: DECISION
This is an application by Eugene Alexander de Kock for amnesty in terms of Section 18 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. He is seeking amnesty for the following offences:
1. Conspiracy to murder Solly Zacharia Shoke in 1986;
2. Attempted murder of Solly Zacharia Shoke in or about 1986 in Mbabane, Swaziland;
3. Using a false passport and illegally entering Swaziland in or about 1986;
4. Illegal crossing of international borders at Nerston Border Post; and
5. Unlawful possession of arms and ammunition.
Frans Hendrik Small Berger Labuschagne previously submitted an application for amnesty in respect of his involvement in the incident we are now dealing with. Unfortunately that application was received after the cut-off-date and his evidence could not be heard. Consequently, de Kock was the only applicant to testify at the hearing. His evidence is briefly as follows. In or about 1986 at Ermelo or Middelburg (he is not entirely sure where exactly) he was approached by Labuschagne who was then a member of the Security Police. He told him that he had received information from an informer that "Jabu" (real name Solly Zacharia Shoke) was very involved in the activities of Umkhonto weSizwe ("MK"), the military wing of the African National Congress ("ANC"). According to the said informer whose name was never revealed to him, Jabu was in charge of Special Operations of MK in Mbabane, Swaziland, wherefrom he was operating. Jabu was responsible for the supply of arms and handgrenades to MK structures in the former Eastern Transvaal region. ("ETVLR"). He also infiltrated trained MK cadres into the ETVLR. The informer was someone very close to Jabu who knew his movements and activities. Labuschagne was asking de Kock to help him to have Jabu killed in order to stop his activities. Most importantly, he was asking de Kock to ask his superior, Brigadier Schoon, to allow him to help him. De Kock states that at the time he did not know of Jabu. Neither did he know who the said informer was but he subsequently met a person whom he suspected was the informer in question. At the hearing the identity and name of the informer became a highly contested issue between the applicant and Shoke whose legal representative demanded that it be revealed. Happily, the matter was resolved between the parties when the Committee resumed the proceedings the legal representatives placed on record their amicable resolution of the matter and that it was therefore not necessary for the Committee to adjudicate on the matter. De Kock was said to have confidentially revealed the name and identity of the informer who, in any case, was known by Shoke.
Proceeding with the evidence of De Kock: After the conversation with and request from Labuschagne, which took place in the presence of and within the earshot of Labuschagne's Regional Commander, Captain Johan Botha, De Kock obtained the necessary permission from Schoon. It should be mentioned that according to De Kock although Botha did not participate in the discussion it was quite clear that he knew what was being conveyed to him and, by implication, approved of the plan to attack Jabu's dwelling place and kill him. According to the informer Jabu's place was very closely situated to the local police station. When De Kock came back to Labuschagne to advise him of Schoon's approval they started planning together how they were going to have Jabu killed. They could not do it themselves because their white faces could attract attention from the local population as the area was only populated by blacks. They decided to use askaris who were black operatives and worked for the Vlakplaas Security Police Unit.
The first phase of their planning on the day of the attack took place at Piet Retief. It was De Kock, Van Dyk, Botha and Labuschagne ("white members") and the askaris, namely Geoffrey Bosigo, Jimmy Mbane and VZ Ndam.
The askaris knew Jabu quite well as they were previously MK cadres before they were turned by the South African Security Police. The askaris were given an order to kill Jabu at his place and leave immediately and they were issued with three (3) 9 mm Walter submachine guns with silencers and subsonic ammunition. De Kock states that these were some of the weapons which he found at Vlakplaas when he came there in 1985. According to Labuschagne the attack had to take place at night when Jabu was expected to be at home. The askaris were the first to enter Swaziland and the white members followed; they were all using false passports. When they came to Mbabane they gathered in a park and had a further discussion of the plan. Whilst they were discussing the informer came and spoke with both Labuschagne and De Kock. He confirmed that Jabu was at home that evening. He was sent back to go and ensure that he was still there. He was going with Bosigo in order that he could point out Jabu's house to him and thus prevent the danger of attacking a wrong house. The white members were also armed with firearms in order that they could repel any obstacle to the execution of the mission by the askaris. The latter were going to be led by Mbane; Ndam was the second in command whilst Bosigo was to stand nearby and watch out for possible interruption.
After some time the informer and Bosigo returned to the park and reported that Jabu was still at home. This was now the right time for the attack. Then the askaris proceeded to Jabu's place. Their colleagues and the informer remained behind. Whilst the white members were waiting there Bosigo came rushing back. He was driving at a very high speed and it appeared as if something untoward had happened. He jumped out of his vehicle, bleeding profusely, and fell to the ground. With him was Ndam who had also bee injured. Mbane was not in their company but about ten (10) minutes later he also returned. He was not injured but his firearm was not in his possession. The injured askaris were put in the Land Cruiser vehicle and taken to a military hospital in South Africa where they were treated. De Kock and company lied there and said they had been injured in a shoot-out. On the way back Bosigo reported that at the house Mbane's weapon was grabbed from him by Jabu who then used it to shoot at them and this was how they had sustained the injuries. They all entered South Africa by crossing a fence opening at the borders of the countries.
The applicant states that after this incident he heard from his white colleagues from Ermelo who were involved in the incident that the local police there had since recovered the weapon that was confiscated by Jabu and that it was one of the arms which were sent to the Police laboratories in Pretoria for ballistic and forensic testing. This he reported to Schoon whom he requested to do something to circumvent any danger and political embarrassment to the Government of the day. The weapon was subsequently intercepted between Ermelo and the State laboratories. He believes that this was as a result of an effort and plan by Schoon but he does not know who he liaised with. When he reported the failure of the plan to kill Jabu, Schoon was very upset because Jabu was regarded as a very high profile MK operative who had to be eliminated to stop the infiltration of cadres and arms from Swaziland into the ETVLR. At the hearing Schoon's affidavit, exhibit "A", was handed up to the Committee. He denies that he gave the order and states that all he knows is that he was told by the applicant that two (2) of his askaris were injured in a clash with MK members in Swaziland.
During the submissions attorney Ms Cambanis advised the Committee that Jabu was the only person who was injured in the attack. Present with him in the house was his wife Charlotte Shoke, his brother-in-law Chris Dlamini and his two (2) very young daughters Lerato and Tsepho. None of them was physically injured.
After carefully considering the matter we are satisfied that the applicant has given a full disclosure of the relevant facts. Jabu was obviously a high profile member of the ANC and cadre of the MK. It further appears that his name was known to the Military Intelligence Services as a co-ordinator of MK Special Operations in Swaziland at the relevant time. This is common cause between the applicant and the victim. There can be no doubt that the offences and actions committed are acts associated with a political objective in terms of the Act.
Amnesty is therefore GRANTED for all the offences and any delict flowing from the incident.
SIGNED AT CAPE TOWN ON THIS THE 23RD DAY OF JANUARY 2001.
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