TRC Final Report

Volume 1

Chapter 8

Subsection 12

The role of the liberation movements

97 As is recounted elsewhere in this chapter, from 1992 ANC structures began calling for a moratorium on the destruction of state records. Already there was a strong suspicion that the state was planning, or had already embarked upon, a process of systematic destruction. In September 1993, the ANC’s Department of Information and Publicity issued a media release in support of Currin’s attempt to stop the destruction of classified records. However, the ANC leadership failed to put the issue on the table during the multi-party negotiation process, and the liberation movements further failed to ensure that it was addressed in the Transitional Executive Council Act (No. 151 of 1993). Moreover, the Transitional Executive Council failed to act in the wake of the Currin settlement - the Council was, in the words of Currin, “just paralysed and didn’t respond”. When the moratoria were introduced in 1995, they came too late. It is also not clear how effectively the moratoria were communicated to and enforced within security establishment structures. Certainly, the NIA continued systematically destroying records of the ex-homelands intelligence services after the introduction of the moratoria, until as late as November 1996. Of course, it could be argued that more decisive intervention by the ANC and the other liberation movements would not have prevented the mass destruction. Nevertheless, this was a lever that, sadly, was never utilised.

■ FINDINGS

98 A clear distinction has been made in this chapter between the routine destruction of state records outside the parameters of the Archives Act which took place before 1990, and the systematic destruction that took place between 1990 1994. The same distinction is made in the following analysis.

The Commission finds that:

99 Before 1990, ‘sensitive’ records were routinely destroyed by state bodies, particularly those within the security establishment. This was based on an assumption that such records fell outside the ambit of the Archives Act, an assumption that was not tested by a state legal opinion until 1991. The assumption was sanctioned by NIS guidelines authorised by the head of state. The protection of state security was the stated objective of these destruction processes, but they went further in ensuring that certain aspects of the inner workings of the apartheid state remained hidden forever.

100 Accountability rests ultimately with the heads of state at the time, although the NIS carries a heavy burden of responsibility for the key role it played in formulating and disseminating the guidelines mentioned above. The SAS is accountable for having failed to uncover the destruction processes.

101 The massive destruction that took place in the period 1990 - 1994 is a different matter. Here the intention, irrespective of legal considerations, was to deny a new government access to apartheid secrets through a systematic purging of official memory. Evidence assembled in this chapter demonstrates that, from at least 1993, this endeavour bore the explicit sanction of Cabinet. To this extent, Cabinet is culpable. However, a number of other parties must share culpability:

a Both the NIS and the SAP Security Branch began purging exercises long before formal Cabinet sanction was secured in 1993.

b The Cabinet-approved destruction guidelines of 1993 were first passed by the State Security Council and originated with the NIS’s internal destruction guidelines.

c In failing to revise its Guidelines for the Protection of Classified Information in the wake of the Currin settlement, the NIS clearly defied the terms of the settlement.

d As custodian of the NSMS records, the NIS failed to take appropriate steps to ensure that a complete set of such records was preserved. In fact, evidence suggests that the NIS played a key role in ensuring that the records were also purged.

e Numerous individual state officials used the cloak provided by the destruction endeavour to destroy or remove documents without authorisation.

102 Other parties must, in turn, be held accountable for their role:

a In 1993, and again in his appearance before the joint investigative team enquiry into the record management of the civilian intelligence service, Mr Johan Mostert maintained that a full set of original NSMS documentation had been preserved. This documentation had, however, been purged in over ten years of routine destruction. Mr Mostert, who appeared in his capacity as former head of the Security Secretariat, said that he recommended the destruction of certain categories of state records. In his sworn affidavit to the Commission, to which reference has already been made, he acknowledged “sole responsibility for the content of the letter” which was sent to all director-generals in the public service.

b SAS must be held accountable for the indecisive and ineffective steps it took

to halt the destruction endeavour.

c The liberation movements failed to exercise all the leverage at their disposal in acting against the endeavour.

103 Although these activities fall outside the Commission’s mandate period, the NIA was still destroying records systematically as late as November 1996, in defiance of two government moratoria on the destruction of state records. Culpability rests with the officials directly responsible, but the Agency’s top management must be held accountable.

104 The mass destruction of records outlined above has had a severe impact on South Africa’s social memory. Swathes of official documentary memory, particularly around the inner workings of the apartheid state’s security apparatus, have been obliterated.

105 Moreover, the apparent complete destruction of all records confiscated from individuals and organisations by the Security Branch of the SAP has removed from our heritage what may arguably have been the country’s richest accumulation of records documenting the struggle against apartheid.

106 Clearly, the work of the Commission suffered as a result. Numerous investigations of gross human rights violations were hampered by the absence of documentation. Ultimately, of course, all South Africans have suffered the consequences - all are victims of the apartheid state’s attempted imposition of a selective amnesia.