: DECISION
We are now dealing with applications relating to the so-called Manuscript Bomb incident. The applications have been made in terms of Section 18 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No.34 of 1995 ("the Act"). It is not entirely clear when the incident occurred but some of the Applicants surmise that it was in the 1980s. At the relevant time the Applicants were members of the notorious Vlakplaas Security Police Unit and worked under De Kock who was their Operational Commander.
De Kock commenced his testimony as follows. At the relevant time there was a "co-operative document" which was signed by Brigadier WF Schoon and the Directorate of Covert Information ("DCI"), the Directorate of Covert Collections "the DCC"). The DCC's second in command was Colonel At Nel. The document authorised co-operation between the different branches of the Security Services, including the Military Intelligence Services ("MIS"). Commandant Jan Anton Nieuwoudt was the Senior Staff Officer for MIS. The important proviso of the agreement was that certain actions had to be cleared before they could be carried out and the main task was the collection of information not only internally but externally, throughout Africa and Europe. There were various desks, namely for Central Africa, East Africa, West Africa affairs and others. The activities centred around the African National Congress ("the ANC"), the Pan African Congress of Azania ("the PAC") and other anti-apartheid organisations such as the End Conscription Campaign ("the ECC"). Once the information was obtained by the DCC the next stage would be reaction but this did not necessarily mean that the DCC would carry out the operation themselves. The information would be sent to CCB, to Special Force for tasks and in some cases they were made up of C1 operatives, namely from Vlakplaas Unit members. By the way of illustration De Kock said the information that led to the explosion that injured Judge Albie Sachs came directly from the DCC who had the file with the information. This they had passed on to the CCB. The latter took it from that point and effected the attempted murder.
We revert to De Kock's evidence-in-chief. On a certain day he was approached by Nieuwoudt with a request to construct an explosive device in the form of a manuscript. Apparently, Nieuwoudt had intercepted a hand-written manuscript which had been sent from Swaziland to "a facility" in the Republic of South Africa ("the RSA"). The witness is not entirely certain but vaguely recalls that it had been sent to the South African Council of Churches ("SACC") offices for typing whereafter it was intercepted by Nieuwoudt. When the latter came to De Kock he was in possession of the manuscript as well as an unaddressed envelope. De Kock acceded to the request. The addressee's address was going to be inscribed on the envelope by Nieuwoudt and sent to the address that was used by the ANC in Manzini, Swaziland. All De Kock and other Vlakplaas Unit members had to do was simply to prepare the device for Nieuwoudt. To this end, Nieuwoudt left the manuscript with him. When De Kock read the manuscript, it appeared to have been an autobiography of how the writer, ostensibly a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe ("MK") came to join the struggle against the apartheid State. It was about the size of an A4 or A8 paper and it was quite clear that it was a bona fide rendition of the political profile of the author. De Kock approached Brigadier Schoon who approved of the proposed action and thereafter he instructed Du Toit who had the necessary technical expertise to construct the proposed device. De Kock requested him to build the device into the manuscript with the envelope that was given to him by Nieuwoudt. It could not have been any other envelope but only the envelope from Nieuwoudt which had a logo, the details of which De Kock is unable to recall but its use was intended to make it appear as genuine mail from the person to whom the author of the manuscript had sent the hand-written summary of his political history.
After Du Toit had constructed the manuscript and envelope it was handed over to Nieuwoudt who sent it back to Swaziland. De Kock does not know how exactly it was sent but later he heard that a courier who normally fetched ANC mail in Manzini was injured when he opened the envelope. The device had exploded and injured his arm. The envelope had no name and address of the addressee when he gave it to Nieuwoudt and the latter was going to attend to that part of the mission but De Kock believes that it was sent to Swaziland because the MK member who sent the hand-written manuscript was in Swaziland. That was where it was supposed to be returned.
Du Toit testified and confirmed his involvement in the operation, albeit unable to recall the details of the instructions from De Kock. He states that he was under the impression that the operation, just like many other similar operations, had been authorised from higher up to eliminate a political enemy of the previous regime which he defended. After the discussion with De Kock he instructed Kok to prepare the device. He was not involved any further in the matter. He does not recall how powerful the device had to be but he does recall that its power had to be convenient to the size and weight of the envelope. In his understanding, the device only had to be sufficiently powerful to kill the intended target, namely the person who was expected to open the envelope.
Kok testified and confirmed having received an order from Du Toit to assist in the preparation of the bomb, which he did. Because it was difficult to fit the device into the manuscript as it was too thin, he used a booklet with a hard cover. Then it was possible to conceal three (3) explosives into the booklet. He used a detonator which had a spring that would lead to the ignition of the device. The power of the bomb was restricted to the size of the parcel he had to prepare, namely twenty (20) to thirty (30) grams of explosives and the device was prepared in such a manner that for the explosion to occur the receiver would have to physically open the book at least forty (40) millimetres wide for the device to be activated. An earlier testing had shown that an explosive would ignite a flame of approximately half a metre. The parcel was not going to go through the normal postal system and services. Someone was to place it in the post box. At the time he was under the impression that the making of the bomb was authorised by Security Police and that it was an operation against a member of the ANC who had to be killed.
After carefully considering the evidence we are satisfied that the offences committed are acts associated with a political objective in terms of the Act. We accept that this was an action carried out against an opponent of the former white regime and that the Applicants have complied with the administrative requirements of the Act. There is no question about full disclosure, which we are satisfied has been made on the material aspects of the case. It is clear that when the Applicants carried out this operation they were acting on behalf of the previous regime which was in danger of being toppled by liberation movements, inter alia, the ANC and its armed wing MK.
Amnesty is therefore GRANTED for the following offences:
1. Conspiring in Pretoria in the ate 1980s to murder an unknown member of the ANC and MK;
2. The attempted murder of an unknown person in Manzini, Swaziland;
3. The contravention of the provisions of the Explosives Act; and
4. Any offence or delict flowing from the incident.
SIGNED AT CAPE TOWN ON THIS 1ST DAY OF FEBRUARY 2001
JUDGE J MOTATA
ADV N SANDI
ADV F BOSMAN
