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Type FURTHER SUBMISSIONS AND RESPONSES BY THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE COMMISSION FOR TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
Names African National Congress
Appendix One: ANC Structures and Personnel
Appendix Two: MK Camps and Commanders
Appendix Three: Rehabilitation and detention centres
MK Operations Report
Appendix Four: MK List of Operations
Appendix Five: Armed actions for which responsibility is uncertain
NAT Operations Report
Appendix Six: The Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre
Appendix Seven: Case studies
Appendix Eight: Behind South Africa's Low Intensity War
Appendix Nine: For the Sake of Our Lives
The TRC has asked the ANC to make a statement on our "views, motivations and perspectives on the nature of the South African conflict. (...) What were the values that inspired the leaders of your organisation over the years? (...) What inspired the sacrifices which many of your followers made? What drove those who (...) were responsible for the commission of violations (of human rights)?"
In stating its views on the nature of past conflict, the ANC seeks to promote the objectives for which the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was established. We do so keenly aware that if nursed and not lanced, the boil of past conflict will fester in our body politic, slowly infecting it and finally possibly destroying the nascent democracy.
The liberation of South Africa has come with pain: pain of the victims of colonial policies that decreed the majority of South Africans sub-human; and pain of the victims of an ideology that could not be sustained forever because it was inherently iniquitous - thus forcing its proponents and its beneficiaries, like humans possessed, to resort to brute force in defence of the indefensible.
At the root of South Africa's conflict was the system of colonial subjugation. Like other colonial countries, South Africa was victim to the rapacious licence of an era that defined might as right; an epoch of an international morality that justified dispossession and turned owner into thief, victim into aggressor, and humble host into ungodly infidel.
And so history was re-recorded in the image of the mighty, seeking to persuade the subjugated that they were fortunate beneficiaries of philanthropy; occasional victims of a well- intentioned experiment gone awry; a hapless people who should be thankful that, because only a few million among them were being killed and because they were experiencing population growth, a crime against humanity was not being committed.
It defined those of our fellow South Africans from Europe, who had chosen to settle in this country, as superior human beings, with the right to lord it over others; and with the holy writ to declare all but 13% of the land the court of the upper caste, in which their fellow human beings should be temporary sojourners, humbly to serve and to obey.
It fashioned a basic law of the land whose mission was to protect the ill-gotten privileges of the chosen few: with the land and the riches in its bowels, and the flora and fauna of its beautiful landscapes, the property of a white minority that had the sole prerogative to make laws and to choose the government of the day.
The cry of desperation of the majority and the hunger pangs of their children were the fodder upon which fed the laughter and comfort of the tormentors.
And the state - the army, the police, the civil service, the judiciary, and other organs - were built and rebuilt to serve the master and protect their privileges.
With each passing phase, new constitutions, new laws, new proclamations, new regulations, new orders were issued to keep the kaffir, the hotnot and the coolie in their place. And force became the stock-in-trade to maintain and defend injustice.
Where new constitutions, new laws, new proclamations, new regulations and new orders failed, the architects of apartheid legality themselves worked to subvert their own writ: to electrocute their captives to death, to throw bodies into rivers, to shoot and blow bodies up, to murder children and their mothers in their sleep, to kill their own in order to discredit the enemy, and to dispose of those among themselves who dared to question even a single deed.
Yet it would have been nature gone berserk, had the subjugated accepted their station without protest, without resistance, without struggle and indeed without war.
It is the decree of millennia, that an oppressed people will rise to reclaim what is rightfully theirs, precisely because they are not less than human.
Their humanity accorded them the natural right to revolt; their sense of justice obliged them to stand up and seek a system where all could be equal before the law, and where all could have the right to determine their destiny.
It is this humanity that infused the oppressed with the conviction that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white." And it is the trust in the humanity of others which fed their humility, for half a century, to write petitions, to march, to gather, to refuse to obey unjust laws, to withdraw their labour, to boycott puppet institutions...but not to lift a finger in retaliation.
But alas, it came to pass that their humanity was met by sub-human deeds in the name of a self-declared superiority.
The ANC was a product of this history and this conflict, not their creator. It was born out of the desire of a proud people that sought dignity and justice in the land of their birth.
Its historic mission was and remains to give expression to these desires of the majority of South Africans. It led their peaceful protests, and when the avenues for such protest were closed, it took up arms to achieve the same objectives. To do otherwise would have been to acquiesce and indeed, by omission, to help perpetuate a crime against humanity.
In declaring that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, the ANC and its allies recognised that the anti-thesis to racial subjugation was the liberation of all South Africans; that the system it fought against was racial, but the solution to it was the unity of all irrespective of race, colour or creed. It sought to liberate the oppressed as well as the oppressor.
These politics guided the ANC's struggle over the years; and when it took up arms, they guided its definition of the enemy as the system and those who propped it up rather than a specific race group.
In its strategy and tactics, the ANC put politics at the fore, and it defined itself and its army, Umkhonto weSizwe, as an instrument of a people in political motion; the barrel of the gun as one of the means - and not the means, least of all, an end in itself. It mobilised the people to revolt in an organised fashion; it mobilised the international community to act decisively against apartheid.
These billions united in the struggle against apartheid, each contributing in their own way to the demise of this iniquitous system.
The legitimacy and legality of this struggle were written in numerous covenants of the international community. They were written on the ballot papers in April 1994.
The legitimacy and legality of the revolt of the oppressed are written in the constitution which defines the kind of society that the ANC and the overwhelming majority of South Africans fought for, and to which they pay allegiance. Above all, they are written in the hearts of millions of South Africans who were in essence their own liberators; and who today are taking active part in the reconstruction and development of the country.
In its conduct of armed struggle, the ANC sought to avoid civilian injury and loss of life. It ensured that its combatants understood the reasons behind the armed struggle as well as the tactics required to win to our side the overwhelming majority of South Africans. In its treatment of captured agents and combatants of the apartheid regime, it emphasised the need for their rehabilitation. It committed itself to international norms in this regard.
And, even at the height of massive repression, the ANC initiated negotiations with the apartheid regime; and it persisted over many years despite being arrogantly spurned, with these efforts culminating in the transition at the turn of this decade.
Yet, as indicated in the main submission and further elaborated in this document, mistakes were made, which we sincerely regret.
We are also mindful that armed conflict meant that combatants on both sides confronted one another in various terrains and under various circumstances. That is in the nature of war; and for such legitimate acts of war, we expect a balanced appreciation of the circumstances that obtained at the time.
Yet this appreciation cannot detract from the need to handle with compassion the victims of the conflict in general, whatever the circumstances which spawned their privations.
In the final analysis, through the new democratic order, we seek to make conflict and war unnecessary.
In our new constitution and its recognition of individual rights and rights of communities; in socio-economic development; in open and transparent government; in new doctrines and through supervision of the security services; in the judiciary and other institutions charged with enhancing democracy; in the media whose independence is guaranteed; and, above all, in an informed, active and organised citizenry, we have the wherewithal to build a society in which violent conflict and the excesses that go with it are forever eliminated.
This is what inspired the members, combatants and supporters of the ANC. This is what inspires us today as we strive to build a better life for all South Africans.
In our first submission we concentrated on providing the TRC with an overview of ANC policies, strategy and tactics within the context of the struggle for national liberation in this country. We paid particular attention to those issues which are central to the mandate of the TRC: the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights, as defined in the Act which brought the TRC into being.
The questions we have received from the TRC in response to our first submission indicate that at present your primary areas of concern include establishing a clearer understanding of ANC policies; of the ANC's structures and lines of accountability; and of who was responsible for ensuring that ANC policy was adhered to by the general membership of the ANC. Several questions indicate the related concern of the TRC to establish a better understanding of what actions were taken by the leadership of the ANC to deal with instances where there were deviations from policy. Concern has been indicated regarding the need for better understanding of the ANC's policies with regard to Inkatha, particularly in the context of the violence in Kwa-Zulu Natal since 1984, and the post-1990 explosion of violence in Gauteng.
In addition to several questions reflecting these key areas of concern, the TRC has asked for detailed information on the activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe and the ANC's former Department of National Intelligence and Security (NAT). More information on the activities of the former apartheid regime has been requested, particularly with regard to the National Co-ordinating Mechanism and other covert activities.
Our response to these major areas of concern is presented as follows:
We wish to emphasise that this is a supplement to, and not a substitute for, the main submission presented to the Commission in August 1996. As such, there are many areas regarding ANC policy, our general approach to struggle, the context in which our actions took place, the policies and actions of the apartheid regime, which are not covered in this operational report. The two submissions should be treated as complementary.
In instances where there is insufficient detail, this is either because the information is not available, or because the relevant issues will be covered appropriately and adequately in individual applications for amnesty.
The TRC has asked for information on the functions and composition of a range of structures, political and military, at national and regional levels. This information, with diagrams, is attached to this submission as Appendix 1.
A full list of all MK camps, a list of rehabilitation centres, and the names of the commanders, is provided in Appendix 2.
The TRC has asked how these various sectors interacted, and which formal and informal channels of communication were in place. These questions, we believe, will be answered in the context of the detailed operational reports.
The TRC has requested "further clarification of the ANC's definition of a "justified target". We have been asked whether there were any recorded instructions defining justified targets besides the pamphlet circulated in 1985 in which the ANC called on the people to "take the struggle to the white areas", and in which targets were inter alia defined as "the racist army, police, death squads, agents and stooges in our midst." The TRC wants to know whether this definition of targets could be "used to legitimize the killing of policemen, alleged informers, community councillors, and co-opted parliamentarians", and what we mean by the term "stooges in our midst." Elsewhere we were asked "to what extent should ANC leadership take responsibility for acts of violence committed by UDF supporters, (eg. necklacings, petrol bomb attacks)?" The TRC has asked for more information on Bartholomew Hlapane, and whether the ANC takes responsibility for his execution. The TRC has asked what was the ANC's "military policy" towards Inkatha, and whether the ANC leadership considered members of Inkatha "legitimate military targets."
In our main submission, we referred to this subject on a number of occasions. The draft document Operation Mayibuye (see p 48) defined targets as "strategic road, railways and other communications; power stations; police stations, camps, and military forces; and irredeemable government stooges."
In 1978, after the Politico-Military Strategy Commission, a report was produced in which it was stated that the role of armed activity at that time was to "concentrate on armed propaganda actions whose immediate purpose is to support and stimulate political activity and organisation, rather than to hit at the enemy."
In his statement at this time, OR Tambo said "We have always defined the enemy in terms of a system of domination and not of a people or a race...As we have done in the past, so shall we continue, consistently and unreservedly, to support, fight for and abide by the principles of international law."
In 1983, the document Planning for People's War noted that there should be "more concentration on destroying enemy personnel", universally understood within the ANC to mean members of the SAP, SADF, other security structures, and their collaborators.
In the light of these quotations illustrating the ANC's definition of justified targets, it is clear that action against the machinery of repression - SAP and SADF members and informers - was considered legitimate. These people had chosen to act in the front-line of repression in defence of the apartheid regime.
In most cases those who were attacked by MK were notorious members of the Security Branch, or those involving themselves in a particularly direct manner in acts of violence against communities. There were also many petrol-bomb attacks on the homes of members of the SAP which were carried out by local activists. A survey of ANC statements will show that we consistently called on members of the SAP and SADF to turn their arms on the oppressor, and come over to the side of the liberation struggle.
Informers were essential tools of the security forces; without them, the apartheid regime would have been seriously hampered in their attempts to crush resistance. Many informers and "turned" cadres were directly responsible for the imprisonment, detention and deaths of literally thousands of activists and ANC leaders. An example of a particularly dangerous informer is provided by Bartholomew Hlapane, about whom the TRC requested more details. Hlapane was the most senior office-bearer to betray the struggle - he had been a member of the ANC's NEC and of the Central Committee of the SACP. Hlapane gave evidence in the trials of Braam Fischer, and compounded this treachery by giving evidence for the state in a number of other trials.
Hlapane crowned these deeds by playing a central role in the March 1982 Denton committee hearings in the USA, which produced "witnesses" supplied by the apartheid regime. This propaganda exercise sought to seriously damage the reputation of the ANC in the international arena, and to set back the liberation struggle, by portraying the Movement as a terrorist group under the control of the Soviet Union, carrying out depraved acts such as infecting South Africa's water supplies with cholera. He was shot by an MK unit.
There have been recent attempts to portray the 1983 constitutional changes - against which the UDF mobilised millions of South Africans - as evidence of progress towards a more equitable society, a process in which the ANC should have participated, rather than intensifying the armed struggle.
We feel it necessary to review this period briefly in order to ensure that our understanding of the context in which the general uprisings of 1984 onwards took place, and in which the ANC called for the intensification of the struggle on all fronts, is conveyed to the Commission.
In the late 1970's the NP had begun to realise that it needed to extend the base for military conscription; the SADF was in favour of extending the call-up to "coloured" and Indian communities. However, it was generally recognised that it would be difficult to conscript people who did not have the vote.
A perceptive editorial published in the Rand Daily Mail commented on the issue as follows:
"The growing challenge to the South African state must inevitably push matters to the point where further military mobilisation will seriously damage the economy with its endemic shortage of skilled labour. Yet manpower constraint is not the only factor. (...) Equally important is the public relations aspect. For propaganda purposes the state clearly needs growing numbers of non-whites in the Defence Force to project the view that the military build-up is not part of a racial and class struggle, but rather a case of all South Africans preparing to fight shoulder to shoulder against the forces of "communism and chaos." A third reason for Coloured and Indian conscription concerns the National Party constituency. All along, the Nationalist leadership has made it clear to its followers that the extended rights and privileges the Coloureds and Indians will receive in the new dispensation will carry with them increased responsibilities of "full citizenship". That means, quite simply, also sharing the burden of defence."1The majority of South Africans - those not classified "white", "coloured" or "Indian" - were explicitly barred from the new racist "tricameral" parliamentary system, which unashamedly sought to further entrench apartheid by drawing allies into the laager to assist in preventing democratic change.
These moves were combined with the three Koornhof Bills, which also aimed to further entrench - not dismantle - existing apartheid institutions: two aimed to bolster the community councils, while the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, which became known as the "Genocide Bill", proposed the tightening of influx control so that those in the impoverished bantustans would be permanently frozen out of the urban areas. The regime made it clear that it wanted these councils to form the basis for whatever "Bantu" political expression it would tolerate outside the "homelands"; in essence, the councils were to be the urban equivalents of the bantustans!
The ANC called on people to mobilize against and destroy the structures created in terms of these laws, as did many community-based organisations within the country which rallied under the banner of the United Democratic Front. There were mass boycotts of elections to these puppet structures. Many councillors were elected on pathetically low polls, and there was intense pressure from communities on councillors and MPs to resign from these structures. In many cases councillors resigned and were welcomed back into their communities.
The quote we used from the ANC's January 1984 annual statement (p 51 of our first submission) was chosen because it provides a clear example of the ANC's understanding that military struggle could not occur in a political vacuum, and was one of a number of inter- related forms of struggle against apartheid. "The system" in all its manifestations was the target of mass-based struggle.
These institutions of apartheid are identified as the "organs of central and provincial government, the army and the police, the judiciary, the bantustan administrations, the community councils, the local management and local affairs committees." The statement continues: "It is these institutions of apartheid that we must attack and demolish...Thus, through our efforts, the so-called Coloured Persons Representative Council ceased to exist; as a result of extensive mobilisation, the puppet South African Indian Council was brought in by an insignificant minority. (...) White South Africa alone should man the apartheid constitutional posts, which it alone has created, to its exclusive benefit. Those who elect to serve in these apartheid institutions must expect to face the wrath of the people."
The TRC has asked us to define what we meant by "stooges in our midst". These could be described as those among the oppressed who chose to directly assist in apartheid oppression and repression. Councillors and those who chose to serve in the tricameral parliament and participate in repression, certainly fell into this group of collaborators with apartheid.
A critical point which must be made is that a guarantee for conflict at local level was built into this new legislation: the new community councils had to be self-financing.
As a study by Haysom noted, resistance to these structures at grassroots level intensified "as community councils imposed the predicted rent rises on impoverished townships in a futile bid to balance the books of their "autonomous" local authorities, as they employed their own police to act against squatters, as they evicted people from their homes, as they participated in talks on removals.
"It was in this context, rather than in straightforward political campaigning, that physical attacks on councillors and on their property were launched by angry crowds of residents. Attacks on policemen's homes became commonplace at a much later stage of the...resistance, after fatal clashes between police and residents had become commonplace and mass arrests and detentions had become the order of the day. Political reservations about community councils and the councillors would not have touched ordinary residents had not the worsening economic situation in South Africa forced residents into direct conflict with the community councils...Allegations of corruption levelled at community councillors have been numerous and widespread. 2This passage from an eyewitness account of the Sebokeng uprising of September 1984 gives insight into the attitudes of many township residents towards the councillors:
"(The Apostle) Paul has said that not all of us should be leaders, as leaders are more punished than anybody else. So, referring that to our situation, no man should just agree to be a leader if he has no true qualities of leadership, and no-one should feel easy on the throne he has been nominated to occupy, if he has not been freely elected by the public. This I say because, if you keep on ruling defiant hearts, the time they revolt against you not one piece of your belongings together with your life will remain yours. If people are dissatisfied with you, it is better for you to resign before the terrible dark clouds overwhelm you in your wilderness; if you defy their needs, then you ask for a brutal retribution.A survey of available information shows that the overwhelming majority of attacks on the homes of town councillors (or members of the tricameral legislature) were carried out by local activists, and were often in the context of explosive anger on the ground in response to initiatives by councils or brutalities by the security forces. The number of deaths and injuries which resulted from these attacks were extremely limited when compared with the deaths and injuries inflicted on members of anti-apartheid organisations. Whilst the ANC (and UDF) leadership did not order such attacks, and took no pleasure in any loss of life resulting from such actions, it certainly did not condemn them in principle. Although the ANC leadership did not at all times approve of the methods adopted by people, actions of this nature were in essence the result of state repression, and they were in line with the ANC's stated policy to mobilise people against institutions designed to yet further entrench apartheid.
A brief review of statistics published by the SAIRR in its annual surveys covering the years 1983 - 1986 will serve to illustrate these points.
In 1983, there was one attack at a community council office in New Brighton, which resulted in one death and five injuries. In 1984, of the 175 people killed in "unrest related incidents" during the year, four were councillors who were "killed by enraged crowds." 149 of these 175 deaths in 1984 took place after the 3rd of September - the day which signalled the beginning of serious civil unrest, when residents of Sebokeng marched against a rent increase imposed by the council.
By April 1985, according to the Department of Constitutional Development, twelve councillors had died since the beginning of September 1984. The SAIRR annual survey for 1985 lists several petrol-bomb attacks on councillor's homes across the country, and a few incidents in which grenades were used. There were (according to the SAIRR survey) four cases of attacks on the homes of tricameral MPs; no injuries or deaths are mentioned. All of these attacks were petrol bomb attacks, with hand grenades used as well in two cases.
The SAIRR's statistics for 1985 show that twenty-six members of the security forces were killed by residents of townships, while one was killed by "guerrillas." In the same period, 441 township residents had been killed by members of the security forces. These statistics do not include a breakdown of the large numbers of deaths and serious injuries caused by state- sponsored "vigilante" groups which intensified suddenly in the latter half of 1985. MK units were encouraged to support communities in ridding the country of these violent collaborators with apartheid.
According to the SAIRR's 1986 annual survey, it was difficult to compile accurate statistics for this year because of heavy censorship of the media by the apartheid regime. Adriaan Vlok claimed that 18 members of the SAP were killed and 192 injured in "rioting" during the year. This included attacks on "special constables" who had been introduced to stamp out popular organisations and prop up the councils. There are no statistics for the number of attacks on councillors during this year; there were "spates" of attacks on councillors and others perceived as collaborators in February in Alexandra, in May in Thokoza, and in September in Soweto. Besides these incidents, the SAIRR survey lists seven attacks on councillors in which one councilor was hacked to death and the child of a councilor was similarly killed "by a group of five men". Nearly all the attacks listed are described as being carried out by "mobs" or as petrol bomb attacks. In a few cases hand grenades were used and in one case a limpet mine exploded at a block of flats in Fordsburg, which was used to house Soweto councillors.
This survey lists one (1) petrol bomb attack on the home of a Labour Party MP. In contrast, according to the SAIRR, at least 1,298 deaths in "political violence" took place during the year, with activists, trade unionists and religious leaders the targets of petrol bomb, hand grenade and hit squad attacks.
According to the SAIRR Annual Survey for 1988 (p. 602), "speaking in Parliament In March 1988, Chris Heunis declined to say how many community councillors and members of black local authorities had died as a result of their holding these offices. Mr Heunis said that although these people had been "attacked and killed or injured in 1986 and 1987, it cannot beyond doubt be attributed to their holding these offices."
It would be most accurate to say that the ANC did not define councillors as targets - they themselves chose whether or not to define themselves as particular enemies of their communities, and it was usually members of their own communities who acted against them. There is also the possibility that some attacks on targets of this nature were "false flag" operations. In 1988, the home of Allan Hendrickse, leader of the Labour Party, was the target of a hand grenade attack. In 1992, the SAP took legal action against the Afrikaans weekly Vrye Weekblad to prevent it publishing allegations that police were directly involved in this attack. Hernus Kriel then twice avoided answering questions put to him in Parliament by Michael and Peter Hendrickse, as to whether the state had been responsible for this attack. It appears this case remains unsolved.
The ANC's definition of justified targets - and conflict in general in the 1980s - should also be understood in the context of the parameters defined by the regime's counter-mobilisation tactics and the harnessing of the National Security Management System (NSMS) to crush resistance.
The growth of popular and effective grassroots organisations, which successfully resisted evictions and rent increases, and took up other bread-and-butter issues in their communities, threatened and marginalised the community councils. It was critically important to the state to support the community council system, at all costs: a revealing statement in this regard was made by Magnus Malan in late 1987. Speaking in Parliament, he identified what he called six factors which affect security: law and order; structures in the black community; housing; employment opportunities; education; and strike activity. By "structures in black communities", he said, he meant tertiary levels of government, that is, the town councils. "If things go wrong on this level, the top cracks", he said. This provides some insight into the reasons behind the degree of ferocity with which the apartheid regime sought to prop up these utterly discredited structures.
The National Joint Management Centre of the NSMS co-ordinated a network of Joint Management Committees at local, sub-regional and regional levels; each JMC had various sub-committees, including an intelligence sub-committee. At local level, these commi ttees brought together the security forces, pro-government black figures and township administrators with the aim of securing political and security control in their areas. Many councillors were therefore directly collaborating in the violence of the apartheid state.
Attempts by the state to "counter-mobilise" against popular organisations to prop up the community council and bantustan systems resulted in the emergence of the "vigilantes", particularly in the latter half of 1985. Along with municipal police, the regime used "vigilantes" in an attempt to destroy popular, legal organisations in the townships; they were also deployed to crush resistance to the "independence" of KwaNdebele. In KwaZulu, the same period saw the emergence of a related phenomenon - the "warlords." Ebenezer Maqina's counter-mobilisation group, the AmaAfrika National Front (code-named "Project Henry" by the government's covert operation, Adult Education Consultants, which was responsible for handling him) provides a key example of the degree to which the state was involved in fuelling violence at grassroots level during this period.
Maqina served on the local Joint Management Centre in Port Elizabeth, and was in the forefront of violence against grassroots organisations in the area, generally portrayed as "UDF/Azapo conflict." SAP agents such as Patrick Dlongwana were deployed to assist. Another example is provided by the DMI-run programme of support for the mayor of Zwide, Thamsanqa Linda, which was code-named "Project Tommy" - also falling under the control of the local AdEd structure. It is more than probable that all "vigilante" leaders and councillors were directly linked to these covert intelligence and security structures.
This violence was cynically and deliberately portrayed as "black-on-black" violence, and is now dishonestly presented as the result of the ANC's refusal to participate in the regime's legislative programme to further bolster apartheid.
Just a few other examples of these "vigilante" groups include the "Phakathis" or "A Team" of Thabong, in which it was alleged several councillors were involved and which used council property; vigilantes in places such as Leandra and Huhudi were responsible for hacking to death and shooting many activists and popular leaders. There were many others, such as the Memesis and Kekanas in the Eastern Cape, also grouped around unpopular councillors, which the regime hoped could become part of their covertly-run "Xhosa Resistance Movement" along with their "AmaAfrika National Front. "
The death of Councillor Kinikini in Uitenhage provides an example of the circumstances under which a number of councillors were killed, and of how the state itself was directly involved in fuelling violence at grassroots level through its attempts to counter-mobilise communities and prop up the administrative pillars of apartheid. All the councillors in Kwanobuhle resigned, except for Benjamin Kinikini. He was hated in his community because he, together with a man named Jimmy Claasen, had surrounded himself with an armed "vigilante" group calling itself "the Peacemakers."
This gang was mentioned in a number of trials at the time; they "arrested" people, "tried" them, assaulted them, and handed them over to the police. They often held people prisoner in Kinikini's funeral parlour. In one case a sixteen-year-old girl was abducted, raped, and forced to lie in a coffin all night by this gang of thugs. Counsel for defence in one public violence trial stated that it was well-known the "Peacemakers" were in the pay of the SAP. On Sharpeville Day, March 21st 1985, the Uitenhage massacre took place when police shot dead seventeen civilians. Anger was running very high in Kwanobuhle and other townships. On the morning of March 23rd, Jimmy Claasen and at least one Kinikini kidnapped four youths at gunpoint from their homes, and held them captive in the mortuary section of Kinikini's funeral parlour; they then took them to the bush and sjambokked them. People gathered at Kinikini's business to demand the release of the youths, attacked the building, and eventually an enraged crowd hacked Kinikini and five male relatives to death.
An article published in Sechaba (April 1987) on the Sharpeville Six, who had been convicted on the doctrine of common purpose for the killing of a councillor, expressed the ANC's attitude in this way: "The ANC stands absolutely with the Six, and with all others facing the same fate, and does not discriminate between those who identify themselves consciously with the ANC and those who do not. Because it has won the support of the masses and thus has the responsibility for providing a disciplined structure and leadership for that struggle, the ANC has the duty to defend unhesitatingly those who ally themselves with its objectives. (...) Further, the evidence in the trial showed beyond all doubt that the councillor identified himself with the regime, and was willing to enforce its oppressive laws. In fact, the judges of this regime made this very point, and attached importance to it."
As the mass-based resistance against apartheid took root in the mid-eighties, the ANC leadership strongly disapproved of some of the methods chosen by people to kill informers and other collaborators, particularly the "necklace", and stated this on more than one occasion. UDF leaders also condemned the use of the "necklace" on several occasions. But the ANC leadership refused, and will always refuse to condemn those who believed they were part of the struggle for liberation led by the ANC and the UDF, and were making their contribution by ridding communities of informers and those amongst them who directly collaborated in apartheid violence (please refer to our first submission, pp 77 - 78).
The extent to which the NP has consistently tried to use the phenomenon of "necklacing" to damage the ANC and divert attention from their own atrocities has always raised the suspicion that they were involved in some of these incidents. It was certainly their agent, Joe Mamasela, who was centrally involved in creating the conditions under which the first recorded "necklacing" took place, which was conveniently filmed in horrific detail, immediately sent out world-wide, and portrayed as "evidence" of the savagery of the ANC. A number of covertly-funded fronts were prominent in propaganda campaigns focused on "necklacing." There has also recently been a profoundly dishonest attempt to create the impression that Chris Hani expressed approval of, and claimed ANC responsibility for, the phenomenon of "necklacing" by quoting one sentence from a lengthy response he made to a question on the ANC's attitude towards "necklacing". Here is the reply he gave in 1986:
"You know for a long time South Africa, being a colonialist power of a special type, has depended on the continued repression of our people through active collaboration by puppets. We know that even in the classic colonial situation in countries like India, Kenya, the old Tanganyika and elsewhere, the colonialist has always depended on the African askari. Similarly, in our country, we know ourselves that the colonialist, the racist regime if you like, has always depended on the active collaboration of the oppressed on the recruitment of the Black policeman, the Black special branch. Because the Black policeman the Black special branch and the Black agent stay in the same township as we do, they have been the conduit through which information about our activities, about our plans has been passed to the enemy. This has made the process of organisation and mobilisation very difficult.
"So the necklace was a weapon devised by the oppressed themselves to remove this cancer from our society, the cancer of collaboration of the puppets. It is not a weapon of the ANC. It is a weapon of the masses themselves to cleanse the townships from the very disruptive and even lethal activities of the puppets and collaborators. We do understand our people when they use the necklace because it is an attempt to render our townships, to render our areas and country ungovernable, to make the enemy's access to information very difficult. But we are saying here our people must be careful, in the sense that the enemy would employ provocateurs to use the necklace, even against activists. We have our own revolutionary methods of dealing with collaborators, the methods of the ANC. But I refuse to condemn our people when they mete out their own traditional forms of justice to those who collaborate. I understand their anger. Why should they be cool as icebergs, when they are being killed every day?
"As far as I am concerned, the question of the necklace and how it should be used belongs to all of us, to the ANC, to the democratic movement. We should sit down and discuss amongst ourselves how we should mete out justice. What is revolutionary justice? One fact is that, where agents and collaborators are concerned, we should establish, where it is possible, our own revolutionary courts where justice should be meted out. And in those courts we should involve some of our best cadres so that our forms of justice do not degenerate into kangaroo justice. We would like to maintain revolutionary forms of justice. But South Africa is not a normal society; the situation is very very abnormal. People are angry because we are fighting fascism in that country.
"The ANC will never abandon its leading role. We are saying to our people, whatever method you devise, there should be democratic participation, there should be democratic discussion, and whatever method we use, that method should conform to the norms of the revolutionary movement. As I say we understand why the necklace has been used. We know even the negative and positive aspects of the necklace. There is a lot of discussion now going on the question of the necklace. But it is not this silly co nclusion that it is Black on Black violence. The necklace has been used against those who have been actively collaborating with the enemy. We say the movement should be vigilant to ensure that whatever sentence is passed on anybody, it is a result o f participation by the revolutionary elements of our struggle." (Sechaba, December 1986.) In October 1987, the Botha regime refused to grant The Sunday Tribune permission to quote OR Tambo after he had made a speech in which he stated that the ANC was strongly opposed to the practice of "necklacing." Helen Suzman commented that this was a "shameless use of selective prohibition. (...) A statement where "necklacing", one of the most outrageous acts attributed to the ANC, is strongly discouraged, yet the government does not allow this to be published."
In yet another example of dishonest attempts to exploit the issue of "necklacing", untrue statements by bank robber Lucky Malaza, who somehow was "mistakenly" released by the De Klerk administration as a political prisoner after falsely claiming to have been involved in a necklace murder, have been quoted at some length in the NP's latest submission to the TRC.
We trust that as the work of the Commission continues, the truth in regard to the lengths to which the stratkom structures of the apartheid regime went to use "necklacing" to discredit the ANC and the UDF, and to promote the perception that covert st ate-sponsored terrorism was "black-on-black" violence, will be brought to light.
The TRC has asked what was the ANC's "military policy" towards Inkatha, and whether the ANC leadership considered members of Inkatha to be "legitimate military targets." The ANC had no "military policy" with regard to Inkatha. The ANC has never considered Inkatha members or officials as targets simply because they aligned themselves with Inkatha.
The predominant feature of the violence in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s was attacks on whole communities. "Warlords" played a pivotal role in this violence, assisted by elements within the SAP who either refused to intervene or actively supported the aggressors. Those communities (or sections of communities) who did not actively support Inkatha were regarded automatically as being ANC- or UDF-aligned, and became the target for violence. In essence this was the same pattern of violence experienced by urban communities in other parts of the country at this time, when the "vigilantes" were armed and deployed in defence of the administrative pillars of the apartheid state.
These activities were not unique to KwaZulu Natal, Inkatha or any other organisation in the overall context of the struggle to end apartheid, and the activities of the former apartheid regime to counter this threat through a range of illegal covert methods based on the theory of counter-mobilisation.
In Natal, and in KwaZulu in particular, the violence against anti-apartheid organisations and individuals intensified in the mid-1980s with the emergence of the "warlords" and "vigilantes" in rural and urban areas. These included gangs such as the AmaSinyora in KwaMashu, the core of which consisted of criminals who had been recruited in prison. Others were the Amakwebi in Chesterville, and the A-Team in townships such as Chesterville and Lamontville. In addition, the NP covertly set up UWUSA (one of several projects running under the umbrella of Project Ancor), which operated in the labour field and concentrated on violent strike-breaking and the destabilisation of COSATU-affiliated unions; in several incidents people were killed. The Caprivi trainees were organised into hit squads and deployed in 1986-1987.
All these sources of violence against the enemies of the apartheid state were deliberately created by the NP government, in line with the counter-mobilisation tactics they had adopted to crush resistance. They were trained, armed, managed and covertly funded via the NP's security and intelligence agencies, particularly the Department of Military Intelligence, the Security Branch, and the Kwa-Zulu Police. Some of this training was done under the cover of "white right wing support" for Inkatha.
According to a top secret report to the State Security Council prepared by a "work group" consisting of "Kat" Liebenberg, Joep Joubert (in command of the Special Forces at the time) and "Tienie" Groenewald (a stratkom specialist in DMI), the central objectives of Operation Marion were (to quote from the report) "to limit ANC/UDF intimidation amongst the black population by means of Inkatha", and to "establish Inkatha as a more effective organisation against the ANC/UDF" - in other words, to use Inkatha to "counter-mobilise" against the mass democratic movement, in the same way that other groups were covertly set up or manipulated, as described above.
Given the active involvement of the NP government (via its security forces) in this conflict, communities were left defenceless; it was up to them to try to defend themselves. A key example is provided by the formation of SDUs in Edendale in 1987 in response to wholesale and arbitrary attacks on the community. In some cases particular Inkatha officials or members distinguished themselves through violence against leaders or communities whom they perceived as a political threat, and themselves became targets for attacks, carried out by members of local communities. Many "warlords", if not all, were directly supported or controlled by handlers in the NP's intelligence and security establishment. Possibly at times MK cadres based in these areas participated in counter- or pre-emptive attacks. Such attacks were almost invariably motivated by the need for self-defence, or to protect communities under threat.
Allegations to the effect that MK has been engaged in "serial mass murder" of hundreds Inkatha officials are part of a long-running stratkom operation with the objectives of creating confusion with regard to the true perpetrators of violence in KwaZulu Natal, whipping up maximum levels of enmity and fear at grassroots level, and ensuring that reconciliation is as difficult as possible.
The accuracy of this so-called "death list" has been called into doubt on more than one occasion by violence monitors and investigative journalists, who point out that the compilers of this list have tended to claim that anyone killed in certain areas was an "Inkatha leader", and in some cases those on the list were not members of Inkatha at all.
Attempts by the UDF and other organisations to halt this violence over the years must be mentioned. These attempts have been consistently derailed or spurned by elements within the leadership of Inkatha, presumably on the advice of their handlers. Whilst the late Harry Gwala was in prison, and also immediately after his release, he advocated peace and negotiations with Inkatha. On his release, Chief Buthelezi wrote him a letter congratulating him, which was cordially responded to by Harry Gwala. However, as the violence in the Natal Midlands took off - which was characterised by indiscriminate killings of even elderly people and children - Harry Gwala increasingly urged communities to defend themselves. As he put it, were communities to fold their arms and passively accept attacks? He encouraged people to form SDUs and resist attacks, rather than run away and be forced to live as refugees.
Operation Marion was not terminated when De Klerk took over. The SAP report written in March 1990, and which came to light at the time of the "Inkathagate" scandal in 1991, made it clear that a key objective of the continued covert support afforded to Inkatha at this time was to prevent the Inkatha leadership "throwing in (their) lot with the ANC" as the negotiations phase began. This is the context in which conflict in KwaZulu Natal since the 1980s, and the violence in the post-1990 phase, should be seen.
Information regarding the role of police agent Sifiso Nkabinde in ensuring that violence continued in the Midlands has very recently come to light, and will no doubt yet again underline the pivotal role of the NP in this conflict and bloodshed - the "ANC/Inkatha conflict" in this region was largely yet another version of "black-on-black" violence (ie. the results of counter-mobilisation) elsewhere in the country as described in our earlier submission.
The TRC has asked for detailed information on "the scope and scale of legitimate MK operations" as well as attacks not in accordance with ANC policy which had "become a trend in the late 1980s." In a separate question the TRC asked "to what extent do MK commanders in the Front Line States take responsibility for actions - especially those involving civilian targets - of cadres inside the country?"
The TRC has asked us to assess to what extent "militant rhetoric and ambiguous statements" led to possible cases of misinterpretation of "ANC policy on soft tagets."
In a separate section on the Ellis Park bomb of 1988, the TRC has quoted Chris Hani and Steve Tshwete at some length, commenting on this blast. The TRC says their comments appeared to imply that "any inner-city location could represent a legitimate target because of the possibility that the police or army may have located an office in an ostensibly innocuous-looking building. Did such statements not confuse the definition of a legitimate target?" They underline this point by asking whether the leadership condoned "such actions of killing and injuring civilians", and whether there were "different perceptions on the definition of legitimate targets among ANC leaders."
The TRC has asked what steps were taken by the ANC to avoid civilian casualties in landmine explosions, and how many civilians were killed in these incidents.
Whilst regional ANC structures (RPMCs) had a greater level of autonomy in the post 1983 period, and did not have to clear all operations with Lusaka before going ahead, all ANC members and officials were bound by ANC policy with regard to the armed struggle, and did not develop their own policies.
We feel it is very important to point out that attacks not in accordance with ANC policy did not become a trend in the late 1980s, in the sense that such actions became the dominant form of all MK attacks. This is shown clearly in the lists of armed actions during the period in question. Attacks resulting in primarily civilian casualties represented a very small proportion of all armed actions: the majority of MK actions continued to be in line with ANC policy during this period, which is testimony to the degree of discipline amongst our cadres in the face of extreme provocation.
The attached MK Operations report includes two lists of armed operations. The first of these consists of a list of armed operations, arranged chronologically and according to nature of target, which we believe were carried out by legitimate MK units.
The second list consists of incidents of armed action which fall into a grey area with regard to the nature of the intended target, and also includes incidents for which we suspect MK cadres were not responsible.
With regard to these lists of incidents of armed action, it is important to note that the ANC did not keep records of all operations carried out by our cadres - this in any event would have been a suicidal breach of elementary security procedures - and as we have tried to show, given the nature of guerrilla warfare, cadres had to make decisions for themselves at times; they did not constantly report to their commanders. We must emphasise that we cannot be certain that these lists are entirely accur ate or comprehensive. The information was drawn largely from press reports and similar sources, and given the degree of censorship practiced by the government at the time, it is possible that many incidents were deliberately prevented from reaching the press. Where questions arise on specific incidents, the ANC will make every effort to assist the TRC.
The ANC, of which MK was an integral part and entirely subordinate to the political leadership, did not approve of attacks on "civilian targets". Attacks on civilian targets would be morally indefensible, and strategically senseless: they would not only be in contradiction to the ANC's work to avert racial civil war, but would alienate domestic and international support for the struggle against apartheid.
As indicated in our first submission, a number of attacks did take place, carried out by MK, which were not in line with ANC policy. What were the reasons behind this, and what was the attitude of the ANC towards these incidents?
Some attacks occurred because of anger. The period between late 1984 and 1988 witnessed unprecedented violence directed at black civilians. This behaviour of the regime was a significant factor in provoking certain attacks which were in breach of policy. Anger on the ground was explosive: the atrocities committed by the apartheid regime demanded retaliation. In some cases, cadres responded to state brutality by hitting back in anger, as soon as possible - as in the case of the Amanzimtoti bomb, described in detail in our main submission.
The attitude of the apartheid regime, which refused to take prisoners of war, was another factor. When unexpected difficulties arose, cadres had to decide on their feet: and sometimes they made wrong decisions. At times, the situations they faced were desperate to the extent that it is highly unlikely that there would be a peaceful outcome, even if they had surrendered - the Silverton bank siege and the Goch Street incident are cases in point.
Gathering tactical intelligence was the responsibility of units on the ground; this was exceptionally difficult given the conditions in the country. At times attacks which appear to be aimed at civilian targets were nothing of the sort - the cadre may have had information to the effect that an SADF or SAP group would be present at a particular railway station or hotel or restaurant at a particular time, but due to a range of difficulties - ranging from faulty intelligence to devices which malfunction and go off at the wrong time - an explosion occurs, apparently senselessly, in a civilian area. The Magoos Bar attack falls into this category, as indicated in our first submission to the TRC. It is also possible that some of these incidents occurred through deliberate disinformation, in which infiltrators into MK units set up attacks of this nature.
Technical difficulties accounted for a number of these incidents. At times insufficient training could have resulted in situations in which cadres were not able to ensure that explosions took place at the intended time, and made mistakes in setting timing devices. At times accidents occurred. Defective timing mechanisms accounted for some of these incidents, and resulted in unintended civilian casualties - the Krugersdorp Magistrate's Court bomb is a case in point, and there were probably others.
At times, an operation would take place in support of campaigns or other struggles taking place within the community - such as strike action, mass retrenchments, a rent or bus boycott. An explosion at an office block, a railway line, factory or supermarket makes sense in this context. Civilians were never the targets in these cases - they would in most cases be our supporters or potential supporters; however, it did happen in some instances that the timing of a blast went wrong for a range of reasons and resulted in unintended civilian casualties.
We feel it is important to also bring to the attention of the Commission certain relevant factors which flow from the essential character of a guerrilla army.
In contrast with a conventional military force, in which virtually all planning takes place at HQ level by experienced officers, in guerrilla warfare most of the initiative is with the unit, and detailed planning takes place at the lowest level. Each cadre has to be trusted to make decisions with regard to choice of target within ANC policy, whilst keeping a close eye on developments and feelings among the people in his/her community - a responsibility which no soldier in a conventional force ever has to face.
There were long and insecure lines of communication, command and control. There was no "hotline" to higher structures to ask for guidance; the vulnerability of clandestine communication could - and at times did - result in the arrests and deaths of cadres. Consequently, a great deal depended on the political maturity, general experience, and immediate situation in which each cadre operated. Many of the established MK units had been allowed a degree of initiative in executing their operations, as long as these remained within policy guidelines; training in MK camps took this reality into account. In fact it was in part to deal with these problems that Operation Vula was launched, to establish senior political and military leadership inside the country.
Maintaining discipline in guerrilla and conventional armed forces is also fundamentally different. In the case of a guerrilla force, discipline flows from a thorough understanding of the political objectives of the armed struggle - not from threats of court-martial or punishment.
MK cadres conducted crash courses for eager volunteers inside the country. Some of these recruits had sketchy political understanding of the nature of the struggle in comparison with those cadres who had gone through the intensive political and military training provided in camps in exile. Some supporters had loose connections with MK units, and drifted in and out of structures; they were never thoroughly under the discipline of the ANC and MK, yet commanders on the ground sometimes found their contributions indispensable.
We have described the conditions under which the Kabwe conference was held in our first submission. The struggle had to be intensified; in the period after the Kabwe Conference, less emphasis was placed on avoiding civilian casualties at all costs in pursuit of attacks on legitimate targets. As ANC President at the time, OR Tambo, put it:
"I will summarise the position taken by the Conference in these terms: that the struggle must be intensified at all costs. Over the past nine to ten months at least - at the very least - there have been many soft targets hit by the enemy. Nearly five hundred people have now died in that period...massacred, shot down killed secretly. All those were very, very soft targets. They belong to the sphere of the intensification of the struggle. What we have seen in places like the Eastern Cape is what escalation means for everybody. The distinction between "hard" and "soft" targets is going to disappear in an intensified conflict, in an escalating conflict. (...)With regard to the quotes from Steve Tshwete and Chris Hani on which the TRC has requested comment, it is clear to us that their statements do not depart from stated ANC policy in the post-1985 era on the issue of legitimate targets. In fact, they are in line with what the President of the ANC emphasised after the Kabwe Conference: that because of the pressing need to intensify the struggle, the growing viciousness and use of terrorism by the regime, the ANC was going to relax the single-minded preoccupation with avoiding civilian casualties in the course of armed actions against legitimate targets.
This is a quote from Chris Hani, at the time MK Commissar, from a speech broadcast on the ANC's Radio Freedom on March 1st, 1986:
"We are saying comrades (...) that our country is in a state of civil war. It is true that so far the brunt of suffering has been borne by our people. Our people are attending funerals, our people are mourning for their dead, but comrades. Umkhonto we Sizwe, instructed by the leadership of the ANC, is gearing itself to step up activity in white areas so that the entire country should be ungovernable.A factor which should not be underestimated is that the banning by the regime of all ANC literature and jamming of broadcasts from Radio Freedom made it difficult for senior ANC leadership to get through to cadres and activists on the ground t o ensure a proper understanding of policy. Every effort was made to block and distort the ANC's message, or anything which could be remotely construed as supportive of the message of the liberation movement. An extraordinary range of items were banne d; possession of ANC publications such as a pamphlet or a copy of Mayibuye or Sechaba could result in a lengthy jail sentence.
Whilst the above statement provides a clear articulation of the ANC's position, as we indicate elsewhere in this document, it is quite possible that ambiguity in some of the formulations on this subject may have given the impression to some cadres that they should totally disregard the possibility of civilian casualties in the course of their operations. To the extent that this occurred, we regret it. However, as again stated elsewhere in this document and the main submission, where such impressions were created resulting in operations out of kilter with the ANC's policy, statements were issued and senior cadres tasked with clarifying the position to commanders in the Forward Areas, and through them, cadres on the ground.
Increasingly in this period, attacks took place in urban areas, in which civilians were caught in the crossfire. Bona fide cadres and supporters who carried out attacks of this nature believed they were fulfilling the general direction to intensify the struggle and carry it into the white areas in accordance with the political will of the leadership of the ANC.
With regard to the Ellis Park car bomb in 1988, about which the TRC has asked a number of questions, the information required is contained in an amnesty application. With regard to the explosion in Roodepoort outside a branch of Standard Bank in 1988, at this stage the ANC does not know who was responsible for this attack, and none of our cadres have applied for amnesty in this regard. It was reported at the time that an ANC official in Lusaka stated that a nearby SAP station, not civilians, had bee n the target of this explosion; we have no details as to what operational problems arose.
With regard to landmines, it must be emphasised that the ANC never used anti-personnel mines, specifically because we were concerned to avoid civilian casualties. The ANC used only anti-tank mines, which require at least 300kg to detonate, because our primary targets were the military patrols on roads immediately next to borders. The mines were laid overnight so that they would be triggered when the SADF patrolled early the next morning. It was reasoned that because farmworkers generally did not have transport and moved around on foot, they were unlikely to be affected.
As we stated in our main submission, cadres were under strict instructions to do careful reconnaissance in order to avoid civilian casualties, but it was often more difficult than anticipated to ensure that civilians were not caught in these explosions; in some cases farm workers travelling in heavy vehicles were killed or injured.
It is a fact - not an allegation or opinion of the ANC - that farmers in Designated Areas (that is, declared military zones) were not considered civilians by the regime itself, and were all active participants in overt military networks. We provided considerable detail on the relevant legislation in our first submission, on pp 59 - 60.
We do not have reliable statistics on how many people were killed in landmine explosions for which the ANC was responsible. A rough estimate based on available press reports shows that approximately thirty explosions took place between November 1985 and July 1987 resulting in about 23 deaths in total, including two cadres who were killed whilst laying a mine. We reiterate our sincere regret that any civilian deaths and injuries occurred.
In late 1987, all members of MK HQ were called in by OR Tambo, who expressed his concern at the number of unnecessary civilian casualties which had occurred in certain attacks, particularly those involving the use of anti-tank landmines. He tasked MK HQ with ensuring that all cadres fully understood ANC policy with regard to legitimate targets. In addition, MK HQ ordered that the laying of anti-tank mines should be halted.
MK HQ sent senior commanders to the forward areas to meet with MK structures there, and convey the concerns of the national leadership. When possible these senior commanders also met with units. In cases where meetings could not be held with units, command structures in the forward areas were told to contact all command structures of their units, whether they may have been involved in operations of this nature or not, and ensure that all cadres were entirely clear on ANC policy regarding legitimate targets. Chris Hani, Aboobaker Ismail and Keith Mokoape visited structures in Maputo; Lambert Moloi, Chris Hani and Julius Maliba ("Manchecker") met with Zimbabwe structures, and Chris Hani, Aboobaker Ismail, and Lambert Moloi visited Botswana structures. Ronnie Kasrils visited structures in Swaziland.
In most cases cadres responsible for these actions had not deliberately set out to flout ANC policy, but had believed they were acting in accordance with the wishes of the leadership, or had acted in anger. Conveying the instructions of the leadership in this unequivocal manner through the most senior officials of MK HQ was sufficient action, as the overwhelming majority of MK cadres were disciplined soldiers and activists.
We remain convinced that some of these attacks were not carried out by our cadres, but were the work of the regime itself. We again urge the TRC to use its powers to obtain information of this nature from those who would have been responsible for any actions of this nature, with the objective of damaging the domestic and international image of the ANC. As previously noted, Stratkom structures at national, regional and departmental levels should be intensively investigated.
Given the conditions in the 1980s, it is remarkable that so few armed attacks took place in which there was a high rate of civilian casualties. MK certainly had the capacity to kill many thousands of civilians. This would have been easy to do; but we never took this route, even under extreme provocation. When compared to the policies on armed actions adopted by other national liberation movements on this and other continents, the degree of restraint exercised by the ANC and MK is extraordinary.
The humanity of the ANC's approach has never been acknowledged - nor reciprocated - by the apartheid regime, which always defined black civilians in general (and all those who opposed the regime) as "enemy forces", whether they were armed or not.
The ANC largely concurs with the remark that landmines (particularly anti-personnel mines) are indiscriminate weapons, although efforts were always made by our cadres to avoid the deaths and injuries of civilians. The thousands of anti-personnel landmines planted in Angola and Mozambique by the former apartheid regime and its surrogates continue to take their toll on civilians to this day. The recent banning of the sale and manufacture of all anti- personnel landmines by the new government is testimony to our belief that the use of these weapons is in conflict with a society committed to the building of a human rights culture.
As stated in our main submission, the ANC takes collective responsibility for all bona fide MK actions. We regret the deaths and injuries to civilians arising from MK's armed actions. We apologise to their families and next-of-kin for the suffering and hurt that these actions caused. Where applicable, MK cadres have their applications for amnesty with regard to these actions.
3. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING EXCESSES AGAINST CADRES AND CAPTURED AGENTS, AND STEPS TAKEN TO HALT THESE PRACTICES
The Commission has asked what, in our opinion, were the weaknesses of the Security Sector of the Department of National Intelligence and Security (NAT) which may have led to violations of human rights. We have also been asked a number of questions regarding specific incidents, and on action taken by the leadership of the ANC to correct these problems.
The TRC has asked us to whom cases of abuse of certain prisoners, and the steadily deteriorating physical conditions of this camp, were reported. The NEC discussed these problems on a number of occasions before 1985, and has asked whether documentation to this effect is available.
The TRC has also asked several questions regarding the functioning of all tribunals, and the cases they considered.
The TRC has asked how many mutineers died in the Pango mutiny; their names; the exact circumstances under which they died; they cite the Stuart Commission, which gives details about the shootings of two people by security personnel on 07/02/84. They refer to Khotso Morena, who was shot and seriously injured when running away after exploding a hand grenade. Were mutineers travelling to Viana ambushed by ANC officials? How many prisoners were taken after the mutiny? How many of them were transferred to Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre?
In our main submission to the Commission, we acknowledged that some excesses had occurred in the treatment of captured agents, and apologised for these incidents. The matter of violations which did take place in Camp 32 (also known as the Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre, or Quatro) and other camps had been a source of serious concern within the ANC, when information reached the leadership and other structures. The reports of four past commissions of inquiry appointed by the ANC leadership to look into allegations of abuse provides concrete evidence of their concern.
The perception that abuses which took place were systematic or widespread is wrong. Those members of the security department of the Department of National Intelligence and Security (NAT) who abused prisoners did so in violation of ANC policy: there was nothing "systematic" about such acts. NAT personnel were given comprehensive and professional training in security and intelligence work in socialist and other countries. The suggestion that any cadre of the ANC was trained specifically in torture is rejected with contempt.
In addressing the questions raised by the TRC, we will use the reports of past commissions of inquiry appointed by the ANC as a primary point of reference, and occasionally augment the findings of these commissions with other available information. (These reports were presented to the TRC with our first submission, and were also released to the public.)
We will concentrate on presenting our understanding of how circumstances arose in which excesses in violation of ANC policy took place, in line with the mandate of the TRC to establish the truth and ensure that conditions under which such violations took place are never allowed to recur.
First, we will briefly sketch the backdrop against which some of these excesses took place. Agents infiltrated into our structures carried out acts such as the attempted mass poisoning of cadres, supplying intelligence which led to the bombardment of one of our camps, sabotage of equipment and deliberate attempts to encourage indiscipline and internal conflict of various kinds. There were a number of cases in which agents supplied their handlers with information which led directly to the assassinations of leaders and the ambushing or arrest, torture, and imprisonment of cadres.
NAT uprooted the regime's most prized network of infiltrators in 1981. Analysis of the activities of some of these agents in the political context in which they took place indicated that they were not merely involved in various attempts to disrupt or damage the ANC, but were actors in a far broader and more ambitious operation by the regime to eliminate and replace key leaders of the ANC, thereby setting the movement on a new route which would culminate in its destruction. (A copy of the "Shishita report", which covers this investigation in detail, has been submitted to the TRC.)
This was a severe setback which thoroughly rattled the regime. Their response was a desperate attempt to "jam" our screening procedures by throwing large numbers of infiltrators into the field. Many if not most would-be infiltrators in the post-Shishita period were hopelessly ill-prepared for the missions their handlers had assigned to them. For example, one confessed that he had been told to attempt to assassinate OR Tambo - but had not been supplied with a weapon, or any other form of logistical support such as a plan to retreat after the operation. Others - such as Patrick Dlongwana - had been so thoroughly exposed inside the country, that his handlers must have known he would be picked up immediately. It appears the regime hoped the ANC's machineries would be overwhelmed by this influx, which would to some extent serve to divert our resources away from prosecuting the armed struggle inside the country, and create conditions under which the more professional infiltrators they deployed might slip through the net.
Means to deal with this influx of agents had to be devised. As the NAT Operations report shows, nearly 40% of confessed agents were never imprisoned. But others were dangerous, or had committed such serious crimes that they had to be isolated. It is in this context that Camp 32 was established, and cases in which excesses on which the TRC has requested more information occurred.
As the organigrams accompanying this document show, the National Executive Committee (NEC) has always been the ANC's highest policy- and decision- making body. The National Security Council and the Revolutionary Council fell under the Office of the President, with the various military, political and security structures, committees or departments reporting to the Revolutionary Council. NAT - as the Department of Intelligence and Security was generally known - was no exception.
In the 1970s and the early 1980s there was significant overlap between MK and NAT structures, particularly in Angola. Mzwai Piliso was the most senior leader in charge of all camps in Angola, and was also appointed head of NAT, of which the Security department was one sub-sector, in 1981.
NAT slowly developed towards more clear-cut lines of command, specialisation of work, and separation of functions; more details in this regard are supplied in the operational report. In the early 1980s, confusion set in as the role of the Security Department (and NAT in general in Angola) veered away from what should have been its central function - gathering intelligence and screening recruits to protect MK and the ANC as a whole - towards taking on largely disciplinary roles and, at Camp 32, guard duties.
In dealing with the question of the weaknesses that emerged over time, it is therefore necessary to also look at the situation in Angola in general.
Discipline is the cornerstone of any army. MK was guided by the ANC's Code of Conduct, a copy of which was attached to our first submission. Breaches of discipline common to most armies were usually handled at camp level by the camp command structure; these were cases such as fighting between cadres, abuse of authority, disregard of camp rules, going AWOL, petty theft, exchanging camp property for liquor, drug abuse (mostly dagga) and illicit liquor brewing. Punishments for offences of this nature were laid out in the Code of Conduct (see p. 89 of our first submission.) Sometimes the punishments meted out for contraventions of the MK Code of Conduct were entirely out of proportion to the deed.
This is a regrettable feature of many armies. While we would never wish to compare MK - a guerrilla army composed entirely of volunteers - with the SADF, which relied on forced conscription, we feel it should be pointed out that a number of SADF conscripts are known to have died after brutal beatings; other forms of punishment and ill-treatment (such as excessive "paal PT" ) resulted in deaths. There were a number of minor mutinies; in 1979, there was a mass walkout of over 60 SADF soldiers from their base in Upington in protest at the treatment they were receiving.
In six cases between 1979 and 1981, MK cadres died as a result of being beaten. (A list of these names has been submitted to the TRC.) Reports on these incidents would be sent to the Camp Commander, and senior officials would meet with the Camp Administration to hold an inquiry into the incident to prevent recurrence of such excessive actions. Measures such as demotion or redeployment would be taken against perpetrators of excessive punishments.
The case of Joel Mahlatini provides a good example of the manner in which the ANC leadership handled cases of this nature. Mahlatini was severely beaten on the orders of his Camp Commander, Kenneth Mahamba; he was dead on arrival at Camp 32. The leadership took this incident so seriously that an inquiry was instituted, which facilitated the uncovering of the spy network some years later, of which Mahamba was a leading member. After exhaustive investigations of their cases, trial by Tribunal, and a final decision by the NEC, Justice Tshabalala, Jabu Zikalala, Vusi Mayekiso and Kenneth Mahamba were executed. Other members of this network - Dick Khumalo, Escom Maluleka, John Maleke, and Drake Chiloane were executed later after the same process had been followed. There were other cases over the years of executions of agents after investigations into their cases, the sitting of a tribunal, and a final decision by the political leadership. A list of these names has been submitted to the TRC.
Serious breaches in discipline by MK cadres at times resulted in capital punishment. It must be emphasised that there were no cases of summary or unauthorised execution.
Before a tribunal was held, Military HQ in Lusaka would be informed of the case by the Regional Command structures. The NEC would appoint at least one senior official to sit on the tribunal with officials from MHQ and the Regional Command. In some cases local authorities were also involved in this process. The tribunal would report its findings to HQ, where a final decision would be made.
Between 1981 and 1989, four cadres were executed for murder and rape of Angolan women, four for murder, and in 1989, one was executed for rape. (A list of these names has been submitted to the TRC.) Those who were executed for rape and murder were imprisoned for around two months whilst the leadership consulted with the Angolan authorities on the manner in which these crimes should be handled. They were publicly executed with fellow- villagers of the murdered women and local government officials present.
The only other occasion on which capital punishment was carried out on MK cadres was at the time of the Pango mutiny in 1984. Before dealing with the questions posed by the TRC in this regard, we will deal with the background to this incident by describing the situation as it developed in Angola.
Many of the problems which arose in military camps in Angola at this time were the result of the tensions between the ANC's policy on armed struggle, and the intense frustration felt by recruits who had flocked to MK in the wake of the 1976 uprising when they were not immediately deployed inside the country after initial military training. Since 1979 the ANC had elaborated its policy perspectives in this regard, and believed that military struggle was secondary to building the base for mass political struggle within the country.
To quote from the "Green Book":
10a) (...) the armed struggle must be based on, and grow out of, mass political support...All military activities must, at every stage, be guided and determined by the need to generate political mobilisation, organisation and resistance..."Many recruits wanted desperately to just go home and fight, underestimated the difficulty of the logistics involved in infiltrating them safely into the country, and did not appreciate the rationale behind the leadership's approach.
In late 1977, a group of fourteen cadres who had just completed their initial six-month military training at Novo Katengue camp demanded to be sent to the front immediately. They refused all orders, and also refused to go on an advanced training course. They were sent to Quibaxe, where they were excused from classes but had to contribute to normal camp duties. Again, they refused to obey orders.
A Tribunal was convened, and seven of them were sentenced to one month's imprisonment, the others to two months. In addition, they had to carry out tasks such as digging trenches. After they had completed their sentences they were accepted unconditi onally back into MK structures. Sworn affidavits (made in 1993) from all of these cadres have been submitted to the TRC. These expose allegations that a serious mutiny was put down by troops trained in the GDR, and that cadres were subsequently ill- treated by Ronnie Kasrils, as deliberate disinformation typical of the propaganda in the report of the Douglas "commission", a stratkom exercise covertly funded with taxpayers' money.
A similar incident took place in 1979 at Fazenda, when about fifteen cadres demanded to go to the front, refused to be disarmed, and fired shots at night. They wanted to go to Luanda to meet the ANC leadership to demand immediate deployment. This "mutiny" was solved politically by Mzwai Piliso and Moses Mabhida, who talked to the cadres. There was no violence and these cadres were allowed to remain in MK structures. For some cadres, a deep sense of depression set in after spending too many years in camps in Angola. In the words of the Stuart Commission report:
"The Commission believes that the conditions in the camps, the total isolation from the outside world, the desperation and frustration of not being deployed, make it practically impossible for cadres to survive (politically, morally, and psychologically) in the camps for several years."This problem was exacerbated by steadily decreasing attention to the camps in the early 1980s - both political and in terms of providing basic resources - by the seriously overstretched national leadership in Lusaka. In the words of the report of the Commission, "over the years, visits to the camps by the leadership has decreased significantly. This has affected not only the national leadership but surprisingly also the regional leadership. The latter tend increasingly to spend more time in Luanda than in the camps."
Apart from these problems, general conditions in the camps were at times difficult. Food supplies were at times inadequate, and bandits specifically targeted supply lines from Angolan ports, exacerbating the situation. Medical supplies and other essential items were not always readily available. Tropical diseases, particularly malaria, were rife, and there were too few doctors in Angola to adequately service all the those in the camps - cadres and prisoners alike. Access to clean water supplies was almost always a serious problem.
Angola was a war zone. The constant threat to ANC camps and cadres from UNITA bandits was yet another source of tension and difficulty. Many cadres were killed in operations against UNITA, and these deaths and injuries were a factor which had direct bearing on the 1984 mutiny. Certain agents also deliberately played on these incidents to create demoralisation and mistrust of the ANC leadership.
The delays in committing the majority of cadres to battle affected not only recruits but commanders as well, particularly after the destruction of Nova Katengue, which had been in many respects a model of the kind of camp the ANC wanted to maintain.
In addition to these factors, by the end of 1983, according to the report of the Stuart Commission, a range of practices had set in which had seriously corroded the ANC's vision of its army, and which had direct bearing on the mutinies. Some members of camp administrations had begun to abuse their powers; cadres felt they were no longer being consulted sufficiently, and that their concerns were not being properly conveyed to the leadership in Lusaka; an intolerance of valid criticism had developed. In addition, there was insufficient provision for cultural activities and regular briefing on current events inside the country. There was poor management of human resources, and a belief that unfair decisions regarding deployment were being made; this resulted in much frustration.
One of the key factors which contributed to a drop in standards in general in Angola in the early 1980s was the deployment of many senior and experienced cadres out of Angola into machineries in the Forward Areas or inside the country to develop the armed struggle. This meant that much younger cadres with less experience had to take over their positions.
As a result of all of these factors problems arose in the camps, and disciplinary measures also fell short of the ideals the Movement had always aspired to.
The lead-up to the Pango mutiny, particularly the mutiny at Viana transit camp in February 1984, has been described in considerable detail in the report of the Motsuenyane Commission (pp. 37 - 40.) The question asked by the TRC regarding the exact circumstances in which the mutineers died, making reference to the cases of Diliza Dumakude, Zihlangu Zanempi (referred to as Salier Janemzi), and Khotso Morena indicates that some confusion has arisen. The Pango mutiny could be described as having two phases.
In the first phase, cadres who had been refusing to accept military discipline and firing in the air were sent to Viana transit camp after senior officials spoke to them. The allegation made in the report of the Douglas "commission" to the effect that some cadres were "ambushed by ANC officials" is untrue. Some of those who arrived in Viana remained mutinous and refused to be disarmed. When a second, larger group of cadres arrived, they too refused to be disarmed. Subsequent events are described in some detail in the report of the Stuart Commission on p 22. Vuyisile Maseko and Khotso Morena were captured but the security personnel were unaware that Maseko had a grenade; he set it off in the car, but all the occupants were able to escape. Morena ran straight for a tent in which arms and explosives were kept; both Chris Hani and Joe Modise were very close by, addressing cadres, and it was clear that their lives could be in danger. Morena refused to stop when he was ordered to give himself up and was shot.
After intervention by Angolan security forces order at Viana camp was restored. The mutineers were disarmed and agreed to be relocated to Pango. There a group of them secretly planned to seize the camp arsenal and mutiny again.
The Pango mutiny occurred in mid-May 1984. The mutineers systematically killed most members of the camp administration, using heavy calibre weapons. In all, eight MK cadres were killed by the mutineers, in some cases in cold blood the morning after the mutiny had begun, when they hunted down those who had been wounded and were hiding in the bush.
The camp was recaptured by loyal cadres; in the shoot-out seven mutineers were killed. Others fled the camp; one was found dead some days later when cadres were fetching firewood; he had committed suicide with a pistol, which was found next to his body. One captured mutineer died of malaria before the military tribunal was convened; he refused to accept treatment for his illness. Two cadres escaped from the camp when it was recaptured, and have not been heard of since.
A military tribunal was appointed and convened on 22/05/84. Available documentation on the deliberations of the tribunal have been submitted to the TRC.
Sixty-six people testified before the tribunal. Of these, the tribunal recommended that sixteen mutineers should receive the death penalty, while the others were either recommended for demobilisation or were acquitted and referred to the camp disciplinary committee to face lesser charges.
Seven mutineers were executed by firing squad. The others were spared after the leadership reconsidered the decision to execute them, and were instead imprisoned at Camp 32. In all, twenty-three mutineers were imprisoned until 1989, while four were imprisoned for a short time and released in 1984. A list of the names of all those who died during the mutiny and those who were executed has been submitted to the TRC.
As a result of these events, the Stuart Commission was appointed to inquire into the causes of the mutinies, consisting of Hermanus Loots ("James Stuart"), Aziz Pahad, Sizakele Sigxashe and Mtu Jwili. (The latter two later became heads of Directorates in the restructured NAT.) The Commission presented its report to all members of the NEC in March 1984 (before the more serious mutiny erupted at Pango.)
By this time, the preliminary briefings of the Commission had already convinced the leadership about the need for a National Conference of the ANC to discuss matters pertaining to the intensification of struggle generally, as well as the problems in the camps.
The Commission found that while some of those most directly involved in the mutinies had long histories of disruptive and destructive behavior, and also had "illusions of power and leadership", the mutinous behaviour which had occurred by February 1984 could not be described as "an organized act of conspiracy on the part of the enemy".
In its painfully incisive assessment of conditions in Angola, the Stuart Commission report noted that since 1979 nearly all petty offences had been dealt with in a destructive manner "as distinct from the earlier revolutionary constructive punishment" which sought essentially to rehabilitate offenders rather than crush them. The report of the Commission notes that the "tragic fact is that it was at its worst in the training camps."
Grievances against the Security department also came to the fore in this report. In the words of the report, "interviews carried out by the Commission in all our camps reflect one unanimous response: that the security department carried out tasks which are not supposed to be theirs - the task of disciplining offenders." Instead of concentrating on its role as an intelligence service, dedicated to exposing agents and protecting the ANC in general, it had become a "military police" force within the camps. At times such actions took place "without consultation or approval by other (members of the) camp administration."
It is also clear from this report that a lack of clear policy guidelines, and clear lines of command, contributed directly to the ANC's failure to halt abuse. It recommended that the NEC should "clearly define the tasks and powers" of the Security Department, draw up a Code of Conduct to govern the behaviour of these cadres and ensure it was enforced, and "formally and categorically prohibit(s) the use of violence and torture by the Security Department (as well as other officers in camps)", re deploy "notorious security men", and "adopt a coherent policy with regard to captured enemy agents."
Both the Skweyiya and Motsuenyane Commissions were told that prisoners at Camp 32 had been subjected to serious abuse. It is necessary to point out that while some of the allegations made to the Skweyiya Commission were true, others were deliberate attempts to mislead the Commission, and members of the Department accused of abuses were not given the opportunity to reply to these allegations; hence the establishment of the Motsuenyane Commission.
The report of the Skweyiya Commission notes that Mzwai Piliso, head of Personnel and Training as well as of the Security Department at the time, "candidly" admitted that he had personally participated in beating a suspect in 1981 on the basis that a plot to kill members of the leadership had been discovered and he wanted information "at any cost."
It is clear that setting an example of this nature would have affected the behaviour of other members of the security department. These factors are also relevant:
It is unreasonable to expect people to deal with situations for which they have no training, particularly when they are young and inexperienced. Most members of staff at various rehabilitation centres were very young cadres who had left the country to join MK. They were not trained as Military Police or prison warders. The training they received was the same as that of all MK cadres, while some underwent more specialised training in intelligence work from the late 1970s onwards. But none were trained specifically for the roles they had to take on - very unwillingly at times.
It was necessary but undesirable work; as a former member of staff at Camp 32 put it, most cadres in these postings had "joined the ANC and the army with the sole purpose of training and getting back home to engage the enemy for the liberation of the country, but because of the tasks they were called upon to perform in this camp, had to lose all those possibilities of ever going to the front, going for further training, and enjoying other privileges enjoyed by others".
Structures in Angola had to rely on other structures in the forward areas and inside the country to provide information necessary to carry out proper investigations. Because of the weakness of some of these structures, and the long lines of communication, several persons classified as suspects took a long time to be cleared.
To summarise, the report of the 1984 Stuart Commission makes it clear that in some respects Angola, "generally regarded as a reliable rear base of our struggle...(had) been used as a dumping ground for enemy agents, suspects, malcontents and undisciplined elements". The report also shows that in some respects the ANC leadership did not take adequate steps to ensure effective management of its military camps, which included ensuring that cadres deployed in these camps had policy guidelines to work by, understood their "line functions", and were under clear lines of command and control.
Whether this kind of management was possible given the conditions under which the ANC was working at the time - particularly in Angola, which was a war zone - is questionable. Nevertheless, stronger action to halt the excesses described in the report of the Stuart Commission could have been taken, and in this regard, the ANC again expresses regret at this state of affairs and its consequences.
As we noted in our first submission, the ANC took a range of steps to halt abuses. Within a few weeks of the tabling of the report of the Stuart Commission, nearly all its recommendations had been adopted and were in the first stages of implementation.
Most critical in this regard, and as the first major policy action, the 1985 National Consultative Conference in Kabwe took a range of decisions on all these matters. (It is worth noting that 40% of the delegates at the Conference were from the camps, and they submitted presentations on problems in Angola.) The ANC elaborated the existing Code of Conduct , and established the Office of Justice, reinforced the existing Review Board, and established the National People's Tribunal.
Mzwai Piliso was removed from his post as head of NAT to concentrate on other duties. Andrew Masondo was censured by the leadership, and the post of National Commissar was abolished; in addition, he lost his post on the NEC. Both performed well and with loyalty to the ANC in their new postings.
Previously tribunals had been constituted as needed. They had been convened to try suspected agents, to decide on punishments for cadres who had committed offences as defined in the MK Code of Conduct, and to deal with the mutineers. In all cases, senior political office-bearers would be appointed to tribunals by the NEC, who served along with high-ranking MK officers such as regional Commanders and Commissars. The report of the Stuart Commission recommended that a formally constituted, independent and specialised structure was necessary. As a result, the National People's Tribunal was established.
The TRC has asked several specific questions on the functions of the new structures for justice. The first National People's Tribunal was appointed soon after the Kabwe Conference. Hermanus Loots was the chair, with Shadrack Pekane, and Z.N. Jobodwana as the other members. The latter two were lawyers. This structure was tasked with overseeing and making judgements on the basis of investigations carried out by NAT. It was fully independent: there was no formal link between the Tribunal and any other ANC structures, including the Office of the President.
The Tribunal followed procedures laid down by lawyers in the ANC's Legal and Constitutional Affairs department, which were in essence the same procedures followed in South African courts. Persons accused of offences would be summoned to the Tribunal. There were prosecuting lawyers, and every accused would be represented by one or two lawyers, who had access to the charge sheet in order to prepare their defence. At the end of the proceedings both sides would summarise the evidence presented and the Tribunal would adjourn. This process often took two to three days to complete.
The Tribunal could recommend one or a combination of the following lines of action:
The sentence recommended by the Tribunal was referred to the President, who would usually refer the case to the Review Board, which was tasked with acting as a court of appeal with the powers to confirm or change the decision of the Tribunal as the members of the Board saw fit. Only after the Review Board had considered the case would sentence be confirmed (or set aside) by the President.
The Review Board was also tasked with regularly reviewing cases and making recommendations to the NEC as to whether prisoners should be released or not. Their work was considerably facilitated by the adoption of the elaborated Code of Conduct .
The chair of the Review Board was Dan Tloome; Ruth Mompati and John Motshabi made up the rest of the Board. The Board would from time to time set up groups of senior ANC figures to conduct inspections and report back to the leadership. We regret that we have not been able to locate the documentation relevant to the work of the Review Board; if specific questions regarding the work of the Review Board arise, the ANC will assist the TRC in this regard.
In addition to these structures for justice, there was a Presidential Council to which those whose cases had been considered by the Tribunal and Review Board could appeal if they were unhappy about the decisions of these structures. This council, which consisted of the President, John Nkadimeng, Dan Tloome and later, Joe Slovo, could set aside sentences and grant pardons.
Steps were also taken to ensure that clearer lines of command were in place over NAT personnel working in Angola. At a meeting held in Lusaka in 1986 between NAT and MK delegations, chaired by OR Tambo, it was agreed that NAT cadres fell only under the authority of the NAT Directorate, and that MK structures in the region should not make any unilateral decisions affecting NAT line functions. Whilst MK structures did not usually issue any orders directly affecting the welfare of prisoners and suspects, tensions had arisen due to confusion in the lines of command.
The NAT Directorate itself also took steps to improve the conditions under which prisoners were held in response to the directives of the leadership. A report written by the head of the Recording Department in November 1987 which highlights the difficulties of extending Camp 32 facilities given the physical terrain, and argues that the camp should instead be closed altogether and transferred to a more convenient place, has been submitted to the TRC. A report on a visit to Camp 32 in December 1987 by a member of the NAT Directorate has also been submitted to the TRC. Three deaths took place in Camp 32 during the first half of 1987, and a Commission was appointed to investigate the circumstances in which these deaths took place; the report of this Commission has been handed to the TRC.
The report of the Skweyiya Commission notes that it took some time before the measures provided for in the Code of Conduct were implemented properly. Zola Skweyiya was appointed Officer of Justice in 1986, and also had the responsibility of established in the ANC's Legal and Constitutional Affairs department. He reported directly to the President.
He experienced considerable difficulties in fulfilling all these roles for a range of reasons, including a shortage of staff, and a degree of unco-operativeness from the head of NAT. Whilst Mzwai Piliso fully accepted the decisions taken at the Kabwe Conference, given the degree of pressure he was under on various fronts, he was distinctly unenthusiastic about dealing with the complex and time-consuming logistics involved in flying staff of the Office of Justice into Angola to interview all prisoners and review their cases. However, when Zola Skweyiya approached the President to facilitate this visit, the President took immediate action to "unblock" bureaucratic channels, and Joe Nhlanhla in his capacity as Secretary of the Politco-Military Committee (PMC) played a central role in ensuring that the Office of Justice received all necessary support.
In May 1988 (not 1987, as stated in the report of the Motsuenyane Commission) the Office of Justice arranged a sitting of the National People's Tribunal in Luanda (not at Camp 32, as stated in the report of the Motsuenyane Commission.) This Tribunal reviewed the cases of twenty-five prisoners held by the ANC at this time, including some of those who had confessed to being enemy agents. Hermanus Loots chaired the Tribunal. Penuell Maduna acted as defence lawyer for the prisoners, and pleaded on their behalf. Mr Loots has pointed out that members of NAT who worked with this Tribunal had a "very positive attitude" towards the committee and gave their full co- operation.
In seven of the cases heard, the Tribunal concluded that the "possible sentence" would be imprisonment; in the view of members of the Tribunal, the evidence against them left no doubt that they were guilty of the crimes for which they had been imprisoned. In two cases the "possible sentence" recommended by the Tribunal was capital punishment; in seven cases judgement was reserved; and they recommended that two cases be re- investigated.
In seven cases, the Tribunal recommended release as it was felt that there was insufficient concrete evidence against these accused. Six had been imprisoned in 1987, whilst the seventh recommended for release had been imprisoned since 1982. With regard to the group of six, members of the Tribunal privately felt it was very probable that these prisoners were indeed guilty; the NAT investigators were entirely convinced of this, and were very unhappy at this recommendation for release.
However, the Tribunal stuck rigidly to its mandate and argued before the NEC that they should be released, since the evidence against the six had not been led properly. The group was released. This case is a good illustration of the tensions between the ANC's desire to act in accordance with accepted legal procedures and the abnormal circumstances in which we were attempting to put such high standards into practice. (A report-back by NAT structures on the procedures of this Tribunal has been submitted to the TRC. This document also answers the TRC's questions regarding the background of those released.)
By the time of the appointment of a commission of inquiry into the death of Thami Zulu in late 1989, the new NAT leadership had been in place for some time.
In the words of the report, "there has been a process of major reorganisation of the security department, with notable improvements in the conditions of detainees." Violence was expressly forbidden, and a member of the department who had assaulted a detainee had been recently sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment by the Tribunal, which sat in Lusaka. The commissioners inspected the rehabilitation centre and noted that "the general conditions for detainees, poor as they were, had improved immeasurably compared with their truly parlous situation before Comrade Nhlanhla had taken over."
The report also notes that according to a friend of Thami Zulu's, although he was indignant about the investigation, "he made no mention of physical abuse (...) We have no reason to believe he was subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment." In fact, Zulu told his colleagues in the military that he had not been tortured, and his parents and family visited him on more than one occasion during the period that he was confined.
The commissioners also questioned "at length and with some rigour" members of the department who had been responsible at various times for interrogating Zulu, and generally undertook a thorough review of the investigation and the methods used. They concluded that they were "satisfied that the investigation panels worked in a systematic and objective manner, probing all the pros and cons of every question. They were not clumsy cops, but skilled interrogators who prepared carefully, basing themselves on logic, probabilities and attention to detail. What impressed us particularly was their willingness to take into account factors which could prove favourable to TZ's position." The commissioners also noted cases in which the department had "carefully cross-checked" allegations by taking action such as arranging an identification parade. (Documents relevant to the investigations carried out by NAT in this case have been submitted to the TRC.)
Two months after Zulu had been confined, the panel reported that although it had found no conclusive proof that he had been collaborating with the enemy, there were "some matters in relation to which he had been unable to give convincing answers" but these could only be cleared up by obtaining information from the Swaziland special branch - probably an impossible task at the time. It recommended that Zulu be disciplined for criminal neglect in the case of the June 1988 deaths of nine cadres under his command, who had been ambushed and shot dead by police soon after crossing the Swaziland border near Piet Retief.
The report notes that despite many improvements, some of the critically important measures introduced after the Kabwe Conference were not functioning as well as it had been hoped: "while considerable progress has been made, the Code has not been fully implemented and the situation of legality inside the ANC falls short of what the Conference called for." In addition, there was no regulations to govern periods of investigation; as the report puts it, "witnesses from Security themselves asked for a clear set of norms governing detention, since they feel torn between the conflicting objectives of not giving up their investigations until irrefutable proofs or disproofs existed and not prolonging their inquires in an undue manner."
Among the findings and conclusions of the Motsuenyane Commission, appointed in 1993, and which examined the period from the late 1970s to 1985, were the following:
The ANC concurs with these findings, which largely confirm the findings of earlier inquiries appointed by the ANC itself.
It is perhaps necessary to remind the Commission of the conditions under which the ANC was operating. The ANC was a banned organisation, and every effort was made to destroy it. The Movement did not have the resources of a state; it had limited material means, and was operating in impoverished and developing countries where apparently elementary necessities were very difficult to organise. Communications were unreliable and intensively monitored; transport was always a problem. Angola was in the grip of a devastating civil war in which UNITA bandits were receiving the support of South Africa and certain Western countries. To travel in Angola in certain areas was a life-threatening exercise. All these factors contributed significantly to the lack of effective management of structures in general, particularly in Angola.
With regard to various questions asked by the TRC on interventions by individual leadership figures, all officials, whether specifically tasked to or not, were obliged to halt any activities which were in conflict with ANC policy on the treatment of prisoners. We have tried to describe to the Commission how the ANC's policies evolved to ensure that justice was done and the human rights of prisoners were protected; in this regard the ANC acted collectively, not as a result of individual interventions.
Various phases in the ANC's attempts to deal with the problems which arose must be distinguished. It was between 1981 - 1985 that most of the excesses took place: this is the period covered by both the Skweyiya and Motsuenyane Commissions. As noted in the findings of the Motsuenyane Commission, the adoption of the Code of Conduct at the Kabwe Conference "showed that the leadership of the ANC was gravely concerned with the need to correct the indentified wrongs once these had been properly investigated." Steps were taken but there was weakness in implementing these decisions. Between 1985 - 1987, codes of conduct and policy guidelines had been adopted and mechanisms were set up to ensure implementation of these decisions. While the ANC had limited resources, we submit that we used what we had well, and that there was steady improvement in the structures established to ensure justice was done.
The period from 1987 - 1990, when a new leadership was in place - provisionally under the Secretary-General, and later on a permanent basis under Joe Nhlanhla - was characterised by ever-greater vigour in ensuring the protection (at great expense) of the human rights of hard-core agents who had been involved in atrocities within and outside the country.
With regard to the ANC's decision to appoint the Mostsuenyane Commission in 1993 - which cost us R3 million - the Commissioners commented in their conclusions "It would be wrong to ignore the historic significance of the investigation the ANC, through this Commission, has undertaken, a first in the annals of human rights enforcement. By its commitment to this inquiry, the ANC seeks to breathe life into the lofty principles proclaimed in the Freedom Charter - to render fundamental human rights the Golden Rule, to be applied in good times and bad, peace and war" (p. 171.)
The ANC acknowledges that more could have been done in all the periods under review. And, to the extent that we violated the human rights of prisoners and suspects, the ANC again expresses regret and apologises to those who were subjected to ill-treatment, to their families, and to the nation. Above all the ANC apologises to all who were wrongfully accused of working with the apartheid regime and other hostile agencies.
3.5.1 The Commission has asked how the ANC justifies the fact that Mzwai Piliso and Andrew Masondo retained senior posts in the post-1994 administration.
Both Mzwai Piliso and Andrew Masondo were seriously censured by the leadership of the ANC, as described above. These officials both performed well and with loyalty to the ANC in their new postings.
In addition, an ailing Mzwai Piliso had to testify to both the Skweyiya and Motsuenayne Commissions in 1993, where he publicly admitted that he had to take responsibility for allowing certain abuses to continue. To continue punishing these officials endlessly would be contrary to humane practice, and to the ANC's belief that after rehabilitation those members who had erred should be reintegrated fully into structures. In addition, these officials had not acted with personal vindictiveness; they had acted within the broader context of weaknesses and problems afflicting the ANC as a whole, as outlined in this section of our submission.
As the architect of the policy of reconciliation and nation-building, it is the view of the ANC that all those who have made mistakes in the past are capable of mending their ways and contributing to the building of a new society.
We wish to bring it to the attention of the Commission that there are a number of former agents and champions of the apartheid regime who now occupy senior positions in public and private institutions. To hound loyal anti-apartheid fighters who made mistakes in the course of struggle would be to perpetrate a gross injustice.
3.5.2. The TRC has asked a number of questions concerning action taken against members of the Security Department of NAT who were or who have been accused of being guilty of ill-treating pris- oners and suspects.
The names of those members of the Department who were imprisoned for offences by host governments have also been requested. The TRC has also asked for the list of NAT personnel which was submitted to the President by the Skweyiya Commissioners. The full names of all NAT officials mentioned in the Motsuenyane Commission have been requested by the TRC "for research and investigative purposes."
Our answer to these questions is informed by the approach above. Those who have already been severely punished not only by the ANC or the authorities of host countries should not continue to be punished endlessly.
The list of names produced by the Skweyiya Commission was based on a fundamentally flawed process. Some members of NAT were falsely accused of abuses by people who testified to the Skweyiya Commission. This Commission did not even give those accused the right of reply, let alone properly examine the allegations made by witnesses. This is precisely why the Motsuenyane Commission was appointed.. The Motsuenyane Commission followed a far more rigorous process of inquiry, and drew conclusions regarding the behaviour of certain members of the Security sector of NAT.
Certain members of the former Security department will be approaching the TRC with amnesty applications. If in the course of the investigations of the TRC, more information is needed regarding any specific incident, the ANC will provide appropria te assistance to the TRC.
3.5.3. The TRC has requested the "full evidence" on the basis of which the Stuart, Skweyiya, Motsuen- yane and Thami Zulu inquiries came to their conclusions, as well as all evidence presented to any other commission of inquiry set up by the ANC.
The ANC has already supplied the TRC with transcripts of the Motsuenyane Commission hearings, but does not have access to all the other items of evidence requested. We regret that we have not been able to locate all the evidence placed before the 1984 Stuart Commission. All available information connected with the Thami Zulu inquiry has been submitted to the TRC.
The only other commission of inquiry into incidents of relevance to the mandate of the TRC was a commission appointed to investigate the circumstances under which three prisoners had died in Camp 32 in 1987/8, and to generally review conditions. It was found that two had died of natural causes but one had been beaten so badly that he died of his injuries. A copy of this report has been submitted to the TRC.
3.5.4. The TRC has asked several ques- tions regarding the procedures of all tribunals, military or other- wise, held in the past. All rele- vant documentation has been requested.
We trust that most of the questions asked by the TRC in this regard have been answered adequately in this section. We regret that we have not been able to locate all the documentation requested by the TRC. If further questions arise regarding the procedures of specific tribunals, the ANC will make every effort to assist the TRC by ensuring (as far as this is possible) that those who served on tribunals will give oral evidence to the TRC.
3.5.5. More information has been requested to support our "allega- tion" that the Douglas "Com- mission of Inquiry" and the Returned Exiles Coordinating Committee (Recoc) were state- sponsored campaigns to discred- it the ANC.
We believe we have already given the TRC all the information necessary to allow a thorough investigation of the activities of Recoc, the front called the International Freedom Foundation, and the Douglas "commission" by going directly to those responsible for running these stratkom operations.
These include the Strategic Communications committee of the SSC; Adriaan Vlok, Johan van der Merwe, Lt-Col. Alf Oosthuizen of the former SAP (who appears to have been the main co- ordinator of this stratkom operation among others), and whoever else was tasked with stratkom operations within the former SAP; Paul Erasmus (who has, as we pointed out, given official documentation on the Recoc operation to the press); the former head of Military Intelligence, "Joffel" van der Westhuizen, and the former head of DMI's Communications Operations (renamed Command Communications), Brig. Ferdi van Wyk; Russel Crystal, who has been involved in stratkom operations since the 1980s and who fronted for the IFF; evidence gathered by the Skweyiya Commission into corruption in the former Bophutatswana, which found that Advocate Douglas had been paid with taxpayers' money secretly routed through the Bophutatswana "national security council."
There is also the agent who fronted for the SAP's Recoc, Patrick Dlongwana (who later called himself Hlongwane.) Dlongwana has yet to explain why he publicly claimed that the "armed wing" of his organisation (the "South African Republican Army") was responsible for the murder of ANC Midlands leader Reggie Hadebe, and a massacre in Daveyton in which nine civilians were killed.
In this regard, it is clear that the Recoc stratkom went well beyond merely discrediting the ANC, and was used as a smokescreen for certain so-called "third force" violence.
Advocate Douglas himself, who is currently representing illegal gambling houses in KwaZulu Natal, could also possibly assist.
3.5.6. The TRC has asked for the names of those who we described as having been "wrongfully arrest- ed" in the wake of the discovery of the spy network in 1981, and in what form apologies were ten- dered to them.
With regard to the TRC's questions concerning those who were "wrongfully arrested" in the wake of the discovery of the spy network in 1981, we would like to make the following points: firstly, the term "wrongfully arrested", as used in our main submission, means that people were arrested because there were grounds for suspicion that they may have been involved in the network, and were released when it was found that insufficient evidence existed to confirm this suspicion. They were not arrested for malicious reasons.
Secondly, we feel that listing the names of these people would be a serious invasion of their privacy, which could result in unjustified suspicions arising against them in their communities. Apologies were tendered to these people in different ways; there was no standard form of redress. Some received personal, verbal apologies from senior leadership figures such as Joe Modise and/or Joe Nhlanhla. In some cases people were provided with bursaries to further their studies. In other cases, they wer e assisted with reintegration into various ANC structures.
3.5.7. The TRC has asked why the ANC did not establish a Commission to investigate all the deaths of exiles (including "killings, extra- legal executions, and disappear- ances")?
We reiterate that no "extra-legal executions" were carried out in areas where the ANC leadership had control over its structures and membership. We have shown earlier that the ANC leadership acted in accordance with our Code of Conduct and procedures which were refined over time. Executions were only carried out after the cases had been considered by a tribunal or other structure composed of senior leadership.
In fact the ANC did set up a structure to gather information on all deaths in exile: the Bereaved Parents Committee, which is continuing its work; and the list submitted to the TRC with our first submission is the product of their labours.
The apartheid regime was not interested in attempting to free its agents, presumably because they felt this would mean acknowledging that our imprisoned cadres were prisoners of war. They cared very little for those who had served them.
The TRC has asked these questions with regard to what they call "ongoing conflict" in the post-1990 phase: "It is clearly stated (in the ANC's submission) that the violence was largely due to Third Force activity. While this may be true, indications are that ANC members and cadres were involved in the ongoing conflict. What level of responsibility should the ANC leadership take for these actions?"
They have also asked whether there is "any record of MK's role in SDU's and instances where their actions may have resulted in gross human rights violations - even where actions were understood to be in self-defence? Can the ANC supply detail about the training, instruction and report-back structures of the SDU's?" In a closely related question they ask "what role did MK play in the SDUs in KwaZulu Natal, specifically in operations against the IFP and KZP members after February 1990? Is there a record of such MK actions?" The TRC wants a "more detailed account of MK activities in the Transkei in the early 1990s". They want our response to "claims that MK - especially operating from the Transkei - was responsible for the killing or assassination of IFP office bearers, especially in the early 1990s."
The TRC has commented that our first submission "showed limited focus on the 1990 - 1994 conflict. It is clearly stated that violence was largely due to Third Force activity. While this may be true, indications are that ANC members and cadres were involved in the ongoing conflict. What level of responsibility should the ANC leadership take for these actions?"
We feel that certain misconceptions which may have arisen should be addressed. Firstly, our first submission did not show "limited focus" on the period in question. A careful reading of our document will show that considerable care was taken to highli ght the "anatomy" of state repression in the 1980s, in describing the concept of counter-mobilisation which underpinned the thinking of the security establishment, in identifying critically important covert projects (Ancor, Marion, etc.), and in as precisely as possible, indicating the key structures tasked with work of this nature, rather than producing endless examples of the tactical expression of these strategies.
The section on the post-1990 violence should be read as a continuation of the earlier section on the 1980s. We concentrated on identifying key features of this period, such as the continued existence of the National Security Management System, renamed the National Co- ordinating Mechanism (NCM), the continued existence of covert fronts and projects carried over from the 1980s in some cases, and what we know of the activities of key units such as the Directorate: Covert Collection, rather than giving many examples of the thousands of acts of brutality which characterised this bloodiest period of South Africa's history, in which around 12000 civilians were killed. We stated unambiguously that we believe the violence was in essence a continuation of the violence of the 1980s, and exhibited many of the features of the violence during that earlier period as described above in this submission, although it was now projected as "political intolerance" - or the work of a mysterious "third force" which was supposedly against both the state and the ANC, intent on derailing negotiations.
According to a recent report, official documents show that the State Security Council first mooted the idea of a "third force" on 04/11/85. Cabinet minutes of a meeting held in May 1986, which was chaired by PW Botha, and at which FW de Klerk was present, show that the creation of this "third force" was discussed again. It would be complementary to the existing security forces, it was decided, "so that they will not be unnecessarily compromised". It is difficult not to conclude that illegal, covertly-managed violence was being contemplated, for which a specialised unit would possibly be required. In other words, those engaged in developing plans for this covert force were fully aware that they were going to break their own laws, and were attempting to make provision for the principle of "plausible denial" on the part of both the political leadership and the upper echelons of the security establishment.
According to SSC and Cabinet minutes, final approval was given for the setting up of an operations centre from which the "third force" would be commanded on 22/09/86. But the model for this "third force" - which had been developed by Niel Barnard, Adriaan Vlok, General Johan Coetzee, and General Jannie Geldenhuys - was not implemented. According to these minutes, the Cabinet was informed that structures were already in place to carry out the tasks envisaged for the "third force". These included the CCB, Unit C10 of the SB, and the Directorate: Covert Collection of the Department of Military Intelligence.
In addition to these structures, we urge the TRC to investigate the role of the Internal Stability Division (the re-named Riot Unit) since the 1980s, and the Reconnaissance Regiments, particularly 5 Recce, which has been involved in providing support to Renamo for many years and which was, according to former member Felix Ndimene, involved in some of the train massacres in the post-1990 phase.
We again urge the TRC to thoroughly investigate the activities of key NCM committees including the Cabinet Committee for Security Affairs, the Security Secretariat (with its various sub-committees, particularly the one tasked with Strategic Communications), the Security Committee (which replaced the National Joint Management Centre), and the Joint Security Staff. (More detail in this regard appears in our first submission on pp. 43-45.)
The former NIS, headed by Niel Barnard until early 1992, was a critically important role-player at the highest strategic level, and we urge the TRC to call on Mr Barnard to provide more information in this regard.
If we understand the term "third force" in this sense, the ANC would agree with the TRC's interpretation of our submission to the effect that most of the post-1990 violence was "third force" violence. As the official manual of the National Co-ordinating Mechanism puts it, "the application of the full powers of the state in order to resist the revolutionary onslaught is still valid." The post-1990 violence was the work of the state, was organised at the highest level, and was aimed at strengthening the hand of the government at the negotiations table by forcing a progressively weakened ANC into a reactive position in which it would be held hostage to the violence, and forced to make constitutional concessions.
In this regard, the cynical use of Inkatha in particular remained critically important. Operation Marion was not terminated when De Klerk came to power. According to a document dated 12/03/1990, written by General Jannie Geldenhuys, it is stated that the State President had been briefed on "a range of sensitive projects" and had given "approval in principle for the running of Stratkom projects." According to this memo, "covert Stratkom projects are controlled and managed by the secretary of the State Security Council. This includes the allocation of areas of work to departments. The secretary of the State Security Council receives directives and assignments in this regard from the State President and conveys this to the relevant department. The Stratkom projects in the attached appendices are managed in consultation with, and on the request of, the secretary of the SSC." Operation Marion is listed among the "covert Stratkom projects" in the appendix attached to this memo.
The key question which must at all times be kept in mind is this: who stood to benefit from the violence?
The ANC was not engaging in "ongoing conflict", nor were the majority of people on the ground embroiled in "ongoing conflict": they were being attacked by covert units operating in accordance with the wishes of the apartheid regime, and by organised, armed "vigilantes" which had, with the assistance of the NP's intelligence and security forces, established informal military bases in several hostels from which to launch attacks on civilians in their homes, on trains, or at bars and vigils. This was fully in line with the original objectives of Project Marion, and the determination of the De Klerk administration to maintain control over the pace and content of the negotiations process.
Further information with regard to the use of Low-Intensity Warfare tactics of this nature - which has not by any means been unique to South Africa - is provided in an article, from the publication Challenge accompanying our submission (appendix 8.)
We again urge the TRC to investigate those covert operations and key structures we identified in our first submission, which we are confident will expose the true nature of the post-1990 violence, and assist in eradicating clandestine structures still in place to this day. As far as possible, covert units or fronts were self-financing; some raised funds through illegal activities such as vehicle theft, the smuggling of ivory and rhino horn, and drug dealing.
With regard to SDUs, we dealt with this question in considerable detail in our first submission (please refer to pp. 63 - 66.) SDUs were formed in response to state-sponsored violence which was devastating many communities, with certain SAP units directly involved in these attacks by omission or commission.
As the violence which exploded on the Reef in July 1990 intensified, there were repeated calls by communities under attack for MK units to be deployed to defend them. The ANC (and MK Military HQ) felt that the negotiations could be jeopardised should MK become formally involved in attempts to defend people from these attacks, but approved the involvement of MK members based in communities under threat. in SDU structures.
The ANC also set up a Peace Desk, which included representatives from COSATU, the SACP, Sanco, and other community organisations. The Peace Desk gathered information on the violence and participated in structures set up in terms of the National Peace Accord. The ANC also took the issue of violence to the negotiations table, and called on the De Klerk regime to take action to halt the carnage. We took the issue to the United Nations. Despite these efforts, the violence continued to intensify.
SDUs were established in communities under attack as a joint project between the ANC and the community concerned. It should also be noted that the legitimacy of SDU structures was recognised in terms of the National Peace Accord.
As we stated in our first submission, some members of MK Military HQ were tasked to attend to issues relating to the SDUs, their organisation, training and the provision of weaponry. The draft document "For the Sake of Our Lives" clearly states that allowing units of this nature to operate with party-political bias would be highly dangerous and should be avoided at all times. A full copy of this document, as requested by the TRC, accompanies this submission (appendix 9). The units should have been controlled by the communities in which they operated, but many communities were entirely destabilised by LIW violence, and organised structures at grassroots levels were almost non-existent.
It was made clear that the overall control of SDUs was to remain with community structures, and MK cadres were to participate as members of the community: MK Command would not play a leading role. Various clandestine units for the training and organisation of the various SDUs were set up, and some cadres were tasked to provide weaponry where possible. We do not have records of MK's role in SDUs since they were not HQ-controlled structures.
Members of SDUs were drawn primarily from the communities in which they were established. Often they were youths, and in some cases SDUs included members of MK who lived in those communities.
A dilemma arose with regard to the arming of SDUs. MK members came under increasing pressure from communities to obtain arms. The ANC called on communities to make contributions towards to purchase of arms; this was largely unsuccessful, and the regi me refused to issue weapons licences to members of SDUs. In addition, people could legally only buy hand guns, which were futile given the nature of the violence.
The perpetrators of violence were organised and equipped with automatic rifles and machine guns, including AK 47s. Official spokespersons of the De Klerk regime pointed to the use of AK's and blamed the ANC; however, the Cameron Commission discovered t hat the SADF had approximately 38 000 AK 47s at its disposal. Eugene de Kock has testified that in late 1993 he and former undercover SB agent Philip Powell of Inkatha collected truckloads of weaponry from an Armscor subsidiary, Mechem, including hand grenades, light machine guns, land mines ammunition and assault rifles (including AK 47s.) Powell narrowly missed obtaining a further thousand assault rifles from Eskom (at a cost of R2.1m) this deal had been authorised by the Commissioner of Police, Johan vander Merwe.
Senior ANC leaders decided that selected SDUs should be assisted in those areas of the Reef which were hardest hit by destabilisation. Selected members of MK, including senior officials from the Command structures, were drawn into an ad hoc structure to assist with the arming of units and to train and co-ordinate efforts in self-defence in these communities; this was done on a need-to-know basis. At MK's conference in Venda in August 1991, the President called on MK to fulfill its responsibility in defending communities under attack.
Selected units of the Ordnance structure of MK provided weaponry to certain SDUs through dead drops or by providing sketches to senior personnel, which were then passed on. These Ordnance units did not know to whom the materiel was passed on.
SDUs that had been trained patrolled townships at night, setting up roadblocks and checking on unusual movements. In some instances, the units carried out attacks on known warlords in their townships.
Tensions arose between HQ and Natal ANC structures, where some leaders called for an offensive approach to deal with Inkatha warlords and others who had been perpetrating violence with impunity for years. The ANC had to take a very firm stand to preven t offensive action and to maintain a self-defensive posture.
In a few areas, such as the Vaal, problems arose between "rival" SDUs. Because of the principle of need-to-know being applied, in areas where a number of SDUs had been established some SDUs became suspicious of others. The ANC had to occasionally intervene in an attempt to defuse these tensions.
In addition, as we pointed out in our first submission, the state made every effort to subvert SDUs in order to prevent any form of sustained resistance to the state-sponsored violence inflicted on their communities, and to discredit the ANC. Some SDUs became little more than gangs of criminals, at times led by police agents, and inflicted great damage on popular, ANC-aligned community structures: this was well illustrated in the case of the notorious Phola Park SDU, which was led by an agent of th e SAP, and which we referred to in some detail in our first submission. Another instance of this nature is provided by the activities of police agent Sifiso Nkabinde in the Midlands.
We saw the familiar pattern of the state countering the ANC's initiatives by turning them against us, and against the people in general.
With regard to questions the TRC has asked about MK cadres in the Transkei: ANC and MK cadres returning from exile and prison, or emerging from the underground, went to settle in or near the areas where they originally came from, including the Transkei. Because of the relatively stable security situation in that territory in comparison to other parts of the country immediately after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, some cadres who were in danger of being killed by apartheid agents, or arrested in the uncertain period of 1990 - 1991, may also have settled in this area.
As was the case in other parts of the country, MK cadres were tasked with ensuring the security of the leadership and their own security, and where applicable, to assist the people in their own self-defence.
With regard to the TRC's request for information on the case of Sipho Phungulwa, this is contained in an amnesty application.
5. RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RECEIVED FROM THE TRC WITH REGARD TO ACTIVITIES OF THE FORMER APARTHEID REGIME
The TRC has asked us to "provide evidence illustrating the restructuring of the NSMS and its subsequent activities."
An original copy of the official handbook on the National Co-ordinating Mechanism (the renamed National Security Management System) is available in the set of appendices released with this submission (appendix 10). We also attach official documents issued in 1992 setting out changes to certain key structures in the NCM hierarchy (appendix 11).
It is not possible to provide information on the activities of the restructured NSMS, since this was a not a specific unit or department, but a co-ordinating mechanism at strategic level designed to ensure that a range of activities by a various government departments (including the SADF, SAP and NIS) were carried out in the desired manner. However, a study of the NCM Handbook will show that various structures at the upper level of the NCM had distinct mission statements.
We urge the TRC use its powers to obtain information on the activities of these structures, which is crucial to an understanding of the nature of the post-1990 violence, from those who were actually responsible for running them. The activities of the Secretariat of the SSC, which included a Stratkom branch, and of the Joint Security Staff are of particular importance; in this regard we refer you to p. 45 of our main submission in which we explicitly identified the most important structures which, we believe, should be the focus of inquiries by the TRC.
The TRC has requested more information on the activities of Adult Education Consultants, and the proposed Xhosa Resistance Movement.
A translation of the document in which what was called the "main plan" for Operation Katzen accompanies this submission (appendix 12)
With regard to Adult Education Consultants (AEC), a memorandum from the Chief-of- Staff: Intelligence to the Chief of the SADF, titled "Extension of Counter-Mobilisation Strategy" accompanies this submission (appendix 13). This memo lists over twenty projects running at this time under the NP's Project Ancor and sub-project Kampong. Adult Education Consultants was established in order to implement Project Ancor.
With regard to the activities of AEC affiliates, considerable information on the activities of this group of front companies is readily available from a range of print media sources. Again, we would urge the TRC to request information directly from those at SSC Secretariat level who were responsible for conceptualising these and all other fronts, and those who were tasked with running such fronts - or to subpoena people if necessary. We specifically identified key people responsible for these particular operations in our main submission: see pp 35 and 38. These individuals include Louis Pasques (who was and possibly still is a member of the Broederbond), Dr. Johan L. van der Westhuizen (who went on to found the ACDP), Tertius Delport, "Joffel" van der Westhuizen, "Kat" Liebenberg, Magnus Malan, Louis Pienaar, Ben Conradie, and the chief of the Army in 1986. After April 1991, responsibility for Project Ancor was passed to the Chief of the Army, Georg Meiring. It is highly improbable that Niel Barnard, as head of the NIS, was not involved in these projects as well.
There were many other fronts, a number of which we mentioned in our main submission; we trust the TRC intends to ensure that this information comes to light by actively obtaining information from key officials.
The TRC has asked what information did Carl Edwards and Craig Williams have which makes the ANC believe they were involved in his death. We trust the TRC will question these agents in this regard as they have all relevant information.
With regard to the TRC's question as to whether the ANC can supply any evidence substantiating the involvement of South African security forces in the deaths and disappearances of MK cadres and ANC members, we feel that the TRC itself has the investigative and research resources available to pursue this matter, and that this is in fact part of the mandate of the TRC. Investigations by the TRC have already led to some cases of this nature coming to light, and we urge the TRC to continue this work.
"The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act...also requires that we make recommendations on the reparation and rehabilitation of victims. The views of your party on this matter will be appreciated. The nation has limited resources, there are a range of initiatives included in the Reconstruction and Development Programme - and yet, there are individuals and communities who suffered in a specific way as a result of gross human rights violations. What is the obligation of the nation towards these people? What forms of memory, rehabilitation and reparation are reasonably possible?"
The mandate of the TRC with regard to reparations is to make recommendations to the President about the type of reparations required, and to determine the number of people entitled to reparations.
The ANC firmly believes that meaningful reparations to the victims of the system of apartheid are necessary, and in particular to the victims of gross violations of human rights. Unless there are meaningful reparations, the process of ensuring justice and reconciliation will be flawed.
The finalisation of the forms, quantum, and implementation of such reparations must be the responsibility of the State. The State is our only instrument to ensure that decisions in this regard are related to available resources, both now and in the foreseeable future.
Further, the State has access to various capacities and instruments within several line function departments and Ministries which will have to be mobilised to ensure effective and systematic implementation of sustainable reparations. For example, special pensions, educational grants, skills training, medical aid, welfare, the issuing of special medals, the erection of memorials, and the possibility of a museum in remembrance of those who suffered these injustices. It is along these lines that we believe the TRC should look for the forms that reparations and rehabilitation should take.
The ANC has ensured that government has set up a Ministerial body to look at the forms reparations could take, and the capacity of government to implement reparations. This committee has been mandated by the government to hold discussions with the TR C's committee on reparations. We would at the same time urge the TRC not to lose sight of the crucial necessity to identify those who qualify for reparation and rehabilitation.
We take into account the fact that available resources can never match what would be required to ensure reasonable reparation and rehabilitation for the gross violations of human rights which arose under apartheid and in order to bring apartheid to an end. Nonetheless, there is widespread recognition that there are individuals and strata both within our society and abroad who have directly benefited from the system which was sustained by apartheid repression. It would be useful if the Commissioners could apply their minds to considering the necessity and viability of ensuring that the doctrine of Odious Debt is given recognition in mobilising some of the resources that would help make the reparations more feasible.
1 The Rand Daily Mail, 03/12/83; quoted by W.J. Pomeroy in Apartheid, Imperialism, and African Freedom; International Publishers, New York, 1986. (Banned for possession in South Africa in December 19988)
Please note: In this document we have concentrated mainly on those structures which are of direct relevance to the mandate of the TRC. There has been no attempt to cover our diplomatic structures, or departments which fell under the offices of the Secretary-General or the Treasurer-General over the years.
Most of the information contained in this appendix is drawn from memories. There may be minor mistakes and omissions.
Following the banning of the ANC in 1960, OR Tambo was sent out of the country to represent the ANC abroad; Yusuf Dadoo was deployed to represent the SACP. After the arrests of most members of MK's National High Command, some of those who had evaded arrest left the country. Internal ANC (and SACP) leadership ceased to exist.
Under the leadership of OR Tambo, offices were established in Dar-es-Salaam in 1964 to organise training of MK cadres. From 1964 onwards an office was established in Lusaka; by 1965 the ANC's HQ was in Morogoro, Tanzania, and its main military camp was at Kongwa.
In 1966 the leadership group moved to Morogoro, which became ANC HQ, with MK becoming the ANC's military wing. In 1967, OR Tambo became Acting President, after the death of Chief Albert Luthuli. The ANC's Secretary-General was Duma Nokwe, Moses Kotane filled the post of Treasurer, and Joe Modise commanded MK. The primary task before them was the reorganisation of the ANC's severely disrupted structures.
There were no elected members of the NEC until the 1985 Kabwe Conference. People were co-opted to this structure as the leadership saw fit. During the 1960s, the following people were NEC members:
Other members: Mzwai Piliso, Mendy Msimang, Moses Mabhida, Themba Mqota, Mark Shope, JB Marks, Tennyson Makiwane, Ambrose Makiwane, Jimmy Hadebe, Joe Matthews, Alfred Nzo, T.T. Nkobi, Johnny Makathini, Mzwai Piliso, Robert Resha, Dan Tloome, and Joe Modise.
At the Morogoro Conference it was decided to form the Revolutionary Council (RC), tasked with concentrating on the home front, developing internal structures, creating publicity for the ANC, and waging armed struggle.
The NEC was reduced to eight members after the Morogoro Conference, and during the period between 1969 - 1985, the NEC and RC (later the PMC) co-opted additional members as seen fit by the leadership.
The RC expanded over the years by co-opting new members and developing structures or portfolios, including Communications, Ordnance, Intelligence and Security.
Acting President: OR Tambo
Other members: John Motshabi, Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Themba Mqota, JB Marks, Tennyson Makiwane, Ambrose Makiwane, Jimmy Hadebe, Joe Matthews, Alfred Nzo, T.T. Nkobi, Johnny Makhatini, Robert Resha, Dan Tloome, Joe Modise.
Members who were co-opted to the NEC during this period included: Thabo Mbeki, Chris Hani, Joe Jele, Jacob Zuma, Joe Gqabi, John Nkadimeng, John Gaetsewe, Robert Manci, Andrew Masondo, Henry Makgothi, Florence Moposho, Simon Makana.
Chair: OR Tambo
Other members of the Revolutionary Council, 1969-1976: Joe Modise, Thabo Mbeki, Jackie Sedibe, Duma Nokwe, Moses Kotane, Tennyson Makiwane, JB Marx, Robert Resha, Ruth Mompati, John Motshabi, Joe Slovo, Andrew Masondo, Mzwai Piliso, Reg September, Jacob Masondo, John Gaetsewe.
The Department of National Intelligence and Security (NAT) was first established in April 1969 under the leadership of Moses Mabhida.
In 1976 a Central Operations Headquarters of MK was set up, and the process of establishing MK training camps in Angola began.
President (as of 1969): OR Tambo
Other members: Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Andrew Masondo, Robert Manci, Joe Gqabi, Jacob Zuma, Steve Dlamini, John Nkadimeng, Simon Makana, Florence Moposho, Gertrude Shope, Duma Nokwe, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini, Simon Makana.
Special Operations was set up in 1979 to undertake high-profile acts of sabotage on key economic installations. This structure reported directly to OR Tambo.
The first Special Operations Command consisted of Joe Slovo, Montso Mokgabudi ("Obadi"), and Aboobaker Ismail ("Rashid".)
Chair: OR Tambo
Other members: Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Robert Manci, Steve Dlamini, Florence Moposho, Gertrude Shope, Duma Nokwe, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini, Duma Nokwe, Joe Slovo, Yusuf Dadoo, Jacob Masondo, John Motshabi, Chris Hani, "Lennox" Tshali, Peter Dlamini, Bogart Soze
The following members of the RC were co-opted to the structure after 1977: Joe Gqabi, Mac Maharaj, Godfrey Pule, Jacob Zuma, John Nkadimeng, "Peter" Tshikare, Sizakele Sigxashe, Andrew Masondo.
This committee was charged with re-establishing the political underground and organising ANC propaganda inside the country.
The role of Central Operations HQ was purely to develop armed struggle internally, and did not control all aspects of MK activities.
Central Operations HQ Personnel: Joe Modise, based in Lusaka, was responsible for the Western Front (operations via Botswana). He was assisted by Keith Mokoape and Snuki Zikalala.
Joe Slovo, based in Maputo, was responsible for the Eastern Front (operations via Swaziland.) He was assisted by Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi") and "Lennox" Tshali and Jacob Zuma.
Commanded by Chris Hani and Lambert Moloi. Lesotho reported directly to the RC. It was in practice run as a separate area, with its own joint command consisting of political, military and intelligence components.
Angola was a special case; it was considered a military zone because of the war in the country. Various structures, all directly reporting to the RC, were established in Angola during this period.
The Regional Commander was Mzwai Piliso. Julius Shekeshe took over the post of Regional Commander in 1979.
Personnel and Training (1976 - 1980): Headed by Mzwai Piliso. This post entailed responsibility for all MK camps and arranging MK training abroad. He was assisted by Andrew Masondo (National Commissar), Ronnie Kasrils (Regional Commissar) and Julius Shekeshe (Regional Commander.)
Commisariat: Headed by Andrew Masondo as of 1976. Political instructors included Mark Shope, Ronnie Kasrils, Wellington Madolwana ("Francis Meli"), and Jack Simon. Ronnie Kasrils was Regional Political Commissar between 1977/78 -1980
Security and Counter-Intelligence (Angola, 1976 - 1980): Godfrey Pule and Sipho Dlamini were key figures in Angola intelligence structures. Mike Themba ("Mike Sandlana") was in charge of security in Angola from 1977 - around 1984.
Eastern Transvaal Rural:
Two machineries operated from the Western Front (Lusaka via Botswana). The Botswana Command consisted of Snuki Zikalala and Keith Mokoape.
3.9.1. The Botswana IPC (1976 - 1980) was led by Henry Makgothi and Dan Tloome. At various times, Jenny and Marius Schoon, Patrick Fitzgerald, Magirly Sexwale, Zakes Tolo and "Negro" also served on this structure.
Natal: led by Judson Khuzwayo, Ivan Pillay and T. Tryon
3.9.3. The Maputo IPC (1976- 80) Indres Naidoo, Jacob Zuma, John Nkadimeng, Sue Rabkin, Sonny Singh, John Nkadimeng (Swaziland to Maputo)
Other members of the Directorate were Godfrey Pule, David Motsweni ("Willy Williams"), "Peter" Tshikari, and "Ulysses" Modise.
This was led by. Yusuf Dadoo with Aziz Pahad as Secretary. Other members were Reg September, Solly Smith, Ronnie Kasrils, Jack Hodgson.
In 1981, in line with the ANC's ongoing attempts to better co-ordinate political and military activities, Senior Organs consisting of military and political personnel were established in the Forward Areas.
President: OR Tambo
Other members: Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Andrew Masondo, Joe Nhlanhla, Robert Manci, Joe Gqabi, Jacob Zuma, Steve Dlamini, John Nkadimeng, Simon Makana, Florence Moposho, Gertrude Shope, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini, Chris Hani.
Other members: Joe Slovo, Yusuf Dadoo, Joe Modise, Jacob Masondo, John Motshabi, Joe Jele, Chris Hani, "Lennox" Tshali, "Peter" Dlamini, Joe Gqabi, Mac Maharaj, Godfrey Pule, Jacob Zuma, John Nkadimeng, "Peter" Tshikare, Sizakele Sigxashe, Andrew Masondo, Mzwai Piliso, Robert Manci, Steve Dlamini, Simon Makana, Florence Moposho, Gertrude Shope, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini, Bogart Soze.
Commander Joe Modise, based in Lusaka, was responsible for the Western Front (operations via Botswana). He was assisted by Keith Mokoape and Snuki Zikalala.
Joe Slovo, based in Maputo, was responsible for the Eastern Front (operations via Swaziland.) He was assisted by Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi") and Tshali (""Lennox" Tshali").
The following appointments were made in 1981:
After the assassination of Joe Gqabi in Zimbabwe "Peter" Tshikari took over as head of Intelligence.
Each S.O consisted of a joint political/ military committee and the following substructures: a Political Command, a Military Command, and a NAT structure.
Other Members: Joe Slovo, R. Manci, Bogart Soze, "Lennox" Tshali, "Peter" Tshikare , Ronnie Kasrils, Sello Motau ("PaulDikeledi"), Julius Maliba ("Manchecker")
Chair: Jacob Zuma
Chair : Joe Slovo
Leading figures in this SO during this period were Billy Masetlha, Keith Mokoape, Dan Tloome, Marius and Jenny Schoon, Patrick Fitzgerald (the latter three were forced to leave Botswana during this period), Wally Serote, Thabang Makwetla, Hassan Ebrahim.
For the first time a full formal Regional Command with established structures was created 1980. The Regional Command was composed as follows between 1980 - 1989.
Regional Chief of Security:
Regional Chief of Personnel:
Regional Chief of Transport:
Regional Medical Officer:
The Senior Organs in the forward areas had not been particularly effective in improving co-ordination between the political and military aspects of struggle. In April 1983 a conference of all Front commanders and commissars was held in Luanda to address the continuing problem of a lack of effective co-ordination between the military and political aspects of struggle. It was felt there should be joint planning, command and control in all operations; and the ANC had to move towards building military structures inside the country, taking a longer-term view and preparing the ground for peoples' war in order to sustain military operations, rather than carrying out a string of one-off "pot boiling" actions.
The NEC resolved to intensify its work both inside and outside the country. External work was to be co-ordinated by a newly-created External Coordinating Committee.
The Revolutionary Council was replaced by the Politico-Military Council (PMC), which became the executive arm of the NEC in relation to all matters pertaining to the conduct of the political and military struggle inside South Africa. The PMC co-ordinated the activities of the Political HQ, Military HQ, and NAT, and was supported in its activities by a small Secretariat. By 1983 a new Military Headquarters (MHQ) had been established, bringing together and reorganising the old general HQ along formal military lines.
The PMC met once a month and was tasked with the overall strategic planning for internal ANC/MK work, and to assess the state of the nation. The executive committee of the PMC, the Secretariat, met between full PMC meetings on a weekly basis.
The Senior Organs were replaced by Regional Politico-Military Committees (RPMCs), and were also given the authority and responsibility for making operational decisions. The RPMCs were charged with co-ordinating political and military activities in their areas of responsibility, and (where possible) setting up Area PMCs inside the country. Area PMCs would be responsible for providing local-level leadership on political and military matters, the gathering of intelligence, and the screening of recruits.
President: OR Tambo
Other members: Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Andrew Masondo, Robert Manci, Joe Gqabi, Jacob Zuma, Steve Dlamini, John Nkadimeng, Simon Makana, Gertrude Shope, Florence Moposho, Chris Hani, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini.
MHQ representatives on the PMC: Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Chris Hani.
Other members included: Alfred Nzo, T.T. Nkobi, Job Tlhabane ("Cassius Make"), Sizakele Sigxashe, Andrew Masondo, Moses Mabhida, John Nkadimeng.
John Motshabi, Joe Jele, Mac Maharaj, Jacob Zuma, Jabu Molekane, Joel Netshitenzhe, Vusi Mavimbela, Ellen Khuzwayo, Gertrude Shope, Ruth Mompati.
Commander -in -Chief: OR Tambo
Special Operations no longer reported directly to the President. Aboobaker Ismail was appointed overall commander of Special Operations, and reported to Joe Slovo at MHQ.
Director: Mzwai Piliso
5.8.1. Maputo RPMC/ Co-ordinating Mechanism in Swaziland, 1983 - 1985 (included Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe before 1985)
Joe Slovo, Jacob Zuma, "Lennox"Tshali, Bogart Soze, Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi"), Siphiwe Nyanda and John Nkadimeng.
After the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984, the Maputo RPMC was replaced by a co-ordinating mechanism in Swaziland.
This was chaired by Ronnie Kasrils (1984), then Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim (1985 - 86) Other members included Thami Zulu, Siphiwe Nyanda, and a NAT representative.
Two regional PMCs reported to the co-ordinating mechanism in Swaziland: the Natal Regional PMC, led by Shadrack Maphumulo, Ivan Pillay, Thami Zulu, Cyril Raymonds ("Fear"), Terence Tryon, and Doris Skosana. the
Transvaal Regional PMC, led by Siphiwe Nyanda, Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi"), "September", Ntsie Manye and "Archie" (Billy Whitehead)
Botswana structures went through a number of rapid changes in the 1980s because of a number of cross-border attacks and severe infiltration by the enemy.
In 1983, Lambert Moloi headed the Botswana RPMC. In 1984, a Co-ordinating Committee was established, consisting of representatives from military and political structures.
Chair: Thabang Makwetla, followed by Thenjiwe Mthintso
The political machinery resorting under the Botswana RPMC at this time was led by Wally Serote and Thabang Makwetla.
This RPMC was headed by Judson Khuzwayo, with "Wana", Linda Mti, Skenjana Roji and Thenjiwe Mthintso (between 1982 - 1983.)
Commander: Timothy Mokoena (Godfrey Ngwenya) (1984 - 1987)
The Kabwe Conference was held in May 1985. In response to the sharp increase in mass struggle inside the country, Political HQ was replaced with a strengthened Internal Political Committee (IPC) in 1987.
Operation Vula was launched in 1986, with Joe Slovo assisting the President. Mac Maharaj and Ronnie Kasrils were among the leading figures in this project. By 1988, Mac Maharaj and Siphiwe Nyanda had been infiltrated into the country.
A Code of Conduct was adopted. In terms of the general (civilian) Code Of Discipline, three offices were established specifically to better regulate disciplinary procedures, and halt abuses that had been occurring. These were the Review Board, the Officer of Justice, and the National Peoples' Tribunal.
A Provisional Directorate of Intelligence and Security was created to run NAT, and action was taken to clarify the command structures over NAT personnel deployed in Angola. A President's Council (also referred to as the National Security Committee) was established in the latter half of 1987, and was chaired by OR Tambo; this committee had the brief of overseeing the functioning of NAT and dealing with security issues in general.
Other members: Johnny Makathini, Simon Makana, Joe Slovo, Thabo Mbeki, Chris Hani, Moses Mabhida (until his death in 1986), Tony Mongalo, Dan Tloome, John Motshabi, John Nkadimeng, Mac Maharaj, Cassius Make (until his assassination in Swaziland in 1987), Florence Moposho, Joe Nhlanhla, Joe Modise, Ruth Mompati, Henry Makgothi, Pallo Jordan, Jacob Zuma, Joe Jele, Sizakele Sigxashe, Robert Manci, Gertrude Shope, Francis Meli, Reg September, Jackie Selibi, Hermanus Loots ("James Stuart"), Steve Tshwete, Zola Skweyiya.
Other NEC members were co-opted in 1987: Ronnie Kasrils, Jackie Sedibe, Aziz Pahad, and "Bra T" (Godfrey Ngwenya), and Sindiso Mfenyane.
Other members: The Secretary-General, Alfred Nzo; the Treasurer General, Thomas Nkobi; the head of NAT, Joe Nhlanhla; Joe Modise.
The Tribunal was appointed for a period of three years by the NEC. The President appointed the Chair from among the members of the Tribunal. The Tribunal would recommend sentences to the President, who would usually refer such cases to the Review Board. After the Board had dealt with a case, sentence would be confirmed by the President and carried out.
MHQ representatives on the PMC: Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Chris Hani, Steve Tshwete, Ronnie Kasrils, Job Tlhabane (until 1987)
PHQ was replaced by the Internal Political Committee in 1987. PHQ/IPC representatives on the PMC during the period from 1985 - 1990 were: Mac Maharaj, Joe Jele, Jacob Zuma, Ruth Mompati, Steve Tshwete, and Joel Netshitenzhe.
NAT representatives on the PMC: Mzwai Piliso (until 1987); and then Joe Nhlanhla and Sizakele Sigxashe
PHQ was led by Joe Jele, with Mac Maharaj, Jacob Zuma, Ruth Mompati, Steve Tshwete and Joel Netshitenzhe.
Army Commander: Joe Modise
After the Kabwe Conference, the NEC appointed a Provisional Directorate of Intelligence and Security to run this Department.
Director: Joe Nhlanhla (confirmed in 1987)
Chair: Ronnie Kasrils (chair, 1984); Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, until 1986 when he was abducted; Siphiwe Nyanda (1986 - 87/88); Silumko Sokupa (1988 - 1989)
Other members: Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi") (1985 -1987); Thami Zulu (1985 -1988); Vusi Mavimbela (1985 - ); Welile Nhlapo (1985 - ) Shadrack Maphumulo (1985 -1987, when he was killed ).
Chair: Charles Nqakula
Chair: Charles Nqakula
Security and Intelligence structures remained in place. Additional members taken on in this period were Lindinto Hlekani, Steve Tshwete, and Chris Pepani.
Botswana RPMC, mid-1985
Chair: Thenjiwe Mthintso, until 1987; then Thabang Makwetla
Chair: Barry Gilder (temporarily), then Thenjiwe Mthintso
Political machinery: Thabang Makwetla, Thabo Kubu, James Raditsela, Mapule Raditsela, Hassan Ebrahim, Kgomotso Jolobe.
Military machinery: Patrick Mvundla ("Naldei Sehume", who was killed in the SADF raid of 28/03/88); Boy Molokoane (who was killed in an ambush outside Francistown in January 1988); "Itumeleng" Tsimane, and Dan Hatto.
During this period a specialised structure concentrating on the Western Cape was set up and was composed of the following cadres: James Ngculu, Dick Ngomane, "Blah" Riekets, and later Miranda Ngculu.
Ordnance: the head of the regional Ordnance structure was Benjamin Mongalo, who reported directly to Lusaka. An additional structure was set up under J. Modimo, tasked with infiltrating arms into the country, which also reported directly to Lusaka.
"Ali" Makhosini (1987 - 1989)
With the unbanning of the ANC, the release of the ANC leadership from prison and the return of exiles, many changes took place. A range of new structures had to be set up to meet the challenge of negotiations and the return of exiles. Tokyo Sexwale was tasked with attempting to take care of the need of MK cadres until MK HQ personnel arrived in the country. Key structures set up during this period included the Negotiations Commission. In response to the state-sponsored violence which took off in July/August 1990, a Peace Desk was established.
Political structures at HQ were re-organised into an internal re-organisation committee, which Ronnie Kasrils, Steve Tshwete and Sue Rabkin as key officials.
President: Nelson Mandela
Kader Asmal, Thozamile Botha, Cheryl Carolus, Jeremy Cronin, Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, Harry Gwala, Chris Hani, Pallo Jordan, Ronnie Kasrils, Ahmed Kathrada, Terror Lekota, Saki Macozoma, Mac Maharaj, Rocky Malebane-Metsing, Winnie Mandela, Trevor Manuel, Gill Marcus, Barbara Masekela, Thabo Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Wilton Mkwayi, Andrew Mlangeni, Joe Modise, Popo Molefe, Ruth Mompati, Mohammed Valli Moosa, Elias Motsoaledi, Mendi Msimang, Sydney Mufamadi, Billy Nair, Sister Bernard Ncube, Joe Nhlanhla, John Nkadimeng, Siphiwe Nyanda, Alfred Nzo, Dullah Oimar, Aziz Pahad, Albie Sachs, Reg September, Albertina Sisulu, Zola Skweyiya, Joe Slovo, Marion Sparg, Raymond Suttner, Steve Tshwete, Mcwayizeni Zulu.
Commander-in-Chief: Nelson Mandela
(Note: most of these posts were no longer operational posts in accordance with the ANC's commitment to suspend armed actions in 1990.)
Director: Joe Nhlanhla
During the period from 1976 - 1980, camps in Angola fell under the command of the late Mzwandile Piliso, at the time head of the department of Military Training and Personnel. In 1980, Simon Shekeshe ("Julius Mokoena") was appointed Regional Commander. He was succeeded by Graham Morodi ("Mashego") in 1982. Godfrey Ngwenya
("Timothy Mokoena") was the next Regional Commander until 1985 when he was injured in a UNITA ambush, and then Ali Makhosini took over this post. The following MK camps were maintained by the ANC in Angola; all camps were closed down in 1989, when military structures were shifted to Uganda and Tanzania.
This was the first training camp to be opened in Angola by the ANC, in 1976. It catered for the first group of 40 MK cadres to receive military training in Angola, and was under the command of FAPLA and Cuban instructors. Gabela Training Camp was merged with Benguela Camp in 1977.
This camp opened in late 1976 and was closed in mid-1977. It catered for only two intakes of cadres who were in transit to training camps. The average number of cadres present was 200.
This transit camp was established in mid 1977 for cadres who had been at Engineering Camp and Gabela camp, and who were on their way to open Nova Catengue Training Camp. The numerical strength was around 300 cadres. The camp was closed in 1982.
Established in 1976, this camp accommodated around 500 cadres from the transit camps listed above. The camp was destroyed in an aerial bombardment in 1979, based on intelligence supplied to the apartheid regime by infiltrators within MK.
Originally a transit camp established in September 1977, it became a training camp in 19.. It accommodated around 200 cadres. The camp closed in 1989.
Commanders: Successively, Parker Tsie (1977 - 1980), Oupa G. Banda, Seremane Kgositsile ("Kenneth Mahamba"), Livingstone Tom Gaza, Herbert Malinga, and Lloyd Mabizela, Sydney Mpila.
Established in 1976, this camp usually had fewer than 100 cadres present at any time. It was closed in 1988. This camp provided specialised training.
Fazenda camp was established in 1978. It catered for trained cadres who were undergoing further training courses, including "survival" training. The numerical strength was around 200 cadres at any time. It was closed in 1980 or early 1981 when it was merged with Quibaxe camp.
Founded in 1979 after the destruction of Nova Catengue in April that year. The numerical strength was around 400 cadres at any time. It closed in 1989.
Commanders: Successively, Thami Zulu (1979 - 1981), Seremane Kgositsile, Godfrey Ngwenya, Matthews Nkosi, Phillip Sebothoma, Dumile Thabekhulu, Ben Senokoanyane.
Established in 1979, this camp catered for newly recruited members of MK on their way to other camps for military training. The average strength of the camp was around 400 cadres. It closed in 1989.
Commanders: Sucessively, Dan Hatto, Golden Rahube, Steven Kobe, Johnson Langa, Lawrence Madi, Leepo Modise.
Founded in 1980, the camp was short-lived and was closed in January 1981, when it was shifted to Caculama and became known as Caculama Camp or Malanje. It catered for around 300 - 400 cadres at any time.
Established in January 1981, as described above. Around 400 cadres were accommodated at this camp. It was closed in 1989.
Commanders: Successively, Godfrey N. Ngwenya, Sipho Binda, Thibe Lesole, Dumisane Mafo, Themba Nkabinde, Steven Kobe.
This camp replaced Funda camp in 1979. The number of cadres varied from time to time but seldom more than 100 were present. Caxito was in a malaria infested area and was for this reason closed down in 1984.
This facility was opened in 1979 and closed down in 1989, when inmates were moved to a government facility in Uganda.
The commanders of Camp 32 were successively: Sizwe Mkhonto, Morris Seabelo, Afrika Nkwe (for a few months only), Mzwandile Damoyi and William Masango.
Initially this building was used by Military HQ, and MK cadres who had been found guilty of disciplinary offences would be confined here for limited periods as punishment - a kind of "detention barracks." Later, it was used to hold discovered agents or definite suspects in transit to Camp 32. It was closed in 1987 when Sun City was opened to take its place. Conditions at the RC were good, and very few people were held here at any time; it is not possible to give an estimate, as requested by the TRC, for the number of inmates at the RC at any one time. The RC did not have a commander as such; those responsible for people held at the RC would be senior MK and NAT officials in the region.
Sun City was opened in 1988 and closed in 1991. It was not like Camp 32, with a command structure - it was largely a holding facility, as described above. There were one or two guards, and Jan Mampane ("Reddy Mazimba") of the Regional NAT Directorate was responsible for people held at Sun City. Most of those held were definite suspects who had been isolated for purposes of investigation, and some who could not be held at Camp 32 because it was so badly overcrowded.
A brief description of the ANC's facilities in Morogoro and Dakawa is necessary to clear up confusion which may have arisen. The Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College was built in Morogoro in the late 1970s. There was a primary school, high school, day care centre and also an adult education centre, with staff houses and other facilities. Unit 1 was part of the dormitory and kitchen area, and a small office was used here to briefly confine people who had committed serious breaches of discipline before they were sent to Lusaka for their cases to be considered. It was not a prison in any sense of the word.
The Tanzanian government also had an office and representative at the entrance to the complex, where there was a temporary holding facility since there was no police station in the immediate area. People who had broken the laws of the land would at times be held here by the Tanzanian government before being taken to the nearest police station, after which the law would take its normal course. This too was not in any sense a prison.
The Farm was established in late 1987 as a rehabilitation centre for ANC members based in the area who had committed offences in terms of the ANC's code of conduct, but whose cases the Tanzanian government considered too petty to be dealt with in their courts of law (for example, stealing and selling clothing.) It was also at times used as a holding facility for confessed agents and definite suspects whilst the security structures in Tanzania were waiting for tickets to arrive from Lusaka so that these agents or definite suspects could be flown out of the area. Conditions were not harsh; the centre consisted of proper buildings with tiled rooves; there was running water and flush toilets.
In 1989, when all camps were closed down in Angola, a batch of six dangerous agents who had in fact been sentenced to death by tribunal, but who had not been executed, arrived in Tanzania. The local NAT structures had no information as to why these agents had arrived in Tanzania and were alarmed at their appearance in this civilian area; they temporarily confined these agents at the Farm whilst seeking clarity from structures in Lusaka. The Tanzanian government assisted by clearing a wing of a local prison to confine these agents. Conditions in the prison were not harsh.
The regional NAT structures responsibile for these holding facilities and the rehabilitation centre during the 1980s were headed successively by Daniel Oliphant ("Mtu Jwili"), Gabriel Mthembu ("Sizwe Mkhonto"), and David Motshweni ("Willy Williams").
By the time Camp 32 was closed down, there was a total of 69 prisoners. After negotiations with the Ugandan government, they were transferred to a small prison in the town of Kayunga, where conditions were considerably better. The number of prisoners was further reduced by releases until only 32 of the most hardened agents remained; these too were released in 1991.
The head of NAT structures in the region was Wandile Dlamini; Lister Mooi along with Ugandan prison officials were responsible for guarding the prisoners.
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1. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE
"The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom".The objective of the armed struggle was the overthrow of the apartheid state in order to achieve democracy, freedom and peace in South Africa. The ANCs decision to embark on armed struggle was reached after many decades of non-violent resistance, which was met by increasingly brutal repression by the apartheid regime.
The African National Congress (ANC) had no choice but to resort to armed struggle after the National Party government first narrowed the arena of legal political activity and finally closed it in 1960 by banning the movement. The ANC asserted moral legitimacy for the resort to violence on the grounds of necessary defence and just war. Further, Umkhonto we Sizwe was a means to channel the revolutionary violence the oppressed were calling for, especially after the Sharpeville massacre:
From the very beginning, the ANC emphasised that armed resistance took place within political context, and was one of a number of inter-related methods of struggle. Cadres had to fully understand the basic policy positions of the ANC, the first step in military training; they were at all times guided by and subordinate to the political leadership of the ANC.
Cadres were taught to maintain the moral high ground occupied by the liberation movement, owing to the justness of our cause, in the actual theatre of battle. This meant that the choice of targets, attitude towards civilians and treatment of captives had to reflect the ANCs policies. The forms of armed struggle adopted by the ANC and MK were intended to achieve the goals of the movement with the least loss of life: in essence, the armed struggle was waged to bring peace to South Africa - to stop the apartheid regime as quickly and as effectively as possible in order to prevent the conflict in the country degenerating into racial civil war.
MK was at all times subordinate to the political leadership of the ANC. Detailed information on ANC structures and personnel, including military structures and personnel, is attached to the main document of this second submission (appendix 1.)
Few liberation movements have had to wage armed struggle under such complex, difficult and harsh conditions. In the early years, South Africa was surrounded by countries hostile to the idea of liberation, particularly Rhodesia and the former Portuguese colonies. There were no friendly bases on the borders of our country, which made infiltration into South Africa difficult and dangerous. Cadres spent many lonely years in the camps long after they had completed their training because of this difficulty. At times there was a scarcity of food and clothing, a lack of medicines and health facilities.
In this regard, the role of the Commissariat became crucial. In all the camps, there was a commissariat responsible for the political education, general welfare and cultural well-being of cadres.
Serious attention was given to the general education of cadres. Special literacy classes and bridging courses were designed. So successful were these courses that many who completed them were able to enroll in formal education institutions in countries such as Angola, Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda.
In a centre outside Luanda called Technical Training Centre (Moscow), formal education was given in mechanics and auto electrics; driving lessons were also available. The ANC also ran a huge centre called the Self-Help Medical Centre (the Plot) where courses in nursing, advanced motor mechanics, building and carpentry were offered. Hundreds of cadres trained in these centres became professionals.
There were two centres in Angola (Quela and Camalundi) for training cadres in agriculture and the production of food for the army. Production was very successful, especially in the early 1980s. We were able to supply most of the camps. Our camps were bee-hives of cultural activities. There was a network of committees to promote music, drama, literature, etc. In all camp programmes, cultural activity was compulsory. Many excellent choirs, drama and musical groups were formed. Many poets emerged from our camps, who continue to produce magnificent work to this day. Perhaps the highest achievement in this regard was the formation of the cultural ensemble known as Amandla Group. It was supported and nurtured by great South African artists such as Jonas Gwangwa, Dennis Dipale, Abdullah Ibrahim, Letta Mbuli, and others. The group became internationally renowned, staging successful tours in Southern Africa and Europe.
Military training courses were designed to produce a cadre with a broad range of skills, well equipped to execute the various tasks of the liberation struggle. Lectures were conducted on political science, and the art of warfare.
The following military subjects were taught in the camps:
Courses ran for three weeks, three months, six months, nine months or longer depending on the mission/tasks for which the individual or unit was being prepared.
Over the years thousands of cadres were produced, among them commanders, commissars, instructors and specialists in various military fields. Some would remain to staff the camps and continue to train other cadres; many infiltrated the country for various tasks; yet others joined the diplomatic corps to run the many external missions of the liberation movement.
Today many of these cadres are to be found among the leadership of the Alliance; some are ambassadors and officials in foreign missions; others are Ministers, members of Parliament, in the civil service and the private sector. Others served many years of imprisonment, or gave their lives for the liberation of this country.
A full list of MK training camps and the names of commanders, as requested by the TRC, is attached to the main document of this second submission as appendix 2.
The first MK actions in 1960 were sabotage operations; cadres were under strict instructions to avoid all loss of life. Targets included government installations, police stations, electric pylons, pass offices, and other symbols of apartheid rule; in rural areas, there were arson attacks on sugar cane fields and wattle estates.
The sabotage campaign failed in its objective of convincing the apartheid regime to engage in negotiations in a National Convention. By the time of the Rivonia arrests, MK leaders were discussing the possibility of embarking on guerilla warfare to take the struggle forward.
The draft document Operation Mayibuye indicated aspects of the thinking of the leadership at this time, and identified targets as follows:
In the years following the Rivonia arrests the ANC built up a force in some of the liberated countries in Africa. It was decided to launch a joint campaign (later known as the Wankie campaign) with ZIPRA in Zimbabwe in 1967/8. This operation was aimed at infiltrating trained MK operatives into South Africa in line with the concept of rural-based guerilla warfare. However, some of the operatives were forced to move into Botswana and others had to withdraw to Zambia after considerable difficulties were encountered, particularly the lack of bases among the population. A group of cadres, including Chris Hani, were captured in Botswana and served prison sentences there.
Following the Wankie campaign, the ANC held a watershed Consultative Conference at Morogoro in 1969 to discuss ways of taking the struggle forward. Conference adopted a new programme, Strategy and Tactics of the ANC. This was the first comprehensive set of strategic guidelines for the ANC in the period of armed struggle.
A decision was made to shift the ANCs approach from sending armed groups of cadres into the country to spark off guerilla warfare, and instead emphasised that period of political reconstruction inside the country was necessary since the successful development of armed struggle depended on political mobilisation and strong underground structures, an important precursor to theories of peoples war developed in the early 1980s.
Military struggle was seen as forming only part of, and being guided by, a broader political strategy to ensure that the battle against apartheid was fought on all possible fronts, involving not just an army but all those oppressed by apartheid:
When we talk of revolutionary armed struggle, we are talking of political struggle by means which include the use of military force (...) It is important to emphasise this because our movement must reject all manifestations of militarism which separates armed peoples struggle from its political context.
Guerilla warfare is carried out by a small and militarily weak organisation - poorly armed but highly mobile - against a highly organised conventional force which has all the resources of the state behind it. From the outset MK aimed to limit the loss of civilian lives, and constantly targeted the military and police, who formed the frontline of defence of the apartheid state.
Classic guerilla warfare roots itself among the rural population and moves from there into urban areas; it is dependent on the availability of suitable terrain, such as inaccessible mountains or forests where base camps can be established. In contrast, MKs tactics had to take into account the relatively unfavourable terrain in South Africa. A multi-faceted approach was adopted, with guerilla operations carried out throughout the country in both rural and urban areas, targeting the central pillars on which the apartheid state rested:
This basic approach did not change over the years, even under extreme provocation, However, by the early 1980s it was accepted that in the context of intensified confrontation between the apartheid regime and forces for democratic change, the fear of civilians being caught in the cross-fire could no longer be a decisive factor in avoiding certain armed operations directed against the personnel and infrastructure of the apartheid state.
The 1976 uprising, and subsequent massacres and other atrocities by the security forces, gave new impetus to the struggle. Thousands of new recruits flooded into MK, bringing with them a fresh will to fight the enemy, born of their own bitter experience in fighting a brutal enemy only with stones. New vistas opened to intensify the struggle and to hit back in defence of the people.
The key challenge was to channel this youthful and impatient militancy into military/political struggle within ANC policy guidelines. The ANC had the responsibility to educate these youths to understand that the enemy was in fact the system of apartheid itself, not white individuals. It is a remarkable achievement on the part of the ANC that we succeeded in doing this. Many of these youths, after initial training in MK camps and in Eastern Europe, were briefed and infiltrated back into the country to begin operations.
Between 1976 and 1979 there was a marked escalation of armed actions: about 37 armed actions took place between June 1976 and the end of 1978. Railway lines were sabotaged, police stations attacked, and Bantu Administration offices were bombed. The battle was slowly but surely being taken to the enemy, and MK had moved from concentrating purely on sabotage operations to the first stages of guerilla war.
As we stated in our main submission to the Truth Commission, the watershed 1978 Politico-Military Commissions Report (also known as the Green Book) again stressed the central importance of political mobilisation:
"The armed struggle must be based on, and grow out of, mass political support and it must eventually involve all our people. All military activities must at every stage be guided by and determined by the need to generate political mobilisation, organisation and resistance, with the aim of progressively weakening the enemys grip on his reins of political, economic, social and military power, by a combination of political and military action."In line with this approach, the Revolutionary Council (formed in 1969 and chaired by OR Tambo) was reorganised to reinforce the supremacy of political leadership. It was also intended to ensure that the task of mass mobilisation and underground organisation received the necessary emphasis - to reinforce the links between the armed struggle the mass base and the underground structures of the ANC.
A Central Operational MK HQ was established by Joe Modise and Joe Slovo. After several years in which there had been no MK actions inside the country, following the impetus of the Soweto uprising units were sent into the country in 1978 to carry out attacks on police stations - this has come to be known as the G5 Operation. It was commanded by Siphiwe Nyanda; stations attacked included Moroka, Orlando and Booysens The following year, in 1979, the President, OR Tambo, asked the NEC for a mandate to form a special unit to attack key strategic targets - spectacular operations that would hit the economy hard, and inspire the oppressed majority. The unit would report directly to him; he would authorise such attacks and take political responsibility for them. This was agreed to, and the first Special Operations Command consisted of Joe Slovo, Montso Mokgabudi (Obadi), and Aboobaker Ismail (Rashid.)
As with other MK units, targets were carefully selected in accordance with the political policies of the movement, and planning for operations was as careful as possible. Whenever possible, a final reconnaissance was undertaken just before an attack to ensure that conditions had not changed: this was to ensure we minimised the loss of civilian life. A further aspect of all planning was to ensure that cadres had planned for their safe withdrawal after attacks, and had the necessary resources to do so.
Initially the targets were limited to oil refineries, fuel depots, the Koeberg nuclear plant and military targets such as Voortrekkerhoogte. With the increasingly indiscriminate attacks on neighbouring states and the viciousness of attacks on South African civilians by the security forces, it was decided by Special Operations Command to attack military personnel. This resulted in operations such as the car bomb at South African Air Force HQ in Pretoria.
The case studies presented will indicate that such operations were not carried out on the spur of the moment or on the whim of a particular individual, but were based on months of careful preparations.
Parallel to operations carried out by Special Operations, there was a steady increase in the number of operations carried out by other MK units from Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and, in later years, Zimbabwe. One study estimated that 150 cases of armed action took place between 1976 and 1982, overwhelmingly concentrated on economic targets, the administrative machinery of apartheid, SAP and SADF installations and personnel.
In mid-1983 MHQ produced a discussion document Planning for Peoples War1 which posed the question as to whether the time was ripe to move away from the 1979 approach towards peoples war, defined as war in which a liberation army becomes rooted among the people who progressively participate actively in the armed struggle both politically and militarily, including the possibility of engaging in partial or general uprising. Among the conclusions were that the ANC should continue carrying out and even escalating those actions which had played an important role in stimulating political activity, mass resistance and mass organisation, but that there should be more concentration on destroying enemy personnel. )The term enemy personnel referred primarily to members of the SAP and SADF.) The concept of potential future guerrilla zones inside the country was raised.
This document noted that the policy of arming the people cannot mean that we begin now to distribute arms to whosoever wishes to receive them among the oppressed. In the first place, we had neither the capacity nor the means to do this on any meaningful scale. In the second place it would be completely wrong to engage in a policy of merely distributing weaponry to people, trusting to luck that they will use them on the side of the revolution.
This document reflected the debates that were taking place all the time in the ranks of the liberation movement on how to respond to new situations as they emerged. The essence of these debates was around the restraint of the ANC in the face of the enemy s brutality - whether we should not adopt the easy route, and allow less discriminate control over the usage of weapons and choice of targets. At each stage of struggle, people on the ground would respond with anger to repression, and themselves start to take initiatives which would not strictly accord with the strategy and tactics of the ANC.
The constant challenge facing the ANC and MK was how to channel anger on the ground to ensure that the strategic perspective of a democratic and non-racial society is not sacrificed on the alter of quick-fix, dramatic and misguided actions. The tension between such intensification of struggle and the need to avoid a racial war that the MK Manifesto eloquently expressed at the founding of the liberation army, remained with the movement to the last day of armed struggle.
In contrast to this highly disciplined and restrained approach to the use of violence, the South African regime committed atrocity after atrocity against civilian targets inside and outside the country, including supporting the war efforts of UNITA and Renamo, and massive raids against what were portrayed as ANC targets in neighbouring states such as Matola in 1991,1982 Maseru massacre, Gaborone in 1985, Lusaka in 1987, Harare and Bulawayo, to quote a few examples. Several of the casualties in these operations were nationals of the host countries. No distinction whatsoever was made between hard and soft targets - between MK operatives and unarmed refugees and civilians including women and children.
In an interview with OR Tambo published on 06/08/83 in The Guardian, the issue of civilian casualties was dealt with:
Referring to the Matola raid, the Maseru raid and the SAAF bombing of Maputo, OR Tambo added:
...In 1980 we signed the Geneva protocols and said that if we captured any enemy soldiers we would treat them as prisoners of war. The fact is we are not against civilians. We do not include them in our definition of the enemy. The ANC was non-violent for a whole decade in the face of violence against African civilians. What do we mean by civilians? It really means white civilians. No one refers to Africans as civilians and they have been victims of shootings all the time. Even children. They have been killed in the hundreds. Yet the word has not been used in all these years. Now it is being used, especially after the Pretoria [SAAF/HQ] bomb. But implicit in the practice of the South African regime is that when you shoot an African you are not killing a civilian. We don t want to kill civilians. But some will be hit, quite accidentally and regrettably. I am sure we are going to lose many civilians and many innocent people, as happens in any violent situation. (...)
We do not boast about it in the way the SA regime boasts about its killings...I think South Africa is going to be a very happy country one day and we will avoid all avoidable loss of life but - harsh though this sounds - we cannot allow the system to persist for the sake of saving a few lives. It is not so harsh when one considers how many lives apartheid has destroyed. "
The questions of ANC policy towards soft targets and taking the struggle to white areas arise in the context of the unprecedented, mass-based confrontation with the apartheid state which was taking place at all levels of society within the country from the early 1980s onwards. Civics, community organisations, and trade unions were all engaged in intense struggles. MK operations increased sharply, most of them carried out by formal units based inside the country, many of which were supported and housed by underground political cells.
The Kabwe conference was held in June 1985 to assess developments since the Morogoro conference of 1969. The day before it opened, Pretoria attacked several homes in Gaborone, Botswana, killing 12 people - two young female citizens of Botswana (who were blown to pieces), one Somalian, a six-year old child from Lesotho, and eight South Africans, five of whom were members of the ANC, but none of them members of MK. All those killed were unarmed.
Conference reaffirmed ANC policy with regard to targets considered legitimate: SADF and SAP personnel and installations, selected economic installations and administrative infrastructure. But the risk of civilians being caught in the crossfire when such operations took place could no longer be allowed to prevent the urgently needed, all-round intensification of the armed struggle. The focus of armed operations had to shift towards striking directly at enemy personnel, and the struggle had to move out of the townships to the white areas. This was immediately seized on by the propaganda machinery of the apartheid regime, and falsely portrayed as a decision to begin indiscriminate killings of white civilians.
OR Tambo expressed the mood of the Conference eloquently. It represented, he said,
At a press conference he noted that in the preceding nine to ten months many soft targets had been hit by the enemy - nearly 500 civilians had been killed. The distinction between hard and soft targets is going to disappear in an intensified confrontation, in an escalating conflict. (...) I am not saying that our Conference used the word soft targets. I am saying that Conference recognised that we are in it. It is happening every day, he said.
By the end of 1985 an official pamphlet titled "Take the Struggle to the White Areas!" was distributed inside the country.
Targets were identified as follows: the racist army, police, death squads, agents and stooges in our midst, and the call to take the war to the white areas is defined as follows:
The ANC leadership had called on all members and supporters of the ANC to intensify the struggle at all costs, to move towards creating a situation of ungovernability and peoples war.
There were long and insecure lines of communication, command and control. Many of the established MK units had been allowed a degree of initiative in executing their operations, as long as these remained within policy guidelines.
In contrast with a conventional military force, in which planning takes place at HQ level by experienced officers, in guerilla warfare most of the detailed planning takes place at the lowest level: each cadre has to be trusted to make principled and educated decisions with regard to choice of target, whilst keeping a close eye on developments and feelings among the people in his/her community - a responsibility which no soldier in a conventional force ever has to face. There was no hotline to higher structures to ask for guidance; communication could - and at times did - result in deaths, given the degree to which communication lines were monitored. Consequently, a great deal depended on the political maturity, general experience, and immediate situation in which each cadre operated.
Maintaining discipline in guerilla and conventional armed forces is also fundamentally different. In the case of a guerilla force, discipline flows from a thorough understanding of the political objectives of the armed struggle - not from threats of court-martial or punishment.
MK cadres conducted crash courses for eager volunteers inside the country. Some of these recruits had sketchy political understanding of the nature of the struggle in comparison with those cadres who had gone through the intensive political and military training offered in camps in exile. Some supporters drifted in and out of structures, were never thoroughly under the discipline of the ANC and MK, yet commanders on the ground sometimes found their contributions indispensable.
Cadres made decisions in the context of pressures they encountered on a day-to-day basis, in which enemy atrocities against civilians were mounting. Increasing numbers of attacks took place in urban areas, and civilians were increasingly caught in the crossfire. Bona fide cadres and supporters who carried out attacks of this nature believed they were fulfilling the general direction to carry the struggle to the white areas in accordance with the political will of the leadership of the ANC.
The period between 1985 and 1988 witnessed unprecedented violence, overwhelmingly directed at black civilians, as the regime fought to regain the strategic initiative it had lost.
Increasingly in this period, attacks took place in urban areas, in which civilians were caught in the crossfire. Bona fide cadres and supporters who carried out attacks of this nature believed they were fulfilling the general direction to intensify the struggle and carry it into the white areas in accordance with the political will of the leadership of the ANC.
This behaviour of the regime was a significant factor in provoking certain attacks which were in breach of policy. Anger on the ground was explosive: the atrocities committed by the apartheid regime demanded retaliation, and the careful response was at times met with angry contempt. In some cases, cadres responded to state brutality by hitting back in anger, as soon as possible - as in the case of the Amanzimtoti bomb, described in detail in our main submission. A comment by OR Tambo in response to this attack is worth repeating:
"Massacres have been perpetrated against civilians: Mamelodi, a massacre. Uitenhage, a massacre. Botswana, a massacre. Queenstown, a massacre...certainly, we are beginning to see South Africans of all races (burying) their loved ones who have died in the South African situation. The whole of South Africa is beginning to bleed...If I had been approached by an ANC unit and asked whether they should go and plant a bomb at a supermarket I would have said, Of course not . But when our units are faced with what is happening all around them, it is understandable that some of the should say, Well, I may have to face being disciplined, but I am going to do this."A factor which should not be underestimated is that the banning by the regime of all ANC literature and jamming of broadcasts from Radio Freedom made it extremely difficult for senior ANC leadership to get through to cadres and activists on the ground to ensure a proper understanding of policy. Every effort was made to block and distort the ANCs message, or anything which could be remotely construed as supportive of the message of the liberation movement. An extraordinary range of items were banned; possession of ANC publications such as a pamphlet or a copy of Mayibuye or Sechaba could result in a lengthy jail sentence.
Given the circumstances at the time, it is remarkable that so few armed attacks took place in which there was a high rate of civilian casualties. MK acted with great restraint; we certainly had the capacity to kill many thousands of civilians - it would have been easy to do this - but the ANC leadership never took this route, even under extreme provocation. The humanity of this approach has never been acknowledged - nor reciprocated - by the apartheid regime, which always saw black civilians in general (and all those who opposed the regime) as forming an integral part of enemy forces, whether they were armed or not.
When unexpected difficulties arose, cadres had to think on their feet: and sometimes they made the wrong decisions. At times, given the refusal of the regime to treat MK members as prisoners of war, the situations they faced were desperate to the extent that it is highly unlikely that there would be a peaceful outcome, no matter what they decided - the Silverton bank siege and the Goch Street incident are cases in point.
Gathering reliable information and tactical intelligence was often exceptionally difficult. At times attacks which appear to be aimed at civilian targets were nothing of the sort - the cadre may have had information to the effect that an SADF or SAP g roup would be present at a particular railway station or hotel or restaurant a particular time, but due to a range of difficulties - ranging from faulty intelligence to devices which malfunction and accidentally go off at the wrong time - an explosion occurs, apparently senselessly, in a civilian area. It is also possible that some of these incidents occurred through deliberate disinformation, in which infiltrators into MK units set up attacks of this nature.
At other times, an attack would take place in support of campaigns or other struggles taking place within the community - such as strike action, mass retrenchments, a rent or bus boycott. An explosion at an office block, factory or chain store makes sense in this context, although the timing of the blast could go wrong for a range of reasons and result in unintended civilian casualties.
In some cases, cadres were entirely correct with regard to the political reasoning behind their choice of target but placed a bomb at an inappropriate time which resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties. In addition, they did not have sufficient capacity to convey the intentions of their actions, or were blocked from doing so by censorship.
At times insufficient training could have resulted in situations in which cadres were not able to ensure that explosions took place at the intended time, or accidents occured. Technical failures also occurred, resulting in unintended civilian casualties.
The regime did not only block ANC communications of all kinds. It saw the active dissemination of disinformation as a critically important aspect of its programme of counter-revolutionary warfare, in which much emphasis was laid on psychological and strategic communication operations. A central concern of successive apartheid regimes has always been to alienate the people from MK and the ANC. No effort was spared to discredit and demonise MK - and certain attacks on civilian targets portrayed as the work of MK were carried out by the regime, such as the KwaMakutha massacre. In this regard the regime was drawing on the experience of other wars against liberation movements, including the tactics adopted by the security forces in the Zimbabwean war of liberation, such as pseudo operations in which they would attack civilians whilst masquerading as guerrillas. The tactics developed in Namibia in attempts to counter-mobilise the civilian population against Swapo were also harnessed (see our main submission, pp 35 - 36.)
In the mid- to late 1980s, the situation was further complicated by the stepping up of false flag operations as the regime intensified its efforts to discredit the ANC internationally, and alienate growing popular support on the ground. Various examples of work of this nature - such as the Khotso House bomb and the murder of Griffiths Mxenge were cited in our main submission, and there is little doubt that several other operations of this nature will come to light as the work of the Commission proceeds.
In some cases agents infiltrated structures and consistently attempted to influence people towards un-planned or ill-considered violence, in order to discredit the ANC, create divisions in communities, and disrupt structures.
There have been indications that some of those who have applied for amnesty have information on the extent to which false flag operations were carried out in the 1980s and 1990s. We call on the TRC to ensure that all available information on covert projects, including what the NP has called disinformation projects approved during this period is obtained, in particular strategic communications projects, which were controlled by a sub-committee of the State Security Council. Considerable detail in this regard was presented in our first submission, pp. 34 - 40.
Paul Erasmus, a member of the SAP security branch tasked with stratkom (strategic communications) work, has stated that a number of the limpet mines that exploded in central Johannesburg in the late 1980s, for which the ANC was blamed, were planted by the security police in order to discredit the ANC. Joe Mamasela has made similar claims regarding blasts in certain Wimpy Bars. We trust that the TRC will ensure that the truth in this regard is exposed.
In late 1987, all members of MK HQ were called in by OR Tambo, who expressed his concern at the number of unnecessary civilian casualties which had occurred in certain attacks, particularly those involving the use of anti-tank landmines. He tasked MK HQ with ensuring that all cadres fully understood ANC policy with regard to legitimate targets. Failure to comply with these orders would be considered violations of policy and action would be taken against offenders.
In response, MK HQ sent senior commanders to the forward areas to meet with MK structures there, and convey the concerns of the national leadership. When possible these senior commanders also met with units. In cases where meetings could not be held with units, command structures in the forward areas were told to contact all command structures of their units, whether they may have been involved in attacks of this nature or not, and ensure that all cadres were entirely clear on ANC policy regarding legitimate targets.
Chris Hani, Aboobaker Ismail and Keith Mokoape visited structures in Maputo; Ronnie Kasrils visited structures in Swaziland and other areas. Lambert Moloi, Chris Hani and Julius Maliba (Manchecker) met with Zimbabwe structures, and Chris Hani, Aboobaker Ismail, and Lambert Moloi visited Botswana structures.
In most cases cadres responsible for these actions had not deliberately set out to flout ANC policy, but had believed they were acting in accordance with the wishes of the leadership, or had acted in anger. This was particularly the case with younger, more recent recruits. Conveying the instructions of the leadership in this unequivocal manner through the most senior officials of MK HQ was sufficient action, as the overwhelming majority of MK cadres were disciplined soldiers and activists.
In August 1988 the NEC issued a statement specifically on the conduct of armed struggle in the country:
"The NEC further re-affirmed the centrality of the armed struggle in the national democratic revolution and the need to further escalate armed actions and transform our offensive into a generalised peoples war. (...,) However, the NEC also expressed concern at the recent spate of attacks on civilian targets. Some of these attacks have been carried out by cadres of the peoples army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, inspired by anger at the regimes campaign of terror against the oppressed and democratic forces, both within and outside South Africa. In certain instances operational circumstances resulted in unintended casualties."4.4. Post 1990: Suspension of armed operations
Most MK MHQ personnel returned from exile for the December 1990 Consultative Conference. After this conference, MHQ awaited further instructions from the NEC with regard to its role and future direction. MK cadres inside the country had begun surfacing and coming to the ANC office to seek guidance. A rudimentary structure was set up to look after the needs of these cadres while awaiting policy decisions from the political leadership.
The ANC had taken a principled decision to release agents of the regime who were still imprisoned in Uganda at this time as part of the process of furthering the negotiations. However, the regime did not reciprocate and many ANC cadres, especially those on death row, were only released in 1992 after the signing of the "Record of Understanding".
The Groote Schuur Minute, the Pretoria Minute and the DF Malan Accord determined the future of MK activities.
The armed struggle was suspended in August 1990 with the signing of the Pretoria Minute. It was decided that those MK cadres who were outside the country - in camps or in the Front Line States - should undergo further training to prepare them for integration into a new South African Defence Force. Limited numbers of cadres were sent for advanced officers training in conventional warfare. Countries including India, Ghana, Pakistan, Uganda and Tanzania hosted these cadres.
In terms of the Pretoria Minute the ANC had agreed to stop bringing arms into the country. The DF Malan Accord of 1992 aimed to bring the arms of all the armed forces in the country under control. However, the De Klerk regime interpreted the Accord to mean that this applied only to MK; various negotiations ensued, without resolving the matter.
We dealt with the issue of SDUs in considerable detail in our first submission, and our responses to questions raised by the TRC in this regard are dealt with in the main document of this second submission. It will suffice to note that SDUs were formed in response to the violence which erupted as the ANC suspended armed struggle. In response to pleas for assistance from communities under attack, the ANC tasked some members of MK Military HQ to attend to issues relating to SDUs, their organisation, training and the provision of weaponry. It was made clear that SDUs would be exclusively for the purpose of self-defence, that the overall control of SDUs was to remain with the communities concerned, and if MK cadres participated in SDUs they would do so as members of the community: MK Command would not play a leading role, as it was felt this might jeopardise negotiations.
In 1991, MHQ organised a conference for MK in Venda to inform cadres of the state of the negotiations and to get their views on the future of MK. The conference was attended by representatives of cadres from inside the country as well as those in camps in Tanzania and Uganda.
The Venda MK conference supported the decisions taken at the ANCs July conference in Durban, and called on the ANC leadership to secure the release of MK combatants who were still in prison. Cadres called on Chris Hani to remain MK Chief-of-Staff.
The conference also called for a reorganisation of MHQ with the view to preparing for serious negotiations with the regime on military matters and a future defence force. It was decided that multi-lateral talks would be held with all forces within the country, and that the homeland armies should be discouraged from individually holding bilateral negotiations with the SADF.
Following the Venda Conference, the ANC re-organised MHQ (details in this regard appear in the appendix on ANC structures and personnel.) Regional structures were established in each of the ANCs 14 organisational regions and cadres appointed to liaise with MK personnel living in these areas.
There was increasing pressure from the military camps from cadres anxious to return home. Once negotiations appeared to be proceeding relatively smoothly at Kempton Park, the return of these cadres was speeded up.
After initial bi-lateral negotiations between MK Command and the SADF, we went on to have multi-lateral negotiations with the seven existing armed forces in the country. MK and other forces participated in the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council under the Transitional Executive Council.
In December 1993, MK held its final parade. After the elections, the integration of all members of all armed forces into a new SANDF began in earnest in May 1994. Later that year, the weapons that were in MK Ordnance stockpiles were handed over to the SANDF. Other weapons were collected and handed over. The President decided that all MK arms stockpiled in foreign countries should he donated to those countries; they were not compatible with those used in the SANDF.
We have selected two case studies - one from Special Operations, the other from general military operations - to illustrate some of the points regarding the conduct of armed struggle that we have highlighted in our submissions to the TRC. Operations such as the attack on SAAF HQ and the laying of anti-tank mines have been seen in some quarters as contradictions of ANC policy regarding the avoidance of civilian casualties.
The SAAF HQ operation illustrates the problems which arose as a result of the enemy locating strategic installations in high-density civilian areas. In the section on anti-tank landmines, we provide the TRC with more detail on the objective of these operations and the operational difficulties which arose.
This operation came in the wake of a cross-border raid into Lesotho in which 42 ANC supporters and BaSotho were killed, and the assassination of Ruth First in Maputo. The objective was to carry out a highly visible attack, which was impossible to cover up, against military personnel in uniform. No direct operations had previously been carried out against military personnel except for a number of skirmishes between MK cadres and the security forces, usually in the remote border areas.
It was decided to target military personnel who waited for buses outside SAAF HQ at approximately 16h30 each day. In the early stages of planning this operation, discussions were held on the possible loss of civilian life, and whether this would be justified. After careful consideration it was decided by OR Tambo, in terms of the mandate he had been given by the NEC, that Special Operations should proceed with the operation, taking great care to ensure that the target was unmistakably military.
On the afternoon of May 20th, 1983, the unit drove into Pretoria and parked the car packed with explosives in Church Street, at the entrance of Air Force HQ. When the bomb exploded a few minutes earlier than planned, 19 people were killed, including both MK cadres and 11 Air Force officers, According to initial media reports, more than 200 military personnel and a few civilians were injured, but these figures were later distorted by the government in an attempt to portray this attack as aimed at civilians.
The ANC never used anti-personnel mines, specifically because we were concerned to avoid civilian casualties. The ANC used only anti-tank mines, which require at least 300kg to detonate. The objective of these operations was to strike at the SADF personnel patrolling borders, and at the Commando units consisting of farmers linked to the area defence systems within the overall security network. The areas in which these operations took place were primarily the designated areas along the Botswana, Zimbabwe and Swaziland borders.
In 1979 the Promotion of Density of Population in Designated Areas Act, No. 87, was passed in an attempt to stem the exodus of white farmers from border areas, and increase the number of farmers in these areas to serve as the first line of defence against the infiltration of guerrillas from neighbouring states. At least R100m was made available over a period of five to six years for the provisions of loans to such farmers, and for the construction of strategic roads and airstrips in these areas.
The Act stipulated that loans be given on condition that farms were managed according to SADF directives, and that all white farmers in the areas had to undergo military training, be members of the regional and area commandos, and make themselves available to the SADF and Department of National Security to carry out reconnaissance and intelligence tasks whenever called on to do so. All were linked into the Commando system of part-time SADF forces and the military radio network known as MARNET. Many farm buildings were constructed in such a way as to constitute a chain of defence strongholds along the borders ready to be used by the SADF whenever necessary. The Act stipulated that the SADF was empowered to enter any property in the designated area to demolish or erect military facilities or any other structure without the consent of the owner. (For more information, please refer to p. 59 of our main submission.)
These measures were not only defensive: Messina, Louis Trichardt, Alldays, Ellisras, Thabazimbi, Zeerust, Piet Retief, and Amsterdam were all key towns from which acts of aggression were launched against neighbouring states.
The tactic adopted was to lay anti-tank mines overnight so that they would be triggered when the SADF patrolled first thing the next morning. Roads in the immediate border area were used primarily by the SADF and farmers actively supporting the efforts of the SADF, thereby defining themselves as legitimate targets. Most farm workers went on foot and would, it was reasoned, not be affected.
The decision to use landmines and the choice of area of operation was made at Military HQ; the commands were based in Zimbabwe and later, for operations in the Eastern Transvaal, in Swaziland.
Units would be sent into the country to conduct reconnaissance with the aim or determining the movements of enemy personnel on the roads, their routines and schedules, the habits of local people, etc. This usually took a few days; once the reconnaissance had been completed, cadres reported back to their commanders. Operational plans were drawn up, and the reports and plans were then sent to Military HQ. When operations were approved, detailed implementation plans were drawn up and cadres instructed to lay the mines.
Initial operations were carried out fairly close to the borders - within 2-4 km. However OR Tambo ordered that operations should be carried out deeper inside the country as the governments of neighbouring countries were coming under pressure from the apartheid regime. The effect of this was to move some operations into areas where the roads were not used almost exclusively by the defence force and Commando farmers. In addition, because cadres had to be in the country longer there was an increase in the number of firefights between guerrillas and the security forces.
When it became apparent that the landmine operations were not having the desired effect of consistently striking at security forces, they were suspended by MHQ.
It is not possible to give a detailed account of every MK operation, as requested by the TRC. We did not keep records of this nature, mainly for security reasons. More detail will be forthcoming in applications for amnesty by various commanders and combatants.
There are two lists of armed actions attached to this submission. Appendix 4 provides information on operations carried out by members of MK, arranged chronologically and according to the nature of the target in each case. It is drawn from reports, recollections of the MK commanders, press reports, and the SAIRR annual surveys. There are probably omissions, and some mistakes may have occurred due to incorrect reporting or a range of other reasons.
The incidents and attacks listed in Appendix 5 fall into the grey area described above. We are not certain that all these attacks were carried out by MK personnel or by people trained by MK personnel. We cannot state with certainty what the objectives of these attacks were, but it is probable that many were carried out in good faith in the belief - incorrectly at times - that the cadre was acting in accordance with the injunctions by the leadership to intensify the struggle at all costs and carry the struggle to white areas. In other cases we strongly doubt that our cadres were responsible, but do not have sufficient information to substantiate this.
In the course of war life is lost. The challenge before us was to avoid indiscriminate killing of civilians, which MK certainly had the capacity to carry out. Although it is possible that entirely accurate statistics will never be known beyond any doubt, it is evident that MK acted with great restraint.
This record should be compared with the many thousands of deaths of civilians at the hands of successive apartheid regimes - with this continuing right until April 1994 - in countless massacres, assassinations, and executions. In addition there have b een millions of civilian casualties - bloodshed of holocaust proportions - in wars waged by surrogate forces in neighbouring states.
We also register our deep regret for the deaths of innocent civilians killed in the course of the struggle for justice and freedom. We extend our condolences to the families of all those who were killed or injured, including the soldiers and police wh o fought against us. The taking of life is not an easy thing; to us all life is sacred, and we have never been callous in our struggle.
Details are not available, but it is estimated that the MK High Command co-ordinated over 190 acts of sabotage between October 1961 and July 1963. There were no deaths or injuries.
Note: a study by Tom Lodge of the University of the Witwatersrand estimated that there were 150 MK attacks between 1976 - 1982
30/11/76 Skirmish with SAP: Eastern Transvaal Two SAP killed as arrested cadres escape custody, throwing grenade into SAP vehicle
15/06/1977 Unplanned actions/skirmish with SAP: Two civilians killed in warehouse in Goch Street during unplanned panic reaction when cadres realised they were being followed by SAP; two cadres captured; Monty Motlaung beaten so badly by SAP he was brain damaged; Solomon Mahlangu hanged
27/10/77 SAP personnel: Bophutatswana; Three cadres killed by SAP after throwing a
??/01/78 Personnel actively assisting SAP:
10/03/78 Government buildings: Bantu Affairs Admin. Board, Port Elizabeth Bomb explodes
14/04/78 Personnel actively assisting SAP: Former deputy president of the ANC in the
14/01/79 Skirmish with SAP: farm near Zeerust; Seven cadres clash with SAP; I captured, others escape over Botswana border
24/01/79 Economic: railway between Fort Beaufort and King Williamstown Large quantity of explosives on line found and defused
05/05/79 SAP personnel/building: Moroka SAP Station Cadres open fire in charge office; 1 SAP killed, 3 injured; 3 civilians injured; extensive damage caused by grenades in offices
November 1979 SAP building/personnel: Orlando SAP Station Cadres open fire, hurl grenades into charge office; 2 SAP killed, 2 SAP wounded; pamphlets distributed
14/01/80 SAP building/ support for community resistance: Soekmekaar SAP Station Little damage; minor injury to one SAP; local community involved in struggle against forced removal
04/04/80 SAP buildings & personnel: Booysens SAP Station Attack with grenades, rocket launchers, AKs causes damage, no injuries
01/06/80 Economic: Sasol 1,2 and Natref Eight fuel tanks destroyed in series of blasts; no injuries; R58-m damage
15/10/80 Economic/support for community resistance: Railway line in Dube blown up; Soweto community had called for a stayaway previous day to protest against rent increases, visit by Koornhof
29/10/80 Government buildings: West Rand Administration Board Two grenades cause extensive damage, injure security guard and friend
30/10/80 Government residence: Port Elizabeth House of Transkei consul damaged with bomb; no injuries
According to the SAIRR, between January and October 1981 there were at least 40 ANC guerilla attacks in urban areas; there were 17 between July 1979 and June 1980.
21/05/81 Economic/Republic Day protests: PE rail link to Johannesburg and Cape Town Line damaged by explosion
25/05/81: Series of actions in support of Republic Day protests:
21/07/81 Economic: power supply; Pretoria, Middelburg, Ermelo At least six explosions at three installations
02/09/81 SAP buildings & personnel: Mabopane SAP station Two SAP, two civilians (one a child) killed
10/10/81 Economic: Durban railway station Government buildings: Durban offices, Dept. Co-operation and Development Four injuries; no details
01/11/81 SADF buildings & personnel: Jeppes Reef House near Swaziland border occupied by SADF Destroyed in rocket/grenade attack
09/12/81 Government buildings: office of Chief Commissioner, Department of Co-operation and Development, Cape Town
According to the SAIRR, there were at least 26 sabotage attacks by the ANC between December 1981 and November 1982; 13 suspected ANC cadres were killed in shoot-outs with the SAP. According to the SAP, there were 39 acts of insurgency in 1982.
21/05/81 Government buildings: Port Natal Administration Board, Pinetown bombed Government buildings: Offices of Dept. Coloured Affairs, Durban
04/06/82 Government buildings: offices of Presidents Council, Cape Town Bomb explodes in lift shaft of building housing these offices; one killed
28/06/82 Economic: Scheepersnek: Two bombs cause extensive damage to railway depot, pump station, stores, vehicles; Durban-Witwatersrand oil pipeline shattered SAP & Government buildings: Port Elizabeth; Station Commanders office and New Law Courts damaged
28/08/82 SADF buildings: Umvoti Mounted Rifles Army Camp, Red Hill, Durban Extensive damage to building and three SADF vehicles
26/10/82 Government buildings: Drakensberg Administration. Board, Pietermaritzburg Three bombs explode
20-21/11/82 SADF/SAP installation & personnel: SAP rural station & temporary SADF garrison at Tonga Rocket attack seriously injures two SADF personnel
31/12/82 Government building / SAP building: Johannesburg Magistrates court (200m from John Vorster Square) Explosion; no details
26/01/83 Government buildings: New Brighton Community Council offices Building extensively damaged; one dead, five injured
May 1983 Government buildings: Roodepoort; Offices of Dept. Internal Affairs Damaged in two explosions: R250 000 damage
20/05/83 SADF personnel and building: Nineteen killed (2 MK, 11 SAAF officers) in car bomb at entrance to SAAF HQ, opposite building housing military intelligence personnel; 217 injured (number of military/ civilian injuries unclear
28/06/83 Government buildings: Dept. Internal Affairs, Roodepoort Explosion; no details July 1983 Economic: Sasol plant, Secunda Minor damage
07/07/83 Government buildings: Dept. Internal Affairs, Roodepoort; SAP building: Roodepoort Bombs detonate at 00h40 causing structural damage
06/08/83 Armed propaganda: Bomb explodes at Temple Israel, Hillbrow, before Marais Steyn due to speak there; no injuries
20/08/83 Economic: substation near Mamelodi Explosion causes damage of R100 000 26/08/83 Government buildings: Ciskei consular generals offices, Carlton Centre Limpet mines explode at 18h50; one injured
12/09/83 Government buildings: Ciskei offices in Pretoria Limpet mine planted after hours causes structural damage
13/09/83 Economic/support of industrial action: Rowntree factory, Umbilo Bomb blast at 19h45; structural damage
11/10/83 Economic/SADF personnel: Warmbaths; Mines explode at 02h20; extensively damage large fuel storage tanks, three rail tankers, one road tanker; two devices set to explode 1 hour later found on door of Civil Defence office; no injuries. PW Botha due to speak in Warmbaths.
01/11/83 Economic: Durban Buses at municipal bus depot damaged by bomb at midnight Economic: Germiston Railway line bombed Economic: Springs SAP defuses bomb on railway line SAP building/personnel: Durban SAP workshop Bombed; no details
02/11/83 SAP vehicles: Wentworth; Explosion at 02h55 damages vehicles in SAP mobile store and adjacent student residence (Alan Taylor Residence)
03/11/83 Economic: Bosmont railway station Damaged by bomb Economic: bus depot near Durban SAP buildings: SAP store near Durban 22/11/83 Economic: Durban Pylons damaged by two explosions
03/11/83 Economic: railway line, Bosmont/Newclare railway line damaged in explosion railway line near Germiston damaged by explosion railway line near Springs; explosives defused
03or 07/12/83 Government building: office of Department of Community Development, Bree Street., Johannesburg Explosion; no injuries
12/12/83 Government buildings: offices of Dept Community Development and Commissioners Court, Johannesburg Severe damage in limpet mine explosion; seven injured
15/12/83 Government buildings: offices of Dept Foreign Affairs, Johannesburg Seven injured in explosion SADF buildings: Natal Command HQ Three bombs explode on beach front nearby; no damage
According to the Institute for Strategic Studies, Pretoria, there were 44 MK attacks during this year.
29/02/84 Economic: Mandini Power Station Bomb explodes; no information SAP building: Mandini SAP station Bombed; no details
11/03/84 Economic: Mobil fuel depot, Ermelo; Four explosions, extensive damage, five storage tanks destroyed; no injuries
12/05/84 Government buildings: Durban, Trust Bank; Explosion causes extensive damage to offices of Dept. Internal Affairs and Durban HQ of SA. Railways Police injured
13/05/84 Economic: Mobil Oil Refinery, Durban; Cadres set fire to refinery in RPG.7 attack; running skirmish lasting several hours ends when car in which cadres were travelling is followed to construction site by police; all were killed along with three labourers who burned to death when paint store set alight in the battle. 4 SAP also injured.
16/05/84 SAP personnel: Jabulani; Explosion destroys two private vehicles belonging to SAP members outside Jabulani SAP station
06/06/84 Economic: petrol rail tankers, Merewent, Durban Four mines damage railway / defused (unclear)
28/07/84 Government buildings: SA Railways Police charge office, KwaMashu Attacked with hand grenades
7/08/84 Property of government personnel: Extensive damage to Tshabalala Dry Cleaners, Soweto Economic: Glenmore, Durban Escom sub-station destroyed
12/08/84 Government buildings: Department of Internal Affairs, Johannesburg Explosion causes minor damage
16/08/84 SAP buildings/personnel: SAP HQ Soweto East; Roodepoort City Centre Building Two mines destroy the second and third floors of building, injure District Commander, four SAP, two civilians; R260 000 damage
24/08/84 Government buildings: SA Railways Police Regional offices, Dept Internal Affairs offices in Anchor Life Building Bomb explodes at 17h30; two civilians and four Railways Police injured
03/09/84 Government buildings: Dept. Internal Affairs, Johannesburg Explosion at 16h07; four injured
05/09/84 Economic: Escom sub-station, Rustenberg; Explosion destroys installations, disrupts power to Rustenberg and large area of Bophutatswana.
14/09/84 Government Buildings: Department of Community Development, Krugersdorp Bomb at 17h00 causes damage
According to the Institute for Strategic Studies, Pretoria, there were 136 MK attacks during this year, a 209% increase compared with figures for 1984.
02/05/85 Economic/ support for workers: explosion at Anglo American and Anglovaal, Johannesburg R170 thousand structural damage caused. Both had engaged in mass dismissals of mine workers
15/05/85 Government buildings: Brakpan Commissioners court and offices of Messenger of the court Attacks on the morning of the funeral of Andries Raditsela who had died in detention
??/06/85 Economic/support of worker struggle: AECI offices, Johannesburg Bomb damages offices; company was involved in labour dispute
//?06/85 Economic: Umtata Explosion destroys Transkei Development Corporation bulk fuel depot; disrupted water and power supplies
??/06/85 Collaborators in apartheid repression: Attack on home of Rajbansi with petrol bombs and hand grenades; no injuries Government personnel: Attack on home of former Gugulethu town councillor; no details
??/07/85 Support for worker struggles: Umlazi Hand grenade damages bakery in Umlazi where workers were on strike
??/10/85 SAP personnel: Cape Town; Shots fired at police patrol; two incidents of attacks on police with hand grenades; no further details
??/11/85 SAP personnel: Cape Town Four people including SAP officer and wife, railways policeman, killed in various hand grenade attacks; total of 20 such attacks recorded by this time say SAP.
??/11/85 SAP personnel: Cape Town Two grenade attacks on homes of SAP personnel SAP buildings: Manenberg SAP Station Vehicles damaged in grenade attack
??/11/85 SADF/Personnel actively assisting SADF: Soutpansberg area Anti-tank mine explodes; four SADF, four others injured
6/12/85 SAP personnel: police patrol in Soweto One SAP injured by grenade 08/12/85 SAP personnel: Chesterville Home of SAP member bombed; no details
??/12/85 Government buildings: Chatsworth Magistrates Court; Limpet mine explodes at 18h00; structural damage
17/12/85 Economic/support of industrial action: Limpet mine explodes at 03h00; damages eight buses, PUTCO Fleetline depot, Umlazi
19/12/85 SADF/Personnel actively supporting SADF: Wiepe area One farmer or civilian injured in anti-tank mine explosion
20/12/85 SADF/Personnel actively supporting SADF: Messina Six killed in anti-tank mine explosion in game farm
23/12/85 Cadre response to state brutality: Five civilians killed, 40 injured in Amanzimtoti shopping centre blast; attempted warning failed; Andrew Zondo hanged.
In Parliament in February 1987, Adriaan Vlok refused to disclose the number or nature of incidents of sabotage, armed attacks and explosions that had occurred during 1986 as this was not in the interests of the safety of the Republic. According to the Institute of Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria, there were 230 incidents of insurgency during the year, a 69,1% increase over the 136 incidents in 1985.
??/01/86 SADF/ Personnel actively supporting SADF: Ellisras area near Botswana border Two killed in anti-tank mine explosion; no details
04/01/86 SADF/personnel actively assisting SADF: Stockpoort (Botswana border) Two killed and two injured in anti-tank mine explosion
05/01/86 Skirmishes with SAP: roadblock on East London /King Williamstown road One SAP killed, one cadre killed
04/02/86 SADF personnel: Gugulethu Four SADF injured when grenade thrown into their military vehicle
09//01/86 Economic/ SAP personnel: Durban Limpet damages substation in Jacobs, 21h15; second limpet explodes kills one SAP, injures three - five SAP (or one SAP, two engineers)
20/01/86 Economic/SAP personnel: Four limpets damage pylon near Durban 20h45; fifth probably aimed at SAP explodes later; no injuries
09/02/86 SAP personnel: Umlazi Limpet mine destroys two SAP vehicles at Umlazi SAP station when parked after returning from riot patrol; no injuries
19/02/86 SAP personnel: Cambridge East SAP station; Explosion in toilet block near Radio Control room; no injures
12/02/86 SADF/ personnel actively assisting SADF: near Messina Bakkie detonates anti-tank mine; no injuries
17/02/86 Skirmishes with SAP: Zwide Two SAP killed, two cadres killed, one arrested SAP personnel: area unknown One SAP injured when vehicle hit by 10 bullets
??/02/86 Economic: De Deur Limpet causes structural damage to substation 01/03/86 Skirmishes with SAP: Port Elizabeth or Grahamstown One SAP seriously injured, cadre killed
04/03/86 SAP building/personnel: John Vorster Square Two SAP members, two civilians injured in explosion on 3rd floor
15/03/86 Government buildings: Limpet mine explodes in front of Springs railway station, outside Indian Administration Offices; one civilian seriously injured
26/03/86 Skirmish with SAP: Volsloorus One cadre killed when he allegedly threw grenade at SAP members
08/04/86 Collaborators in apartheid repression: attack on home of former LP secretary in Natal, Kevin Leaf No injuries
21/04/86 SADF / personnel actively assistingSADF: Breyten/Chrissiesmeer district Two anti-tank landmines detonate, injuring two civilians in taxi and one tractor driver
21/04/86 Skirmishes with SAP: Alexandra Cadre attacks SAP, one seriously injured; cadre retreated unharmed
27/04/86 Skirmishes with SAP: Edendale hospital Gordon Webster rescued; one civilian killed, two SAP injured
25/05/86 SADF / personnel actively assisting SADF: farm of Colonel Koos Durr, near Davel Anti-tank miine kills two, injures eight
10/06/86 SADF/ personnel actively assisting SADF: the farm Boshoek, 5km from Volksrust Anti-tank mine injures one person
10/06/86 SADF/ personnel actively assisting SADF: the farm Blomhof,near Volksrust Anti-tank mine injures two farmworkers
14/06/86 SADF personnel: Magoos/ Why Not bars Car bomb kills three, injures 69, the majority civilians; McBride sentenced to death
16/06/86 SADF/ personnel actively assisting SADF: Winterveldt: Probable anti-tank mine explosion kills three BDF troops in troop carrier
22/06/86 Economic: fuel storage tanks, Jacobs; Limpet damages tanks Economic: liquid fuel pipeline betw. Sapref and Limpet damages pipeline Mobil Refinery near Durban
30/06/86 SAP personnel: Westville, Natal Mine explodes 03h15 on pedestrian bridge; second limpet aimed at responding SAP members explodes 15 minutes later
05/07/86 SADF/Personnel actively assisting SADF: Volksrust One person injured by anti-tank landmine; no details
05/07/86 Government personnel: Vosloorus and Katlehong; Five Development Board. officials killed in two attacks on their vehicles; two cadres killed
26/07/86 SAP personnel: Katlehong; Cadres attack municipal police twice; both cadres killed, five police killed, 12 police injured
30/07/86 SAP personnel: Umtata SAP station Three SAP, four civlians die , seven SAP injured in grenade and AK attack
30/07/86 SADF/Personnel actively supporting SADF: near Nelspruit Anti-tank landmine explodes: no injuries
16/08/86 SADF/ personnel actively assisting SADF: E. Tvl border area Anti-tank landmine kills five, injures two civilians
17/08/86 SADF/ personnel actively assisting SADF: the farm Stellen Rust near Nelspruit Anti-tank mine injures two civilians
22/08/86 Personnel actively assisting SAP: Natal Grenade attack on Inkathas Winnington Sabelo; AK 47 fired at car of his wife as she entered the driveway, killing her and injuring 3 children
24/08/86 Government personnel: Imbali Grenade attack on home of town councillor Austin Kwejama; one child killed, one child injured
24/09/86 Government personnel/ support for community action Home of Soweto Housing Director, Del Kevin, extensively damaged by limpet mine; no injuries
06/10/86 SADF/ personnel actively assisting SADF: Mbuzini, near Mozabique border Anti-tank landmiine injures six SADF members in military vehicle
22/10/86 Personnel actively supporting SADF: two anti-tank landmine explosions Damage to property (Van Zyl)
Early Nov. 1986 Economic/ support for community struggle Two offices of PUTCO bombed in Soweto after fare increase of 17,5% announced
02or04/11/86 SADF/Personnel actively assisting SADF: near Nelspruit Anti-tank landmine explosion kills one woman, one child injured
10/11/86 Government buildings: Newcastle Magistrates Court Two bombs explode; 24 injuries including Magistrate and Public Prosecutor
23/11/86 Government buildings: Fordsburg flats Limpet mines explode at new housing for Sowto town councillors; no injuries
15/12/86 SADF / personnel actively assisting SADF: Barberton area Anti-tank landmine injures two SAP in SAP vehicle
19/12/86 SADF / personnel actively assisting SADF: Komatipoort area Anti-tank landmine injures SADF member Government personnel: Soweto Grenade attack on home of Soweto councillor; two SAP injured
Note: According to the Institute of Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria, there were 234 incidents of insurgency during 1987; there had been 230 in 1986.
1987 Government buildings: Jhbg Magistrates Court Four killed, several injured 1987 SAP buildings: Kwandebele SAP station No details
08/01/86 SAP personnel: AECI plant Policeman shot at; skirmish followed inwhich two SAP and one civilian injured
12/01/87 OK Bazaars HQ: Bomb causes extensive damage, no injures (Note: there had been a protracted strike.)
09/01/87 SAP personnel: near KTC Riot Squad member killed, two injured by grenade thrown into their vehicle
31/01/87 Government personnel: Diepmeadow; Home of town councillor Senokoane attacked; six injured including two SAP officers
02/02/87 SAP personnel: Single Quarters, Bokomo SAP Station Two attacks with grenades; one SAP injured
19/02/87 Personnel actively assisting SAP: Grenade injures Chief Lushaba and Samuel Jamile of Inkatha
03/03/87 SAP personnel: Gugulethu Cadre shot dead by police after he allegedly fired on their patrol with an AK 47
17/03/87 Skirmishes with SAP: Inanda SAP raid; cadre resisted; SAP kill cadre, one woman, injure man and baby
28/03/87 SADF / personnel actively assisting SADF: Josefsdal/Swaziland border area Anti-tank landmine kills four, injures one civilian
01/04/87 SAP/SADF personnel: Mabopane or Mamelodi Grenade thrown into Hippo, three SADF killed, two injured
??/04/87 Skirmish with SAP: Umlazi Three cadres killed, four SAP injured, one critically, in shootout
23/04/87 SAP personnel: Bonteheuwel Grenade attack on home of SAP member No details
24/04/87 Skirmishes with SAP: Umlazi Riot SAP raid; cadres resisted; three Riot SAP injured, two cadres killed
04/05/87 SADF / personnel actively assisting SADF: area west of Messina; Driver killed and 10 passengers injured when truck detonates landmine
16/05/87 SAP personnel: Newcastle; Explosion at Newcastle station waiting room; second explosion at 01h34 while SAP investigating first blast; one SAP injured
20/05/87 Government buildings; SAP personnel: Johannesburg Magistrates Court Car bomb kills three SAP, injures four SAP, six civilians injured
12/06/87 SAP personnel: Witbank Two SAP found dead Government buildings: Athlone Magistrates Court Limpet mine explodes; no details
15/06/87 Government personnel: Gugulethu; Grenade attack on home of councillor; four injured, two of them special constables
06/07/87 Skirmishes with SAP: Mdantsane; SAP ambush: cadre kills two, injures three Riot Unit SAP; cadre shot dead
08/07/87 Skirmish with SAP: Motherwell SAP crush alleged cadre and his sister to death in shack after they allegedly were fired on
30/07/87 SADF personnel/ personnel actively assisting SADF: the farm Bodena owned by Danie Hough Anti-tank landmine injures three civilians
30/07/87 SADF personnel and buildings: Car bomb explodes outside Witwatersrand Command killing one SADF, injuring 68 military personnel and civilians
27/08/87 Government personnel: Soweto; Home of former Mayor Kunene attacked; two council police killed
30/08/87 SADF personnel: Military barracks, Dobsonville Grenade thrown at five soldiers outside barracks; estimated eight SADF members killed or injured
02/09/87 Skirmish with SAP: Sandton SAP kill cadre after he allegedly threw a grenade at a roadblock
??/09/87 SAP Personnel: Marble Hall Commander of KwaNdebele National Guard Unit and his son (also SAP officer) found shot dead by AK 47 fire
01/10/87 Collaborators in apartheid repression: Bomb placed outside door of Rajbansis NPP office in Lenasia explodes hours after official opening; no injuries
12/11/87 Government buildings: Zola Municipal offices Two limpet mines explode, third detonated by SAP
14/11/87 SADF personnel: Cape Town; SADF commemoration march from CT to the Castle: limpet mine explodes in bin which over 700 SAP and SADF filed past; 1 SADF injured
23/11/87 Skirmishes with SAP: Umlazi; SAP raid on house: two cadres and alleged collaborator killed; two SAP injured by cadres who resisted
10/12/87 Skirmishes with SAP: Port Elizabeth area SAP raid on shack; heavy resistance from cadres; SAP drove Casspir over shack, killing four
25/01/88 SAP personnel: Kokstad; Limpet exploded at Kokstad Mens Club opposite Kokstad SAP station; frequented by SAP; building, two vehicles damaged
01/02/88 Skirmishes with SAP: ? Transkei; roadblock Cadres attempted to resist; three killed, one injured by Transkei police
12/02/88 Personnel actively assisting SAP: Johannesburg; Cadre opens fire on car driven by ex-Rhodesian soldier, now private security firm official; details on injuries unclear
01/03/88 SADF personnel: Benoni Explosion causes extensive damage to bus transporting SAAF personnel; no details
07/03/88 Skirmishes with SAP: Queenstown SAP raid; cadre resisted, wounded six SAP; cadre and civilian killed by SAP
17/03/88 SAP personnel: Krugersdorp magistrates court and adjacent SAP Station Two SADF, one civilian killed; 20 injured in car bomb court and adjacent SAP station; plan to prevent civilian injuries failed
27/03/88 SAP/SADF personnel: Pietersburg; Antheas Club, frequented by SAP and SADF, slightly damaged by limpet placed in back garden; no injuries
09/04/88 Government buildings: Atteridgeville Development Board canteen Limpet explodes nearby; no injuries
12/04/88 Skirmishes with SAP: Mpumalanga township; SAP cornered cadre who killed self and two SAP with grenade; trapped second cadre who resisted: cadre killed one SAP and three civilians wounded in crossfire
15/04/88 Explosion outside Pretoria Sterland cinema One cadre killed, one civilian injured According to an ANC official in Lusaka, the intended target was a nearby government building; the bomb exploded prematurely
22/04/88 SAP personnel: Soweto Cadre ambushes municipal police vehicle, wounds four SAP, one civilian
04/05/88 SAP personnel / buildings: Kagiso SAP Single Quarters Limpet mine explodes against wall; no details
24/05/88 SAP personnel: Germiston station Cadre opened fire on SAP at station; killed when SAP returned fire; three civilians injured in crossfire
03/06/88 SADF buildings / personnel: SA Irish Regiment HQ, Anderson St, Johannesburg Explosion; no details
03/06/88 SAP personnel / buildings: Explosion outside Standard Bank, Roodepoort during lunch hour kills 4, injures 18 civilians According to an ANC official in Lusaka, the target had not been civilians but an SAP station nearby; no details on what operational difficulties caused this incident.
29/06/88 SADF personnel: cafe in Poynton building frequented by SADF and Prisons officials Explosion injures two SADF, two Prisons personnel, 13 civilians
14/07/88 Skirmishes with SADF: Kruger National Park; follow-up operation after 12/07 landmine Four cadres killed
16/07/88 SAP personnel: Nyanga Cadre fires on SAP vehicle; one civilian killed, one injured SAP return fire; cadre wounded
17/07/88 SAP personnel: Soweto highway Cadre opens fire on SAP vehicle from back of bakkie; two SAP injured
22/07/88 Government personnel: Soweto Grenade attack on home of Soweto Council personnel manager, BE Qakisa; no details
26/07/88 Government personnel: Soweto Three grenade attacks on homes of Administration Board employees( P. Legare, Mr Naledi, Mr Gumede); no details
??/07/88 Collaborators in apartheid represssion: Lenasia Explosion outside home of member of Presidents Council, Dr Ismail Jajbhay; no injuries
03/08/88 SADF building and personnel: Wits Command Car bomb explodes; no injuries Skirmishes with SAP: Bridgewater area Five cadres killed in two incidents
19/08/88 SADF buildings/personnel: The Castle, Cape Town Mini-limpet mine explodes within Castle grounds; no details
20/08/88 Government personnel: Duncan Village Grenade attack on home of mayor, Eddie Makeba; extensive damage; no injuries
??/09/88 Collaborators in apartheid repression: Bomb goes off at Laudium home of Pretoria municipal election candidate; no injuries
22/09/88 Collaborators in apartheid repression: Explosion at the home of municipal election candidate SD Goolam injures four SAP, two guards, one civilian
??/09/88 Three limpet mines in Lenasia explode at the offices of the Lenasia bus service, at the home of the Lenasia Management Committee, and the offices of the House of Delegates; no injuries
03/09/88 Skirmishes with SAP: Molweni, Durban Cadre fires on SAP from house; cadre killed, four injured
10/09/88 Collaborators in apartheid repression: Mini-limpet placed under basin next to back door of Lenasia HOD candidate, Mrs Ebrahim; no details
19/09/88 SAP building & personnel: Benoni Car bomb explodes in flats 100m from SAP station; two civilians injured
??/10/88 Collaborators in apartheid repression: Bomb damages campaign HQ of a Wentworth municipal candidate in Durban
??/10/88 Government personnel Municipal councillor and assistant escape injury when hand grenades thrown at them in Thokoza
??/10/88 Explosion at KwaThema civic centre used as polling point in municipal elections; baby killed, four people injured
??/10/88 Government buildings: Magistrates Courts at Wynberg (Johannesburg), Bishop Lavis, and Stellenbosch Explosions at these three places cause no injuries
??/10/88 SAP Buildings & personnel: near Alexandra Municipal Police offices Limpet mine causes extensive damage, no injuries
??/10/88 Government personnel: Wattville and Thokoza: Homes of municipal candidates attacked with hand grenades; no injuries Tumahole; Limpet mine explodes at homes of two councillors; no injuries Gompo Town; Hand grenade attack on home of deputy mayor; no injuries
??/10/88 SAP buildings & personnel: Katlehong Municipal Police barracks Mini-limpet explodes, no details
??/10/88 SAP personnel: Potchefstroom: building housing Security Branch Bomb explodes, at least one SAP injury
??/12/88 Government buildings: Boksburg Receiver of Revenue offices Limpet mine explodes; no injuries
??/12/88 Government buildings: Cape Two municipal buildings, Magistrates Court in Paarl. Bombs explode; no injuries
??/01/89 Economic: Post Office, King Williamstown No details Economic: Railways, Wilsonia, (E Cape) No details Economic : Mount Ruth railway station, Mdantsane No details
??/01/89 Economic/SAP personnel: Glenwood, Durban Escom sub-station damaged by explosion; SAP defuse second bomb nearby
??/01/89 Collaborators in apartheid repression:Benoni Limit mine explodes at home of the chair of the Ministers Council in the House of Delegates extensive damage no injuries
??/01/89 SAP building/personnel: Katlehong Municipal Police Station Two municipal police killed in grenade attack
??/02/89 SAP personnel: Col. D. Dlamini, commander of Katlehong SAP Station Limpet explodes at his home; no details
??/04/89 SAP personnel: Thokoza Two municipal police injured when grenades thrown at councillors home
??/05/89 SADF installation: Klippan Radar Station Attack by large group of guerillas using mortars; no injuries reported
??/06/89 Collaborators in apartheid repression Limpet mine at home of Boetie Abramjee LP MP; no details
??/08/89 SAP building/personnel: Brixton Flying Squad HQ Attacked with hand grenades and AKs; no injuries reported
??/08/89 SAP personnel: Lt-Col. Frank Zwane; Former liaison officer for SAP, Soweto; Zwane and two sons injured in grenade attack ??/08/89 SAP building: Athlone SAP Station Explosion; no details
??/02/78 It is reported that an unexploded bomb "capable of destroying 22 storey building found in Johannesburg office block"
26/07/81 Two bombs extensively damage motor vehicle firms in central Durban, 05h50 and 06h10; three injuries
13/05/83 Explosive device (37kg of explosives in gas cylinder) found by SAP under bridge on Southern Freeway, Durban; defused
03/04/84 Car bomb at Victoria Embankment, Durban, kills three civilians, injures 20 civilians Note: According to the SAIRR, two of those killed were Daya Rengasami and his wife Navi. He had been a member of the SA Students Organisation and the BPC. The ANC in Lusaka denied an SABC report that it had claimed responsibility; other reports claimed that the ANC had prepared a statement on the blast which was held back once it emerged that the Rengasamis were casualties of the bomb. Rajbansi said he believed his offices nearby had been the intended target of the bomb. The investigating officer was Capt. Andrew Taylor of the SB who is one of the accused in the Mxenge trial; he may be able to supply more details.
08/04/84 Arson attack at Hermansberg German Mission, Natal; extensive damage to vehicles and farming equipment
??/08/85 Three limpet mines explode in department stores in Durban, causing limited damage and no injuries
(17h00 and early hours of 28/09), Smith Street; Game Stores (17h30), Checkers (17h30), all in central Durban Limpet mine defused in Spar, 18h30, central Durban
??/10/85 Home of Umlazi headmaster attacked with hand grenade. Limpet mines found at school in Durban (no details on area)
10/02/86 Large bomb defused by SAP in Amanzimtoti 200m from where the December 1985 blast (for which Andrew Zondo was hanged) took place.
17/03/86 Mini-limpet discovered at Afrikaans high school at Elsburg, Germiston; police detonate limpet
18/04/86 Bomb explodes in casino of Wild Coast Holiday Inn; 2 civilians killed, 1 injured Note: the ANC denied responsibility for this attack.
01/05/86 Two grenades thrown at the home of Mr Klein, principal of Wentworth Primary School. Klein says he is not politically involved. He was a police reservist some time ago. Klein and wife both injured.
24/06/86 Explosion at 14h00 injures 16 civilians at a Wimpy Bar, Rissik Street ? Outside President Hotel, Johannesburg; explosion at 14h26 seriously injures five civilians
07/09/86 The Durban holiday home for underprivileged children escaped unscathed after a car bomb blast nearby
??/09/86 Mini-limpet explodes in bar of Devonshire Hotel injuring three civilians (this was a popular venue for Wits students)
19/04/88 Explosion at private office block less than 100m from Parliament. Back entrance destroyed, branch of Santambank seriously damaged
25/05/88 Grenade attack on Sofasonke Party rally in Soweto; two killed, 38 injured Note: an ANC spokesperson blamed "armed political renegades" for carrying out attacks which were then blamed on the ANC, and denied knowledge of this attack.
26/05/88 Outside African Eagle Building, Pretoria: limpet mine injures four civilians Outside Ruth Arndt Early Learning Centre, Pretoria: limpet mine detonates during lunch hour (target may have been SADF offices, Proes St)
28/05/88 Explosive device at bottom of platform staircase at Johannesburg railway station: - 1 civilian injured
??/06/88 Mini-limpet mine explodes at Pretoria snack bar, injuring 18 people 09/07/88 Outside Johannesburg Cambrians hockey club: limpet mine explodes outside; no details
24/08/88 Limpet mine discovered outside Wimpy Bar, Standerton: limpet mine discovered; dragged into street and detonated; no details
??/09/88 Hand grenade thrown at home of Allan Hendrickse, leader of the Labour Party, from a moving car
02/09/88 Outside a shop on the corner of Smith and Fenton Streets, Durban: limpet mine explodes at 17h30; two civilians injured
08/09/88 Grenade thrown into the home of couple who did not join a strike (Mr and Mrs Modiko); child injured
??/09/88 Bomb under a car in parking lot of East London hotel explodes after area cleared; no injuries
??/12/88 Five people, one an SAP member, killed in Soweto; police said an AK 47 was used indicating that the ANC was responsible
??/02/88 12 civilians injured in a blast at Wits Medical Command administration building in Braamfontein. The head of SAP public relations (Brig. Herman Stadler) claims that the ANC was responsible and had carried out the attack for propaganda purposes; this was proved by the fact that newspapers had received an early tip-off, he said.
The conditions which led the ANC leadership to adopt armed struggle as one of the "four pillars" of struggle for the liberation of South Africa have been described in some detail in our main submission.
The roots of NAT can be traced to the establishment of a military intelligence unit in the 1960s, tasked with undertaking reconnaissance missions to find routes for the infiltration of trained MK cadres; the establishment of reception areas inside the country for these cadres; and the selection of inanimate targets for armed propaganda attacks.
At this time the Department had no counter-intelligence capacity: there was no structure specifically tasked with the screening of recruits and exposure of agents in our midst.
In the 1960's, cadres were carefully recruited or selected by ANC branches inside the country before being sent abroad for military training.. This screening and selection process inside the country resulted in a degree of complacency in the ANC's mission in exile.
These weaknesses were exploited by the intelligence services of the apartheid regime, which managed to infiltrate some of its agents into ANC and MK structures. They went about their missions aimed at destroying the ANC's exile mission unhindered, since no professional structure existed to thwart their operations. In addition, Pretoria extended its defensive and offensive capacity through forging alliances with the intelligence services of neighbouring colonial states, and was also supported in this regard by a number of Western powers.
The ANC achieved some success with infiltrating cadres back into the country but in most cases they were quickly tracked down by the regime before or immediately after they had accomplished their missions. These cadres were arrested, usually tortured, imprisoned and later banned, or at times executed. The suspicion grew that the regime was well informed of MK's plans, and it was decided that the situation could not be allowed to continue unchecked. It was decided at the Morogoro conference that a Department of Intelligence and Security should be formally established, tasked with the protection of human and material resources of the ANC. Moses Mabhida, who was appointed head of this Department, was also head of MK's Training and Personnel section. This unit was tasked with establishing military training camps in Africa, and arranging courses in military training in sympathetic countries.
This was a huge mandate, entailing several different sets of tasks. Under ideal conditions, these tasks would have been carried out by clearly demarcated structures and personnel trained in various distinct skills.
In reality, as the tasks before the Department increased over the years, it came to assume the roles of Military Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, Military Police, VIP protection, and correctional services in a relatively ad hoc fashion. In addition, from the late 1970's onwards, the Department began to build its strategic intelligence capacity, capable of forewarning the leadership of enemy moves, rather than merely being on the defensive. Besides this broad range of tasks, the head of the Department had the responsibilities of ensuring that all training camps were properly run, arranging specialised courses, and ensuring that only trusted cadres were sent on further training or on missions inside the country.
Despite these problems, the Department worked at improving its capacity and scored some major successes. In 1981, when an MK cadre died as a result of a beating ordered by Kenneth Mahamba, the commander of the camp where this incident had taken place, the case was investigated by NAT. This investigation facilitated a major breakthrough with the discovery of an extensive network of infiltrators in a number of countries, some of whom were linked not only to Pretoria, but also to the intelligence services of some Western powers.
As we mentioned in our first submission to the TRC, some of these agents had managed to move into important strategic positions within the structures of the Movement. Analysis of the activities of some of these agents in the political context in which they took place indicated that they were not merely involved in various attempts to disrupt or damage the ANC, but were actors in a far broader and more ambitious operation by the regime to eliminate and replace key leaders of the ANC, thereby setting the movement on a new route which would culminate in its destruction.
Given the very limited resources accorded to this Department, the trying physical conditions under which it worked, the nature of missions with which enemy agents had been tasked by their masters, and the lack of training of cadres in certain duties (such as prison services), it was probably almost inevitable - but by no means excusable - that regrettable incidents occurred. The lack of clearly defined lines of authority at times exacerbated these problems. These issues are dealt with more fully in the main document of this second submission to the TRC.
Because of its past achievements in disrupting enemy attempts to destroy the ANC, and the danger potentially posed by this Department to the success of the many covert operations which were running during the negotiations era, this Department was targeted for sustained attack by the former apartheid regime's stratkom structures. The perception has been deliberately created in some quarters that the Department became a monstrous and lawless force which terrorised ANC members in exile, and killed large numbers of detainees or "dissidents." While our main submission will deal with some of these issues, this operational report will also serve to dispel some of the mythology and disinformation surrounding the work of the Department.
We will provide a clearer picture of the evolution of the Department, the nature and scope of its activities, and the context in which they took place.
The Morogoro Conference, held in 1969, assessed the first phase of the ANC's armed struggle. The Revolutionary Council (RC) was established and was instructed by the NEC to concentrate on the home front: developing internal structures, gaining publicity for the ANC, and waging armed struggle.
During this period, the embryonic Department had no formal structure, and all members of the Department were also members of MK. Intelligence gathered was primarily on routes back into South Africa and on inanimate targets. In addition to this these tasks, the physical security of the President was attended to.
The 1976 Uprisings ushered in a new era for the Department. The sudden mass influx of new recruits to some extent rendered screening procedures ineffective This infusion of new blood into the Movement, though welcomed, was equally fraught with danger since the regime was quick to exploit the situation by sending in several agents to infiltrate the Movement.
It soon became evident that some agents had escaped the screening procedures of the time. There was an attempt to kill about 500 cadres by poisoning their food in the infamous Black September episode of 1978. This was followed by the aerial bombardment and destruction in April 1979 of Nova Catengue military camp, which indicated that the enemy had good intelligence. However, the Department had received forewarning of the attack, and the camp was evacuated in time.
In response to these threats, certain cadres were selected and sent for specialised training in Security and Intelligence work in various countries, mainly the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. The latter courses were different to previous ANC courses followed by all MK recruits, which centred on Military Combat Work, with Security and Intelligence forming only a part of the course. This training emphasised that the use of force was counter-productive, and stressed the use of the intellect.
MK personnel sent for training in intelligence work qualified in the period from 1978 - 1979. On their return, they joined the 60's generation of officers, and NAT began to take shape.
Screening procedures were improved and re-organised, with the introduction of a standard questionnaire for all new recruits.
Regional structures were reorganised. Reception centres to screen all new recruits were set up in Forward Areas. The Department concentrated on Angola first, where screening procedures had as yet not been formalised.
Investigations into the poisoning ('Black September') of 1978 and the bombardment of the Nova Katengue camp in 1979 continued. These cases were solved only some years later.
Other changes followed. Camp 32 (later called the Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre) was established in 1979 near Camp 13 (Quibaxe) in Angola in order to create a means to contain and rehabilitate cadres who had committed offences, and to imprison enemy agents who could not be isolated in the other military camps.
By 1981 a National Directorate of NAT had been appointed by the NEC, and the Department was organised into three main sectors: Intelligence, Security, and Processing of Information.
A number of agents were identified as a result of these improved screening procedures. The information gleaned in this manner was augmented by several voluntary confessions, and ongoing investigations into earlier cases of sabotage. It was evident that the apartheid regime felt confident and had adopted a very arrogant attitude, telling some of these agents that they had nothing to fear from the Department even if they were discovered: they would merely be given political education and released, they were told, and would be able to resume their activities as agents. To some extent, this was true. But in 1981, the Department dealt a heavy blow to the enemy when it uprooted its most prized network of infiltrators. This operation was popularly known as Shishita (the report prepared at the time on this network has been submitted to the TRC.)
As we stated in our first submission, with this being dealt with in more detail in the main submission to which this report is attached, a number of decisions were taken at the Kabwe Conference specifically to halt the abuses that had occurred by members of the security department of NAT, to reorganise and improve the functioning of the Department, to improve conditions under which prisoners were held, and to ensure that investigations and sentences were carried out fairly, with the accused entitled to proper legal representation.
The most important of these were the establishment of the Review Board and the Office of Justice, both of which reported to the President's office. NAT would in future send reports on its investigations into suspected agents to the Office of Justice, which would take over from that point. The Review Board would broadly act as a court of appeal. (Considerable detail on these structures has been presented in our first and second main submissions, and they are also covered in the report of the Motsuenyane Commission.)
It was decided to remove Mzwai Piliso from his post as head of the Department, and an interim Directorate was set up under Alfred Nzo, consisting of Joe Nhlanhla, Jacob Zuma, Sizakele Sigxashe, and Tony Mongalo.
This provisional Directorate was tasked with restructuring the Department in order to ensure that its practices were in line with the new structures for justice established after the Kabwe Conference, investigating the style of work within the Department, and assessing its ability to respond to the changed circumstances of struggle within the country and in the international arena.
The NEC had declared Angola a military zone between 1983 - 1986. NAT in Angola fell under Military HQ during this period. In 1986, a meeting was held between MK and NAT, chaired by OR Tambo, in which the vexed question of lines of authority over NAT in Angola was addressed. The delegations committed themselves to ensuring that the NAT Directorate would be in command of NAT cadres deployed in Angola and that they would report only to the NAT Directorate in Lusaka.
In July 1987 the new permanent Directorate of the Department was appointed by the NEC. Joe Nhlanhla was appointed the Director, with Jacob Zuma as Deputy Director, Sizakele Sigxashe as head of the Central Intelligence Evaluation Sector (CIES) Simon Makana as Administrator, Tony Mongalo, and Daniel Oliphant heading Counter-Intelligence. Most of them were members of the NEC.
NAT was restructured into more clearly defined Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, Processing, and Security sub-sectors. The task of Intelligence was confined to investigations, on the basis of which reports were submitted to the officer of Justice, whose office would decide on what further action to take, The new leadership tightened up supervision of interrogation practices, systematically investigated conditions in detention centres, and implemented other corrective measures where appropriate. A programme to review the cases of all those held in Camp 32 was set in place, and the National People's Tribunal met in Luanda in 1988 for this purpose. More details in this regard appear in the main document of this second submission. The mutineers were fully pardoned, demobilised, and sent to Tanzania to be re-integrated into the civilian structures of the ANC in 1989. Plans were drawn up for a modern prison in Uganda.
By this time, the ANC's intelligence structures had begun to function within the country and was assisted by various MDM networks, and contacts within the intelligence services of the regime. This led to greater confidence, efficiency, and a greatly improved intelligence capacity in general. It became relatively easier to cross-check biographies, follow up on accusations, investigate suspicious tendencies, and obtain advice on possible agents from activists and cadres inside the country.
NAT built up an extensive dossier of files on agents; this was not guess-work, but hard information on the names of their handlers, their force numbers, their grading by the SB, their activities and contacts. The dossier was updated regularly with fresh information from inside the country. The extent of infiltration of anti-apartheid structures was immense, running to thousands of agents.
All ANC camps in Angola were closed down in 1989, including Camp 32. All but 32 prisoners were released, and these were transferred to a small prison in Uganda after negotiations with that government. In 1991 the group of 32 were also released and allowed to return to South Africa, where several immediately rejoined their handlers and fronted for the SB-managed stratkom outfit, the "Returned Exiles Co-ordinating Committee". The activities of this front are dealt with in more detail in our first submission, and in the main document of this second submission.
The negotiations era was characterised by the worst ever state-sponsored violence known in the country, in line with the De Klerk regime's strategy of negotiating from a position of strength in order to extract constitutional concessions from the ANC, which entailed covert measures to destabilise the ANC's support base and disrupt its ability to function effectively. Threats to the physical security of the ANC's membership in general, its leaders and physical installations, increased drastically on a number of fronts, from state-sponsored covert operations through to the white far right.
By this time (at national level) the Department had six main sub-sectors: Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, Central Information Evaluation Section, Security, Technical, and Administration.
The Department developed policy on the restructuring and reorientation of the existing intelligence services; workshops were held inside and outside the country to discuss the shape and role of a future intelligence service in a new democratic order. Open meetings were also held in military camps to discuss these issues and contribute to this policy debate. Towards the end of 1993 preparations for the amalgamation of NAT and the National Intelligence Service began.
The posture of the ANC's NAT was always defensive. The apartheid regime defined all ANC members and sympathisers as the enemy, and as potential targets. The lives of the ANC leadership were con-stantly under threat; for example, OR Tambo had to be moved from safe house to safe house on a permanent basis.
Any organisation deemed to share the same aims as the ANC was also considered an enemy of the state. The "enemy" included Trade unions, particularly those aligned to Cosatu, SACTU, and the SACP. The "enemy" included youth organisations, civics,. students groups, women's organisations, even religious officials and groups (such as the SACC), organisations such as the End Conscription Campaign and the Black Sash - all who did not support apartheid, whether civilian or not, were defined as the enemy.
There were countless attacks on the offices, activists, cadres and leaders of these groups - assassinations, ambushes, car bombs, letter bombs, accidents caused by tampering with cars, massacres by the SAP, massacres and killings by surrogate forces or covert hit squads, aerial bombardments, poisonings, petrol bomb and hand grenade attacks.
In addition, the neighbours of activists or refugees were at times deliberately targeted in order to sow fear and alienate support. To give just one example, the home of a neighbour of Chris Hani's in Lesotho was blown to smithereens.
They had no respect whatsoever for the distinction between civilian and military targets, whether inside or outside the country. Even children were fair game. On more than one occasion the Department averted plans to poison the food and water supply at ANC civilian installations in Tanzania: the children at Somafco were the intended target of one of these agents. There are countless other examples of civilians being targeted.
The apartheid regime also had no respect whatsoever for diplomatic norms, and attacked ANC offices in Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, London, Sweden, and Belgium. They assassinated the ANC's representative in France, Dulcie September; the Zimbabwe Chief Representative, Joe Gqabi; and the Chief Representative in Lesotho, Zola Nqini. They attempted to murder Godfrey Motsepe in Belgium. They killed the wife of another Chief Representative in Zimbabwe, Mhlope Masondo. The deputy Chie f Representative in Lusaka, Adolphus Mvemve was killed, and Max Sisulu narrowly escaped with his life in the same incident. A plane on which Steve Tshwete was travelling from Lesotho had to be diverted to Gaborone where it made an emergency landing when it was discovered it had been tampered with. Such examples could be multiplied.
Besides this overt aggression, the enemy also went to considerable lengths to infiltrate agents into all organisations considered to be in the enemy camp, particularly the ANC and MK. No effort was spared to penetrate our structures at all levels of the Movement. The failure to pick up enemy agents in time resulted in serious setbacks and losses.
The 1981 breakthrough profoundly shocked the ANC leadership when the extent and sophistication of this penetration became clear. Despite this success, other agents remained in place, some in senior positions.
Analysis of the missions of agents who were captured and confessed, or who voluntarily confessed, shows that the primary areas of interest of the enemy were the gathering of information on the movements of leadership figures; infiltration routes into South Africa; MK operational plans; lines of communication and means of transport; the location of camps, other installations, and residences; the strength of MK in terms of numbers of trained personnel; MK training programmes; and political developments within the Movement in general. We lost many committed and talented leaders and cadres through the activities of such agents, as in the cases of Zweli Nyanda, Joe Gqabi, Paul Dikeledi, and Cassius Make to mention just a few (see the attached case studies for more information.) Some of these informers are yet to be discovered.
Some agents were tasked not only with passing on information of this nature, but also with carrying out acts such as poisoning and sabotage of essential equipment. Others were trained in the psychological warfare field; their work aimed at destroying the ANC from within, and they usually took on the role of agent provocateur. They sought to damage MK and the ANC in general through stirring up dissent, tribalism or other forms of factionalism, spreading false rumours, encouraging general demoralisation, creating suspicion within structures, damaging relationships, and instigating or encouraging acts of indiscipline. Given the conditions under which the ANC was operating, such acts could be highly dangerous and destructive.
The apartheid regime did not hesitate to get rid of its own agents when it appeared they were about to change sides or give the ANC damaging information. The ANC is convinced that both Solly Smith and Francis Meli were poisoned in order to silence them. The truth about the death of askari "September" (Glory Sidebe), the poisoning of Thami Zulu, the death of "Fear" (Edward Lawrence) in 1988, and the extent to which poisons have been used as a weapon by the apartheid regime, remains to be discovered. We strongly suspect that some of those cadres and activists who died of "natural causes" may have been in fact victims of poisoning or other chemical agents: for example, an agent was assigned the task to use a chemical of some kind on the food of Dullah Omar, which would induce a heart attack, according to his handlers.
The introduction of rigorous screening methods at the beginning of the 1980's was therefore not the result of paranoia or hysteria: this was a matter of taking obviously necessary steps in self-defence, given the nature of the enemy we faced.
Reception centres were established in Angola and in the Front Line States bordering South Africa to receive and screen all new recruits. Indicators such as inconsistencies in biographies, false statements, unconfirmed accusations, and certain patterns of behaviour were used to identify possible suspects. Despite their training, many agents feared having to face NAT, and confessed readily. Many felt little loyalty to their apartheid masters.
As noted earlier, by the late 1980s NAT had substantially improved its intelligence capacity inside the country, and had compiled an extensive dossier of hard information on agents, which was updated regularly with information from inside the country, and as a result of other investigations and confessions.
Among other duties, NAT members in the forward areas (the Front Line States) were tasked with the gathering and analysis of information on the strategy and tactics of the regime, its surrogates and supporters; recruitment of activists to the ranks of the Movement; the screening of new volunteers and recruits; and the training of operatives who were based inside the country. Such training included methods of gathering information in areas of interest to the ANC.
At times we knew in advance that certain agents were being sent into the field, and were able to confront them with detailed information as soon as they arrived: in these cases agents confessed within minutes, since it was obvious that they could not deny the information NAT had on them. Keith McKenzie and Patrick Dlongwana provide examples of this nature. In other cases, NAT would lure agents out of the country, feigning ignorance of their treachery, and confront them with information when they arrived.
The sloppiness of the SB (which accounted for the overwhelming majority of discovered infiltrators) also assisted NAT at times, and resulted in agents being picked up immediately - on one occasion ten infiltrators were sent in with a weak "legend", pass ports which had all been issued on the same day, signed by the same official, and with sequential numbers!
On arrival, recruits were welcomed by the official in charge, and advised of the rules that would govern their stay in the reception area or centre by the person in charge. The Chief Recording Officer (CRO) would formally explain to the new arrival the necessity of providing the Movement with his or her biography. Recruits had to supply detailed information on their family and educational history, their reasons for leaving the country, reasons for wanting to join the Movement, and details on the political activities in which s/he had been involved. Biographies also served as skills audits, and as a means of gathering valuable information of various kinds.
Completed biographies were collected by the CRO, and handed to another officer to study and prepare for interviewing the recruit. The biography would be evaluated on the basis of information at the ANC's disposal, including information from confessed agents or information on collaborators supplied by other cadres. Biographies were also cross-checked against biographies written by other recruits where there were points of similarity (such as the area from which recruits came, the organisations in which they said they had been involved, and so on.)
When possible, an officer who was familiar with the area or region the recruit came from would be deployed to carry out the interview. The objectives of conducting this interview were to clarify any questions arising from the recruit's biography.
On completion of the preliminary interview, a report would be tabled for a panel which discussed and analysed the case. In the majority of cases, recruits were cleared immediately. The following categories were used:
Cleared (Category A): the recruit / volunteer was considered to be neither a security threat nor an impostor, and was cleared to join MK, be sent to school, or for immediate deployment inside the country.
Doubtful (Category B): where the volunteer / recruit was considered by the panel to be neither a security threat nor an impostor, but had possibly exaggerated or embroidered her/his biography. They were usually given the benefit of the doubt.
Confessed (Category C): In this category there were:-
Definite suspect (Category D): in these cases the panel concluded that the person concerned was definitely or highly probably a security threat, since the biography showed significant inconsistencies with other information at our disposal. In these cases, the person concerned would be further interviewed or interrogated.
If the panel felt that a biography indicated there was cause for concern, there would be a second (even at times a third) interview in which emphasis would be laid on discrepancies, false claims, or other questions arising. Sometimes people confessed at this stage. Confessions were handled in various ways.
In cases where recruits confessed after being prompted or persuaded to do so, the panel would seek to understand the recruit's motive in withholding this information. In some cases it was merely prompted by fear of the consequences of confessing, without other ulterior motives. The panel would usually clear these cases with the proviso that the recruit would be barred from joining the military until they had demonstrated their trustworthiness.
If concern about the recruit remained unresolved, the suspect would be informed that the interviewers required further information with regard to discrepancies arising in the interview process, and would be moved to a "safe house" for interrogation.
The suspect would be confronted with details of discrepancies that had arisen in the earlier processes of screening and interviews, giving the suspect room to realise that the Department had specific information which was in obvious conflict with what s/he had been claiming, which had to be clarified. In some cases where agents had continued to maintain their innocence through the screening and interviewing processes, it now dawned on their minds just how grave the situation was, and some would confess.
Various techniques were used in interrogation. It was common to ensure that suspects were sitting in uncomfortable positions to put pressure on them. Using force was explicitly against policy, but this did occur at times, particularly in cases where the Department was aware that lives of other people in the field were at stake. There were some cases in which suspects were severely beaten, particularly before 1985.
In cases where the truth had finally come out and had been verified by cross-checking other sources of information, this would be conveyed for assessment to the panel, which would report its finding to the Officer of Justice. After this, the case was out of NAT's hands. The office of Justice would decide whether he felt there was a case, and if so, recommended that the Tribunal hear the case. Confessions or other information extracted under duress were unacceptable.
There were some cases where suspects would continue to flatly refuse to co-operate, or continued to deny, at times in the face of strong evidence to the contrary, that they were working for the regime. These cases would also be referred to the Office of Justice.
Although screening procedures were exhaustive, we have no illusions that some agents entirely escaped the net; others were only picked up years later (see the attached case studies.) To illustrate the entire process described above, of 500 new recruits who arrived in Angola for training in 1987, the breakdown was as follows:
(At the time these statistics were produced 58 recruits had not yet been attended to i.e. gone through the screening process.)
We feel it is important that the TRC and the nation is given more information on how the ANC handled cases in which agents confessed. Some had been sent to infiltrate the ANC exile structures or had infiltrated ANC underground structures inside the country and the other Front Line States, or had infiltrated other anti-apartheid organisations. Some were agents who had been operational in the field in violent attacks, at times of the "false flag" variety, on anti-apartheid activists. Yet others remained dormant for some time and spontaneously confessed some years after being accepted into ANC structures.
A considerable proportion of those who confessed were never imprisoned or punished. Those who voluntarily confessed on arrival or joining the ANC were not imprisoned. Several of those who confessed after some time, when their consciences had begun to trouble them, were never imprisoned or punished. Some were people no-one had suspected, whilst others had raised suspicion but we had no tangible evidence against them. Some agents had committed minor or no crimes against the struggle, and were not imprisoned.
People who had confessed and who had not been imprisoned were allowed to participate as full ANC members, and were not exposed to the rest of the ANC/MK community. They enjoyed every right a genuine cadre deserved, except in some cases in which selected individuals were barred from being deployed in strategic or sensitive areas of the Movement.
There have been sustained campaigns of disinformation aimed at creating the impression that hundreds of people were tortured, imprisoned or killed in the ANC's camps, particularly Camp 32.
We present the following statistics based on analysis of available information on the approximately 308 persons who were imprisoned at various times.
The following categories of prisoners were imprisoned between the years 1977-1991:
The vast majority of those imprisoned by the ANC were released (245 cases, or 82,41% of cases.) Four escaped from custody, and two drowned when they tried to swim across a river; fourteen died of natural causes, usually malaria, which was rife in the region. In four cases, prisoners died as a result of being beaten. There was only one case of suicide in prison.
In several cases in the past, agents were pardoned and released. In fact many agents were never imprisoned at all, as mentioned above.
In 1987, when the new Directorate of NAT took over, there were 115 prisoners in Camp 32. By September 1987, the number had been reduced to 81. The number of prisoners continued to be steadily reduced by releases; in 1989, when Camp 32 was due to be closed down, all but 32 prisoners were released; of those released, only one opted to leave the ANC, which he was assisted in doing; he opted to go to Kenya where he was granted refugee status. All the rest, including the mutineers, were pardoned and reintegrated into civilian or military structures of the ANC. Several were given bursaries to study overseas, and are today successful professionals or business people. Only the group of 32 of the most committed agents were held after 1989 in a government prison in Uganda; they too were released in 1991, despite the heinous crimes committed by some of them.
Most of this group of 32 former prisoners made peace with the ANC, but some returned immediately to their masters or came under pressure to do so by the apartheid regime. In the case of De Souza, he apparently became involved in gang warfare in Eersterus and was involved in a number of cases of murder and attempted murder, including of his own wife (see the case study on Da Souza attached to this submission.)
For years, much emphasis has been placed on the unacceptable treatment meted out to certain agents and suspected agents in Camp 32, particularly in the period from 1981 - 1984. By its own actions to halt these excesses, through the range of measures we have described in our various submissions, the ANC has shown clearly that the leadership never considered such practices acceptable. This commitment to the protection of the fundamental human rights of all has carried through into the policies adopted by the new government, and in the legislation which now governs the functioning of the intelligence and security services of this country.
The considerable achievements of NAT must also be taken into account when assessing its role in the conflict of the past. On a number of occasions, the Department uncovered enemy plans timeously, preventing attacks on our camps and residences. Although Nova Katengue camp was destroyed, the Department was able to protect cadres by receiving advance warning of the plans of the enemy.
The extent to which the regime had managed to penetrate the ANC was timeously discovered in 1981, as described elsewhere in our submissions. Without doubt the greatest achievement of this Department was the protection of the Movement, particularly its leadership core, which has been responsible for the transition to democracy and peace in this country - although there were some very painful failures, particularly in the cases of Chris Hani, Joe Gqabi, Cassius Make, Dulcie September, Morris Seabelo and other leaders and cadres who fell victim to the assassins and raiding parties of the apartheid regime, which carried out massacres in every Front Line State.
There was no limit to the lengths to which the apartheid regime was prepared to go in its attempts to destroy the ANC. There were many attempts on the lives of leadership figures, and they lived under constant threat. For example, OR Tambo had to be constantly moved from safe house to safe house by the Department. The same measures were taken for the protection of Nelson Mandela during the negotiations phase. Despite certain failures and regrettable incidents at Camp 32, we submit that this Department contributed substantially to creating the conditions under which it was possible to begin building the new democratic order.
Before a decision was taken to establish a rehabilitation centre in an isolated place, the ANC leadership embarked on a political campaign of appealing to those who had agreed to work for their enemy through being blackmailed or because of poverty and other reasons to come forward and confess, so that they could be pardoned. The President himself took part in this campaign, which met with considerable success: several people came forward and confessed.
Prior to the establishment of Camp 32, agents would be kept in the military camps established in Angola. Negotiations were carried out with the Angolan authorities and it was arranged that the ANC could move these agents to local jails. However, th is arrangement also proved inadequate, because some of the agents managed to escape back to South Africa. This caused deep concern to the Angolan authorities. Given the fact that Angola was just emerging from a protracted war in which South Africa ha d played a central role, there was the potential danger that these escaped agents could give vital information about Angola to Pretoria.
Because of these factors, the Angolan authorities granted the ANC the use of a deserted farm to set up a facility under its control. Camp 32 was the only place at which prisoners were held for any significant period of time, besides the government facility in Uganda to which the occupants of Camp 32 were sent in 1989.
The farm was situated 200 km north of Luanda between two MK training camps, Pango and Quibaxe. Because of the condition of the road, and due to the war situation, it took a full four hours to travel the 200km by car. The only available transport was shared between the three camps.
None of the three camps had running water. Water had to be fetched from nearby streams; in the case of Camp 32, the nearest stream was 4 km away.
In the late 70's and early 80's food supplies in all ANC centres in Angola were at times inadequate, as we relied heavily on donations from sympathetic countries. These supplies arrived by ship irregularly and had to be transported to the camps; Unita bandits specifically targeted these supply lines. Supplies were shared equally amongst those in the camps, including the prisoners. Efforts were made - with mixed success - to improve conditions by growing vegetables and keeping poultry and pigs. Clothing was exchanged with local people for fresh supplies.
Inadequate medical care was a problem for all members of the ANC in Angola. Malaria was endemic. We had to rely mainly on medical orderlies who were locally trained. Serious cases had to be referred to hospitals in Luanda, which were ill-equipped because of the war. Adding to all these problems there was a serious shortage of transport, which affected all three camps.
The dilapidated buildings on the farm were adapted to suit a prison building. It had no windows but there were ventilation vents. One large room was converted to a cell that could accommodate about 15 people; six other rooms were converted to accommodate between 5 - 10 people and another room was converted to host 4-6 single cells. Inmates used plastic containers as toilets when they were in their cells, and emptied these in the mornings.
The ANC's faith that there would never be a large number of people who would have to be confined proved to be misplaced. The problem of overcrowding at Camp 32 got steadily worse over the years, but was addressed in 1987 when a programme of reviewing cases and granting pardons began, as described elsewhere in our submissions.
Difficulties with transport, food, water and medical supplies were general in the region, and common to all camps. The camp did have a truck, but when it broke down it was not replaced. In the absence of transport, inmates had to push a water tank to the nearest source of water, a river about 3km away. The camp had no doctor, but relied on some Medical Orderlies who were not equipped to deal with complex medical problems. Overcrowding, and the unhealthy conditions in the cells, created conditions for disease and did result in some deaths, although most deaths occurred because of malaria.
There were ongoing attempts to improve conditions at Camp 32. A tractor was obtained to alleviate the problem of fetching wood and water. A generator was obtained, as well as a television set and sports equipment. More medical orderlies were trained. Ventilation was improved, and plans drawn up for the building of a modern facility (this plan was submitted to the Motsuenyane Commission.)
The camp was under the command of the Commander; his deputy was the Camp Commissar. The rest of the administration consisted of the Chief-of-Staff, Chief of Logistics, Chief of Ordnance, and the Chief Recording Officer. Commanders of Camp 32 were, successively, Sizwe Mkhonto, Morris Seabelo, Afrika Nkwe (for a few months only), Mzwandile Damoyi, and William Masango.
The Staff consisted of the Staff Commander and Staff Commissar, the Communication Officer, a medical orderly, drivers, and Recording Officers.
The next layer of the administration was a platoon of guards led by a Platoon Commander and Platoon Commissar. The platoon was divided into Sections, each with its Section Commander and Section Commissar.
Camp 32 was staffed by members of NAT. The reasons for this anomaly arose out of the non-existence of a defined structure -viz. military police or at best, qualified prison warders, to take on responsibility for this Centre.
On arrival, detainees would be put in isolation cells until their cases had been cleared. They would be issued with uniforms different from other people in the camp. Those in isolation were exempted from participating in any camp activities. The only people with whom they would have contact with would be their interrogators. As soon as the investigation had been completed, they would be integrated with other inmates in communal cells. Each communal cell had a commander and a commissar who saw to the discipline and general welfare of his cell mates.
Being deployed in the camp for guard duties did not mean that the cadre concerned was cut off from all other opportunities, but there was a general perception that once deployed in this capacity, one's chances of ever taking on other duties in the Movement were slim. Cadres tended to regard the inmates as being the cause of their being what they saw as "grounded", and this resentment contributed directly to certain cases of abuse of prisoners. The situation was not made any easier given the fact that some of the inmates would taunt the guards - one of the most common insults was that the guards, fearing to go to the front areas and tackle the forces of the regime, had pleaded with NAT to be deployed at the rehabilitation centre where life was relatively easier and less dangerous. This infuriated some guards.
Contrary to the general perception created by deliberate disinformation, prisoners often got better food than the guards. This was because it was envisaged that those who were already irretrievably lost in serving the regime's cause could in future be used in a prisoner exchange programme, thereby freeing some of our captured combatants. When there was a food crisis, this policy also aggravated relations between guards and inmates.
At the RC, the suspects followed a programme which included political education and manual chores around their 'residence'. During these periods within the camp, armed guards would be deployed about them. The guards were not informed of the reasons for the detention of the inmates. Only the recording officers knew this as part of their investigations. This is also why prisoners were given names different to their real and MK names - to protect their identities. Usually these names were meaningless or made reference to the offence they had committed (e.g. Dyasop was called "APC" because he had thrown a grenade into an Armed Personnel Carrier of the Angolan army, killing an Angolan soldier.) The only knowledge the guards had was that they were guarding what were called imidlwembe (traitors), as the camp was known to be a security camp.
05:30hrs: General wake up call. Except for those that were responsible for preparing breakfast, inmates did not necessarily have to follow this programme (wake up call).
06:00 - 07:30 hrs: Inmates individually empty their pots and wash themselves under armed supervision. Those who sought medical assistance or consultation with medical orderlies utilised this time.
07:30 - 08:30hrs : Breakfast for all in the camp. It was common practise during meals for Commissars to read and analyse the news in the communal dining hall. Those still in solitary confinement would be visited later by the Commissar.
08:30 - 13:00hrs : Daily duties, including the fetching of water and wood for the camp plus the general cleaning of the camp.
14:30 - 17:00hrs: Unless unforeseen circumstances had arisen (e.g. insufficient water in the camp or firewood), this time was used for leisure. Those who wished to study could use this time for visiting the library. Others chose to occupy themselves with indoor games and political discussions.
17:30 - 18:30hrs: Leisure time. Consultations by inmates with the medical orderlies could also take place during this period.
Weekend Programme The programme was similar to the weekly routine except that inmates began their day at
06:30hrs. 08:00hrs: Breakfast was then inmates would do their washing. Commissars would join them for discussions.
10:00hrs: Sports (football or volley ball) and indoor games. It was not uncommon in Angola and also in Uganda for the guards to challenge the inmates to a soccer match.
to provide a clearer understanding of the missions and activities of agents aof the former apartheid regime
In all cases of South Africans who worked as agents, and who are not dead, we have given only their travelling names. Foreign nationals are named. Should the TRC require real names for a specific investigation, the ANC will co-operate in this regard.
We have also deleted the names of the siblings of agents, and the names of all those who (we believe) unwittingly assisted these agents, for obvious reasons.
We have also deleted the names of those who agents implicated unless we were able to verify such claims.
In 1967 the subject moved to Benoni. Early in 1969 he wrote a letter to the station commander of the Benoni police, complaining of the number of thefts in the Indian areas committed by Africans living in Wattville.
In response to his letter, he was visited by Sergeant Saddie/Sadie, who told him that he would be paid R30 for any information he supplied to them. He was referred to the Benoni Security Police for briefings, where he met a Captain Van der Merwe, a Station Commander, who told him that he wanted information on political activities. Subject accepted the task.
After the death of Sergeant Saddie, Sergeant John Vilakazi replaced him as subject's handler. The subject claims that he was receiving his R30 monthly salary although he was not submitting any information to Captain Van der Merwe.
By 1970 the subject was running his own taxi service business, says he lost interest in police work, and concentrated in his business. In fact the money he was getting from them was nothing compared to what he was making from his business. Eventually payments stopped. All the same, John Vilakazi kept on paying him friendly visits.
It was in 1975, after the Frelimo take-over in Mozambique, that he was called by John Vilakazi to the Security Police offices in Cranbourne, Benoni. He was informed that Captain Van der Merwe had been promoted to a Major, and was transferred to Germiston. He was introduced to the new Station Commander Captain Abrie/Abrey who was to be his next handler. Captain Abrie instructed the subject to befriend students residing at Actonville, since he was transporting them with his Kombi from Durban to Westville University. Later the same year, the Benoni Students Movement was formed, but the subject claims he never managed to get any information from them. His payment was increased to R40 or R60 per month.
After 1976 (he claims) his contact with Abrie relaxed because he was now operating his own engineering business, the I.C. Engineering Construction Supplies. He informed the handler about this, and did not receive any monthly payments afterwards but continued to keep in touch with Abrie and John Vilakazi.
1) To try and befriend Shrish Nanabhay so as to monitor his activities. The police suspected he was connected to the ANC/SACP.
2) To monitor the activities of Kisten Moonsamy, an ex-Robben Islander, released in 1978. The subject went to visit him, and Moonsamy took him into his confidence and introduced him to George Naicker.
3) Through Naicker he met Ebrahim Ismail, Poomoney Moodley, Rajes Pillay in Durban, Amin Kajee, Rokaya Adams, Prema Naidoo, and Shrish Nanabhay. He reported to Abrie about all these people.
4) In 1979, George Naicker asked the subject to post him a letter in Swaziland but before posting it the subject took the letter to Abrie.
5) After Rajes Pillay had skipped the country, Naicker established contact with her through the subject who became a courier. On four occasions when given material like cassettes, leaflets, literature, etc. by Rajes and Ivan Pillay in Swaziland he took the material to Swanepoel (his new handler after Abrie) before he took it to George.
6) He was reporting all the contents of his meetings with Ivan and Rajes to Swanepoel and was also contacting Warrant Officer Van Dyk of Oshoek border post for clearance.
7) After the Swaziland ANC machinery discovered that the subject was a plant, Naicker and Ebrahim were called to leave the country, which they did in December 1980. Swanepoel instructed the subject to trace their whereabouts.
8) The subject contacted Ivan in Swaziland, who said he did not know of their whereabouts. In Mozambique he was informed by Idris Naidoo that they have passed through Mozambique, and the subject went back home to inform his handler.
9) When Rajes and Ivan proposed that he go for a crash course in Maputo, he went to inform Swanepoel about this offer and was encouraged by him to proceed. He also briefed the subject on how to behave.
Information from a very reliable source within the police was received to the effect that there was a police agent working as an ANC courier who would be arriving with ANC material from Swaziland on 26/09/1980. The material was to be dispatched to George Naicker.
When this information was compared with other information at our disposal it was found that the subject was to go back inside the country on the 26/09/1980 with leaflets, literature, etc. to give to George Naicker. It was beyond any doubt that the subject was the culprit and that he had submitted this information to the enemy. It is then that George Naicker and Ebrahim Ishmail were called outside the country, to save them from the police.
After the two comrades had disappeared, the subject reappeared without pre-arrangements in Swaziland, to contact comrades Ivan and Rajes. He went up to Mozambique after he was told that they (Ivan and Rajes) did not know where Naicker and Ebrahim were.
He was then lured out of the country by the offer of a five-day crash course in Mozambique. His handler Swanepoel agreed to this. On arrival in Mozambique the subject was arrested with the help of the local security and interrogated. He willingly gave an incomplete confession. Later, when imprisoned in Angola, he made a full confession.
Before he was locked up at Camp 32, while still kept in Viana camp, he tried to desert the movement with the help of one local, together with Dominic Kgati. He was then locked up at Camp 32 for rehabilitation and released on 1/06/1987.
Given a chance, he was deployed at our regional logistics in Angola as a Secretary. The subject managed to accumulate a lot of money, by selling 200 bags of potatoes from the stores. This was in preparations for his intended marriage and desertion. He ultimately deserted the organisation in 1988/1989 and sought help of the United Nations. Unfortunately for him, he was recaptured before leaving Angola through the United Nations and again locked up. In his possession he had 1 000 000 Kwanzas which was confiscated.
Captain Van der Merwe (promoted to Major), Captain Abrie, Captain Swanepoel, Sergeant Saddie, Sergeant John Vilakazi
1. According to the confession made towards the end of May 1988, he attended the University of the Western Cape (UWC) in 1973. After its closure due to student protests he ended up in Durban living with his sister, while searching for a job. He could not find a job. It was at this time that he was recruited by a white man to work for the South African Special Branch. He made contact with SASO office in Durban and also medical students who were politically active and submitted reports to his handler on their activities.
2. Early in 1974 he was instructed to go back to the Western Cape and enrol at UWC in order to monitor the political situation there. At this time many students were leaving the country because of police harassment and joining the national liberation movement in exile. He was instructed to join these students, leave the country, join the ANC, study its internal situation, gain experience, and remain dormant.
3. He made contact with the enemy again when he was deployed in Swaziland. He was serviced by couriers who travelled to and from his brother in law, Paul Meyer, who is a policeman in Lusikisiki. Paul Meyer was the linkman with the main handler who is a senior Security Branch officer (based at CR Swart Square, Durban). At this time the subject's main task was to keep close to MHQ personnel, analyse MHQ strategic thinking, and with time establish the main lines of ANC work in developing the armed struggle.
4. In 1983 whilst deployed as a leading cadre in the Natal Military Machinery in Swaziland he was arrested by the Swazi police. He knew that one of these policemen, (name deleted) was working for the South African Security Branch. During questioning he revealed to (deleted) the following information about his unit in Swaziland: comrade Zweli (Gebuza's brother) is commander of the unit; comrade Magagula is in charge of logistics in the area; that Madolo works for Border infiltration. He also told the police the location of the infiltration point, told them about codes of communication and the location of DLBs.
5. Ralph was introduced by the police station commander, (deleted), to two Boers who introduced themselves as Captains Van Niekerk and Van Der Walt. They wanted to know about residence of ANC members. They were particularly interested in the location of the place where Comrade Zweli Nyanda stayed, and this happened to be the same place where Ralph was staying. The subject described and drew a sketch of the house, which was at Mobeni. They told him that they wanted to attack the place but needed his collaboration to effect this plan. He agreed to do this.
6. In his words, "my task would be to alert them as to when the comrades were asleep and to unlock the back door, switch off the outside light for the attack, keep in touch with (deleted) and break my bedroom window to "escape"." He did exactly as instructed by his masters and the result was that comrades Zweli Nyanda and Keith MacFadden were killed in that raid through his practical assistance to the Boers.
7. Also on the basis of his experience in MK work, he was also instructed to push MHQ for deployment in the country which he did. The enemy was confident that he would succeed in doing this due to his experience at the front. The enemy objective was that he would develop his own structure and also rise in MK structures inside the country. The strategic goal of the enemy here was to allow the structures inside the country to grow and then cut them down, but leave an embryo for the ANC to build on and within that embryo leave its own forces so that the new structure is also controlled. This would go on indefinitely.
"The origin of the plan to attack this residence came about as a result of my compromise and treachery whilst in the hands of the Swazi police in 1983, a few weeks before the actual raid.
"During my arrest and detention I displayed cowardice when confronted on the question of where I stayed. I referred them to No 6, the known ANC flat. This they dismissed telling me that they knew all the ANC refugees who lived there and reported regularly to the police station as was expected of legally registered refugees. This took place in the first sessions with Mtunga leading the questioning.
"I then had to point out some other place. I pointed out the late comrade Nzima's flat at Mzimnene in Manzini. The following day they took me to the flat with a number of policemen. The place was raided and three young recruits including comrade Eddie (FAPLA) were arrested. I was not aware that these comrades would be there. The van which had recently been purchased was parked there. Among the items in my clutch-bag were the keys for the van.
They, the police, went back to the police station and returned to fetch the van. "It was after this first act of betrayal that (deleted) from Headquarters was then involved in leading interrogations. During these sessions there was (3 names deleted) whom I knew at that stage (through our Security Department) was working with the Boers. At a certain stage (delete)d from HQ told me that what information they received from me would be kept secret. "What I exposed during these sessions was that:
"I also exposed the people I worked with, the structure, comrade Zweli being in charge, comrade Magagula and Belgium, Magagula for logistics. I also exposed to (deleted) the workings of border infiltration and mentioned the Gege area as a place we used.
"At an earlier stage there was a wrangle over the van which I insisted was not an ANC vehicle but belonged to a girlfriend of mine, (name deleted.) She was subsequently called in for questioning and at the initial confrontation stubbornly denied having laid eyes on me but through reasoning and influence by the comrades outside, she came back to change her statement and said she was my girlfriend and had borrowed me the van. At a later stage comrade Duma was called and through his insistence to the special branch that this was an ANC vehicle I was forced to agree that it was.
"The station commander, then came into the scene. Earlier on I had noticed two Boers at the police station. (Deleted) shifted me to a cell where I was alone and threatened that he would see to it that I was handed over to the Boers unless I co-operate with the Boers. I met these two Boers who introduced themselves as Captain Van Niekerk and Van Der Walt. They wanted to know our places. I revealed the house at Moneni where the attack took place, and described and drew a sketch. They needed my collaboration to effect this plan. I agreed to do this.
"My task would be to alert them as to when the comrades were asleep and to unlock the back-door, and also to switch off the outside light for the attack. I would keep in touch with (deleted). I was also to break my bedroom window to "effect my survival". I kept in touch with (deleted) under the guise of trying to secure back the contents of my clutch-bag which (deleted) of HQ said he would return.
"I informed (deleted) of the trip to Maputo and the time of our departure. I also exposed the house/farm at Malkerns where we kept material. The house in Fairview I also exposed. These were subsequently raided by Swazi people and weapons were captured."
"On that particular evening myself and Keith (MacFadden) were busy trying to phone Maputo to make sure that we were picked up from Lomahasha. Zweli had gone earlier in the night to pick up Fikile whom we were to send to Durban as a courier. When we were at home we had something to eat and had some Scotch (liquor).
"Then around 11.30pm Zweli and I left for the house in Fairview to try and make a last attempt to phone Maputo. We failed and he phoned home to wish his mum happy birthday. When we reached home Keith had gone to bed. I lay on the bed with my clothes on. I then heard cars make their way down the road and then turn to come up. This was around 2 am or 2.30 or so. I stole out of the house through the back-door and went to these vehicles - a Mercedes and two vans. I told them in the Mercedes (boers) that the comrades were asleep. I was then to move down and immediately afterwards break my bedroom window and dash to wait by the cars.
"I broke the window and dashed into the bush. I remained there until the attackers left and heard one of the neighbours (Marcel) at the house.
"I emerged and then went to the house. I saw Zweli lying near the gate and Marcel checked his pulse. He confirmed he was dead. I inquired after Fikile and was told that she had been heard by the neighbours after the enemy had left asking for assistance which she was denied and left. I then left with Marcel for the police where I found Fikile. I reported the attack to the policemen on duty. I made my way back to the house with Marcel. I saw Keith with a bullet hole in the head crouched in a corner. It was clear he was dead.
"I covered him with a blanket and quickly looked through the house for my travelling bag which had reports. This had been taken by the boers. I found an executive bag with some documents which I took with me.
"I then left with Marcel for Matsapa and reported the attack to comrade Vundla who advised that I go back to the police since I had already reported to them. I asked him to keep the documents which I had retrieved but said this was not possible since the Swazis may raid. I took the bag to Reggie Msibi whom I told about the raid. I then also went to the opposite flat to inform comrade Paul Dikeledi of the raid.
"I went back to the house with Marcel where I found top brass of the police force - Sotsha Dlamini (CID), Edgar Hillary, Anton Dlamini (Special Branch) and others. I gave them a brief report of what `happened'. Their main interest was where our weapons were. They and myself went through the house where I was pointing out the various bedrooms. The confiscated political literature and did police work (finger prints).
"We then had to move to the police station. I remember having to start our cars (the Golf, the Stanza) since the cops were saying they could be booby-trapped. On arrival at the police station I was questioned and I gave my version of how I escaped, pointing out why I still had my clothes on (were to leave for Maputo) and that I had broken the window when jumping out with my back. They remarked about my `miraculous' escape. I was then kept in one of the traffic department offices for what they called `protective custody'. I had free movement around the police station. I was kept there for two weeks and released into the care of comrade Duma's custody with one of the vehicles. The other car, (the Golf) was released into the custody of Favin, Keith's brother. My release enabled me to attend comrade Zweli's funeral.
"During my stay at the police station it was suggested to me by (deleted) from HQ that I leave Swaziland. My response was that I would leave per instruction by the ANC. I was recalled by the ANC to Maputo around December. I gave my version to the Movement. It was false.
"P.S. During the interrogation sessions with (deleted) from HQ, he asked me about King (an enemy agent whom we had recently kidnapped about a month ago.) I admitted knowing him, but blamed his disappearance on comrade Zweli."
One thing is certain: the subject, like his wife, confessed only because he was cornered. Like his wife (also a confessed agent), subject never had the courage or the intention to face the Movement squarely about his crimes and confess fully.
"I first met the subject in the camp, I was not very close to him. But as he was part of the camp commissariat of which I was also a member, we would now and then discuss some political questions. In the process I gathered that he came out of the country in 1975 to Botswana but did not immediately join the ANC. In fact he was one of those elements who were anti-ANC that time in Botswana. Of course one can understand that since people were coming from Black Consciousness and he found himself in Botswana which was then a stronghold of BCM. But the way he immediately became so positive to the ANC was rather too fast to be sincere. That is my own opinion which can be wrong.
"In the camp he was very close to (deleted) who once worked in our Radio Freedom in Lusaka and later had some security problems.
"I left him in Quibaxe for Katengue. I stayed in that camp for about five months and left for the Party School in Cuba for two years. When I came back he was no longer in Angola. I went for further training in the GDR. When I came back I was again immediately sent back as the Commander of the group of 40.
In January 1982, I went to Maputo and became the Commissar of the Natal Urban Military Machinery. I worked with Cde Problem (Commander), Zweli Nyanda (Chief-of-Staff), the subject (Chief of Communications) and Belgium as Chief of Recce. Later Problem left the machinery and Zweli was appointed Acting Commander. (...)
"Early in 1982, I left with the subject to Swaziland. I did not know very well the area since I was once there in 1977. I was then underground after having trained with the unit of Solomon Mahlangu in Funda. We got the car waiting for us on the Swazi side of Lomahasha. I had no weapon nor money for emergency. The subject had a Scorpion (pistol) and some money.
"As we were proceeding on our journey to Manzini we were stopped by police but we managed to run away. When we approached Simunye we could see that a road block was being mounted. We alighted from the car and took cover in the bush. Unfortunately it was next to the garage and the security guards spotted the subject. They did not see me. He was arrested. When I saw this I jumped onto one of these security guards. The subject was freed and instead I was arrested. He did not help me but instead ran away. When he came to Manzini he reported that I was asleep that is why I got arrested which was an incorrect report of what actually took place. I took this incident as a simple question of cowardice on his part.
"In 1983 before the formation of the Natal Military HQ of which I was a treasurer, we infiltrated Cde S'khusele to Pietermaritzburg. He found some problems with his unit. Some members of that unit deserted. S'khusele managed to go to the Transkei, arranged a document and left for Lesotho. He was met by Zweli and reinfiltrated back home. He carried out about five operations and retreated back to Lesotho and later to Maputo. We got a report from our security that the enemy knew when he retreated and the exact date when he was infiltrated inside the country. Up to now we do not know who gave the enemy that information.
"When S'khusele was in Maputo he wrote a hand written report. He was infiltrated back to Pietermaritzburg with somebody who later became a state witness against him. During the trial of S'khusele the enemy produced the report he had written in Maputo, saying that they got it from a highly sensitive source in the ANC. He is serving 20 years now. To my knowledge that report was filed in Maputo. I know because S'khusele's unit was being briefed in Swaziland it was in my house, and the subject did not have that report with him. Therefore it was in Maputo.
" "Later when I was in Dar es Salaam I tried to find out how did that report reach the boers from (deleted), I was told that that report was captured when the boers killed Zweli.
"Before the death of Zweli the subject was arrested in Swaziland. He showed the Swazi police where he had parked the car he was driving. Later he came with them to my house and showed them where we had parked the new van we were using for our route recce inside the country.
"Later he came with the police to my house claiming that he was staying there. I was about 20 metres from the house discussing with another comrade. Unfortunately there were SACTU underground comrades in the house coming from home and one of our comrades. They were all arrested. The subject also pointed another house which we used for underground cadres coming from home.
"All along he was defended by Thami Zulu. I think Thami did this because he thought that the subject was being victimised because he once commented that there were people who did not like the subject because he was not coming from Natal. Such comments can be demoralising and one feels not to confront somebody if other people would think that you are confronting somebody on regional or tribal grounds. You become disarmed.
"Zweli died when the subject was in the same house. He did not suffer any injury. One is not trying to suggest that everybody must die when there is an attack.
"I was later arrested in Swaziland. Zweli's sister came to Swaziland. She wanted to see me but could not. "In prison I was told by Cdes Alzina Zondi and other female comrades that Zweli's sister had told them that the subject was responsible for the death of Zweli. She had found this from a Special Branch (policeman) she was close to. I reported this to Thami Zulu but I was ignored.
"Before the death of Zweli we had captured a sellout who had infiltrated us. In his confession he said the enemy knew about the communication we maintained with him. No force had been used against him. He just confessed and he seemed to be sincere. I was responsible for his interrogation.
"Then came the Nkomati Accord. I was arrested. Thami Zulu and the subject were arrested together. They had bought two cars for the machinery. Already Swazi police knew about those cars. The one who had arranged for them these cars was arrested later and the police were saying that he was responsible for buying ANC cars.
"There was an old man we used for banking our money. The police knew about this. He was later arrested and questioned about this.(Note: Fear acknowledges betraying this man in the previous record .... CIES, 10/05/1992) "The subject had been arrested with weapons. To our surprise the subject was released and not deported like others. In fact an advocate was saying he was not going to defend a man who had said so much to the police.
1.1. After a thorough preparation, the panel felt that in order to achieve better results it was necessary to begin on the involvement of his wife with the enemy. He had previously mentioned her in the long list of enemy agents as the first one that he was sure of.
1.2. We also had information from our source that his wife was seen in Durban (purpose of visit not known). Ralph could have known about this. This could not have been the first time that she went home.
1.3. Information from another source revealed that when subject's wife left the country, she was under enemy instructions to join and inform Ralph to join the ANC. This does not appear in the biography that she wrote when she joined the Movement.
1.4. It was also felt that after breaking him on the above mentioned aspect this was going to open avenues for him to reveal his handler or handlers and how they used to communicate. From his last confession (about how his wife came to work for the other side) it was felt that he should be in a position to know more on how she used to work with the other side.
2.1. After being asked to relate about his wife, he merely repeated all that he had revealed in the previous sessions without any additions (for about one and a half hours).
2.2. After being asked on how many times (that he knows of) did his wife go to SA from Bay and for what purposes, he claimed not to have been in a position to monitor her movements when they were staying together; which to us seemed ridiculous.
2.3. He then revealed that his wife went to SA for about 4 (four) times as far as he knows; and never wanted to reveal the purposes of her visits there.
2.4. He also revealed that she refused to submit her Lesotho Passport when asked to do so; because it reflected her trips to SA and could have led to her being questioned and discovered to be an enemy agent.
2.6. When we woke up Ralph up (27/07/88) to start work, he complained of stomach pains and wanted to vomit. We saw that we could not continue and we decided to consult the doctor. A comrade walked to get a lift to town since our transport had not yet arrived.
2.7. On arrival; the doctor certified him dead and informed us that he suspects that he could have taken some poison.
RECEIVED FROM WITHIN THE SAP "The placing of agents at high levels remains one of the prime objectives of the enemy and this program is conducted from the highest levels e.g. Lawrence was handled by Major Stadler of HQ."
In 1977 or 1978 subject started a (love) affair with one Modise. Modise was a uniformed member of the South African Police working at Ramotswa Border-gate. At the time subject was working at the Gaborone General Post Office. Modise asked subject to report to him about people who cross into Botswana from South Africa illegally.
*+ Sergeant Smith - Zeerust home telephone number 21919; Work place telephone number 22012 or 22013, Zeerust Security Branch Offices.
While working at January's restaurant in Ramotswa, she came to know Gilbert Moilwa, Isaac and others to be refugees. Subject reported these to Modise. Gilbert later returned to South Africa while his friends proceeded to Zambia.
In 1978 subject visited Violet Pule in Johannesburg. There they took photographs with Sadi Pule's family. Soon after that trip, Sadi Pule visited Botswana. Sadi gave subject a passport size photograph of a woman, named Maria, who Sadi said was goin g to visit Botswana. Sadi requested subject to assist Maria when she arrived in Botswana. Subject took the photographs she had taken with Sadi Pule's family and that of Maria to Modise. Modise later returned them and subject posted them to Sadi Pule.
Sadi was detained during 1978 by the South African Security Branch after the visit to Botswana. In detention she was shown the photographs her family had taken with subject and was asked to identify subject. Sadi did not know where the enemy got the photographs. (This information on Sadi Pule's detention is from Sadi herself).
Subject was recruited by Sadi Pule in 1982 for the Women's Section work. She was to serve as a courier. Subject reported that approach to Modise.
Was sent inside the country to deliver ANC cloth material and pamphlets to a certain Mapule in Mapetla, Soweto. Shortly afterwards Mapule was taken in by the enemy.
Subject was sent to recruit several individuals in Botswana and Bophutatswana (names deleted). Comrades Florence Mophosho and Aurelia Gqabi gave subject a letter to deliver to comrade Albertina Sisulu. Subject showed the letters to Modise who later returned them.
Modise (SB) once asked subject to monitor Clement Bogatsu, a Motswana who is a driver at BHC. Subject reported that Clement was close to Lekoto and Chris of Special Ops. Clement was later arrested in South Africa.
Subject reported to Modise (SB) that two cadres under Special Ops had been infiltrated into the country by a driver of Phillip Moletsane in Moshaneng. The driver was later arrested and allegedly recruited by the enemy. Subject claims to have got this information from Phillip Moletsane.
Lekoto of Special Ops once gave subject a code - list and money in an envelope and weapons for safe-keeping. Lekoto also sent subject to call Phillip to Botswana. When subject went to call Phillip she took the code-list with and gave it to Modise and also told him about the money and weapons. Modise later gave the subject the code-list.
Comrades Steve (Sebata alias Luvuyo Mzana alias Enoch Muiseng Mashoala) and Naledi assigned subject to recruit somebody in Moshaneng to take cadres to South Africa.
Subject went to report to Modise about her task. Modise, Langa and Sergeant Smith (all policemen) later met subject and told her that she would have to report to Botswana that she had recruited Mr Richard Maduenyana. Maduenyana was also called into the meeting, (or Richard Moduenyana or Richard Muduenyana)
Richard arrived in Botswana and was given money to buy a canopy for his vannette in South Africa. He was also given instructions on how and where to pick the four cadres inside the country.
Comrades Steve/Sebata/Mashoala and Naledi took the four cadres across and went to the rendezvous. On arrival there they heard the sound of a big truck in the bushes. They waited there until Richard Moduenyana came to the meeting spot. When Moduenyana pulled off with the four cadres, Steve and Naledi heard the sound of the truck again. They got worried because they felt the truck was following the vannette. Early the following day they heard news over BBC radio that the four cadres had been killed. The two (Naledi and Luvuyo) instructed subject to go and check on Moduenyana.
Subject went to report on Modise (SB) about the task she was assigned. Moduenyana was called by Security Branch police to a meeting on a secret farm in Zeerust. Present at the meeting were Major Crouser (Crouse?), Sergeant Smith, Wehrman, Modise and Langa (all these SB controllers). Also in attendance were Moduenyana and subject. Here a strategy was worked out on how Moduenyana was to handle comrades Steve and Naledi.
After the mmeting subject returned to Botswana and there she reported that Moduenyana was going to visit Botswana the following day, that he had sustained injuries and was treated by an Indian doctor who was his friend in Rustenburg.
On the said day, Moduenyana arrived in Botswana. He gave Steve and Naledi the story and showed them old wounds in his body which the comrades believed. They arranged with him to visit Botswana for medical treatment. The car Moduenyana was driving when he visited Botswana was riddled with bullets.
Later Steve and Naledi sent subject to call Moduenyana when the arrangements for his medication were finalised. On arrival in South Africa subject met Sergeant Smith who gave her the story to pass to the comrades, that Moduenyana had recovered.
Moduenyana was later given an Isuzu vannette with a radio (for communication), the registration number being YBG 1345, blue in colour with a white canopy. Moduenyana is also a member of the Opposition Party of Bophuthatswana.
Subject was introduced in Botswana by Lekoto of Special Ops to a contact who was to receive material (weapons) in Magaliesburg. This was on the 16/12/1985. The person left Botswana same day. On the same day subject reported telephonically to Modise (SB) and then left Botswana the following day.
+ On arrival in Moshaneng subject phoned Modise again telling him that she (subject) was on the way with the car loaded with material.
Outside they found policemen waiting for them. They were ordered back into the garage and the material was found. The police took the contact person with them plus the material and left the girlfriend behind. The material taken by the enemy from the contact was made up of: two car-bombs material; three AKs; grenades; money for Special Ops cadres.
The girlfriend was later detained - on the 24/12/1985 and was to be charged for perjury when she refused to testify against her boyfriend.
In 1985 subject met Sergeant Smith, Major Crouser, Wehrmann, Modise and Langa. They showed subject a map of Gaborone and asked her to identify Sadi Pule's house. Subject pointed Sadi's house in Tlokweng and another house across the road where a female comrade lived. Two weeks later Muzi Nkwanyana visited Sadi in Tlokweng. A week later, Sadi's house was attacked during the Gaborone June 14 raid.
After the raid subject visited Sadi's house (which had been attacked) and later reported to handler Modise that Sadi was safe. Subject also reported the location of the residence of Naledi behind the Community Centre to Modise.
In May 1987, subject phoned Smith and Modise (SBs) in Zeerust and reported to them that Abraham Pule had arrived in Ramotswa from South Africa and was proceeding to Gaborone. Subject also told them the date he would be coming back to Ramotswa. Subject states: "The day before Abraham Pule left Botswana I phoned Modise and Smith to inform them. Modise later told me that Abraham got arrested at a roadblock having weapons..."
++ Initially Modise used to give subject R50 to R150 per month.
Subject was given a radio and shown how to operate it by Smith, Modise and Langa. Only used the radio once when handlers wanted to know whether there were any cadres in her place. Apart from this used to use telephone.
Subject was lured into Lusaka, Zambia where she confessed to her dealings with the Security Branch against the ANC. This was in March 1988. She was returned to Botswana after the authorities there demanded her as their national. For more on that you may see the file of Enoch Muiseng Mashoala alias Luvuyo.
DATE OF REPORT: March 1988
Subject's interest to work with the police force was aroused when he was in his last year in high school. Together with 150 other school mates (boys) they were taken to a semi-military training camp.
The camping was organised by the South African Defence Force (SADF), the welfare organisation of Pretoria, the South African Police (SAP) and his school viz. Eersterus High School. Main function of this camping was to introduce and expose them to career opportunities in the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the South African Police (SAP). It was held at Rashoop military base outside Pretoria.
End of the same year (1979), all those who had attended this camp were sent applications forms to go to the Police College. Subject was unable to join the police because of his father's refusal to sign those forms, he wanted him to get a university education.
In 1980 he was recruited, together with his friend (deleted) by Colonel Dries van der Merwe to work for him. Their task was to monitor the unrest (1980 school boycotts) in their area, Eersterus. For every piece of information submitted to their handler they got R200.00. The same year he was introduced - by his handler - to Jonathan Nel of the Security Branch who was to be his next handler the rest of his time with the police.
During 1980, a training course in fire-arms, surveillance, personal security and politics was organised for him, in a farm outside Erasmus in Pretoria.
1) In 1981 he was infiltrated at the University of Western Cape (UWC) to monitor and report any political activity in the campus especially about the anti-Republic Day campaign nd people behind the formation of the Students Representative Council (SRC).
2) In 1982 he was instructed to enroll at Witwatersrand (Wits) University, for a Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.) degree so as to conduct similar tasks of reporting any political activity there.
MISSIONS ASSIGNED AND CARRIED OUT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (First year):
1) He was instructed to join anti-apartheid student groups, report on their activities, their support on the campus and the degree of their contact with the ANC. He was to attend rallies and demonstrations.
2) Make a list of all students who are in the institute of the international educational programme, that is to say, all those who come from South Africa because the boers feared that this might be the recruiting ground of the ANC.
At the end of that academic year on May 1984 he was ordered to go home for holidays and his route had to via London where he had to meet Nel and get new instructions for the time in London. The tasks in London were:
a) To join the South African Communist Party (SACP) and pick up literature at its office;
a) He went home on June, 1984 with the task of infiltrating the United Democratic Front (UDF) up until the time he left for the United States in August the same year.
a) He again went via London where he was instructed to work in the ANC office and report on its activities and contacts with other people around London.
NOTE: He submitted all the information gathered to Nel who was there at that time. Nel also took pictures of the subject, Dali Tambo and George while they were busy working at the stall.
At the end of August 1984, he went to the United States. He started this academic year at Columbia University in New York. He came to this university through transference which he applied for on the previous year. He applied for this transference by order of Captain Nel because Columbia University is where the anti-apartheid activities were concentrated. His tasks there were:
a) To work for the American Committee on Africa (ACOA)
Just before he went home on June 1985 holidays Nel arranged a visit to the United States by his wife. In June, after the Columbia University had proclaimed its disinvestment in the companies which had businesses in South Africa, Nel ordered him to go home. The subject has participated in these disinvestment campaigns to an extent that he even went on hunger strike.
Around July 1985, while he was still on school holidays he was briefed about his new mission of infiltrating the ANC in Africa and try by all means to work for the International Department in Lusaka. During one of these briefings he was introduced to a certain Fish (Security Branch policeman) who he (Fish) claimed (deleted) was an acquaintance. Arthur was to help the subject through to be deployed at Thabo Mbeki's office. (Subject later withdrew the implications this person as false).
He was not to undergo any military training in the ANC. All the information gathered was to be sent through J. Burton, Dominium Press, P.O.Box 391813, Bramley. He then went to the United States on July and started arranging with comrade Neil Mnumzana to go to Lusaka.
ACTIVITIES WHILE IN THE ANC (INCLUDING INFORMATION PASSED ON TO THE ENEMY):
He was in Lusaka up until comrade Chris Hani suggested that he goes to Harare and be stationed there. In Harare he used to communicate with Nel through a certain Bruce. He gave information about ANC facilities in Harare, personnel and places of stay including comrade Chris Hani's movements. He even set up appointments with comrades Raphael and June so that Bruce (contact sent by Nel in Harare) could take their pictures. His activities led to the attack of some of our houses in Harare.
In April 1986 he went back home, South Africa, without the consent of the ANC. On arrival at home he was detained as a cover story aimed at deceiving the ANC.
For all his activities he was receiving R1 500.00 per month deposited into his bank account. While he was at home he went several times to Gaborone.
Subject was instructed by his handler Nel (Louis Pasteur Building, Prinsloo Street, Pretoria - fourth floor, room 401) to go to UDF offices in Khotso House for purposes of spying on their activities. De Souza reported about the results of this visit to Khotso House to his handler, Nel and drew the lay-out of the UDF and Afroscope offices. Later on the offices of Afroscope were raided and all video materials which were there were confiscated De Souza was also about to leave the country for his studies abroad. Nel told him that he should recommend to his UDF contacts certain `progressive' people in Eersterus area who would take over his UDF tasks in the area after he had left the country. These `progressive' people who were given to the subject by Nel for recommendation were (six people who subject said his handler told him were working for NIS.) He says his UDF contacts left with names, telephone numbers and work places of the people recommended by Nel.
COMMENTS (CIES 12/04/1991): Comrades who were dealing with his case felt that he had given an incomplete confession. Subject implicated a lot of people but later retracted on account that the confession was made under duress.
HANDLERS: Major Dries van der Merwe (subject says he is now a Colonel); Captain Jonathan Nel; Bruce (surname unknown)
Note: De Souza was amongst the last group of 32 released in 1991. As outlined in the ANC's first submission to the TRC, he returned to Eersterus where he apparently became involved in gang violence; he was eventually tried for murder and attempted murder but died under circumstances which remain unclear before serving this sentence.
Please note: the video tapes of Dlongwana's confession, as requested by the TRC, are in the process of being coverted into a format compatible with ordinary VCRs and will be handed over shortly.
DOB: 23/09/1958 in Port Elizabeth
He was recruited in detention, in 1980, by Sergeant Nkomane (Bra) at Swartkop police station. Nkomane was a Security Branch policeman at Sanlam Building and staying at Ferguson Road, New Brighton, Port Elizabeth.
Subject was arrested together with people who were involved in a bomb blast (dynamite) on 15/02/1980. In this case, he (subject) gave evidence in court against his colleagues. The co-accused, a certain Mzamo and Mzwabantu were sentenced to 11 years and 12 years respectively. (In first confession subjectmentions this recruitment as his second recruitment. The first recruitment took place at Algoa Park Police Station in 1977 during their arrest for boycotting classes. He was recruited by Sergeant Buzani. He was released whereas others got lashes.He claims to have never worked up until 1980 when recruited again.)
1) He was instructed by Sergeant Buzani of Sanlam Building to attend political gatherings and take names of speakers and the deliberations.
In 1980 he was trained by Constable Van Vuuren at Queenstown Golf Club, on how to shoot with a Presto automatic gun. He was again trained at Sanlam Building on fire-arms, communication (walkie talkie), intelligence and photography. Instructors were Lieutenant Momberg and Sergeant Van Wyk.
a) Sipho Hashe, a Secretary General of PEBCO (Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation)
2) He shot one Nompumelelo in the right thigh. Together with six Security policemen, they raided one Toto of Veeplaas who was a member of Port Elizabeth Students Congress (PESCO), also a boyfriend to Nompumelelo. On their arrival at the place where they thought Toto could be, people started running away, and the police started shooting. The subject claims he was the one who shot Nompumelelo. Her leg was amputated
3) In 1983 he stabbed one Mzolisi Gxuma at No.29 Siyongwana Street, Zwide Township (a shebeen house). Mzolisi had exposed the subject as a police informer. Subject only appeared once in court and the case was squashed.
4) Shot dead one Mpumelelo Mpendu, an uncle to Mkhuseli Jack - leader of Port Elizabeth Youth Congress (PEYCO) and chairman of the Consumer boycott. Reason for shooting him is that they wanted to frustrate and demoralise Mkhuseli Jack. Mr Mpendu was living at No.12 Fumba Street, Zwide, P.E.
7) Shot one Xola, a member of PEYCO. Due to pressure in Port Elizabeth, the subject was transferred to Germiston in 1986. His home was petrol bombed. Whilst in Germiston he carried out the following tasks:
8) In 1986, he reported about (deleted) of NAFCOC. He used to give money to people leaving the country. (Paid R100 for the report)
11) Sold some executive members of Vosloorus Students Congress. The following are missions conducted outside South Africa:
12) In 1982 he photographed ANC houses in Lesotho per instructions of Momberg. (He went to Lesotho in September 1982 and was staying at Hilton and Victoria hotels. Completed his mission and went back to South Africa in November 1982. The mission was sponsored by Sergeant Swarts)
He left South Africa on December 8, 1982 instructed by Lieutenant Momberg, and met his operational unit at Hilton Hotel.
With his unit of six, they went to one house where they threw a grenade at the main door. After the door fell they then stormed in. They found three ladies sitting on top of the bed. Whilst checking the whole house they found three men. They were put against the wall,ordered to make mock marriages with their girlfriends, and thereafter executed. m According to the subject, he shot the one in the middle.
From here they went to Chris Hani's house, and shouted that he must surrender himself. Noting no response, they stormed the house with grenades and bazooka. Subject says they attacked all the houses he photographed earlier on. After the raid he was taken by helicopter back to the country. For this mission he was paid R1 800.00 and given a new car (2.1 Cortina).
14) In February 1983 he was instructed by Lieutenant Smuts to confirm survivors and casualties of the raid. When he arrived in Lesotho, he joined the ANC. Upon completion of his mission, he told comrade Sparks that he wanted to go back to South Africa. It is then that he was handed over to the local police on suspicions. He was released after 16 days and deported to South Africa. He received R1000 for this mission.
16) Other missions fulfilled: Together with "Reverend" Ebenezer Maqina they were instructed to infiltrate ROOTS, to carry out the following tasks:
i) Whenever there is a stayaway called by PEBCO, Roots should distribute pamphlets that Pebco has cancelled the stayaway.
ii) If students boycott, Roots should go to that school and beat up the students to go back to classes.
iii) Whenever PEBCO or Cosas has called a meeting, Roots should organise a similar meeting on the same day.
(Note: it has subsequently come to light that Maqina was being handled by the PE branch of Adult Education Consultants, which was managed by the Department of Military Intelligence.)
17) At a funeral of one MK cadre, Samuel Segole, who died in a shootout in Natalspruit, the subject presented a paper prepared by the police. He was masquerading as Stephen Nhlapo from Alexandra - a Release Mandela Committee member.
Left the country in 1986 per instructions of Lieutenant Kallie van Dyk of Germiston through Ramatlabane .
To identify as much as possible people coming from his area.
Confession (prepared for the Tribunal) in 1990; A report by Nat in Lusaka dated 12/05/1987; Confession statement by subject dated 02/05/1987.
As outlined in our first submission to the TRC, after Dlongwana was released in 1991 he went back to his handlers and fronted for an SAP-run stratkom operation called the "Returned Exiles Co-ordinating Committee." He was also linked with the warlord Thomas Shabalala.
D.O.B: 09.01.1966 Xaba Location .
He was asked to check on students who were at rallies, boycotts and stay-aways. He was asked about where the residences of Mkhuseli Jack, Henry Fazzie, Mike Xhego and Boy Njomba were and claims he said he did not know.
He goes on to say the only mission he carried out was of killing a person (unnamed) in Langa around April/May 1986.He claims he shot the guy with two shots and the third shot he directed to the sky to silence the dead man's girlfriend who was screaming.
Thereafter he took his girlfriend (deleted) of Mabombo street in Langa to Port Elizabeth. He was given R100.00 for the mission and R100.00 for submitting the gun.
He was forced to find a contact which would assist him to leave the country by Gerber and Groenewald. Subject together with Vuyani Jibiliza; Boy Njomba and Mthunzi Thoba met Lundi Shayi of Adelaide. Lundi came after two weeks and informed them about Reverend Stofile. Groenewald had told subject to report once he found a contact so that he could give him something to take to the Movement.
On the 16th September 1986 subject was given a blue powder (poison) and told how to use it by one Richard who claimed he was an Instructor of Physical Training in one of our Camps around 1984 in Angola. He was told to promote tribalism and if possible mutiny.
He was told by Richard that our cadres eat frogs and lizards and was shown a video cassette of people eating those things and being portrayed as Umkhonto cadres. He was then given R500.00 by Groenewald and promised more money by the time he comes back. He claims he gave the money to his mother.
The following day, the 17th, he went to Alice with Lundi using money given by Filton Kona.They met with Reverend Stofile who organised them passports. On the 7th November 1986 they left Alice and Reverend Stofile was arrested. They were given money by Mrs Stofile and went to Johannesburg to Winnie Mandela who organised passports for them.They were later briefed by Vuyisile Sefako.
On the 13th May they left for Botswana with Stelfox Godlo, Vela Qwamashe and Motlatsi. He claims he had thrown the poison in dirty water upon arrival in Chelston (Lusaka) he arrived in Angola in September 1987 and commenced with training the following month (October).
Three to four months thereafter he started his dirty work. He met a person by the name (deleted) who he claims behaved in the same manner as he was instructed by his handlers. One day he met another person during the digging of dugouts by the name (deleted) who had shown him a weapon belonging to one soldier (David) and he hid it in the dugout. Subject attempted to cache other weapons in this way.
At some point after failing to steal the second weapon (both were SHE Petersons) he was a sentinel at one of the Posts (ant hill) where there was a machine gun. He had stolen a pair of pliers from the maintenance unit and he emptied the gun powder from the first five cartridges and the last five on the loading belt of the PKM company machine gun and later returned the belt back to the weapon. The next sentinel never noticed. The next morning the machine gun was taken on a convoy to Malange where it failed to fire during a UNITA ambush. One comrade died and the Camp Commissar was wounded. The subject was a suspect at this time since he was also on duty in the same post.
In a second incident some time later he forced an empty cartridge casing, with the end of the primer removed (to make sure no one discovers the casing inside) into the barrel of another PKM machine gun.This was discovered minutes before the convoy took off when all weapons were checked. All weapons were inspected and that casing was discovered.
The recording officers checked all areas of suspicion and possible suspects. This was narrowed down and the other incident of sabotage was also taken into account. The list of possible suspects was further narrowed down by looking at biographies of the suspects. It was found that the subject's biography had been considered doubtful in the first place although there had been no tangible evidence to interrogate him.
Security went to the dwelling where subject was staying, a pair of pliers was discovered and subject claimed he used it to fix his bed and he stole it from the maintenance unit.
Thirdly, in Luanda after the subject was removed from the camp for investigation, his unit was taken from the camp with the legend that they were going to get new deployments.They were given several weapons to clean in preparation for the convoy which was bound to the Northern Front. Subject told the investigators that he was cleaning a rifle. But to the suprise of investigators, they discovered that a striking pin missing from a PKM machine gun which he had assisted in disassembling. Subject was later taken away for thorough questioning and he confessed.
In January 1984 the subject and his friend by the name of Alfred Makene were looking for a job at Checkers stores, where they were given forms to fill in.
Several days later he received a telephone call informing him that there was no work (at the store) but he should try a place in Prinsloo Street. When he got there he was given forms to fill in. A week later a policeman came to his place and took him to Silverton police station. Later he was taken to Compol.
There he was offered to work with the police, which according to him, he refused. Then he was asked to spy for the police in his township, Mamelodi. He agreed. He was tasked to report especially on the activities of Moses Chikane (Transvaal Secretary of the UDF), Mike Mailula, who worked at Khotso House; and Louis Khumalo of Mamelodi Parents Action Committee. He was also to report on the activities of organisations such as the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) United Democratic Front (UDF), and the Mamelodi Youth Organisation. He was told by his bosses that he would be given training.
He received his training at a farm house in the north of Pretoria. He spent three months at that farm house studying banned books about the African National Congress. He received training in developing legends and covert communication methods (coding and decoding). For the next six months he was taken to a place called Onverwacht near the Odi/Moretele district, between Ga-rankuwa and Mabopane townships on the way towards Klipgat and Jericho villages. He did physical training, and was instructed in surveillance, counter surveillance, engineering (usage of explosives), driving and car maintenance, interviewing, interrogation, and house breaking. In all he did a nine months training course.
In June 1985 he participated in the grenade attack on Louis Khumalo's home in D Section Mamelodi East, together with (deleted) who was driving the car, and some trainees from Hammanskraal Police College. They spread pamphlets bearing the name of the United Democratic Front in Khumalo's yard so as to create confusion in the ranks of the democratic movement. He received R100.00.
The second mission (also in June 1985) was the distribution of anti-United Democratic Front pamphlets bearing the name the Azanian People's Organisation's name in Atteridgeville. He was given R100.00. In around June 1985, subject took part in a night march by police in Duduza location, Nigel, pretending to be comrades in the township by singing revolutionary songs. The aim was to arrest the youth who were blamed for unrest in township. The mission was a failure.
Again in June he participated in a clash between members of the UDF and Azapo in Mohlakeng; the police were wearing Azapo T-shirts, and threw stones at UDF members. The subject was paid R100.00.
In July 1985 he took part in the booby-trapping of explosives that killed three comrades of the seven Duduza activists who were detained at John Vorster Square. Subject and another black policeman acted as African National Congress guerrillas on a mission to sabotage an electrical substation on the outskirts of Kwathema township near Springs. He was paid R150.00. Also in July, he participated in the hand grenade attack at a house belonging to a member of the United Democratic Front, in Huhudi, Vryheid, together with three others from the local police station. They each got R110.00.
At the end of July 1985 he started preparing himself to go for studies in Lesotho at the National University of Lesotho. On the 10 August 1985, he travelled by train from Pretoria station via the Germiston-Bloemfontein line to Marseilles station on the Maseru border. There he met his handler Johnson and was briefed to monitor the activities of South African students on the campus, follow the movements of a student leader called Kutwanakutwana and other ANC-aligned students. Johnson gave him the telephone number 72369 and told him that when dialling he should start with the last number (9) and end with the first number (7). He was given the codename "Boaparo" to use when phoning.
He received a bursary from the World University Service instead of the United Nations. Subject joined student organisations such as Committee in Action Solidarity with Southern African Students (CASSAS) and the Union of Namibian and South African Students (UNISAS). When he went home on vacation he reported to Johnson on his contact with Ngoako Ramatlhodi and Mpumulwana Tolo, who were ANC-aligned students. Subject declared himself a refuge in Lesotho, and joined the ANC.
2. To note the guarding system at camps. 3. Encourage subversion and dissatisfaction amongst soldiers.
In the event of being discovered he was told to run away to the South of Angola and hand himself over to the South African Defence Force in Namibia. He gave himself up to the African National Congress before fulfilling his task.
She was recruited by Allan Ndlovu in Swaziland in 1985 and handed over to Captain Ronnie Nel. Nel has been described as Head of the Elimination Squad for Swaziland, based in Compol Building, Pretoria. There was no contact from the end of 1985 until March 1986. She was then approached by a Van Vuuren, whose actual name was Lange - this she discovered on signing for the money after the death of Viva Yethu, an MK cadre.
She pointed out the house where Pantsu, a cadre of the Movement, was living; he was killed early in 1986.
She informed Allan Ndlovu that September was travelling between Mbabane and Manzini. This led to September's arrest, and eventual abduction to South Africa. She worked in an enemy cell which included (deleted) and (deleted.) The latter is a Mozambican renegade, who was suspected to be an MNR member in Swaziland. Subject confirmed he was an enemy agent.
The operation was carried out as follows: subject was to lure comrades to her place for a meal, they would be tailed from there and executed. However, the comrades came and left early that afternoon. It was then planned to try again on Saturday. Subject made contact with the comrades on Friday and telephoned Ronnie Nel about this in the morning. The comrades were kept under surveillance the whole day and in the late afternoon the subject phoned her handler, telling him that they would gather at (deleted)'s place that night. Subject arrived at (deleted)'s place last and found everyone there. They were preparing to leave for a party in Tembemile.
(Deleted) and the subject refused to go with the rest, and went to inform Nel who was parked in the yard of the flats. The enemy had three cars, a red Golf, a Mitsubishi and a white BMW. The Mitsubishi followed Viva's car from the flats and the two travelled in the BMW. They went directly to the party to enquire whether Viva and the others had arrived. They were in for about ten minutes, on their return the engine of the car was running and Nel was in radio contact with the other car. They travelled straight to the scene of the execution. (Note: Subject did not actually witness these executions as she remained in the car.)
(Deleted) and the subject then quickly checked Viva's car for anything important. (Deleted) took from the car a pistol, house keys, about R800 in cash and a notebook from Viva's clutch bag.
Back in the car, the subject was asked about which places the survivors may have gone to. She suggested Tod Masilela's place nearby. They were to kill the survivors if found. At Tod's place, Tod chased her away. (The survivors were in fact inside - note from NAT panel.)
The subject was later dropped at Mary Mkuhlase's house where she spent the weekend. (Deleted - the Mozambican) then took the enemy to the house where the comrades lived, which they searched and took weapons.
The subject was told by Paul, about two days before his death, that there was an important person arriving with whom she could discuss some of the financial problems she had raised with him. She later overheard (an office worker) receiving a telephone message from Maputo for Paul that this person was arriving on Thursday and that he should be met at the airport. She duly informed Ronnie Nel about this.
That Thursday Paul Dikeledi, Cassius Make and a Mozambican woman travelling with them were killed on their way back from the airport by white persons driving a white BMW.
The subject reported on the location of houses of our comrades in Maputo after her trip in September 1986.
For special operations she received more. For the killing of Viva she got R800. For passing on information which led to the ambush and killing of Paul Dikeledi and Cassius Make she got R500; originally she had wanted R1000.
Recruited in March 1985 (elsewhere he says September 1983) by Sergeant Shekheshe Ntombela, a Security Branch policeman at C.R. Swartz Square, Smith Street, Durban. Shekheshe lives at Ntuzuma Township at E Section. Actual place where recruited was in one of Shekheshe's flats which he rented to (name deleted) at Indunduma Section, 28th Avenue, on the third floor, Clermont.
Brigadier Pieter Swanepoel, C.R. Swart Square; Sergeant Shekheshe Ntombela, C.R. Swart Square, Durban.
Underwent training from March 1985 to 06/09/1985. Training included food poisoning, firearms, etc. Trained together with (two names deleted).
Instructors were Brigadier Swanepoel from C.R. Swart as well as a Mrs Smith and Shekheshe. Used open ground near Westville Womens Association near Lamontville for firearms practise and a house in Morningside for classes.
(Four names with work addresses supplied in Bulawayo, Angola, and Zambia, one allegedly within the UNHCR.)
MISSIONS FULFILLED (AS THEY APPEAR IN HIS HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT SIGNED AND DATED 15/01/1990) ON BEHALF OF THE SECURITY BRANCH POLICE:
*** Killed Eugene Nunu Kheswa a close friend of his (subject) after making sure he was drunk. "I was given money to make him drunk and later I was joined by (3 names deleted). I stabbed him on the neck and they finished him off and I go to report to his family ... nobody was arrested.. the date was 30/06/1985".
*** "In the following week we killed Thandi Poswa who was always in touch with Reverend Xundu church ... we shot her thrice on the chest when she was crossing the 24th Avenue..."
*** "Unfortunately we were spotted by Nelisiwe Octavia Lamola, a student at Ziphathele High School. We were given a mission to silence her because she reported the matter to KwaDakeka Police Station. We used our initiative there by crushing her with a car." This took place on 12/07/1985.
*** On Mrs Victoria Mxenge "...(deleted) shot her five times on the chest but she never fell, where I followed her with an axe and chopped her next to her dining room door."
*** On Mbongeni Ngema, a unionist from Umlazi: "...we parked our car next to his house in pretext that our car gives us the trouble, at dawn when he was supposed to go (to work) in his office, when he tried to assist us on our car, we shot him and ran away.
*** " I also found myself shooting the people who were coming for a memorial service at Umlazi Cinema where 19 people died and over 20 got injured. I was exposed there by a stupid play between myself and Mike Evans, a riot squad man. The people saw me and said that they are going to kill me".
For the missions which Bongani Raymond Malinga fulfilled he was given R27,500 plus R250 a week for transport. For the massacre of 19 people Bongani got R18,000. Bongani left R36,000 in Allied Building Society, Smith Street, Durban; left R4,000 at Barclaysbank Cromptece Street, Pinetown; left R1,800 at Nedbank, West Street. " I left these blood monies under Shekheshe's protection, we also gave back our weapons to him".
MISSIONS CARRIED OUT AS OUTLINED IN CASE NUMBER 7/1990 OF THE PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL IN THE MATTER: THE PEOPLE VERSUS BONGANI RAYMOND MALINGA: 07/05/1990:
*** In contravention of the common law principle that every person has a right to life, and further, in contravention of Section 2(A) (I) (II) (III) (IV) and (V) the accused intentionally and unlawfully murdered comrade Victoria Mxenge, and was paid by the racist regime R5000 for this criminal act.
*** Intentionally and unlawfully murdered one Thandi Poswa (Phoswa) and was paid by the racist regime an amount of R2800.
*** Intentionally and unlawfully murdered, one Nelisiwe Octavia Lamola because she had seen them murder the said Thandi Poswa, for which criminal activity the accused was paid R2000 by the racist regime.
*** Intentionally and unlawfully murdered one Eugene Nunu Kheswa on 01/06/1984 for which the regime paid the accused the sum of R3500.
*** Intentionally and unlawfully murdered Bongani Mngema for which crime the racist regime paid the accused the sum of R2500
*** Intentionally and unlawfully participated in a massacre at Umlazi Cinema where 19 people were murdered and 34 seriously suffered badly harm.
*** In contravention of Section (A) (I) (II) (III) (IV) and (V) read with Section (B) (I) and (III), the accused infiltrated the ANC with the intention and acting on behalf of and/or in collaboration with the enemy; or, -- causing confusion in the ranks of the ANC; in particular in the ranks of MK and/or -- encouraging the ANC students at SOMAFCO to defect from the ANC and run to Western countries.
*** In contravention of Section 2 (A) (I) (II) (III) (IV) and (V) read with Section (B) (I) and (V) the accused acting on behalf of and/or in collaboration with the racist regime, infiltrated the ANC with the intention to murder comrade Chris Hani (the Chief of Staff of MK) and/or comrade Joe Modise (the Commander of MK).
Confession Statement of Marvin Sefako dated 15/01/1990; People's Tribunal Report dated 07/05/1990. Authored in Angola and Lusaka respectively.
Sefako was first imprisoned in 1988; recommendation to imprison subject confirmed by the National People's Tribunal; he was released in 1991.
CASE STUDY 10
DOB: 01/08/1933, Gweru, Zimbabwe.
* In April 1962 was attached to the Special Branch/Security Branch until he retired on pension in November 1980.
In October 1985 whilst working at Peter Wild Associates, Masasa, Harare, Conjwayo was approached by one Mary Baker, a South African Intelligence operative. Enquiries revealed that Mary Baker is possibly also known as Merry Patrice Mackenzie. She is formerly known as Mrs Richardson.
Conjwayo was shown a photograph of Winston Hart and Peter Berg. He was asked if he still remembered Hart whom he had worked with before, when he was a serving member of the Special Branch. After a positive response, he was told that Hart wanted him to do a job on his behalf. Conjwayo enquired on the nature of the job and he was told that it involved the monitoring of the ANC(SA) President, O.R. Tambo and Chris Hani whenever they visited Zimbabwe. Conjwayo refused to co-operate initially.
During the September 1986 visit by Mary Baker, Conjwayo finally agreed to Hart's previous propositions thereby agreeing to work for the South African intelligence against the ANC in Zimbabwe. Baker immediately went to South Africa where she informed Hart about Conjwayo's submissions. Nothing was heard from either Baker or Hart until April 1987.
* In April 1987, Baker came to Zimbabwe in the company of a white man known as Frank Cloute (Cloete?). Cloute was introduced to Conjwayo as Hart's business partner who was on a business trip. Baker informed Conjwayo that Hart wanted him to travel to South Africa for a meeting. Before Baker left, she gave Conjwayo a South African contact number: 79524444 Randburg.
* In June 1987, Conjwayo visited South Africa to fulfil his promises. At Hilbrow Railway Station, he contacted Baker on the above telephone number. Baker arrived and soon afterwards Hart also arrived. A short while later, another white man only identified as Brian arrived, and he appeared to be senior to Hart. Conjwayo's tasks were repeated to him. His monthly salary was outlined as $450 plus $100 vehicle allowance; plus vehicle to be maintained by Hart and tyres supplied whenever Conjwayo visited South Africa. Was to be paid through Baker in Zimbabwe.
* Sometime in September 1987, Conjwayo was phoned by Mary Baker from South Africa and he was instructed to go and wait for a call from John of the Innez Terrence public call box. John has since been identified as Christopher John Bawden, aka Kit. Kit instructed Conjwayo to proceed to number 8 Durban Road and check whether Jeremy Brickhill was staying there. If he failed to locate him at the above address, he was to proceed to Grassroots Bookshop in Stanley Avenue, which Brickhill owned.
* Conjwayo after locating the home and work place of Jeremy Brickhill reported all that to Christopher John Bawden who was booked at the Holiday Inn in Harare. * A few days before 1987 Christmas holidays, Conjwayo was contacted by Mary Baker to expect a call from John. This John has since been identified as Michael Anthony Smith. The message was that he should look for Jabulani (ANC cadre) and lure him to an RV along Beatrice Road, from where he would be abducted to South Africa. Conjwayo tried but failed to lure Jabulani to the RV because he was elusive. The South Africans had hoped to airlift Jabulani to South Africa using the aircraft that para-dropped Henry Thompson alongside three consignments of arms of war at Carlson's farm, Fort Rixon on 27 December, 1987.
* In January 1988 Conjwayo was given $8000 by Henry Thompson to purchase a vehicle and to look for a driver. After buying a vehicle Conjwayo proceeded to the Employment Exchange where he secured the services of Obed Amon Mwanza, a Zambian national as the driver.
* On the 10/01/1988 Conjwayo parked the vehicle at the Bulawayo Sun Hotel from where it was collected by Christopher John Bawden (Kit) and Michael Anthony Smith who armed it on the 11/01/1988.
After arming the vehicle they parked it at Kine theatres along Grey Street from where it was later collected by Mwanza under Conjwayo's instructions. Mwanza was told to drive the vehicle to Number 16A Jungle Road, North Trenance on a purported foreign currency deal.
Upon arrival at the house, Mwanza was to hoot three times to signal his arrival. Mwanza did not know that the car was armed with a bomb. He also did not know that Chris Bawden and Anthony Smith were following behind up to the corner of Jungle Road and Hydrang Road. Upon arrival he did as instructed and then Christopher Bawden, using a remote control device, detonated the bomb instantly killing Mwanza and injuring six ANC cadres, one of them seriously.
* Conjwayo was eventually arrested at Number 29 Makwiro Road, Mabvuku, on 15/01/1988 and was immediately conveyed to Bulawayo. Kevin John Woods was arrested alongside the owner of the garage, Rory Burt Maguire and his manager, Michael Howard. Through their interrogations, Michael Smith, Barry Bawden and Guy Bawden were arrested. Kevin John Woods is a former member of the CIO and one of the arrested Zimbabwe based South African sabotage and spying operatives.
D O B: 23-09-1968
The subject was arrested in December 1985 (he was 16 years of age) whilst moving with two of his friends who managed to escape. He was beaten up and thrown in to the hippo by the South African Defence Force soldiers, who dropped him at Algoa Park police station.That ultimately laid basis for his recruitment.
He was recruited on 18-12-1985 by a white police man,whose name is Sergeant Gerbe, and a black police man known as Nombombo,they are both based at Algoa Park in Port-Elizabeth. He was given a code name James,a telephone number:541034 Algoa Park, and a brown identity card written Gerbe's name, and beneath of the subject and photo.
2. Gerbe promised to enlarge his home & decorate it, and also pay rent. 3. In case of going abroad for studies his family will be supported.
In March 1986 he was taken for 2 weeks course at Saint Johns More military camp. At this place also Bantustans armies & police got trained by the boer instructors. The place is situated next to the place called Motherwell out side Port-Elizabeth,on the way leading to Uitenhage.
- Camera, Hallena1985 model, 4 cornered flash which is removable, taught to take photo's of all actions. Also on how to use it at far away distances and when it is cloudy, by Nombombo.
3 weeks of anti- African National Congress and anti-communist propaganda politics for 3 weeks. Covering topics such as anti-Sovietism,distorted Freedom Charter, invincibility of the racist regime, causes of the Maseru massacre, and the Ethiopian starvation. He was taught by Van der Merwe, Botha and Van Vuuren who were sharing topics. He was learning with 20 other people (he doesn't know their names.)
In February 1986 he was given a mission to attend the funeral of a cadre of Umkhonto weSizwe by the name of Thandoxolo Mbethe, to:
Look at people who are armed;
In April 1986 the subject was moving with the racist police and vigilantes. He shot a girl in the chest while the Bedford car they weretravelling in was moving at a very high speed.
Managed to photograph a group of comrades burning a bus. A group of comrades holding meeting at a shop known as Kwa-Vantjie.
On leaving the country the subject was given the description of his contact as Vusi who wears a red earing on the left ear and black soleless shoes Given R450.00 to use for travelling.
To poison food;
Route to leave South Africa:
In May 1986 he mobilised a friend by the name of Mzimkhulu to leave the country. they got a lift from Port-Elizabeth to Johannesburg, and found their way to Meadowlands to a person called Tirewo of Zone 9. Tirewo took them to his relative Kenneth Ngwedzeni of Zone 8 where they stayed for two months.
From there they left for Botswana, On arrival in Botswana they were taken to Dukwe transit camp were he met Vusi talked about their missions Vusi went to an extend of showing him the list of addresses he had with him. They last saw each other in Zambia.
Whilst in Zambia Mthobile claims to have poured the poison given to him into the soft porridge when he was on duty on September 16 1986 in Cherlston transit camp in Lusaka. He says he only poured in half of it. Because he was afraid, he claims to have taken some of the poison in a glass of water and drank it, trying to commit suicide, the reason being he was afraid to account for the mess. About 40 people were rushed to the Hospital with severe diarrhoea. Other comrades were discharged from hospital, leaving him behind at the hospital.
Subject had been in contact with the Movement since 1986. On 15th May 1987 subject was sent by the Maputo cdes to be investigated in Lusaka because he was linked to a bomb explosion which took place in Harare on 12/05/87 in comrade Mhlophe's residence resulting in the death of his wife. (Cde Mhlophe is a former ANC Chief Representative in Mozambique).
In around August or Septmebr 1986, a comrade named Victor Ephraim Tebogo Lesia passed away in Tanzania as a result of a car accident. The late comrade's family was informed and the mother came to Maputo accompanied by the subject, who claimed he was Victor's uncle, and proceeded to Tanzania. It was during this period that subject got acquainted with our comrades in Maputo and struck up a close relationship with Cde Mhlophe (former Chief Representative in Mozambique) and Herbert (Chief Rep. in 1987).
Subject had also been visiting Lesotho where he knew cdes Ngalitye and Herbert. On the family's return to South Africa they were contacted by the Security Branch enquiring on their trip to Tanzania.
In 1985 subject claims to have formed a project which he called Leslie's Performing Arts and Cultural Institution. He applied to various foreign companies for sponsorship. The American Embassy in Pretoria responded and sent him forms to fill in.
In October 1986 (after the trip to Tanzania) the application was approved and he received a grant of R15 000 to purchase equipments. A Mr Hutchison from the American embassy met the subject to start the project. A short while later, a Mr Brown and Ernest Becker were introduced to him at the American embassy in Pretoria. He was told about a white organisation called the Orange Free State Art Foundation and was advised to make contact with its members and subsequently join.
At some point Mr Hutchison flew to Bloemfontein to meet subject and introduced to him a Mr Cooper, a lawyer to handle the financial side of the project.
During the period of October 1986 to May 1987 subject made about five (5) trips to Maputo from Bloemfontein as per instructions from his handlers, Brown and Becker in Pretoria. In general his missions were to establish:
+ the number of ANC members in Maputo
PAYMENTS: Subject claims that for his first mission he received a sum of R2 000; for the second mission he received R1 000; he was not paid for the third trip, because he did not report to his handlers about secretly taking his son, David Makhaya Lesia, to join the ANC in Maputo. For the fourth mission he was paid R800, and for the fifth, R2 000
++ He wanted to do underground work and he claimed to have already formed underground structures. He needed trained cadres and materials to carry plans to eliminate enemy personnel.
Subject's account of the bomb which killed the wife of Cde. Mhlope:
Subject then contacted his handlers in Pretoria who gave him the television. They told him that there were certain wires which were part of the packing material, and had to be removed to operate the remote controls. The subject went to Maputo and delivered the television to cde Mhlophe.
Despite all the peace initiatives of the churches and human rights organisations, despite all the peace accord, despite all the exposures and revelations about the involvement of the security forces in the conflict, the violence continues. Why?
JEFF MARISHANE has been studying this kind of violence in South Africa and in other parts of the world. The killings are not as senseless as they appear to be. Viewed against the background of what the military strategists around the world call LIC (Low Intensity Conflict), South Africa's violence makes complete sense-rather frightening sense.
The violence in South Africa today is a classic example of what the military strategists call Low Intensity Warfare (LIW). This counter-insurgency strategy has a long history in South Africa and other parts of the world. Some acquaintance with this history will help us to understand the reasoning behind the violence.
Their humiliating defeat in Vietnam finally convinced the United State military strategies and politicians that guerilla wars, insurrections and revolutions cannot be defeated by conventional armies using conventional military strategies. The mightiest army in the world with well trained personnel, sophisticated weapons, endless bombardment, wholesale massacres, torture and even the notorious napalm bomb could not defeat the Vietnamese insurgents.
Will and determination were on the side of the Vietnamese who kept coming back despite the merciless war of attrition conducted against them. Not only did the US Army lose the minds and hearts of the Vietnamese, they almost lost the minds and hearts of their own citizens.
It was obvious that from the perspective of US military interests that new and imaginative strategies of counter-insurgency would have to be found. Low Intensity Conflict was born out of this search for alternatives, although many of the elements of the new military strategy had been formulated earlier.
In 1952, when General Sir Gerald Templar, the British Military High Commissioner in Malaya, was asked whether he had enough troops to defeat the insurgents in this British colony, he replied: "The answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan People".
In the USA, even before the Vietnam war, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) had begun to develop this "hearts and minds"strategy in their covert operations.
Edward G. Lonsdale, a former advertising executive, was sent to the Philippines as a CIA operative in the fifties to destroy the Huk rebellion by winning the hearts and minds of the people.
He did this by planting informers, recruiting defectors, spreading disinformation and by numerous other "dirty tricks". But most of all he constructed a political alternative in the person of Ramon Magsaysay, a friendly, popular man performs, for peace and for elections. Like F.W. de Klerk?
In the fifties in the Philippines this formula worked. After the Vietnam fiasco this was the formula for counter-insurgency around the world - it was even used a second time in the Philippines when Marcos, the new dictator, lost the minds and hearts of the people.
This approach came to be known as Low Intensity Conflict. It was further developed over the years and its tactics became more and more sinister and violent.
In the days of P.W. Botha we heard a lot about the total onslaught that required a total strategy on the part of the State. The idea and the words came from General Andre Beaufre's book, "An Introduction to Strategy" (Faber 1963) which was based upon his experience of counter-insurgency as a French general in Algeria.
Basically total strategy or total was means "anything goes" - any kind of dirty trick or deception or even terrorism. The argument is that we can only defeat "the enemy" by adopting the methods and strategies they use. Their total onslaught requires a total response. If they lie, we lie; if they kill, we kill; if they plant bombs, we plant bombs; if they destabilise communities we do the same.
The perception of what any particular liberation movement is trying to do may be wrong, but LIC is thought of as giving terrorists a dose of their own medicine with disinformation, sabotage, death squads, hitmen, assassinations, planting bombs in buildings, killing civilians and generally destabilising communities.
The US Army has defined LIC as " a limited political military struggle (which) ranges form diplomatic, economic and psychological pressure through terrorism and insurgency". A former commander of US Special Operations in EI Salvador describes LIC as "total war at the grassroots level"
High Intensity Warfare means a nuclear war. Mid-intensity Warfare means a war with conventional weapons like the war against Iraq. Low Intensity Warfare uses unconventional methods against any kind of "communist" or "terrorist" threat.
LIC is anti-communist. It is a way of destabilising revolutionary movement which are thought to be communist and a way of destabilising governments that have been taken over by communists. In the late started low intensity wars against the new Marxist governments in Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Afghanistan. They trained, armed and supported right-wing guerrilla groups in each country to do the work of destabilisation: Unita in Angola, Renamo or MNR in Mozambique, the Contras in Nicaragua and the Mudjahedin in Afghanistan.
Two very important lessons were learnt from this exercise in Low Intensity Warfare. The first was that the aim of LIC should not be a military victory but destabilisation. Once the country had been thoroughly destabilised and the economy in ruins, the long suffering and war-weary people would quite happy to vote for a pro-Western government in a general election. This happened a short while ago in Nicaragua.
Counter-revolutionary terrorism is far more effective than any amount of propaganda as a way of getting people to vote for peace, reform and moderation.
The second lesson the strategists learnt was that you must use puppets or surrogate armies. You must not introduce a foreign army of occupation. You must no introduce a foreign army of occupation. You must get the people of the same nation to fight the government you want to destabilise. Angolans must fight Mozambicans.
The lessons of the Vietnam war are now clear: don't try to win the war, just your own troops, get the "native" to fight one another.
Finally, LIC terrorism had now become the most effective way of keeping a pro-Western government in power. In countries like Guatemala, EI Salvador, the Philippines and South Africa, LIC is a kind of divide and rule strategy that prevents and effective revolution form the left. Every possible means is used to get the poor to begin fighting one another. This demotivated and confused to organise a liberation struggle against the government. It then becomes possible for the government to pose as the neutral peacemaker.
A variety of means are now being used to instigate internal conflict: vigilantes, gangsters, death squads, agents provocateurs, recruiting mercenaries form the unemployed, exploiting political rivalries and tribal loyalties.
Today the most sophisticated use of LIC to destabilise the left and the communities that might support them is being planned and executed in South Africa.
South Africa's military strategists are very well versed in the theory and techniques of LIC. Many of our generals, including Magnus Malan, studied counter-insurgency in the military academies of the USA. Their links with other military strategists from Chile to Israel are well known.
The generals and the politicians have not only made use of the theory of total strategy and dirty tricks and winning hearts and minds, but they have also gained much experience in the use of death squads, as we learnt from the Harms Commission and numerous other revelations, and in the "art" of destabilising other countries by means of hit squads or surrogate forces like Renamo, Unita and the Lesotho Liberation Army.
By 1989 it had become abundantly clear that these strategies were not working. More subtle forms of counter-insurgency would have to be worked out.
At the beginning of 1990, the new plan began to emerge: abandon the policy of apartheid, unban the opposition, present the National Party as a moderate, reformist party working for peace, improve the image of white South Africa and stop sanctions. But what if the black majority took advantage of the new freedom to rise up and take power? Whether that is likely to happen or not, it represents what whites fear most.
Addressing these fears on March 8. 1992, during the white referendum debate on TV, Hernus Kriel, the Minister of Law and Order, pointed our that since February 2, 1990 the violence has changed from "black on white" to "black on black". Does that mean that there was deliberate strategy not only to stop the ANC's armed struggle, but also to destabilise the black community by instigating internal conflict?
The pattern of violence since the beginning of the 90's is clear. In ICT's booklet on violence, "The New Kairos" published in September 1990, a clear distinction is made between "the causes of the violence and the conditions that make violence possible."
The conditions that are being exploited include political rivalry, tribalism, hostel dwellers and residents, squatters and residents and competing taxi associations. But the instigators of the violence are a "third force" that most commentators and analysts now trace back to the Special Forces of the SADF. Nobody else could orchestrate conflict throughout the country on such a massive scale without being discovered. The operation is now so extensive and so complicated, employing thousands of highly skilled people, planning hundreds of attacks and conspiracies, using vast amounts that it is not longer possible to monitor the operation, left alone stop it.
What still puzzles many commentators, however , is the motive. Are they trying to wreck the negotiations process? Acquaintance with the long history of low intensity conflict as strategy shows that the violence is meant to complement the government's negotiation policy by demotivating demoralising, destabilising and confusing the war-weary people of the township who are then supposed to opt for peace at all costs as they did in Nicaragua, Angola and Mozambique. It has all been very carefully thought out to confuse and frighten everyone.
On February 2, 1990, the security establishment did not abandon the low intensity war that they had been waging against the people for years. They simply adapted it. Sergeant Felix Ndimene claims that his SADF superiors described the new mission of the Special Forces as "a different kind of war". The same people are now busy with a more extensive, more invisible and more destructive war against the people