CHAIRPERSON: We want to welcome Mr Roelf Meyer. I thought that he had somewhere in his pocket Cyril Ramaphosa because for a very long time he and Cyril were inseparable siamese twins. We do want to say thank you for the role that you and Cyril and the other people did play in the process of negotiation. It was a very important role and our country must give thanks for what you and Cyril, particularly, but, obviously, you had other people, but you were the leaders in that very delegate work of negotiation and we want to welcome you. I think I am in that, although the people waited for some time it was not your fault, we are glad that you have been able to give us this time and, perhaps, we should show that we appreciate your coming. Just give him a small hand, not too big, just a small hand. Wynand Malan will have you take the oath.
MR MALAN: Mr Meyer to the best of my memory you have got no objection to taking the prescribed oath. If you would please stand.
ROELF MEYER: (Duly sworn in, states).
MR MALAN: Thank you very much. You may be seated. Dr Randera will facilitate your evidence and thereafter we probably will each have a question to pose to you. Thank you very much.
DR RANDERA: Mr Meyer, good afternoon. I am sure you are
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feeling a little bit harassed having rushed from wherever you were to this hall. I have been in that situation many a time myself so please feel relaxed. You are going to give us, this afternoon, a general overview of homeland policy of the last Government and, more specifically, how it related to this particular area of our country. The youngest homeland that was created, KwaNdebele. I hand over to you.
MR MEYER: Thank you Chairperson, honourable Commissioners for the opportunity to come to you here in Philadelphia this afternoon. I apologise for the fact that, unfortunately, there was no chance for me to arrive here earlier and I can imagine that in the process your business for today might have been delayed. I appreciate the fact that you were prepared to give this opportunity, however.
I was called upon on Friday, Chairperson, to try and facilitate the Commission on the question of what was behind the homelands policy and I guess, more particularly, what was behind the idea of independence for the homelands. Now I must just say to the honourable Commission that in the little time since Friday one did not have all the time to prepare for this. I am, therefore, not in a position to give a written submission to the Commission, but in that regard, Chairperson, I would like to suggest and I will take it further on my side, that in a further submission to the Commission, which is intended in any case, that we from the National Party side take up the responsibility to especially focus on this issue and give a submission to the Commission that will also, in writing, address some of the questions that I might not be able to answer to today and which I believe could be of great importance to the Commission in understanding, for all us, for the sake of all us,
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understanding what was behind the idea of the creation of the homelands and, of course, as it was such an important part of the system of apartheid, I believe that is important that one tries to find out more about this issue. So, although I am here this afternoon and will try to respond, also to questions put by the Commission and will try to focus on some of the issues that I believe might highlight the events in this particular homeland some years ago, I think a broader perspective is required than what I am able to give to the Commission at this stage. So if that would be acceptable to the Commission, then I would certainly take it on myself to ensure that we bring to the Commission a more substantial written submission on this issue.
CHAIRPERSON: May I just respond warmly to your suggestion and say that we would certainly appreciate that because we are asked to provide an account or the different perspectives and it will be a great help to the Commission in drawing up its report to have a submission such as you suggest. Thank you in advance for that.
MR MEYER: Thank you Chairperson. Chairperson, I am in the second instance or in the second place, probably not the best informed person to speak on the issue that you have asked me to come and make a submission about. I never had a specific responsibility in regard to this issue. Namely the creation of the homelands and whatever happened in regard to the issue, but I have tried to, in the little time available, tried to refresh my own mind and to do a little bit of research as to what transpired. I think it is appropriate although not necessarily in regard to this specific issue that is before the Commission at the moment. It might be of some value just to refresh our minds as to
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where the idea originated from. Of course one then has to look at what the architect behind the homelands idea had in mind himself and that was of course Verwoerd, H F Verwoerd. Now, one can only, in these times, read what he had to say about it. It would therefore, again, not be possible to put yourselves, yourself in the mind, actually, of the person who created the idea, but only to read from what he has said in speeches and in other literature on the issue. Let me immediately say what I am trying to do, therefore, for the sake of the Commission, if I may submit, Chairperson, is not to argue a case, but rather to try and give a perspective. I am definitely not arguing a case here this afternoon in favour of the homelands policy. I want to make it very clear because with hindsight one can certainly say that that was a big mistake. The point is in understanding what transpired over a period of 30 years, one has to go back to that time and, at least, try and create a perspective of what was at the back of the minds of those that created it.
Now it seems to me from what one can read in various speeches of Verwoerd that he himself, at least, had in mind the creation of a policy and of instruments that would try to address the problems related to the Constitutional future of the country as he saw it. It is interesting to note that in some of the key references that he made in this regard, he tried to find a moral basis for the idea of creating the homelands. A moral basis which he, in his words, described as to give to each and every person the right to govern over his or her own people. He was reading in Afrikaans, if I may, from a particular sentence that I came across in one of his speeches in which he said, and that was in 1961, the moral foundation is aimed at providing for each his own
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rights in full with regard to his own people. So at least it seem that he tried to find a moral basis for what he intended to do and that moral basis then went further to say. Incidently in the same speech he said that he wanted to address the soul of the matter and that was to get away from discrimination and domination. If I may read again from a particular passage in this speech, in Afrikaans again, where he referred to a honourable member of the opposition, at that stage who questioned him. He said the honourable member for Parktown has said that discrimination and domination is the heart of the entire debate and situation in which we find ourselves. This is indeed the heart of the matter and the Government it its policy attempts to escape this dilemma. Then he goes on and he says therefore we take the position that you should to each wherever he may live in his particular areas should be granted political governance over his own people. So it seems, if I have to analyse this today, Chairperson, it seems to me one has to come to the conclusion that in the mind of Verwoerd he wanted to establish a moral basis and that the basis was therefore to try and get away from discrimination and domination and to do it by separating the various peoples of the country.
Now, as I said earlier, it is not my intention to go much further with this argument or this perspective, at least, this afternoon, but rather to deal with it more fully then in a written submission. Simply for the sake of allowing ourselves to get behind what was the intention, but to take this through to the period that is in question, that is the subject for investigation now before the Commission. One has to recall that between those remarks in 1961 of
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Verwoerds' and what happened in the middle of the 1980s in this particular area. Can I just say, Chairperson, incidentally it is my second time that I can recall visiting, specifically, this hospital. The previous time was, I think, more or less ten years ago when I had certain responsibilities and, inter alia, came to visit this hospital to see the conditions here. Now what happened here in the mid-1980s is a reflection of what, apparently, Verwoerd had in mind and which did not work out. One must recall by the mid-1980s that four of the homelands had independence, so called independence. That was the Transkei, Venda, Bophututswana and Ciskei and KwaNdebele was the fifth in line for independence. Apparently, if I understand the information correctly, the idea of creating independence, also, for this homeland originated from both sides. On the one side from the side of the South African Government and on the other side it was, apparently, also the desire of the Homeland Government, at that stage, because already soon after it gained self legislative status in the early 1980s, the legislature of this homeland decided to pursue independence. By the 1980s or by 1986 this desire was answered by an announcement by the South African Government that KwaNdebele would become independent, I think, by the end of that year. That is 1986.
Now in some way, Chairperson, KwaNdebele seems to be a good case study of the whole homelands policy in the sense that it was also part of the original dream of Verwoerd. Although it came into existence much later and it seems even that at the time of Verwoerd the thought of a separate homeland for the Ndebele was not in his mind, at least. Although, therefore, this homeland came into being at a much
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later stage it was also part of the original dream, but it was also the first one and the only one where independence was pursued, but did not come into existence because, of course, as we all know, independence never materialised here. The reason or the reasons why it never materialised seems to me to be twofold, if I again, I understand the information correctly. After the announcement of the possibility of KwaNdebele becoming independent at the end of 1986 and those announcements were made, if I remember correctly, firstly in February of 1986 by the then Commissioner General for this area and later through an announcement, I think it was by the then State President, Mr P W Botha, in May of 1986 that a specific date was actually intended for its independence. I think it was December 1986. Now after those announcements and more specifically after the May announcement, huge uprising took place in this area and therefore there was a huge internal reaction against the idea of independence which certainly contributed to the area never becoming independent.
There was also another reason which I came across and that was that after the announcement in May of 1986 by the then State President, apparently, the South African Government had second thoughts about proceeding with independence. I am informed that there was a meeting. I guess, and unfortunately I could not confirm the exact date of that meeting today and nobody relevant could actually give me the exact date, but it seems to me, if I deduct from other dates, that that meeting might have taken place in early August of 1986. A meeting that was called by, it seems to me, the then State President, Mr P W Botha, and which was particularly attended by Mr Pik Botha and Mr
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Barend du Plessis as Minister of Finance and the then Minister for Development Aid who was Dr Gerhard Viljoen. At least they who I mentioned were present and it was held with the then Prime Minister or Chief Minister, rather, of this area, the late Simon Skosana. At that meeting he and his associates were informed that the South African Government would like the people or the legislature of this area to consider the question of proceeding with independence because of financial considerations. I am being told that, particularly, Minister Pik Botha and Minister Barend du Plessis, both of them had very serious doubts about the question of independence for this particular area and they took such a position on the side of the South African Government and since Mr Barend du Plessis was the Minister of Finance, and I checked this information with him personally. He took a very strong stand that there was no chance for this area to become independent and having fiscal autonomy or independence as well. That would have meant that the area would not have a separate independent Ministry of Finance as well as other financial instruments or institutions of its own if it does become independent. Apparently, on that basis, or at least, that was one of the arguments that was produced during that meeting, the people from KwaNdebele were sent back and asked to reconsider the matter.
If my information is correct there was thereafter, in fact, a decision then which I am not sure whether it was followed through immediately by the legislature of KwaNdebele that the area should not become independent any longer. I guess that decision was taken by mid-August 1986. Now if my information, therefore, is correct and my
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assumption is that that meeting took place at the beginning of August, that was definitely also further reason why, in fact, this area eventually did not become independent.
That is a little bit of the political background which I could research. Chairperson, I am afraid to say that I did not have much more time to go into all the details. I am quite prepared to try and give a further or try and give some answers if there are further questions, but I was mainly asked to deal with the question of the political background to this whole issue because, quite clearly, much of the violence that took place in those years, 1985, 1986 and later on, arose from the whole question of independence or not.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. We are, obviously, very grateful that you, in this very, very short space of time, since Friday you were able to have taken so much trouble to try and provide us with what you have given us. Obviously, I think my colleagues here will be, I do not know whether peppering you with questions. They might not do that actually. They might be nice or something. Wynand.
MR MALAN: Mr Meyer, will you not spend some time on the different approaches to Moutse. First the exchange of land between Lebowa and KwaNdebele idea, the incorporation of Moutse and, perhaps also, reflect on whether that was not a change of policy. I mean did you have any knowledge at the time or would you talk a little about Moutse and the role of Moutse in both the failure of independence and the conflict generally.
MR MEYER: Chairperson, I again, have to say first of all that I have no direct or personal knowledge because I never dealt with the issue in any capacity. So I have to rely on
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information that I could obtain over the weekend. It seems to me that the whole Moutse issue, again from different perspectives, were very important to this whole sad development of the situation here because on the one side if, one can probably say if it was not for Moutse there would, in any case, not have been a homeland such as KwaNdebele. That is probably true.
INTERPRETER: The speakers mike is off.
MR MEYER: On the other hand it is also true that by taking Moutse away from Lebowa and establishing it as part of KwaNdebele and making it, in fact, part of the KwaNdebele homeland was, certainly, a factor that gave rise to part of the conflict as it thereafter developed. I am afraid to say that I do not have the detailed information available. I guest some of it is, in any event, already produced to the Commission, but if there is any chance that I could help the Commission in this respect with more information, I would certainly try to do so. My conclusion would, however, be that Moutse was, definitely, a very big contributing factor to the violence and the conflict in the area.
MR MALAN: Mr Meyer, if you will allow me to just pursue this a little further. From our research what came to the fore was that the incorporation of Moutse was really a departure from the concept of ethnic independence. The independence of people because at that stage it was clearly not a Ndebele majority, or it was not understood at the time to be a Ndebele majority. Was there discussion about that in the party at the time? I was there, but I do not want to give my evidence. Maybe I should make my own statement at some time, but would you not reflect on that. The change in policy and whether that did contribute to a total loss of
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belief in policy and whether that, perhaps, contributed to the changeover. Would you not reflect a little on that. Change from ethnic to geographic independence and consolidation.
MR MEYER: I tend to bow to the superior knowledge of the Commissioner, Chairperson, because as he correctly stated if I recalled correctly, he was directly involved in some of the work that was done. Not negatively, but in a way that he a particular knowledge of the issue. I think I can just say the honourable Commissioner is absolutely correct, Chairperson, in a sense that was, to my mind, a departure from the previous position that was held. As it was also indicated by Verwoerd that the general objective was to create homelands and independent territories for people coming from the same nation or ethnic group. That in this case. and this actually puts a question mark about the whole KwaNdebele, not so much on an issue of whether it has any substance in terms of its existence, but the question of what was the moral idea then behind creating a homeland like this one. I think the honourable Commissioner was correct in making the deduction that it was a change in policy at that time.
MR MEYER: Chairperson, I would like to put one further question, but with your permission, I will do that later. Let us first purse the policy line.
CHAIRPERSON: I took over from Fazel. I am very sorry to have stolen your thunder.
DR RANDERA: Mr Meyer, I want to incorporate in my question something that was included in your submission, the submission that you talked about earlier on. Mr de Klerk, when he spoke in Cape Town, talked about different periods
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in Nationalist Party policy and talked about the post 1978 policy in his term as a period of reform. You said, also, in response to Mr Malan's question that there seemed to be a change in policy in terms of what Mr Verwoerd thought about homeland policy and what happened in the 1980s. I just want to know in coming to those sort of decisions what methodology, if any, was used by the party in trying to determine what people's thinking was because today we have heard already the result of that policy change. We also heard that for the people of Moutse, at any rate, there was a court case where they clearly, actually, said that they did not want to be incorporated into KwaNdebele at the time.
MR MEYER: The question is, if I understand you correctly, what the National Party Government did to actually consult in the process of taking decisions. I am trying to apply that question specifically to this area when I respond, Chairperson, and that is I am afraid to say that it is not clear to me whether there was actual consultation because another area in question is, of course, Ekangala, which also formed part of that same process of, let us say, deviation from decision making. It seems to me that in the case of this homeland altogether there were was a notion that there should be a homeland for this area, but that it was not properly, if I may say so, thought through, unfortunately. That is a deduction I am making from the facts that I have tried to study. Again, one will have to go further and to more detail.
Let me just say that when Mr de Klerk has referred to the start of change of policy from 1978 onwards, it, of course, did not necessarily originally reflect a change of police in regard to the homelands idea. It was rather a
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start to a change of mind in looking at, first of all, the position, viz a vie, the coloured community and the indian community as you will recall. After those changes were made in 1983, then further attention was given by the then Government on the questions of reforms regarding homeland policy and so forth. I think a big question remains in that regard which, I guess, we will have to respond to and that is after 1976 it must have become clear to the Government of the day that the whole idea of the existence of the africans permanently in the, so called, white areas is an inevitable fact and that something related to that conclusion or deduction that had to be made at that stage, already started or had to start materialising in Government thinking from that period onwards. Unfortunately, it did not materialise in respect of the changes of the Constitutional changes that took place in the early 1980s because we did not see it in the Tricamaral Constitution and, of course, only thereafter new thinking was given to the whole question of, in the end, what to do with the homelands policy.
Now, it becomes clear, any maybe I should have pointed that out earlier on. It becomes clear that by 1985 and 1986 the South African Government had a clear view that at least no further independence was pursued for any of the homelands that did not become independent at that stage. It also became clear that outside of the independent, so called independent states, the rest of South Africa was seen as one united geographic area and that in some or other way Constitutional reality will have to be given to that. I am referring in this context to speeches that have been made by the then State President in 1985 and 1986 which actually gave effect to this acceptance of the fact that we are
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talking about one undivided piece of land, but, that of course, only meant the areas outside of the, so called, independent states.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Russell.
DR ALLY: Mr Meyer, I accept that you say that you are not defending the policy, but you are trying to give a perspective and understanding, but if you would just indulge me. I want to just explore some issues which you mentioned in this giving of a perspective or an understanding. You say that the issue of the homelands that Verwoerd was trying to find a moral underpinning. Now, I want to just explore that issue with you because would you not accept that at the end of the day the implementation of that policy depended very critically on the Nationalist Party still being able to maintain order and domination? How would that relate to the issue of finding a moral underpinning which you said was an attempt to move away from domination and discrimination when the implementation of that policy rested very much on the ability still to dominate and still to exercise power? I would just like to explore that idea with you.
MR MEYER: Chairperson, I think one has to go back again to what Verwoerd had in mind and then follow it through from there. I guess Verwoerd had a dream that this moral basis would provide to everybody and to all the various ethnic groups in the country, not only a sufficient basis, but a moral basis upon which the country could be divided and each of the different ethnic groups could live in peace also with each other. I especially say it was a dream because under no circumstances could that dream materialise because the dream had one critical mistake in itself. That was that it was impossible to separate the people of this country into
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different geographical areas altogether. The critical issue that was, apparently, not on the table at the time of Verwoerd and that was not questioned in his time was actually how to deal with the millions of South Africans that would not, necessarily, find themselves in any of the homelands. I think this question really started to emerge for the first time in the mid-1970s. If I look back at the overall picture it seems to me that the real first event where this question started to come to the fore was after the 1976 unrests in Soweto. The particular question of, on the one side, this dream, but on the other side the reality that you cannot and will never be able to separate the different ethnic groups or the different communities totally into different geographic areas.
Of course that, since it was not addressed by Verwoerd, his dream was an impractical one and later on, it seems to me, that people when they started to deal with the realities also did not look much further into the original moral basis of what Verwoerd might have had in mind at his time, but simply started to look at how the idea could be forced through although it became unimplementable in terms of the original idea. So, I think there was a dualism, there was a conflict. Later on also in the minds of those that had to apply that dream, but the basic fault was, to my mind, the fact that Verwoerd himself did not address the realities of what he had in mind.
DR ALLY: Mr Meyer I want to come back to this issue of the question of morality and the question of an ability to implement. More specifically the question of authoritariasm because an issue which emerges over and over again in many of the conflicts particularly in homelands is the extent to
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which the security police, the police, other authoritarian structures become more and more involved in the conflict, in the issues to the point where it is those structures, in the end, who seem to be in control rather than the politicians. So I would like to come back then and explore this issue of whether one can have this idea of a dream or a moral order against the backdrop of this question of wanting to maintain power and domination.
MR MEYER: Yes, that remains a very difficult question, Chairperson. Maybe one should go back and think more about it and come back to the Commission with a proper answer. Let me immediately say I welcome this interaction because I think the Commission is correct in asking these questions and maybe it is good for us who, at least, have voted for these policies in the past to try and come to terms with ourselves in terms of how now, with hindsight, one looks at it. So, I think it is very appropriate that we deal with these kinds of questions and even if we cannot find the answers this afternoon, then there might be good reason to go further with it.
Let me reflect a little bit as it would come up in my mind now, as we sit here, this pertinent question that was put by the Commissioner. I think part of the problem that started to emerge, especially after 1976, and 1976 seems to me to have been a very important watershed, almost, in the way in which the whole approach was dealt with. Maybe there were other critical dates as well, but in my mind it seems to me that 1976 was the start, actually, of much of the change, no not the change, much of the emphasis that was put on this issue later on. Now the kind of emphasis that I think was given to the matter was, on the one side, the
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dream and, on the other side, the idea that there must be law and order, so to speak. In other words to deal with uprising against the implementation of the dream in a manner that would ensure order come what may and that that was a dominant factor in the whole approach.
I am trying to find out, we had recent newspaper reports about certain Cabinet minutes of 1976. When I read those newspaper reports and had to respond to them I asked myself, but what was at the back of the mind of those that took those decisions and of the person that made that recommendation to Cabinet. It seems to me part of the thinking was, at least, with hindsight again, wrong, but at least part of the thinking was that we must establish law and order. We must put this reactionary or the revolts into place and we have to do it, if necessary, through security measures of an extraordinary nature. I think that was the kind of thinking that existed behind this and that, probably, explains some of it that you are referring to.
DR ALLY: Thank you. Just a final comment, because that question was actually asked against a background of having spoken to some of the police people and security people who were involved in Moutse, KwaNdebele at the time. You may recall the Brigadier Hertzog Lerm who was Commissioner of Police here after August 1986, a Captain, now Superintendent de Jager who was a Commander of a police station and then was in the office of the Commissioner of Police. They are implicated by many witnesses, many possible victims in gross human rights violations and when we put some questions to them their response was do not blame us, the politicians gave us a job to do. They said this is the policy and you make sure that this is implemented come what may and,
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therefore, if we did take extraordinary measures, that is not our responsibility. That rests directly with the politicians because that was the policy which they had decided upon. So that was the context in which I was asking you these questions, but thanks for your response.
MR MEYER: It seems to me my answer then fits into the further reference that the honourable Commissioner made, Chairperson, I guess to respond to those remarks. I guess, at least, Lerm would have understood his position to be responsible to take or to keep law and order and to ensure that, by all means, it prevails in the area.
CHAIRPERSON: Tom, I think we have to, I mean, it is nearly six o' clock and the people, everybody has been. Just one tiny point I wanted to ask and, I mean, it is not, I mean, you would not be the one who thought of the policy or its implementation, but it seems very odd when you were saying as the, even the moral basis for what you were doing, was to give people the right in their own areas a control over their affairs, but it did not seem to occur to anyone that you wanted to consult the people for whom you were thinking, I mean, that this particular policy would be of benefit to. It seems a very critical contradiction why if you thought this thing was good, you did not believe that its persuasive powers were so strong that if you brought it to the people they were going to accept. I mean did you know what their mindset was that did not seem to see this fundamental contradiction?
MR MEYER: I am afraid to say, Chairperson, I think that was part of the mistake of the past. That, unfortunately, people were not consulted on their views and it was the kind of authoritarian style of the past which, unfortunately, led
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to many mistakes, I guess. Although the intentions, and that is why I quoted Verwoerd on this. The intentions in his own mind might have been very good. I guess he was even seen as a liberal at the time because he argued very strongly that he wanted to get away from the concept of "baasskap" by allowing people to govern themselves and that the white person, the white man should not govern over others, but in the process that concept was, apparently, not further consulted through.
Can I say, in a lighter vane, Chairperson, that the whole idea, the notion of consultation is something that, fortunately, we also learnt through the process of negotiations over the last number of years. Now people are saying, well, in the old South Africa there was no consultation, only decisions. Now it is only consultation and no decisions.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Roelf Meyer, thank you very much. We will take you up on your offer of expanding on some of the points that have been raised, but we are grateful that you should have taken the trouble and to do it in a pleasant manner. I mean we are talking about things that are very painful, but in the new country that you and others have helped to be negotiated into, we hope that a healing is going to happen, that we will see this truth, we will see the ghastly mistakes that were made to come to accept that it was not just even mistakes, I mean, that policies were wrong, were evil even and that having acknowledged that we should be able by our, also, saying we are sorry for what has happened for the pain that was caused. That we can, together, move into this new South Africa with the determination that things of this kind, we will not allow to happen again.
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Yes. Wynand.
MR MALAN: I will not put a question. I did warn that I had a question, but if I could just put a request, then, to the Minister or to the ex-Minister. In some of the investigations we did, Section 29 hearings and so on, we had quite a lot of feed about the Joint Management Centres and you were, at a stage, responsible for that and I think Leon Wessels as your successor. We were given or what we are finding is that the police did not operate as the police. It operated as sort of the uniform branch and the security police and that was also reflected in the JMCs. Not to pursue this at the level of questions, would you not do something to give us a memo on that as well and especially in the time that you were responsible.
CHAIRPERSON: I am sorry. Well it is just that, I mean, as you know I am an old man now and there are some things that I forget. Sometimes conveniently, sometimes not so conveniently, but let us just say thank you very, very much for a very useful contribution and I want to thank all of those who participated because the level of contributions has been very high. We also thank Alban. Just when I am getting, I mean, I really am sort of getting into my stride.
MS SOOKA: No, it is just that I think flowing out of the questions on policy we would like to prepare a series of questions which we want then to submit and get them to answer.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MS SOOKA: If that could be tackled in your next sentence.
CHAIRPERSON: Let me start again. All of you have been very, very nice people. Everybody wants to be commended, but quite seriously each of us has a contribution to make to
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this new South Africa. There are some of us who think that because we now have freedom that that freedom is really licensed, but in fact, I mean we have a new struggle. We had the struggle to get rid of apartheid. Now we have the struggle to make our country the success that it must become and each one of us must fold up their sleeves and put their shoulders to the wheel. Each one of us, black, white, coloured and whatever, now that we know that we belong together. So from here these people say they are going to have quite a number of other questions that they would like to put to you and you have very graciously said yes. Thank you very, very much.
Will you kindly leave these things at the door if you have got it. If you take it out it is very dangerous this thing, it will bite you. You should please leave it at the door there, but I just want to say again a very big thank you to everybody. Thank you to the police, thank you to the briefers, thank you to our statement takers and thank you to my colleagues on the panel here, thank you to the interpreters, thank you to the technicians, thank you to all these beautiful nurses and the people who fed us. We are enormously grateful so I am going to clap you and then you can join me in clapping you. Thank you.
MOUTSE HEARING TRC/MPUMALANGA
