TRC Final Report

Volume 3

Chapter 3

Subsection 17

Deaths in custody

118 Numerous reports of torture and deaths in detention were received, particularly from the Newcastle area. Newcastle was an MK gateway to Swaziland and Mozambique and the Security Branch intensified its operations in Newcastle in an attempt to obstruct the movement of operatives in and out of the country. It was also a centre of strong student and union resistance. A number of student activists and unionists were detained and tortured by members of the Newcastle Security Branch during 1986 and 1988 [KZN/FS/205/NC, KZN/FS/203/NC]

119 Deaths in custody were also reported from other urban centres, amongst them, Mr Ephraim Thami Mthethwa [KZN/ZJ/146/DN, KZN/NG/020/DN], who died on 25 August 1984 in the Durban Central Prison after 165 days in custody awaiting trial on charges relating to his alleged attempts to leave the country for military training. Mthethwa was alleged to have committed suicide by hanging himself with his tracksuit jacket. He was twenty-three years old at the time.

The Case of Bongani Cele

Lamontville UDF activist Bongani Cele [KZN/NG/031/DN] was constantly harassed by the police in 1987 and went into hiding. Police approached his brother S’khumbuzo [KZN/NNN/094/PM], assaulted him and forced him to point out where Bongani was hiding. Bongani was taken into detention. Later police brought Bongani, heavily chained, to his house to point out where he had allegedly hidden weapons. On 9 July 1987, his family was informed that he had been shot dead by police officers allegedly acting in self-defence. According to the police, Bongani had attempted to pull a pin from a grenade. However, the post mortem report indicated that Bongani had been shot in the back at very close range while his feet and hands were chained. No one was ever prosecuted in connection with the death.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE SAP MADE ROUTINE USE OF ASSAULT AND SEVERE TORTURE AS PART OF A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN TO SILENCE AND SUPPRESS OPPONENTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. THE ACTS OF SEVERE ILL TREATMENT PERPETRATED BY MEMBERS OF THE SAP CONSTITUTE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. IN SOME INSTANCES, THESE UNLAWFUL ACTS RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF DETAINEES. THE SAP IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED TO THESE ACTS.

Public order policing

120 The introduction of an auxiliary force of special constables during this period was seen as a means of bolstering the work of the SAP in combating the rising militancy of the UDF in the province’s townships. It was also part of a strategy employed by the state to remove ‘white faces’ from the front line of public order policing of the conflict brewing between Inkatha and the UDF at the time.

121 At a section 29 hearing, the Commission heard that former SAP Captain Brian Mitchell, based in the Natal Midlands, understood the special constables to be a vital element of the state’s strategy. Mitchell described the special constables as the ‘third force’ in the Midlands area; their sole purpose was offensive deployment against UDF supporters and for the support and assistance of Inkatha.

122 In 1988, some 300 Inkatha recruits were trained and deployed as special constables in the Pietermaritzburg area. The Commission has established from sworn testimonies of former special constables that Inkatha membership appeared to be a criterion for selection in Natal. Inkatha officials and indunas (headmen) assisted in recruiting the young men and endorsed their applications. Mr William Basil Harrington [AM0173/96], a member of Riot Unit 8, told the Commission that he worked closely with special constables and that those based in Pietermaritzburg had their applications for employment signed by Inkatha leader, Mr David Ntombela.

123 This drawing of special constables from the ranks of Inkatha supporters confirmed the open collaboration of the state security forces with the activities of Inkatha. In Natal, the special constables constituted a convenient and effective striking force for the state and for Inkatha against the UDF alliance. Between 1988 and 1989, special constables played a role in bolstering Inkatha in the greater Pietermaritzburg area, particularly in the Edendale Valley, KwaShange and other sections of Vulindlela.

124 In January 1988, the first batch of Natal recruits, numbering approximately 300 Inkatha supporters, was taken for special constable training at the SAP’s Koeberg base in the Western Cape. The batch included 130 ‘Caprivi trainees’ who had already received secret offensive training by the SADF’s Special Forces in 1986. During their training at Koeberg, they were shown gruesome videos of burning houses and brutally slain people and were told by their instructors, one of whom was Warrant Officer Rolf Warber of the Pietermaritzburg Security Branch, that the scenes were typical of ANC/UDF violence against innocent Inkatha members, their ‘brothers and sisters’. Special constables testified that they cried openly at the sessions and were urged to kill UDF people on their return to Natal. After six weeks of training, the special constables were attached to SAP Riot Units and deployed in the Pietermaritzburg and Mpumalanga areas where the UDF was gaining the upper hand. Many special constables were sent to guard Inkatha officials and traditional leaders and became involved in vigilante and hit squad activities.

125 Former ‘Caprivi trainee’ and special constable Brian Gcina Mkhize [AM4599/97], told the Commission at the Caprivi hearing:

Mr [MZ] Khumalo told us that our task is to infiltrate the Special Constables, to go and get deployed with the Special Constables who work in Pietermaritzburg. While in 'Maritzburg, we will be able to further our aims to hit directly at the ANC.

126 At the same hearing, Mr Daluxolo Luthuli said of the special constables:

As they were police, they knew very well that they have to work under the instructions of the IFP, for example, killing people who were UDF members. They were doing that while they were police and they were not taking instructions from police … they were taking instructions directly from the IFP.

127 The special constables deployed in the townships around Pietermaritzburg soon became associated with acts of extreme criminal brutality. In the first year of their deployment in the Pietermaritzburg area, 137 special constables had their services terminated. Of these, 102 deserted their posts and the remainder was dismissed as a result of criminal charges that were brought against them.

128 Former Security Branch Divisional Head for Pietermaritzburg, General Jac Buchner, conceded at a section 29 hearing that the special constables, far from assisting the SAP in maintaining law and order, had in fact contributed to the problem of political violence. Senior Riot Unit officer, Daniel Meyer, told the Commission at the ‘Seven Day War’ hearing that:

I don’t think it’s a state secret that Special Constables was one of the single biggest mistakes made by the police in KwaZulu-Natal.

129 He conceded that the special constables had not been deployed under proper control and that Riot Unit members operating with special constables engaged in serious criminal acts.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT AN AUXILIARY FORCE OF SPECIAL CONSTABLES WAS TRAINED AND THEN DEPLOYED IN AND AROUND PIETERMARITZBURG IN 1988–89, AND THAT THIS FORCE BECAME INVOLVED IN VIGILANTE ACTIONS AND OTHER CRIMINAL ACTS, INVOLVING KILLINGS AND ACTS OF SEVERE ILL-TREATMENT, TARGETING MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE UDF UNDER THE DIRECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE RIOT SQUAD OF THE SAP. THE SAP IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE VIOLATIONS ARISING FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL CONSTABLES.