DECISION
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These are applications for amnesty by former members of the  then Port Elizabeth Security Police; namely, Snyman; Du Plessis;  Van Zyl; Nieuwoudt and Lotz, as well as by the Vlakplaas Security Police. 
For the sake of convenience and easy reference, Applicants  3, 4, and 5 shall be referred to as  the PE Group ; the 6th , 7th and 8th applicants, including Joe Mamasela and Roelf Venter, whose application was previously heard by a different panel, as the Vlakplaas Group. 
In the course of the prolonged hearings in this matter  Mamasela;  Mogoai and Koole, who was never a member of a liberation  movement, were referred  to as "the askaris". It is only convenient to adhere to the reference. The term is apparently  used to  refer to former members  of liberation  movements  who  were turned  and worked  for the security  forces  of the previous  government. Mamasela and Mogoai are former members of  Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC) who were so turned and worked for the Security Police at Vlakplaas. 
As already  implied, Koole was a permanent  member  of the Security Police when the events referred to herein occurred and, like all members  of his group, was based  at Vlakplaas. Although Mamasela was the first person in 1994 to reveal his involvement  in the  abduction and murder of the deceased referred to herein  by  members of the then South African Security Police, he has not  applied  for amnesty.
All the applications arise out of the disappearance of the so- called  PEBCO 3 in 1985, namely  Sipho Charles Hashe; Qaqawuli Godolozi and Champion Galela. 
The PE Group's applications mainly relate to  the abduction  in Port Elizabeth on the 8 May 1985 and subsequent murder at Cradock of the PEBCO 3 on the 9 or 10 May of the same year. Snyman  and Du  Plessis  were not physically involved in the abduction  and  murder of the said deceased  but,  for reasons  which will become apparent in due course, the two had authorised  the abduction and murder of the deceased. Snyman who was the most senior, and the Commanding officer of the then Eastern Cape  Security Police  had been  approached  by Du Plessis  who suggested that the three activists be killed. When  Snyman  agreed  to the idea  Du Plessis  approached Van Zyl  and ordered  him to set  up a team  for the operation. Van Zyl  set  up  the PE Group  team consisting of himself; Nieuwoudt and Lotz.  The PE Group were physically  involved in the abduction and murder of the deceased. 
The Vlakplaas  Group who assisted in the abduction  did not take part in the killing of the PEBCO 3. Mamasela is alone in his  evidence that all the Vlakplaas Group members and a number of senior Security Police officers from Port Elizabeth and different parts of the country were involved in what he described as a brutal torture and murder of the deceased after they were abducted.
Mogoai and Koole apply for amnesty for their role in the abduction and for assaulting Hashe and Godolozi. 
Beeslaar  applies for amnesty  for his role in the  abduction  of the said  three and specifically an assault on Hashe when he kicked him. 
Van Zyl  further  applies for amnesty in respect of the  offences  of unlawful  possession of  an unlicensed firearm which he had brought into the Republic of South Africa in 1975, which weapon was used in the murder of the deceased. He also seeks amnesty  for defeating the ends of justice, in that he destroyed  the weapon  by cutting it with a saw to destroy any possible  physical evidence of the crimes committed.
Generally all the applicants are being opposed by the deceased, primarily on the ground that no full disclosure has been made. 
The PEBCO 3 were at all material times office-bearers of the Port Elizabeth Black Civics  Organisation ( PEBCO), an affiliate  body of the then United Democratic Front (UDF) which was aligned to the ANC. It appears from the evidence that there is much  conflict  as to  whether  the elimination  could  have occurred  on the 9th  or 10th May.  It is, however, not necessary to deal with the  conflicting evidence on this particular point. Different legal  representatives  appeared  for different applicants  who all gave different and conflicting testimonies of what happened, in particular  regarding  how and by which one of the applicants  the deceased  were  abducted  at the airport. 
It  is also not  necessary  to deal  with  these  contradictions  as all applicants  admit  having  abducted  the  PEBCO 3, hence the applications.
There is a welter of conflict and confusion regarding when exactly, how and by whom the deceased were violated. The PE Group, Venter and Beeslaar, save for his admission in regard to Hashe, vehemently deny having assaulted and tortured the  deceased. Mogaoi and Koole deny brutally torturing the deceased to death  as  alleged  by  Mamasela. 
On the whole this matter  has given rise to considerable difficulty and we have been able to derive little assistance from Mamasela whose testimony,  although in the main confirms the evidence  of Mogoai and Koole that the PEBCO 3 were severely assaulted  during the interrogation, but  is just as contradictory and, on  some points, improbable. 
After carefully considering all the evidence in the matter it is clear that the myriad of contradictions can be classified into material and immaterial differences which can largely be attributed to human  failure of memory, due to lapse of time. There are also those that are not that innocent. We shall  accordingly refrain  from expressing  what our conclusions  would  have been  upon  every issue.  We do, however,  think that in the circumstances if the deceased were assaulted and tortured, as it is now being claimed by some of the applicants, that is a very important information for applicants to disclose. An applicant who fails to do so cannot be said to have made a full disclosure. It has been suggested that the duty to make a full disclosure only requires of an applicant to give evidence pertaining solely to the  offence or delict in respect of which he seeks amnesty and is not  required  to make  disclosures  on acts, offences or omissions  for which he is not seeking amnesty.  The argument cannot be accepted. To adopt such approach would be placing an  unwarranted restriction on and giving a very narrow  interpretation of the relevant portion of the Act. Those who appear before this Committee are expected to be frank and honest  about their actions. They may not withhold important  information  pertaining to their actions and the actions of others in the planning and execution of acts or omissions forming  part of the subject matter of the incident under consideration.
It is common cause that in the evening of the 8 May 1985 the PEBCO 3 left their homes to meet an official from the British Embassy. For many years various attempts to trace them, and including court proceedings against the South Africa Security Police, to produce their bodies yielded no positive results. Up to the time of submission of their amnesty applications the PE Security Police denied any knowledge of or involvement in the  disappearance of these men. 
It is also common cause that before 8 May 1985 Hashe had made   telephone contact with one Tozamile Botha, a co-founder and former member of PEBCO who was an ANC exile based in  Lusaka at the time.   In that conversation  Hashe solicited Botha to organise funds for PEBCO and Botha indicated that he would ascertain the possibility of obtaining such aid, either from or via  the British Embassy.  He was going to communicate with him later in regard  to progress made in that connection. Fatefully for Hashe, that conversation was intercepted by Nieuwoudt who was  monitoring his movements and activities. The PE Group then lured  Hashe and his two comrades to the Port Elizabeth airport  under the impression  that they  were to meet  an official from the British Embassy. 
When the unsuspecting trio came to the airport  they were swiftly  abducted and taken into the askaris' kombi which transported  them to Cradock where they were held in the old disused Post Chalmers Police Station.  At the time  the Vlakplaas Group under Captain Roelf Venter were in the Eastern  Cape, assisting  to curb  the high  levels  of political  violence and tracing MK cadres who  had infiltrated the area. The Port Elizabeth Security Police believed that the PEBCO 3 played a crucial role in fomenting the political  unrest and the general  strife  that existed in the area.  They had  been told  by their  informers that they were part of the ANC underground network which recruited supporters to undergo  military training in exile and had knowledge of the presence cadres and weapons in the area. These activists were to be killed  to weaken the PEBCO in its mass mobilisation campaigns. According  to the PE Group the askaris were only  there to help with the abduction and they were not going to be involved in questioning of the three activists, since they lacked  interrogation  skills. They  were not even supposed to know that they were going to be killed, hence  the "superficial" interrogation to make  them (Vlakplaas Group) believe that the abduction was solely for interrogation. They also say that they as part of the plan, the  elimination was only going to take place after Du Plessis had advised them that "the coast was clear" meaning that they had  not been seen by anyone when they abducted the activists at the airport the previous day.  This he did the following day when he  came to Post Chalmers at about 12 noon. He spent  about an hour  there with the PE Group. They say at that stage the Vlakplaas  Group had already left.
Du Plessis says he did see the PEBCO 3 there who were in a relaxed mood and  showed  no signs of  having been assaulted at all.  Neither did they lodge such a complaint to him, which he is convinced they would have done had such been the position. The PE Group say after Du Plessis had left each one of them shot and killed one of the PEBCO 3.  Their bodies were placed on a pile  of wood and burnt with  diesel.  The remains of their bodies were collected and thrown into the Fish River by Nieuwoudt the next day when they were returning to Port Elizabeth where Van Zyl gave a  report  to Du Plessis on the success of the operation. 
The latter reported to Snyman who asked for no details as to how  the abduction and killings had been effected, because the operation was carried out on "a need to know" basis. He was  not supposed to know  where and by whom  the deceased  had been killed and  only the actual killers were to know.
In this matter amongst a  number of documents  that were made available to the Committee is a transcript of the evidence of Venter  which was frequently  referred  to at the hearing. He had testified  that he had been asked by one of the Port Elizabeth Security Police to make his askaris  available for the abduction and was given photographs of the activists to show to the askaris. Initially he only knew that the activists were going to be abducted  for interrogation and removed from their areas where they instigated unrest, but later  he "gathered" (suspected) that the three were to be eliminated since their car had been burnt. He says immediately after the abduction had been carried out they all met outside the airport where it was asked of him by Van Zyl to make his askaris available to assist with the interrogation and further  investigation. This he did and left them under the PE Group command. He says both himself and Beeslaar did not go to  Post  Chalmers that evening  but returned to Glen Connor in Port Elizabeth where the Vlakplaas Group were accommodated in the course of their presence in the Eastern Cape. 
That evening  the askaris  and the PE Group travelled together to Cradock where  the interrogation was going to take place. It was only the following day that he and Beeslaar went to the Post Chalmers where he learnt from on of the PE Group members  that a lot of information had been obtained through the interrogation. He also saw the PEBCO 3 whose faces were covered with a cloth and they showed no signs of having been assaulted. He denied  participating in the interrogation of  and assault on the activists as alleged askaris. He has no knowledge and never heard what happened to the PEBCO 3 after he left them there with the PE Group. His claim of  the consumption  of liquor at Post Chalmers  is denied by the PE Group 3, but it is being supported by Beeslaar and all three askaris. The evidence of  the presence and use of liquor by some of the applicants must be accepted and it is clearly  not unrelated to the evidence of the use of violence against the activists.
The PE Group’s evidence that the askaris never participated in the questioning of the  PEBCO 3 must  be rejected as false. All three askaris, and particular Mogoai and Koole, implicate themselves and say  that they took part in  the questioning and assault on Hashe and Godolozi whilst Galela was screaming  endlessly  in a cell where he was being kept separately. They  say the interrogation was being led by the PE Group and all Vlakplaas Group members  participated  in the questioning and assault  of the deceased. This  evidence  is accepted  as reasonably true  and is  consistent  with probabilities , having regard to the  reason for the  decision to abduct  and kill the  PEBCO 3. 
They  were believed to have  been some  of the most  dangerous  activists in the area and possessed knowledge of ANC underground structures. This view is fortified by evidence of Beeslaar who spontaneously kicked Hashe. He says he did so because  Hashe 's head was covered  with a cloth and he wanted to speak with him about something. He does not even recall what  he wanted  to talk  to him about  because  he was  not part of the interrogation.  There is no evidence at all that anyone of the applicants who were there reprimanded Beeslaar for the assault. This alone sufficiently lends credence to the view that, in so doing Beeslaar was taking part in a general atmosphere of assaults and torture of the PEBCO 3.  It is not deemed necessary  to repeat the details of the assaults and order in which the activists were taken from the garage where they were being kept and brought outside to be questioned and assaulted. 
Evidence has been led that during the questioning Hashe admitted  keeping an AK47 at his sister's place.  This soon turned out to have been a lie as Hashe later said  he was lying and had done so to relieve himself from further assaults. The deception  is said  to have  infuriated  his interrogators who administered more blows  to him.  Considering this evidence with the other evidence from Nieuwoudt  that at some stage Hashe and Godolozi volunteered themselves to work as police informers, which offer was refused,  the conclusion is inescapable that they were being seriously  assaulted during the questioning. Not surprisingly, even  Nieuwoudt himself says they did not believe the offer to be genuine, but a trick by the activists to be released.
In this context it is necessary to deal more fully with the evidence of Du Plessis who clearly has chosen to collude with the PE Group to deny that the PEBCO 3 were tortured  before they were killed.   It is not being implied here that Du Plessis witnessed the assaults and torture. He says there was not supposed to be any interrogation at all  because they knew that they were not going  to get anything they did not know.  He says the purpose of the operation was simply to kill the PEBCO 3 and thus weaken the PEBCO in its activities. It was not to obtain information from  them because they were satisfied with the information they  were receiving from their informers.   But contrary to this explanation  Nieuwoudt says when Du Plessis arrived at Post Chalmers that  morning he wanted to know if any new information had been obtained from the activists. He was answered in the negative. This shows  that  he clearly expected  interrogation  to have taken place and, indeed, according to Nieuwoudt, a superficial  questioning did occur before Du Plessis came and after he had left.  It is quite unlikely  for Du Plessis  not to have intended  that  the PEBCO 3  be interrogated, and if need be even to be assaulted to obtain new information from them before they were killed. He was quite  senior to all  the PE Group members who carried out the operation in terms of his orders. His evidence  that the captives were at ease with themselves is rejected as  improbable and only  tendered to bolster the alleged veracity of his claim. He says  if  the PEBCO 3 had been assaulted  before his arrival they would  have told him. This is  quite an unlikely  thing to have happened in the circumstances. That PEBCO 3 knew  that they  had been lured  to the airport;  they had been abducted and not  arrested in the way  arrests are normally effected, and being  held in a remote desolate place where no passers-by could hear their screams, they must have known that their fate was sealed. 
The alleged mood of relaxation is highly unlikely in the circumstances. It further appears from the evidence that the questioning  took quite  some time  without  meaningful progress, and it is quite improbable that no assaults ever took place to force them to reveal  the presence and whereabouts  of MK cadres and location of arms in the area. The deceased  were believed to  be master-minding the prevailing unrest and their questioning  must have  been intense to ensure that they disclosed whatever  information  they had before they  were killed.
Before concluding we also need to deal with the testimony of  Koole and  decide to what extent he has been frank and honest. Previously Koole made a statement to the Attorney General's office, which statement was taken by Captain De Lange. In that statement he repeatedly implicated Nieuwoudt in his account of the events. 
In this  regard it is important to mention that although Mogoai, who was generally an impressive and satisfactory witness who answered all questions truthfully with neither exaggeration nor hesitation, at  the hearing he could not identify anyone of the PE Group members who was present and took part in the interrogation and assaults. He  did, however, testify that these were the same Security Police from Port Elizabeth who had taken part in the abduction at the airport. Nevertheless, that presents  no evidential problems as the PE Group members place themselves on the scene save to deny having assaulted the deceased. 
Proceeding to deal with the evidence of Koole.  At the hearing  he suddenly denied ever making the allegations which implicated Nieuwoudt.  De Lange testified and said he wrote the statement  according to what was said to him by Koole. Surprisingly, the signature of Koole was appended to the statement and one hand-written correction had been made and initialled by him. Koole says when he appended his signature it was agreed between  himself and police messengers from the A/G's office that the necessary  corrections would been made so he could sign again. It is  not necessary  to traverse  all the evidence  that was led in this respect, but suffice it to say that a prolonged and rigorous questioning revealed that Koole was not being truthful. He was evasive in his answers and would refuse to answer clear and simple questions. At times he would ask that such questions be repeated and explained. Although  he had testified that when De Lange took the statement from him he tried to persuade him to implicate Nieuwoudt, he had not even told his legal representative about what he believed to have been an irregular and unprofessional conduct  by De Lange.  Further questioning on the matter showed that there was nothing improper about the  questions that were put to him by De Lange. 
De Lange was called to testify  and he was a very impressive and candid witness who answered all the questions without equivocation. 
In the result the various applications are decided as follows:- 
1. Amnesty is hereby GRANTED to HAROLD SNYMAN for  conspiring and ordering the abduction and murder of  Sipho  Charles Hashe, Qaqawuli Godolozi and  Champion Galela.     
2. Amnesty is hereby REFUSED to HERMANUS BAREND  DU PLESSIS for the conspiring and ordering  the abduction  and murder of  the three deceased. 
3.  Amnesty is hereby GRANTED to KIMANI PETER  MOGOAI for the  following offences:-
 i)   The abduction  of PEBCO 3 ; and for 
 ii) Assault on Sipho Charles Hashe and Qaqawuli  Godolozi.
4.   Amnesty is REFUSED to the following applicants:
 4.1   Johannes  Martin Van Zyl; 
 4.2  Gideon Nieuwoudt; 
 4.3  Gerhardus Johannes Lot;
FOR:
The abduction and murder of Sipho CharlesHashe; Qaqawuli Godolozi and Champion Galela -  the reason being failure to make a full disclosure in respect of the assaults. It would  be too artificial and absurd in the circumstances of the case to separate the two offences as they were both committed  in a continuous train of events.
5.  Amnesty  is REFUSED to Gerhardus Cornelius Beeslaar for  the offences of  abduction and assault  on Sipho Charles  Hashe. The applicant has not shown that he had any  political objective  when he  assaulted  Hashe. He has not   made a good  impression on the Committee and in his   evidence  displayed  a selective  memory  of the  events that  occurred. This observation  is being  made mindful  of his   alleged medical  condition affecting  his ability  to  remember events. 
 Having regard to all the evidence he clearly  cannot  be said  to have made a frank and honest disclosure to the  Committee regarding the assaults on the PEBCO 3 whilst  they were being questioned.  There is sufficient evidence  that he was present and took part in the questioning and  the general assault and torture. Although his evidence   regarding his role in the abduction has not been challenged  in any  material respect, amnesty cannot be granted for the   offence.  He has not disclosed his part in and knowledge of  the role of the others in the assaults and torture. His  persistent denials in this respect must be rejected as false.
6.  Amnesty is further REFUSED to JOHN MARTIN VAN ZYL  for the following offences:-    
 i) Unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm and
 ii) Defeating the ends of justice.
There is  no evidence that  he had any political objective when he took  possession of  the said firearm in 1975, and the fact that it was used in 1985 in the elimination of the PEBCO 3 does not automatically alter its possession into an act or offence  associated with a political objective. There is no evidence suggesting that in destroying the said firearm he committed the offence of defeating  the ends  of justice.
7.  Amnesty is REFUSED to JOHANNES KOOLE for the 
abduction of the PEBCO 3 and  assault  on Sipho  Charles Hashe and Qaqawuli Godolozi.
The widows and dependants of the deceased are declared victims in terms of Section 22(2) of the Act.
Signed at Cape Town on this ...........day of ......................1999.
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JUDGE B. NGOEPE
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ADV DE JAGER SC
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ADV   N J SANDI