DECISION
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On our about 4 May 1983 Philip Rudolf Crause, a Branch Commander of the Security Police in Zeerust was informed by one Moatshe, a Botswana citizen that he would be transporting two (2) armed MK. operatives who were coming to wage the struggle against the National Party led government, through the Derdepoort border post into the country. He informed him that he would be dropping off the operatives next to a certain mine on the Republic of South Africa side of the border and then return to Botswana.
Crause advised amongst others Wikus Johannes Loots a Regional Commander of the Western Transvaal and General Johannes Albertus Steyn. Steyn was the overall Commander of the area and both Loots and Crause were under his command.
Upon hearing this information General Steyn ordered a road block to be established with a view to intercepting the operatives in order to effect an arrest on them. It was then arranged that General Steyn would leave for the border in order to keep Moatshe’s vehicle under surveillance and report its movement to Loots. Prior to his departure, Steyn put Loots in command of the operation and thereafter left with one Major Truter for the border.
Upon assuming command, Loots instructed the other applicants who were under his command, to stage practise the arrest at a spot that had been identified for the setting up of the road block, named Silent Valley. Whilst practising, the inherent dangers of executing Steyn’s order to arrest the operatives at a road block became glaringly apparent to the other applicants. There was general concern among the policemen that any attempts to execute the intended arrest as ordered by Steyn, place the lives of the police in serious danger of being attacked by the operatives. More importantly General Steyn’s order was that the police were to be divided into two groups in order to be on the left and right side of Moatshe’s car when it approached the road block. Moatshe would be forced to stop at the road block whereat the operatives were to be arrested.
Furthermore, they expressed their grave concern that as the operatives were armed, on being stopped at a road block they would in all probability open fire at the policemen and the police would then have to return fire and shoot at the operatives. Of particular concern herein was the fact that there was a greater risk of the police firing at each other in the process of returning fire from the operative due to lack of appropriate cover. All these serious concerns were expressed to Loots on the ground.
Loots considered the concerns raised by his officers and then decided not to execute Steyn’s order because of the inherent dangers associated therewith. When giving evidence Loots contended that the objective of the arrest was to prevent the operatives from infiltrating the country and thereby intensifying the struggle the ANC and its military wing, MK. were waging against the NP lead government, (which struggle the police were also intent to resist). He thus decided not to abort the whole operation but to rather eliminate the operative in order to achieve the aforementioned objective.
He further testified that he believed that as a person put in command of the operation, he had implied authority to take such a decision. He had then instructed the applicants who were under his command and the others present, to shoot the occupants of the car, including Mr Moatshe as soon as the car came to a stop. He had not been able to inform General Steyn of the amended order even though he was in radio contact with him because the radio was used by other people and disclosing such information posed a security risk. He was also unable to drive to the border where Steyn was in this regard because the realisation of the danger posed by Steyn’s order were made shortly before the operation was to be carried out.
The applicants and the others present then took up new positions in the roadblock at Silent Valley. They were kept informed of the movement of Moatshe’s car by General Steyn who spoke to Loots by radio. Moatshe’s car stopped at the roadblock and the applicants had immediately thereafter opened fire at the occupants of the car thereby killing the operatives as well as Moatshe. After the shooting the car had approximately 84 bullet holes. Moatshe was driving and the two applicants were passengers.
When Loots was questioned why he had given instructions to his officers to shoot Moatshe as well, he stated that he had included Moatshe because he had been suspected of being an ANC courier.
Whilst there is no doubt that the applicant save for General Steyn and Brigadier Loots were acting under instructions of Loots when they killed the two operatives and Mr Moatshe, we have difficulties in accepting the reasons advance by Loots for killing Moatshe. Loots has relied upon the fact that the decision to kill the two operatives was taken because as a commander had had implied authority to take whatever decision that would advance the objective that was sought to be achieved by his appointment as such by Steyn.
Having considered all the evidence before us we are satisfied that Loots took the decision to eliminate the two operatives bona fide with the objective of countering or otherwise resisting the ANC struggle that the operatives were allegedly coming into the country to wage against the state. We however are not satisfied that the decision to kill Moatshe was taken bona fide with the objective of countering or otherwise resisting the struggle waged by the ANC on the state for the following reasons:
Moatshe volunteered the information to the Security Police that
he would be transporting the armed operatives across the border.
He gave them very detailed information in this regard, inter alia
the number of the operatives he would be transporting, that they
would be armed and the approximate time of when he would be
transporting them. He gave them details about where he was to
drop them off inside the country. This imparting of information
does not accord with a person who is acting against the state and
assisting the ANC or its military wing the MK. On the contrary
the presumption that Moatshe was by this information assisting
the police becomes inescapable and the probabilities are that he
acted as an informant.
Loots has contended that Moatshe was not a police informer
whilst Venter in his amnesty application No. 2774/96 gave
evidence that Moatshe was a police informer. When Loots was
questioned why Moatshe specifically asked for a member of his
Unit, Crause when he first came to the border to give this
information if he was not a police informant who regularly passed
on information about operatives entering the country either through his assistance or not, he replied that Moatshe asked for Crause because he had on previous occasions been warned by Loots about his suspected activities as an ANC courier and that he volunteered this information in return for a favour of some kind that even he, Loots, did not know what it was. One is compelled to ask what favour would Moatshe have expected from the Security Police because on Loot’s own evidence he had been merely warned by Loots about his suspected activities as an ANC courier. What favour would he have expected from the police under those circumstances begs the question.
Even if it were conceded that Loots had suspected Moatshe of being involved with the ANC as a Courier, he had not doubted the information voluntarily imparted to the Security Police by the suspected ANC supporter but had in fact immediately acted upon it. The question that arises is why should you have any reason to believe the information given to you by someone suspected of being an ally of your political opponent (the ANC). All the plans about intercepting the operatives and the stage practises resultant to those plans were elaborately and extensively made on the basis of Moatshe’s information only.
Notwithstanding the points mentioned hereinabove, what is crystal clear is that there is no shred of evidence that Moatshe was considered by General Steyn as an opponent against whom action had to be taken, when he issued an order to intercept the operative at the roadblock. His order was quite clear, to effect an arrest on the MK operatives only and not Moatshe. Loots was therefore appointed to assume command of the arrest of the operatives and not of Moatshe. Quite clearly the General who was overall commander of the operation had not perceived Moatshe to be an opponent against whom an arrest had to be effected. Consequently Loots could therefore not have bona fide believed that he had implied authority to act against Moatshe. Moreover Moatshe’s information was acted upon by the police, an action which would not ordinarily have occurred if Moatshe was considered an opponent by virtue of his activities in assisting the ANC to infiltrate the country with their operatives. It is most probable that Moatshe was an informant of the police. However even if he was not, Moatshe never posed sufficient a threat to the police to necessitate being eliminated.
Steyn testified that when he arrived at the scene of the shooting, he approved of the decision taken by Loots to eliminate the two (2) operatives and Moatshe. With respect, we fail to comprehend how he could have approved of Moatshe’s killing because he himself had never made Moatshe an object of an order he gave to Loots.
In the premises we are satisfied that the decision taken by Loots to kill Moatshe was not an act associated with a political objective. Similarly General Steyn could not have approved of Loot’s order to kill Moatshe because Moatshe was not part of his earlier order given to Loots to effect an arrest. The officers on the other hand cannot be faulted for having obeyed an order from Loots, to kill both the operatives and Moatshe.
In the premises amnesty is GRANTED to the undermentioned applicants acting on the instructions of their commander, Loots, to kill Moatshe and the two operatives:
GIDEON JACOBUS VAN ZYL
JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN
CHRISTOFFEL JOHANNES SMIT
ISAK JOHANNES MARAIS
WILLIAM CHARLES C. SMITH
DANIEL JOHANNES NIEWENHUIS
PHILIP RUDOLF CRAUSE
for the killing of the two operatives Solomon Mlonzi (Code name - Krushev), Schoeman Ramokgoba (Code name - Marx) and Moatshe a Botswana citizen at Silent Valley near Derdepoort on or about 4 May 1983 and any other related offences connected therewith.
Amnesty is GRANTED to Loots for the killing of two operatives namely, Solomon Mlonzi (Code name - Krushev) and Schoeman Ramokgoba (Code name - Marx) at Silent Valley near Derdepoort gate on or about 4 May 1983.
Amnesty is GRANTED to General Steyn for being an accessory after the facts in respect of the killing of the two MK operatives namely, Solomon Mlonzi (Code name - Krushev) and Schoeman Ramokgoba (Code name - Marx) and for defeating the ends of justice in respect of the killing of both Krushev and Marx and Mr Moatshe.
Amnesty is REFUSED to Loots for the killing of Moatshe at Silent Valley near Derdepoort gate on or about 4 May 1983.
This Committee is of the opinion that the next of kin of Moatshe, Solomon Mlonzi and Schoeman Ramokgoba are victims as defined in the act and recommends that they be referred to the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation for consideration, in terms of Section 26 of the Act.
Signed on the ........... day of ......................... 1999.
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JUDGE S. KHAMPEPE
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ADV. C DE JAGER SC
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ADV I. LAX
