TRC Final Report

Volume 2

Chapter 6

Part Part2

Subsection 2

■ INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS

The cause of the fire

10 Nothing in the cargo inventory could have resulted in a "self- promoted" fire. However, the original cargo manifests were not part of the record of the Margo Commission, and it is uncertain whether those in the possession of the Commission are authentic. There is therefore no reliable list of what cargo was being transported by the Helderberg when it crashed.

11 It was suggested to the Commission that Armscor may have had a goods consignment on the Helderberg that could have been responsible for causing the fire. Armscor conducted an internal investigation after the incident and denies having had any items on the flight.

12 The Commission believed that two Armscor employees from the company Somchem, which was producing rockets and missiles during the apartheid years, could provide important information. Armscor could not assist the Commission in locating either Dr JJ Dekker, who was the MD of Somchem, or Mr François Humphries, who was procurement officer at the time.

13 Interviews with SAA pilots indicated that there was a belief amongst pilots that passenger flights were frequently used to transport armaments and components for Armscor.

The timing of the fire

14 Much time has been spent attempting to determine the exact time the fire broke out. The conclusion reached by the Margo Commission was that the fire started just before the descent to land in Mauritius.

15 This conclusion is questionable because of the fact that there is no overlap between the conversation of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR, commonly known as the black box) and the conversations between the Helderberg and Mauritius air control an hour before the crash and again four minutes before the crash. This could indicate that the CVR stopped recording before the descent for landing, and the recorded conversation could therefore have taken place at any time on the nine-hour flight from Taipei.

16 The conversation on the CVR was analysed by the Flight Engineers Association, which concluded that the discussion was likely to have taken place within three hours of the flight leaving Taipei. This would indicate that something stopped the recording at this early stage of the flight. The flight engineers presented the Margo Commission with a submission indicating that they believed there had been two fires on board.

17 The Margo Commission ruled most of the CVR recording inadmissible because it was irrelevant and too personal. Analysts have argued that this decision by Justice Margo prevented his commission from accurately placing the conversation and may therefore have led to incorrect conclusions.

18 The theory of two fires on board was impossible to test adequately, since the recording of the conversations between the Helderberg and South African air traffic control went missing shortly after the incident and was never recovered.

In a letter to the Commission, a United States marine said that the CIA had a recording of this conversation. The Commission wrote to the director of the CIA asking him to confirm this and to make a copy available. No response was received.

The fire

19 The Margo Commission did not find a cause for the fire on board the Helderberg, but said that it might have been caused by "ordinary packaging material". This Commission's investigation indicates that ordinary packaging material is unlikely to have been the cause, for the following reasons:

• The fire was contained, and burnt fiercely at a high temperature.
• A packaging material fire causes a great deal of smoke, which would have set off the smoke alarms before the fire threatened the structure of the plane. The indications are that the smoke detectors were not activated until the fire had reached dangerous proportions.
• A promoted fire could reach very high temperatures (far in excess of 1000 degrees Celsius) without setting off smoke alarms.
• A promoted fire could cause packaging materials to catch alight if they were to be exposed to the flames.

20 The possibility of a "self-promoted" fire is raised in a submission to the Margo Commission by Mr Greg Southeard, a chemist working for Burgoyne and Partners of the United Kingdom. Southeard indicated that he believed that the fire could have been caused by an incendiary device or a hazardous substance.

21 The director of civil aviation, Mr Japie Smit, told this Commission that most of such fires the world over are caused by illegal substances on board, and said that, when they simulated the fire, they were unable to put it out without the assistance of the fire brigade.

22 A letter from a Somchem employee to a journalist working on the matter stated that:

South Africa's ammonium perchlorate (APC) production facility was set up in the 1970s at Somchem. Around the time of the Helderberg crash, South Africa was involved in military operations in Angola, Namibia and on the home front. The operational demand for solid rocket fuels was high. Somchem was not keeping up with the demand. A decision was made to double the capacity. This involved shutting down the plant for the duration of the extensions.

Because of the ongoing demand, it was impossible to stockpile APC prior to the shutdown. Obviously a large quantity of APC had to be sourced outside the country for a period of several months in defiance of prevailing military sanctions. This was difficult and expensive, and I believe that initially the necessary APC was sourced from America and that it was brought in on SAA passenger planes as an integral part of the necessary deception (Commission's summary).

23 Ammonium perchlorate is used mainly in military Class One applications, and as such is forbidden on all aircraft. Class Five, for commercial/technical application, could be carried by air in limited quantities depending on the type of aircraft (passenger or cargo) and packaging instruction. Supplier countries include the United States, China, Japan and France.

The investigation

24 Questions raised throughout the investigation process indicated that the investigators of the Margo Commission had not followed correct procedures. The matters raised are summarised in the finding below.

■ CONCLUSION

25 This Commission's investigation into the Helderberg crash raised significant questions about the incident itself as well as the subsequent investigations that were conducted.

26 The matter is still under investigation by the special investigation team of the Gauteng Attorney-General.

THIS COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION INTO THE CRASH OF THE HELDERBERG ON 28 OCTOBER 1987 SHOWED THAT MANY QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS REMAIN UNANSWERED, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

• THE DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION (DCA) NEGLECTED TO SECURE ALL DOCUMENTATION AND RECORDINGS AS REQUIRED BY THE FLIGHT ENGINEERS ASSOCIATION [FEA] REGULATIONS: THE CARGO MANIFESTS WERE MISSING.
• MR JIMMY MOUTON OF THE FEA ALLEGES THAT THE FEA WAS REQUESTED BY THE LAWYER ACTING FOR THE DCA, AS WELL AS BY JUSTICE MARGO HIMSELF AT A LATER STAGE, TO WITHDRAW ITS SUBMISSION INDICATING THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN TWO FIRES ON BOARD.
• THE TAPE WHICH WOULD HAVE RECORDED CONTACT BETWEEN THE HELDERBERG AND SPRINGBOK RADIO CONTROL REMAINS MISSING.
• EYEWITNESSES OF THE CRASH WERE NOT CALLED TO GIVE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE MARGO COMMISSION.
• THE MARGO COMMISSION DID NOT CALL MEMBERS OF ARMSCOR TO GIVE EVIDENCE.

27 It is clear that further investigation is necessary before this matter can be laid to rest.