Submissions

.

INTRODUCTION

4. Strategic Planning in the SADF was based on two main considerations. Firstly the National Security Strategy and secondly the threat perception against the country. For this reason it was decided to present the submission as follows:

a. Summary of the RSA National Security Strategy.

b. The Revolutionary War in South Africa from the Perspective of the SADF.

c. The Organisation, Aim and Functions of the SADF.

d. The Defence Strategy, Planning and Authorisation.

e. Defence Force Operations.

f. "Conclusion".

PART 1

INTRODUCTION

1. The RSA strategy as formulated in Boek 1/Beleid . Die RSA se Belange en die RSA-Regering se doel, doelstellings, en beleid vir ordelike Regering, asook Riglyne vir die uiteindelike Staatkundige bestel van Suider Afrika (1980), was to improve the quality of life for all South Africans. This strategy, which was approved by Cabinet on 4 March 1980, further elaborated the national goals.

a. Political Goal. To ensure self-determination for all population groups in South Africa.

b. Economic Goal. To strive for the optimal combination of economic and social development

c. Social Goal. To further living standards based on religious and cultural principles and equal opportunities for all population groups.

d. Security Goal. To ensure the security of South Africa against any threats. In this regard the RSA's Strategy emphasised that the RSA had no aggressive intentions towards its neighbours, but that the RSA's posture was of an offensive nature and would, through pro-active actions, ensure its national security.

2 The development of the RSA's National Security Strategy was directly influenced by the ANC's strategy of revolutionary warfare and it was expected of the RSA security forces to maintain law and order and create a stable environment in which the RSA Government could bring about evolutionary political change in the country.

THE RSA's NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

3. Mr P.W. Botha became Minister of Defence on 5 April 1966. Whereas his predecessors had been primarily concerned about threats directed against South Africa, Mr Botha's speeches were characterised by a broader vision of security, encompassing the East-West global ideological conflict and South Africa's role in it. Three themes predominated in his speeches: firstly that the West was threatened by Soviet expansionism, secondly that South Africa was part of the West and lastly, that South Africa played a central part in the Soviet strategy of cutting Europe off from South Africa's essential raw materials. In this regard he argued that the Cape Sea Route was of vital importance to the West. Not all Western countries shared his view on Soviet strategy and in December 1967 the British government declined to sell maritime military equipment to South Africa. This led to the establishment of ARMSCOR in 1968 with the aim "to make the country self-sufficient in the field of defence."

4. The Minister of Defence defended his idea of an indirect war. In 1968, he argued that "� in the world we live in, the dividing line between war and peace is generally no longer a clear one, and the South African Defence Force ..must take that situation into account". In 1970 Mr Botha reiterated that "�there (was) a global struggle between the forces of communism on the one hand and the forces of stability, security and progress on the other." He emphasized that the military and economic fronts were but two of the ways in which that onslaught was waged. The struggle for South Africa had to be seen in the same context. The Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, added that the ultimate aim of the communist and leftist powers was not Rhodesia and Mozambique, but what can be taken from South African soil.

5. To counter "the Soviet expansionism" the SA government concluded defensive arrangements with Portugal and Rhodesia. Units of the SA Police were dispatched to Rhodesia in September 1967 : "�to fight against men who originally came from South Africa and were on their way back to commit terrorism in South Africa." Of more practical importance was the fact that these states (Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia) formed an effective buffer against direct foreign intervention by force. The strategy was to keep the "defence line" as far as possible away from South Africa itself.

6. The unexpected coup in Portugal on 25 April 1974 brought the RSA's defence line to its borders and this changed the government's perceptions of security in a very dramatic way. Prime Minister Vorster, with his policy of d�tente, extended a hand of friendship to the newly independent states, but in 1974/5, with the approval of the USA , the SADF joined the civil war in Angola to render assistance to UNITA. Mr Botha explained the excursion into Angola as the willingness of South Africa to shoulder its responsibility as an ally of the free world.

7. On 28 September 1978 Mr P.W. Botha was elected as the RSA's eighth Prime Minister and elaborated the concept of the total onslaught with greater clarity. The 1979 White Paper on Defence recorded "�increased political, economic and military pressure on South Africa�" and expressed concern that "�.the military threat against the RSA is intensifying at an alarming rate". The idea of a total onslaught against South Africa, as "�Moscow's stepping stone to world conquest", became the departure point for security-related government policy:

a. The Steyn Commission Report (1982) stressed that the Soviet Union's aim was world domination. Its methods included subversion, disinformation, psychological war, espionage, diplomatic negotiations, military and economic aid programmes, terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The surrogate forces the Soviets were employing included the ANC, SWAPO, the SACP and other related organisations.

b. Mr Botha said in parliament that "the total onslaught exists in that there is, under Marxist guidance, an onslaught on our institutions which, if they were to be destroyed, would cause chaos in this country. It is in view of this that I advocated a total national strategy...".

8. The threat perception of any country reflects perceived threats in the light of perceived vulnerabilities. In order to safeguard their security, states may either try to reduce their vulnerabilities or reduce or eliminate the perceived threats. South Africa's perception of the threat was characterised by its multidimensional character. The threat was part of a global Soviet strategy for world domination, in which South Africa was one of the targets and in which the aim was the revolutionary overthrow of the South African political, economic and social order, thus isolating the Republic. Although neighbouring countries were not considered to pose a direct military threat to the Republic, the possibility that they could do so in future, was not ruled out, because of an unprecedented build-up of sophisticated conventional armament in those countries. The situation was aggravated by the presence of Soviet, other East Bloc and Cuban forces in the region, particularly in Angola. In addition to the latent conventional threat posed by neighbouring countries, they were also perceived to pose an indirect threat by granting the liberation movements, such as the ANC, training bases or transit facilities in their territories. The ANC was singled out as the main internal revolutionary threat, aided by various countries and organisations. Although the Soviet Union and East Bloc countries were described as the most important supporters of the ANC, certain Western countries were undermining South Africa by lending moral and material support to the anti-RSA revolutionary movements and by applying sanctions against and advocating disinvestment in South Africa. Mr Botha put it as follows : "�there is an attempt, under Marxist leadership, to bring about revolution in Southern Africa, more specifically in the Republic of South Africa. This can no longer be denied. The revolutionary elements are there, and nothing ... can satisfy the hunger of those powers. They want nothing but the overthrow of the present order. They want nothing but the overthrow of the civilisation in this country".

TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY

9. The RSA Government believed that it was confronted by a "total onslaught" and in order to counter it, they had to develop their own total strategy. The need for such a total strategy was identified in the White Paper for Defence: "the process of ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of a state's authority in a conflict situation has, through the evolution of warfare, shifted from the purely military to an integrated national action... the resolution of conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdepartmental and coordinated actions in all fields - military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, and cultural, etc.

10. In parliament it was stressed that the only counter-strategy against a total onslaught with any hope of success is also a total strategy - total resistance must be offered, fragmentary and ad hoc efforts in any sphere would be futile and pointless. The onslaught must be resisted on a national basis in all spheres, by all national groups and inhabitants of the South African subcontinent.

11. This strategy based on principles of self-determination and protection of minorities, Christian values, civilised norms and general welfare provided by a capitalist economy and underwritten by strong security forces were at the foundation of the whole plan. This plan , which had the approval of the highest authority, was based on the fundamental analysis of the enemy's strategy and tried to draw all believers across the colour lines into a united anti-Marxist alliance.

THE NATIONAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

12. In order to formulate a total strategy to counter the total war being waged against the RSA, the State established an organisation for managing the machinery of government. A high degree of orchestration and coordination is required within the body politic in order to ensure integrated joint planning by all the Government Departments involved, which resulted in the formulation of a Total Strategy. This requirement for joint planning led to the rationalisation of the organisation for managing the machinery of government into two main systems, i.e.

a. The Welfare System; and

b. The Security Management System..

STATE SECURITY COUNCIL

13. The SSC was established in terms of the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act, Act 64 of 1972, as a statutory Cabinet Committee with the function of advising the Government on:

a. The formulation of national policy and strategy in respect of the security of the RSA, as well as the implementation of such policy and strategy.

b. Policy regarding the combatting of any specific threat against the RSA.

c. Intelligence priorities.

14. In terms of the Act the SSC would consist of :

a. The Prime Minister (later President) as chairman.

b. The senior Cabinet minister and the ministers of;

i. Foreign Affairs;

ii. Defence;

iii. Justice;

iv. Law and Order, and

c. The Chief of the SADF, the Commissioner of Police and the directors-general of National Intelligence, Foreign Affairs and Justice.

15. Other ministers and officials, who were not statutory members of the Council, were co-opted to attend specific meetings of the Council. The Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, the Minister of National Education and the Minister of Finance were among those co-opted in this way. The SSC was assisted by a Working Committee, which comprised the Secretary of the SSC and the heads of departments represented on the SSC.

16. A permanent secretary to the SSC was first appointed in August 1979. The secretariat was later expanded to include three main sub-divisions, one for strategic planning, one for the co-ordination and evaluation of intelligence and a third for strategic communications. The secretariat of the SSC was responsible to the office of the Prime Minister/President for:

a. The provision of co-ordinated intelligence to the security management system.

b. The co-ordination of strategic planning for national security purposes.

c. Co-ordination of the implementation of national security strategies.

d. Co-ordination of strategic communications.

17. In March 1980, the Cabinet approved the first extensive national strategy, titled, Boek 1/Beleid: Die RSA se Belange en die RSA-Regering se Doel, Doelstellings en Beleid vir Ordelike Regering. This document sets out the philosophy of Total War and Total Strategy. Arising from the threat analysis, the national aims, objectives and policy, as well as the political, economic, social/psychological and security policies for the RSA, the independent homelands and Southern Africa, were clearly defined.

18. It is however important to note that the State Security Council Act only provided the SSC with an advisory function. All recommendations and advice by the SSC were referred to the Cabinet for further action. The SSC had no decision-making powers in its own right. This meant that whereas the SSC was charged with the responsibility for advising the Government on national security matters, the ultimate responsibility was vested in the Cabinet. Any recommendations made by the SSC were subject to final approval by the Cabinet, while the execution of policy was the responsibility of the various government departments as part of their normal line functions.

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

19. The National Security policy defined the following aims and objectives:

a. The establishment of a National Security Management System (NSMS), decentralised to the regional level, based on the doctrine of Total Strategy - the need for co-ordinated action between all departments - to address the multidimensional (total) threat.

b. Maintenance of a policy of non-aggression against any other state or group of states, but with a pro-active posture which could include pre-emptive action against real or potential aggressors to ensure the security of the RSA.

c. Provision of co-ordinated, reliable and evaluated intelligence.

d. Protection of the RSA against any form of external aggression or internal revolution.

f. Involvement of all population groups in the maintenance of law and order and the protection of the RSA. This included a system of national (military) service.

g. Maintenance of a conventional military capability to ensure national security through pro-active steps and self sufficiency in the development and manufacture of armaments, where practically possible.

h. Ensuring orderly government by maintaining the rule of law and protecting the country's borders.

20. This strategy, as well as others that followed later, included the concept of pro-active or forward defence. For this purpose, Africa, south of the equator, was sub-divided into three areas, namely, the vital area (the RSA), the tactical area (the neighbouring states) and the strategic area (countries to the north of the neighbouring states.)

21. The National Security policy made explicit provision for pro-active actions beyond the borders of the RSA, if necessary, for self-defence or pre-emptive purposes.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL AND DEPARTMENTAL STRATEGIES

22. In 1980, the SSC laid down the procedure for the planning and approval of national, interdepartmental and departmental strategies.

a. As the first step, the guidelines for the National Strategy (Total Strategy) were formulated and approved by the SSC. These guidelines formed the nucleus of the Total Strategy.

b. Thereafter, the details of the Total Strategy were developed by inter-departmental committees and working groups with the assistance of the secretariat of the SSC and the Working Committee. The final draft Total Strategy had to be submitted to the SSC for approval, after which it provided the framework for departmental and inter-departmental planning and implementation.

23. The various departments submitted regular progress reports on the implementation of specific strategies. These reports were consolidated by the secretariat and submitted to the SSC, thus enabling the Council to monitor the progress and scope of implementation.

MANIFESTATION OF THE RSA NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: GUIDELINES AND DIRECTIVES

24. The influence of the ANC strategy of revolutionary warfare on the development of the RSA National Security Strategy can clearly be seen in the development/manifestation of this strategy. There is a clear interface/correlation between the development of the ANC strategy and the counter-revolutionary strategy of the RSA Government.

25. The strategy against the ANC, included the following tasks for the SADF:

1. The development of the required military infrastructure for effective counter-insurgency operations.

b. The prevention and suppression of terrorism against the RSA, including military actions against bases and training facilities in neighbouring states.

c. The disruption and immobilisation of ANC operational command structures and centres.

d. Neutralising the propaganda and espionage threat of the ANC to military personnel and installations.

e. The protection of the RSA borders and coastal areas against terrorist infiltration.

f. The protection of national key points against sabotage.

g. Supporting the SA Police in stabilising the internal situation.

26. In the later counter-revolutionary strategy (1986-88), the following three objectives formed the basis of the strategy:

a. That revolutionary organisation and mobilisation had to be halted so as to create a situation of stability and lawfulness in South Africa.

b. Continued revolutionary 'contamination' of the population was to be

prevented through effective government and local administration,

particularly in the major unrest areas.

c. The population had to be influenced to accept and support the national aim of peaceful and evolutionary political change and to combat revolutionary organisations that sought change through violence.

27. Several types of guidelines, directives and strategies were formulated by the SSC and submitted to the Cabinet for approval from 1980 to 1990, and sent to departments for implementation.

a. Boek 1/Beleid: Die RSA se Belange en die RSA-Regering se Doel, Doelstellings en Beleid. (March 1980).

b. SSC Directive no 9, on the implementation of radio propaganda and the neutralisation of hostile radio broadcasts aimed at the RSA.

c. A total strategy for Southern Africa (October 1980).

d. SSC guidelines for the protection of educational institutions (March 1981).

e. A total strategy against the ANC (August 1981).

f. A plan for the construction of (international) border fences (August 1981).

g. A total strategy for Soweto and other black urban areas (September 1981).

h. Total strategies for Lesotho, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Swaziland (November 1981).

i. A total strategy in respect of the role of trade unions in labour unrest (April 1982).

j. SSC guidelines for economic warfare (April 1982).

k. Guidelines for a total strategy against the UDF (October 1983).

l. Revised authorisation procedure for cross-border military operations (October 1985).

m. Revised strategy for Southern Africa (May 1986).

n. National strategy for the Revolutionary Onslaught against the RSA

(December 1986).

o. Revision of the functions of the SSC and the addition of a Cabinet

Committee for Security Affairs (November 1989).

p. Guidelines for future secret and covert actions and special operations (June 1990).

q. Guidelines for a (revised) national security strategy (November 1990).

28. These documents provided the framework for the implementation of security actions. Each department represented in the SSC was responsible for the implementation of the strategies applicable to its particular area of responsibility.

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PART 2

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE

1. The revolutionary war in South Africa lasted for more than forty years but it escalated during the period 1980 - 1990. The main role players were on the one hand the ANC (MK), and to a lesser degree the PAC (APLA), assisted by several mass democratic organisations and on the other the South African Government with its security apparatus, namely the South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defence Force, (SADF).

2. The principal participants on the side of the revolutionaries were

a. the Charterist Alliance comprising the ANC/SACP/COSATU, with Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) as The military wing, and internal front organizations such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and later the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) and SA National Civic Organization (SANCO);

b. the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and its military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA); and

c. the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) and its military wing, the Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA).

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

THE BEGINNING : 1912 - 1958

3. The ANC was established in Bloemfontein in 1912 to fight for the political rights of the black population of South Africa. From 1921 to 1950 the ANC aligned itself with the South African Communist Party (SACP - which was formed in 1921) in several labour disputes and strikes against employers and the SA government. However, it was unsuccessful in making real progress in securing political rights for blacks in South Africa.

4. In 1948 the National Party won the general election and as promised in its election manifesto and after nationwide strikes, the SA Government banned the SACP in 1950. The result was that the party went underground, creating front organisations through which it continued its operations. The most important front organisation was the Congress Alliance, which drafted the Freedom Charter in 1955. In 1958 the ANC incorporated the Freedom Charter into its constitution.

BANNING OF THE ANC AND PAC

5. After the adoption of the Freedom Charter the ANC alliance continued with violent activities. Violent demonstrations and strikes became common as the SACP, the PAC and the ANC cadres were doing their utmost to turn every possible incident into physical confrontation and conflict. In early 1960 both the ANC and the PAC decided to organise an anti-pass law campaign. The response of the security forces to this campaign resulted in the Sharpeville shootings on 21 March 60.

6. The Sharpeville incident reverberated throughout South Africa and around the world. Riots and protest erupted in black townships. On 30 Mar 60 the RSA government declared a state of emergency and enacted the Unlawful Organisations Act , Act No 34 of 1960 which on 8 Apr 60 formalised the banning of both the ANC and PAC.

M-PLAN AND RIVONIA TRAIL

7. After the banning of the ANC and PAC, the command of the ANC developed a strategy which later became known as the M-Plan (named after Mr Nelson Mandela). It was a revolutionary strategy, which made provision for the division of the Black townships into zones, each having a local revolutionary committee appointed by the regional command of the ANC. The M-Plan also made provision for an operation, called " Operation Mayibuye". The aim of this plan was to seize power in the RSA, through acts of violence and sabotage. The second part of the plan defined certain rural areas of the RSA where guerrillas were to trigger a revolution.

8. At a secret meeting in June 1961 the ANC decided to establish an armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) - Spear of the Nation. They purchased a small farm, called Lilliesleaf, from which to conduct "operations", while Mr Mandela visited several countries to gain support for their campaign against the RSA. The first batches of MK recruits left the RSA in July 1962.

9. Before the ANC/SACP could implement the M-Plan, the SAP raided the Lilliesleaf farm on 11 Jul 63 and arrested most of the ANC (MK) leadership. The Rivonia Trial followed, where Messrs Mandela, Sisulu, Goldberg, Mbeki, Mhlaba, Motsoaledi and Mlangeni were found guilty on charges of high treason and sentenced to life imprisonment.

THE MOROGORO CONFERENCE

10. After the Rivonia Trial the ANC, SACP and PAC made attempts to infiltrate3 the RSA via Southern Fhodesia (see Part 1, page 3, para 5). In 1969 the ANC decided that a new strategy was necessary and a conference was held in Morogoro, Tanzania, where the document "Strategy and Tactics of the ANC" was drawn up . It was a document full of optimism for extending the guerrilla war to the classic mobile phase which would lead to the collapse of the SA government. The document spelled out three stages, namely

a. the initial guerrilla phase which would involve acts of armed propaganda, sabotage, landmines and car bombs;

b. the equilibrium phase in which strong MK units would engage the government's forces in mobile warfare, and

c. the third phase, which would culminate in a general offensive which would coincide with the collapse of the the RSA economy, demoralization of the government's security forces and the isolation of the government.

STUDENT UNREST

11. The sixties will be remembered because of worldwide student unrest. The neutralisation of the ANC and PAC inside the country created a vacuum which was filled by a group of Black students who formed a student organisation, called the South African Students' Organisation (SASO). Steve Biko was elected as its first president. This was followed by the establishment of the Black People's Convention in July 1972. Together they formed the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) to carry on with Steve Biko's Black Consciousness Ideology (The Black man's struggle for empowerment.

12. 1976 was characterised by ongoing student unrest in Soweto. The unrest and the death of Steve Biko in detention in 1977 caused a mass of students to join the ANC.

INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES

13. One of the biggest problems facing the ANC was the lack of bases close to the border of the RSA. In 1974 the Portuguese government was overthrown in a coup which led to FRELIMO's accession to power in Mozambique and in Angola of the MPLA, after the collapse of the Alvor Accord and the expulsion of the FNLA and UNITA from Luanda. This development gave the ANC the much-needed bases close to the RSA border.

"PEOPLE'S WAR"

14. In 1978 the ANC leadership began to investigate a new strategy and undertook study tours to many Third World countries. This was followed by a visit of a high-profile delegation (including Messrs Tambo, Mbeki, Hani, Slovo and Modise) to Vietnam to study that country's struggle against the USA. In their report presented to the ANC executive in Luanda, key aspects of the Vietnamese struggle were highlighted, for example "the combination of a political and military struggle, the mobilisation of the whole of the people to fight the enemy; the unity of the internal situation and international solidarity; and the party's leadership role over the armed forces." This was a classic recipe for a "total" revolutionary war.

15. After this visit to Vietnam the ANC formulated a new strategy for a "people's war". Officially it was termed "The Four Pillars of the Revolution - a Strategy for People's War." These pillars were

a. the all-round activity of the underground structures of the ANC;

b. the united mass action of the people (mass mobilisation);

c. the armed offensive, and

d. the international drive to isolate the RSA.

16. The document of the Political-military Committee, Planning for People's War, was drafted in 1983. The National Executive Committee of the ANC approved the document but stated that "we have to be a little more clear about what we mean in practice". Therefore the ANC leadership gave more details about what was meant by this strategy in official ANC publications:

a. In Sechaba it was emphasized that

i. the role of the workers and trade unions will be to bring South Africa's economy to a halt ;

ii. white "anti-apartheid" movements must be created to oppose compulsory military service and the war in Angola ;

iii. the "people's army" must be strengthened so that the ANC "could march in the vanguard of semi-spontaneous mass upsurges", and

iv. the masses must be armed and trained as part-time guerrillas.

b. In The African Communist it was stated that : "by people's war we mean a war in which a liberation army becomes rooted amongst the people who progressively participate actively in the armed struggle both politically and militarily, including the possibility of engaging in partial or general insurrections. The present disparity in strength between the enemy forces and ours determines the protracted nature of the struggle ... such a struggle will lead inevitably to a revolutionary situation in which our plan and aim must be the seizure of power through ... whatever ways might present themselves."

c. In Sechaba it was explained that the goal of transforming the "armed offensive into a people's war remains one that we must pursue with the greatest vigour. Our mass military offensive must aim to increase the number of casualties among the enemy's armed forces, to disperse and reduce these forces, make it increasingly impossible for them to defend themselves and undermine the material-economic base ..."

d. In another article the concept of arming the people was discussed "In other words ... it must become part of a policy to involve more and more armed people as organised contingents in support of our struggle and acting under our leadership."

KABWE CONFERENCE 1985

17. With the influx of new recruits in the late seventies and the new bases in the Frontline States, the ANC decided to hold a conference at Kabwe, Zambia to examine its new strategy. In a report, Commission on Cadre Policy and Ideological Work, the conference recommended that the ANC

a. should establish cores in existing youth organisations;

b. must be in charge of the process; and

c. should educate youth and religious groups and other cultural organisations to translate their beliefs into the rejection of apartheid and to become more involved in the struggle. This was the birth of the concept of people's education - revolution before education.

PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR AND THE FOUR -PILLAR STRATEGY

PILLAR 1 : ALL-ROUND ACTIVITY OF THE UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES AND UNITED MASS ACTION OF THE PEOPLE

18. One of the biggest problems facing the ANC was the lack of bases inside the country. Mr R. Kasrils explained this problem in Sechaba : "�the problem facing us is that the bulk of our army is recruited and trained outside the country, and remains there". It was therefore necessary for the ANC to develop, organise, arm and train MK cadres inside the country to lead the revolution.

19. In the same article Mr. Kasrils outlined the organisation of MK inside the country:

a. Guerrilla units (operating in the rural areas of the RSA).

b. Underground fighting groups (sabotage and assassinations in urban parts of SA).

c. Self-defence Units (SDU-security elements for the ANC cadres and fronts).

20. Other publications outlined the role of the underground as follows :

a. "�(it) links the armed struggle to the masses, popularises the skills of warfare, and prevents professional combatants being isolated."

b. "The underground acquires and transports weapons, spreads the politics of the movement, recruits cadres, observes targets and gathers information."

c. "�(the underground) must plan its actions and ensure that these reinforce and merge with people's mass action."

PILLAR 2 : MASS MOBILISATION

21. The second pillar of the revolutionary strategy, that of mass mobilisation, depended upon the successful implementation of the first pillar. The implementation of the first pillar - that of underground structures - created an environment where the masses cooperated and adhered to the demands of the revolutionary structures. One of these organisations was the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was established on 20 Aug 83 as "a broad front of popular resistance". The UDF claimed that over 700 different groups in South Africa were members of this loose-knit coalition. Although the UDF repeatedly denied that it had any links with the ANC, its political agenda was almost parallel to that of the ANC. The ANC saw the UDF as a political arm of revolution, under one command, focusing on the central question of all revolutions - the question of state power. Because of its involvement in violence, the RSA government declared the UDF an illegal organisation in 1986. In 1989 the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) was formed, which was in fact the old UDF under a new guise. The MDM saw its aim as to deepen the isolation of the regime, maximize unity against it and weaken its ability to resist the struggle for a democratic and non-racial South Africa. The SA National Civics Organisation (SANCO) assumed a large part of the role of the UDF and MDM.

22. During the period 1984 to 1989 members of the ANC's underground saw themselves as the guardians of the revolutionary forces inside the country. According to the M-Plan and the strategy of people's war they created the following:

a. Liberated Zones. These were no-go areas for the police and other administrative functionaries. The aim of this step was to make the country ungovernable and to establish political and para-military control over communities through SDUs and Combat Units and for these areas to serve as safe areas for MK.

b. Alternative structures. After an area had been "liberated", alternative revolutionary structures were instituted. The most prominent alternative structure was civic organisations that were locally based and aimed at mobilizing the people within a specific area around bread and butter issues. Their mass base however, offered a tremendous potential for militant action.

23. The underground structures determined their own disciplinary code where they enforced their will by intimidation and fear - those found buying goods from white-owned shops were forced by the comrades to eat their soap powder or drink their cooking oil. One of the most feared methods of intimidation was the so-called people's courts and the gruesome necklaces where anyone accused of collaborating with the RSA government was sentenced to death by the necklace method. An example of the execution of a so-called collaborator was the necklace murder of councillor Benjamin Kinikini and his sons on 21 March 1985, while a Dutch television crew filmed the incident. Necklacing was a very contentious subject and several comments/statements were recorded, for example :

a. In Sechaba Mr Chris Hani wrote that "the necklace was a weapon ... to remove this cancer (of collaborators) from our society ... to cleanse the townships from the very disruptive and even lethal activities of the puppets and collaborators. I refuse to condemn our people when they mete out their own traditional forms of justice to those who collaborate."

b. "Here (in townships/liberated zones) collaborators and informers live in fear of petrol, either as petrol bombs being hurled at their homes and reducing them to rack and ruin, or as petrol dousing their treacherous bodies which we set alight, and burn them to a charred despicable mess".

c. "We want to make the death of a collaborator so grotesque that people will never think of it."

24. Between 1984 and 1989, 399 people died as a result of necklacing. An additional 372 were burnt to death in their homes or after petrol had been poured over them and they were torched to death. The result of this intimidation was that although a very small part of the country was affected the government decided to stabilise the situation by declaring a partial state of emergency in South Africa in 1985. In 1986 it was extended to a national state of emergency.

25. Armed violence was merely one of many strategies adopted by resistance groups in the RSA between 1976 and 1994. Further actions were also aimed at political, economic, social, educational and psychological bases of society. Over time, however, violent acts were increasingly integrated with other strategies.

26. Armed action by the ANC (MK) and PAC (APLA) against the RSA Government was initially conducted from the RSA's neighbouring states. From the mid-eighties onwards, it also took on a strong internal character.

THIRD PILLAR : ARMED STRUGGLE - THE VIOLENT COMPONENT OF THE REVOLUTION