DECISION
The applicant was during the relevant period a general in the South African Defence Force commanding the Special Forces Unit. This decision will deal with three incidents which became known as The Nietverdiendt Ten Incident, The Ribeiro Murders and the Piet Ntuli incident.
Background: The applicant testified that towards the middle of 1986 the Special Forces Unit under his command was ordered by General Geldenhuys, then head of the Defence Force, to assist the Security Police in countering the revolution. This resulted in close co-operation between him and Brigadier Jack Cronje who at that time was in command of what has since become known as the Vlakplaas unit of the Security Police. The applicant was asked by General Geldenhuys to work out a plan in order to effectively counter their opponents in the political struggle. More details about the then prevailing situation were given in the decision on the application of Brigadier Jack Cronje under application No.2773/96.
The applicant had a series of meetings with Brigadier Cronje and according to him they agreed that the Security Police would identify so called targets which would then be eliminated with the assistance of the members of the Special Forces Unit. According to the evidence the members if the Special Forces were highly trained combating soldiers trained and selected because of their abilities to engage in war and their military successes. They could hardly be called a peace-keeping force. The applicant and his staff members in fact accepted that they were deployed in a war situation and that they had to carry out their duties as soldiers. The only difference was that they would now participate internally in the RSA, as well as externally, while they previously operated only externally.
The applicant further testified that he informed his superior General Geldenhuys about the broad outline of the plan. It was stressed that nothing should be done and would be done without the approval of his counterpart, Brigadier Cronje of the Security Police, who he in turn believed would act with the approval of his superiors.
The applicant testified that during the early meetings with Brigadier Cronje the following targets were identified:
1. Activists leaving the country for military training or blitz retraining courses over weekends;
2. Dr and Mrs Ribeiro who according to the information given to the applicant were highly active in assisting MK trainees to leave and re-enter the country and who rendered monetary, logistical, medical, and training support to the MK soldiers and activists;
3. Mr Piet Ntuli, a minister of the KwaNdebele government. The applicant was under the impression that Mr Ntuli was indeed an active supporter of the ANC. According to the evidence rendered by members of the security police he was a leader of a movement known as the Imbokotho movement which created havoc in the then KwaNdebele.
The Committee will now deal with the applicant's involvement in incidents flowing from the above.
1. The Nietverdiendt Ten incident on or about 26 June 1986.
The decision in this application should be read with the decision in the application of Jan Hattingh Cronje, application No.2773/96. The background was set out on pages 1-6 and this incident was dealt with under Schedule 12.
The applicant testified that he was informed by Commander Charl Naude that 10 activists were on their way to Botswana for further military training. Naude was in command of a section of Special Forces which was ordered to assist the Security Police of Northern Transvaal region under Brigadier Cronje. The applicant was satisfied that they fell within the category of persons who were identified by the security police as targets.
Furthermore the applicant was assured that Brigadier Cronje would be present and in charge of the police taking part in the operation. He authorised the operation and left the planning and the execution in the hands of Naude.
Naude later reported back to him that the 10 activists were killed and he also read in the newspapers about it.
The Committee is satisfied that the offences were associated with a political objective, that they were committed in the course of the conflicts of the past and that the applicant has made full disclosure of the relevant facts. He was not present at the scene of the murder and the circumstances prevailing there and the roles played by his subordinates will appear in the decisions dealing with applicants Naude and Vorster, applications Nos.4533/97 and 5641/97. The applicant, however, jointly selected the targets with Cronje and instructed Naude to plan and execute the operation.
The applicant was a member of the security forces and accordingly satisfies the requirements set out in section 20(2)(b) and 20(2)(f) of the Act and the offences were associated with a political objectives as set out in section 20(1) of the Act.
Amnesty is therefore
GRANTED: to the applicant in respect of the following offences
1. The murders of Abram Mokolane, Samuel Masilela, Sepo Sibanyoni, Jeremia Mfudi, Thomas Phiri, Jeremia Mkabula, Morris Nkabinde, Matthew Kekutle, Stephen Makenna and Elliot Sasage and/or any other person being part of a group of ten black men from Mamelodi, at or near Nietverdiendt in the district of Thabazimbi on or about 26 June 1986;
2. Desecration of the bodies of the deceased;
3. Arson and/or malicious damage of property;
4. Contravention of sections 2, 28, 29 and 39 of the Arms and Ammunition Act, 75 of 1969;
5. Contravention of section 2 of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968;
6. Contravention of sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 27 of the Explosives Act 26 of 1956;
7. Any other competent or related verdict based on the same facts and which would relate to the same offence namely the murder of ten males at or near Nietverdiendt on or about 26 June 1986.
The Committee is of opinion that the next of kin of the abovementioned deceased are victims in terms of the Act and refer the matter for consideration in terms of section 26 of the Act.
2. The Ribeiro Murders.
As already stated herein before, the applicant testified that Dr Ribeiro and his wife were identified as targets for elimination by the Security Police. In this respect there is a conflict between the evidence of Cronje (Application No.2773/96 Schedule 8) and the applicant. Cronje said that the Ribeiros were identified as targets by the Special Forces under the command of the applicant whilst the applicant testifies that they acted according to the agreement to assist with the elimination of targets already identified by the Security Police.
Whoever might have taken the initiative in the incident which resulted in the murder, it is clear that even before the Special Forces Unit was ordered to assist the Security Police in their struggle against activists and the liberation forces in the Northern Transvaal region, members of the Security Police under the command of Cronje namely van Jaarsveld and Joe Mamasela on one occasion, and Hechter and van Vuuren had previously, on an earlier occasion, attempted to assassinate Dr Ribeiro. These attempts are reflected in the decisions pronounced by this Committee on the 17th February 1999, in Applications 2773/96 schedule 8, No.2776/96 schedule 15 and No.2777/96 schedule 6.
It is therefore clear that the Ribeiros had been previously targeted by the Security Police and it is highly improbable that the Special Forces, who at the time did not have an information network within the country, would have acted without being requested to do so by a member or members of the Security Police, and on information supplied to them by the Security Police.
The applicant testified that the Ribeiros (both Dr and Mrs Ribeiro) were identified as targets during one of the first meetings between him and Brigadier Cronje in 1986. At a later stage towards the end of 1986 Naude approached him and reported to him that they were planning the elimination of the Ribeiros. He accepted that this was in accordance with the original planning and identification of targets during the earlier meetings with Cronje. The detailed planning was left to Naude but he authorised the operation and associated himself therewith.
Naude testified that after the targeting of the Ribeiros was discussed he requested information about the whereabouts of the Ribeiros, where they were staying and what their movements were. He received a folder containing an area map and some other detail. The folder however did not include information received from informers etc. It was only an extract from the security file kept by the Security Police. He commanded Noel James Robey to assist in the actual execution of the plan and handed the file to him. He later with the approval of either the applicant or Colonel Verster arranged for two members of battalion 32 in Namibia to be sent to Pretoria. Robey met them and gave them R2 000,00 for expenses. They booked themselves in at the Manhattan hotel and were thereafter daily met by Robey who introduced himself to them as Lionel Kirby. They in turn introduced themselves as Jao Pinta and Louis da Silva. Robey is convinced that they were also at the time using false names, but was not sure. He arranged to meet them daily near Pretoria station and from there showed them the route to Mamelodi and a pre-arranged venue from where the operation would be directed.
They repeatedly drove the route for two days and on the 3rd day they familiarised themselves with the vicinity around the Ribeiro house. Everything was ready for the operation to be carried out on the fourth day.
Robey fetched two 45 Colts with silencers and ammunition, handed it to them and they drove off to Mamelodi. It was arranged that after they had done the shooting they would hurry back to the pre-arranged spot where they would get into a car driven by Robey while one Vlietstra would drive off with the vehicle they would have used in the operation.
Robey, after seeing the two assassins off, had trouble in starting the Golf which was destined to be the get away car after the operation. As time was running out he used his Land Rover and drove to the Palms Hotel in Silverton (near Mamelodi) where he was to meet Naude and Hechter of the Security Police.
Everything worked according to plan. The assassination was carried out, the two Angolan assassins rushed back, changed motor vehicles and drove off with Robey in his Land Rover. He dropped them off at the hotel, picked them up at 5:00 the next morning took them to military headquarters and they flew back to Namibia. It later turned out that Robey's Land Rover's registration number was spotted by someone chasing the assassins. This later resulted in a criminal investigation against him.
Neither Naude nor Joubert met the two Angolan soldiers. Joubert himself was not further involved after he authorised Naude to carry out the operation. Naude and Hechter drove past the Ribeiro house and reported the incident at the police station and thereafter informed van Jaarsveld. The vehicle used during the operation was later completely destroyed.
According to the applicant he later met the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee and it became apparent that the latter was not informed about the operation, neither did he approve of it. He required a full investigation. Because it was clear that the elimination of the Ribeiros was not approved at the highest level of the SAP the applicant expressed his doubts to his commander, General Geldenhuys about the basis on which Special Forces co-operated with the Security Police. As a result thereof General Geldenhuys instructed him that in future he was not to carry out joint covert operations unless he obtained some sort of written proof that such an operation carried the approval of the head of the SAP.
Having considered all the evidence before us, the Committee is satisfied that the application meets the requirements of section 20(I) of the Act;
that the applicant as a member of the security forces falls within the provisions of section 20(2)(b) and (f) of the Act and;
that the offences were associated with a political objective as required in section 20(1) of the Act.
Amnesty is therefore
GRANTED: in respect of the following offences
1. The murder of Dr and Mrs Ribeiro at Mamelodi on or about 1 December 1986;
2. Any acts as an accessory after the fact in respect of the aforesaid murders, including defeating the ends of justice;
3. Malicious damage to property;
The Committee is of opinion that the next of kin of Dr and Mrs Ribeiro are victims in terms of Section 26 of the Act and recommends that they be referred to the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation for consideration in terms thereof.
3. The Piet Ntuli Murder. The facts in this matter have been fully dealt with in the decision in application No.2773/96 relating to Brigadier Cronje under schedule 7.
As was pointed out above the applicant General Joubert testified that Ntuli was identified as a target during one of the early meetings between Special Forces and the Security Police Unit, represented by Brigadier Cronje. He was later requested by either Cronje or Hechter to authorise the preparation of a bomb which would be used in the elimination. He ordered Trevor Ian Floyd to obtain the bomb from Special Forces headquarters and to instruct captain Hechter of the Security Police about the handling and detonating of the bomb. Neither the applicant nor any member of the Special Force unit were actively involved in the operation itself.
For the reasons already set out in the decision in application No.2773/96, pages 1 to 6 and 15 to 17 amnesty is
GRANTED: to the application in respect of
1. The murder of Piet Ntuli in Kwa-Mhlanga, KwaNdebele during or about July 1986 and the following offences connected therewith;
a. malicious damage to property;
b. contravention of the Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969;
c. contravention of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968;
d. contravention of the Explosives Act 27 of 1956.
Any act as an accessory after the fact in respect of the aforesaid murders, including defeating the ends of justice.
The Committee is of the opinion that the next of kin of Piet Ntuli are victims in terms of Section 26 of the Act and recommends that they be referred to the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation for consideration in terms thereof.
SIGNED ON THE 21ST MAY 1999.
