TRC Final Report

Volume 3

Chapter 3

Subsection 35

226 By the beginning of the 1990s, the conflict had spread to rural areas which – apart from some ‘faction fighting’ – had escaped much of the political turbulence and violence of the preceding decades. The political struggle was taken to the rural areas by unionised workers and youth. Many of the rural youth had attended township schools where they were exposed to the ANC and to political activism. Back home, they directed attacks at IFP-supporting chiefs and local councillors whom they labelled as non-representative, non-democratic and, in some cases, corrupt. They questioned the decision-making processes under the tribal system and developed a general disrespect for and rejection of tribal officials. Violence was perceived as a way to replace autocratic tribal institutions with democratic structures.

227 IFP-supporting chiefs who lost their lives in the conflict included Chief J Ndlovu from Ixopo, Chief Duma from Donnybrook, Chiefs Memela and Molefe, both from Bulwer and Chiefs Nyela Dlamini and Majozi, both from Richmond. The IFP’s submission to the Commission lists more than twenty indunas (headmen) who died in political conflict.

228 In 1990, three IFP residents of Mahwaqa ward, Mtwalume (South Coast), successfully secured a court interdict restraining their chief, Bhekizizwe Luthuli, and his supporters from threatening, intimidating, destroying their properties or engaging in any unlawful attacks on any persons resident in Mahwaqa ward [Case no 3046/90]. In their affidavits, Chief Luthuli was cited as the main aggressor who mobilised and led his amabutho to attack their homes on 3 March 1990 – leading to the destruction of more than 200 houses belonging to ANC supporters. Chief Luthuli was alleged to have ordered his people to kill all UDF children in his area. He was also alleged to have led armed men in three consecutive attacks at Mahwaqa between 23 and 25 March 1990, in which eleven people were killed.

229 On 14 September 1991, the ANC and IFP were party to the signing of the National Peace Accord, binding themselves to adopt certain procedures and to change the strategies and tactics currently employed by their supporters. In practice, however, the Peace Accord did little to change the situation.

230 The Peace Accord made provision for the establishment of “voluntary associations or self-protection units in any neighbourhood to prevent crime and to prevent any invasion of the lawful rights of such communities” (clause 3.7.1). It stated unequivocally that “all existing structures called self-defence units shall be transformed into self-protection units” (clause 3.7.6) and that “no party or political organisation shall establish such units on the basis of party or political affiliation, such units being considered private armies” (clause 3.7.2). In reality, neither of these clauses was adhered to. The ANC continued to use the term ‘self-defence unit’ (SDU) to describe its paramilitary, community-based ‘defence’ units, while the IFP adopted the term ‘self-protection unit’ (SPU) in place of previous terms such as tribal policemen or community guards.

231 ANC-aligned SDUs emerged in the mid-1980s following a decision by the external mission of the ANC to become more involved in internal politics. The SDUs underwent formal paramilitary training under MK, primarily outside South Africa’s borders. Informal training was conducted in a number of local communities as well as in the Transkei. The ANC gave arms and assistance selectively to areas hardest hit by violence, such as the Transvaal and Natal. The SDUs also drew upon community resources to arm and sustain themselves. The Commission heard that arms were also procured for some ANC-aligned union leaders. Amnesty applicant Alexander Erwin⁴³ [AM6091/97] told the Commission that in 1988 he was in command of a defence operation for NUMSA leaders in the province. Weapons procured under his command were used in offences committed in various places around the province.

232 The SDUs were most organised in the townships/urban areas. They were composed largely of radicalised youth, many of whom had abandoned their education and chosen to rebel against their elders and the local authorities. The militaristic and highly politicised nature of the SDUs bred a culture of violence and lawlessness, which was especially harmful to impressionable township youth. This led to many of the SDUs turning into criminal gangs. In some Natal communities, the SDUs became uncontrollable and unaccountable to the residents. Internal divisions and conflict became a feature of SDU activity, particularly in rural communities where the ANC was less organised.

233 In September 1993, the IFP and KLA embarked on what was to be the biggest training project of IFP supporters yet. The SPU training project was based at the Mlaba camp near Mkhuze in Northern Natal. By April 1994, over 5 000 IFP supporters had received so-called self-protection training at the Mlaba camp (as well as at the Emandleni-Matleng camp).

234 By mid-1993 the province had become a jigsaw puzzle of party political strongholds and ‘no-go’ areas. Townships and tribal authorities were divided into ANC and IFP sections. Arson attacks, involving the widespread burning of houses, became a means of forcing residents to flee their homes, thereby facilitating the consolidation of a party stronghold. The incidence of such attacks increased dramatically in the period leading up to the national elections in 1994, affecting the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. The Commission heard evidence to the effect that supporters of the IFP were overwhelmingly responsible for pursuing this means of eradicating their opposition.

235 Mr Fred Kockett, a journalist who spent five years reporting on the Natal violence, described it as follows⁴⁴:

In the townships, people are confronted with violence at every turn. On their way to work, at work, in the city, at home, at play, at weddings, [at funerals and night vigils], at community meetings, in their beds at night. Life in the townships, never normal under Apartheid, was now very abnormal. Coping with threats or the death of a friend had become as habitual for residents of the townships as it was for people in suburbia to lock their front door security gates when they left home each day.

236 These conditions remained unchanged until a few days before the April 1994 national elections when the IFP, which had maintained a policy of non-participation, agreed to contest the elections.