in particular, from the members of the MK or the APLA?

MR DE KOCK: From the public yes. From MK and APLA, we would not be able to conceal it, because they were already familiar to MK and APLA. What MK and APLA did not know was whether these people were working for the Security Police or not.

The lack of such knowledge of whether or not they were working for the Security Police, would be a lack of intelligence gathering on the behalf of MK or APLA, possibly weak information or communication channels.

MR DILIZO: Which would therefore mean for instance in this particular case, that the knowing of Shosha and Tshabalala by the members of the ANC, would be detrimental to the functioning of the Security duties?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. However, it would not have been such a great obstruction, because Shosha did testify regarding certain ANC matters, Tshabalala also testified in ANC matters and I have no doubt that the ANC would have known that these two persons were working for the Security Police, they testified against some of their own people, who were ultimately convicted.

It wouldn't have been familiar to those in the camps. There is reference in "The Fog of War" by Van Klausowitz that communication and intelligence systems are insufficient and can give the wrong information to the wrong people, and lead to the wrong decisions as a result.

MR DILIZO: Would you say it was highly incumbent upon Dandala, Morse and Tshabalala to do their utmost best to see to it that Batandwa did not escape, more in particular after he had identified Shosha?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I wouldn't say that.

MR DILIZO: I take Shosha, that she was more or less a person in the position of an informer, whose identity must not have been seen by the ANC that she had deflected to join the government as an Askari. That is the reason behind my question?

MR DE KOCK: She had already testified in cases, before she came to Vlakplaas, so therefore I believe that the ANC already knew that she was no longer on their side.

Most probably they didn't know that she was at Vlakplaas. She was the first woman at Vlakplaas, but she wasn't the last.

MR DILIZO: Then with regard to Tshabalala?

MR DE KOCK: I imagine that Tshabalala's photo appeared on a list, a photo list of eight or ten Askaris' faces which was generally distributed throughout the Republic of South Africa by the ANC.

I think that Tshabalala was already known for working against the ANC somewhere in the system.

MR DILIZO: So, in this particular case, would you have expected Morse and Tshabalala to have fully introduced themselves to Dandala as well as with regard to their nature of operations?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that presentation would have been undertaken at Barkly East, because all of those involved, that would be East London, Transkei and of course the Vlakplaas people, would have been introduced to one another at Barkly East and they would have been properly introduced, because they would be working together.

They would be acting together and I wouldn't say that private information was shared among these individuals, but with regard to who was working for whom, and who belonged to what Unit, there would be utter clarity on that.

MR DILIZO: Perhaps the reason why I am asking that question, I imagine the situation where for instance in the Intelligence Service, a spy is sent to go and spy on B and while he is still busy spying on B, then D is being sent to spy on the one spying on B, which shows that there is no question of much confidence in each other, you treat each other with caution. That is the reason why I am asking that question.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is a century old principle in counter-intelligence. At Vlakplaas I appointed some of the Askaris to an extra salary from the Secret Fund, to ensure that I don't have to go and get 20 or 30 Askaris who were messing with weapons, because in other words I had Askaris who spied on other Askaris, yes counter-insurgence.

MR DILIZO: And one of the major purposes of your nature of working was that these activities should not come and back fire against the government, because it would reflect adversely to the government, even up to the international levels?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it could reach international levels. We have to look at organisations such as Amnesty International and several other organisations.

MR DILIZO: So, which means therefore that this idea of ensuring that the information does not back fire adversely against the government, could have for instance operated in the mind of Tshabalala that I mustn't introduce much to Dandala to such an extent that it can back fire against the authorities?

MR DE KOCK: I would believe that with the individual members, there could be a small level of holding back some information to cover up his real background. It is possible, but I am speculating. It would depend on the person himself.

MR DILIZO: So, now according to the evidence of Tshabalala, when they returned to Barkly East, they were congratulated by a certain white man, most probably for the death of Batandwa. So that gives me the impression that as I have asked that question in a different way, that the authorities would be satisfied with the mere outcome, for instance without considering the appropriateness of the actions of those who were involved like Dandala and Tshabalala?

MR DE KOCK: The Askaris were congratulated many times, sometimes by the Minister, also for people that they arrested, or ANC members that they recruited.

They were not congratulated because they killed the man. The ANC members were either caught or he was recruited or he was killed, he was congratulated in many aspects.

MR DILIZO: But even if they had killed, they would generally be subsequently protected through the so-called cover up activities?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, to cover up and I refer to the Harms Commission, this came from such a high level that concerning me, this came from a Presidential level, it couldn't be any other way.

MR DILIZO: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DILIZO

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Dukada?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DUKADA: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Can I just start with the background of Vlakplaas. As I understand, Vlakplaas was engaged mostly in covert actions, that is unlawful actions?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. The primary objective although covert, it was legitimate. This meant that your members are not known, they don't move in vehicles with blue lights, they don't wear uniforms and their modus operandi was unconventional.

The second agenda, let's call it your illegal covert actions, would be internal actions like the bombing of COSATU House and Khotso House and cross border operations for example in Botswana and Swaziland.

MR DUKADA: Thank you Colonel. Just for information Colonel, I have read your book on working for an apartheid State and other material pertaining to your involvement in various activities as a member of Vlakplaas.

Now, the point I am saying is that at times you were involved in unlawful activities, like for instance abducting an ANC activist from one area to another, you would have to apply for a warrant of arrest and perform duties as if you were an ordinary policeman?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, there were two instances in Swaziland where we did not just kidnap a person, we broke out a person out of a Swazi prison.

So, yes, that is illegal.

MR DUKADA: Right, and there was maximum co-operation between yourselves and the Transkeian Police when it comes to combating terrorism in Southern Africa?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot testify to that. I never liaised with any of the Generals or with any of the police members of the Transkei.

I do know that Warrant Officer Dan Naude and Captain Willie de Lange, there is one or two members but I know those two specifically liaised very closely with the Transkeian Security Branch.

The third person is Colonel Griebenouw.

MR DUKADA: Do I understand you Colonel, to be saying that you have no personal knowledge about any operations which were conducted between members of Vlakplaas and Transkeian Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: No, I would have knowledge of this incident. At one or two other incidents Vlakplaas members did indeed work in the Transkei area.

I don't know of any arrest that took place there. Vlakplaas also liaised with the Directorate of Covert Collection, and there Vlakplaas was partially involved with actions in Transkei, but that is for later applications, that will come.

MR DUKADA: Yes, but what I am asking you Colonel is apart from reports that should be constantly given to you, you have no personal knowledge of operations carried out by members of the Vlakplaas and Transkei Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: Not that I can recall now. If my memory can be refreshed, I could probably confirm it, but I can't recall.

MR DUKADA: And even with the killing of Ndondo, you have no personal knowledge except assisting in falsifying documents about Tshabalala after the incident?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR DUKADA: As far as the planning, the decision to go and arrest and kill Ndondo, you have no personal knowledge, except reports which were made to you, subsequent to the killing?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. Can I just qualify just to give you a broader comprehension.

I would have had eight to ten groups in the field of which the one was at Barkly. Then I had agents in Swaziland and border patrols.

So, at the end of the month, I would have the full picture or most of the information. My authority was delegated by the Divisional Commander. If that Divisional Commander kept information from me, then I would not be aware of it.

My members as far as I know, fully briefed me. I did ask questions and that is why I mentioned here that I have a vague recollection that the person who died, escaped because his shoes came off. And it is then that he went through the window.

That is just to give you an indication.

MR DUKADA: Let me put it very simple for you Colonel. Were you ever involved in any discussions for the arrest or killing of Ndondo?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR DUKADA: And the knowledge about this incident came only as a result of reports furnished to you after the killing?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR DUKADA: And you never instructed Morse or Tshabalala or anybody to go and arrest Ndondo?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR DUKADA: Now let's come back to Exhibit H, the last Exhibit Mr Chairperson. I am particularly concerned about the last document in the bundle, paragraph 3.

Can we just have a look at paragraph 3 Colonel, beginning with the words Gen Kawe.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR DUKADA: There it is reported that - it is a telegram - which is reporting that Gen Kawe wanted some assistance in the defence of the case.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is how this paragraph reads.

MR DUKADA: Can you just clarify the meaning of that? Can you just clarify the meaning of that paragraph?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would seem and that is my inference that I draw, that Gen Kawe realised that on a legal basis, there was problems here and he had to ask Colonel Griebenouw for assistance.

MR DUKADA: Yes, I know that you were not the person who wrote the letter, but if there were legal problems, there were many local legal personnel in the Department of Justice to assist, why would he have to go to an external source for assistance? Are you able to help me on that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not be able to say. I am not trying to be funny, but maybe Gen Kawe could tell us, because something must have bothered him insistently.

MR DUKADA: Yes. Colonel, could we just go back a little back to the modus operandi, the general method of procedure by Vlakplaas?

Was it also one of your objectives to arrest an ANC member and bring them for prosecution in a court of law?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and indeed that did happen.

MR DUKADA: Yes. And you used to do that on a number of occasions?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that happened at several incidents. I cannot give any number, but there were many.

MR DUKADA: And in this instance, when Ndondo was fetched, according to Tshabalala at Exhibit E, the fourth page, Exhibit E, I don't know whether you have Exhibit E, paragraph 10(a)?

Can you see paragraph 10(a), where in supporting his application, Tshabalala says Batandwa Ndondo ...

MR DE KOCK: Can you just repeat the reference?

MR DUKADA: Paragraph 10(a).

MR DE KOCK: Okay, I have that.

MR DUKADA: The heading is State Political Objective Sought to be Achieved. It says Batandwa Ndondo was suspected of being an ANC terrorist. He was to be abducted and brought to the Republic of South Africa for interrogation and possible recruitment as an Askari. Can you see that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR DUKADA: The evidence we heard from Mr Tshabalala is that they had handcuffs on the day in question, but he was, that is the deceased, was never handcuffed.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR DUKADA: If there was an intention to arrest Ndondo and abduct him, would you agree with me that he would have been handcuffed as you regarded him as a very dangerous person?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR DUKADA: And in the eyes of Shosha, Tshabalala and Dandala not to arrest Ndondo would have been a very difficult, sorry very dangerous thing to do in those circumstances? Sorry, let me rephrase the question, not to handcuff him, such a dangerous person would be a terrible risk?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR DUKADA: Do you agree?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would be a risk.

MR DUKADA: I am not trying to persuade you to indulge in an opinion, but if they wanted to kill him, the easiest way was to let him run and shoot him? In other words, not to handcuff him, but to let him run and shoot him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't be able to say that. Could I just qualify here and say that the two persons who could give us the best information here, would be Gen Kawe and Warrant Officer Dan Naude, because it would have been simple for any of the two to contact the Security Branch at Qala and tell them please fetch Mr Ndondo.

We would have to go and look what these two gentlemen had in mind by using Vlakplaas. I would believe the Vlakplaas members went with a bona fide idea to arrest the man and that would include Dandala.

But those two gentlemen could tell us, call the Security Branch, go fetch him, you know where he lives.

MR DUKADA: Yes. Yes Colonel, in fact you would be requested by the Transkeian Police in this instance, to come and help them in arresting a particular ANC activist or any person belonging to the ANC or PAC who was within the borders of the Transkei?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would believe that the local Security Branch, along with the Uniform Branch, could go to his house and arrest him.

This doesn't mean that the objective that the Chief of the Security Police in Transkei and the Chief at East London had there, that it was conveyed to the foot soldiers.

MR DUKADA: You see, I don't know whether you follow me Colonel. I appreciate your assistance so far. What I am asking you is why would instead of simply going straight to Qala by a policeman in Qala district and arrest an ANC activist who was in Qala, why would there be people from, all the way from Pretoria, Vlakplaas, holding meetings, sleeping at Barkly East, waking up in the morning and going to Qala, all of them?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, can I just sketch a broad picture here? The presence of the Askaris at Barkly East, would not be for the arrest purposes of Qala. They served the whole Eastern Cape at that side, or the border area.

In this two to three weeks, this would be one of the tasks that they would do for the Security Police in the border area.

It would not specifically be only for this person.

MR DUKADA: No. That again goes to my point Colonel. I am glad that you are getting the point now. There is no need to risk an Askari’s identity to members of the public, the gentleman, Mr Ndondo who was an ANC activists, was at Qala, you had policemen in Qala to go there simply, and arrest him.

In other words you avoid detection of Askaris and the risk as well of any other person belonging to the Police Force, that is my point?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and I agree with you. That is why I would go back and say that the gentlemen, Warrant Officer Naude and the Chief of the Security Police, would give us those answers.

MR DUKADA: Mr Chairman, I don't intend to be long with the witness, I am just trying to find out if I have anything else that I would like to - thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DUKADA

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mapoma?

MR MAPOMA: Thank you Chairperson, I have no questions.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAPOMA

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wessels, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: Yes, Mr Chairman, I will be very brief. I will just swop places.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, very well, would you do that. What about you Mr Majokweni?

MR WESSELS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Colonel, if the instruction to Braam Morse was to cross the border into Transkei and to seek and kill Ndondo, then it would have been a covert operation, do you agree?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, but it would have been one of the illegal ones. That couldn't have been decided by Dan Naude or Griebenouw or Kawe.

MR WESSELS: In the event, if it was in fact a covert operation, then the presence of the Transkei Policemen would not have been needed?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. We now find members of the SAP with weapons inside an independent State and if they drive and meet with a roadblock or they are involved in an incident, then they could be arrested by the Transkei Police and be locked up.

MR WESSELS: As I understood your evidence Colonel, the presence of the Transkei Policemen would be because the Askaris would not have any powers of arrest and that is why you would need the Transkei Policemen to be there to effect an arrest, is that the position?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: But now, if it was a covert operation, if the intention and the direction or the instruction was to seek and kill, in other words a totally covert operation, then you would not have needed the presence of the Transkei Police?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR WESSELS: So judging from the de facto situation here, when Dandala was in fact brought into this operation, would you agree that viewed from your point, with your experience, that this operation has the hallmark of a non-covert operation, in other words, it fits in with an operation where the sole intention was to seek and arrest?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. I just want to bring this into context, covert operations. If I send somebody in private clothing, to buy some dagga from somebody on the corner for me, that would be a covert operation.

In this case the Askaris moved as a covert group for the Security Police, for the purpose of arrest. It wouldn't be a dirty operation, or a dirty trick if one had to call it that.

MR WESSELS: But the emphasis really Colonel, lies therein that the presence of Dandala would seem to swing the probabilities to this operation being a non-covert operation in the sense that it was not an operation where the sole intention was to seek and kill, but it was rather then an operation to seek and arrest?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct. It would have been a seek and arrest, however if it would be necessary, it was within their power to use their weapons in order to achieve an arrest.

MR WESSELS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Wessels. I understand Mr Majokweni, that you have no questions.

MR MAJOKWENI: That is correct.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAJOKWENI

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Sibanyoni?

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr De Kock, you gave us briefly your history and I took it that you said you were appointed Commander of Vlakplaas in 1985?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Which month?

MR DE KOCK: July, the 1st of July.

MR SIBANYONI: And when the incident, the arrest or abduction of Batandwa took place, you were already the Commander?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Isn't it so that as a Commander you would be informed about everything on the ground before it took place, in other words if there should be an operation, if there should be a person who should be arrested outside South Africa, I take it that maybe that should be known to you first?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not necessarily. The action was not launched with the objective of achieving anything unlawful or covert, in the line that somebody had to be killed.

The Unit, when they left Vlakplaas, and this was of application to all the Units, would report to the Head of the Security Division and would then fall beneath that person's command for discipline and control.

Thus, I would not receive ten phone calls from ten groups which would say, okay, we are going to make an arrest now. The communications systems which I tried to maintain, were as efficient as possible. The death of this person was not foreseen, as far as I know, and it was not a planned shooting operation, not from Vlakplaas members.

If there was another agenda, I would not be able to comment on that.

MR SIBANYONI: This question I am going to ask you, I did ask Mr Tshabalala, I would like to have your response to it.

Ndondo was a citizen of Transkei, which was an independent State at that time?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: And if he was arrested for having undergone training in Lesotho, coming back to Transkei, I take it the court, the proper court where he was supposed to be arraigned, was supposed to be Transkei. Now, we understand that he was supposed to be arrested and brought to South Africa, where was he going to be charged and tried?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is a question that I would like to pose as well, but I would like to pose that question to Mr Naude.

They must have had a specific reason for wanting Ndondo there. Captain Morse and the others were specifically referred to Ndondo and there would have been a definite reason for wanting him in the Republic.

I will concede, that is a question for which I am also seeking an answer.

MR SIBANYONI: I heard you talking about Shoza, you were referring to Shosha I suppose, the female Askari who was in the kombi?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Ms Sigodi?

ADV SIGODI: No questions, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Colonel, you testified that according to your information, Norma Shosha shot the deceased?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Who provided, can you recall, who provided you with that information?

MR DE KOCK: My recollection is that it was Lieutenant Adamson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. You have heard the Inspector Dandala and Mr Tshabalala say that Norma Shosha never left the kombi, she remained in the kombi.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If the deceased was indeed shot by Tshabalala and Captain Morse and Inspector Dandala, why would you be told that it was Norma Shosha who shot the deceased?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, perhaps just to explain, during the incident in which the deceased's legs were grabbed, inside the minibus when it appeared that he was going to fall out, she then shot him in the leg with her 32. I am just mentioning this for the sake of thoroughness, for in case there is another witness later.

CHAIRPERSON: I see. But were you told who shot and killed the deceased?

MR DE KOCK: No, I was told that he was shot on a continuous basis until he fell. There was nothing like a coup de grâce.

CHAIRPERSON: I see. Did Captain Morse give you any report as to what had happened in the Transkei?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, surrounding the shooting and in the basic line as I have also given it to you here. He did not mention the shot which Shosha fired.

CHAIRPERSON: I see.

MR DE KOCK: And he also didn't mention anything about cover ups.

CHAIRPERSON: I see. He merely told you that he and Dandala and Tshabalala had shot at the deceased who was running away?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Why was it necessary to give Tshabalala another identity?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if my memory serves me well, the reason was that the person who put the question in Parliament, wanted to see this Policeman. He wanted to know to which Unit this policeman specifically belonged.

In other words, there couldn't be any kind of evasion that such a policeman did exist.

CHAIRPERSON: What was this person supposed to have done, was there an indication?

MR DE KOCK: The person?

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand this extract from the Parliamentary proceedings, it would seem to indicate that Mr P.O. Sole posed these questions to the Minister?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: In regard to a certain person whose name has been furnished to the South African Police? What was this person supposed or alleged to have done?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with regard to the documentation that was sent to us at that time from the Police Liaison Department at Parliament, I don't have that in my possession. It was in Afrikaans and it was more extensively phrased than what it is phrased in the Hansard extract.

I am still under the impression that the person who put the question, knew that there was an Askari involved here, he knew what was going on. He was merely very subtle in the manner in which he put his questions in Parliament.

CHAIRPERSON: Was the Minister being asked whether Tshabalala had joined, a former of the ANC, had joined the members of the South African Police, was that a question?

MR DE KOCK: I have a recollection of that. They wanted this person. The request was to produce the man, and then they would have the Askari and the rest of the situation.

CHAIRPERSON: According to this extract, this was raised some time in October 1987?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, that is the date that appears here.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. As far as you can recall, was there any suggestion that perhaps Tshabalala had been involved in the killing of the deceased Ndondo?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I could say yes, because that sounds right, but I can't actually remember. If I were to look at all the effort which we put in to concealing Tshabalala's true identity, to the effect that he still can't regain his former name at this point, then that would be the correct inference.

CHAIRPERSON: I see. So your interest in this, in concealing the identity of Mr Tshabalala was to make sure that the world doesn't know that Tshabalala, an Askari, was working for the South African Police?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson. The same request was not directed for Dandala or Morse or Shosha.

CHAIRPERSON: Norma Shosha, there was no request ...

MR DE KOCK: Norma Shosha yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So the concealment of the identity of Mr Tshabalala had nothing to do with the criminal proceedings that were commenced shortly after the killing of the deceased?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't be able to say.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence, what really sparked the change of the identity, was the question in Parliament.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Which was addressed to the Minister as to whether they do have a person, a former member of the ANC, who was now working for the police?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And as I understand the chain of events, the Minister of Law and Order then would make enquiries from the Commissioner of Police at the time?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And the Commissioner of Police would in turn, direct the query to the Head of the Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: At the time it was Brigadier Van der Merwe?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And Brigadier Van der Merwe would in turn direct the query to is it Captain or Brigadier ...

MR DE KOCK: Brigadier Schoon.

CHAIRPERSON: Brigadier Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: What position did he have at the time, Brigadier Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: He was the Head of Section C.

CHAIRPERSON: I see, that is Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Under which Vlakplaas fell.

CHAIRPERSON: And then because you were the Commander of the Vlakplaas, Brigadier Schoon would then direct the query to you?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And were you given instructions by Brigadier Schoon, to conceal the identity of Mr Tshabalala?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he give you any reason for that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he would have. It was connected to the shooting incident in Transkei. However, I don't want to sketch a scenario for you in order for it to fit in or look correct, I can only give you what I truly know.

CHAIRPERSON: Because as I understand the position, the shooting or the killing of the deceased had occurred some three years ago, was it three years ago? Some two years ago, was it, 1985?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And Mr Tshabalala had been appearing in court?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: In connection with the killing, but what really led to the change of his identity, was the query in Parliament as to whether there was an Askari that was working for the police?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson. My hypothesis would then be that the cover up wasn't working any more. The question had been put in Parliament, and we couldn't conceal it any more. Now we had to search for another manner in which to defeat the ends of justice.

That then resulted in the change of identity.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know what explanation was given for the sudden disappearance of Tshabalala for the purposes of the criminal trial in the Transkei?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't want to speculate, but I think that something was said to the effect that the man isn't here any more, he is on an investigation, or he has left the country, it was one of those two.

I have a vague recollection of that, and that he wasn't available, that he couldn't be found.

CHAIRPERSON: ... the court that an accused person cannot attend court, simply because he is on some investigation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. If we weren't able to find him at that point in time, he wouldn't be able to testify or be tried. The case would be scrapped from the roll, and we would hope that it would be forgotten in time.

CHAIRPERSON: But I would have thought that if an accused person doesn't appear in court, a warrant of arrest would be issued against that person?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, yes. However, they would be looking for Tshabalala and not for Mavusu. Tshabalala is not a shadow, and he was gone.

For all official purposes, Tshabalala was simply not available.

CHAIRPERSON: Did someone from Vlakplaas convey to the Investigating Officer or to the Prosecutor or to the Attorney General of the Transkei, that Tshabalala has disappeared?

MR DE KOCK: I could imagine that somewhere in the documents I spotted something where mention is made that Tshabalala is not available. It is in one of those documents. I could study it once again this evening and see if I could trace it.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you, if you don't mind. Is it possible that Tshabalala could have come to the Transkei and make a statement of and concerning the death of the deceased without you knowing about that statement?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I would have approved the journey from Pretoria to the Transkei for the purposes of making statements.

I wouldn't have any control over the exact statement which was to be taken.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any recollection of any request having been made by Tshabalala to come to the Transkei for the purposes of making a statement?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, a request like that would have to be directed. I would not have known what the nature of the investigation would have been, or how far it had come and I wouldn't have simply exposed him like that.

I would have had to approve it first.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know an Officer by the name of Willy I think it is, let me just ...

MR MAPOMA: I think it is page 61 Chairperson, if I may assist.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know an Officer by the name of E. Willy of Umtata?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. I have seen the name for the first time upon studying these documents.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DE KOCK: And I have also heard it for the first time during the evidence which was given.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. I think his rank at the time is given as being Colonel. Colonel E. Willy?

MR DE KOCK: Completely unknown to me Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If Colonel Willy wanted to obtain a statement from Mr Tshabalala, would Colonel Willy have made the request to you?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. The procedure would have been to liaise with the Liaison Officer of the SAP who was either Colonel Griebenouw or Dan Naude and they would have then put the request through to us.

I wouldn't have had any problem with sending Tshabalala, because the information which I had at my disposal was that the incident had complied with the prerequisites for using a firearm.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me just direct your attention to page 138, the last but one paragraph where you indicate that the person who should take responsibility for this conduct, obviously the Minister of Law and Order, the Commissioner of Police, the Veiligheid (indistinct), why do you say the Minister of Law and Order should take responsibility for your conduct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the Minister of Law and Order knew very well that we were using former members of MK and APLA.

There can be no doubt about that, and they knew that we were undertaking operations on a cross border level. Whether it was Swaziland or the Transkei didn't make any difference, it was the same. I think that it was Min Le Grange and he was the Minister who decorated me and other members in 1983 for a cross border operation in Swaziland, so therefore he could have said in Parliament, yes, we do have such a Unit and we do have former MK and APLA members, and we are using them for counter insurgency services, and still he didn't say anything.

I have no doubt that he had good reason to conceal this.

CHAIRPERSON: Does it, what about the Commissioner of Police?

MR DE KOCK: Could you repeat please.

CHAIRPERSON: The Commissioner of Police?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the Commissioner of Police by nature of the matter, was usually a former Security Chief.

The Commissioner of Police would have known that a Unit such as C1 existed. That is something which would have been impossible to hide from the Commissioner of Police.

The Commissioner of Police could have forced the Security Chief and said to him, bring this man to me, I want to see him, and there was no basis upon which that could have been refused.

CHAIRPERSON: What were the instructions from the Commissioner of Police to the Head of the Security Branch, do you know?

MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't know, because we are working once again with a chain of command. It is on a one to one basis, and it is on a need to know basis.

CHAIRPERSON: You received your instructions from Brigadier Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Is he the one who said you must conceal the identity of Mr Tshabalala?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Did he mention to you whether he had discussed that with the Head of the Security Branch and the Commissioner?

MR DE KOCK: No, I don't have any recollection of that right now.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you Mr De Kock. Is there anything arising? Mr Dukada, is there anything arising?

MR DUKADA: I have no question Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DUKADA

MR HUGO: Could you please grant me a moment?

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr De Kock. Does that conclude the case for Colonel De Kock.

MR HUGO: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman, that is the end of his evidence.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Are there any witnesses that the applicants intend to call?

MR DILIZO: Mr Chairperson, with regard to Mr Dandala, no witnesses to call.

MR KNIGHT: Mr Chairperson, in respect of Mr Tshabalala, there are no witnesses to be called.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mapoma, do you have any witnesses that you would like to call?

MR MAPOMA: No Sir, except that I can explain that at the insistence of one Mr Hugo, we did subpoena Colonel E. Willy. He is present. I don't know whether he intends asking some questions to him.

Also we did subpoena Chief Keizer D. Matanzima at the insistence of the victims. And also Gen Kawe and Colonel Booi have been subpoenaed also at the insistence of the victim's family.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dukada, on behalf of the victims, do you have any witnesses that you want to call?

MR DUKADA: Mr Chairperson, we do not have any witnesses to call to oppose the application. We don't have any specific witness to call.

CHAIRPERSON: What is to become of the witnesses who have been subpoenaed?

The Committee would like to hear is it Colonel Willy, is he here?

MR MAPOMA: Yes, he is here Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is he here, where is he? We would like to hear Colonel Willy, but unfortunately due to the lateness of the hour, we can only hear him first thing tomorrow morning. Colonel Willy, will you make sure that you are here tomorrow morning, at about nine o'clock? Very well.

Who are the other witnesses?

MR MAPOMA: Gen Kawe, Colonel Booi and Chief K.D. Matanzima.

CHAIRPERSON: Those are implicated persons, are they not? As far as Gen Kawe and Colonel Booi, they are represented by Mr Wessels, Mr Majokweni. Okay, very well. At whose instance was Mr Matanzima subpoenaed?

MR MAPOMA: At the instance of the victims Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you intend calling Mr Matanzima, Mr Dukada?

MR DUKADA: Just to clarify something Mr Chairperson. There is a newspaper cutting which was presented as evidence during the course of the proceedings. We don't intend to call Mr Matanzima as a witness for the family at all, but to put - to seek leave from the Committee to put questions to him regarding the remarks which were allegedly made by him in the press. That is the only aspect that we want to cover.

CHAIRPERSON: What I want to find out is that he has been subpoenaed, I gather, what I want to find out is do you want to put questions to him, is that the position?

MR DUKADA: Certainly Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, very well. Is he here? Would you come up forward Sir. As far as the microphone, to the microphone Sir.

MR HOBBS: If I may just place my name on record, I am Jonathan Hobbs, I am an Advocate at the local Barr. I have instructions to appear for Chief Keizer Matanzima at these proceedings.

He has received a subpoena. I saw it fit earlier today to convey Mr Matanzima's or my instructions in this regard, to Mr Mapoma and to the victim's family at whose insistence he has been subpoenaed.

Now, the questions raised there are such that in my submission, his evidence will not be able to proceed either today, even if there was time, or tomorrow. I think I did convey the reasons to you Mr Chairman, earlier.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you have to state that for the record.

MR HOBBS: The Commission member, Mr Mapoma has ... (no further proceedings, due to power failure) ...

WITNESS EXCUSED

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS