TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION HEARING
HELD AT
DURBAN
ON WEDNESDAY, 6 AUGUST 1997
[VOLUME 3B : PAGES 211 - 348]
1A PROCEEDINGS RESUMED ON 1997/08/06
APPEARANCES AS BEFORE
MR LYSTER: We will begin this morning's proceedings with evidence from Mr Zweli Dlamini who, as indicated yesterday, will be testifying with a balaclava so that his image is not projected in the media in order to protect his safety. The panel as well interested counsel have had an opportunity to identify him. Thereafter we will call Dr Rocky Williams from the side of the Defence Force and after the lunch break Mr Howard Varney will make an unsworn submission and those parties represented here who wish to make a counter or rebutting submission, will have a limited opportunity to do so, bearing in mind the time limits which are available to us. We have - it has been indicated to us by counsel for General Liebenberg that they would want to make such a submission and they can do so after Mr Varney's evidence. If anybody else representing implicated persons wishes to make a short submission, if they could please notify Mr Macadam during the break so that we can look at limiting the length of these submissions so that we are able to finish this afternoon.
For those people in the audience who wish to follow the proceedings with the use of earphones, the evidence - the first witness will give his evidence in Zulu and it will be broadcast in English in the hall, but there are earphones available for those who want to follow it in Afrikaans or in the original Zulu.
Dr Boraine who was with us for the last two days is not here today and he will not be returning to the panel and I would like to welcome another member of the Truth
/Commission
1A Commission, Professor Simangele Magwaza from the Reparations Committee.
I think those are all the opening remarks I want to make. Mr Macadam.
MR MACADAM: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. I have been approached by counsel representing the Inkatha Freedom Party who indicated to me that he wished, prior to evidence proceedings to place certain things on record if he may be permitted to do so.
MR LASICH: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, there is a matter that concerns us. As we understand it, Mr Luthuli is still a witness in this matter. His evidence will continue after the hearings dealing with the Caprivi training and we have good reason to believe that Mr Luthuli gave a press conference after the Commission adjourned yesterday, which is something we believe amounts to a gross irregularity. This morning I contacted Mr Macadam to ascertain what transpired and he seems to be more familiar with the facts. He's definitely not involved in the press conference and we are not suggesting the Commission had anything to do with this. I would appreciate it if he could just indicate to the Commission what his understanding of what transpired yesterday, what took place, in other words, yesterday, if he could just indicate what took place yesterday, for the benefit of the Commission. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
MR MACADAM: Mr Chairman, what transpired is that a member of my staff who is on duty at the proceedings was approached by a media person indicating that the media wished to interview Mr Luthuli. According to him, he referred the matter to Mr Luthuli's counsel and the matter
/was
1A was dealt further by Mr Luthuli's counsel. I noticed at the adjournment of the proceedings, while I was preparing my files for today's proceedings that Mr Luthuli was surrounded by a number of people on the stage before he left the actual stage, but what transpired at that stage I'm not aware. I may place further on record that I had occasion to listen to the 8 o'clock news broadcast on TV3 where the - Mr Luthuli was reported as having indicated that Minister Buthelezi was aware of his activities or had sanctioned them, words to that effect, but as I understand Mr Luthuli's evidence, at no stage did he in any stage implicate the Minister. All his allegations related to Mr Khumalo. I'm not - I cannot comment on where the television got that information from, whether it's a misquote of Mr Luthuli's original evidence or whether it was information volunteered after the adjournment of the proceedings.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Macadam. Mr Stewart, is there something that you wish to offer? I certainly can't take the matter any further, I didn't know about these developments, although I would caution against witnesses still under oath from talking to the media, but would you like to ... (incomplete)
MR STEWART: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. Mr Luthuli has come forward over the process of a number of years now wishing to tell the truth as he experienced it and as it happened and that's what he wishes to do before the Truth Commission now and in due course in his amnesty application and he is committed to doing that and he shows no disrespect to the Commission. Quite the contrary, he is committed to the process that the TRC is embarked in.
/There
1A There is nothing which prohibits him from also speaking the truth, as he knows it, elsewhere than before the Commission and in clarifying certain questions or certain matters which he had given in evidence yesterday and clarifying them to the press yesterday evening, which is what happened and what the press had sought, he didn't contradict in any way the testimony that he had given before the Commission yesterday and merely answered some questions that the press had asked which they may well have felt that Commissioners may have asked Mr Luthuli in order to clarify certain aspects of his evidence.
And if I may say one additional thing and that's in response to Mr Macadam, the record of course will reveal it, but in my recollection it's not quite accurate to say that Mr Buthelezi wasn't implicated in any way in yesterday's testimony. He was implicated in certain respects about functions which took place when the trainees returned from Caprivi, so there were certain aspects in which he was mentioned and in that sense implicated.
I have nothing further to say. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
MR LASICH: Mr Chairman, I wish to hand over to my instructing attorney who has some things to say on behalf of Dr Buthelezi and the Inkatha Freedom Party about the incident yesterday. All I can say it surprises me that an officer of the Court would condone such actions. If I may then hand over to Mr Falconer.
MR FALCONER: Thank you, Mr Chairman and members of the Commission. My name is Patrick Falconer. I act on behalf of the Inkatha Freedom Party and Minister Buthelezi.
/Certain
1A Certain events which Mr Lasich and Mr Macadam have alluded to took place after this Commission adjourned yesterday, which we find extremely disturbing.
At 7.00 pm last night I was telephonically contacted by a journalist who identified himself as Allan from Reuters. He notified me that a press conference had been held here after the Commission had adjourned and that certain questions were put to Mr Luthuli which incriminated Minister Buthelezi. In fact he allegedly answered a question stating that Minister Buthelezi must have been fully aware of the hit squad activities.
I am also advised that at 8 o'clock last night and in subsequent news broadcasts on the SABC, including the Zulu news broadcast similar reporting was made. I have managed to acquire the introduction portion of the SABC 8 o'clock news broadcast last night and I wish to read a portion of that.
"Former IFP hit squad leader, Daluxolo Luthuli says there is no way that Inkatha leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi could have been unaware of the killings committed by the Caprivi trainees in KwaZulu-Natal in the mid eighties".
I am presently awaiting video footage of all of the news broadcasts.
As the legal representative for Mr Luthuli says, all he did was say certain things in clarification. Unfortunately our recollection does not go to any evidence of this nature having been tendered before this Commission. He clearly exceeded what he had told this Commission.
/In
1A In our view, Mr Chairman, this conduct constitutes a prima facie offence, a violation of the provisions of Section 39(a), (b) and (c) of your Act and I'll read 39(c) -
"Any person who does anything in relation to the Commission which, if done in relation to a Court of Law, would constitute contempt of Court".
We submit that Mr Luthuli's behaviour and anyone who may have advised him to so behave constitutes a criminal offence.
I have had opportunity to take instructions from Minister Buthelezi this morning. He has asked me to voice this objection. He has informed me that he is astounded by the allegations that have been made and he vehemently denies any implication or knowledge with the hit squad allegations.
Mr Chairman, I would like to just take this opportunity to point out that a further difficulty which we have is that many high profile people in this country, of influence, are being implicated in allegations. Once such statements are made it constitutes irreparable damage, no matter what apologies are made thereafter.
We accordingly request that those involved act more responsibly and not permit certain statements to be made to the public until such time that this Commission has had an opportunity to properly evaluate all the evidence and make its findings.
In the circumstances we require, before continuing and participating and lending this Commission our co-operation, an unconditional undertaking from Mr Luthuli
/and
1A and those instructing him - advising him, at least, that they shall not make any further such statements until the Commission makes its findings or a report. We require a ruling from this Commission to the effect that a directive be issued to all witnesses and the media that no such conduct shall be tolerated in the future and an apology from Mr Luthuli and those advising him for his improper conduct. We would also appreciate a proper explanation as to what exactly transpired.
Thank you, Mr Chairman.
MR (?): Sorry, Mr Chairperson, obviously the parties I represent are potentially in a similar category and I would just like a further explanation from the representatives of the IFP as to the basis for the allegation that Mr Luthuli is guilty of contempt of Court. My understanding of the provisions of the Act are entirely the contrary.
MR LYSTER: Thank you. I don't want to enter into a legal debate between two representatives at this forum. I am going to take a minute to discuss that with my colleagues and we will reply to Mr Falconer.
MR FALCONER: (?) Thank you, Mr Chairman.
MR (?): Sorry, Mr Chairman. One further thing that I would like to have considered in the discussions that you have with your fellow committee members and that is, is that like Mr Luthuli, my clients are here to tell the truth. They see this forum as an opportunity to let the public know exactly what happened in their histories and I would certainly be very surprised if any decision was taken that thwarted that process in any way. Thank you.
MR LYSTER: We'll take a five minute adjournment. Please
/don't
1A don't leave the room, we're going to adjourn for five minutes and we'll be back.
BRIEF ADJOURNMENT
ON RESUMPTION
MR LYSTER: Thank you. We've had an opportunity to discuss this matter during a short adjournment.
Mr Falconer raised four issues relating to -
(1) an undertaking from Mr Luthuli that he would not make such statements or take such action again;
(2) a ruling from the Commission that witnesses should not in the future do what Mr Luthuli is alleged to have done yesterday;
(3) an apology from Mr Luthuli; and
(4) a proper explanation from Mr Luthuli and his counsel as to why this took place yesterday.
With regard to (1), (3) and (4), that's the undertaking from Mr Luthuli, an apology from Mr Luthuli and a proper explanation, the Commission clearly cannot play a part in this at all. This is something which Mr Falconer should take up directly with Mr Luthuli and his counsel and I would advise him to do that at a later stage. It is not something which the Commission can involve itself in at all.
With regard to (2) a ruling from the Commission that witnesses should not engage in this sort of behaviour. We must realise here that we are dealing with competing rights, rights of Mr Luthuli; the rights of Mr Buthelezi and the rights of the press and these are equal rights that these various people enjoy. This Commission is committed to transparency and we feel that we are not able to make a ruling which would seek to in any way muzzle the
/right
1A right of Mr Luthuli to say what he wishes to say. It should be borne in mind that these issues can be taken up with Mr Luthuli when he is cross-examined and counsel for Minister Buthelezi and the IFP will have a full opportunity to rebut these allegations in public. So the Commission cannot make a ruling with regard to the second issue raised by Mr Falconer.
And finally, if there is a feeling that there has been a breach of Act 34 of 1995, then this is obviously something which Mr Falconer and his client should take up with the SAP.
I think that is all I need to say at this stage.
MR STEWART: (?) Mr Chairperson, members of the Committee, I would like to respond on behalf of Mr Luthuli to the three requests that were put by Mr Falconer that relate directly to him.
The first one was that of an undertaking not to speak to the press. At this stage Mr Luthuli makes no such undertaking. He will speak to the press as advised and cautiously and in showing no disrespect to the Commission. That is something on which further discussion can take place, of course.
Secondly, in regard to the apology, Mr Luthuli makes no apology for the statement he made. He reiterates and he stands by that statement which was that Minister Buthelezi must have known about the hit squad activities that took place and that were carried out and conducted by the Caprivi trainees.
In the event that Mr Falconer's client has any remedies, those would be in the Criminal or Civil Law rather than before this Commission.
/As
1A As far as the fourth matter is concerned which was the explanation as to what took place, that explanation has already been given initially by Mr Macadam and subsequently by myself. It was not something which I would have termed a press conference, but rather a huddle in which certain matters were clarified.
Thank you, Mr Chairperson.
MR LASICH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr Chairman, at this stage I am instructed we will continue our participation in these proceedings, but we will be taking further instructions as to possible remedies.
Thank you.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Lasich.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Macadam.
MR MACADAM: I call Mr Zweli Dlamini.
MR LYSTER: Mr Dlamini, can you hear me and can you understand me through your earphones?
MR DLAMINI: Yes, I can hear you.
MR LYSTER: Thank you. It may take you a couple of minutes to get used to this system, but I'm sure you will, like the other witnesses, have - can you give us your full names, please?
DAVID PHILIP ZWELI DLAMINI: (Sworn States) (Through Interpreter)
MR MACADAM: Mr Dlamini, how old are you at this stage? --- I'm 29 years old.
Is it correct that you grew up in the Hammarsdale area of KwaZulu-Natal? --- Yes, that's correct.
And in the early 1980s, did you become a member of
/any
1A any political organisation in the area? --- Yes, that's correct.
Which organisation? --- Inkatha.
What position did you hold with this organisation? --- I was in the Youth League.
And while you were in the Youth League of this organisation, was there any violence in the area where you resided at that time? --- Yes.
What type of violence was this? --- It was the violence between the UDF and Inkatha.
What form did that violence take? --- It was just a fighting between the UDF and Inkatha.
And you yourself, did you take part in that violence at all? --- I didn't.
Now in 1986, were you at any stage approached or did you of your own accord consider a career in the KwaZulu Police Force? --- Yes, ... (inaudible) came. He is the person who approached us and he was recruiting for people who were coming to join the police, the KwaZulu Police.
And this person whom you've named, what position did he hold? --- He was the chairman at Inkatha.
Did he hold any position in the KwaZulu Police itself? --- He didn't.
And what did this person then tell you? --- He told us that he needed people to be trained to become KwaZulu Police.
And what did you do when he told you this? --- He wrote down my name and told us that he's going to come back and we'll be taken for training to become KwaZulu Police.
/Where
1A Where did you - did you go anywhere to receive this training that he mentioned? --- Yes, we did.
Where did you go to? --- A Kombi from Ulundi came. They took us to Ulundi.
And where specifically in Ulundi did you go? --- We went to a place called Nhlungwane.
What type of place was that specifically? --- It was a government place with a few houses.
Was it in an official KwaZulu Police building? --- It wasn't.
Okay. Could you just explain more or less what this place was? You said it wasn't an official police building. --- It was just houses. I would say they look like government offices, like for the Department of Works(?).
And were there any persons in charge of this facility when you arrived there? --- Yes, we did find people there.
Who were those persons? --- We found Xesibe(?), he was in charge of the camp.
Was he a member of the KwaZulu Police, or not? --- That's what I knew.
And any other persons other than him? --- Yes, there were many people whom I didn't know.
And what happened after you had arrived there? What took place in that camp? --- We used to sing Inkatha song and we were also taught about Inkatha.
And was any explanation given to you precisely what you were going to do or what would become of you eventually? --- There wasn't. They told us that we were going to be police.
/And
1A And in that period, did you fill in an application form to become a member of the KwaZulu Police? --- I didn't.
Were your fingerprints taken? --- They were not taken.
Were you at any stage asked whether you had a criminal record or been involved in any illegal activity? --- I wasn't asked.
Now you talk about you and the others there singing Inkatha songs and being told about Inkatha. Were any other political parties discussed at all at that stage? --- We were only taught the Inkatha policies and songs.
And how long did you remain in that camp approximately? --- About two weeks.
Where did you go to from that camp? --- We went back - we went to Ulundi Airport where we found the plane which took us to a place which I didn't know. We landed in a place which was a bush area.
What happened once you arrived at this strange place that you were unfamiliar with? --- We alighted and trucks came. We get into this truck.
And where were you taken to? --- They took us to a terrain, a bushy terrain.
Once you arrived there, what did you find? --- We just found this bushy - open area which was bushy. We stopped there and we found that there were people around there.
Who were these people? --- I didn't know them at that time. We stayed with them then. We were given tents which we have to erect and use as sleeping places.
And was there any persons in charge of this camp?
/--- Yes,
1A --- Yes, there was.
Who was? --- It was Madlanduna.
Is he attending these proceedings today? Do you see him, this person whom you've described as Madlanduna? If you - there are various people sitting behind you. Do you see him at all there? --- Yes, he's around.
Point him out to the Commission. --- He's the third one from the right-hand.
Possibly the witness can be asked to approach the person whom he points out ... [break in recording].
MR STEWART: (?) Mr Chairman, I don't think that any issue is raised about the identity of Madlanduna Luthuli.
MR LYSTER: Ja, I think just for the sake of completeness, Mr Macadam is a stickler for detail. Thank you.
MR MACADAM: He has in fact identified Mr Luthuli, the previous witness. Now was anything explained to you by Mr Luthuli when you arrived there? --- Nothing was explained to me.
And if you could tell us briefly, what did you proceed to do once you had arrived there? --- We were given uniforms which were blue or green overalls and some tackies and we started clearing the place, building some places where we can stay. We erected the tents and stayed there.
And after that was completed, did you receive any training at all? --- Yes, we did receive training. After that they started training us, that was physical training. It took about two weeks.
And you say "they started training us", but up until now you've only mentioned Mr Luthuli. Who is the "they"
/that
1A that you are referring to? --- There were also white people. Those whom I remember are JJ, Swart, Kevin and those were supposed to be our instructors.
And did you know or did they tell you who they were working for? --- I didn't know.
Right. You started off telling us about this basic training. Could you proceed further, what further training you received? --- We were also trained as to how to use firearms. We started with AK47s.
Are there any other firearms which you recall? --- It was the AK47s, G3s, sub-machine guns, UZIS, rocket launchers, limpet mines, explosives, PE4 Cortex and we learned a lot about those.
What exactly did you learn about these various weapons that you've described? --- We were told that they're normally(?) used by the ANC, therefore we should learn and know about them, so that when we come out we are able to use them.
For what purpose would you use them? --- When we come back in KwaZulu-Natal, these were the arms which we're supposed to use to protect the KwaZulu people.
How were you going to protect them? --- We had to use these arms which we were trained.
And can you proceed to tell us more about any other things that you were possibly trained in, apart from these? --- We had trained in house training as to how to penetrate a building if you want to kill someone inside and also about ambush and in all those cases we had to use all the firearms that I just mentioned.
And anything further that you recall? --- I don't remember anything.
/Were
1A Were you at any stage put into a specific group of persons during the course of this training? --- Yes, we were divided into four groups. There was an offensive group, contra-mobilisation group, defensive group and offensive.
[Break in recording] ... was this division into various groups done? --- At the end of the course.
And which group did you form part of? --- I was in the offensive group.
Can you indicate to the Commission what you did while you were part of this offensive group? --- We were dealing with the learning about arms, the attacking of houses. During the demonstration there was a house which was locked and we were shown as to how to penetrate the house and attack or shoot and we were told that when you enter a house you should have a hand grenade, UZIS, shotguns and AK47s. Those were the firearms that we were taught about.
What did you do once you'd entered this house? --- You had to shoot anyone inside the house.
Why was that? --- That was supposed to be the ANC inside, so we had to shoot everything.
Is there anything else which you recall about your training specifically while you were part of the offensive group? --- We came back to South Africa and we had to take another course.
You can describe that course later when we deal with once you had returned. Now you told us initially that you went to the camp at Ulundi in order to join the KwaZulu Police. --- Yes, while we were at the camp we realised that we're involved with soldiers and not police.
/Madlanduna
1A Madlanduna had to explain to us that, "You are going to be trained to be soldiers, because you have to protect the KwaZulu Government and its officials".
And did you at any stage receive training while you were in this place that you were taken to from Ulundi in the aeroplane as to how you ... (intervention)
INTERPRETER: May you please repeat your question?
MR MACADAM: Now were you at any stage in the camp where you were taken to from Ulundi, given any training or instructions as to how you should react with the police? --- Yes.
Will you tell us about that? --- They said we should avoid them, not mix with them.
Anything else? --- I have forgotten.
[Break in recording] ... answer is that you have forgotten, is it that you cannot remember? Is that what you wish to convey? --- I don't remember any further.
Now when you returned from this camp, what did you then proceed to do? --- We went back to Ulundi to a place called Nhlungwane and we stayed there and Chief Buthelezi came to welcome us. He was together with Sipho Mzimela, M Z Khumalo and others whom I have forgotten now, whom I can't remember. They celebrated for our return and they slaughtered a cow, which was slaughtered and we feasted and it was jubilant.
And after that? --- We feasted and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi expressed his joy. We had people ... (inaudible) ... with firearms and he was happy that we all came back safely and no one was injured. That's what I remember.
Now did you, once you returned back to KwaZulu,
/receive
1A receive any further training? --- We went back to out respective homes and we were contacted if required. I went back to my home at Mpumalanga, that's Hammarsdale.
Yes and after that? --- After that we were contacted from Ulundi. We went back to Ulundi and we were told that we have to report to our nearest police stations at home so that we could be able to perform our duties.
[Break in recording] ... that? --- It was Madlanduna ... [break in recording]
(END OF CASSETTE NO 1A)
(START OF CASSETTE NO 1B)
1B --- ... and I was in Hammarsdale at the Mpumalanga Police Station so I used to go up every morning, go to the police station to report.
To whom did you report? --- At that time it was Lieutenant Makhatini who was in charge of the police station. We were introduced to him and we were told that we were going to work under him, so we used to go to the police station and stay there and not doing anything. After that it became clear that we should get appointed so that we can start work. Photos were taken of us - photographs were taken and were sent to Ulundi and appointment certificates were sent back to us and they were brought by a detective sergeant.
Who was responsible for the taking of photographs of you? --- There's a place where we took those photos, I can't remember the place, the name of the place.
Was it at a police station or a private photography company or where was it? --- No, those were ID photos. Each and everyone have to go and take his to the police station.
/Why
1B Why was this necessary that this be done? --- Because we couldn't be able to handle the firearms without appointment certificates.
Right, if you could take it further and tell us now what eventually transpired after these photographs were taken? --- We were taken to Ulundi and brought back. The were given the title of detective sergeants and we were posted to different chiefs and we were told that we should guard those chiefs. I was posted in Maritzburg, that's where I was working.
[Break in recording] ... certificate showing that you are a detective sergeant in the police. Had you been through the police training college and received any courses on how to be a detective? --- No, I didn't.
Had you, prior to being issued with the certificate, held the rank of constable in the police? --- I was never a detective.
Once you had the certificate indicating that you were a detective sergeant, did you investigate any criminal cases, take statements from witnesses, arrest suspects and warn them in terms of Judges' Rules, or not? --- No, we didn't do such things.
Were you receiving a salary from any source at that stage? --- Yes, from the Inkatha offices.
Did you receive a salary from the KwaZulu Police at that stage? --- No, it was from the Inkatha offices.
And did you have any firearm in your possession at this stage once you had obtained the certificate? --- Yes, we were given firearms, because we had the way to dodge the police.
Now what type of firearms did you have? --- We
/had
1B had R1s, ... (inaudible) ... shotguns. It all depended on a particular place where you were supposed to be posted in and the intensity of violence in that particular area.
Where did these firearms come from? --- They were from the KwaZulu Police Station.
How did you acquire them? --- We got them from the police station.
Could you just explain in more detail how you managed to acquire them from the police station? --- There was one sergeant by the name of Zuma. He is the one who handed the guns to us at the time when they were posting us to go and protect the Indunas.
And what did you do with these firearms? --- We took them with us and went to our respective posts.
And thereafter? --- After that, I think we went to Maritzburg, because there was intensive fighting there, therefore when you go out, you need not necessarily have to carry a firearm because at the time the ANC ... (intervention)
INTERPRETER: Excuse me, we didn't get the last part of it. We did not get the last part of his statement, the witness' statement. --- We were given the firearms and we went to Pietermaritzburg. That's the place where we were supposed to work. We stayed there, because there was a fight, people were fighting. At night if there was a chance, we will go out to hit or attack the UDF people.
MR MACADAM: If you can - I want to clarify certain aspects. Firstly you said you went to areas where there was violence. What caused you to go to those areas? --- Those were the places where - under a lot of Indunas in such areas.
/Was
1B Was it your own decision that you made of your own accord to go there, on your own initiative or did somebody else influence you to go there? Can you just explain to us what exactly the position was? --- Madlanduna was always in contact with the people at the police station at Mpumalanga and he is the person who deployed as to those places where we had to go and work.
Right. And you then said you took part in various attacks. Can you explain in more detail what these attacks were? --- We entered houses and shooting people inside those houses and then you have to run and go back to your place after doing that.
You say, "We did this". Who was with you in these attacks? --- There were people who were with me. Trevor Nene was one of them.
I don't need you to give names of specific individuals, but were they for example people that had grown up in the Hammarsdale area? Could they have possibly been people that were trained with you in this place that you went to from Ulundi, or who exactly were they? What type of people were they? --- They were people with whom I was trained at Caprivi.
And what prompted you to carry out these attacks, you and these others? --- We were trained and we knew that we were trained to kill only. There wasn't anything that we knew. Our enemy, the UDF, was operating in those area where we were working, therefore if you happened to meet a UDF member you have to shoot.
Did you have specific orders from any persons or individuals to carry out those attacks? --- Yes. Madlanduna used to give us instructions that if ever we
/are
1B are attacked we have to attack back.
And over what period did this take place? If you can give an indication. Was it a matter of years or months or weeks? --- I would say it's about a month.
Can you give us an indication of approximately how many of these attacks you were involved in? --- I would say, I'm referring to Pietermaritzburg only, because after that while I was there I got injured.
Now referring specifically to Pietermaritzburg, can you give an indication of how many attacks you yourself took part in? --- Many times in the particular area where I was deployed. That's where I got injured.
Yes, but can you answer my question, to indicate approximately how many attacks? --- I can say approximately three times. I don't remember well.
And you've just said you became injured in one of these attacks. Can you tell us exactly what transpired there? --- I got injured. We were shooting, it was cross-fires, we were shooting the soldiers. I had to go to hospital and I stayed in hospital for about six months. I was discharged and I went back home and thereafter I was taken to Ulundi.
I just want you to go through what you've just told us in more detail. You described that you were injured. Who injured you? --- It was the SADF which was guarding the surrounding area.
You said you were taken to hospital. By whom? --- I don't remember, because I lost consciousness after the injury and I just discovered myself lying in hospital.
Were you arrested or not in connection with this incident? --- I wasn't arrested.
/MR (?)
1B MR (?): Mr Chairman, I'm terribly sorry, but could I request that perhaps the witness just be asked what had happened there? We are left in the air all the time as to what was going on. He says he was shot by the SADF. How did it come about, what was he there? What was it about? It would be very helpful if we could have some sort of background to make sense of this evidence, Mr Chairman. I don't want to criticise by saying this, but we're just interested in trying to put some flesh on to this evidence.
MR MACADAM: Mr Dlamini, if you could then give us more detail on this incident where you said you were shot by the SADF. Tell us exactly what took place there. --- There was some fighting in the particular area where I was deployed and the police - soldiers were patrolling the area together with police. I got out of the place where I were and I went to just near a place. It was at night. I was armed and there we had a shoot-out. We had a shoot-out with the soldiers, we shot at each other and they injured me on my foot. I lose consciousness and I ended up in hospital.
Who are these persons that you say were with you when the shoot-out took place?
MR NTSEBEZA: (?) Was it - I'm not sure, the Zulu seems to suggest other than what he said. I don't want to put words in his mouth. The English translation said he was shot in the foot. I don't think that is what the witness was saying. Can the witness say and will the interpreters take note of what he's saying? --- I said the whole right foot, the foot, the leg and the arm, I mean, the whole right foot. I mean the leg and the foot.
/
MR MACADAM
1B
MR MACADAM: Now if you can continue from that point on and in detail ... [break in recording] ... what transpired next?
MS SOOKA: (?) We are not satisfied with that response. Where exactly was the witness shot?
MR MACADAM: Possibly to assist us, can you indicate to us now, can you stand up and point to your body where you received these injuries? Sorry, there is no need to undress. Just show us by pointing to your leg and your arm and whatever. --- All over the leg, my thigh and my hand.
Thank you, Mr Dlamini. Possibly the record will reflect that the witness raised his trouser reflecting a severe scarred area on the actual front shins of his leg and then he proceeded to point to the thighs above his knees and he also pointed to arm area on the right-hand side of his body. Right, if you can proceed. You said you found yourself in hospital. What happened while you were in hospital? --- I woke up and people came ... (inaudible) ... M Z Khumalo and others whom I have forgotten. They asked me as to how I got injured. Because I was unconscious I couldn't speak to them. They said they will get a special doctor for me. The doctor came. However, I don't remember his name, I don't know his name. This is the person who treated me until I was discharged.
You said you were unconscious at this stage, so how were you able to know that these people visited you and said they would get the special doctor for you? --- There came others some time to see me, that's why I managed to talk to them and they asked me as to how I was
/injured
1B injured and I told them I was involved in a shoot-out with the soldiers and then they decided to get me a doctor and I was guarded by a police during that time.
Who were these police who were guarding? --- There was the SAP.
Why were they guarding you? --- I didn't find the real reason because I didn't ask them.
And how did it come about that you left that hospital? --- When I was feeling better, the people who came to fetch me it was Madlanduna and Jabulani Makhatini. They were driving a KwaZulu police car. I don't remember the time at which I was discharged. I don't know whether the police who were guarding me knew that I was being stolen out of the hospital. I was taken into a car and drove - which drove back, drove me back to my home.
You said that the police didn't - you're not sure whether the police know you were being stolen out of the hospital. Can you explain exactly the circumstances under which you left that hospital? --- It's now(?) that I find out that I have been stolen out of the hospital. They came, took me out and put me into a car and then we left.
Were the police who you said were guarding you still present at your bed in the hospital, or not? --- In the morning they were there. At about 2 o'clock they were not there. That was the time where I was fetched.
Tell us more detail about these police that were guarding you. Were they there all the time or would they just pop in and spend an hour or two there and leave or what - what exactly was the position with them? ---
/They
1B They used to stay there during the day and the night. However on that particular day, I think they had to relieve each other 2 o'clock and I left during that interval. However, they used to guard me day and night.
You've so far described them as police. Can you tell us whether they were South African Police or KwaZulu Police? --- They were SAP.
And just to wrap up one aspect, the area where you were shot by the SADF, you said that was in the Maritzburg area. Can you recall the specific part of Pietermaritzburg which it was? --- It was as ... (intervention)
INTERPRETER: I'm sorry, I didn't get the name? --- It was called ... (inaudible).
MR MACADAM: Which suburb of Maritzburg is this close to? --- Edendale.
You can proceed. You said you were taken from the hospital to your home. Where did you go after that? --- I stayed at home for about a week and M Z Khumalo came to my home. He took me to Ulundi. That's where I stayed and I was told while in Ulundi that the police are looking for me because of my involvement in the shoot-out with the soldiers and I was taken from Ulundi and they took me to a place called Venda for a hiding - to hide.
Right. Firstly, who told you that the police were looking for you? --- M Z Khumalo.
And who took you to Venda? --- M Z Khumalo.
Where in Venda did you go to specifically? --- (Inaudible) ... at a place called - I don't remember the name, I have forgotten the name. It's in Venda. It's a base with many houses like a soldiers' base.
/And
1B And what happened there? --- I stayed there for about two weeks. There was a doctor who was attending me. I stayed there for two weeks and they removed me to another place called Mkuze and I stayed there.
And who took you to Mkuze? --- It was Captain Langeni. He was one of the person who was in charge of the KwaZulu Police.
And thereafter, what happened? --- I stayed in Mkuze until I recovered.
And then? --- As the police were still looking for me, I left the place during the nineties and I was to be sent to Koeberg to be trained as a special constable. I came back and back to Ulundi and they deployed me back to Mpumalanga, in Hammarsdale which is in Mpumalanga.
Who sent you to receive this training as a special constable? --- It was Mr Langeni working together with Mr Madlanduna.
And where did you receive the training as a special constable? --- In Cape Town and a place called Koeberg.
And in which police force did you become a special constable? The KwaZulu Police or the South African Police? --- I was trained by the SAP. However when I came back I joined the KwaZulu Police.
And at the stages you were dealing with Captain Langeni, did you ever inform him that you were wanted by the police? --- I think he knew, because he was always in contact with Madlanduna and Khumalo, so I didn't ask him.
And you said you then became a member of the KwaZulu Police and you had reported to Ulundi. Did you get posted
/to
1B to any police station after that? --- Yes, I went to work at Hammarsdale and I there Madlanduna. I worked as a special constable in Hammarsdale. There was some fighting at a place called KwaNjokogase(?) and people were being attacked and they were running away from that place running to Hammarsdale Township, there Madlanduna asked me to assist, because our people were getting killed.
What assistance did you - did you provide any assistance? --- Yes, I did give help to the people who were being killed or attacked. I met one young man by the name of Kay. I organised with him to go and attack people at KwaNjokogase.
And thereafter what happened? --- I found that the police were looking for me and I told Madlanduna that the police are looking for me and I had to run away to Ulundi again.
[Break in recording] ... police were looking for you? --- The South African Police.
For what reason? --- After the killings in KwaNjokogase.
Where in Ulundi did you go to? --- At the township called Kwa(?) A(?) and the barracks which normally accommodated police. I stayed there. One man by the name of M R Mkhize came and he was complaining that people are being attacked or killed at Esikhaweni, Empangeni and I was also asked to come and assist because people were getting attacked and I did agree, because ... (intervention)
Mr Dlamini, the Commission will have - hear evidence later concerning Esikhaweni so we don't need you to tell us what transpired in Esikhaweni at this stage, but what
/I want
1B I want to clarify with you is that you indicted to me when I was asking questions about the training that you received in that strange camp after you were taken from Ulundi to this place in an aeroplane, you indicated or I got the impression that you were conveying that at a later stage, once you had returned to South Africa there were some form of other training. Did I understand you correctly, or not? --- Yes.
Could you explain to us what this other training was all about? --- It was training to kidnap people, that if you are armed, you were taught how to kidnap the person and the way to find the particular person and the easiest ways to kill and the sensitive spots which, if you stabbed the particular person and then you had the chance to shoot the person.
Sorry, Mr Translator, he said ... [break in recording].
MR NTSEBEZA: (?) Through the interpretations. You mentioned sensitive areas. What do you do to the sensitive areas in order that a person should die quickly? --- Beside shooting a person, there's some ways which you can use to kill a person. These veins which are connected to the heart, so there is a way to stab a person besides shooting the person to - you can stab the person into sensitive areas to kill him instead of shooting him.
MR MACADAM: When did that training take place, firstly? --- It took place after we came back from Caprivi and were inside the country at a place called Venda. I was trained there after I was injured.
By whom were you trained? --- It was Mr - it's a white man who was known as JP to us.
/Had
1B Had you seen this person before anywhere? --- We were with him at Caprivi and he was one of the instructors.
And you say, "We received this training in Venda". Who else was there other than yourself? --- The whole of the offensive group were getting the exercise, excluding(?) myself.
I've got no further questions to the witness, Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MACADAM
MR DLAMINI: (?) Mr Dlamini, you mentioned that after you had become a special constable, a constable, you were posted to Mpumalanga and then you took part in an attack on the instructions of who you call Madlanduna, I think it is the same - Mr Luthuli. Now can you give more detail about that particular attack? --- I have explained that there was intensive violence at a place called KwaNjokogase and people from that area were running to the IFP people to ask for help and they contacted Madlanduna and Madlanduna asked me to try and help because people were coming with complaints so I tried to help.
That's exactly what I want you to say. What - when you say you attempted to help, just tell us what you did. --- I went to the area to kill all the people who were attacking these people who were running to us.
Did you kill any people and how many people did you kill? --- Many things happened. Some of them got injured, some died. I can't remember the number, because I used to do this and ran away.
Is your evidence that you don't know how many people you killed, but there were quite a number? You don't know
/how
1B how many people were injured, there were quite a number? --- Yes.
MS SOOKA: (?) You said that before you were shot, you were asked the question by Mr Macadam how many such attacks had taken place and I think the figure that was mentioned was three. Is that correct? In the Pietermaritzburg area. --- Yes, that's correct.
[Break in recording] ...? --- That's correct.
PROF MAGWAZA: (?) Mr Dlamini, my understanding is that you were trained to play an offensive role in your attacks, but each time you talk about the attacks, you come across as though you played the defensive role. You said, "Our people were being assaulted". You said, "When UDF hit us, we also hit". How did you see your role? Was it was offensive or defensive? --- My work was, I could say it was offensive or to kill anything which was there.
So you played both the offensive and the defensive role? --- No. I was only doing the offensive part, the killing part.
MR NTSEBEZA: (?) Thank you, Mr Chairman, just one clarifying question. Mr Dlamini, earlier on you referred to Sergeant Zuma who was supplying weapons. Which office was he?
INTERPRETER: May you please repeat that last part of the question?
MR NTSEBEZA: Sergeant Zuma was referred to as the one who was issuing weapons to Mr Dlamini and other people. What I want to find out, the office in which he was working. --- He was as the KwaZulu Police.
In which office he was based? Mpumalanga,
/Pietermaritzburg,
1B Pietermaritzburg, Durban? --- At Mpumalanga, Hammarsdale.
MR (?): Mr Dlamini, how long were you in the Pietermaritzburg area for on that particular series of occasions when you were involved in those attacks? --- We were not many, we were just two at that time.
The question was how long were you there for? --- About a month. We are - we're in one member of Legislature(?) in Ulundi, we were in this gentleman's house and he was a member of the Legislature.
Who was that person? --- The name just slipped away. I'll remember it as soon as possible.
Thank you. How many people did you kill in Pietermaritzburg? --- Many.
More than five, more than ten, more than twenty? --- Maybe about twenty, because we used to attack and run away.
These were men, women, children? What sort of people ... [break in recording]? --- It was young - young men, not women.
2A When you were in Pietermaritzburg, who were you reporting to? --- I used to report to Madlanduna in Hammarsdale.
And who were you - somebody must have been telling you what areas to work in and who to liaise with and how to know who your targets were. Who was that? --- It was Madlanduna.
Do you know who gave him his information? --- I don't know.
Thank you. Just one follow up question. How do you know the people you killed or shot at or attacked were
/only
2A only young men? --- Because it used to be reported in the news that so many people died in that place.
MR LYSTER: Mr Stewart, is there anything you want to add or lead your client on?
MR STEWART: No, there's nothing. Thank you, Mr Chairperson.
MR LYSTER: Thank you. As with the other witnesses, counsel will be given an opportunity at a later stage to conduct cross-examination and Mr Dlamini will be recalled later to testify with regard to his activities in Esikhaweni Township. Thank you.
MR MACADAM: (?) Mr Chairperson, Mr Dlamini has remember the name that he had forgotten previously about the person that he stayed with. --- It was Mr Mncwabe(?).
Sorry, which Mncwabe? Do you remember his first name, because there are a whole lot of Mncwabes in the Pietermaritzburg area who were involved. --- I just knew him as Mr Mncwabe who worked at the Legislature
MR MACADAM: Mr Chairperson, I'd like at this stage to call Dr Rocklyn Mark Williams. Unlike the other witnesses who have testified, Dr Williams will not be recalled at a later stage to give any evidence to Esikhaweni. His evidence will be led in its entirety at this stage. I have, prior to the commencement of proceedings, been approached by various counsel who indicated that they had a difficulty in that Dr Williams - that they wished to consult with other experts before they would be in a position to cross-examine Dr Williams and I indicated to them that I did not foresee any difficulty in allowing Dr Williams' cross-examination to stand over until a
/convenient
2A convenient stage next week where that cross-examination can take place, if necessary.
ROCKLYN MARK WILLIAMS: (Sworn States)
MR MACADAM: Is it correct that you currently hold the position of a Director of Defence Policy within the South African Ministry of Defence in the South African National Defence Force? --- It's in the Ministry of Defence in the Department of Defence. The South African National Defence Force is a component of the Department of Defence.
Do you hold any military rank over and above your academic qualification? --- I'm a colonel in the part-time forces of the South African Army.
And you were requested by the Commission to give evidence at these hearings and in response thereto you compiled a report in which you set out your qualifications and experience and the types of fields in which you are qualified to express an opinion. You furthermore furnished a report in which you dealt with various topics of a military nature, firstly the meaning of "offensive" generally in military terms. Secondly, your opinions in the field of counter-revolutionary warfare. --- That is correct.
Do you confirm the correctness of these two reports which you have compiled? --- They're very brief reports, but I do confirm the correctness of them.
If you could - these hearings are being attended by persons who have not had an opportunity to study your two reports. If you could then briefly indicate to us the nature of first of all your practical experience in the field of military matters? --- My practical experience excluding my academic experience is varied. I served in
/the
2A the former South African Defence Force as a conscript and then in the Active Citizen Force. The bulk of my military training has been as a commander in the former Umkhonto we Sizwe. I was, as I said earlier, a colonel in the South African Army and I have now civilianised in the Ministry of Defence. So that's really my professional practical experience.
And if you can indicate your service in the former SADF, was that in a combat role or not? --- No, it wasn't, bar certain combat supportive roles. I was in the South African Corp of Signals, although at a certain stage I was deployed as a platoon leader in the townships in the Eastern Cape in 1986 which is ... (intervention)
And in your service in Umkhonto we Sizwe, was that in a combat role or not? --- I was deployed in a special operations capacity primarily in intelligence, strategic and tactical intelligence.
And did you receive any training or experience in the field of revolutionary warfare during that period of your career? --- Well, the ANC was an organisation that was committed to the principles of revolutionary strategy. Obviously part and parcel of that was also studying the principles of counter-revolutionary strategy.
And in your current position as a Director of Policy, have you gained any practical experience in combat roles of defence forces, or not? --- Well, the area that I'm actually employed in is defence policy and the notion of combat goes to the heart of the operational commitments of any modern defence force.
And if you could briefly sketch for us your academic experience and qualifications? --- I have a PhD in
/civil
2A civil military relations which I obtained at the University of Essex which basically looked at the role of the South African Defence Force from 1966 to 1992. I have written quite widely on a number of different issues including military strategy, military doctrine on indeed offensive and defensive posture; on civil military relations; on human resource, it's a very broad area which I've published locally and in international journals.
And there are two aspects in which you may be of assistance to the Commission. That is the nature of the term "offensive" when used in the military context. If you could assist us in how you understand that terminology. --- I don't - look, I don't think brevity would do it, but detail, so if you'll bear with me for a couple of minutes, I'll outline the different contours and permutations of the way that "offensive" is used, with your permission, Chairperson. I think the term "offensive" - I don't think, I mean the term "offensive" is regarded as one of the key principles that actually underpin the principles of war. When one speaks about the principles of war, one speaks about a very wide range of principles, including the political objective, including the concept of manoeuvre, the principle of manoeuvre including the principle of surprise and simplicity and security, but one of the key principles is the principle of the offensive, because without the offensive it makes it extremely difficult for an armed organisation to actually accomplish the political objective that has actually been set for it, so I - the point of departure would be that the offensive lies at the heart of military
/strategy;
2A strategy; it lies at the heart of military doctrine; it lies at the heart of military training and at the end of the day it lies at the heart of military deployment, even if one has adopted a totally defensive posture. I think it's important as well to stress that there are different levels at which offensive can be defined and indeed different levels at which defensive can be defined and I'll briefly mention then at the strategic level a country can have an offensive posture, it can also have a defensive posture and that basically reflects the national political intent of the country. Is a country's intent towards neighbouring states hostile and aggressive, i.e. do they intend to actually invade it? At a strategic level, if that's the case, then you would say the strategic disposition of country is offensive. If one is speaking about an operational level, one would say that at the level of the battle, the - a country would have the capacity to react pre-emptively, to attack offensively and to actually wage offensive combat within the sphere of the battle. That's the second level. I think the third level at which the word "offensive" and "defensive" can be used is at the tactical level. That's really at the level of the skirmish. That's in an immediate area of operation, it's not a particularly range and gathering from what the witnesses have said here, that's the level that the personnel referred to and trained here were actually deployed was more at a tactical level. There one can act defensively or offensively, although the nature of tactical deployment is such that offensive and defensive tends to be quite mixed up at that level, so I think one also needs to understand "offensive" in terms of the
/levels
2A levels at which it could be waged. In terms of the definition of "offensive". As is the case with any area of professional expertise there are many definitions, so it is best at the end of the day to either refer to a definition that is regarded by most soldiers as being generic and also to look at a generic definition of "offensive". Universally I think it is regarded that Klausavit(?) who wrote the book on war provides and is regarded as possibly the most authoritive person on military strategy and Klausavit says quite simply that the three characteristics that define the offensive are threefold. The first if the capacity to invade a country and to occupy it; the second is the capacity to undermine the enemy's political will and capability to wage war and thirdly - and this third one really goes to the heart of what makes the military offensive unique as opposed to political or economic - the third aspect is it is the ability of a country of one(?) armed force to annihilate and to destroy the enemy, because at the end of the day that is what armed forces are trained for, unlike other organisations. That's the particular nature of the contract they have, either with the State or with the body politic. So that in essence is the nature of the offensive. There is a definition that I can give you that puts it ... (inaudible), with your permission, it's a definition taken from a SADF manual in 1980s, 1982 and it puts very lucidly, there's nothing unique about this. This reflects the way under modern armed forces see it and I'll read it to you and it says and this document is available for people -
"During the offensive the formation
/"organised
2A "organised for combat to make the best use of the capabilities of all its elements employs a combination of fire power and manoeuvre to dominate ..."
and here I stress the following points -
"... to dominate, neutralise and eventually destroy enemy forces to control the terrain or to disrupt enemy areas. It commands of commanders to plan thoroughly and to attack aggressively and violently to gain maximum shock effect in destroying the enemy including its material and will to resist. This aggressive action contributes to success by weakening the enemy to the point where he can no longer resist effectively".
And I think possibly that's the best definition that you're going to get of "offensive", whether it's at a strategic, operational or tactical level.
And you'll make this document from which you've quoted available ... (intervention) --- I can make it available.
... to all the counsel as soon as you've concluded your evidence. And that you quoted as being from a South African Defence Force Manual? --- In the early eighties.
In the early eighties and today in the nineties, does that definition still hold in the new South African Defence Force or not? --- This is standard doctrine. This is standard doctrine of any modern military armed
/force,
2A force, so it doesn't change, at whatever level one is referring to it and there's nothing particularly contentious about it doctrinally. It's shared by all modern armed forces and indeed it's shared by guerilla armed forces as well.
Now if we could move on to the next aspect where we would like to hear you on and that is the concept of counter revolutionary warfare. Can you briefly explain to the Commission what that concept is, what it embraces? --- The concept of counter revolutionary warfare really originated as a result of the experiences that the French had in French Indo China, initially, where it was felt that in order to defeat a revolutionary army, it was necessary to take the principles of revolutionary warfare which at that time were very much the principles of the late ... (inaudible) ... and quite literally turned him on the head. The true principles that really underpin counter revolutionary warfare, the two points of departure is that firstly in counter revolutionary warfare, unlike on the modern conventional battlefield, you cannot defeat the enemy by force of arms alone and there are numerable books that elaborate on this principle; that the key thing in this regard is to actually ensure the political and the moral conquest of the population that you're seeking to win over. Military - military force has a role in that, but it's always subservient to and part of the political and the moral direction. So that's the first aspect. It's a different type of war. It's a political war in essence. In order to enable to counter revolutionary organisation to accomplish those objectives, counter revolutionaries believe you take these principles
/and
2A and you turn them on their head and this is being done by a number of theorists. One theorist who had considerable influence in the former South African State in the 1970s and the 1980s and indeed to a large extent the counter revolutionary strategy of the State was based on that, is the - is Colonel John McKeon who was based in Vietnam and he wrote a book which is quite an authoritive book called The Art of Counter Revolutionary Warfare and he takes the principles of revolutionary warfare, turns them around and devises a counter revolutionary strategy, which is quite detailed, but which I could outline in a bit more detail if the Chair requested it.
If you could just outline the salient features of that concept to us. --- His - his definition of it is most probably the most pithy, because he looks at the five principles that underpin counter revolutionary warfare. He says the first principle is for that country or that state or that organisation waging counter revolutionary warfare is what he called you must preserve yourself and you must annihilate the enemy. You've got to preserve your own power base. This accords with your general principles of war. It's pointless going on to the offensive if your own power base is not secure, because if your own power base is going to be undermined, well, then you can't wage war, logically and self-evidently. So he says you've got to preserve your own power base; ensure that your own social and political support base and your infrastructure support base is intact and then at the same time one must obviously continue waging war against the enemy, but that's not sufficient. He goes on to outline the second principle and he calls that the consolidation
/of
2A of strategic bases. He says in order to win this political war, you can't lapse into sort of a false sense of confidence. You've got to out and win political support amongst critical sections of the population. They may not people who traditionally supported you, but at the end of the day they are the people who are going to ensure the success of your counter revolutionary campaign, hence such statements as the war is 80%, political 20%, military - so you've got to make sure you win over support in the political and the social sectors of your population. The third principle he outlines is he says you've got to do this by mobilising the masses and you've got to mobilise the masses politically. You've got to mobilise the masses militarily, indeed the two of those are indistinguishable, in order to accomplish this. You've got have a variety of political organisations capable of doing that and you've got to ensure that they have the military means of protecting themselves. He says the fourth principle is you've got to try and secure outside support for your struggle, because without that you will be deprived of legitimacy and it's essential to have that international recognition and the fifth point he maintains is that in order to do that you've got to have unity of effort. That once again is a military term, is you've got to make sure that all the different agencies and departments and individuals involved in this counter revolutionary struggle work as one and don't start pulling in different directions and those basically are your principles of counter revolutionary warfare.
Sorry, Dr Williams, could you just repeat your fourth one? I didn't catch you. You were talking quite
/quickly
2A quickly and I didn't catch it entirely. If you wouldn't mind, please? --- The fourth one is called securing international support. It acknowledges that any struggle waged by guerillas or waged by government forces requires levels of international support. Clearly your guerillas will be supported by international opinion, in some case they'll be supported by countries who provide them with rear(?) bases. Similarly, counter revolutionaries acknowledge and recognise the importance of international support for the effort, both morally but also practically, financially, because one's own resource base is quite limited.
And lastly the concept the unity of effort, between whom would there be unity? --- The unity of effort works at a number of different levels. It's got to work all the way down from national literally to village level or local level, be it rural or urban and it's got to be between such critical actors as the political authorities, the political elite. It's got to be between the civilian administration and it's got to be between the armed forces. It can't become a purely military exercise and it can't become a purely political or civilian exercise. All these - it's a difficult thing to achieve. It's more difficult for the State to achieve that than a revolutionary organisation. The State has a whole lot of judicial, juridical, legal and political constraints that hamper that unity of effort, but a high level of unity effort is required in order to accomplish those objectives.
And you said that this was one authority in this field. Were there any other authorities that you feel
/were
2A were significant and ... (intervention)? --- There was, at a more general strategic level and a person who also had considerable influence over the formulation of strategy in this country in the seventies and eighties was a General Boufre(?) who was a general in the Algerian Armed Forces and he wrote a book called "On Strategy". He was the person who really outlined the concept of total strategy, which had considerable influence in the sixties and the seventies in many developing countries. There's a Frenchman called David Kaloula(?) who also wrote on this, on the art of counter revolutionary warfare. There was a person, I can't remember his initials now, but quite authoritive called Thompson, who wrote about the British experience in the Malaysian. In this country the former General Pops Fraser in the 1960s wrote on the application of these principles in the South African environment, so there are a number of different authorities. Those are the major ones, but if one goes into any military library, into the archives, you'll find that there's a wide range of books, both of an academic and of a doctrinal nature that are written on this.
And in the South African context, in the early 1960s a conflict arose between various groups who now are known as the Liberation Struggle and the then government of the day. What type of conflict would you classify that struggle? --- Well, clearly according to the definition that we're using now and the doctrine we're using now, that would have been defined as one of the earlier stages of a revolutionary struggle. The organisation had committed itself to armed conflict; was involved in the initial political preparation, the Stage 1
/and
2A and Stage 2 of classic revolutionary organisation and so that would be the initial stages of the organisation of a liberation struggle.
And what was the response by the government of the day to that revolutionary ... (incomplete)? --- I suppose that's a question of historical record, because in 1960/1961 in some senses the State was responding reactively, but doctrinally one finds in the 1960s the State and particularly the armed forces beginning to do a lot of work on the strategic and the doctrinal ramifications of counter revolutionary strategy. They do this both at a doctrinal level. You'll find in the late sixties the then South African Defence Force organising a number of manoeuvres and exercises up in the then far Northern Transvaal with the intention of organising various counter insurgency manoeuvres. This is reflected in a lot of the thinking in the former SADF; it's reflected in the doctrinal development in the staff colleges and within the defence force as a whole, so I mean there were a series of practical and doctrinal preparations that were initiated then and received full expression as the South African Defence Force is deployed in the then South West Africa and actually begins to gain a practical experience of counter insurgency warfare.
And could you sort of in broad terms sketch for us how this experience in South African forces developed and what it actually entailed? --- It's difficult to do it in a brief period of time, but I suppose one can refer to a number of salient moments.
Yes, if you could do that, please? --- The - as I have said earlier, your earliest origins were in the
/late
2A late 1960s where you find people like General Pops Fraser actually writing manuals on and actually delivering a couple of speeches on the then Springbok Radio on the whole principles and the strategy of counter revolutionary warfare. You have these exercises in the far Northern Transvaal which are supposed to resemble the Zambezi Valley. South African Defence Force officers and non-commissioned officers also received some limited exposure at the time in the then Rhodesia, either as staff officers or gaining direct hands on experience by being seconded to the South African Police who up until 1972 were being deployed in Rhodesia. Experience in Angola, experience in Mozambique, officers being attached there to assist and learn from - from those armed forces. In 1970s you find that the doctrine of counter insurgency, doctrine and strategy becomes enshrined in the training of the defence force and by the mid, the late 1970s you find that at least as part of your infantry training counter insurgency training are both - are primarily of a rural type, but I mean increasingly of an urban type as well, becomes instituted in the training curriculum and cycles of the Defence Force. This obviously corresponds to the fact that in Namibia the South African Defence Force takes over responsibility for border protection from the South African Police in 1972 and is involved in quite a protracted counter insurgency campaign and struggle against the SWAPO forces, receives some exposure to that in Rhodesia in the late 1970s when South African personnel are deployed in support of the Rhodesian Army and then obviously on its own doorstep, post 1976 begins to conduct its own counter insurgency campaigns within South Africa
/itself
2A itself as MK and to a lesser extent APLA's armed attacks increased.
And could we deal briefly with the issue of South West Africa. How was that dealt with by the South African Defence Force? --- Well, organisationally it's - once again that's quite detailed, but organisationally it was dealt with via the establishment of a territorial command in South West African which was headed by a South African Defence Force officer. The command itself was divided up into a number of different sectors. Within these sectors there were different configurations of forces which were used to counter the insurgents, the guerillas. Some of these - most of these forces were of a counter insurgency nature. There were a number of different units that were established towards this end. In addition to counter insurgency units there were special force units and specialist units that were used in that regard. There was the attempt also - we spoke earlier about the question of unity of effort - there was an attempt in the mid seventies to actually integrate and try and co-ordinate the activities of the different State departments involved in the administration of South West Africa to ensure the unity of this effort. It's really a very detailed area and ... (intervention)
Well, perhaps I can just put to you what I think would be accepted as common knowledge, is that you had this SWAPO which was trying to drive the South Africans out of South West Africa. They were based in Angola, which was then headed by the MPLA which allowed SWAPO to act from their territory and also were sympathetic to SWAPO's cause and within South West Africa there was a
/local
2A local government with the South African Defence Force. Could you explain to us, just briefly in the concept of counter revolutionary warfare what actually transpired. How was SWAPO - how was an attempt made to curtail SWAPO and its backers? --- Your key area is, because this is counter revolutionary warfare, was an attempt to organise the population politically and that is why leeway was allowed for such organisations who were regarded as moderate at the time in South West Africa, such as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and a number of smaller organisations to mobilise and organise amongst the population. Militarily a number of strategies were followed which were consistent with the rural counter insurgency campaign. The first was there were levels of area protection to protect the local population; a number of cross-border raids were launched; there were search and destroy operations in some cases across the border in Angola, but also in Angola there was a concomitant strategy of trying to empower UNITA as what was seen as a moderate option to MPLA via the provision of logistical and financial support so as to enable UNITA to establish both a presence inside Angola and ultimately to possibly constitute a government in Angola which would then advantage the perceived stabilisation of Namibia, South West Africa, both politically and militarily. I think the point was made once by General Malan that it was - it's pointless trying to occupy a country like Angola militarily, because it would be a Vietnam scenario, it would be an endless war of attrition and that the key thing to stabilise Angola, at least as far as the pursuance of South African Government interest at the time
/were
2A were concerned, was to install a government that was moderate; that had the support of - or was perceived to be moderate by the then political authorities and that had the backing of the population and appropriate levels of legitimacy and that could also act as a buffer against further incursions into North and South West Africa.
You talked about South African logistical and financial support to UNITA. Was there any other form of support which they received? --- Well, direct support and I think this is also known public, direct support was channelled by the Director of Special Tasks, Chief of Staff Intelligence and that really constituted the key support that UNITA required. UNITA, I think unlike many other rebel movements, did have a basis inside Angola amongst the Avunbundu(?), so it was based to a certain extent amongst the Angolan population, but logistical, financial and material support needed to be channelled to it and was by Ops Disa(?) of Director to Special Tasks.
And Director of - which department did it belong? --- That fell under the then Chief of Staff Intelligence. It no longer exists.
And I just take it from these terms that this was a component to the South African Defence Force as opposed to any other State Department? --- Well, Chief of Staff Intelligence was the intelligence division entrusted with the responsibility for providing intelligence to the then South African Defence Force and still is with the South African National Defence Force.
And you then also dealt with the issue of, as you've said I think in your own words, when the violence or the correct term, but trouble is coming closer to the South
/African
2A African doorstep and the ANC and APLA. Could you explain what was done there? --- I think it was declared by the then State President, P W Botha, that one of the key essences of the total strategy concept at the time was to ensure the broadening of the State, the basis of support and once again this corresponds to the principle of counter revolutionary warfare, the establishment of strategic bases and that was done very much via a system such as the Tri Cameral System, attempts to woo and win over sectors of the black working class, to recognition of trade unions, granting of permanent domicile in urban areas and to a certain extent also trying to institute those principles of counter revolutionary warfare within, particularly after 1984, particularly after Sebokeng and the Vaal uprising in 1984 within the affected black areas itself and you find the classic principles of counter revolutionary warfare being applied there; counter mobilisation, mobilisation of the masses, establishment of political organisations, that was seen to be stabilising or alternatively as a counter balancing force to the influence of the liberation movement and at that time the mass democratic movement. Arming to a certain extent of local groupings. In some senses quite a literal application of the principles of McKeon and that's reflected in the documentation that comes out at - at the time.
And if we can deal with certain aspects. If we look at - and there again I think this will become as accepted as now common cause, we would say that the ANC was based or had military bases in Mozambique. We had a government FRELIMO, which was supportive of the ANC and supplied
/those
2A those bases and gave moral and other support. Do you know of any military response taken to counter that? --- Well, there were ranges(?), I mean the type of responses one would use against that and, I mean, that's also possibly for historical record, there were a range of responses. They were political and political and diplomatic pressure, it was economic pressure as well, the blockade of Lesotho being a case in point; the slowing down of freight trains to Zimbabwe being a case in point, but militarily yes, there were a number of raids launched by special forces, SADF special forces personnel, sometimes specialist units into what was known as the front line states, Maputho, Harare, Gaberones, Luanda were all on the receiving end of this for virtually a whole decade in the 1980s.
And there was also a political organisation, RENAMO, which was opposed to the FRELIMO government and had commenced a struggle, an armed struggle to overthrow FRELIMO. Specifically in regard to that organisation, can you comment? --- Well, support was provided by a number of different conduits to RENAMO. RENAMO also organised to a certain extent within Mozambique as well, so it had its own support base there, but it's documented what type of support was provided to RENAMO. It was once again logistical material, financial support, a certain amount of political support in the sense that their contact with sympathetic organisations were facilitated at the time by certain government departments. The principle was precisely the same as Angola. The installation of - the possible installation of a government that would be more sympathetically predisposed towards the concept of a
/constellation
2A constellation of states in Southern Africa at the time and one that would thwart the type of support that FRELIMO was, at least prior to the Nkomati Accord in 1993 - 1983/84, providing to the ANC and to a lesser extent other liberation movements.
Was there armed - I mean military support in the form of either arms or training? --- Well, there were extensive arms provided. There were a number of documents that had to conform, the Gorrin(?) Goseré(?) revealed the Vaz(?) diaries; the trial of former Roland Hunter and the - not former, I mean he's still with us - the trial of Roland Hunter revealed that. It's been documented in a number of places; the air drops that they had, that were organised for RENAMO; the type of South African Defence Force support that was provided ranging from small and heavy calibre weapons and finances, provision of logistical facilities within South Africa itself; utilisation of Chief of Staff Intelligence and Special Forces infrastructure to assist RENAMO.
And which component of the SADF supplied that assistance? --- Well, the tasking for this was - well, the co-ordination of this was actually done, was co-ordinated by Chief of Staff Intelligence. As I said earlier, this was done by the Director to Special Tasks which co-ordinated these types of endeavours in Angola, in Zimbabwe, in Lesotho and in Mozambique and presumably further afield within Africa, so the co-ordination was done by Chief of Staff Intelligence, indeed had to be done by Chief of Staff Intelligence because the nature of this type of support is both covert and clandestine. The actual tasking of particular individuals depended on the
/nature
2A nature of the operation. Special Forces would be tasked for the training and the deployment of people if the nature of the task at hand was a Special Force type of operation. The Air Force should be tasked if it was required to drop men and material and equipment into Mozambique, so the tasking depended on the nature of the task in hand, but basically ran across the entire Defence Force.
And you used - this support was done, you said, in a covert and/or clandestine manner. Would you first of all just explain to the Commission what "covert" in military terms means? --- My reading of "covert" would be the concealment of the source of a particular operation or a particular initiative, whereas "clandestine" would refer more to maintaining secrecy around a particular operation. "Covert", you wish to actually disguise the origins of the support. "Clandestine" is simply making sure that your operations are conducted in secret.
And the - one of the major issues which this Commission is focused with is the situation in the mid eighties in KwaZulu-Natal. Now in a nutshell, this - I'm drawing now from what emerged in a very lengthy trial in the Durban High Court last year, but it appeared there that the Inkatha Freedom Party indicated that it was coming under attack from the UDF which at that stage was perceived to be an alliance or ally of the African National Congress, attacks taking place on political leaders in the Inkatha Freedom Party, destruction of property, disruption of their political rallies. That resulted in the South African Defence Force supplying training to 200 Inkatha supporters who would then serve as
/a paramilitary
2A a paramilitary force and that training was given in the Caprivi, also under the Special Forces component of the SADF. Can you make any general comments at all in that scenario, bearing in mind what you've outlined to us already? --- General comments with regard to the strategy pursued or to the nature of the training?
To specifically that scenario, the fact that here the SADF would train 200 Inkatha supporters once the conflict had arisen between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the United Democratic Front in KwaZulu-Natal. --- From what one hears and from what one reads in the document - and I'm venturing, this is my opinion - is it looks as though the type of strategy adopted was very much consistent with the principles and the strategy of counter revolutionary warfare. Here was an organisation that perceived itself to be under direct attack and direct threat. It had consolidated itself to a certain extent politically, but it required the ... (inaudible) ... to consolidate itself further and extend its influence and actually neutralise its perceived political opposition and so the whole process of mobilisation of the masses is reflected in the way this unit was trained in the counter mobilisation component. The equipping of this organisation with the military capability to both protect itself and respond more proactively is reflected in the organisation of the defensive, the VIP and the offensive components. Its need for a thorough understanding and ability to anticipate the situation was reflected in the request for an intelligence capability and that's largely consistent with classic counter revolutionary and counter insurgency strategy, so that would be my reading of the
/way
2A way State planners at the time were responding, via the provision of this type of assistance.
Now you've had an opportunity for the last three days to be in attendance and listen to the evidence of firstly the Political Commissar of this group and then a member who was trained and who was placed in the contra-mobilisation group and a member who was trained and was placed into the offensive group and the two trainees both indicated in their evidence that they were unaware as to who their instructors were. Can you comment specifically on that? --- I'd require a bit more detail to ... (intervention)
They indicated when they were questioned, there were indications that they thought they were a private security company or the last witness said he simply didn't know at all, but clearly at no stage was it explained to them they were being trained by the South African Defence Force. --- Well, I think clearly that refers to the desire of the organisation, in this case the South African Defence Force providing the support to conceal. It's a covert operation. It's to conceal the nature of the support being provided to them, the true origins, hence the need for a private security company.
And if we go back to the conflict which prevailed in KwaZulu-Natal at that stage, which Inkatha said there was the killing of their leaders, destruction of their property, disruption of their rallies. How does the training that these persons claim they received correspond with what would be a proper response to that situation? --- In some sense - I'll answer that at two levels. In some sense it's not an easy question to answer, because
/one
2A one has to really specify what the precise political objectives of the organisation were at the time, but if one takes the training itself, in some senses the training is pretty generic. For instance the basic training provided to these people is the type of basic training you'd receive in any military organisation. It's PT, it's drill, it's musketry, it's field craft and, I mean, that's done throughout the world, at least in the 20th century. The type of training that they begin to receive in terms of weapons corresponds in my reading more to what would be called basic infantry weapons training or platoon weapons training. That includes both small calibre and heavy calibre weaponry. Once again, if you're going to train a standard infantry unit, that's the type of weaponry that they'd actually be exposed to at the end of the day, although if these units were going to be trained for more defensive purpose, I would submit that training them in mortars, in this case the small mortars, 60mm mortars, training them in rocket launchers and that, may be a useful exercise, but if the declared purpose is simply VIP protection and defensive, it's a moot point why they were actually being trained in that, but be that as it may. Maybe that type of exposure is of benefit to the creation of military culture and a military mind. The training in plastic explosives, in home-made explosives as was confirmed over here, is a bit more difficult to comprehend, because it's difficult to see where that actually fits in. It's a very wide training base that you're actually providing to people, but if the declared intention was simply to train them for defensive purposes, as you mention now, then I would say two things need to be
/made.
2A made. It becomes puzzling why they - if I could just make the following point before I go any further. No type of weaponry or equipment is inherently offensive and defensive bar obvious examples like intercontinental ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons. It's very much the intention, the doctrine and the anticipated deployment behind the armed forces. They tell you what, whether the nature of the training is offensive or defensive or for what purpose it's going to be oriented. So that's why I say they received training in this, but the moment one starts speaking of training like house penetration, attacks, ambushes, concealment of evidence and the other things that were actually referred to, one is moving into a much more grey area, into a much more offensive, one would read, if one is training people for those type of purposes, in which those weapons would be less used in a defensive role. I think the Liebenberg Report, the former Chief Army General Liebenberg, refers to the type of training that a defensive element should receive and he says so in the report, it should be in basic military procedures, crowd control, protection of installations and he mentions a couple of other - I can't remember them off-hand, but - small calibre weapons, but here you're speaking about heavier calibre weapons; you're speaking about the ability to plant and detonating - make explosives; you're speaking about, at a tactical level, a more offensive role. So one would read into that that regardless of whether we actually look at whether it was an offensive or a defensive unit, you're reading into that a much more proactive role for the personnel who had been trained and who you intend deploying.
/I have
2A I have been informed by the panel that there is a witness that is only available to give evidence today and that person must be heard and ... (incomplete)
(END OF CASSETTE NO 2A)
(START OF CASSETTE NO 2B)
2b
MR MACADAM: ... and the other aspect, it came out, I think in the first witness' evidence specifically, is that he placed a lot of emphasis on the fact that the weapons which he handled appeared to be mainly of Soviet Block origin. Can you comment specifically on that? --- It wasn't unusual in basic infantry training, both in the 1980s and in the 1990s, to equip infantry platoons with Soviet made weapons, with RPDs, with RPGs, but to totally equip a force with foreign weaponry without using R4s, R1s at the time, would seem to confirm the covert nature of this operation and that's a desire to actually conceal the true nature of this unit and its origins. That's the reading that in my opinion I would make or something like that.
And there was also evidence of manoeuvres to attack houses where the occupants of the houses would be killed. Now can you comment on that? --- I haven't heard extensive evidence on that, I mean, I've read the evidence on that. It's difficult to work out what the precise motive for that was, although there is allowance made and, as I say, this is not a rule in counter revolution strategy, but there is allowance made in counter revolutionary thinking at least and it's a very small allowance, that under certain circumstances when the political and legal constraints of a situation prohibits you from engaging more robustly with your opponent, that
/certain
2B certain acts of, I suppose one would call it counter terror, could be permitted, but it's very qualified.
And two of the witnesses also mentioned the fact that they were told that they had to hide from the police. There's evidence given that when the attack on the house took place a sock would have to be placed over the ejector of the firearm to prevent the cartridge cases ejecting and landing on the ground. One person said as well how to escape from police custody. How would that fit in? --- Well, once again going back to the two previous comments that I made and that you referred to, I mean, that once again confirms the covert nature of this deployment and the desire to hide the origins and the nature of the units and the personnel being used in these attacks, I think self-evidently.
And if we look at the initial objectives, the prevention of the assassinations of political leaders, defence(?) of property, disruption of rallies, now I think this is also common knowledge that the South African Defence Force was employed in the mid eighties specifically to bring to an end the violence that had taken over in KwaZulu-Natal. Are you able to describe just briefly what that was response was, how that response or need was catered? --- Well, the former South African Defence Force and the present South African National Defence Force, when it described urban counter - the involvement of the army or the defence force in urban counter insurgency warfare, is very emphatic about the use of the defence force, not using the defence force in police supportive roles and it derives its definition from the reading of the Defence Act in 1957 and it says the
/only
2B only military task which army can do in which they're not in support of the police, are things like protection of natural key points, protection of certain government buildings and certain forms of reconnaissance, for instance, observation posts, it says otherwise if it acts in support of the police, it always acts subordinate to the police; it will not use police weapons; it will adhere to the principle of minimum force and the principle of minimum force will be reflected in rules of engagement; it will respect the local population - this is doctrinally at least - it will maintain its image throughout. So the principle is very much in urban counter insurgency operations, unlike other urban counter insurgency principles elsewhere in the world, of acting in support of the police. So its role is very limited and its role is almost exclusively defensive in that role. In a rural counter insurgency role. In a conventional role, it's allowed to assume an offensive capability, but in an urban coign environment it acts strictly in support of the police and that was the principles in the 1980s and those are the principles now.
And in that context would you expect then the SADF to have been deployed with mortars, RPG7s and Soviet Block weaponry? --- Not at the time. Not in an urban coign environment, not in an urban counter insurgency environment. That would be deployed with armoured personnel carriers, Casspirs, Buffels, small calibre weapons, teargas canisters which can only be fired on authorisation of the police - obviously your officers would carry pistols and then obviously your support equipment.
/And
2B And you've heard certain of the witnesses have sketched how they operated once they had returned and received that training in the Hammarsdale and the Pietermaritzburg areas. Are you able to furnish any comments or opinions to the type of activities they claim they were involved in, how they operated? --- Well, that - I mean, the training they received in - that appears to be the type of training that was provided by Special Forces, obviously it's difficult to confirm that now, but the range of training they received seem to be of a more of a special operations, possibly a special forces type training. One can only surmise that the reason this was done was that because of the existing political and legal constraints which limited your defence force to the type of roles that I've outlined now, that if one was going to engage more proactively in the type of counter revolutionary strategy that was envisaged in this area, then one would have to utilise a different approach, a different type of training and possibly a different calibre of personnel.
Can you draw any links at all between training received and what these persons claim they actually did once they got back? --- Well, it appears to be consistent. I mean they were quite capable of using the weapons that they were trained in, be it hand grenades, you know, be it light calibre weapons. What they used was what they were trained in.
And you've had - I don't know if you've had an opportunity to go through the documents which were handed in as an exhibits in the trial in the Durban Supreme Court last year where, for example, you have the Liebenberg
/Report,
2B Report, a report prior to the Liebenberg Report where, for example, a definition is given of "offensiveness", which is then in brackets described as, "of beskermings-komponent".
MS (?): Protection component.
MR MACADAM: The documents and this was also commented on by the Court at the time that these documents were incomplete. There wasn't a complete set of documents. Furthermore, there were documents going up to various meetings and discussion groups, without any indication of what discussion took place, what policy decisions were taken after those discussions. The Court also remarked there were variances between what was contained in the Liebenberg Report as to what the categories of trainees would be, the type of training and in fact what was given in the Caprivi. Bearing in mind all these difficulties with the documents, do you see any factors or issues which are relevant in those documents which could assist this Commission in making its findings? --- In light of what you've said, I've read the documents last week. I mean, I think there is a consistent theme that flows through the documents and that refers to the type of capabilities required and the type of structures required to accomplish them. Not every capability is reflected in the structure. Sometimes a number of capabilities are reflected in a particular structure. The only inconsistency I see in the document is the document I think just prior to the Liebenberg Report where the offensive capability is equated with the protection element. In all other documents those two are actually separated out. The protection capability - the defensive
/capability
2B capability is seen as one capability and the offensive capability is seen as another and they are both allocated their respective structures with which to accomplish those particular tasks. Even though General Liebenberg says at the end of the day that when the offensive unit isn't actually in operation, they can double up as VIP protection, which is not uncommon actually with Special Force type units, because they've got such a wide skills base they can and they do operate a drill(?), as our Special Forces did with Lore Kabilla(?) in Zaire more recently. So I think there is a very consistent theme that runs through it in terms of the type of capabilities that are required at a political and military level and the extent to which that's reflected in structures and strategies.
And how would you compare the requirements set out in the Liebenberg Report with the training that these trainees claim they received? --- Well, in most cases they received the type of training that was actually requested, although I did notice in the Liebenberg Report he - General Liebenberg places quite a lot of premium on the defensive element receiving the type of training that he outlines there which is more of a tactically defensive nature, whereas it sounds from the evidence that they were given a very wide range of training, that included both tactically defensive and tactically offensive weaponry and doctrine. He seems to veer with the defensive element at least more towards - a more conservative training for them, whilst leaving the more robust training for the offensive component.
And could you just clarify, you did indicate the
/minimum
2B minimum force concept which prevailed in the SADF's involvement in the violence in the mid eighties. Now I take there - that one would have the use, for example, when one wanted to just prevent a mob killing people at a rally or attacking and destroying property, one would have to use for example rubber bullets, shotguns with non-lethal pellets, teargas, etcetera. Is that correct? --- That's correct. You know, your disposition would also be more defensive. You wouldn't barge, you know - if you were going to break up crowds, I mean, at the end of the day, you wouldn't barge in and start - well, you weren't supposed to have to start massacring(?) people. You would employ a range of measures prior to being involved in that.
And the - if you can comment on the desirability, if we hear the evidence that the police will claim they were going to be members of the KwaZulu Police, but it would appear that an official and proper appointment within the KwaZulu Police only took place at a later stage, the desirability of civilians having knowledge of the type of weaponry which these people had? --- Given the level of training, it would be worrying. The advantage of having people in uniform who have got specialist knowledge, is that they fall under the command and control of the armed force in question, but if there are number of people with that type of specialist knowledge and access to material and access to the resources running around with those type of skills, I think one witnesses the type of mayhem that's been all too common since the eighties, in certain areas.
And another factor that possibly you might comment
/on,
2B on, is the factor when the persons were selected, they claim that there was no inquiry to establish whether they had previous convictions or were wanted by the police? --- That's surprising when you recruit someone, because normally you'd like to check on a person's psychological profile. I think particularly in the military you'd like to check on someone's psychological profile for many reasons. You'd also like to check on their medical profile, you'd like to check on the educational qualifications. I mean when recruiting, like in any corporate organisation, you do a thorough assessment of who you're actually taking in. It just seems a bit peculiar, if not a bit irresponsible just to take in people willy-nilly without actually checking on their background.
And the fact that the persons claim that only supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party were selected as recruits? --- Well, I think that related to the nature of the political project at hand. It was a political request for military and armed assistance and that was one of the criterion that were stipulated right at the beginning.
And finally, just for the assistance of persons who are not versed in military terminology, can you just generally described to us what "Special Forces" entail? What type of soldiers are Special Forces? --- Well, in any military scenario you require military personnel who are capable of operating behind enemy lines in the enemy rear areas who possess a wide variety of specialist skills to perform a number of different tasks. It may be to harass the enemy; it may be to disrupt his or her
/logistical
2B logistical lines; communications; command structures; headquarters, by blowing them up, by sabotaging them, to put it quite simply. It may the need to acquire strategic intelligence or tactical intelligence in the enemy's rear areas. You may have a need to assassinate or remove certain military figure heads or under certain circumstances certain political figure heads. You can use Special Forces in a ... (inaudible) and I mean that goes back over the centuries. So Special Forces are highly trained personnel who have to work in both covert and clandestine conditions with a wide range of skills. They can deployed inside a country or they can be deployed outside a country. If you're fighting a battle outside the country you'll deploy them there. If you're being attacked and your enemy is inside your own territory, you'll employ them internally and indeed in rural counter insurgency allowance is made for the utilisation of Special Forces under such circumstances when the capabilities of your normal military forces aren't sufficient to deal with the enemy that you're actually facing. That I think in essence is Special Forces, distinguished from other specialist component within a defence force.
I have no further questions, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MACADAM
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Dr Williams. You will be required at a later stage and it will be communicated to you when cross-examination may take place and questions by the panel as well. We'll break until 2 o'clock.
LONG ADJOURNMENT
/ON RESUMPTION
2B ON RESUMPTION
MR NTSEBEZA: Thank you, Chairperson. Before we resume, I think it is proper for me, through you, Chairperson, to make an observation about certain remarks that have been going on since the beginning of these proceedings.
The substance of the remarks, especially today, something I will comment on in a moment, but I think what we need to say is that we must support these proceedings, the sort of decorum that we accord proceedings in a Court of Law. We have made the point that we are not in a court, that we are not a Court of Law, but the point must be made that the decorum that attaches to these proceedings is the decorum that would fit a Court of Law.
I am particularly perturbed that I should address the remarks to my colleagues, to lawyers. Since the inception of these proceedings there are many remarks that have been made that are of a destructing(?) nature.
Attorneys and counsel have remarked loudly in some instances, whilst proceedings are going on. You will recall that in today's proceedings I had the occasion to intervene when a witness had indicated where he was shot. Now I'm subject to correction, but I think I heard the distinct remark when the witness said he was shot in the foot, that there was a remark coming from my left which is where the lawyers are sitting, that that is where his brains are. Now I'm subject to correction.
Now if I've heard that remark, not only is the remark offensive for what it says, but it address what I want to be saying, namely that these loud remarks are of a nature that cause us to be distracted from the business
/which
2B which we are here gathered about. Of course, if the remark that I heard is what I think I heard, it is offensive in the extreme. It does not help the process for which this Commission was set up and given the race of the person who was testifying at the time and generally the race of those who are the legal representatives here, if the remark as I said that I heard is what I think I heard, it's very unfortunate.
I'm not making an issue about it. I'm simply saying I would expect that in this particular proceedings we should conduct ourselves in a way in which we would conduct ourselves in Courts of Law. That goes generally for the public, but it goes generally and particularly for my colleagues, lawyers, who should know better.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, what perturbs me is that this matter has now on a very personal basis been directed at me and my colleagues in general with the general stroke of a broad paintbrush as if we are acting unprofessionally or unethically in making remarks from here.
Now what I object to most stringently is the way in which here, in public - I don't know whether it is for purposes of publication or what, this kind of remark is made instead of if there was a problem, the lawyers be called to your chambers and this be discussed, because that would have been the proper procedure and I want to tell you, Mr Chairman, I think it is objectionable that this remark was made by Mr Dumisa Ntsebeza, where we have no way of defending ourselves and where he himself even says that he is not sure that he heard the correct remark.
I object to this kind of situation, Mr Chairman. We are here to assist you and I think most of us have
/indicated
2B indicated and have showed it quite clearly that we are here to assist and we've lived up to that intention. I object to this, Mr Chairman.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Visser. You talked about proper procedures and I would suggest that the proper procedure is not to make sotto voce comments of any sort and if people want to make remarks out of frustration or whatever it is, please restrict them to yourselves or to another forum after these proceedings. I'm not going to let the matter be debated any further. Thank you.
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, may I at this point in time - it's Mr Van Zyl speaking - before this witness testifies, there's just certain remarks that I would like to make, if you would allow me at this stage, please.
I understand from the Committee that the position is currently that a decision has been made, a final decision by yourselves to the effect that the witness, Mr Varney, should not be cross-examined and viewed in the light of the time available for his evidence and the time constraints occasioned by the fact that he is leaving the country tomorrow, there will be no time for cross-examination at this stage. However, there are certain aspects which I would like to place on record in this regard and the first aspect is that the clients represented by myself, about nine in number and two of these have had their names mentioned by witnesses who have already testified. I assume that there will be no further witnesses, other than Mr Varney, who could possibly implicate any of my clients.
The effect of that and this is my submission that the rest of my clients, other than the two whose names
/have
2B have been mentioned, although one of them will also be implicated by Mr Varney's submission, that these people have been notified because Mr Varney was to testify before this Commission and during which testimony the persons would have been implicated and if that was not to be the case there would be no purpose in notifying these people.
The Commission this morning indicated ... [break in recording] ... and also in the search of truth. It's my submission that in not being given the opportunity to cross-examine Mr Varney on certain aspects which relate to my clients and which implicate my clients is not, with respect, the correct way of pursuing the truth. You have indicated that you will make no findings, but that a finding will be made at a later stage.
What is however worrying in this regard is the fact that a certain value must be placed or attached to Mr Varney's submission and at this stage it's very unclear how this will be done and what value will be attached to his evidence seen in the light of the fact that he will testify without having sworn the oath and without any opportunity for cross-examination. It also creates a problem for those people who at a later stage must make a finding, seeing as they will not have tested evidence on which to base their decision.
As far as Mr Varney's submission is concerned, it is also my submission that that will be a mere interpretation of certain documents and testimony adduced during the so-called Malan trial last year and that is, in my submission, the function of the Commission and not the function of a witness who, by way of submission, an unsworn submission, then puts forward his version and
/interpretation.
2B interpretation.
It is also my submission that with the benefit of instructions from certain clients who were authors of some of these mentioned documents that in all probability a very short period of time by means of cross-examination, the correct versions or the versions of our clients could have been put to this witness in order to arrive at the truth and that could also have had the effect that Mr Varney could in respect of certain conclusions and inferences which he has made could perhaps changed these or changed his views.
It also would appear to a person that in the light of the fact that notice has been given that Mr Varney will testify and I assumed under oath, that such a notification was given to a colleague's attorney, to the effect that Mr Varney's evidence will be the only evidence which will implicate his client. However, that letter was dated the 1st of August of this year and it would seem as if meanwhile a decision has been taken that Mr Varney will not testify under oath and I would like to enquire to enable me to evaluate his evidence. I'd like to argue and take certain points of view and in order to be able to do that I would like to know who took this decision and why this was taken.
The prejudice to my clients is, with respect, not only a potential of prejudicial findings which could be made against them, but it's also seated in the fact that there's been wide media coverage of this matter and these proceedings, it will probably be broadcast on the news tonight and also broadcast abroad, also in the press. Mr Varney's evidence will be quoted or will be referred
/to.
2B to. This will have the effect that the image created as regards my clients and insofar as they are implicated, that this could be very prejudicial to their interests and this could mean that they will be permanently implicated in a negative sense.
MR LYSTER: [Break in recording] ... twenty past two. I understand the gist of the submission that you're making.
MR VAN ZYL: Accordingly they are prejudiced by the current procedure and I have understood that Mr De Vos intends making a submission after Mr Varney's evidence has been led. As a result of the fact that I was of the view that Mr Varney was going to testify, I am now no longer able to make such a submission, which I would have preferred to do and also in that respect my clients are being prejudiced.
Thank you, Chairperson.
MR COETZEE: (?) Mr Chairman, there's one or two aspects that I indicated that I'd also like to put on record earlier on this morning.
Pertaining to this debate about the remark, I'd like to put on record that no such remark came from any of the representatives that represents my clients.
The issues that I'd like to put on record are very similar to that that has been raised by my learned friend. Before the Committee proceeds to accept the submission of Mr Varney I'd like clarification on the following issues which are of vital importance to the clients I represent.
The Section 30 notice which was served on our clients is based on allegations contained in the Varney report. At all stages we were brought under the direct impression that Mr Varney will testify in this regard.
/I firstly
2B I firstly refer to a letter dated the 30th of July 1997 where the chairman, Mr Lyster, indicated that cross-examination of Mr Varney will be allowed, but it will be limited. I furthermore refer to a letter sent to General Groenewald on the 2nd of June 1997 where it is indicated that Mr Varney will be a witness. At a later stage the Committee made a ruling that Mr Varney will no longer be giving evidence, but that he would only be making submissions. I request the Committee to clarify by supplying reasons why the Committee decided that Mr Varney need not testify. It possibly appears that the sole reason for this decision is the fact that the Committee does not wish possibly to have his allegations contained in the Varney report tested under cross-examination.
Furthermore, the main reason why were here is because we were brought under the impression that he is going to testify and that we will be able to test the veracity of the allegations contained in this report.
Furthermore, we request reasons as to why the Committee is of the opinion that Mr Varney has the necessary locus standi to make a submission. On behalf of who does he make a submission and it's clear that in the normal procedure a submission relates to evidence that has been given during a hearing.
The submissions that Mr Varney makes do not relate to any evidence that has been led in these proceedings or that the Committee intends dealing in these proceedings.
It is furthermore submitted that it is procedurally unfair and the rules of natural justice have not been applied. Due to the fact that the allegations contained in the Varney report have been referred in national
/television
2B television and in the press, it is our submission that this report contains very serious allegations against the clients I represent. There are factual inaccuracies and inferences are drawn from the factual inaccuracies. Obviously these untested allegations severely prejudice our clients.
As late as the 5th of August a letter was sent to an attorney Coetzee that states that Mr Varney will be called as a witness. I beg leave to hand up the documentation that are referred to indicating that the information - I beg leave to hand it up to the Committee. I'm indebted.
MR LYSTER: We will take a short adjournment to discuss our response to submissions raised.
BRIEF ADJOURNMENT
ON RESUMPTION
MR LYSTER: I am not going to address each and every issue raised by Mr Coetzee and Mr Van Zyl, but just address them in general terms.
At the beginning of today's proceedings we understood that there was an agreement in existence to the effect that Mr Varney would make an unsworn submission and that there would be an opportunity for counsel to make rebutting submissions thereafter. It seems that there was no such agreement and we are disappointed that only at this late stage are we told that there is in fact no such agreement and that there is still an insistence on cross-examination.
In view of the fact that time is clearly of the essence and that Mr Varney is leaving the country tomorrow we have decided the following that Mr Varney will give
/evidence
2B evidence under oath and that he will do so for a period of at least one hour; that counsel will have a very limited opportunity to conduct cross-examination of Mr Varney and this will probably only extend to about one and a half hours and thereafter, if any counsel present wish to make submissions - to submissions with regard to Mr Varney's evidence, that they do so tomorrow or at the end of the proceedings.
In view of the time constraints I wish to draw specific attention to remarks which I made at the beginning of these proceedings on Monday which are set out in Regulation 6.1 of the determined procedures for the hearing and also in remarks which I made in my opening address where I said that the panel will not permit any evidence - sorry, any cross-examination which amounts to a repetition of versions which have already been put forward in other forums.
With regard to locus standi of Mr Varney, this Committee - this Commission, in fact, is at liberty to request persons to make submissions and to give evidence before it and it has done so on many, many other occasions and it has asked people who do not represent any particular group or community or organisation to do so. We believe that Mr Varney has locus standi. He was - you will be aware he was appointed by the Minister of Law and Order specifically to investigate ... (inaudible) ... in KwaZulu-Natal. He has an intimate knowledge of the political conflict in this province and we have no hesitation in believing that he is an appropriate person to make a submission here today.
I think those are all the remarks that I need to
/make.
2B make. I have repeated about three times that time is of the essence and we will now proceed with Mr Varney's evidence under oath. Mr Varney, can you give us your full names, please.
HOWARD GRANT VARNEY: (Sworn States)
MR LYSTER: Mr Macadam.
MR MACADAM: Mr Varney, how old are you? --- 37 years.
And do you hold any academic qualifications? --- A B.A., LL.B., Bachelor of Law.
And is it further correct that you are an admitted attorney? --- Correct.
The Chairperson has indicated that you have extensive experience in the field of the political violence which prevailed and possibly still does exist in KwaZulu-Natal. Could you briefly outline the extent of that experience? --- Yes, I practice as an attorney with the Legal Resources Centre in Durban focusing primarily on political violence cases. During the course of 1994 or rather 1993, I was appointed by the Transitional Executive Council to investigate hit squads in the KwaZulu Police. Just before the elections I was also appointed as Directorate of Policing Inspectorate in this region to monitor and oversee certain policing aspects of the elections and then during the middle of 1994 I was appointed by the Minister of Safety and Security to oversee an investigation into hit squad allegations particularly in the KwaZulu Police and I was the convener of the Investigation Task Board, a civilian body which oversaw the investigations of the ITU, the Investigation Task Unit who had actually carried out the
/investigations.
2B investigations.
Now is it correct that when the Commission planned this hearing that you were requested to make a submission in respect of various persons whom the Commission felt may be implemented to their detriment in the evidence which may be heard at the hearing? --- Correct.
And did you then compile a written submission in respect of each and every one of these role players which were put into various groups depending on their political affiliations or associations with certain government structures which existed at the time? --- Correct. They were, as I understand, sent in the form of Section 30 notices to the persons in question.
And is it further correct that prior to you being informed that you would testify this week, you compiled a further submission, a document which is dated the 4th of August 1997, which was then circulated on the first day of these hearings? --- Well, Mr Macadam, it's not a further submission. It is merely a summary of the more salient points that are already contained in the Section 30 notices, but in its composite form it is in fact my submission, not a further submission.
And are there any new issues which you raise in this latter document which were not contained in one or other of the original submissions? --- As far as I am aware I refer to one document, a 1979 State Security Council document which was not referred to in the Section 30 notices, but I understand that that document has been circulated to the representatives here today.
And ... (intervention)
MR (?): The document hasn't been circulated.
/Well,
2B Well, for the sake of brevity, I shall not refer to that particular document then.
MR MACADAM: Just for the purposes of the record, do you confirm the correctness of these written submissions? --- Which written submissions?
The ones that accompanied the Section 30 notices and the document dated 4 August. --- Correct.
Now accompanying the Section 30 notices, were various documents which purport to be compiled by either the South African Defence Force or the former State Security Council, certain of those documents were exhibits in the case of S v Peter Msane and Others in the Durban Supreme Court last year, but there are certain other documents which were not included in that trial. Is that correct? --- That is correct, they are largely State Security Council documents. They were seized by members of the Investigation Task Unit for use in their investigations and they have now been lodged in the State archives.
And the documents which were used in the S v Peter Msane, they went through as Exhibit E in the trial. How were those document obtained and how, before the actual trial commenced? --- Can we not assume that given that they were proved in court that this particular hearing can accept that particular process or do you wish me to through a blow by blow account of obtaining a warrant from the Pretoria Magistrate's Court and then going to Military Intelligence Headquarters and the procedure that followed? I think that's probably unnecessary.
If you can - where they actually obtained from before they were presented as exhibits in the trial. --- /Well,
2B Well, from different places. The Operation Marion documents themselves were handed over by Military Intelligence representatives and it is their claim that it was held by one Brigadier C J Van Niekerk. Other documents, the State Security Council documents were seized from State archives and a number of other documents were obtained from other sources within the South African National Defence Force.
Now if you could proceed to make your submission as you are an admitted attorney, I don't propose to lead you as I would a lay person. So I leave it in your own hands and I'll merely stop you if there are any issues which I believed should be clarified for the elucidation of the Commission and the community which wishes to hear these proceedings. --- Thank you. Chairperson, members of the Human Rights Violations Committee, before I commence there is one small concern I have from my side, which isn't a major concern compared to my learned friends across the stage. I understand I am going to be curtailed in terms of time in presenting my analysis and I think that would be rather unfortunately if I were prevented from presenting the analysis in full. I am going to suggest that I be permitted to in fact complete my submission. I will endeavour to keep it as brief as possible. I can tell you now that in terms of the sections before you, for those of you with copies, I will deal with the background and introduction and context more or less as it is. The sections dealing with Operation Marion which is the bulk of the section, there I will endeavour to summarise and paraphrase and maybe even skip sections, but I do believe that I should be allowed to
/finish
2B finish the entire submission and if need be, I'm sure my learned friends would have no objection if we carried on a little later than expected.
MR LYSTER: Please continue, Mr Varney. --- This hearing focuses on human rights violations carried out by state sponsored hit squads operating in the townships of Mpumalanga in the late 1980s and Esikaweni in the early 1990s. This violence caused untold destruction and misery to the residents of these townships. The wider evidence suggests that much of this organised violence had its roots in certain state initiatives taken in the mid 1980s. These activities were the subject of intensive investigations undertaken by the Investigation Task Unit, the ITU, between 1994 and 1996. The ITU's primary brief was to investigate hit squad activities carried out under the cover of the KwaZulu Police. I have been asked to give an overview of the picture unearthed by the ITU. This story, I believe, explains how it was possible for hit squads such as the Esikaweni hit squad, to act with impunity for several years. This particular story relates to acts of violence and brutality committed against supporters of the United Democratic Front and the African National Congress by hit squads of the Inkatha Freedom Party and KwaZulu supported by the former National Party controlled South African Government and its security organs. It does not suggest that the IFP was not the target of similar actions launched by the ANC and UDF. Numerous IFP member, KZP members and others involved in governmental structures were the targets of hit squad actions launched by the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto weSizwe, Self Defence Units and militant comrades. Since
/the
2B the mid 1980s KwaZulu-Natal and areas on the Witwatersrand have been involved in varying degrees in a low intensity war. This war has claimed the lives of more than 20 000 persons. It is not the aim of this Commission to apportion blame on to one side or another. Members on both sides have been both perpetrators and victims. It is however plain to see that the conflict was not a matter of acts carried out aimlessly ... [break in recording] ... on all sides. Sadly, with regard to KwaZulu-Natal we are still waiting for political leaders - on all sides of the political spectrum - to display statesmanship by revealing their roles in this war. True conciliation and peace will not be achieved by face-saving disclosures behind closed doors and secret amnesty deals. Only the truth boldly stated and for all to see will permit us to put the past behind us. At the end of the Commission's term I believe that the central question it must answer on the set of facts arising out of this inquiry is whether the Caprivi operatives such as Luthuli and Mkhize who have testified in this hearing acted out a series of unconnected private frolics, or whether they were not part of a wider strategy devised and orchestrated at the highest political levels. I will argue that the documentary and oral evidence and the probabilities point conclusively to the latter. Moving to my introduction, in the case of Esikaweni the High Court in the matter of S v Mbambo made a finding that organised hit squads were responsible for much of the violence in the area between 1992 and 1993. In his finding on sentence, the Presiding Judge, Mr Justice N van der Reyden made the following finding and I quote -
"The present case is confirmation of
/"speculation
3A "speculation that hit squads are one of the factors, which contribute to the violence in this country, and more specifically KwaZulu Natal, as experienced during the last few years ... ... All attempts ... to restore peace have been unsuccessful. ... People who exploit the unrest and disorder reigning in our province, be it common criminals or supporters of political causes, however noble the cause might seem to them and their leaders, must be told in no uncertain terms that a civilised society shall not tolerate the assassination of political opponents by members of a police force, who are duty bound to serve and protect the citizens of that society, irrespective of their political persuasions".
He called further for a -
"... full investigation into the alleged involvement of those persons identified by the accused as the masterminds and puppet masters behind the Esikaweni Hit Squad ..."
If I may pause just briefly here and stress the inability of the cause referred to by the Judge in his finding here. It may be argued and I believe cogently that those in Inkatha, the leaders of that organisation and in the State did believe that they were in fact ultimately protecting
/their
3A their supporters and protecting the status quo. It is simply the means that I believe is the subject matter of this particular debate and it is the means I would argue have been objectionable. Central to the hit squad actions in Esikaweni, Mpumalanga and elsewhere were the Caprivi trainees. For this reason it is necessary to examine the source of this group in the mid 1980s. It is my submission that those who gave birth to the Caprivi trainees are ultimately accountable for the actions taken by that group. The training and deployment of the Caprivi trainees fell squarely within the strategies adopted by the South African State in the mid 1980s. The State perceived itself to be facing an onslaught of total revolutionary war from within and outside South Africa. To combat this threat the State employed counter revolutionary strategies which involved the taking of a wide range of actions. These included political, psychological, economic and security or forceful measures. By the mid 1980s political and violent actions executed by anti-apartheid groups such as the ANC and allied organisations had reached unprecedented levels. The State adopted equally drastic measures to counter these threats and these measures included acts of terrorism and guerilla warfare. They were carried out by specific security organs and "middle" or counter revolutionary groups within and outside South Africa. The IFP's SADF trained offensive element was a case in point of such operation carried out within South Africa. The operation was codenamed "Marion" and was executed by Intelligence Operations Directorate of Special Tasks, DST. DST's support of groups such as Renamo in Mozambique and Unita
/in
3A in Angola are examples of such operations carried outside South Africa. Operation Marion was naturally accompanied by a programme of deception and cover-ups and I would argue they still continue today. As I have mentioned, the originals of all the documents I am about to quote are held at the State Archives or are authenticated exhibits in court trials and inquests and it goes without saying that the documents I am going to be quoting are classified "Secret" or "Top Secret". In fact most of them are classified "Top Secret". Under the sub-heading, "Provision of an offensive paramilitary capacity to Inkatha", the Operation Marion documents point unambiguously to the offensive or attacking nature of the offensive element supplied to Inkatha. While there are but two reference that can attract debate if considered alone in isolation, the offensive theme which runs through the documents is set out in blunt and obvious terms. Examples include direct references to "offensive steps", meaning "hit squads" and the ability to take out undesirable members. The duty sheet of the liaison officer appointed to support the operations on the ground set out the nature of offensive actions in paragraph 15 of his duty sheet and I quote -
"OFFENSIVE ACTIONS: Must only carried out by trained cells under strict control, Authority must be granted by DST-2 beforehand. Targets must be approved by REEVA, SAP(Security) and SADF. Criminal prosecution of participants must always be taken into account ..."
/It
3A It is little wonder that another document referred to the deep concern that because "offensive actions were part of Marion's tasks", the Chief of Staff Intelligence and other senior officers involved in the planning of Operation Marion may be charged with crimes carrying the death penalty. I think I am going to emphasise that. Here we are talking about or the document refers to those involved in the planning of Operation Marion may be charged with offences carrying the death penalty because offensive actions were part of Marion's tasks. I think the Commission will have little difficulty in comprehending and understanding the meaning of such passages. The documents speak for themselves. To extract an innocent interpretation requires in my view the taking of an adventure into the absurd. If the Commission declines to engage in such theatrics it must consider whether the conduct was confined to the parties actually implicated in the documents, that is the military command structure, or whether there was a connection that led to higher levels. Put another way, did those in the organising structures at the highest political levels approve of an entirely laudable project which the military and Inkatha behind their backs subverted into something unlawful and monstrous? There is nothing in my view to support this proposition. This submission will endeavour to show that there was an unbreakable connection between the authorisation by the highest political structures of offensive support to Inkatha and the passages that I have just referred to. The offensive capacity requested by Chief Minister Buthelezi, as he then was in 1985, and approved of by the South African Government, is the same
/offensive
3A offensive capacity referred to in subsequent military documentation. In short, it is my submission that the references to an offensive capacity and offensive actions refer to an ability to carry out pro-active actions against enemy targets. This resulted in the committal of an unquantifiable number of extra-judicial killings. It is my further submission that it is not only those who carried out the ground who are responsible, but those who facilitated the launching of the operation in the first place. So my submission will accordingly highlight the roles of those who authorised its provision and those who requested it in the first place. It is plain to see that these politicians anticipated that the supplying of an offensive unit together with arms and ammunition to a civilian organisation involved in an on-going violent conflict would result in attacks being launched against the political opponents of the organisation in question. Although the South African Defence Force had withdrawn support for offensive operations by the end of the 1980s and this was because the military feared exposure of its own role following the arrests of trainees who were involved in offensive actions, it was always an aim of Operation Marion to provide Inkatha with a capacity of self-sufficiency to enable it to act independently of the SADF. Now the security concerns that I have referred to led ultimately to the placing of most of the placing of most of the trainees into the KwaZulu Police during mid 1989 and hit squad activities continued under the cover of the KwaZulu Police through into the 1990s. The Esikaweni hit squad which operated during the early 1990s is a case in point of this capacity of self-sufficiency being
/implemented
3A implemented under the cover of the KwaZulu Police and while the political leaders of the South African Government and Inkatha may not have been aware of the individual actions carried out, I believe they are accountable for the murders and the atrocities that flowed from this project. It will no doubt argued by representatives of those implicated that the "offensive" passages to which I have referred to earlier and I will come back to, ought to be excised from consideration, because they are out of place, a misinterpretation of what was actually meant or alternatively they are fabrications. As far as I'm aware, the authenticity of these documents have never been seriously disputed. The authors confirm their contents. It is only their interpretation which has been the subject of much debate. It will almost certainly be argued at this forum that the "offensive" term in Marion documents ought to be read as "protective" and that is in fact the view that was accepted by the Court in the trial of Magnus Malan and others. In my view that was an incorrect finding. While the offensive actions envisaged were aimed at preventing or stopping the ANC and UDF from carrying out attacks on Inkatha members, they were intended to be in the form of initiative-taking actions, in other words pre-emptive strikes. Now seen from the perspective of Inkatha and the State, this objective can be described as "protective". That, however, does not make such actions legitimate in terms of the law, no matter how noble the overall cause and I believe that is what the learned Judge in the Mbambo matter was referring to. Those urging the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to let matters rest with the HUGO Judgment, may also wish
/the
3A the Commission to rely on judicial findings of say the Harms Commission. In my view these findings are not compelling and I would suggest that the Commission devote most of its energies in evaluating the enormous quantity of documentary and oral evidence before it. Before dealing with Operation Marion in greater detail, I intend to set the scene or, as one of my learned friends said yesterday or the day before, to set the stage, to explain how projects such as Marion and others came into being. Marion did not take place in a vacuum. It was part and parcel of the State's counter revolutionary programme that was in place at the time and it is necessary to examine this background in some detail. So I now move to the chapter called "Context" and under the sub-heading, "Counter Revolutionary Strategies". During the 1980s the State Security Council, which I am going to refer to as the SSC and its superior and subordinate bodies devised several strategies for deployment against the UDF and the ANC. The government adopted the guiding strategies of Counter Revolutionary Warfare principles. These principles involved tactics aimed at destroying or annihilating the insurgents and revolutionaries while winning the hearts and minds of the population. Key tactics included the use of terror in certain circumstances and the establishment of "counter guerilla" or "middle groups" to mobilise politically and to act violently against revolutionary forces. Now this is evidence from a number of documents. A State Security Council meeting held in July 1985 a number of Counter Revolutionary Warfare principles were adopted under item 8. All these principles coincided with "lessons" and
/principles
3A principles set out by writers such as General C A Fraser of the SADF and J J McCuen to whom I will refer to shortly. During 1986 P W Botha, the State President at the time, circulated a document to all those involved within the Forces and the government in the counter revolutionary struggle. The document was a paraphrasing of General Fraser's paper titled, "Lessons learnt from past revolutionary wars". I shall refer to this document as the Fraser document. Now both the Botha document and the Fraser document referred to the careful weighing up of the use of force before it is used. Fraser's original document which was uplifted from the Defence Force's own records, specifically related the use of force to acts of terrorism in this particular chapter. Terrorism was referred to as a particularly appropriate weapon since it aims directly at the inhabitant. Now Fraser was at pains to caution against the indiscriminate use of terror. He argued that it was counter productive in most circumstances, but he did put up one exception and given the value of terror in certain circumstances, he said, "if you are going to use it", and I quote -
"... the use of terrorism by government forces must be decided upon at the highest level, and it must be so applied as to avoid it boomeranging".
Now just moving on to another aspect of counter revolutionary war, the Botha document also referred to a classic counter revolutionary write up by the name of J J McCuen, an American. His book was paraphrased and distributed within military and security structures. In that particular paraphrasing there was a little chapter
/referred
3A referred to as "Counter Guerillas", or the creation of "Counter Guerillas". The development - and I quote directly from McCuen here ... (intervention)
"The development to of a counter-revolutionary guerilla force which is employed according to guerilla tactics to annihilate revolutionary guerillas and take control over the population".
The Fraser document as well also advocated the creation of guerilla forces as an important adjunct to a government's strategic force. Now it's plain to see that the government adopted this strategy. The political and military support supplied to Inkatha and other ant-revolutionary groups within and outside South Africa fell squarely within this strategy. The SSC at its meeting of the 12th of May 1986 tasked the then Ministers of Defence and Law and Order to create a Third Force to effectively wipe out terrorists. The security forces were further tasked with countering the underminers using their own methods and I think we should stress that particular passage out of the SSC Minuted, "using their own method". It is entirely in line with what counter revolutionary writers have been advocating. The SADF in an earlier document compiled by one Brigadier Ferreira of the office of the Chief of Army set out to a lesser or greater degree where this Third Force already existed and according to paragraph 6 of his document this Third Force was situated within the following organs. The SADF's counter insurgency forces; the SADF's Special Forces; the SADF's Special Tasks; the SAP's Security Police; the SAP's counter insurgency forces and the SAP's Special Task Force
/elements.
3A elements. It was indeed the SADF's Special Tasks which supplied the offensive support to Inkatha, amongst other things. It was also the DST that supplied military and political support to other counter revolutionary groups within the country and outside. These included Renamo and Unita, the Lesotho Liberation Army and the Xhosa Resistance Movement in the Ciskei. Now DST and the other departments mentioned in the Ferreira document set out to counter the revolutionaries using their own methods as directed by the SSC and in pursuance of this plan, leaders, activists and supporters of the ANC and UDF and allied organisations were targeted for elimination. By way of an example, an aspect of Operation Marion involved the elimination of enemy targets and this I will deal with in some detail later and we have seen through amnesty hearings and other documents that have come to light that similar actions were carried out by DST's Operation Katzen in the Eastern Cape; and operations of the SADF's Special Forces, the CCB and the SAP's C10 Unit or Vlakplaas and C4, Trewitts, which played a co-ordinating role. Moving to the sub-heading, "The UDF as an internal revolutionary threat". The UDF was seen by the State at the time as part and parcel of the revolutionary onslaught and the mass offensive orchestrated by the ANC. Little distinction was made between the external and the internal threat and the UDF and its activists were accordingly targets for counter revolutionary actions and just as the State in those days hit using the harshest action against targets in neighbouring countries, they did the same within South Africa. To give you an idea of how the UDF was perceived, I am just going to quote from a couple of
/State
3A State Security Council documents. Firstly, a 1985 document declared the UDF to be an organisation that was dangerous to the State which had to be neutralised. It was further accused of fomenting unrest and directly and indirectly promoting the aims of the SACP and ANC. According to another document produced in April 1986, the UDF was accused of being responsible for the systematic wiping out of recognised leaders. Another document produced during that month, the UDF was singled out as the most important body in the internal revolutionary onslaught and I quote from that particular document -
"... although the UDF publicly distances itself from violence, the violence that flowed from UDF arranged actions was so intertwined with ANC terrorist actions that it was difficult to differentiate between them".
A strategy document that was produced and circulated at the 12 May meeting of the State Security Council also claimed that UDF members were trained in the handling of weapons and explosives and that the UDF had spoken out in favour of violence, so, Chairperson, it is clear how the State regarded the UDF and certain internal organisations at the time. They were really in the same camp as the ANC and SACP, the outlawed organisations, carrying out their work internally, violently and politically and to expand on this, under the next heading, "The internal threat: A spiralling revolutionary war situation". The State at the time perceived itself to be in the midst of a war, a revolutionary war. See for example a July 1986 State Security document quoting from an ANC paper that it had
/announced
3A announced that it had taken the strategic initiative internally and was now in the final phase of a mass- offensive, a (people's war), but according to another document produced in April 1986, radical organisations were already engaging in a revolutionary war pattern. Now according to an SADF general, Marius Oelschig, who was called as an expert in the Malan matter, he referred to the phases of revolutionary war and he quoted from documents as to how important it was that a state facing a revolutionary onslaught needed to know what phase that revolutionary struggle was in, in order to be able to determine the counter measures to be taken against the revolutionaries. Now he described South African during the mid 1980s as going through a phase of revolutionary war which was going from terrorism to guerilla warfare and perhaps let's pause and look at what these four distinct phases are. The first phase is organisation or mobilisation. The second phase is terrorism. The third phase is guerilla warfare and the fourth phase is mobile war, almost on a scale of conventional war. So the State saw itself in that third phase during the mid 1980s or going from terrorism to guerilla warfare. The State then adopted equally drastic measures, equally war-like measures to counter this threat including terror and guerilla warfare. But, I suppose, one could argue in their shoes that perhaps any state would have adopted those methods and perhaps kept quiet about them, but we're not here to discuss the justification of taking such methods in a war situation. Under the next heading, "Inkatha as a counter revolutionary force", the State saw a number of organisations as part of its own counter
/revolutionary
3A revolutionary capacity and according to a State Security Council document produced during February 1986 and I quote -
"Structures such as Inkatha must be built up to be an obstacle to radicalism".
And in an April 1986 document, anti-revolutionary groups such as Inkatha was seen as part of the country's capacity in countering the revolutionary war. Now I want to deal briefly with Inkatha's own political and military objectives and I think you will see that during the mid 1980s these coincided with those of the State itself.
MR LYSTER: Sorry, Mr Varney, before you continue. If there are areas where you think you could, in a sense, paraphrase the material, we would be indebted to you, because as we have said time is of the essence. I don't want to rush you through anything, but if you think there are areas which you could concertina and draw out the main points, I think that will be important. --- I shall try where I can, Chairperson. According to secret documents and announcements made by Inkatha leaders, during the mid 1980s Inkatha wished to establish its own military type force and it is further evident that it was willing to employ force to achieve its objectives. If one looks at a speech made during May 1984 by Chief Minister Buthelezi in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, he referred to the need for a paramilitary wing to carry out protective and offensive actions and I quote
"... In fact I believe that we must prepare ourselves not only to defend property and life, but to go beyond that and prepare ourselves to hit back with
/"devastating
3A "devastating force at those who destroy and kill ...".
So I think it is evident that he was looking at two capacities here. Protecting property and life, but more than that. The going beyond and preparing to hit back with devastating force, clearly an offensive capacity. According to a top secret State Security document produced in March 1989, which looked at the causes of the Natal violence, Inkatha took a decision to turn the whole of KwaZulu-Natal into a "no go area" and this was apparently an unrecorded resolution taken in 1985 and I quote -
"During 1985 the expressed mutual hostility and mistrust between Inkatha and the UDF became a visible reality when Inkatha realised that the UDF represented a threat to its power monopoly in KwaZulu and decided at a Central Committee meeting of Inkatha that the whole of KwaZulu and Natal be turned into a so-called 'no go area' for the UDF, regardless of the consequences".
I may add that the same document referred to the UDF and ANC's policy of making the townships ungovernable as an equal cause to the violence. Not surprisingly there was no reference to the State's own endeavours in fomenting violence. Moving to the process of authorisation. It is evident from State Security and military documentation that clandestine operations, internally and externally, were authorised at the highest levels. Now I'm going to skip 6.1, because that's a document my learned friends
/haven't
3A haven't got, save to say that that document sets out what I have just said, dealing with foreign operations, which had to be cleared at the highest level, clandestine foreign operations. Now that was further refined in November 1986 when the SSC decided that large scale planned offensive operations had to be cleared with the chairman of the SSC, that was P W Botha, the State President and small scale offensive operations had to be cleared with the Minister of Defence where necessary in consultation with the chairperson of the SSC. Now the Operation Marion documents read in conjunction with the Security Council meeting of 3rd February 1986 refers to another clandestine operation, but this time an internal operation, that of supply offensive paramilitary support to Inkatha and that also had to be cleared at the highest level and I suspect that it is the same highest level that was involved in the authorisation of clandestine operations externally and internally. Another example is Katzen and if you look at those documents, you will see on the first page of the Katzen ... (intervention)
MR VISSER: (?) Mr Chairman, I formally object to any evidence led on Katzen. At the beginning of these proceedings I explain that there's various documentation that has been requested relating to Katzen that has not been provided. There are also certain people that are implicated in Katzen that have not received notice, Section 30 notices. Inter alia, I spoke to J(?) Van der Westhuizen's attorney, who is implicated in Katzen in various respects and he has not received any notice, so I respectfully request that no evidence be led on Katzen. --- May I suggest, Chairperson, that with regard to
/Katzen,
3A Katzen, I simply don't refer to names, but the operation generally.
MR LYSTER: I think considering that we're dealing here with Operation Marion, there is a certain amount of information that's publicly available about Operation Katzen. If you just refer to it in passing as another operation of the Directorate for Special Tasks, which is what it was, as I understand it. --- Yes. Chairperson, I also will, during my submission, look in brief at Katzen and other military operations such as the CCB in an endeavour to show the modus operandi of specialist units of the SADF at that time and I believe to complete the picture, that is absolutely necessary, but I will refrain from referring to names.
MR VISSER: (?) Mr Chairman, time is limited and I don't want to unnecessary labour the proceedings. These proceedings relate to Marion. All the - people who have been implicated in Katzen have not received notices and the same relates to CCB. This hearing is about Operation Marion. Mr Varney says he was investigation Marion. That's the evidence that should be heard, otherwise there is going to be severe prejudice to lots of people that aren't here today. No documentation on these matters have been supplied to us. --- With the greatest respect, Chairperson, all the documents that I am referring to were supplied to my learned friends, that is simply incorrect. If the documents I refer to which were included in the Section 30 notices, they were supplied.
MR LYSTER: Mr Varney, I think we are here to concentrate on Operation Marion. You may refer to Operation Katzen in passing as another operation of the DST. Please don't
/mention
3A mention any names and don't go into any detail whatsoever as to the nature of Operation Marion - Operation Katzen. --- As the Chairperson pleases. Now the authorisation of such operations from the highest levels which included defensive actions, involving acts of terror and elimination, is in line with Fraser's recommendation which I referred to earlier, that the use of terrorism by government forces must be decided upon at the highest level. I now turn to Operation Marion itself and as this constitutes the bulk of the submission, I will endeavour to just simply draw from the most relevant documents and concentrate on the most salient points. Under the heading, "The request for an offensive paramilitary unit". During November 1985 according to a document produced at that time, Chief Minister Buthelezi, who I am going to refer to as Buthelezi, set out his need for certain support which included an offensive paramilitary support and this was set out in a memorandum and according to Major-General Tienie Groenewald who authored the document in question, Buthelezi commented that although he was a supporter of peaceful resolution and I quote here -
"... the ANC must realise that if it uses violence against KwaZulu, the Zulus are also in a position to take violent steps against the ANC. He himself would like to take the struggle to the ANC in Lusaka, although at present he does not have the capacity".
According to a handwritten note that particular document, unsurprisingly, had to be destroyed after reading and in my view that passage is an expression of a desire for an
/offensive
3A offensive capacity to carry out retaliatory or pre-emptive actions against the ANC, even in Lusaka, if needs be and that is hardly an expression of a desire for a protective capacity. Under the next heading, "The SADF acts upon the request", the Defence Force accordingly took steps to supply Buthelezi with such a capacity. A further memorandum was put together dated 19th December 1985 and Buthelezi's request for an offensive arm was confirmed. He himself referred to the use of offensive capacity to act against the ANC and the speculation - sorry, the anticipation of the unlawfulness of the envisaged actions against members of the UDF and ANC was recognised in this document and I quote from paragraph 17. It was noted that -
"... it would be practically impossible to indemnify from prosecution such a huge group for steps taken against members of the ANC and UDF".
Now, Chairperson, that sets the scene from the very outset in a document put together during December 1985, even before the operation has been fully discussed and implemented. At that stage they are anticipating unlawful actions flowing from the project and this is a theme that runs through the documents or perhaps the documents are infected with it from start to end, culminating in reference during 1988 to protection in terms of the Defence Act against charges that may arise which carry the death penalty. It was also suggested in the same document that some sort of security structure could be set up through which offensive actions could be taken against the UDF. Now such a structure wouldn't make these actions
/legal
3A legal all of a sudden and indeed there was no suggestion that it would. Such actions would be unlawful regardless of what structures they are clothed in. By way of example, the police are not in a position to simply go out and attack people to take initiatives offensively. They have to act within the confines of the law and within the confines of the Criminal Procedure Act and they are taught that law. These trainees were never taught that law. However, the security structure would have been of practical assistance insofar as it would act as a cover for their offensive operations and indeed the trainees were issued with fake security company ID cards and several were issued with false KwaZulu Police appointment certificates and this permitted them to get away with murder; it permitted them to escape detection. In the same document, the protective and the offensive capacities were clearly distinguished as separate entities. Now the obvious question which ought to be raised is, if we were to believe and accept the argument that this group was simply going to carry out purely protective and lawful duties. Why then did the State simply not increase this capacity in the KwaZulu Police or establish a properly constituted and open above board community guard or reserve guard system? Why come together with a highly clandestine covert system which is called "offensive"? Now as will become evident, the KwaZulu Police was to be expanded in any event as part of the wider package, so they had another purpose in mind with this clandestine operation. As the Chief of Army, General Liebenberg has conceded in his evidence in the Malan matter, no civilian force may act offensively, so again the question, why
/train
3A train civilians offensively? Liebenberg said, "Well, it was a grey area" and he thought they were destined for the KwaZulu Police or the military, which then begs the same question, why were they simply not trained in the KwaZulu Police or in the military and deployed in the police or the military as normal soldiers or police people? But the documents are quite clear, they were destined for Inkatha, nowhere else. Two and a half years later, many were placed into the KwaZulu Police, but for very different reasons, as we will see. Buthelezi's requests were then placed before the State Security Council at a meeting on the 20th of December 1985 and three Minister, Malan, Le Grange and Heunis were tasked with establishing a security force for Buthelezi. A sub-structure of the State Security Council was appointed to investigate the implementation of this decision and a sub-committee was drawn, appointed to draw up a detailed report and if one looks under 4.1 at the notes of a member of the sub-committee of the interdepartmental committee, in his handwritten notes he made, he set out who would provide the protective support and there he says Buthelezi and VIP protection. He attributes that to the South African Police and National Intelligence, the groups that normally supply such protection. Then he has a heading, "Inkatha against UDF" and that is to be supplied by the SADF and DST or the SADF's DST and that I believe is indicative not of protective support to Inkatha, that is offensive. The sub-committee report which was eventually produced in January 1986 distinguished, as previous documents had, between the two capacities and called for the following requirements of Buthelezi to be met.
/(a) personal
3A (a) personal protection;
(b) protection of other selected VIPS;
(c) an offensive paramilitary element;
(d) enlargement of the existing KwaZulu Police Force;
(e) a conventional or ceremonial force;
(f) a national security management system and an intelligence services; and
(g) the authority to issue firearm licences.
So a wide range of support, including protective and offensive measures and as mentioned, it was confirmed in that report that the SAP and intelligence would supply the protective measures and the SADF would create "an offensive paramilitary element and a conventional force for KwaZulu". That was then sent to a meeting of the interdepartmental committee and this meeting is very interesting, because according to a military document, there was a debate at this meeting around whether in fact Inkatha should be supplied with an offensive paramilitary element as set out in the sub-committee report and there was some dispute, it seems. Dr Barnard of National Intelligence and Dr Van Wyk of the Department of Constitutional Development objected and argued against it and they were then countered by the KwaZulu and police and military representatives. It was argued that Inkatha was already taking paramilitary steps which were being conducted unprofessionally and carried high risks and the planned paramilitary steps were only a small part of the political, economic and welfare psychological actions. A compromise was extracted and the following recommendation was made, that -
/"The
3A "The creation of a paramilitary element must be investigated at the highest political level and clarified with the Chief Minister".
So the highly sensitive issue of whether to authorise the creation of a paramilitary element, an offensive paramilitary element was then placed squarely before the State Security Council. Now Dr Neil Barnard who released a public statement before he appeared before a Section 29 hearing confirmed in this statement that he opposed the creation of an offensive paramilitary unit for Inkatha, because, and I quote -
"... it would lead to a further increase of the military conflict in Natal and the result would be more loss of lives ..."
and he also noted ... (intervention)
MR (?): Mr Chairman, sorry. We haven't got that document.
MR LYSTER: That document will be made available to you. It was issued about three weeks ago and it was printed extensively in the national press. A document will be made available to you after this hearing. Please continue, Mr Varney. --- He also pointed out that the force would not be subject to command and control. While the foresight of the offensive force engaging in life-taking actions was obvious and I think obvious to anybody. I don't think you need to be an expert in any way to see that. But Barnard's statement confirms that this specific concern was the subject of the debate at the IDC meeting and had to be debated as well at the meeting of the State
/Security
3A Security Council on the 3rd of February 1986. So indeed the recommendation goes to the SSC and on the 3rd of February 1986 they confirm that recommendation and Malan and Heunis were then tasked with contacting Buthelezi in order to conduct an evaluation of his needs and requirements with regard to the paramilitary element and the ... [break in recording]
(END OF CASSETTE NO 3A)
(START OF CASSETTE NO 3B)
3B --- ... been supplied at the highest level. Needless to say, Chairperson, if they were simply authorising innocuous mundane protective lawful measures, there would have been no need to refer this matter to the highest level. So SSC was then seized with this particular matter and although the SSC deferred the decision elsewhere, they anticipated that such support would result in Inkatha's offensive unit carrying out attacks on its opponents. The available minutes do not indicate any opposition or dissent or an endeavour to stop the operation. Nobody present at that meeting has to date distanced themselves from the decisions made at that meeting and I would argue that if such details had been disclosed at an early stage an unquantifiable number of lives could have been saved, particularly in the early 1990s when the full offensive force of the Caprivi trainees was unleashed and it is my submission then that those involved in those deliberations are not able to wash their hands from what flowed from the project. They are indeed accountable. Moving to the next sub-paragraph under the heading, "Offensive as pre-emptive". With overall approval now granted with support to be supplied to Inkatha and KwaZulu, the military set
/about
3B about to work on the detail in consultation with Buthelezi and how in fact to carry out the project. Following a meeting held between Groenewald and Buthelezi on 11th February 1986, a memo was drawn up and a description of the offensive capacity referred to by Buthelezi in that particular meeting is contained here and we have to deal with this description in some detail, because those representing the military have argued and will argue and will rely on this particular description to claim that the offensive capacity was in reality nothing more than a purely lawful protective capacity and it is my considered view that that interpretation cannot be sustained. The description reads as follows -
"An offensive (or a protective capacity) whereby the UDF/ANC/SACP can be prevented from breaking up Inkatha meetings, destroying property and terrorising, murdering and injuring Inkatha members".
Now it is my submission that what is being referred to there is the capacity to take initiatives to prevent or pre-empt those groups from attacking Inkatha members and supporters. Indeed the author of that document, Groenewald, was asked during the Malan matter what "offensive" meant and he stated that it meant "primarily to take the initiative" -
"Reactive steps are normally taken in reaction to what the enemy does, while pro-active involves the taking of pre-emptive measures before the time. You take the initiative. And you must
/"especially
3B "especially see offensive in the terms of taking the initiative".
Now these actions, offensive actions, you take the initiative even if aimed at preventing possible later attack are unlawful in terms of South African Law and as much has been made of this passage by the military in an endeavour to paint the offensive capacity with an innocent tint, I intend to revisit it very shortly at a later stage. Suffice to say that at this stage, given that we are aware that there are more forthright reference to what offensive capacity is all about, if one interprets that particular passage in its pre-emptive sense, then the document flow and they make sense. They are reconcilable. But if they are interpreted innocently, then the documents make no sense at all. They simply don't flow and they cannot be understood. I'm moving now to the Liebenberg report. I'll try to deal with it as briefly as I can. This report was drawn up following an instruction by General Malan to the then Head of the SADF, General Geldenhuys, to draw up a report which would include a detailed implementation plan together with an organogram and Geldenhuys Liebenberg to do so and hence we have the Liebenberg Report. In the report it's set out that Buthelezi request had already been settled with him, confirmed with him and these included a number of things, personal protection, that of VIPs and so on. He further required a contra-mobilisation unit for political mobilisation, defensive element and offensive element, intelligence capacity, etcetera. Under his request the offensive element was described as a small full-time offensive element that could covertly be used against the
/UDF/ANC
3B UDF/ANC (about 30). Other requirements of his included the expansion of the KwaZulu Police by an additional 500 men, a security management system and so on. The organogram in that particular report, if one refers to it at paragraph 20 of that report, it demarcates the support to the KwaZulu Police and the government on the left side of the structure and the support to Inkatha on the right side and it's a neat distinction between the secret and covert support to Inkatha and the more overt support to the governmental structures. Funnily enough or interestingly enough, it places the offensive element outside of the paramilitary unit, but this was no coincidence, because the original proposals in fact said that as well and one can refer to the 19th of December 1985 document to see that. Buthelezi was listed in the organogram as the link person, the only link person between the clandestine support, Inkatha's armed wing and the overt support to the KwaZulu Government structures. M Z Khumalo was listed as the commander of the paramilitary and offensive groups. A bit further on in the report it dealt with the activities of the paramilitary unit and if one looks briefly at the Leadership Corp, which is also referred to as a defensive group (militia), their training was to include, proposed to include military procedures and the breaking up of meetings and again, one must just pause. Why are they being trained to break up meetings? That is hardly a lawful exercise. Under offensive activities, the following activities were set out and I quote -
"The purpose was to provide a small group of well trained troops for Inkatha which
/"could
3B "could be used offensively against the ANC, UDF and related groups. Further the group could also be used as personal bodyguards for Buthelezi in his capacity as President of Inkatha".
Now I just stress that the second part is a further use of these particular groups. The primary purpose is to act offensively against the ANC, UDF and related groups. Under the heading, "The location and arming of the offensive element and the clear separation of support to Inkatha and to KwaZulu", a document was produced during April 1986 and according to this document, Buthelezi purportedly emphasised that the support to Inkatha including the paramilitary support, must not be mixed up with the support supplied to KwaZulu governmental structures. So although we are all aware that Inkatha controlled the KwaZulu Government, for the particular purposes of this project, there was a strict separation between support to the political party, Inkatha, and the support to the homeland government of KwaZulu. He further reportedly emphasised that the offensive element must not be a separate unit, but it must form part of the larger paramilitary unit. It is also evident from this document that the offensive group was to be armed and it was proposed to set aside a substantial amount of money, in the sum of R200 000 for weapons and ammunition. The money for this and other endeavours will be secretly channelled through Armscor. Moving to the next sub-paragraph entitled "Training".
MR MACADAM: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, is it necessary that we have evidence on the training through Mr Varney at this
/point?
3B point? We have heard considerable evidence from three trainees as well as an expert in counter revolutionary warfare. If we are driven by time restraints, is it necessary that this aspect be actually heard again?
MR LYSTER: I think if you just deal with - for the record, just deal with that in a couple of sentences. --- Yes.
Because as Mr Macadam says, we've had extensive evidence of recruitment, training and - etcetera. --- Fair enough. I shall only refer to the evidence of one Captain Jacobs who, during his training, referred to an attacking capacity in respect of the training of offensive actions. And further, according to Jacobs and I think this is very important, those trained - it was - the purpose of the training was to enable the resistance movements to operate independently of the SADF. I think that is important to remember and indeed the main documents, as we will now see, refer to a capacity of self-sufficiency and therein, Chairperson, lies the connection between the training and the subsequent activities of this group during the 1980s and years later as well, in the 1990s. No documents were supplied for the months of June to December 1986, except for one document in October. Now the months June to December 1986 coincided with the training in Caprivi and I think it's no coincidence that no documents were supplied for those particular months, which is, Chairperson, I have included a reference to the Katzen documents, because Katzen was carried out by the same people, the same department, DST. It had the same modus operandi. It was there to carry out certain violent actions and I believe it will be
/... (intervention)
3B ... (intervention)
MR (?): Mr Chairperson, I thought there's a ruling in this regard.
MR LYSTER: Ja. I've said that Mr Varney could refer to it as another special operation of the Director of Special Tasks. --- Yes.
And I would ask you not to go into any detail as to the specifics of Operation Katzen.
MS SOOKA: (?) Sorry, Chair, with respect, if Mr Varney is simply drawing parallel conclusions, as long as names are not being mentioned, I cannot see that it should be a problem.
MR LYSTER: Ja, I think just try and deal with it as - in as circumscribed a way as possible. --- Yes, Chairperson, I mean ... (intervention)
MR (?): Sorry, could you just repeat that? I never heard what was said.
MR LYSTER: I asked Mr Varney to deal with any reference to Operation Marion(?) in as circumscribed a manner as possible - sorry, Katzen. --- Katzen.
In as circumscribed a manner as possible. --- Chairperson, I will endeavour to be as concise and as short as I can and I won't run through all the points in my submission, but I do believe that that similar fact evidence can be extremely useful in painting the overall picture, particularly since the same parties were involved, but to proceed ... (intervention)
MR (?): May I place on record, there is a ruling in this regard; there is limited time available, specifically because of circumstances beyond, definitely, the defence's control. We have not received people
/involved
3B involved in Katzen and have not received notice. We do not have the documentation relating to Katzen. A ruling has been made relating to Katzen. The most important thing about this inquiry is Marion and I object severely that any reference is made to Katzen. There is limited time available, let's stick to Marion and the issues there.
MR LYSTER: Mr Varney, please continue with ... (intervention) --- Thank you.
... with - insofar as this relates to Operation Marion. --- Yes. Katzen, like Marion, also involved the elimination of targets and there are references in the Katzen documents to "elimineer", being taken out and so on and so forth. As I have mentioned, key players in Marion also featured in Katzen. Other important parallels are the security risks which I have referred to briefly and will return to in Marion and again, the same crops up in Katzen under 11.4 there. The weapons again, often the same parties are involved and in this instance the same individual involved. If one looks at the groups trained, it is evident from a Katzen document produced during November 1986 that they also envisaged similar type groups to be trained for the Katzen purpose as Marion and here they refer to intelligence gathering and recruitment. It's referred to in different circumstances. Here they're talking about the group that goes in to carry out the offensive actions or eliminations, not be used from - not to be used for other purposes such as intelligence gathering and recruitment in case they're arrested. Anyway, I move on from that parallel. I'm not going to deal with point 12. It relates to - suffice to say that
/it
3B it relates to a financial arrangement that on the face of the documents appears to disclose the buying off of one individual who had a falling out with Military Intelligence and was, I believe, bought out of the project and I think that that quote there is evidence of that. Under the heading, "Offensive actions = unlawful actions and the question of legal costs". According to a document produced during October 1986, Buthelezi met with DST officers, Cor van Niekerk and John More. This in fact was the only document provided between June 1986 and January 1988. Now according to this document, Buthelezi equated offensive actions with unlawful actions and the taking of the law into their own hands. Now that is quite unambiguous and to claim that offensive actions means one thing in this document but something else in another or all the others, is a claim that I think rings hollow. So here he was referring to Inkatha members who had taken offensive actions against radical elements and some of these Inkatha men had been arrested and charged and he further purportedly said that although Inkatha had been approached for assistance with legal costs, if money was paid out of party funds, this would come down as - or be seen as a condonation of unlawful actions, a perception which he, as president of Inkatha, could not permit. Now I know - I am aware that this particular passage is going to be the subject of much debate and will be hotly disputed by my learned friends on that side. They will argue, of course, that it simply says that because Buthelezi would not approve the paying of legal costs of those charged for carrying out offensive actions out of party funds, because that would be - it will come down as
/being
3B being seen as a condonation of unlawful actions, that therefore Buthelezi would never have condoned anything unlawful and I don't believe that that particular interpretation can be sustained. Already you have an idea of what the Chief Minister had requested and what offensive actions were all about and if that interpretation were to be sustained, then again the documents make absolutely no sense. It requires in fact the magical expunging of every other reference to offensive and its unlawfulness. It quite obviously cannot be done. There was never any suggestion that the offensive capacity requested in 1985 which I have referred to and granted and implemented through to 1989, changed in its essential form. I shall revisit that particular sentence very briefly at a later stage, given that that particular passage, I'm sure, will be relied upon to paint a virtuous picture of Buthelezi's intentions and his view of offensive actions. Dealing with the next heading, "The mysterious year of 1987". No documents were made available for this entire year and being the first year of deployment of the Marion members, it would have been one of their most active. Apart from the carrying out of the Kwa Makutha massacre in January 1987, another example of this activity was the case of the "Eight Directors". Now the Eight Directors were referred to independently by Van Niekerk, who at that time was in charge of Operation Marion and Captain J P Opperman, an instructor at Caprivi and the liaison officer on the ground. According to Van Niekerk's diary and entry on the 6th of March 1987, it reads as follows -
"Reeva sit met 8".
/Reeva
3B Reeva sits with 8. Reeva was the codename for M Z Khumalo. Now according to Opperman, the eight referred to eight individuals, M Z Khumalo was hiding from the police and these eight persons had murdered somebody. Some of the eight were Caprivi trainees. According with Opperman he made arrangements with John More and Cor van Niekerk and money and food were provided to the eight. They were codenamed the Eight Directors and the group was eventually filtered back into society. M Z Khumalo himself played a central role, but I'm not going to go into that detail. Now it is unlikely that the absence of documents for the year of 1987 and the training months in 1986 and other specific documents, like the one I've quoted there and, in fact, we heard from the evidence of Brigadier John More that monthly reports were compiled. Not a single monthly report was made available. I don't believe that the absence of these documents was a matter of coincidence or an accident, as in fact claimed by Brigadier Van Niekerk, but according to Van Niekerk he colluded with Colonel Mike van den Berg in removing the documents from the Operation Marion file and for those of you who are not familiar with the background, the story goes that Van Niekerk kept certain documents behind in order to, so he claims, as an insurance policy and that policy related to nothing more than showing that the whole operation was of an entirely innocent nature. Now in the trial he testified that he and Van den Berg were deeply concerned about how vulnerable Project Marion officers were to criminal prosecution. According to evidence led in the Msane matter, the Marion file was still available during March 1992 and according to further evidence, the
/balance
3B balance of the Marion documents were not recorded as destroyed in the official register, so it is likely then that at some point, some point in time the balance of those documents were specifically removed from the file and it isn't out of question that this took place in the three days between, when investigators arrived at MI Headquarters and the handing of the bundle over to investigators. That, I concede, is speculation, but it is not out of the question. What is clear is that those specific documents were removed. As I mentioned, I believe that Van Niekerk's claim that he took the documents to show that the project was innocent is a story that he has concocted. If that was the case the documents could quite easily have been kept for that purpose in MI Headquarters itself and further, they would have been disclosed to nip the controversy in the bud when Goldstone investigators first approached the military and I would argue it is quite obvious that the documents were taken in order to show that the project was properly authorised from the highest level. That's what an insurance policy is all about. But, of course, proper authority and lawfulness are not necessarily the same thing, as in this case and others. Moving to the role of the security branch, the SB supplied key support to Operation Marion. Its most important function was to ensure that investigations of crimes committed by the paramilitary unit never saw the light of day and assistance was provided in concealing fugitives from justice and investigations were interfered with. An example was the investigation into the Kwa Makutha massacre and in that case the initial investigation officer, one Warrant
/Officer
3B Officer Mbele complained that the investigation was interfered with. He even went so far as to say that he was instructed by his superiors to release two suspects who had been found in possession of an unlicensed firearm and the one suspect, one Ephriam Buthelezi, was in fact the contact person in the township for the defensive group members who were surveying the Ntuli house. Mbele was instructed in the presence of a senior Inkatha official to take the men to court and have the charges withdrawn and he further said that two members of his investigation team were detained under the emergency regulations without being charged, following the arrest of Ephriam Buthelezi. I think that's a good example of how the Security Branch interfered with those investigations. It was, incidentally, the Security Branch who carried out those detentions. Under the heading, "Swing the conflict in the townships in his favour" and here we're jumping now to 1988 and I'm quoting from a document produced in January 1988 and it's evident from this document that Buthelezi wanted further clandestine training. M Z Khumalo sketches problems in respect of discipline, command and control, which is not surprising since absolutely no provision was made for that. They were in a civilian body as opposed to the police and the army and Khumalo requested two bases, one for the offensive action. He wanted a base where he said where Marion members could plan and take such action and having a base up in the - a secret base up in the hills of Mkuze and up at Port Durnford is hardly the sort of place where you can react and protect, unless of course you're taking planned initiatives of a pre-emptive of retaliatory or retributive nature. And according to a
/document
3B document drawn up in February of that year, Buthelezi reportedly called for more Inkatha members to be trained in order to swing the conflict in the townships in his favour. I move to the heading titled, "Temporarily disappearing" and here we're now jumping to August 1988 and according to a document sent from Malan's office to the Chief of Staff Intelligence and the Chief of the SADF, several matters were brought to Malan's attention by M Z Khumalo and the one I'm going to focus on deals with the need for an individual, one person, to temporarily disappear and I quote -
"Experiencing serious problems in respect of persons who must temporarily be withdrawn from communities, but liaison officers provide no assistance in this regard, and expect Khumalo on his own to formulate solutions in this regard. Dr Buthelezi is extremely sensitive to the political embarrassment that may occur in the pre 26 October 1988 phase as a result of a person not temporarily disappearing".
Now this concern related to an Operation Marion member who was being sought by the law and who Inkatha and the Defence Force eventually took steps to conceal from the law to prevent any connection being made with such operations and their organisations. Incidentally, the 26th of October 1988 was the date for the first nation-wide municipal elections. Now a number of trainees have confirmed that they were concealed from police detection following the taking of offensive actions and again the
/question
3B question to be asked is, why, if we are to believe that the project was lawful and protective, was there a need to cover up the crimes of its operatives? The military were clearly worried and again they referred to putting into practice the aim of Marion to be self-sufficient and independent and to build in cut off points in the interests of security. And again, this is an important point, Chairperson. At this stage the military were beginning to get cold feet and this now a theme that runs from now on through to the rest - to the end of the story as evident in the documents, that at the end of the day they couldn't cover up and clean up every single action taken by the operatives on the ground. Malan then requested a report dealing with the security problems to be put before him by the end of September 1988. Buthelezi met with Chief of Staff Intelligence, Vice-Admiral Putter on the 14th of September 1988. Again no documents were made available for this particular meeting, which is again surprising, because if one looks at the documents or the correspondence that has generated from such meetings, there are generally four, five or more memoranda that are prepared, sometimes before and after and it is likely that the security problems arising from the taking of offensive actions were discussed at this meeting and it is further likely that the idea of smaller offensive groups or cells to carry out the offensive actions was raised at this meeting and this will become evident as we look at the documents that flowed after this meeting. Under the heading, "The disappearing: Indemnity against prosecution: small offensive groups", the report that Malan requested was in fact produced and it appeared in
/October
3B October 1988 in the form of a memorandum. In the report it confirmed that the man who had to disappear had indeed disappeared and in my view, those involved in it, who facilitated it, Malan and the military officers are implicated in the cover up of whatever crime was indeed covered up. The carrying out of offensive actions in small offensive groups was raised as a possible solution to the security problems. A further step was to give Inkatha the capacity to act on its own without SADF assistance and I quote a paragraph -
"Indemnity against Criminal Proceedings. Offensive action is part of Marion's tasks. An attempt is being made to build in cut off points to protect those involved and to train groups so that eventually they can act on their own without SADF assistance".
The document also raised the burning concern that because offensive actions were part of Marion's tasks, Chief of Staff Intelligence, a Vice Admiral and several other senior officers involved in the planning of Operation Marion may be implicated in offences carrying the death penalty. They sought assurances behind the - behind the door assurances for protection in terms of Section 103 of the Defence Act, should they be charged with such offences. So this document is in a sense the pinnacle of that theme that I spoke about, beginning with the realisation back in December 1985 that indemnity from prosecution was going to be required. They were aware at that stage that unlawful actions would flow from the project and somehow those consequences would have to be
/dealt
3B dealt with and in a sense the chicken has now come home to roost in 1988. Even senior officers at the level of Vice Admiral are concerned that they may be charged with offences carrying the death penalty. Under the heading, "Approval of targets and criminal follow up", it is no coincidence that Opperman's October 1988 duty sheet in its reference to offensive actions, referred to trained cells, the strict clearing of targets and significantly criminal prosecution of participants must always be taken into account. So contrary to the claims I am sure will be made that this duty sheet is somehow out of place, it doesn't fit into the story, it in fact fits like a glove into the unfolding story. And I would argue that those types of operations are no different from other operations executed by the SADF, was notably the CCB and they raised similar concerns that they were aware would flow from the elimination of targets and in fact an enquiry was directed to General Geldenhuys by CCB members who were concerned about their liability and Geldenhuys was asked what in fact was elimination of specific target all about and I'm quoting now from a document that emerged in the Goniwe Inquest and in fact was authenticated by General Joep Joubert, Head of Special Forces. Geldenhuys was reported as saying ... (intervention)
MR {?): Sorry to interrupt, Mr Chairman. That document by General Joep Joubert doesn't form part of the papers before us. It wasn't sent to us at all. --- Chairperson, that's only an affidavit authenticating the document I'm quoting from. I don't believe it's absolutely material to my learned friend's objection.
MR LYSTER: Please don't make any reference to it then.
/--- To
3B --- To General Joubert's affidavit?
Yes. --- I won't. General Geldenhuys was reported as saying that -
"He did not see the steps taken by the CCB as 'murder', but rather an attack on an individual enemy target with ..."
MR (?): Sorry, Mr Chairman, I must interrupt again. This question was raised in the Kwa Makutha trial. General Geldenhuys denied that what is said in that document was said by him. I don't know on what basis - he's not here and Geldenhuys denied that and this can have a very serious implication for my client. I submit he is going to be severely prejudiced on the basis that there's not proper notification given, not proper documents given to us supporting this view and my client will be prejudiced. I ask for a ruling that this not admissible, similarly on the basis that the Katzen documents are not available. We haven't been given any documents about the Goniwe Inquest. It contains thousands of pages. It's an investigation that continued for 18 months. We don't know in what context anything was said; we haven't prepared on that. I ask for a ruling that ... (intervention)
MR LYSTER: Mr Varney, I think in the interests of getting on with this thing and the fact that documents haven't been given to interested parties relating to the CCB, please don't make any reference to these documents. --- Chairperson, may I just say the following? The Section 30 notice has been in the possession of my learned friend now for six weeks or more. Presumably he read the document in great detail several weeks ago. He must have read this particular reference. He must have read that
/the
3B the document was authenticated by General Joep Joubert. An authenticating affidavit is of no real consequence to this particular hearing. It was submitted at the Goniwe Inquest and I don't intend to deal with the CCB in any greater detail than I have. It will probably be taking me about 15 seconds to conclude my remarks on it.
MR (?): Well, with all due respect, Mr Chairman, if he is going to be allowed to do that he is going to prejudice my client and that's the intention of the witness. Since when are a witness allowed to argue if - as if he's a lawyer? He's a witness here. The Commission has made a ruling.
MR LYSTER: Mr Varney, please go ahead and don't make any reference to the document or to the CCB. --- As the panel pleases.
Ja. We will take cognisance of the Goniwe Inquest. --- The next heading is titled, "The SAP Commissioner and cover-ups". The security concerns that I referred to earlier, that of trainees engaged in offensive activities being arrested by the normal SAP - there were in fact a number of conscientious and courageous South African policemen who investigated crimes and who arrested a number of people for political actions including these, these politically motivated crimes and this produced a problem for Inkatha and the military. The military were, of course, concerned that these people would spill the beans following their arrest and unless steps were taken to assist them and prevent justice from taking its course, there was the great danger that these people would come clean and one thing would lead to another and ultimately the SADF would be implicated. A meeting was then held, a
/top
3B top level meeting with various representatives of the South African Police during November 1988 and meetings were held with the Commissioner of Police, Johan van der Merwe, Basie Smit and several other senior police officers in a series of three meetings during that month. Attempts were secured in the first meeting to get greater police intervention in the cover up of crimes committed by Caprivi trainees. The Commissioner of Police, Johan van der Merwe explained that they couldn't do much in a pro-active sense, but they gave the following advice that the members concerned must be given bail and then they must simply be taken away. And that, Chairperson, really I think points to the modus operandi of the Security Forces at the time to intervene and obstruct the course of justice when it was getting close to people involved in such operations. As a result of this meeting and the somewhat depressing outcome for the military officers concerned, a decision was then taken that somehow they must get these people into the KwaZulu Police and steps were then taken to demobilise the paramilitary unit and most Marion members were ultimately placed into the KwaZulu Police during June 1989 and according to the documents, Buthelezi and Khumalo reported opposed the withdrawal of military support for offensive steps and this is - the security reasons was the reason in fact why these men were placed into the KwaZulu Police some two and a half years later, not because of any plan that was hatched at the outset. I also draw your attention to the covering letter of the November 1988 meeting, which referred to a movement away from offensive actions to mobilisation steps and I pose the question, why, if
/offensive
3B offensive steps only involved plainly lawful and protective measures, that the military wants to move away from support for offensive steps, particularly in the light of the deteriorating situation for Inkatha and it's also evident from the documents. These so-called protective actions should have been stepped up, not phased out and indeed Buthelezi in subsequent documents did just that, he called for the stepping up of offensive steps. So it makes little sense, unless of course the offensive steps were plainly offensive steps and the military were concerned about being implicated. Under the heading, "Buchner and the choosing of targets". In one of these meetings I referred to in November 1988 which was held between Security Branch Commanders and DST officers, Brigadier Jac Buchner of the Security Branch in Pietermaritzburg was reported saying that -
"Inkatha must not know that we are choosing targets".
And Brigadier Van Niekerk of DST who attended the meeting made the following entry in his diary -
"Must we rather not go for lower level targets that make less waves"
or less ripples and at the same meeting it was stated that Marion members should only talk to Security Branch members and again one must ask if they were simply engaged in bona fide protective actions, why shouldn't they normally deal with the uniform and detective branch members? Why only the Security Branch? And if I just pause briefly on the question of targets. Presumably the claim will be made that this simply relates to the connection of Intelligence. Well, if it does, then it makes no sense,
/because
3B because why would the collection of intelligence of lower level targets make less waves? It was all secret anyway. And, of course, before target selection and actions carried out, you needed to collect intelligence in any event and I would argue that the targets referred to there were targets in the normal sense, targets for elimination. Under the heading, "Offensive actions and hit squads". On the 31st of October 1989 two senior officers, Colonels Van Niekerk and Van den Berg met with Buthelezi and a report of this meeting was produced in November 1989 and according to a paragraph in this meeting -
"The Chief Minister expressed his concern over the situation in Mpumalanga and the fact that he was losing the 'armed struggle'. He referred to the 'cell'- idea for offensive action which did not get off the ground".
Now you will recall my earlier references to the security problems and one way of preventing these security problems was to carry out offensive actions in small offensive groups or small cells and here that particular theme plays itself out where Buthelezi reportedly says, "Well, this was an idea that was raised for a way of carrying out offensive actions without incurring the security problems" and he wants this particular proposal implemented. And at the same meeting, according to another document drawn up on the 2nd of May 1990, Buthelezi reportedly expressed concern that he was -
"... losing the armed struggle and in that regard emphasised that 'offensive steps' were still a necessity; meaning
/"the
3B "the deployment of 'hit squads'".
I'll come back to that briefly. There's also a further reference where M Z Khumalo is reported as saying that at the very least Buthelezi still required -
"... cells which can take out undesirable members".
Now here is the reference to offensive steps in its unadulterated form, "offensive steps" being hit squads and one is at a loss to see how can interpret "offensive steps" in an innocent light when such references are there in such blunt and obvious form. Attached to that particular document was a memorandum titled, "Subject for discussion" and one of the subjects was, I quote -
"Offensive capability (cells) for Inkatha: In Oct 89 CM Buthelezi asked that Int Div reconsider the training of offensive cells for Inkatha seeing that an urgent requirement for these exists".
So just to recap the story here, the military are getting cold feet. They are withdrawing support for offensive actions; they still have to deliberate on whether to, in fact, take forward this idea for carrying out offensive actions through these offensive cells. So Buthelezi's request was taken to Malan who maintained, and I quote -
"... that the violent option was a difficult matter".
The security risks were simply too high and to bring this home to Buthelezi, it was decided to take the South African Police Detective Branch Head, General Basie Smit, to talk to him. Malan's explanation was put to Buthelezi by Van Tonder at a meeting with him held on 9th May 1989
/sorry,
3B sorry, 1990. Now, Chairperson, these passages that I have been referring to, they speak for themselves. They set out the essential nature of offensive actions in very crisp terms and needless to say, the documents do not reflect a crisis or surprise from military officers, from the senior people there, following the reported remarks of Buthelezi and if indeed the military felt that they had been duped here, they had supplied a purely protective lawful force to Inkatha, then surely they would have been alarmed. They would have called for an immediate investigation ... [break in recording]
(END OF CASSETTE NO 3B)
(START OF CASSETTE NO 4A)
/[Break in recording]
4A [Break in recording] ... The person to whom it was supplied is equating offensive steps with hit squad activity it would have produced a crisis of calamitous proportions and it didn't, and indeed, it took some months for them to deliberate on the particular request around the cells. It took them months to get back to Buthelezi and they tried to sweeten the pill, so to speak. They said they would take along Basie Smit. Presumably he would explain why it was difficult to cover up each and every action carried out by the offensive element. It is hardly surprising that the military have no way of explaining away such crisp references. It says volumes about the attempts to portray the taking of offensive steps as protective in nature and, under the circumstances, the description of the offensive capacity in the much-vaunted 14th February 1986 document, which talked about preventing attacks on Inkatha members, that document could only have been referring to actions in an initiative-taking or preemptive manner. Seen in that light, the documents are not contradictory and the same goes for the 16th October document, dealing with Buthelezi's concerns around the paying of legal costs. If we were to interpret that particular document as Buthelezi would never authorise or tolerate anything unlawful, how do we reconcile that document with this document? It simply cannot be reconciled. Therefore, I believe it that can only be read as Buthelezi not wanting to be seen or not wanting to deal with the repercussions of paying the legal fees of those committing unlawful actions, and I don't believe the interpretation can be taken any further than that. And if one looks briefly at the nature
/of offensive
4A of offensive actions, here we are dealing with a tiny offensive group - no more than 30 persons - and then later in the documents we see it's reduced to 10 persons. We are then told that this group is going to cover - is going to provide blanket protection to Inkatha members throughout the region. They are going to respond to attacks. How can a group of 30 and at a later stage 10, based up somewhere in Northern Natal, respond to attacks unless, of course, they are taking preemptive or retaliatory strikes? So the practice, the size is consistent with a group that takes initiatives. It is consistent with a group that is, in fact, a hit squad. Under the heading, "Do not admit or deny. The spike", or the nail. At the 9th May 1990 meeting, Buthelezi was advised by the Chief of Intelligence Operations, General van Tonder, not to admit or deny anything relating to Inkatha/SADF hit squad allegations made in the "Vrye Weekblad". Now, if, in fact, the operation was entirely above board, entirely lawful, why the advice, "Don't admit or deny"? In the same meeting, Buthelezi reportedly expressed concern that his nephew had gone over to the ANC/UDF, provides great propaganda value to the enemy and he requested to see "Spyker" in secret. Spyker is translated as spike or nail. There are certain suspicions that arise from such a reference and I believe that that passage in that document ought to be investigated. We need to know who is this Spyker and why did the Chief Minister wish to see him in secret if, in fact, that is the case, as it appears on the face of this document. "The closure of Operation Marion". This took place - the operation started to wind down, as I said - certainly
/offensive support
4A offensive support was wound down towards the end of 1989. Most of the Marion members were put into the KwaZulu Police in the middle of 1989. Certainly mobilisation and other support continued. The documents talk about courses that were supplied - organizational-type courses and so on and so forth, and it's evident that the final meetings with M Z Khumalo were held on the 4th December 1990 - or rather Khumalo was advised on the 4th December 1990 that the operation was being closed down and they met with Khumalo finally on the 23rd January 1991. General van Tonder himself continued meetings with Buthelezi up until the 16th July 1991. So, in wrapping up this section of Operation Marion, it was an aim of Operation Marion to supply Inkatha with the capacity of self-sufficiency, and I am now going to argue in the next section that Inkatha's offensive actions continued under the cover of the KwaZulu Police and that the actions of the Esikhaweni hit squad in the early 1990s is a case in point.
MR LYSTER: Mr Varney, could you just take a break there. I just want to consult with the rest of the panel. No evidence has been given at all yet about the Esikhaweni hit squad. We've held this over and we may well request you to stop your evidence here and evidence over the next few days will be led relating to Esikhaweni. But if you could just bear with us for a minute. [Break in recording] ... evidence on Esikhaweni. We would rather hear evidence from those who will be giving evidence later this week and possibly next week and draw our own conclusions relating to their deployment and actions in Esikhaweni Township. So we'd like you then to wrap up your submission, if that's what you intend to do, by way
/of some sort
4A of some sort of closing remark. --- Thank you, Chairperson.
You can briefly mention that allegedly unlawful actions continued to take place through the 1990s, but don't make any reference to the - any detailed reference to Esikhaweni. --- Chairperson, I think I've already made that point.
I think you have made the point in the beginning. Thank you. If we could just have some closing remarks. --- Yes. Before I close, just two - or rather one final point, just dealing with the practice and nature of this particular squad. There were two entities which operated - concern to us (?), the protective and the offensive capacity. It will no doubt be argued by my learned friends that, in fact, they acted in concert together in hostage and other type situations. The protective unit would protect and the offensive group would retaliate, as such. I have already explained how unlikely that was - how impossible. In any event, in order to seal that particular proposition or rather the incorrectness of it, following the return of the Caprivi trainees to South Africa almost immediately the protective unit was removed and placed into the KwaZulu Police and so not only was their training in offensive and protective techniques quite separate, they didn't act in concert in practice. They were physically not together. In conclusion, I believe that the Commission should have no difficulty ... (intervention)
MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, I want to object against the conclusions being addressed to this panel. Firstly, for the very simple reason that it appears that those
/conclusions are
4A conclusions are in direct conflict with the provisions of section 39(a), I think, of the Act, which requires that the Commission in its findings should not be foreshadowed by anybody. Sorry, it is 39(a). If I can just read 39(a) to you briefly. It's very short. 39(a) says,
"Offences and penalties.
Any person who,
(a) Anticipates any finding of the Commission regarding an investigation in a manner calculated to influence its proceedings or such findings is guilty of an offence."
Now, these conclusions are doing precisely that, and we object to those conclusions. We want them struck out.
MR LYSTER: Just by way of a quick response, Mr Maritz, if you were, on behalf of your clients, to put certain conclusions to us or suggest we should see matters in a particular way, would that not be contravening the same thing? With respect, we can hear any opinion from anybody. That doesn't affect our conclusions. It's just that person's opinion, in the nature of an opinion and any Commission is at liberty to hear such evidence or such statements, read any documents, articles and so on. So it would simply make our job absolutely impossible if we were to adopt the very strict or kind of interpretation you are suggesting. Accordingly we will continue to hear Mr Varney on this issue.
MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, may I just reply to that very briefly?
MR LYSTER: Yes, Mr Maritz, please, briefly.
MR MARITZ: No 1, Mr Varney, as a witness, is not
/representing anybody
4A representing anybody as counsel or as an attorney. Secondly, I represent parties, who have been given notice and, for that reason, I can do my job in that respect and I can ask you to make certain findings and conclusions in argument, but it ill behoves a witness to suggest to the Commission which findings it should make and it so done explicitly in the very first paragraph. Thank you.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Maritz. We have received thousands of submissions from individuals, from organizations and from lawyers and we treat those as submissions and we attach to them the weight that we think they deserve. We feel that it's completely appropriate for Mr Varney to make - to come to opinions, subjective as they are, and we will, in due course, consider what weight they deserve, in the same way that we will listen to arguments from everybody present here and draw conclusions as to what weight they deserve as well. So we will allow Mr Varney to make some brief concluding comments. Thank you. --- Thank you, Chairperson. I believe that the Commission should have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the Luthulis, the Mkhizes, the men on the ground and in the front line were not conducting a series of unconnected private frolics but, in fact, acted at the behest of the most powerful individuals within the apartheid state and its surrogate homeland structures. It is evident that the actions that flowed out of Operation Marion did not only include criminal offences, such as murder, by necessity, the cover-up of crimes was the order of the day. As has been pointed out, this involved senior politicians and the highest police and military officers, including the Commissioner of Police himself. This
/deception continues
4A deception continues through to today. Most role-players have chosen to rely on the unlikelihood of an inadequate and overstretched prosecutorial service ever getting its act together to bring thorough and effective prosecutions in such cases. They rely further on what can be referred to as plausible deniability - what I'd like to call the blind eye syndrome. This involves placing some distance between the acts on the ground and the decisions taken at the highest levels. The refrain has often been heard that the highest leaders and officers could not have been expected to know what was going on on the ground and if atrocities did take place this was the work of a few rotten apples. I believe, however, that this submission has set out a story which reveals an unbreakable and consistent connection between the decisions and strategies decided upon at the level of the State Security Council and higher levels with the explicit references in the documents of operations like Marion, Katzen and others, and with the actions on the ground. If one is to refer to rot, then it was part of the system itself, which was infected from top to bottom. I may add that I am somewhat perplexed as to why these role-players continue with their charade. Apart from the fact that few are persuaded by their denials, all sides adopted strategies which were designed to win the war. During this war the struggle was seen by all participants as a life and death struggle. Tactics used by all sides included violence and terror, which resulted in loss of life. I think few will dispute that the overall aim of all sides to the conflict, apart from their respective political objectives, was to protect their supporters from attack and oppression. The
/deception, presumably,
4A deception, presumably, continues in an endeavour to preserve the image of key political leaders. It is a futile exercise. Credibility and statesmanship in these circumstances emerge from being open and honest with the entire nation. Endeavour to confine culpability to the foot soldiers does a great disservice to these men. They are passed off as mere thugs and criminals. They are prevented from coming to terms with their actions. The spinning of webs of deceit and half truths also does a great disservice to the nation itself as it retards the process of South Africa reconciling itself with its past. It will, however, not stop this process. While the acts carried out by members of hit squads, whether they be Caprivi trainees, Vlakplaas members, special forces, or whatever, can only be described as horrific. They must, however, be seen in context and seen in context they are understandable and I believe that the Truth Commission should see the actions carried out by hit squads in furtherance of a political cause in its proper context. The bulk of the activities I have described took place within state structures and it security and policing organs. This culture of impunity and lawlessness still impacts on society today. Those in public office and in the service of the state should, above all others, comply with the laws of the land. They should be subject to the greatest scrutiny. Never again should they be permitted to get away with transgressions of the law. There were many during these dark years who, in their different situations, did what they could to bring about peace and justice. Apart from those in civil society, you will also find such people in institutions like the South African
/Police, the
4A Police, the KwaZulu Police and the South African Defence Force. They played such roles at great risk and sacrifice to themselves. The Commission should find a way of acknowledging these individuals. The record will be incomplete without their stories. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr Varney. There will now be an opportunity for counsel present to make certain representations. I understand that some counsel want merely to stand up and say that they will be replying in due course by way of a written document, which will deal seriatim with each of the items raised by Mr Varney. That was a suggestion which was made by certain counsel during the break. I think it was a very good suggestion. However, I understand that is not a suggestion which has been accepted by the entire group. I want to make it absolutely clear that we do not have much time for cross-examination and that at 7.15 these premises will be closed and I would urge people not to waste what little time there is available with objections and points taken. We are not in any position to extend the period available to us. I think Mr Lasich has, by consent, asked if he can make some opening comments.
MR LASICH: Yes, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, there is often the statement said amongst my colleagues at the Bar and the Side Bar that lawyers make terrible witnesses. I don't intend to test that today. Mr Chairman, I merely confirm what you stated. We will deal with Mr Varney's evidence, which we have used in argument subsequently during the course of the hearing. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Lasich. Is there anybody who wants to place himself on record by way of a similar
/suggestion?
4A suggestion?
MR WILLS: Yes, Mr Chairperson, I too will be making a submission and also be using Mr Varney's evidence in argument at the conclusion of these proceedings.
MR LYSTER: If, in doing so, if counsel want to say just very briefly that they do not agree with the contents of the document, so that is placed on record at this stage, that's also obviously all right to do so.
MR VISSER: May I take a turn quickly, Mr Chairman? Mr Chairman, we believe that we can deal with most of what Mr Varney said in a written representation, but we also believe that, in fairness, perhaps also to Mr Varney, that if there is time at the end of the line and if there isn't, well, then so be it, but that we may just wish to put a few points to Mr Varney, because it would be fair for him to comment before we make written representations, but we certainly will make the latter to you at a later stage, yes.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Visser.
MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairman, I have not been in a position to take any instructions regarding Mr Varney's submissions. My instructions at this stage are to deal with it in argument in a similar fashion at the end of these proceedings. Thank you.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Bosman. Perhaps we should have just placed - you should have just placed yourselves on record. It was Mr Lasich for the IFP, Mr Wills, Mr Visser, Mr de Vos - Mr Bosman is it? Sorry, it was your suggestion.
MR MARITZ: Ja, we don't have a microphone available at the drop of a hat. We also reserve the right to make
/submissions
4A submissions in regard to this submission that has been presented. We would like the opportunity of just posing a few questions, but very briefly. It won't be a very lengthy cross-examination.
MR DE VOS: Mr Chairman, it's De Vos speaking. I am virtually in the same situation as my learned friend, Mr Maritz, as instructed by my clients. Thank you.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr de Vos. Does anybody else want to place on record what their attitude is?
MR VAN ZYL: Thank you, Mr Chairman, it's Mr van Zyl speaking. We, of course, would also like to reserve the right to make written representations and arguments at a later stage and we would also like, depending on the questions being asked by Mr Maritz and other senior colleagues of mine, if they do that before me, we would also like to ask a few questions to Mr Varney in cross-examination. It also will not be a lengthy process. Thank you.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr van Zyl.
MR OLIVIER: Mr Chairman, I also have no instructions at this stage, but I also reserve the right to make written representations at a later stage.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Olivier.
MR TOWEEL: Mr Chairperson, my surname is Toweel, on behalf of Colonel van der Berg, and I also reserve the right to make submissions, but I have no cross-examination at this stage.
MR LYSTER: Thank you.
MR GROBLER: Mr Chairperson, Grobler, on behalf of Major-General Joubert. In the light of the fact that you regarded it very strongly as a submission and in the light
/of the fact
4A of the fact that all the evidence on which this submission has been based has not been placed before you, we reserve the right to respond at a later stage to it.
MS H KRUGER: Mrs H Kruger. I am in the same position as my colleague before, and I will deal with the submissions at a later stage.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mrs Kruger.
MR DE VOS: It seems I'm the one who is supposed to start, Mr Commissioner, thank you.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr de Vos.
MR DE VOS: Mr Varney, due to the fact that most of the documents that you refer to are in Afrikaans, I'm going to start my cross-examination with Afrikaans. You are well conversant with that, I believe. Thank you. Mr Varney, you were a member and convenor of the ITU. Is that correct? --- I was on a body ... [break in recording] ... task board, which was a civilian body comprising three lawyers appointed by the Minister of Safety and Security to oversee the investigations of the Investigation Task Unit. That body was headed up by Senior Superintendent Frank Dutton.
Is it correct that I've understood your evidence correctly - here I'm referring to several articles written by yourself, inter alia, the first document by yourself and Mr Jeremy Sarkin, as well as a document, which was furnished to us and that was the Marion report, as well as a second summary of the report, which was given to us about two weeks ago, as well as the last summary of the report, which was given to us on Monday, the 4th August this year, when the hearings commenced. The information upon which you base your argument or arguments, has that
/been collected
4A been collected, gathered by Mr Dutton - is that correct? --- Senior Superintendent Dutton was involved in the investigations and he was the investigation officer in this particular case, so obviously much of what is contained in these reports is as a result of his investigations, but it isn't only gleaned from the investigations of the ITU, much of it is gleaned from an analysis of the documents themselves. In fact, you will find very little in terms of witness testimony in these various documents.
Would you agree that Judge Hugo found that Mr Dutton was not being entirely frank with the Court in the Msane case? --- Did you say Mr Dutton wasn't being frank?
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone was not on.
MR DE VOS: May I repeat? And that he had ulterior motives, especially in his evidence regarding what happened at Iscor. --- With regard to his evidence at Iscor, those were findings that Mr Dutton, or rather Senior Superintendent Dutton made and which he passed on to the Attorney-General. It was not Dutton's decision to lead that evidence at the hearing. That was the decision of the Attorney-General and I don't believe that one can -I don't agree with the finding of the Court that because the Attorney-General led Dutton on that particular aspect that Dutton now had an ulterior motive to mislead the Court on the question of security measures at Iscor - he has a part. I don't believe there's sufficient in there to make a such a finding and I would certainly disagree with it.
Would you agree that the Judge also found that some of the State witnesses were prompted and told what to say
/by members
4A by members of your investigation unit? --- The Judge made no such finding in his judgment. What he did do was he raised the potential for such things to happen. If you read the judgment closely, you will find that he made no such positive finding that members of the ITU had prompted individuals to give certain evidence.
Sorry, I can't hear a thing.
MR MACADAM: Sorry, Mr de Vos, the Afrikaans is on channel 1. The English is on channel 2. What I'm doing is I'm surfing between the two channels so I can hear both of you properly, but you may want to do that.
MR DE VOS: Mr Varney, can you remember that the witness, Cloete, testified that he was told what to say by members of the task unit, the investigation unit? --- I wasn't in court at that particular time. I didn't hear all of Mr Cloete's evidence. I am aware that he proved to be a very poor witness and that he was broken down by the cross-examination of several senior counsel. I don't recall him saying that he was particularly prompted to say certain things.
Would you dispute it if we referred to the judgment of Justice Hugo in this regard, that there was such a finding? --- Well, clearly I won't dispute that.
Mr Varney, you are not a military expert. Is that correct? --- I'm not a military expert, as such, but I have over the past 2˝ years been studying these particular documents that I've been referring to for some time.
You are an ordinary attorney by profession. Is that correct? --- Mr Chairman, may I make a suggestion in order to curtail these proceedings? My learned friend,
/Mr de Vos,
4A Mr de Vos, is going through this long-winded process of I am only an attorney, I'm not an expert, and so on. Perhaps he should simply put his case down on record first. Put his point to me and then I'll answer it. I think this is a laborious process, which we really don't have much time for.
The witness can't tell me how I should cross-examine him.
MR LYSTER: Yes, you're quite right, Mr de Vos, he can't, but I may make some suggestions as to how to speed the process up, and I think in my initial remarks I said that cross-examination should, if possible, be limited to putting a client's version to the witness and asking whether he agrees with it or not, unless you obviously want to put documents which are not - which you would regard as in dispute, etcetera, but I think if you can try and do what you can to speed up the proceedings I would be grateful.
MR DE VOS: Thank you. I am at the point where I would like to refer to the documents. Before I refer to the documents, you were for a number of years an active member of the End Conscription Campaign in Natal. Is that correct? --- I was, but I think you need to say what the relevance of such a line of questioning is all about. Are you trying to infer that because I was a member of the End Conscription Campaign and other organizations that were involved in anti-apartheid work in those days that I am somehow not qualified to pass an opinion on these matter? I think just get to the point.
Please answer my question, Mr Varney. The purpose of my questions is to demonstrate that you are a
/prejudiced or
4A prejudiced or biased witness.
MR LYSTER: Well, with respect, Mr de Vos, just put it to the man that he's biased. You know his background. You are going to waste a long time going through, "Are you this, are you that, are you the next thing?" Closing all the channels and then you are going to put your punch to him. We know that, but rather just put the proposition to him that he's biased and if you want to state the basis upon which you make that statement, do so. You know, we just simply don't have the time to do it piecemeal and painstakingly in that sort of fashion.
MR NTSEBEZA: It seems to me that what is in contention here is the version that Mr Varney has put as a witness and if that is in contention I think let's go to the heart of the matter. It can never be limited cross-examination if it is going to go into his life history, where he was born, whether he's an attorney, whether he's an ordinary attorney. We must address the issue. If there is a version which you say Mr Varney has failed to put to us as a Commission put the version.
MR DE VOS: Thank you, Mr Commissioner. The point I'm trying to make is this. In all the documents which we've seen, all these documents have as a basic principle that the Judge, sitting with assessors, did not do their work properly, that Advocate McNally and his team and you were a member of that team, that they also did not do their work, that the Defence Force, which you are trying to suggest had ulterior motives, that the Government of the day also had ulterior motives, and that the State Security Council, as such, also had all kinds of ulterior motives. Is that your evidence? --- Are you suggesting that
/because of
4A because of certain papers that I've written that I'm suggesting the Court had ulterior motives? You seem to have lumped the Court and the State Security Council and hit squads all in the same boat, so I think that you need to differentiate or categorise as to what you are referring to.
Mr Varney, the point is very simple. You criticised Judge Hugo explicitly in all the documents. You said that he should have called certain witnesses, that he didn't understand the documents, etcetera. Is that correct? --- Yes, that is evident from the face of the papers I've written.
In other words, is it correct that you are biased? You have a very particular view of events and you do not agree with what happened during the eight-month trial in Natal. Is that correct? --- Absolutely.
Let us look at the documentation as you referred to it in your evidence today before this Commission. The first document to which you referred is dated the 18th July 1985. That was the meeting of the State Security Council, if we try and do this in chronological order. Would you agree with that? Please forget about the 1997 document. Let us look at 18 July 1985, that document.
MS SOOKA: May we ask that while the witness is being cross-examined that counsels preferably keep their cell phones off so as to ensure that the proceedings don't get interrupted.
MR DE VOS: Do you have the document? --- Yes, proceed.
According to you, on that occasion there was a national strategy established or formed by the South
/African Government
4A African Government based on Fraser's book, as well as McCuen's book. Is that correct? --- If you look at my submission that the meeting held on 18th July 1985 refers to principles which coincided with the lessons and principles set out by counter-revolutionary writers, such as General C A Fraser.
Yes, what about it? --- That is my answer.
So, is your answer then that references were made to all these works by Fraser and McCuen, but was it actually accepted by the Government of the date and the State Security Council as the Government's principles? --- These principles are set out in a State Security Council meeting dated 18th July 1985, under the heading, "Beginsels vir die bekamping van ..." ... [break in recording]
INTERPRETER: "Principles for the combating of the revolutionary onslaught". --- And these principles informed the State at the time of counter-revolutionary strategies, and they happened to coincide with the writing of Fraser and McCuen.
MR DE VOS: Mr Varney, you are afraid to answer my question, because you know what I'm going to do. --- [Break in recording] ... your question.
Would you agree that if you look at item 8 of this document, it is said there, "For the information of the meeting the chairperson gives the following synopsis of the principles of revolutionary warfare, based on the writings of various experts on the topic". Would you agree? --- [Break in recording] ... are you trying to say that, in fact, those principles didn't form State Security strategies at the time? What is the actual point
/you are trying
4A you are trying to make? Perhaps you should get to that.
Please just answer my question. Is that what it says here? Would you agree that the reason why it was given to these people at the meeting was for them to take note of it - for their information? --- That is what is says there and I'm arguing further that those principles, in fact, informed that meeting and State Security policy in the development of State Security strategy to counter the revolutionary onslaught. That I've said. You know, what more can one say about it?
These same points were debated by General Oelschig at the Msane trial. Do you remember that? --- I think, Mr de Vos, just get to the point that you want to make.
Mr Varney, you are a witness. You are not an attorney. Please just answer my question. Were these issued debated with General Oelschig? --- I cannot obviously recall everything that General Oelschig raised, but he did deal extensively with counter-revolutionary strategy during his evidence.
Yes. May I assist you, Mr Varney. Can you remember that General Oelschig testified that General Fraser wrote two books and the first book was written in the early '60s, when he was still a Brigadier? Do you remember that? --- (No audible reply)
And the second book was written in the late '60s, when he was a General. --- Six or seven years apart, along those lines.
Yes, a long time. What is interesting is that the second book which he wrote stopped at paragraph 31 of that summary which forms part of the appendix to his book. Do
/you remember
4A you remember that? --- In the second edition or paper that he wrote, which was based on that early edition - I think they were both called, "Lessons learned from past revolutionary wars" - in the second edition that particular paragraph doesn't contain the reference to acts of terrorism. You are going to suggest now that he changed his mind between the first paper and the second paper. Well, I would dispute that. I would argue that he hadn't changed his mind, that that particular reference was edited out, as many others were edited out, not because he had changed his mind, but because of other reasons.
Mr Varney, you are trying to preempt my questions. My question is this. The first books, appendices were not attached to the State Security Council's memorandum, but the second one was. Do you agree with that? --- Yes, I agree with that and, as I said, the two papers are basically the same. There is nothing really to distinguish between the papers, and I would argue that the suggestion that, because Fraser didn't include the reference to terrorism relating to the use of force in his second paper, that that was simply abandoned, that he suddenly changed his mind, which General Oelschig argued at the case ... [end of tape] ... [break in recording] ... is in the record. Why are we going through it again? I asked counsel please not to deal with issues which have been dealt with in other forums and they're sitting there in those boxes there. Why are we going through this evidence again?
The point I'm making is not on record. That is the whole point. The second book, the appendix there was
/attached to
4B attached to the State Security Council meeting's minutes of the 18th July 1985. What Mr Varney, however, did in his submission to you was that he simply attached the first books, annexures, as of that, was the annexure attached to the minutes of the meeting of the 18th July, and that is simply not true. Would you agree with me, Mr Varney? --- The paper referred in the Botha document is based on Fraser's work, and I don't believe there is any problem in going to the original Fraser document. In actual fact, I believe the original document probably carries more weight than subsequent documents, that it was refined here and there perhaps. If there was a reference in the second document, which said, "I refer to the use of force as terrorism. In this paper I have revised my view and I don't see force as terrorism, I see it as something else", then perhaps you would have a point, but I think it's splitting hairs to say you agree in one paper force equals terrorism and in another paper force equals something else. It's a pointless argument and if you look at the wider circumstances of what formed counter-revolutionary strategy you will see that acts of terror, counter-guerilla and so on and so forth form part and parcel of that strategy and certainly Fraser's work and others fed into that.
The point I'm trying to make is very simply this. You are telling a blatant lie to this Commission by referring to paragraph 33 of the annexure which formed part of the first book, and which appendix was not part of the State Security Council document. That is my first point. --- Let me deal with that question. I refer you to paragraph 1.2 under the context on page 6 of my
/submission.
4B submission. Do you have it?
Yes, what about it? --- Third line from the bottom,
"Fraser's original document specifically related the use of force to acts of terrorism."
I'm not misleading, I'm talking about his original document, the first one.
Yes, but in your documents to this Commission you are creating the impression, and in all the documents which you have published, also the Varney Report, the very substantial report, you create the impression that this paragraph 33 had been annexed to the minutes of the State Security Council meeting of the 18th July, and I'm putting it to you that it's a lie. --- Well, I would dispute that contention.
I will also further put it to you that the second book written by Fraser, in fact, stops at paragraph 31. It simply doesn't contain a paragraph 32, 33 and what follows. What do you say about that? --- I don't have that before me, but I'm sure if you read it very closely you will find that all the numbers, in fact, have changed between the two books and you will find in there that Fraser's advocation of the discriminate use of force, which is what paragraph 33 is all about, is contained in a second paper, albeit under a different chapter. Perhaps you would like us to stand down and we can sit and waste time and find that, but I can assure you it's in there.
Would the Commission bear with me for a second, please? Mr Varney, I would like to put it to you that the whole issue on which you are relying, namely that, as it
/was put in
4B was put in paragraph 33, namely that when the decision is made to counter terrorism, that this decision has to be taken at the highest level and that this comes from Fraser's first book and was never before the State Security Council. Would you agree with that? --- Well, may I ask, how are you able to tell that both books, one or the other, were not before the State Security Council? If one is going to split hairs on this question. And it's a waste of time, because there is no essential difference. Some sentences may have been left out, some paragraphs may have been changed, but there is no essential difference in thrust and in form between the two Fraser documents, and, with respect, Mr de Vos, you are splitting hairs here.
Mr Varney, I have a surprise for you. On Friday I photostatted the original Fraser document, which I found in an archive, and if you think I don't have it, I do, and I'm putting it to you you have no basis for making this statement. Would you like to have a look at this document? --- It is a waste of the Commission's time. I can assure you that the ... (intervention)
MS SOOKA: I think, Mr Varney and Mr de Vos, I think that the question that is being put to you is whether - how you actually know one or the other document is actually attached and I think in the interests of getting to some kind of sensible option on this perhaps you would make the point of what it is that you want to say to Mr Varney, so that we don't have this wrangle, because it's not really taking us anywhere. If you're saying - if you're making a point in respect of either the first or the second document being used, I would be glad if you got to that
/point.
4B point.
MR DE VOS: Mr Varney, would you agree that both Fraser's first book and the second book ends with summaries of everything that he has written about in his book? Do you agree with that? --- I do recall that.
And the second book, the summary there ends at paragraph 32, which reads as follows:
"In the struggle against the riotous elements it is preferable that, by means of international agreement, it be made possible for Government forces to ignore national borders, internal boundaries and for police and ..."
... (intervention) --- If my learned friend is going to be putting documents to me, I believe that, just as I have made all the documents that I have quoted from available he should do the same to me.
Here is the book. I can show it to you. It is Fraser's second book. Would you like to have a look at it? And perhaps I can also show you Fraser's first book, which after paragraph 32 then continues and contains the relevant passage on which your whole argument before this Commission is based.
MS SOOKA: I am sorry to come in again. I think that we did agree, or rather it's the view of the Commission that in the same way that we want to make sure that you have an opportunity to put your point, I think that what we would prefer you to do, if you - I hear what you are saying, that a different document, in fact, was attached to the State Security Council minutes. Now, if that is your point, put that to Mr Varney and get him to agree on it,
/but really
4B but really let's move on, because are wrangling around this point now for the last 15 minutes. If you want to address it further, you could actually put that in the submission that you are going to make, but I would prefer us to deal with concrete perspectives which you are disagreeing with on behalf of your clients. This is, as we have said before, not a court of law. We are interested in getting to some understanding of the truth, without in any way inhibiting you, of course.
MR NTSEBEZA: Put it in a different way, Mr de Vos. If I gather correctly from the nature of your questions, it would seem to me that you would be disputing the premises on which Mr Varney has based his conclusions and it may well be that you want to say his conclusion that the policy was based on the two books is the wrong one. I'm conjecturing here. During the procedure that we have laid out and where, in terms of an agreement that was announced earlier, you are also going to be able to deal seriatim, point by point, with all the issues that you would like to raise in the documents. It seems to me the approach should be that you put to him a version and then I cannot say this with much more emphasis than I've said before. If it is your claim and it is your case that he has got it all wrong by presupposing that the State Security Council policy was premised on the two books, say so.
MR LYSTER: I think just to add to that, if you want to say that he has been selective in his choice of documents and that he's trying to mislead the Commission by attaching a document which wasn't, in fact, attached to the State Security Council document, I think that that should be put to him, because that seems to me that's
/where you
4B where you are leading.
MR DE VOS: Mr Varney, we can make it simple. I'm putting it to you that your assumption, which you made that the State Security Council's view was based on certain principles contained in Fraser's first book, that that is incorrect. --- Yes, that's your view. I reject it.
I'm also putting it to you that the document which you attached is not the correct document. It's not the same document which was distributed at the State Security Council. --- Yes, but, Mr de Vos, that is really a question of splitting hairs. The documents are, by and large, the same and, as I've mentioned, the omission of a word here and a couple of sentences there and the reshuffling of the order means nothing. The thrust of what was being said is the same in both documents. Just because he was a Brigadier and became a General and then wrote a subsequent document based on the earlier one, it doesn't mean he suddenly changed his mind, as claimed by General Oelschig and, as I said earlier, that contention, in my view, is laughable and the question about whether it was the first document or the second document or both that ended up before the State Security Council is irrelevant.
Let us turn to the next document in your line of thinking and that is the State Security Council's meeting of the 12th May 1986. Do you have that? In your documentation you rely quite heavily on this meeting and you say that option 4 was accepted at the State Security Council meeting and that it was from this option 4 that the third force was born. Is that correct? --- On the contrary, if you read all the supporting documents - you
/can't simply
4B can't simply go to one document and say, "Therefore I draw this conclusion". You have to see it in conjunction with all the supporting documentation and, Chairperson, if you look at the supporting documentation, you will see that the third force was but one aspect of the wider counter-revolutionary capacity and, following my reading of the supporting documents, and this particular document, option 4 related to the setting up of a structure - a co-ordinating structure - upon which the State President would sit and which individuals would be seconded to. To say that that option 4 in itself was the third force, well, we are still waiting to hear whether, in fact, that was the case or not. We don't know how far option 4 was taken and you'll read in my report that we say this requires further investigation. We do note, however, that certain aspects of option 4 were indeed implemented. For example, they talk of an operations room, and if you scan the State Security Council document you will see an operations room was, in fact, set up at some stage or another, but certainly that would have fed into a co-ordinating structure that may indeed have co-ordinated counter-revolutionary activities. We suspect that perhaps Minister Vlok was involved in that particular structure, as head of the GBS, and it certainly does fall under the heading, "Discussions of a third force". Another thing you must remember is that third force and counter-revolutionary capacity were used interchangeably in those years. You will note that I don't make any particular - I don't deal in detail about the third force per se. What I do say is that this particular meeting, where the State Security Council tasked certain ministers with undermining
/the revolutionaries
4B the revolutionaries, using their own methods, that that indeed provided the type of direction to the security forces on the ground, to the security force commanders, both police and military, to, in fact, go ahead and to use those methods against the revolutionaries.
Let us look at Annexure 4 and option 4. You didn't provide us with that, am I correct? Option 4, this document, did you give that to us? --- Option 4 was referred to in supporting documents that were put before this particular meeting and, in fact, you, as a member of the legal team at the Malan trial, were given those documents and others weeks in advance and you presumably do have them.
And what is said in option 4 is the following. I'm going to read it to you and I want to know if you agree.
"Different variations are possible and the following is one.
(i) Appointment of a chief, a counter-revolutionary.
(ii) A situation room under the commander of a chief counter-revolutionary.
Further, as 3(ii) above ..."
3(ii) refers to a situation room under the direct command of the chief of counter-revolutionary forces or his delegated officer. The point No 4 - I'm not going to read the whole thing - that deals with the restructuring of the South African Police's existing capacity. Point No (c), elements of other law enforcement agencies can be divided under this heading, will fall under this heading. (d) the requirement that this directorate must co-ordinate all counter-revolutionary strategies in conjunction with
/the ...[break
4B the ... [break in recording]. Point 4, the JMC will continue in existence unchanged, to co-ordinate the counter-revolutionary strategy and to monitor it, and the last point, point 5, MKK and JMC will all continue in its current form to co-ordinate current actions and to monitor those. Would you agree that that is what the document says? --- Yes, I accept, Mr de Vos, that you are reading out of it, so perhaps just put the version of the point that you wish to make and challenge me and I will respond to it.
I am sorry, I don't know what Mr Varney said.
MR LYSTER: He said if you have a point to make put it to him and he'll agree with it or disagree with it. --- I accept that you're reading out of it. If you have a version to put to me then I think just go ahead and do it.
MR DE VOS: The version which I want to put to you is that much reliance is placed in the fact that there was a third force. We experienced that in the Peter Msane trial. Do you remember that? --- [Break in recording] ... with the interpretation. Could you just repeat that?
You placed a heavy reliance on the so-called third force, which existed. Is that correct?
MR LYSTER: Sorry, with respect, Mr de Vos, he's not making the point about the third force at all. What he's talking about is the option that the State would choose to use other methods, used the revolutionaries' methods against them. That's the point he makes in the document, and that he quotes from this thing in relation to. So, with respect, he's not making the point at all about the third force. He only speaks about it in reference - in relation to the point that he's trying to make that the
/State would
4B State would choose the revolutionaries' methods and use them against them themselves. That's the focus of this particular extract. And really, I don't see the point you're trying to make about the third force. This is not an inquiry into the third force.
MR NTSEBEZA: And at the risk of being repetitive to the point of being ad nauseam, it seems to me you are acting -well, it's obvious, you have instructions and even if it was the issue that we are focusing on, the issue is that your instructions have a different view from that that has been presented by Mr Varney and he has given a fairly lengthy reply as to what happened at the State Security Council meeting, as a consequence of which he has drawn the conclusions that he has drawn. It obviously is not in tandem with what your instructions are. Given the nature of the sort of exercise we are engaged in, and we are all novices in it, isn't it the preferred route, now that you see and you have heard what he says is the way at which he came to the conclusion that he came, shouldn't you put your instructions - the instructions which you have, in a way that seeks to undermine the premises and the conclusions that he has come to, without having to refer to document so and so, so as to prove that? That is the occasion - that you will do when you have the occasion to make the detailed submissions in writing which you said you were going to do and in relation to which you have reserved your right? I would suggest that the way that we should go. You have instructions which seek to undermine both his premises and his conclusions. Put those instructions to him.
MR DE VOS: Mr Commissioner, I'm grateful for your input.
/My problem is
4B My problem is that Mr Varney, in his earlier Varney Report, the so-called very thick Marion Report, relied very heavily on the so-called third force. Those same facts were debated in the criminal trial, the KwaMakutha trial. Nothing came of it. Mr Varney then goes from the KwaMakutha trial and proceeds to make certain insinuations in the submission that even though a statutory third force did not exist between the police and the third force, that there was actually an alternative third force, and it is that third force, according to him, which operated from the highest political levels and authorised cold-blooded killings. Our point is that if there was no such third force, and there is no evidence in that regard - Mr Varney has himself said that we don't actually know - then all the evidence which was adduced and all those documents are pro non scriptive. It means nothing. And that is the point I'm trying to make, because you will see that from here I will move back to the Marion documents to point out certain incorrect interpretations regarding those documents and that will link up with my initial cross-examination of bias, or which related to bias. May I please continue on this basis?
MR NTSEBEZA: Now, you obviously have got instructions, either to refute the premises and the conclusions and the argument that you are going about is the argument which you have reserved. Why don't you put to this witness your instructions? If your instructions are to deny, for instance - I am not acting for your clients - if your instructions are to deny both the premises and the conclusions that Mr Varney has come to on the basis of that State Security Council meeting at which the third
/force was
4B force was discussed, put it to him that he was wrong, that he drew the wrong conclusions, that he predicated his conclusions on wrong premises, and that he is biased, if you want to say so.
MR LYSTER: If I could just add one aspect, Mr de Vos, if he's biased and you want to put that to him, that's fine, but he may be biased and his conclusions may still be correct and if his conclusions are not correct, then put that to him. Whether he's biased or not may not necessarily be the point. So if you think he's biased - you have already said to him he's biased, he's got ulterior motives - I think that's how you put it - that's fine. We've taken note of that. Let's rather move on and press the issues. --- If I may say that, almost in defence of Mr de Vos, he now has put the version up and I think I should now respond to that version. In essence, what he's saying is that the Malan trial found that there was no such thing as a third force. The State Security Council didn't establish a statutory body as a third force, separate to the SAP and the SADF. Now I come along and I use these documents to suggest that there is a third force. I think that is the lines along which he is arguing and I think I ought to respond on that basis. If that's the incorrect version, Mr de Vos, please tell me. In the first instance, the Malan trial was not a trial to investigate the third force. Almost no time was spent on it - perhaps 20 minutes. One can hardly use the Malan trial as some sort of basis for saying what type of force it was, whether it existed or not or - it simply dealt with other issues and it dealt with the third force in passing, but I think what we need to do is we need to look
/at the documents
4B at the documents themselves to see what they say about this third force and if you look at, say, for example, the documents circulated, and the same document that you quoted relating to option 4, it defined under the heading, "Investigation, creation, special counter-revolutionary capacity (including a third force)". So this third force, whether it was set up or not - and I concede a separate statutory third force, a separate body to the SAP and SADF, was not set up and I've said so in my report. If you read it closely you'll see I say that. I concede it. But let's look at the wider special capacity of not just the third force itself. What is the special capacity? It's defined as follows. A special capacity specifically organized, equipped and trained to plan, co-ordinate and set up counter-revolutionary actions to fight internal unrest and terrorism. So that's the broad umbrella under which the special capacity will operate. And then, of course, they go into those different options. Let's look at the 12th May meeting itself. That meeting perhaps shouldn't have been called, "Discussion of a third force", it should have been called, "Discussion of a special counter-revolutionary capacity, including possibly a third force", because a lot of matters are decided upon before ... (intervention)
MR NTSEBEZA: Mr Varney, is your simple answer that even though there was not created a special separate force, as a consequence of the discussion there was a third force, even if it was not a third force as a separate force? And are you saying in reply that you are not agreeing with the proposition put to you? (Inaudible) ... that, you know, we are not about investigating the third force and even
/you alluded
4B you alluded to the third force by the way. I'm trying to find a way in which you can express what you want to say in the shortest possible time. --- No, I'm aware that you're trying to short-circuit these proceedings and we don't have much time left, but since the matter has been raised and since it's before the attention of this committee I think I ought to draw the attention to specific passages which related to what the special capacity, which may include a third force, ought to achieve and of particular importance is the fact that it was the existing security forces that were to take certain actions. There was certainly discussion about certain options that may end up co-ordinating such actions and even seconding military and special forces people to do specific actions under this co-ordinating body and we don't know whether that was implemented or not and we certainly know that no separate third force was set up, but what I do argue in my paper is that this special counter-revolutionary modus operandi, as such, this is one of the meetings that did send a direction for such actions and if one looks at some of the decisions taken at this meeting the ... (intervention)
MR DE VOS: After your long answers, the point is very simple. Item 11 was discussed in the meeting and there were quite a few points. You mention all these points but, at the end of the day all these points mean nothing, because the last point, the meeting decided to adopt option 4. All the other points regarding the establishment of a third force and who should assist whom was irrelevant. They were ignored. That is the point I'm trying to make. Is that correct? --- Mr de Vos, that
/isn't the
4B isn't the correct reading of this document. If you look at it carefully, the document sets out certain items and certain resolutions and decisions that are taken and in the column next to it it says, "Optrede deur", "Steps by". You can't look at the bottom of the page and say that the decision at the bottom of the page cancels out the decisions at the top of the page. If one looks at ... (intervention)
MR NTSEBEZA: Mr Varney, with respect, do you agree with his proposition or don't you agree with it? The fact that you can just look at the - that the bottom line is that option 4 was opted for. Do you agree with that? --- I obviously don't agree with it. It's an incorrect reading, but, Mr Commissioner, I think I ought to point out that the point that I'm trying to make is that direction to use the methods of the revolutionaries against them was, in fact, tasked to existing ministers, namely that of Defence and Law and Order and that these objectives had to be carried out by, in fact, the existing security forces and that is the direction that went down. ... (inaudible) ... (intervention)
That's the point you made in your document. That's the point you have already made in your document. --- Yes, I'll let the matter rest there.
MR DE VOS: Let us continue, otherwise we'll never finish. Let us have a look - you mentioned the highest political authority and I want to devote attention before coming to the military. The highest authority, according to you, is the Cabinet, the State Security Council and the State President of that time. Is that correct? --- That's partly correct, Mr de Vos, and this term, "Highest
/level",
4B level", "Highest political level", is a term that is bandied about in certain of the documents and it's unfortunate that I wasn't able to refer to the 79 document, because I think that would have been quite elucidating. That question, in fact, was also put to Former State President de Klerk, and he conceded that at times it meant different things, but what he did say, if I recall correctly, was that it generally constituted the State President himself and, depending on the particular circumstances, it would also have included certain other key ministers. Now, in these circumstances, I only speculate, because there is no definition of, "Highest political level", that it would have been, certainly in terms of Operation Marion, it would have been the State President himself, in consultation, I suspect, with ministers holding security portfolios.
Let us go on to the State Security Council meeting of the 20th December 1985, where assistance to Minister Buthelezi was discussed for the first time. Do you know who put this subject to the State Security Council? --- That isn't evident from that particular minute, which is very skeletal in nature. We don't know what was the actual subject matter of what was discussed or who tabled it. What we do know is that the document dated 19th December 1985, and this, you as a counsel who attended the Msane matter will recall, was placed before Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, I believe either the day before or on the very same day that that State Security Council meeting was going to take place. So I think one can again speculate, but I think quite good speculation that it must have been Minister Malan that either put before or played
/a significant
4B a significant role in placing that matter before the State Security Council. After all, it was one of his subordinate officers of defence that brought the matter to him.
You are speculating. Before you give a long answer, is that correct? Are you speculating?
MR LYSTER: He said so.
MR DE VOS: Can you remember the evidence in the Msane matter? Can you remember that it was referred to that Mr Heunis approached this matter? --- Mr de Vos, I'm not going to dispute such things. Presumably you have looked it up, and I accept that. I had no doubt that Mr Heunis must have played a significant role. After all, his department was on that was going to play a significant role in supplying certain support and - so that doesn't come as a big surprise to me. Heunis was one of the people tasked to give the wide-ranging support. The support wasn't only for military assistance. There was wide assistance and Heunis' department was going to play some role. So Heunis and Malan certainly were key players, but I would be very surprised if you were to tell me that Malan played no role whatsoever in that meeting. In fact, I don't believe I could believe you. If you look at the November 1987.
MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, can I just interrupt here, please? I represent General Malan here and this speculation about General Malan and the role that he played without any factual basis whatsoever is totally worthless and this cannot continue in this way.
MR LYSTER: I don't think - if you want to say in passing that you believed it may have been General Malan, because
/he was the
4B he was the holder of a security portfolio, I think just leave it at that. We can't - I agree with Mr Maritz that one can't start taking that much further, because it simply is just speculation. --- All right.
Although it may be correct or it may be incorrect. --- I will leave it at that with the further piece of information that either that morning or the day before Minister Malan was briefed with a substantial report dated 19th December 1985, dealing with support to Minister Buthelezi. I say it's very likely that Malan played a role in that meeting.
MR DE VOS: Mr Varney, I'm putting it to you that you do not know your facts very well. Can you remember the evidence of General Groenewald, that he made a submission to Buthelezi round about December 1985 on behalf of the branch of the Department of Constitutional Development? They informed the various homelands regarding propaganda and the reporting back, whether it was done on behalf of Minister Heunis' Department of Constitutional Development and he was the man who raised this matter in the State Security Council. --- I'm not disputing that Heunis was the man who raised the matter, but are you suggesting to me that Malan played no role in that meeting?
MR LYSTER: Look, I must interject here. Let's just stop this issue of Malan. We've already said it's speculation. You've made your point. Both of you have. I think let's move on.
MS SOOKA: Howard, I think that it would - that perhaps if you could answer the question and not answer with another question it would be helpful. --- I take the point, but it was a question just by way of clarification.
/
MR DE VOS
4B
MR DE VOS: Then I want to put it to you on the 20th December 1985 the only subject which was raised before the State Security Council was the establishment of a security force for Buthelezi. I'm reading it to you,
"(1) Minister Heunis, Minister le Grange and Minister Malan should give assistance to Minister Buthelezi so that a security force could be established in KwaZulu/Natal."
Do you agree with this? That is contained in the document as it stands. --- [Break in recording] ... done on the minutes. Sorry, are you suggesting that because it says ... (intervention)
Sę maar net, "Ja". --- Ja.
Die tweede vraag is - the second point is Buthelezi should get additional personnel measurements (?) especially ... [break in recording]. Would you agree that that's what it says there? --- (No audible reply)
MR LYSTER: He's never going to dispute that. I mean, let's just get on. Get to the point, please.
MR DE VOS: I want you to have a look at this document. All that the State Security Council decided that a security force should be established in KwaZulu/Natal and additional ... [break in recording] ... protection should be provided to Minister Buthelezi. Is that correct? --- Can you just repeat that, please?
All that the State Security Council said is that three Ministers should provide assistance to Buthelezi to establish a security force and additional security measures should be provided for Buthelezi. Is that what is written there? --- Of course it is, Mr de Vos, but
/that's taking
4B that's taking a - I can see where you're going and I don't want to preempt where you're going, but it's a very simplistic way to deal with it, because it's suggesting that that particular meeting dealing with - or that particular period dealing with this resolution here lasted perhaps two minutes, because that's all they said. Obviously a lot - much more was said, but we don't have the particular minutes of that. So what you need to do is you need to look at the supporting documents. You need to see this meeting in conjunction with the 3rd February 1986 meeting and you need to see that meeting in conjunction with the State Security Council's sub-committee report of 15th January 1986. You need to see it also in conjunction with the Groenewald document drawn up on the 16th January 1986. You can't simply look at it and say, "Well, they're only authorising the setting up of a security force, therefore it's fine".
Let us look at the 3rd February Security Council minutes and we will look and see whether we can actually dispose of this point. Page 4 of it. It says there,
"Minister Heunis reports to the meeting about measures taken in this regard. The meeting approves of these measures and approves of the fact that Mr Heunis must continue with these measures."
Do you see that and do you agree with it? --- We can all read. I think just cut to the chase. Don't ask me whether I can read the documents. Just cut to the chase. What is it that you want to put to me?
What I'm going to put to you is the following. Where in this document do you see the words, "Offensive
/para-military
4B para-military capacity"? --- I just mentioned seconds ago that you cannot adopt, when you're looking at documents, a simplistic view that because you don't see the words, "Offensive para-military unit" in it, it's not there. That would simply be - I'm going to be blunt - crazy. If you look at the totality ... (intervention)
Mr Varney, may I interrupt you? I don't want to interrupt you, but would you agree that the word, "Offensive" or, "Offensive capacity" does not appear anywhere in Annexure A? Do you agree, yes or no? --- Mr de Vos, I have already conceded what has been read. What I'm trying to put to you - rather, I'm not putting anything to you, but what my answer is, is that you have to look at all these meetings together and, starting in November 1985, when it recorded that Buthelezi in a military document wants an offensive capacity, that then goes to the State Security Council. I accept that the 20th December meeting called for the setting up of a security force, but that doesn't absolve them from - there is nothing here to suggest that it wasn't discussed. Of course, I can't say whether it was discussed or not, but what I can do is I can then point to the sub-committee report and I think you need to take out that sub-committee report and I'll point it to you, because this is the report ... (intervention)
I'm not referring to the sub-committee, I'm talking about the chief committee. Please answer my question. You are giving long, protracted answers. My question is a very simple - is it in Annexure A, yes or no?
MS SOOKA: I think you should put your question and then Mr Varney should say, "Yes" or, "No" and then make your
/point and then
4B point and then let's move on.
MR LAX: Sorry, the question is put, yes or no, Mr Varney. You've given your explanation in the previous answer. We've taken note of it. Does Annexure A refer to, "Offensive" in any way at all? --- I've already conceded some time back that it doesn't. I'm not disputing what he's reading to me ... (intervention)
Let's leave it at that. --- But I'm trying to put it in context.
Let's leave it at that. We've heard the context. We've read your submissions and we've heard your evidence. We've heard the context. It's really not necessary for us to hear it over and over again. Thanks. --- Mr Commissioner, can I ask whether I am expected to ignore ... [end of tape] ...[break in recording] ... simply because the word doesn't appear in one document. Obviously I can't and I need to put that on record and I let it rest there.
MS SOOKA: But I think, as Mr Lax has said, that you have laid the context before us. We have noted the explanation that you've given and I think it would help matters if you just move on, on a yes or no or very brief explanation.
MR DE VOS: Can you please answer the question, Mr Varney? --- Mr de Vos, do you want your yes or no. Well, no, it doesn't appear there.
Then, Mr Varney, in the sub-committee's meeting no decision was taken about para-military forces. Do you agree? There were suggestions but at the chief committee where Dr Barnard attended the whole issue of para-military and offensive, etcetera, it wasn't decided on. The whole issue was referred to the highest political authority. Is
/that correct?
5A that correct? --- Yes, the decision as set out ... (intervention)
In die hoogste ... (tussenkoms) --- Sorry, may I finish my answer? What the inter-departmental committee on the 16th January 1986 was considering, or the key point, was sub-paragraph (27), I believe it's these - (i) - whether to recommend the setting up of an offensive para-military unit. There it is in plain Afrikaans in print. That was the subject of the debate at the IDC meeting and that's what went to the State Security Council meeting on 3rd February. Now, to tell me that because the word, "Offensive" and, "Para-military" wasn't there - is not recorded in a skeletal minute that hardly records the discussion, that therefore it wasn't discussed. I think that's a crazy proposition to make.
MR LYSTER: Mr de Vos, I want to draw it to your attention that you've been cross-examining Mr Varney now for one hour and twenty minutes, which doesn't leave Mr Maritz very much time at all. And I agree with my colleagues that this is going very slowly. You need to put forcefully your propositions to Mr Varney and let him agree or disagree and leave it at that, because this doesn't seem to be taking us anywhere. You know, the fact that a word, "Offensive" isn't mentioned in a particular document, well, I sincerely hope that's not your strongest point.
MR DE VOS: May I then follow through with my point, Chairperson. Mr Varney, please look at the State Security Council meeting's minutes - the 3rd February meeting. Does the State Security Council take any decision on the assistance to be given to Chief Minister Buthelezi or
/KwaZulu or
5A KwaZulu or may I put it to you, do they refer the issue to Ministers Malan and Heunis to make an evaluation regarding Minister Buthelezi's requirements? What does the State Security Council do? --- Mr de Vos, that is evident from Annexure A attached to those particular minutes, although you do leave out the little, small matter of the sensitivity being taken up by the highest political level, and the sensitivity I would argue is what was debated at the IDC meeting, namely whether to create an offensive para-military unit for Chief Minister Buthelezi. That was what in issue and that is what the sensitivity was about.
Do you agree that the State Security Council did not take a decision? Just answer yes or no. --- I have actually answered that question. They re ... (intervention)
In other words, they didn't make the decision, yes or no? Is that correct? --- (No audible reply)
Mr Varney, then I don't understand your arguments and your documentation. Your arguments to incriminate Liebenberg and Groenewald from day one was because you said that they were busy with execution actions. Now, we've moved to the 3rd February, but nobody, not even the State Security Council, has made a decision yet. Would you agree? --- At a document date 10th February 1986, and I shall give you the TRC annexure number - TRC16 - you will see that support - the support for Chief Minister Buthelezi has been approved at the highest political level and if you can't understand the argument, well, that's ... (intervention)
Mr Varney, this document was debated for hours in the court a quo. General Groenewald testified on this.
/These papers
5A These papers were given to him by the investigating unit in a very incomplete way. That was his evidence. He was then asked - this document had a certain annexure, 19th December 1985 document - because it says a document was signed by Admiral Putter, saying that he made the submission to Malan - in other words the 19th December document - for that reason he told you, the investigating unit, "Yes, I did". When he finally got hold of the 19th December document, he saw that it dealt with Lekganyane, and he had nothing to do with Lekganyane. For that reason he said in court that he had nothing to do with Lekganyane and the 19th December document. Let us look at the document of the 10th February. All that this document says - it's a document drafted by Brigadier Cor van Niekerk, do you agree? He is not a member of the State Security Council, not a member of the Cabinet. He is not the chief of the Defence Force. Would you agree with that? --- You know, it's really pointless putting these sort of questions to me. Of course I'm going to agree with you, but I think just put your version to me. What is the point you are making?
The point I'm making is this, all that is stated in this letter, you base your entire argument on one word, which says that on the 19th December 1986 a submission under a certain reference was sent by or made by Groenewald to the Minister of Defence about assistance to Chief Minister Buthelezi and Bishop Lekganyane and then the point which you want to make is that since then assistance to Chief Minister Buthelezi has been approved at the highest political level. That is the point you want to make. Now, the ultimate answer is this, Putter,
/who signed
5A who signed this, was not in Cape Town for the State Security Council meeting. Van Niekerk, who drafted this letter, was also not in the Cape. Am I correct?
MS SOOKA: You know, I think whilst, you know, one wants to allow you some kind of leeway, at the same time, this is not a court of law. This is a commission of inquiry, where we are really trying to get an understanding of the points that your client is making, as well as the contentions and perspectives made by Mr Varney. Now, if your instructions are to say that this document is not accepted as being a valid confirmation by your client of approval at the highest level then put it that way and Mr Varney can actually say he disagrees or he agrees with you. But we are really not getting anywhere with this kind of - I know that it's normal in a court of law to cross-examine in this fashion, but remember the purposes are different. In a court of law there is a whole question of a burden of guilt, an evidenciary burden that one must deal with. Our job here is to come to an understanding of the conflict of the past and to get to an understanding of what your clients accept or don't accept. So I would really be grateful, as will my colleagues, if you could try and structure your questions in a way to advance the version which they would have us believe is what they want you to put to us, please. I agree with my colleague, it does not detract with the cross-examination because Mr Varney will then get an opportunity to say yes, he agrees with your perspective or no, he doesn't, but it will move us faster along the road, because we cannot traverse it in this kind of fashion. We are really not going to give your other colleagues any opportunity then
/to put some
5A to put some kind of question to Mr Varney.
MR DE VOS: On the 10th February there could not have been authority for assistance to Buthelezi. Would you agree with that? And I'm putting it to you those are my instructions. --- Yes, well, I understand that those would be your instructions, but there is no way of informing us unless you are going to produce some sort of evidence to show that between the 3rd and the 10th that there wasn't some sort of authority that was handed down, albeit at an informal level, as President de Klerk has already testified before the Truth Commission, this highest political level wasn't a formally-constituted body. It was individuals getting together to make certain decisions. Now, unless you are able to come up with something a little more solid and substantial I don't see why one shouldn't accept what that document says. Unless you are able to show that that document is a fabrication or is wrong for some reason, I cannot accept your argument on this.
Mr Varney, let me put it to you, on your own document you said that on the 11th February 1986 Groenewald met Du Toit Bosman. On the 12th February Groenewald went to see Buthelezi to get clarity on his requirements. Then we have the next bit of documentation. On the 18th February Groenewald reported about the meeting which he had on the 17th February 1986, and he reported to the Minister. Is that correct? Do you remember that now? --- Yes, I'm well aware of the sequence. It's all in the documentation, but I think, with respect, Mr de Vos, it is really pointless in taking me through what is down here on paper. I think what you're trying to get at is
/how could
5A how could ... (intervention)
Mr Varney, please, just answer my question and then we'll be finished quite quickly. On the 17th February the following happened. The Minister, Minister Malan, reprimanded General Groenewald about the fact that Groenewald did the Minister's job by actually going to speak to Buthelezi. Is that correct? That's what it says in the documentation. --- Make your point.
In other words, when Groenewald, on the 12th February, went to speak, they hadn't yet had cognisance of Buthelezi's needs and they hadn't evaluated those yet, so the letter referred to on the 10th February regarding authority on the highest level is clearly in correct, as Groenewald also testified in ... (intervention) --- No, that's a highly simplistic analysis of the documents. If you read the documents in their natural order and their natural flow, you will see that there were different levels of authorization and different levels of implementation and that first level was the agreement in principle, the authority to get the operation off the ground in the first place. At that stage they hadn't worked out the nuts and bolts and the little nitty-gritty detail. That still had to be worked out and the February meetings and the others were part and parcel of that process but the decision in principle to support Buthelezi along the general lines set out in his request, that had been approved but certain of the detail had to be clarified, amongst them matters such as the offensive and para-military support, to name but one. Clarified. That's what it amounts to.
Mr Varney, all that the State Security Council did
/was to say,
5A was to say, "Malan and Heunis, go and speak to Minister Buthelezi, make an evaluation of his needs, find out what he wants". That's all that was said. Let me take you a bit further. I want to put it to you that you haven't given this Commission all the documents handed in at the Msane trial, and specifically here I'm referring to the fact that you didn't give the Commission a signal dated the 8th April 1986, and this signal, if I can just finish, this was a signal sent by the Minister of Defence to HAW2, that's Admiral Putter, in which the following was said, paragraph 4:
"Minister of Defence further requested that HSW on behalf of the Minister deals with the covert leg of the organigram."
In other words that part which refers to the establishment of a para-military force to Captain Buthelezi. He must go and sell this idea to Buthelezi.
"If successful, it can also serve as authorization for implementing discussion with Khumalo as contemplated in certain documentation."
Now, the point I'm trying to make, Mr Varney, if HSI still had to go and discuss matters with Buthelezi to obtain clarification on certain points and the task had been delegated to Minister Malan to first obtain clarity, then up to the 8th April 1986 we know for a fact that there had been no decisions. Discussions still had to take place. Would you agree with that? --- That's not an entirely correct reading of the documents, Mr de Vos. Firstly, as regards your assertion that the TRC didn't get these documents, that's a ridiculous assertion. Do you really
/think that
5A think that I would hand over to a body investigating this matter and leave out a documents like that and leave out certain documents. I'm appalled that you make the intimation that I didn't bring it to the TRC's attention. If you look - firstly, the TRC got a full set of the documents. They were also supplied with my report, which you have referred to, and you will see in that report there's a whole paragraph dealing with that particular signal, but that aside if you look carefully at the documents in question and you've got to start with the Liebenberg report itself, it draws up an organigram - a structure - and if you read paragraph 20 of the Liebenberg report it says, "Put this structure to Chief Minister Buthelezi". It's the structure, the way it's going to be set up - who reports to who and so on - but the essential nature and essence of the support that had already agreed upon. It was just now the detail that had to be settled, so it now was the structure. If you look at that signal, it says, "Put the secret part of the structure to Buthelezi", and that is in line with paragraph 20 of the Liebenberg report. It says, "Daar word aanbeveel dat die volgende oorhoofse veiligheidstruktuur aan die Hoof Minister" ... recommended that the overall security structure be put to the Chief Minister.
And the word, "Proposal" means proposal. There were no final decisions made and that's the point I'm trying to make. But then those weren't executive actions, as you argued. You want to link up the entire Defence Force, Groenewald, Liebenberg and everybody, implying that they were busy with executive actions and that they foresaw that people would die. We argued this in the Msane case.
/You know the
5A You know the law as well as I do that a preparation action undertaken by the State can never be unlawful. Would you agree with that? Is that correct? --- You are aware, as evident from these documents, and if you read them in chronological order that authority - that overall authority had been granted at the highest level and during February 1986. My interpretation, which I stand by, because it's quite evident from the documents that the particular detail, the particular nitty-gritty relating not only to the nature of the particular support but also the structure, that was the detail that had to be sorted out and yes, of course, there were proposals and there were recommendations, but it dealt with the detail, not with the overall support.
MR LYSTER: Mr de Vos, you made a suggestion an hour and a half ago that you would like an opportunity to deal with each of these matters in writing and to rebut or dispute what Mr Varney's conclusions are, and we are not in a situation. It's now 7 o'clock. It leaves Mr Maritz 20 minutes and I think that's being unfair to him and it's - if you made the suggestion, it would seem an ideal place to make those sort of submissions that you do not agree with his interpretation of documents and you can elaborate at length as to why you do not agree with them and he can respond to those and I would like you to wrap it up now so that Mr Maritz can have a go.
MR DE VOS: May I suggest that at this stage so that Mr Maritz can continue with his and I can then amplify with a submission at a later stage. Thank you.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr de Vos.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DE VOS
/
MR MARITZ
5A
MR MARITZ: Am I on, Mr Chairman?
MR LYSTER: Thank you.
MR MARITZ: Thank you. Mr Varney, the questions that I have for you are very brief. I think if we do not argue with one another we can finish in five minutes. First of all, I'm going to put a few propositions to you. The first one is this. Do you concede that Dr Buthelezi at the relevant time was the political foe of the then Government? --- Mr Maritz, do you want me to answer each proposition or must I deal with it at the end?
No, no, no. Do you concede so? --- Well, I don't think it's as simple as that. Certainly there were a great many differences between Dr Buthelezi and the Government at the time. He opposed them. But we have to look at what, in fact, were those differences and, largely, they revolved around issues like his opposition to incorporation of KwaZulu into the - as an independent homeland ... (intervention)
No, no, I'm not talking about that. The only area, as I understand it, where they had common ground was that if change had to be brought about, it had to be done democratically. That was the standpoint of Dr Buthelezi, not so? --- Well, to answer your question, Buthelezi did take the standpoint that change to apartheid should take place peacefully. He was opposed to certain things that the Government was doing, but ... (inaudible).
In a nutshell - sorry - in a nutshell, he was totally opposed to the policies of the then Government? --- Well, I think that is where you're probably incorrect and I intend to answer as follows. Buthelezi was, in fact, part and parcel of the central structure of
/apartheid, the
5A apartheid, the homeland system. He administered apartheid in black areas on behalf of the white state. In that sense he was part and parcel of the apartheid state. He ran a surrogate structure on behalf of Pretoria. That he opposed incorporation, that he opposed racism, that he wanted change to apartheid, I don't think can alter that. And, certainly, Buthelezi's other desires, namely that of resisting and taking action against the ANC and UDF and using the most forceful measures, coincided with that of the State, so at certain levels - certainly at those levels Buthelezi and the Government were ad idem and you'll even see in the Marion documents themselves, drawn up by military officers, where Buthelezi says he has to criticise - he had to criticise Malan in public and there it's written in the documents, but he did so tongue in cheek, and that's recorded as something he put across to Malan via these officers, so that opposition, I think, has to be viewed in the light of his other objectives.
Well, I must say, Mr Varney, that I find your opinion very novel and quite shocking. I'm taken aback by it, because in those years, in the '80s, it was universally accepted, as far as I know, that Dr Buthelezi was in strict disagreement with the policies of the South African Government. --- Being in strict disagreement doesn't necessarily mean that strategic alliances cannot be entered into ... (intervention)
That's another thing. We're not debating that. Please, Mr Varney, let's get on. --- Well, with respect, I think I'm entitled to ... (inaudible) ... (intervention)
MR LYSTER: Just hang on, both of you. Both of you, just
/stop right
5A stop right here. Please don't raise your voice, Mr Maritz. It's really unnecessary. Let's just conduct this in a calm and professional manner, please.
MR MARITZ: Now, secondly, do you concede that at the relevant time Inkatha people were being killed and maimed and property was being destroyed? --- Yes, I said so in my submission. I think it's in the second or third paragraph.
Do you concede that Dr Buthelezi approached the Government for protective assistance? --- Well, I'll give a qualified yes. It's quite evident from the face of the documents that he sought protective assistance and offensive assistance as well. He wanted to protect his people from attack and, at the same time, he wanted the ability to take the initiative and launch offensive actions against the ANC and UDF, in order to prevent them from attacking his people. So I think it's a two-part request that he was involved in there.
The fact of the matter is that he went to the South African Government and he wanted protection? --- If one wants to put it in simple terms, in his eyes, yes, he wanted protection, but he wanted protection in the form of - partly in the form of an offensive striking capacity.
Do you concede too that Dr Buthelezi was the Minister of Police in KwaZulu? --- Yes, I think you can say that goes without saying, that's history.
Do you concede that the KwaZulu Police had fire power? --- Yes, they were armed.
Do you concede that they could have been misused? --- Yes.
Now, I think this is the salient point, Mr Varney.
/I'm not talking
5A I'm not talking about speculation. I'm not speaking about deduction and I'm not speaking about argument. What I want to know from you is this. Is there a single factual basis upon which you can say to this Commission today that when Dr Buthelezi came to the then Government for assistance that the Government should have regarded him, (a) as a total blatant liar and (b) as a killer? --- Sorry, you want me to answer whether the Government believed Dr Buthelezi to be ... (intervention)
I've made my question very plain and I am not shouting. The question is a plain one, not conjecture, nothing of the sort. --- Yes, no, I just want to clarify.
Is there a single factual basis upon which you can say to this Commission or to anybody else that the then member of the Government should have known that when Buthelezi came to them for this cry - with his cry of help - that he was a liar, that he was a killer and that he was going to use whichever was given to him for unlawful purposes? --- Your choice of words does put it in quite a stark fashion.
That's how start it is, yes. --- No, absolutely.
Do you have any factual basis at all? --- I have spent the better part of this afternoon painting the picture as reflected on the documents. I've spent the better part of the afternoon analysing what I believe to be blunt and unambiguous references to an offensive capacity and when - in my reading of those documents I can come to the conclusion, and I think it's a compelling conclusion, that when Chief Minister Buthelezi went to the Government and wanted an offensive capacity he wanted a
/capacity to
5A capacity to take the initiative and strike back. He would have been aware that during the course of those actions loss of life would occur as people get killed in attacks and, furthermore, when the Government supplied that capacity they would have been aware of the very same simple, obvious fact.
Mr Varney, you've argued the matter again. Isn't the simple answer, "No"? Isn't it? --- I have given you the answer, Mr Maritz, and it's quite obvious, from what I have said, that when Buthelezi went to the State he had in mind an operation that would include a protective capacity and an offensive capacity and he would have been aware what that offensive capacity was about, and that is reflected in these documents. One, of course, is relying on the face of these documents. Buthelezi himself has not testified, but if one reads the documents and you read the obvious and most simple references to offensive actions, meaning hit squads, to people wanting protection from charges carrying the death penalty, on this one can put a convincing break in between those documents and what was requested. Then perhaps you may have a point, but I don't see where that connection was broken. If you look at the very first document, he wants an offensive capacity to strike at the ANC in Lusaka. Even the Court remarked on the particular comment, and that was the first document, and the Court remarked during the evidence of General van Tonder that that particular remark looked as though it was an offensive, as opposed to a defensive capacity, and how can you protect in Lusaka unless you are taking preemptive actions?
Mr Varney, please, this was the subject of a very
/long debate
5A long debate. Now, can I say this to you that if you are going to protect yourself with fire power, there is no way in the world that you can prevent taking life. Do you concede that? --- That I can prevent taking what?
Life. --- Life?
Yes. --- If you want to protect yourself?
Yes. --- There are circumstances when that does happen, yes.
Absolutely. Now, the point is this, when Dr Buthelezi went to the Government, is there any evidence at all that he was bound on a course of mayhem and murder? Is there any such evidence? --- Mr Maritz ... (intervention)
In other words, is there any evidence at all that he was dishonest, that he was lying to the Government, that what he really wanted to do was a force to act in a murderous manner and totally unlawfully? --- Mr Maritz, with the greatest respect, you've read my submission. You've read the very first page of my submission. You will see that I concede that the objectives seen from the perspective of Inkatha, and seen from the perspective of the State, that by taking such actions, by striking at the ANC and UDF, by perhaps even eliminating targets, that that will produce a protective objective. It will have the result of preventing further attacks. Now, I can concede that the objective seen in their eyes is protective, but as the Court pointed out in the Mbambo matter, no matter how noble the overall cause, the means to achieve are certainly not legitimate in the eyes of the law, and Buthelezi would have known it and the State would have known it, absolutely.
/On the same
5A On the same basis, would you concede that there was no basis on which the then Government could have viewed Dr Buthelezi, when he came with his request for help, that he was a murderer and a liar and that he was trying to pull the wool over the eyes of the then Government? Do you concede that? --- Well, I think you couch your questions in an unusual fashion, and I think you should refer yourself to the military document dated 27th November 1985 and, in fact, you should refer to all the documents that flowed from that particular document, right through to the early 1990s, and you will see there is a consistent thread, an unbreakable thread that runs along. In that very first document Groenewald makes a little remark, a little recording. He makes a comment on a remark made by Buthelezi, that is he needs an offensive capacity to act against the ANC and UDF. If the ANC is going to act violently against him, then the ANC must know that the Zulus are in a position to act violently against them.
But none of this means that he was bent on an unlawful course. That's the point I'm trying to make, and this is all I'm asking you. Do you have any evidence, apart from speculation or argument or deduction, evidence at all that Dr Buthelezi was bent on an unlawful course of action? --- I think the documents before you put out an extremely compelling case which says just that and, in effect, what you're asking me to say is that the word, "Offensive" in these documents - every one of these documents is a fabrication in your eyes, which I don't think you are going to push that particular line, or, in fact, in the line which I believe you will be pushing, is
/that offensive,
5A that offensive, in fact, has some sort of lawful connotation. It, in fact, is in reality protective and that is the contention that I believe is incorrect and I believe, "Offensive" should be read in its normal meaning, offensive.
In other words, if I understand you correctly, what you are saying is that legalistically one must attach some blame to these role-players. Is that what you're saying? --- Might one attach some blame? I have made my submission and in my submission I say that those leaders are accountable for what flowed from that project, including the acts of murder, yes.
But this is a purely legalistic standpoint that you have? --- Mr Maritz, with respect, I think you should move on. I think we are labouring the point right now.
No, no, it's not for you to say to me where we should go. I'm asking the questions. Don't forget it. Do you concede that your entire submission is a very legalistic one, which is neither here nor there? And I'm putting it to you. --- Well, I reject that contention.
Very well. Now, you have also said this in your submissions somewhere, and I find it terribly contentious, that if, for instance, the Caprivians had not been trained, one would not have had loss of life or to such an extent. Did I understand you correctly? --- Mr Maritz, with respect, that is a disingenuous way of interpreting my document.
Is that not ... (inaudible) ... (intervention) --- Nowhere, nowhere, Mr Maritz, will you find me saying that, "But for the Caprivi trainees this place would have been harmony and a wonderful place to live, with no deaths and
/so on".
5A so on". I think that line of argument doesn't assist the Commission in reaching the bottom of the matter.
Well, I thought that was ... (intervention) --- You will read in all those documents that I have drafted, Mr Maritz, that the Caprivi trainees, what they carried out, contributed in substantial measure to death and mayhem in this country.
Yes, I thought it was a very pernicious standpoint you had and that's why I raised it, but it doesn't look as if you still adhere to it. Nevertheless, can I just, lastly - I told you I was going to be brief - ask you this. I'm not quite sure of your answer, because you argued and I don't want an argument. I want a factual statement. Are you a military expert? --- That I have already answered. That question has been put to me. I am not a military expert, aside from spending a great deal of time over the past 2˝ years studying these military documents before me.
But you are not a military expert? --- The question has been answered, Mr Maritz.
MR LAX: He said so. You don't have to put it again.
MR MARITZ: Now, you are a lawyer. What is the position with the evidential value of an opinion if you're not an expert?
MR LYSTER: With the greatest of respect, Mr Maritz, I won't allow that question. Really, it's pointless. Mr Varney has been allowed to testify. We will decide what evidenciary value to put on his evidence. Really, to put it to him, with respect, is a bit of a harassment. It's absolutely unnecessary.
MR MARITZ: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I'm being interrupted by
/an attorney.
5A an attorney, just give me a moment. No, Mr Varney, it's very pertinent. We will argue the matter if it arises, but I want to merely put it to you that our standpoint is that your opinions, not being an expert, are totally valueless in this regard. Will you bear with me one moment, Mr Chairman? Mr Chairman, as for the rest of the submissions it is a matter of argument and we will address our arguments or submissions in due course. Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARITZ
MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Maritz. Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I hope that I will also be short - brief. Mr Varney, may I preface the few questions that I want to put to you on behalf of the persons that I appear for and I hope you remember who they are, by telling you that they have applied for amnesty so, my purpose to be here is not to conceal any truth or to run away from it. Please view my questions in that light. Just to sketch the parameter within which I am going to contain myself, I am simply going to direct questions to you on the basis - and I'd like you to bear it in mind - as to whether any conduct which appears from your allegations based upon documentation which you have provided, not all of which to us, I may add, on whether that conduct was an act or an omission which also an offence. Do you understand my line of questioning, because that way I can go quickly? May I start with Mr Vlok? Would it be fair to say that your implication of him, by way of deduction or inference, is his association with, membership of, presence at certain State Security meetings? The mere fact that he was there. Would you answer? --- Correct.
/Yes, and
5A Yes, and perhaps to take it further, in fairness to you, the fact that he made some, "Voorlegging", some presentation about this whole issue of a third force - you will remember that was the meeting of - I don't have it at my fingertips. --- 12th May 1986.
Thank you, Mr Varney, the 12th May, correct. One would add that to the basis for your inferences? I am not going to repeat what my learned friend, Mr Maritz has asked you, but on the basis of evidenciary value - that's as far as it goes. Thank you, Mr - the rest we will argue, Mr Varney. Now, coming then to General Coetzee, am I correct - I think you mentioned that your page 14, paragraph 5, that the way you see him being implicated is that he supported the establishment of a para-military strike element, call it what you will, at the time, which was in January 1986 - in the early part of 1986 for Inkatha, that that would be the basis, or is there something which I have missed? --- No, I think you have it in a nutshell. He was part of the sub-committee that recommended the establishment of an offensive para-military unit, but I think it does go a little further than that, because he was the Commissioner of Police. I'm not sure when his tenure ended, but he would have obviously been kept informed of general developments.
I accept your answer. In that regard, may I put to you, Mr Varney, that whatever it was that was discussed at that particular meeting, and I don't think we really have the details of that from the documentation, may I put to you that by the 19th December 1985, which was a little bit before that, what was considered as being help for Minister Buthelezi is what we find in the document
/entitled, "SA
5A entitled, "SAW hulpverlening aan Hoofminister Buthelezi en Biskop Lekganyane", dated the 19th December 1985, at page 3 thereof. Would that be a fair statement to make? Perhaps you can just look at the document, because I'd be interested to see whether you agree with that. --- What paragraph, Mr Visser?
It's at page 3, paragraph 10. It's under the heading, "Hoofminister Buthelezi" and there are (a) to (f).
INTERPRETER: Chief Minister Buthelezi.
MR VISSER: "Hoofminister Buthelezi". I am sorry, you were interpreting. I am terribly sorry. I thought she was correcting me. Mr Varney, the supposition I'm making is simply this. I'm going to say and I'm going to argue later, and that's why I'm putting it up for your comment, that during January 1986, if Coetzee supported anything, by and large he must have had what is in paragraph 10 at page 3 of that document in mind and I will concede immediately that, in addition thereto, whatever he may have considered to be an offensive unit that must obviously be added to that, in fairness, but isn't this essentially what he had in mind? --- Well, it's impossible for me to say whether it was confined to this, whether, in fact, there was much more. We don't have the minutes of the discussions at that particular meeting, but certainly this document and presumably the one before, the November 1985 document, 27th November, would have fed into the deliberations at that sub-committee meeting in which your client sat.
Yes, now, and I certainly don't want to start an argument, but is it fair, do you think, to accept that if
/he says, "Look
5A he says, "Look here, whatever I supported, I'll tell you now, it wasn't to support people to act unlawfully and kill each other", are you prepared, on the documentation as it stands and as you know them better than I do, that that's a possible explanation or an acceptable explanation? Or are you aware of evidence which says that could never have been so, "General Coetzee, you knew"? --- He would have argue, of course, that the offensive capacity as he dealt with at that stage was an entirely innocent and laudable affair. Presumably those are your instructions. He would also have to argue that the offensive capacity they discussed here was something entirely different from the offensive capacity I referred to later, where pretty blunt and straight-forward descriptions were given, and I would find that an extremely difficult argument to accept. In fact, I couldn't accept it.
I'm quite happy with your answer, Mr Varney. I think it's a fair answer. That would be for him to show and if he can't show that, well then either he succeeds with his application for amnesty or he doesn't, but that's another matter. --- Yes.
In general - well, let's first get to the last particular person which I think has featured in your evidence and on the documentation specifically, and that is General Johan van der Merwe. Johan Velde van der Merwe ... [end of tape] ... [break in recording] ... criminal sense results or flows from the discussions which were held at the Liberty Life Building on the 8th November 1988, where Generals van der Merwe and Smit were apparently, according to the note which we have here,
/present. Now,
5B present. Now, you dealt with that, Mr Varney, and if you'll allow me to refer you to page 27, your paragraph 22. I believe this is where you refer to that meeting, where you say,
"It is evident that by November 1988 the military regarded continued SADF support for the taking of offensive actions as an unacceptably high security risk. Attempts to secure greater police intervention ..."
And then, may I suggest to you, with respect, this is an inference as we go on now,
"... in the cover-up of crimes committed by Caprivi Trainees were not successful."
Well, we certainly agree with the result which you come to. They weren't successful and we know why. We've read that document.
"The Commissioner of (the South African) Police Johan van der Merwe and his deputy Basie Smit were not willing to assist ..."
And what I want to contend with you is this:
"... beyond arranging bail ..."
First point.
"... and then assisting in the concealing of members from detection."
Would you please, Mr Varney, take the document which is the minute of the meeting in the Liberty Life Building of the 8th November before you. Have you got it before you? --- Yes, I think just read it. I am familiar with it.
/Well, I
5B Well, I really want to refer you to it because I've just got one simple question for you. Well, two. First of all, are the inferences which you draw in your paragraph 22 based upon that document, or are they based upon some other evidence? --- It is based upon this document, read together with the evidence of General van Tonder.
But they are the SADF, Mr Varney, with all due respect. Whatever other people said or didn't say or thought or didn't think is not what is relevant, in my respectful submission to you. What I'm asking you is is there any other evidence than the minute of the meeting of the 8th November, upon which you base these inferences? --- Well, I don't believe that the evidence of Van Tonder is entirely irrelevant in this matter. The allegation against your clients is that they colluded in preventing the detection of offensive crimes - offensive actions, which were crimes, committed by these trainees.
Right, now what is your ... (intervention) --- And they did so through interfering in investigations and the like and you've seen that, in my submission. Although your ... (intervention)
I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand that. You say that I have seen that they interfered in investigations. --- Here I am referring to the police.
Not to my clients? --- Well, I think by implication your clients come into, being the most senior officers of the day and read in conjunction with that particular document. What they are saying to the military is that, "These members who are arrested, who the law wants, let them get bail and once they've got bail take
/them away".
5B them away". Now, that, in my view, is a number of things. It is colluding in preventing the law from taking its course and it is colluding in the overall aims of this particular project.
Mr Varney, with respect to you, can we read what this document said for a minute, please? That's why I asked you to get it before you. It says in paragraph 1, and I'll read it slowly to be interpreted.
"HDIO gives an overview of Operation Marion."
It then talks about offensive action and then paragraph 2, Mr Varney, if I may take a little of your time - 3. In order to save time, Mr Chairman, may I loosely translate it instead of wasting the time for having it translated. General van der Merwe said, "Look here ..." - that's paragraph 4 - "Every case has to be decided upon on its own merits". You can paint a picture very easily. They are sitting there and they says, "We've got a problem here, people are being arrested, etcetera. Can you do something?", and Van der Merwe says, "Hang on. Let's deal with each case on its own merits". He says, "There is no way in which I ...", I assume, "... can act pro-actively". In other words, "I can't assist you in any other way but which - the following. Where a member of the Caprivi trainees lands in trouble bail could be arranged", not what you're saying here in paragraph 22, with respect, Mr Varney. "And then the member has to be taken away." No way is it suggested that he should be concealed. It is suggested that he should be taken away and I'm putting it to you that what Van der Merwe meant was, "Take away out of the area, because if you don't do that there's going to
/be further
5B be further trouble". What he had in mind is that such a person can interfere with witnesses, there may be further fighting, whatever the case may be. You laugh at me, Mr Varney, and I take exception to that. Please just read the words. There it is in front of you. What else could it mean? --- My apologies for smiling, Mr Visser, but in my view that is a laughable contention that the members involved in murder may then be taken away to prevent further interference. I don't see how you can read that into that document. If you look at how the document flows. You correctly say that HDIO gave an overview of Operation Marion - sorry, DST2 gave an account of problems with regard to offensive actions. General Smit then queries the liaison with security policeman, Captain Louis Botha.
Yes. --- Now, remember what these problems are with offensive actions. The problems, as we have seen from previous documents are that Caprivi trainees involved in offensive actions are getting arrested and the concern is they may talk and if you go back into the documents you will look at the problems around people disappearing, temporarily disappearing and so on and so forth. It has been conceded in evidence before the Court. Those people were concealed from detection from the law. Now, this is the same problem. The problem was not going away. It was increasing. So the next paragraph - unfortunately, I don't have the particular document before me, but according to my report here, it reads, "General Smit's detective branch's involvement complicates matters. What/who must be done/no. It does not help to make promises which cannot be carried out".
/Correct. ---
5B Correct. --- Now, my reading is those promises are, as you say, you cannot interfere and intervene in each and every single case. That's my reading of that because the very next paragraph relates to a possible solution - or the SAP solution, as Van der Merwe puts it, and that is that each case must be dealt with on its merits. There is no manner upon which to be pro-active. He's not making any guarantees here and his solution is as follows, "Where a member is in difficulty, bail can be arranged", and we know that a lot of policemen testified in support of bail applications for Caprivi trainees and others, "But then the member must be taken away". There is no suggestion that the member must be taken away to interfere with the proper investigation. The member must be taken way in order that he is - he doesn't get detected and caught again and, in fact, the evidence of others who have testified here is that, in fact, that is what happened on a repeated basis. They got bail and then they simply disappeared. They were concealed at Mkhuze, at a chief's kraal down the South Coast, and so on and so forth. That emerged in the Trust Feeds case and others, and that is my reading of this paragraph and I would submit that it's the only plausible reading of it.
Mr Varney, we know what happened in the Goniwe case. Why don't you just argue that they should be killed then? Because taken away, taken out, removed. I mean isn't that also a possible explanation? I don't want to cut hairs with you, but with all due respect, are you not prepared to concede that your inference cannot be the only reasonable inference? That's all I'm asking you. That the one I put to you is equally as reasonable? ---
/Well, again,
5B Well, again, that is a highly legalistic argument, but I would like to submit before this hearing that in the light of this document, seen together with all the other documents, seen together with the evidence of Luthuli, Van Tonder on this particular aspect and several other cases, yes, indeed, that is the only reasonable inference to draw from the circumstances.
The last question on that issue is, do you possess of any evidence throughout all your enquiries and investigations, in the position in which you were, which you can point this committee to, to support your contention that General van der Merwe knew anything about the concealment of persons anywhere? Where he was - where you could draw the line, make the connection to him? --- Yes, I don't see that as a particularly material point. I'm not suggesting that he was involved in specific cases, that he arranged bail and concealed people himself, but here he is providing overall direction - policy, in a sense. What he's saying is, "Bail can be arranged and then take the members away, conceal them".
Yes. Mr Chairman, I'm probably through. Will you bear with me a moment? I'm sorry, Mr Varney, I'll be with you in a second. Let me just check whether there's anything else that I have to put to you. Fortunately for me some of the points have already been covered by my predecessors here. Yes, yes, there is one other point which I mustn't forget about. In this very same document, in paragraph 15 there's something here that bothers us. It starts with Brigadier Burger. Now, my instructions from now Major-Burger, is that he didn't attend this meeting. I'm just wondering whether you are in a position
/or with your
5B or with your knowledge whether you can comment on whether this reference to Brigadier Burger may have been a misspelling and that it may have referred to somebody else, and I don't want to raise any disputes with my fellow colleagues here, but I'm going to suggest to you that it's probably a reference to General Jac Buchner. Can you possibly comment on that? --- Well, I'm not in a position to state whether it's a misspelling or not. However, given that Jac Buchner did attend one of those meetings, I think it is unlikely that in the same document they would make that sort of mistake.
Well, I was going to suggest exactly the contrary to you. The fact that there must have been a mistake is (1) the man says he wasn't there - Burger. (2), We've got Buchner on the scene, so the probabilities that it must have been just an oversight or a mistake. --- I'm not going to argue with you on that one.
And neither am I with you. May I just ask my attorney, because I think that's all I wanted to raise, Mr Chairman. He says that he can't think of anything else that I can bicker about, Mr Chairman, so I will stand down, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
MR MARITZ: Mr Chairperson, could I have 30 seconds, please? Mr Varney, I don't know whether you know that I'm acting for Former Minister P D C du Plessis, who apparently was a member of the larger State Security Council over the period 1986 till 1989. Again I wish to express the - state that I have no instructions regarding your submissions which you are dealing with here, however your reply to what I'm about to ask may or may not have an
/effect on the
5B effect on the instructions to be obtained from client. In your submissions you refer to various State Security Council meetings ranging over a period of some eight years. I believe the first one was 1979, up to 1987. Some of the minutes of such meetings, to a more or lesser degree, refer to some form of counter-revolutionary warfare. If I understand you correctly, you also seem to differentiate between the highest in the State Security Council - obviously various levels of authority within the Government, including the State departments of the day. I think you would appreciate that members may have come and gone over the years. Certain persons may have been ad hoc members. Some persons may have attended these meetings for reasons other than perhaps you would want the Commission to believe. The question, Mr Varney, in view of the above, do you seriously suggest that all persons should be held accountable for the alleged acts of murder or can you elaborate or explain to the Commission what you mean by the words, "All" and, "Accountable"? --- In so far as the members of those bodies were aware, had foresight, anticipated that the supplying of an offensive para-military unit to a civilian body, a civilian organization involved in a political and bloody on-going conflict, that they would use that capacity to launch offensive strikes against their opponents, I would argue yes, they are accountable for the acts that flowed from that project. We don't know whether any one of those individuals had any greater connection, but I don't believe one has to show a greater connection. One simply has to show that that foresight existed and that is more than evident from the documents themselves, from the
/circumstances.
5B circumstances. You don't have to be an expert to see that. It's quite patently obvious. Niel Barnard himself said he anticipated loss of life arising out of such a project.
Thank you for qualifying your submission, Mr Varney. Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARITZ
MR VAN ZYL: There is just one aspect that I would like to take up with the witness please. Mr Varney, do you know Mr Rocky Williams? He is a member of the Defence Force or attached to them in one or other way. He testified earlier today. Do you know him? --- Yes.
Is it correct that he was provided with all the documents that you also had at your disposal to compile this report? --- Yes, I'm aware that he at least got a copy of the report that I drafted. It is called, "The Varney Report", but it's the role of the former State in political violence, and I'm not sure what else he was supplied with.
But at least he had the documents that's attached and part of your Varney Report, the whole of the report? --- He had the whole of the report and he was, in fact, last year supplied with a number of documents as well. Exactly which ones I cannot recall.
But at least various documents were provided to him, in order to enable him to formulate his opinion as he testified today? --- Yes.
Thank you, Mr Chairman. --- I should clarify that last year when Mr Williams was supplied with documents, it had nothing to do with this Truth Commission hearing. We were attempting to get Mr Williams to speak
/to the Attorney-
5B to the Attorney-General to give him the opportunity of talking to a military expert, but Mr McNally declined to take up on that offer.
Thank you, Mr Chairman, just one other aspect, please. You make mention of the three accomplice witnesses that testified in the Malan trial last year, being Messrs Cloete, Opperman and Khumalo, and you also criticise them - I think it's on page 57 of your Varney Report - to the effect that their evidence was not satisfactory, but then while, in compiling this document that you read into the record today, your submission, in certain instances you do rely on the evidence of Mr Opperman. Is it a question that you sometimes prefer to use his evidence and sometimes not? And then he's reliable and in other instances not reliable? --- No, not at all, absolutely not.
Explain it to us, please. --- I did not say in that document that - I think the words I used were, "Performed poorly" or something along those lines, and you can have the most honest witnesses in the world, who will perform atrociously in court. They will forget. They will think they have remembered something. They will be tricked into saying certain things. I certainly don't have to tell you and your colleagues that an honest witness isn't necessarily a good witness. I do ... (intervention)
(Inaudible). --- Sorry, may I finish? I do concede in my report that there is on at least one aspect where Mr Opperman was less than frank with the Court and that was the question of whether they were simply going to surgically murder Mr Ntuli or whether, in fact, they were
/going to
5B going to take out all the occupants of the Ntuli household. So I don't believe that Mr Opperman is not to be believed. He was not a good witness, that I concede. That he was disingenuous on one point to protect his own image, I concede that further, but the general thrust of his evidence, I think, ought to have been accepted, especially seen in the light of these documents, because the documents absolutely back up his case.
Okay, then I just want to put it to you that you will probably recall that Mr Opperman testified that in more or less February of 1987 specific orders were given by Brigadier van Niekerk, inter alia, that no further offensive actions should take place. That part of his evidence, do you accept that? --- I do recall that there was evidence along those lines ... (intervention)
I know, do you accept it or not. I am sorry, I'm not shouting, I just want to get finished with the evidence. Do you accept it or not? --- I will finish if you permit me to answer.
Answer it, please. --- And, further, it isn't simply a matter of on one day an instruction is issued and therefore that is the end of the story. Quite clearly that wasn't the end of the story, and Mr Opperman was obviously not party to decisions taken at other levels, and in any event one can debate that until the end of tonight if one wants to. The fact of the matter is that a capacity of self-sufficiency was given to these people. They carried out a whole range of offensive operations with and without the support of the SADF and ultimately they had no connection to the South African Defence Force and that's the crux of this matter.
/Well, Mr Varney,
5B Well, Mr Varney, you now gave us detailed argument and you didn't answer the question. Do you accept that part of his evidence as true or false? --- That he received that specific order at that time?
Yes. --- No, I accept that.
So then there couldn't have been any further actions after February 1987, if his version is true? --- With the greatest respect, I have just attempted to articulate and set the scene as to why you simply cannot say that because of one particular instruction given by a brigadier to a captain at one particular time, therefore it cancels everything that happened post that. And it's evident from the documents that a lot happened post-February 1987. There was much going on in 1988. They had to conceal offensive element members who were being sought by the police. So clearly something else happened - something more happened than that. That's quite obvious to see. (Inaudible) ... a simplistic and, in my view, a ridiculous interpretation of the documents. One can do that, but that would be disingenuous, in my view.
Well, I just want to put it to you, Mr Varney, that it's my opinion and also my submission that by hand-picking the parts of the evidence that's favourable to your conclusions and by discarding those that are unfavourable to your conclusions that you want to draw, it's one of the reasons why your report is absolutely not correct and subjective. --- But, to the contrary, you will see I have in this report analyzed in great detail all that supposedly positive and negative evidence and that is there for the record, so I reject that argument as being ridiculous.
/Thank you,
5B Thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN ZYL
MR LYSTER: Thank you. I don't see any more hands and I'm very grateful for that. Those people who have not asked questions and those people who didn't ask enough questions or still want to pursue Mr Varney's evidence more can obviously do so by means of submission of a written document. I'm afraid we are not able to dissuade them to do that. We are adjourned then till 10 o'clock tomorrow. Thank you very much.
PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED TO 1997/08/07
/PROCEEDINGS RESUMED
