DECISION
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The Applicants are applying for amnesty in respect of any offence or delict committed in connection with and which is directly related to the killing of Pantsu Smith, Soipho Dlamini and Buzi Majola on or about 13th and 14th December 1986, at or near Mbabane in Swaziland and the conspiracy to murder Glory Sedibe on the same occasion.
Evidence was led that the liberation forces used Swaziland as a springboard from where they sent cadres into South Africa. During the relevant period, 1986, there was an increase in land mine and limpet mine attacks in the then Eastern Transvaal. The ANC in their submissions to the TRC referred to thirty explosions during the period November 1985 to July 1987. According to the evidence before the Committee, the majority of these incidents occurred in the districts adjoining Swaziland. Three near Breyten, two near Davel, one in the Vryheid vicinity, two in the Volksrust area, near the border and a few in the Nelspruit area. A number of civilians were killed, including women and children.
All the Applicants were members of the South African Police Force involved in security. General van der Merwe was the head of the Security Branch, Brigadier Schoon was in charge of Section C of the Security Branch in Pretoria and had under his command Colonel de Kock, who was the commander of the Vlakplaas unit. Captain van Dyk and Sergeant Willemse were members of this unit and fell under de Kock's command. Colonel Visser was head of security in the then Eastern Transvaal. He was stationed at Middelburg and Colonel Deetlefs the Station Commander at Ermelo and Warrant Officer Pienaar stationed at Piet Retief, were under his command. Lt General I Coetzee was head of the Security Branch in Soweto and Colonel de Jager, Lt Colonel W Coetzee and Lt Colonel Pretorius and Colonel van Wyngaardt were under his command.
As a result of the increasing number of land mine and limpet mine attacks, a meeting was called at Middelburg to discuss the situation and to decide on preventative measures that could be taken. This meeting was attended by Schoon, de Kock, W Coetzee, Pretorius, Visser, Deetlefs and de Jager. The different units pooled all the information they had gathered and came to the conclusion that the attacks were launched by the ANC unit known as the September Machinery. This unit operated under the broader Transvaal Machinery command. According to the information independently obtained by the different security branches, the September Machinery consisted of Glory Sedibe (MK September) who was the commander and MK's Mzala, Pantsu, Sipho, Busi and Ben. Much of the information was gained from an informant known as SWT 180, who had managed to infiltrate the September Machinery.
The members of the Middelburg meeting decided that the only effective way to deal with the situation was by way of what they called a preventive strike operation. That in fact meant that the September Machinery had to be eliminated. Schoon immediately appointed de Kock as the operational commander, who should take care of the planning and execution of the operation as soon as clearance had been obtained from the Head of Security, General van der Merwe.
On or about 12th December 1986, Schoon, accompanied by I Coetzee, De Jager and De Kock visited General van der Merwe, where he was fully informed of the situation surrounding the September Machinery and why they considered it necessary to strike across the border and to attempt to eliminate as many as possible of the members of the unit. Van der Merwe testified that after carefully considering all the pros and cons of the operation, he authorised the attack. He was convinced that the operation was directed against political opponents of the then government of South Africa, that the operation would meet with the approval of his superiors and the government of the day, that he acted within the scope of his authority and that he considered it to be his duty as a policeman in the then prevailing circumstances. He testified that there was enormous pressure on the security police at that stage to curb and prevent land mine and limpet mine attacks. Politicians and members of the public blamed the police for not protecting civilians and for their failure to prevent these attacks. He considered the proposed operation as the only effective means to at least curb future attacks. It was testified that the operation seems to have been a factor in the significant decrease in these attacks during the following years. Van der Merwe further testified that he accepted full responsibility for the operation, although he did not take any further part in the carrying out thereof.
The Applicants thereafter immediately brought everything in motion to carry out the operation on the following day. De Kock, having been appointed operational commander, instructed W Coetzee and Pretorius to get hold of informer SWT 180 and to request him to make contact with the September Machinery and to furnish De Kock with a sketch plan of the house where they stayed in Fountains, Mbabane and to report to Coetzee and Pretorius in Swaziland about the whereabouts of the members of the September Machinery.
On Saturday, 13th December 1986, SWT 180 entered Swaziland through the Oshoek border post. All the Applicants, with the exception of General van der Merwe, travelled to the Swaziland border. Schoon,, I Coetzee, Visser and Van Wyngaard remained in South Africa at a guesthouse, while De Kock, W Coetzee, Pretorius, De Jager, Deetlefs, Van Dyk, Pienaar and Willemse crossed the border at different border posts. All of them used false passports except Deetlefs and Van Dyk. They had an appointment to meet at the Royal Swazi Spa Hotel.
Late during the night of 13th December 1986, SWT 180 reported to W Coetzee and Pretorius that he had made contact with MK Pantsu, MK Sipho, MK Busi and MK Ben and after they spent the evening socially, he drove them to the house in Fountains. De Kock thereafter deployed the members of his operational team near and around the house while he ordered SWT 180, under threat of his life, to knock at the front door and call upon the inhabitants to open the door under the pretext that he had a flat tyre and required assistance.
When Pantsu opened the door some of the Applicants stormed into the house. According to the plan, MK Pantsu, MK Sipho and MK Busi were shot and killed. It transpired that MK Ben must have left the house whilst SWT 180 went back to report to W Coetzee and Pretorius. At the time of the shooting, as pre-arranged, De Kock, Pretorius, Van Dyk, De Jager and Willemse entered the house. De Kock, De Jager and Pretorius fired shots, whilst Van Dyk hit one of the deceased with the gun butt and the silencer attached to the gun.
After the shooting all the members of the team entered the house, grabbed documents and weapons which they found in the house and vacated the premises as soon as they could. They drove to the border and left Swaziland by crossing the fence illegally. They did not make use of the border posts.
After considering the evidence and the documents before it, the Committee is satisfied that:
1. The applications formally comply with the requirements of the Act as contemplated by Section 20(1)(a) of Act 34 of 1995.
2. The act, omission or offence to which the applications relate is an act associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past in accordance with the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 20 of the Act 34 of 1995.
3. The Applicants have made a full disclosure of all relevant facts.
It follows that the Committee, in terms of Section 20 of the Act 34 of 1995 "shall grant amnesty in respect of that act, omission or offence."
It is, however, a fact that although the planning and the conspiracy to kill occurred in South Africa and the orders were issued here, the actual killing took place in Swaziland.
The Committee will not repeat what was said in the decision of Johannes P Coetzee and others (London Bomb incident) in respect of offences committed outside the Republic of South Africa, but wishes to incorporate it in this decision. For the reasons advanced in that decision and in view of the conclusion arrived at in these applications, the following decision is made.
Amnesty is GRANTED to all the Applicants in respect of the acts, omissions and offences falling within the jurisdiction of the South African Courts flowing from and directly related to the conspiracy to kill the members of the ANC unit, known as the September Machinery and the killing of Pantsu Smith, Sipho Dlamini and Busi Majola at or near the Fountains, Mbabane, Swaziland on 13th/14th December 1986, including inter alia, acts, omissions and offences relating to the use of false passports, illegal crossing of the border and the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
DATED at CAPE TOWN this day of 2000
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JUDGE A WILSON
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C DE JAGER A.J.
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MR J B SIBANYONI
