DECISION
Amnesty is sought by the applicants, who are hereinafter referred to by their surnames, in respect of the following:
1. Conspiracy to murder K Porta Shabangu, Louis Thabo Mohale and Derek Mashobane,
2. Defeating the ends of justice,
3. Malicious damage to property (motor vehicle),
4. Possession of arms and ammunition,
5. Possession and/or use of false documents in crossing the border between Swaziland and the RSA or any other offence emanating from this incident as well as any possible delicts which might flow from these actions.
De Kock testified that at some time or other whilst at Vlakplaas he was approached by Messrs Oosthuizen and Coetzee and possibly on another occasion also by General Erasmus and Brigadier Schoon. The purpose of their approach was that Section C10, the Security Police at Vlakplaas, should intercept and kill a group of ANC activists which was about to leave South Africa and go to Swaziland for military training and smuggling arms into the country. He also stated that Vlakplaas' task was to deal with the so-called terrorists and combat terrorism. De Kock regarded this as an order to eliminate the ANC activists.
Initially it was said that there would be 16 or 17 activists travelling in a Combi to Swaziland. Subsequently it was said there would be only five and that the police would provide them with a vehicle. Ultimately there were only three ANC activists who travelled in a police vehicle.
To carry out the order, the Vlakplaas operatives set up an ambush for these activists in Swaziland. Two askaris, Geoff Bosigo and probably Magopa waited for the activists at a post office in Manzini where they would make contact. Then de Kock led them to the ambush point, a plantation area, for their ultimate elimination at a cul-de-sac.
When the vehicles arrived at the rendezvous point the operatives opened fire and all three activists were fatally shot with an AKM47, ie. An AK without a butt but having a silencer. De Kock then placed in the vehicle an envelope with documentation which was misinformation on a strategic basis used to place the activists on a position of disfavour.
The Vlakplaas team then returned to their rented rooms at Smokey Valley Inn in Swaziland and spent the night there. Then on the following morning they went back to Vlakplaas through the border.
A day or two after the incident Captain Viktor of the Vehicle Branch contacted De Kock and questioned him about the police vehicle which was carrying the activists when they were ambushed. De Kock denied knowledge thereof. De Kock telephonically contacted Brigadier Schoon who later arrived at Vlakplaas accompanied by General Gerrit Erasmus and Mr Coetzee as well as Mr Oosthuizen. It was agreed that the vehicle would be duplicated in all aspects, including the colour of the seats, the radio and the same year of issue and the registration number was made the same as that which was used in Swaziland. This was to give an impression that the police still had in their possession the vehicle allegedly involved in the Swaziland incident, that the one in Swaziland was merely a duplicated one.
De Kock indicated that in his capacity as the Commander of Vlakplaas he takes responsibility for his own actions and for every member under his command, for any of their action in that regard.
The other members of Vlakplaas testified about the roles each one of them played in that; Bellingan drove the Combi with false panels and dropped off the members at the point where the ambush was set up and he moved out again with the Combi. Flores reconnoitred the area where the ambush would take place because Swaziland was his operational area. L J Hanton, before the operation and after the shooting, was asked to load the firearms into the false panels.
There are certain places where the evidence of one applicant differs from the evidence of another. For instance Snyders states that it is him who informed de Kock that one of the activists was still alive after the shooting. De Kock says he acted on his own to ensure that they are all dead; that amongst the askaris was Captain Moss who gave the signal. De Kock testified that he commanded Moss to monitor the police station next to Manzini during the operation, he was not at the scene of the ambush. Du Plessis stated that he was told that the persons to be killed were terrorists who wanted to infiltrate the RSA, de Kock said they were activists who would attend a meeting in Swaziland and thereafter undergo military training. De Kock indicated that people might have mistaken Chris Bosigo for Captain Moss because they were like twins when seeing them from behind.
Mr Du Plessis stated that Mr Coetzee was no longer concerned about the source and that the source could also be eliminated; de Kock was adamant that it was only the activists in the vehicle. Tait stated that the activists were lured to the place of ambush by Captain Moss who alighted from the vehicle on arrival and ran away. De Kock disputes this, and says Bosigo was the driver of the vehicle.
Tait also stated that there were four occupants who were killed in the vehicle. Tait and Bellingan stated that Nortje was present. He was not.
These discrepancies may have been caused by the lapse of time from the day of the ambush and the time the applications were made as well as the similarity in the execution of certain operations where ANC members were ambushed. The incident happened in February 1989. Some applicants e.g Nortje suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder resulting into memory problems.
The amnesty committee does not regard these discrepancies to be of such a material effect that the applicants could be disbelieved in their evidence.
It is important to note that the evidence of Moshoaliba changes the picture to a certain extent. He testified that he was a policeman at the time the incident happened during 1989. He was stationed at Soweto since 1981 where he joined the Security Branch Intelligence Group. His immediate Commander was Colonel Willem Coetzee, his immediate commander was Brigadier Oosthuizen; the group commander was General Erasmus.
He was given a specific task of being an RS agent that is a Republic of South Africa policeman who infiltrates and not an ordinary informer.
He was requested to associate himself with various organisations at school and at tertiary level with the aim of gathering intelligence. He was placed at campuses by the police and registered as a student. The students were engaged in a political struggle and was to conduct protest marches, some of which were accompanied by violence.
At some stage during 1988 he met Louis Mohale who was a leading member of a student organisation, i.e. South African National Student Congress (SANSCO). He use to organise and attend meetings.
Mohale confided in Moshoaliba that students desired to contact the ANC abroad, to have military training so s to be able to acquire arms. Few other students shared the same idea with him. Moshoaliba gradually gained Mohale's confidence. He lent him his vehicle to attend meetings. Mohale and his group were highly politicised and militant. Together with SANSCO, they were supporting the ANC. Moshoaliba regularly gave reports to his handler, Mr Coetzee.
In 1989 Moshoaliba learned that Mohale and some few students were prepared to go to neighbouring countries to contact the ANC. Mohale had contacts with various SANSCO people in various provinces. He reported this again to Coetzee. A police car, a white Opel Kadett which was registered in Moshoaliba's name was provided to Mohale to use in leaving the RSA to Swaziland. When Mohale and his group indicated that they would have a problem as to who within the ANC in Swaziland they would meet, Moshoaliba suggested to him that he could put him in touch with MK people. Moshaliba arranged with Coetzee and the askaris, i.e Bosigo and Magopa who were requested to pretend to be ANC members and meet the Mohale group at the post office in Manzini.
After the Opel Kadett left with the three people Moshoaliba met Coetzee again and reported to him that they had departed to Swaziland.
Apparently Mohale phoned Moshaoliba from Manzini, Swaziland and reported that they arrived late and could not find a person where he was directed; that they met some people earlier and made arrangements to meet again on the following day. Moshoaliba requested Mohale to return to the post office. A white person called and spoke to Coetzee.
A day or two thereafter Coetzee informed Moshoaliba that Mohale and his group were directed to an ambush and that his car had been damaged. Later he was given another car identical to the one he had before.
The gist of Moshoaliba's evidence is that Mohale expressed a desire to travel to the neighbouring countries so as to meet ANC people who would give him military training and arms to bring back into the country; Mohale and his group did not have the means to travel and they did not know any ANC people in Swaziland. Moshoaliba provided the transport and Coetzee provided the two askaris to pose as ANC people in Swaziland. The askaris lured Mohale and his two companions to the ambush point where they met their death.
The amnesty committee is accordingly satisfied that De Kock and the Vlakplaas team which can be regarded as foot soldiers comply with all the requirements of the Act. They acted under orders.
This incident present a clear case where the command structure from the top, downwards accepted responsibility and confirmed the instruction given to eliminate the SANSCO activists.
After careful consideration the committee finds that Snor Vermeulen was not present during the commission of this incident. His name was erroneously mentioned due to similarity of the incidents and the lapse of time.
Mr Cornelius successfully traced the application of D J Britz who was initially thought to be an implicated person yet he duly filed an application for amnesty for this incident. The Committee considered his application on the basis of the papers he filed and the evidence tendered by his co-applicants.
The applicants have satisfied the committee that the murder of K P Shabangu, Louis alias Thabo Mohale and Derek Mashobane was an act associated with a political objective in terms of the criteria set out in the provisions of Section 20 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No 34 of 1995.
The rest of the applicants namely,
DOUW GERBRANDT WILLEMSE; WILLEM HELM JOHANNES COETZEE; EUGENE DE KOCK; DANIEL L SNYMAN; LARRY J HANTON; HENDRIK C DU PLESSIS; DEON A ELS; D J BRITS; W F SCHOON; GERRIT N ERASMUS; PHINEAS M MOSHOALIBA; ALFRED OOSTHUIZEN; JOHANNES J SNYMAN; PIETER H BOTHA; LEON W J FLORES; JOHANN H TAIT; WILHELM R BELLINGAN; ADRIAAN D BAKER; PETRUS C SNYDERS; are GRANTED amnesty for the conspiracy to murder and the eventual murder of K P Shabangu, Louis alias Thabo Mohale and Derek Mashobane on or about 12th to 13th February 1989 and defeating the ends of justice, malicious damage to property (motor vehicle), possession of arms and ammunition, possession and/or use of false documents in crossing the border between Swaziland and the RSA or any other offence emanating from this incident as well as any possible delicts which might flow from these actions.
SIGNED AT CAPE TOWN THIS THE DAY OF 2001.
JUDGE A WILSON
ADV N SANDI
MR J B SIBANYONI
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